

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



Annex K U.S. Government Structures, Processes, and Authorities

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**ANNEX K: USG STRUCTURES, PROCESSES, AND AUTHORITIES
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ANNEX K: U.S. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, PROCESSES, AND AUTHORITIES

Unity of Effort results from effectively linking individual actions to a shared understanding of the problem and shared goals across organizational boundaries. Unity of effort requires clarity in authorities and reporting chains, which exist in four levels in national security operations: command and control within individual U.S. Government (USG) department/agencies; integration between USG departments/agencies, who must ultimately be accountable to the same entity; coordination between USG and bilateral/multilateral partners; and alignment to the greatest extent possible with host nations and international non-governmental organizations.

1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Unity of effort is essential to addressing national security issues that are by nature complex and dynamic: there is no single agency solution, no single “right” answer as to what the challenge is, and no single strategy that will endure over time to solve it. Our current national security challenges – violent extremist organizations, Iran, Arab-Israeli conflict, the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, proliferation of WMD, the global financial crisis, weak and failing states – are *highly* dynamic and complex because of the number of actors involved and the speed at which the environment changes.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

¹ “Whole-of-government” is phrase used to indicate an approach that includes the perspectives and capabilities of all of the relevant departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) A detailed list of recommendations is included at the end of this report. The structure, process, and authority issues specific to sub-regions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arabian Peninsula are explored in USCENTCOM Assessment Team (CAT) sub-regional reports and the Command and Control/Knowledge Management Annex.

2. (U) PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

(U) This report was completed by the CAT over a 100 day period from November 2008 to February 2009. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the USCENTCOM area of interest, a review of existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and suggested actions for USCENTCOM in the context of an illustrative plan for the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of coalition partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve policy goals.

(b)(1)1.4a

The Team consisted of members from across civilian and military agencies/departments of the USG, as well as Coalition Partners. The team analyzed prior and ongoing ad hoc efforts to enhance unity of effort in the USG in states/regions such as Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, consultations throughout the AOR, as well as the numerous studies and reports on national security reform completed leading up to the 2008 U.S. Presidential elections.

3. (U) SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

(U) This assessment looks at the current state of structures, processes, and authorities that create unity of effort from several perspectives: internal to the USG, including between USCENTCOM and other USG agencies; within USCENTCOM; and between the USG and external partners. Challenges specific to sub-regions are addressed in CAT Sub-regional Reports and the Command and Control/Knowledge Management Annex.

(U) Unity of effort is essential to addressing national security issues that are by nature complex and dynamic: there is no single agency solution, no single “right” answer as to what the challenge is, and no single strategy that will endure over time to solve it.

(U) Recognition of the requirement for unity of effort has led in recent years to NATO’s adoption of the Comprehensive Approach, the United Nation’s Integrated Mission Planning Process, creation of multi-departmental offices to address stabilization in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, creation of ad hoc USG integrated structures for Iraq and Afghanistan, and development of a system and supporting processes under National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” and more recently Title XVI of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. Recent studies, including the Project on National Security Reform, have analyzed current challenges and proposed significant changes to the USG to increase unity of effort,³ in part to address the challenge that civilian and military components have no common chain of command beneath the Office of the President.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

³ The Project on National Security Reform’s final report can be found at <http://www.pnsr.org>. Other related studies include the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s *Hard Lessons*, which can be found at <http://www.sigir.mil>.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)


(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

⁴ The Interagency Management System was approved by Deputies in March 2007. Based on best practices, it creates integrated planning processes, joint interagency field deployments, and a joint civilian operations capability including shared communications and information management. There are four components – a Washington Interagency Policy Committee with an interagency staff, an Integration Planning Cell at the appropriate military headquarters, an Advance Civilian Team at the Embassy/field headquarters, and Field Advance Civilian Teams at the sub-national level.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

4. (U) *Incentives and Leadership.* There is currently no requirement for USG personnel in DoD, USAID, or DoS to serve in other national security agencies for promotion. The vast majority of foreign assistance funding is earmarked for specific activities or agency-specific accounts, and Congressional oversight and appropriation committees mirror agency divides and tend to reinforce agency-specific solutions and incentive structures. Finally, there is a limited pool of senior leaders and mentors, particularly civilians, with experience running large organizations in crisis environments and a nuanced understanding of USG agency capabilities and cultures.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

- A recent assessment of foreign aid by three former USAID Administrators described the organizational structure and statutes governing U.S. foreign aid policy as “chaotic and

⁵ Epstein, Susan B. and Matthew C. Weed. “Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations.” *Congressional Research Service* 7-5700, pg.7.

⁶ For additional information on FMS, FMF, IMET current systems and authorities, see the Building Partnership Capacity report.

⁷ American Academy of Diplomacy, “A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future,” October 2008.

⁸ Brookings Institution, *Foreign Assistance: Reinventing Aid for the 21st Century*, Testimony by Lael Brainard before the House Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, January 23, 2008.

incoherent due to 20 years of neglect.”⁹ The myriad of authorities and restrictions includes those on security sector assistance (e.g., police, military, demobilization) in Titles 10 and 22. There is also no national or international legal framework enabling interdiction of shipments of proliferation concern, seizure of cargo, and their disposition.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) USCENTCOM Command and Control

(U) The USCENTCOM AOR is geographic space designated in the Unified Command Plan. This construct assigns the USCENTCOM Commander the responsibility for all military activities, forces, and operations within this space. This geographic designation creates specific seams that require additional coordination and complicate command and control of forces and operations between adjoining AORs. Examples are seams with U.S. Pacific Command (India-Pakistan-Afghanistan), U.S. European Command (NATO, Israel-Arab), and Africa Command (Somalia and pirates).

(U) Additionally the USCENTCOM staff is organized using a traditional Napoleonic staff construct (J1-8 with special staff). Several ad hoc staff elements have been developed to support contingency planning needs (Coalition Cooperation Center, Combined Planning Group, Joint Interagency Coordination Group, etc) and are embedded in directorates. Two of these have robust coalition participation: the Coalition Coordination Center and the Combined Planning Group in J5. Limited participation by coalition staff is allowed in other directorate activities.

(U) USCENTCOM executes command and control of military operations, forces and activities within the UCP established geographic space using:

- Five component commands assigned to support CENTCOM in the Forces For document (ARCENT, MARCENT, NAVCENT, AFCENT, and SOCCENT);
- Two operational commands established by orders to direct contingency operations within Iraq and Afghanistan (MNF-I and USFOR-A); and
- One operational command focused on execution of specific operations using designated Special Operations Forces (Tactical Control (TACON) only).

(U) These component commands are executing significantly increased responsibilities in both scope and volume across the AOR, and there is significant friction caused by overlapping responsibilities or gaps in responsibilities and a lack of capacity.

- Command and control (C2) has evolved over time by creating new organizations (CJTF-7, MNF-I, MNC-I, CFC-A, USFOR-A, etc) and assignment of functions or missions (JRSOI to ARCENT, consequence management to NAVCENT, Lebanon training to ARCENT, etc.) or with the introduction of organizations in to the theater (JSOC, CJSOTFs, etc.) as a need appears. These evolving solutions were rarely established and resourced prior to the identified need, continue to be under resourced or have no long-term resource stream, and often conflict

⁹ Atwood, J. Brian, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios. “Arrested Development, Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, no. 6 (November/December 2008), pp. 123-132.

with other missions occurring within assigned geographic space. These solutions are also often reached through compromise to address competing desires between supported and supporting organizations. This dynamic affects timeliness of response, unity of effort, level of response, and the level of support.

- Coordination between adjoining geographic combatant commands (GCCs) and functional combatant commands (COCOMs) is done through a series of ad hoc elements created to address contingency coordination or through the use of a series of temporarily assigned liaison officers (LNOs). Some organizations such as TRANSCOM and DLA/DESC have taken steps to formalize these as long term requirements and resourcing them but this is the exception. Coordination between COCOMs generally occurs along informal lines with a focus on issue resolution.
- Newly created organizations often face immediate resource challenges because of the lack of formally approved manning documents and resource streams. Expectations of these elements are immediate but resourcing often lags behind the initial creation of the headquarters. This places burdens on existing organizations to continue the assigned tasks without requisite authority and resources, and often strips existing resources from those organizations to meet manning and funding requirements. This saps the energy of the new headquarters from performing critical operational missions. The designation of USFOR-A without a fully developed and resources manning document is the most recent example.

(U) USCENTCOM uses operational level commands (i.e. ARCENT, AFCENT, MNF-I) to address mission requirements in the AOR. There are no commands designated to plan and manage operational activities (as opposed to theater strategic level planning and activities) outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Even within this assigned operational space, different commands conflict trying to execute assigned responsibilities. Examples include:

- Assignment of C2 responsibilities within Afghanistan to different operational commands without assigning an overarching responsibility for synching all U.S. activities within the battlespace;
- Assignment of C2 for missions within the USCENTCOM AOR to different operational commands without assigning an overarching responsibility for synching all US activities within a geographic space (sub regions). Host nations within the region often complain about the number of different operational level commands that approach them on different issues within their country on behalf of USCENTCOM. No one organization is designated as the operational level command to synch operational activities within sub regions designated in the Theater Strategy. Even the maritime space is not designated as a separate and assigned sub region and assigned to a specific operational level commander.
- Logistics coordination occurs along service lines at the operational level and does not provide a mechanism for rapid coordination of logistics support at the operational and tactical level for joint and coalition forces. This is especially noticeable in executing logistics support for special operations forces (SOF) that depend on service component support for their operations.

(U) The USCENTCOM staff is also not optimally organized to advance planning, execution, and assessment of its Theater Strategy and Campaign Plan. Although planning organizations have evolved to address the development of sub-regional or country action plans, little to no staff reorganization has occurred to ensure rapid implementation and assessment of these planning efforts and the incorporation of coalition staff members or elements such as the Combined Planning Group into staff

organizations or processes. This minimizes the ability of very capable coalition staff members from contributing, hinders rapid staff execution of key priority efforts, and causes significant staff friction because of unclear staff lead and support for product development, implementation, and assessment.

(U) Furthermore, responsibility to deal with non-lethal problems is spread across a number of different USCENTCOM directorates with limited coordination.

- The Intelligence Directorate (J-2) is responsible for identifying up and coming issues that could affect the achievement of USCENTCOM's strategic objectives. However, the Directorate has limited capabilities to analyze non-lethal intelligence within a broader development, economic, governance context to make informed decision on what is important and what isn't.
- The Plans and Strategy Directorate (J-5) is responsible for integrating development, economic and governance elements in the formulation of country and theater wide strategies. J-5 planners, while well trained in the Military Decision Making Process, often have limited substantive experience in non-military planning processes or substantive skill sets like macroeconomic theory and policy, agriculture economics and development, health and education administration and service delivery. The foreign area officers in the J-5 focus on aspects of security assistance. They generally lack the training and experience to conduct interagency coordination to specifically address civilian considerations.
- The Operations Directorate (J-3), responsible for translating strategy into country and sub-regional operational plans, works with other USG agencies through the Joint Interagency Task Force on Irregular Warfare (IATF-IW). These efforts tend to be at the tactical level (e.g., counternarcotics and threat financing). Efforts to integrate civilian and military planning often lack senior leadership support and institutional processes.

(U) United States Government Coordination with Coalition Partners

1. (U) *Common planning processes.* Generally, the USG and its key coalition partners lack a shared understanding of the nature of the problem, a common set of goals/objectives and metrics for success. The main driver for coordination is at the political level either on a bilateral basis reaching agreed positions or through higher level multilateral talks (e.g., the RC-S strategy meetings between Secretaries of Defense of U.S., U.K., Canada and Netherlands); these mechanisms are often insufficient to effectively align U.S. and Coalition goals and implementation.

2. (U) *Personnel.* Development of greater understanding among USG personnel of partner nations' cultures, interests and domestic political constraints on policy would improve coordination. The United States spends a great deal of time studying enemies but less time studying friends. Unity of effort can be enhanced through personnel exchanges, training, and education.

3. (U) *Structures.* Honest and open exchanges of information on the nature of the problem and identification of common interests and objectives would enable unity of effort. NATO and the UN provide forums for this exchange, but are hampered in operational effectiveness by their consensus-based processes. The USCENTCOM Coalition Coordination Center, Multi-national Forces-Iraq, and other ad hoc/operation-specific international structures (such as the Contact Group formed for Kosovo, and the Haiti UN Core Group) have positively impacted international unity of effort.

(U) Conclusion

(U) In conclusion, effectively addressing highly complex national security challenges requires that we:

1. Understand the nature of the situation;
2. Determine U.S. interests and how they are affected by the situation;
3. Assess prior/current U.S. and other external player's actions and their effectiveness at reaching U.S. policy goals;
4. Establish realistic and achievable U.S. policy goals for the operation;
5. Comprehensively consider all of the U.S. and partner capabilities and resources;
6. Forge a strategy and implementation plan to achieve U.S. policy goals that best aligns capabilities with requirements and effectively balances short and longer-term goals;
7. Implement; and
8. Monitor progress, validate assumptions, and revise goals and strategy as necessary.

(U) In addition, strategies and implementation plans are only as good as the organizational structures, authorities, and processes that:

1. Prepare our people through joint pre-deployment training and education,
2. Unify the application of all U.S. and partner capabilities on the ground, effectively coordinate with our partners, and harmonize with host nations and non-governmental actors, and
3. Assess and learn.

(U) This report makes several recommendations as to how USCENTCOM can enhance unity of effort and increase the effectiveness of the USG.

4. (U) PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) STRATEGIC GOALS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

6. (U) **OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION** (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

7. (U) **LINES OF EFFORT** (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

8. (U) **RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION** (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

9. (U) **RISK AND MITIGATION** (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

10. (U) **CONCLUSIONS** (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

11. (U) **RECOMMENDATIONS**

(U) Policy Context. USCENTCOM should advocate for the establishment of higher level strategic policy documents, planning processes and structures to provide strategic context for USCENTCOM planning efforts.

- Recommendation: The White House/NSC should issue annual national planning guidance clearly establishing interagency national security planning priorities (“Priority National Security Plans”), and transparent guidance on how agencies can petition for additions/deletions of issues from priority planning list. The planning guidance would be a companion to the National Security Strategy.
- Recommendation: The White House/NSC should require bi-annual whole-of-government regional strategies for Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Europe and Eurasia, East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East, and South and Central Asia. These strategies should clearly outline priorities and goals and highlight tensions and options for discussion and decision by principals. These interagency regional strategies would serve as guidance for Agency-specific planning. USCENTCOM could organize a bi-annual conference to launch such an assessment for its AOR.
- Recommendation: The White House/NSC should adopt a clear methodology and process for priority interagency national security planning that establishes products, responsibilities, and decision points. This can be based on best practices from the three whole-of-government planning doctrines (reconstruction and stabilization, counterterrorism, and homeland security).
- Recommendation: The White House/NSC should create an NSC directorate for national security planning whose staff is drawn on two-year details from each national security agency/department lead planning office, with two-three “gold” planners as leadership. This NSC directorate would oversee planning for Priority National Security Plans and Regional Strategies, update interagency planning doctrine as appropriate based on emerging lessons, and ensure monitoring of progress/implementation of Priority Plans.
- Recommendation: The White House/NSC should develop a unified national strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE) and establish an NSC position responsible for CVE strategic guidance, directly supported by the National Counterterrorism Center, who – in pursuit of its mandate – would be responsible for “facilitating strategic operational planning, within and across all departments and agencies, representing all elements of national power.” (*See Counterterrorism Annex for details*)
- Recommendation: Support USG coordinated strategies for the engagement of key partners on enduring posture and access needs and expand joint and combined military cooperation to

provide increased situational awareness and improve cooperation on enduring base development in the USCENTCOM AOR. (See *Basing Annex for detail*)

- Recommendation: Support establishment of a Strategic Communication Advisor to the President to recommend and clearly articulate a strategic vision, oversee and coordinate authority over the government's SC activities that impact national security issues; define DoS and DoD SC responsibilities and advocate for funding them accordingly. (See *Strategic Communication Annex for detail*)

(U) Personnel. USCENTCOM should support initiatives to build capacity and capabilities of "gold" interagency personnel, and require USCENTCOM personnel exposure to other agencies.

- Recommendations: Support additional resources for civilian agencies to staff planning, assessment, and operations management functions. This includes coordinators for sectors such as Rule of Law where multiple agencies contribute to the effort.
- Recommendation: Support the ongoing efforts of the Reconstruction and Stabilization PCC and U.S. Training and Doctrine Command to develop a curriculum for interagency national security planners. Require that a portion of the planners assigned to USCENTCOM complete the training annually.
- Recommendation: Support creation of strategic planning or interagency planning specialities within the other services, based on the model of Code 59 strategic planners in the Army.
- Recommendation: Support DoD education institutions opening up additional slots and provide backfill for other agency representatives to attend military planning training and education.
- Recommendation: Support and greatly increase joint training and education opportunities, including Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and Foreign Service Institute courses on interagency planning, and pre-deployment training for stabilization personnel (e.g., provincial reconstruction teams).
- Recommendation: Building on the model of the reciprocal detailees with USAID's Office of Military Affairs, USCENTCOM should establish reciprocal detailees with key partners, such as between its J-5/J-3, S/CRS's planning office, DoS's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, and the State Department's foreign assistance directorate.
- Recommendation: Support strategic communication exchange assignments with allies and other agencies within the USG (DoS, USAID) to increase contacts and coordination.
- Recommendation: Support dedication of trained and qualified personnel responsible for combating violent extremism at strategic, operational and tactical levels within key agencies. (See *Counterterrorism Annex for detail*)
- Recommendation: Support development of a new cadre of building partnership capacity advisors who can operate from the ministerial to the tactical level, are multi-lingual and possess sufficient cultural awareness. (See *Building Partnership Capacity annex for detail*)
- Recommendation: Recommend that the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) redesign its curricula towards a whole-of-government approach, exposing students to the full spectrum of foreign assistance tools available to support partner capacity.

(U) Multi-level Integrated Structures and Systems. USCENTCOM should recommend establishment and full resourcing of integrated structures to lead multi-level planning and operations management for priority operations.

- Recommendation: Prioritize support to establishing/enhancing Washington structures (based on the Interagency Management System/Afghanistan Interagency Operations

Group/Iraq Programs and Operations Group models) for planning and monitoring efforts in Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East Peace Process, strategic communications/combating violent extremism, and counterinsurgency. Second-tier priority but deemed valuable by the CAT include Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.

- Recommendation: Support efforts to increase the effectiveness of existing Washington and field structures for Afghanistan. Specifically, resource military planning billets for the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group in RC-East and RC-South; support increased capabilities for the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in Washington, such as metrics and planning. *(See Afghanistan and C2 Reports for detail)*
- Recommendation: Support the establishment of a Washington-based Coordinator for Iraq Assistance to improve interagency efficiency and reduce redundancies across Strategic Framework Agreement categories. *(See Iraq Report for detail)*
- Recommendation: Establish formal habitual relationships with other USG agencies as required to support the development of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan-directed planning.
- Recommendation: Host semi-annual events with Embassy country teams to discuss/synchronize building partnership capacity (BPC) activities and include BPC discussions in semi-annual Security Assistance Officer conferences. *(See BPC Annex for detail)*
- Recommendation: Support embedded all-source analytic cells at embassies (in priority order: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt) to provide the Ambassador and the country team with responsive all-source products available at appropriate classification levels. *(See Intelligence Annex for detail)*

(U) Whole-of-Government Planning and Assessment. USCENTCOM should support creation of whole-of-government plans and associated assessment/feedback/decision-making processes for priority efforts.

- Recommendation: DoS and USAID should develop and resource a deliberate planning apparatus that could easily and routinely interface with the various DoD Geographical Combatant Commands.
- Recommendation: Support country team's efforts to establish whole-of-government plans and interagency working groups to manage implementation of the plans. USCENTCOM could provide planning and other specialized "mobile" or longer-term capabilities upon request.
- Recommendation: Support development of single authoritative USG plan for Afghanistan (building on the existing NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan, ISAF operational plans, USG Integrated Guidance for RC-East) and Pakistan (building on the ODRP's plans and the Mission Strategic Plan) and support establishment of an interagency feedback/assessment process on plan implementation/effects. Second-tier priorities include Yemen. *(See specific sub-regional reports for detail)*
- Recommendation: Support the broad-based and systematic application of existing assessment tools, such as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), which identifies the local drivers of instability, to enable conflict-sensitive approaches to development strategies and programs. Prioritize Pakistan and Yemen. *(See DEG Annex for detail)*
- Recommendation: Support establishment of strategic-level metrics and interagency update briefs to monitor progress and drive revision of whole-of-government plans.

(U) Incentives and Leadership. USCENTCOM should support incentives to pursue “whole-of-government approaches,” both in individual career development and in Agency/Departmental and Congressional resource distribution.

- Recommendation: Support increases to joint DoS-DoD approved funding streams, such as 1206 and 1207. Support an interagency crisis response fund based on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds and 1207 models. Support consideration of how CERP and other military resources can be better synchronized with other agency assets.
- Recommendation: Support implementation of the National Security Professional Development program, including creation of positions, training, and related systems/policies.
- Recommendation: Support revision of DoD personnel policies to include an incentive, such as joint credit, for DOD officers to serve a tour in another agency for promotion to senior levels.
- Recommendation: Encourage all USG agencies/departments to revise personnel evaluation criteria to measure interagency collaboration.

(U) Resources and Authorities. USCENTCOM should support increased flexibility and authorities, and alignment with agency responsibilities.

- Recommendation: Support increased flexibility in and a top to bottom review of foreign assistance accounts and funding. (*See Rule of Law, Building Partnership Capacity, and Development, Economics, and Governance Annexes for detail*)
 - Recommendation: Support increased civilian expeditionary capabilities, including provision of sufficient transportation, interagency training and education, and protection to enable deployed civilians to operate in hostile or semi-hostile environments.
- Recommendation: Support the creation of interagency quick/conflict response funding mechanisms, and support removing actual and perceived blocks to transferring funds between agencies and departments.
- Recommendation: Support granting designated individuals responsibility over USG programs and resources related to a particular effort/priority, such as the Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan or embassy-based Rule of Law Coordinators, and provide them with the required interagency staff.
- Recommendation: Support increased interdiction authorities. (*See Rule of Law Annex for detail*)
- Recommendation: Support a series of legislative changes to increase authorities and flexibility, such as expanding the scope and/or making standing authorities in Title 10, CERP, NDAA Section 1207, Section 1206, Section 1208, and military construction authorities; authorizing reimbursement of salaries for reserve components in support of security cooperation missions, and authorizing geographic combatant commanders to transfer non-lethal excess defense articles; Support amendments to the Berry and Buy America Acts. (*See Rule of Law Annex for detail*)
- Recommendation: Support increasing direct financial support to host governments, either through budget support or trust funds with robust oversight, accountability, and transparency.

(U) USCENTCOM Planning. Support policy changes to enable greater collaboration between agencies, and develop mechanisms to implement those changes within USCENTCOM.

- Recommendation: Work with OSD and the Joint Staff to invite and resource participation (e.g., providing back-fills or travel funding as appropriate) from national security

agencies/departments in its planning from the earliest stages possible, and in particular to shape assumptions, goals, and objectives.

- Recommendation: Support NSC efforts to work with agencies/departments to align planning cycles to the greatest extent possible.
- Recommendation: Develop formal agreements and linkages to interagency expertise, military expertise in service organizations, non-governmental experts in regional or functional areas, coalition planning expertise, and reinstitute bilateral military planning with key nations within the region. (*See Basing Annex for details*)
- Recommendation: Adopt a whole-of-government approach to BPC, incorporating interagency and international partners into planning and activities, including Theater Security Working Groups (TSWGs), incorporating relevant USAID and State programs into the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS), and developing a common BPC lexicon. (*See BPC Annex for details*)

(U) Multilateral Approaches/USCENTCOM with Coalition Partners. USCENTCOM should seek to increase understanding with Coalition partners.

- Recommendation: USCENTCOM should support increased incentives for military personnel to serve in Coalition partner organizations.
- Recommendation: Support USEUCOM initiatives under NATO's Comprehensive Approach to gather and share observations and draw lessons across all civilian and military activities undertaken by allies, and to support interoperability.
- Recommendations: Conduct a periodic meeting with key allies, similar to the Africa Clearinghouse, to review various national BPC initiatives in the USCENTCOM AOR and align efforts where practical. (*See BPC Annex for details*)
- Recommendations: Expand the Near East and South Asia Center to Tampa and to the region to build relationships and increase the cultural and regional expertise of U.S. military and civilian officials. (*See Strategic Communications Annex for details*)
- Recommendation: Transform existing institutions and training centers, such as the special forces training center in Jordan, into regional centers of excellence.

(U) USCENTCOM Staff Organization and Command and Control. USCENTCOM should consider adjusting current command and control (C2) organization to improve unity of effort in contingency operation, better synchronize operational level efforts of all components and USCENTCOM staff, better utilize existing resources, and identify additional resources and authorities required.

- Recommendation: Establish cross-staff organizations with the ability to rapidly plan, implement, and assess sub-regional or priority country requirements.
- Recommendation: Expand coalition integration in to existing staff organizations outside the existing Combined Planning Group in CCJ5 to better inform and coordinate USCENTCOM activities and actions in the region with coalition partners.
- Recommendation: Expand formal information exchange processes between COCOMs on critical issues such as India-Pakistan and Arab-Israeli conflict, modeled on the USEUCOM-USCENTCOM coordination on Turkey-PKK-Iraq issues.
- Recommendation: Consider establishing a Joint Logistics organization to better synchronize service and coalition logistics at the theater operational level. (*See Basing and Logistics Annex for detail*)

- Recommendation: Consider establishing a maritime sub-region, designating the CFMCC as the Operational level CDR, and providing guidance on planning and executing maritime activities to improve synchronization and support for the maritime sub-region assigned to USCENTCOM.
- Recommendation: Increase use of existing service components to meet evolving C2 requirements as reposturing occurs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 - Consider increasing use of a service component to provide C2 for contingency operations in Iraq replacing MNF-I; and
 - Examine designating Service components as operational level C2 of specific contingency operations, such as consequence management, execution of the global war on terror outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, and maritime operations.
- Recommendation: Consider developing sub-regional operational commands (CJTF-Arabian Peninsula, CJTF-Central Asia States, etc) commands to synch operational activities within each sub-region.
- Recommendation: Work with existing components to establish clear guidance on support for all special operations forces activities. (*See Command and Control and Counterterrorism Annexes for detail*)

12. (U) AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

- National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”
- Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, “National Preparedness”
- National Security Presidential Directive 60
- Title XVI of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act
- NATO’s Comprehensive Approach
- United Nation’s Integrated Mission Planning Process
- Project on National Security Reform Final Report (<http://www.pnsr.org>)
- Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s *Hard Lessons* (<http://www.sigir.mil>)
- Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Beyond Goldwater Nichols” (<http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn>)
- Interagency Management System (March 2007) (<http://www.crs.state.gov>)
- American Academy of Diplomacy, “A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future” (<http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org>)
- Brookings Institution, “Foreign Assistance: Reinventing Aid for the 21st Century”
- Atwood, J. Brian, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios. “Arrested Development, Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, no. 6 (November/December 2008)