

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



Annex J Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations Functional Report

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**ANNEX J: BASING, LOGISTICS, AND FRAMEWORK OPERATIONS
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ANNEX J: BASING, LOGISTICS, AND FRAMEWORK OPERATIONS

1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1. (U) Report functions. This annex outlines the current state of activities and environment affecting three enabling functions – Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations (BLFO) – and provides some findings and recommendations related to these functions.

- Basing (Appendices 2&3). Basing includes two elements - posture and access. Posture is defined as basing; forces with equipment; prepositioned equipment; infrastructure and facilities; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I); and sustainment. Access includes agreements and host nation (HN) support that provide required access and freedom of action.
- Logistics (Appendices 4-8). Logistics are those support functions, activities, resources, and requirements necessary to sustain current operations and prepare for future contingencies and operations.
- Framework Operations (Appendices 9-11). Framework operations includes the development and refinement of theater response forces, the expansion of capability and capacity of maritime force posture afloat, and improvements to military planning by expanding planner access to regional and functional experts in the coalition, regional countries, Service institutions, and other governmental and non-governmental organizations.

1.2. (U) Strategic interests. Many of our strategic interests are shared by partner nations based on their economic interests and desire to protect their citizens. Shared interests provide common ground for cooperation. The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Theater Strategy outlines the military strategy to advance U.S. strategic interests in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). That Strategy outlines Overarching Strategic Principles and Objectives. Although basing, logistics, and framework operations support all of the Strategic Principles and Objectives listed in the Theater Strategy, these functions are primarily focused on support for:


- Strategic Principle - “Flexible Force Posture” - The United States will maintain sufficient presence in the region to protect vital national interests and provide support to regional allies.
- Primary Objective - Prepare United States and Partner Forces to Respond to Emerging Challenges.

1.3. (U) Challenges. There are several potential tension points identified in our analysis that effect Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations in the USCENTCOM AOR:

- Access denial (total, partial, temporary).
- U.S. Government (USG) global competition and/or demand for critical resources and enablers.
- Competing USG, partner nation, coalition, host nation interest/requirements and/or difference of opinions between USG departments.
- USG issuance of a negative finding on a host nation.
- Host nation fatigue from supporting a United States military presence.
- Resistance to change from U.S. organizations or institutions due to potential shifts in command relationships; authorities; responsibilities; and resources.
- Requirement for multilateral cooperation when most regional countries prefer a bilateral negotiation approach.

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)



1.6.1. (U) This approach will introduce new long term costs, force requirements, and may shift authorities and capacity to other organizations. As such, these recommendations may require approval from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and Congress. Partner nation acceptance also is a critical factor. That said, the intent is to support U.S. Government (USG) policy objectives while improving the ability of DoD and the USG to project long term requirements, support all operations, and improve military planning and execution.

1.7. (U) Illustrative objectives. While all of our objectives are seen as essential to achieving the stated goals, a few examples illustrate where the use of DIME, partner and host nations, and other COCOMs and DoD agencies will prove useful.

- USG coordinated strategies for the engagement of key partners on enduring posture and access needs are approved and implemented.
- Existing agreements renewed to sustain existing required access.
- Establish/expand LOCs; requires diplomatic/other COCOM support.
- Shared partner nation or NATO logistics capabilities within Afghanistan.
- Availability/quality of HN supplies, services, transportation capabilities to support economic development and BPC.
- Programs to provide access to interagency/regional/functional experts required to support varied planning efforts.
- USCENTCOM staff integrated with coalition planners.

1.8. (U) Opportunities. Some potential opportunities exist to assist in achieving the stated goals, objectives and ultimately U.S. interest:

- Use posture and access obtained in support of current operations and HN awareness of increased threats by states and non state actors to pursue long term, enduring posture and access.
- Use the development of a coalition maritime force to meet long term military requirements in this critical region. This is a coalition success story and, if it can be sustained and expanded

with the right Rules of Engagement (ROE), can be used to reduce United States force presence steady state in the region.

- Use expanded coalition coordination to develop formal long term military planning and coordination relationships with HNs to address shared and combined logistics opportunities and assets as well as basing opportunities.
- Use newly focused efforts on the development of Partner Security Forces to reduce United States force requirements. These efforts will need to be fully funded in the near-term to reduce U.S. Government (USG) force requirements and make up for Partner nation equipment shortfalls. If unfunded critical requirements may require USG resources.
- Logistics offers tremendous opportunity for HN economic stimulus and security cooperation engagement through use of local sources and infrastructure. The U.S. achieves a needed capability and the host nation obtains a revenue injection from procurement and our commerce passing through.
- Capitalize on lessons learned regarding joint logistics, contracting, and basing to support the development of more efficient methods for support within the AOR.

1.8.1. (U) The approach used in this annex identified strategic (10 years), intermediate (5 years), and near-term (18 months) goals with corresponding objectives, tasks and metrics. The appendices provide a matrix with tasks, identification of the lead responsible for implementation, the appropriate Line of Effort (LOE), and possible linkage to other goals, objectives, and/or tasks; the necessary resources and authorities; constraints to overcome in implementation; and risk with mitigations. We recognized and considered a whole-of- government approach instead of a military option only. We believe USCENTCOM must work with elements of the interagency (e.g. Department of State), supporting COCOMs, and DoD Agencies, and other partner nations. Recommendations and resultant action requirements of sub-regional and other functional teams were considered in the development of this annex. Finally, we used existing USCENTCOM planning products (Theater Strategy, Theater Campaign Plan, Sub Regional Actions Plans, and Global Defense Posture Plan) and planning efforts like the Regional Security Architecture to inform planning and provide avenues to achieve stated goals.

1.9. (U) Lines of effort. This report uses four lines of effort (LOE) to advance tasks under an objective and advance objectives towards successful achievement of subordinate goals. Objectives and supporting tasks required to achieve success for each of the 10 subordinate goals may use one or more of the four LOEs below. The specific LOE used to advance each task/objective are outlined in each of the subordinate goal appendices. The LOEs are:

- Diplomatic Support
- Strategy and Plan development/approval
- Sustaining existing capabilities and access
- Implementation of approved efforts/activities

2. (U) PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. (U) PURPOSE: This report was completed by the U.S. Central Command's Assessment Team (CAT) over a 100 day period from November 2008 to February 2009. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the USCENTCOM area of interest, a review of existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and suggested actions for U.S.

Central Command in the context of an illustrative plan for the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of coalition partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve policy goals.

2.2. (U) SCOPE: The Team consisted of members from across civilian and military agencies/departments of the U.S. Government (USCENTCOM, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Defense Logistics Agency, Department of State), as well as a Coalition Partner (United Kingdom). It drew on basing, logistics, theater response force, maritime, and planner analysis, existing U.S. and Coalition plans and policy guidance, relevant reports and studies (see Appendix 13 for a full list of reference and source materials), the expertise of its members, the broader U.S. Government community, coordination with CAT sub-regional and functional teams, and consultations (see Appendix 12 for a full list of consultations).

2.3. (U) METHODOLOGY: This report was developed in the format of a draft illustrative plan in order to impose sufficient rigor in analysis and recommendations. By providing a comprehensive, civilian-military context for U.S. Central Command, this report is intended to mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short term solutions to long term problems.

3. (U) SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

3.1. (U) The assessment outlines the current state of activities and the current environment affecting three enabling functions: basing, logistics and framework operations. It provides insight in to higher level and theater level guidance, key challenges and opportunities, and makes recommendations in the development of the plan that improves over all support.

3.2. (U) Many of our strategic interests are shared by partner nations based on economic interests and protection of their citizens and provide common ground for cooperation. United States interests are outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Our Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan are synchronized with these documents and provide the focus for military operations and planning in the USCENTCOM AOR.

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3.3.1. (U) these LOOs:

- Partner Capability/Capacity Building.
- Force Protection and Risk Mitigation.
- Force Posture.
- Freedom of Operation/Access Security.
- Multinational and Interagency Support.

3.3.2. (U) and all 7 pillars:

- Expand stability, self governance, development and security in Iraq.
- Set conditions for security and strengthen governance in Afghanistan.
- Strengthen partnership & support stability in Pakistan.
- Defeat Al Qaeda.
- Counter, Protect Against and Deter (CPD) Iranian destabilizing behavior.
- Degrade other designated terrorist organizations.
- Prevent the re-emergence of destabilizing capabilities.

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3.5. (U) Basing focused on posture and access. Posture is defined as basing, forces with equipment, PREPO equipment, infrastructure and facilities, C4I, sustainment. Access includes agreements and host nation support that provide required access and freedom of action.

3.6. (U) Logistics assessed those support functions, activities, resources, and requirements necessary to sustain current operations and prepare for future contingencies and operations. A major focus was on internal and external LOCs; support organizations; and expanding logistics to improve security, governance, economic development, and building partnership capacity.

3.7. (U) Framework operations addressed the development and refinement of theater response capacity in and out of theater, to include maritime posture afloat; recognizing regional sensitivities; and expanding planner access to regional and functional experts to improve whole-of-government planning at USCENTCOM.

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3.11. (U) This assessment recommends changes in strategy, capabilities, and processes to secure access and support posture reshaping to meet current and long term defined requirements and changes in processes to improve resourcing of posture (e.g. coordination with other partner nations to expand posture and efficiencies). Key tenants of the assessment include: working within the interagency, partner nations, supporting COCOMs and DoD Agencies to define and reshape contingency and enduring posture and required access; both internal and external LOCs; while adjusting authorities, C2 organizations, processes to reduce risk, increase efficiencies and responsiveness to achieve mission requirements.

3.12. (U) Overall, these initiatives may not be positively viewed by organizations such as OSD, the Joint Staff, and Congress because this approach will introduce new long term costs, force requirements, and may drive a shift of authorities and potential reorganization to support recommended initiatives. Partner nation acceptance will be a critical factor that must be considered for all objectives. The end state will be to support U.S. Government (USG) policy objectives while improving the ability of DoD and the USG to project long term requirements, support contingency operations, and improve military planning and execution.

4. (U) PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

4.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) This report assumes the following:

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5. (U) STRATEGIC GOALS

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6. (U) OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

- 6.1. (U) For the purpose of this report, the three enabling functional areas examined were defined as:
- Basing focused on posture (forces with equipment; bases; prepositioned equipment; Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Information (C4I); sustainment; infrastructure and facilities) and access (host nation (HN) support and agreements) in the USCENTCOM AOR.
 - Logistics included those support functions and capabilities (including internal/external Lines of Communication (LOCs) and logistics focused organizations), activities, resources, and requirements necessary to sustain current operations and prepare for future operations and activities within the USCENTCOM AOR.
 - Framework operations addressed maritime posture afloat, theater response force requirements, and planner access to functional and regional expertise.

6.2. (U) The USCENTCOM Theater Strategy is the base document used to define USCENTCOM operational goals and objectives. All of functional areas listed above were considered enabling functions for USCENTCOM operational requirements defined in the Theater Strategy. Recommendations focused on improved operational flexibility, increased freedom of action, and allow for more efficient execution of required operations and activities in the AOR in support of U.S. Government policy objectives. Recommendations addressed potential changes in policy, planning, operational and staff capacity and capability, processes, authorities, additional resources, and organizations required to achieve these goals in the development of supporting tasks. USCENTCOM will have to be the forcing mechanism for initial action and to support actions throughout execution of all recommendations, but there are select instances where some other governmental department or service component must take the initial action. To ensure success of these goals there is a need to work with and within the interagency, partner and host nations, supporting COCOMs and other DoD agencies.

6.3. (U) We examined the use of other instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic -- DIME) to achieve success in the creation of the objectives, tasks, and metrics. One significant example is in the area of diplomatic engagement with partner and host nations regarding access, agreements, funding, and support as well as implementation and sustainment. Also,

addressed is the element of economics. Our focus was on how logistics, contracting, and engineering can enhance and improve economic development. This furthers the liberalization of regional economics with emphasis on job creation and private sector led growth. The use of economics is seen not only as a tool to provide benefits to both nations, but as a necessary means to employ host nation personnel and perhaps remove them from a pool of disenfranchised individuals ripe for recruiting for terrorist purposes. Perhaps the most important element then becomes the ability to tell our story through the informational element. This will assist in informing all concerned of our level of commitment to the host nation; the economic influx to include employment; diffuse negative efforts of organizations and other nations; and assist in creating an acceptable balance of U.S. presence.

6.4. (U) In our approach, we used existing USCENTCOM planning products (Theater Strategy, Theater Campaign Plan, Sub Regional Actions Plans, and Global Defense Posture Plan) and planning efforts like the Regional Security Architecture to inform planning and provide avenues to achieve stated goals. These products provided valuable insight in to existing planning for the theater and a current reflection of how USCENTCOM is implementing strategic guidance and national policy. The new USCENTCOM planning effort to define a Regional Security Architecture is one of the more useful forums for advancing recommendations in this report.

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7. (U) LINES OF EFFORT

7.1. (U) List of Subordinate Goals. There are 10 subordinate goals between the 3 functional areas shown below:

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7.2. (U) This report uses four lines of effort (LOEs) to advance subordinate goals, objectives, and tasks towards successful achievement of strategic goals. Objectives and supporting tasks required to achieve success for each of the 10 subordinate goals may use one or more of the four LOEs. The specific LOE used to advance each task/objective are outlined in each of the subordinate goal appendices. The LOEs are:

- Diplomatic Support
- Strategy and Plan development/approval
- Sustaining existing capabilities and access
- Implementation of approved efforts/activities

7.3. (U) Subordinate Goals with Objectives. Subordinate goals with their Objectives are outlined below. The appendices provide a sequenced matrix with tasks, identification of the lead responsible for each tasks, the appropriate Line of Effort (LOE), and possible linkage to other goals, objectives, and/or tasks; the necessary resources and authorities; constraints to overcome in implementation; metrics and timelines; and risk with mitigations. Immediately following each objective is the lead.

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7.3.1.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Key Metrics. (A complete list of metrics is provided in Appendix 2)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

8. (U) GRAPHIC: PLAN OVERVIEW

8.1. (U) Due to the expansive nature of the areas assigned to this functional team, the multiple subordinate goals/objectives/tasks, and the movement between LOEs by task, a matrix was developed to depict sequencing of tasks under each objective supporting the each supporting goal. These matrices are outlined in each supporting goal appendices (2-11).

9. (U) RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

9.1. (U) Current Resources.

- Current basing and access is outlined in the situational assessment in one of three documents – The Global Defense Posture Plan draft submitted in July 2008 and under review at OSD; the Iraq Basing strategy approved in Sep 2008; and the Afghanistan basing lay down of current locations. Graphic depictions of these locations are included in Appendices 2 and 3.
- Current posture supporting contingency and steady state operations is significant and constantly changing. This posture was not provided because of this dynamic, but analysis using this posture as a base line start point is recommended as a task to move toward successful achievement of several supporting goals.
- Current maritime posture afloat is outlined in Appendix 10 Tab B.
- Current Theater Response Force is outlined in Appendix 9.

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

10. (U) RISK AND MITIGATION

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11. (U) CONCLUSIONS (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

12. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

13. (U) ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

13.1. (U) Roles and responsibilities of key organizations. Within the context of this planning effort, a broad overview of roles and responsibilities of major organizations is provided below. A more detailed discussion is included in each appendix under each objective.

13.1.1. (U) U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) - Within functional roles, coordinate, develop, and publish timely strategies, plans, and orders; validate, consolidate, and coordinate resource requirements; be the forcing function with other organizations for the development of additional required policy guidance, authorities, processes, organizations, and capabilities to successfully execute assigned responsibilities; coordinate with adjoining COCOMs to synchronize intelligence, operations and logistics support.

13.1.2. (U) USCENTCOM Components - Within assigned roles, articulate specific requirements for changes in strategies, plans, and orders to improve execution of assigned responsibilities; issue timely plans and orders to subordinates; develop strategies and plans as directed for sub-regional areas, countries, or areas of responsibility; coordinate with parent services (where applicable) to support rapid action on COCOM requirements.

13.1.3. (U) Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) - Within traditional roles, provide updated consolidated policy guidance; rapidly review and approved resource requirements; provide authorities at the lowest level possible; serve as the DoD coordinator for Interagency support of military planning and agreements; and refine and document processes to support DoD missions.

13.1.4. (U) Joint Staff - Within traditional roles, support implementation of OSD guidance to Services, COCOMs, and DoD organizations; provide military advice on deconfliction of resource requirements requested against global demands; provide military guidance and orders to DoD elements based on USG policy guidance; support and coordinate for DoD support for Interagency Planning; and coordinate for review and approval of military plans and approved resources required from Services and DoD organizations.

13.1.5. (U) Joint Forces Command and Military Services - Within traditional roles as a global or service resource (funding and force provider), provide COCOM validated requirements to meet operational requirements. Additionally support COCOM planning as required.

13.1.6. (U) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) - Within traditional functional roles; coordinate with COCOMs for the development of transportation networks to provide planned redundancy and mitigate risk within AORs and globally to provide rapid end to end distribution and delivery to meet approved requirements.

13.1.7. (U) Adjoining Combatant Commands (COCOMs) - Provide support for en route delivery and movement of requirements; develop capacity to coordinate with USCENTCOM on matters of intelligence, operations (especially interdiction operations), logistics and other cross seam operational issues.

13.1.8. (U) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) - Within assigned roles, articulate specific requirements for changes in national provider ability to improve execution of assigned responsibilities; develop acquisition strategies as directed; improve capability and processes to support rapid procurement of critical supplies to meet COCOM stated and approved requirements.

13.1.9. (U) Department of State - Within traditional roles, support Interagency planning for military plan development and implementation of USG approved plans; coordinate and support diplomatic efforts to secure access and basing agreements; and support country team coordination of military requirements in each assigned country within approved USG policy objectives.

13.1.10. (U) Host Nations - Understanding the sovereignty of each nation, work cooperatively to advance common strategic interests within a set of bilateral discussions focused on a bilateral security relationship for the long term while providing continued access, basing and support for ongoing operations. Need to support the development of long term formal agreements where possible.

13.1.11. (U) Partner Nations – Understanding the sovereignty of each nation and that they will pursue their own national interest, examine ways to increase awareness of each nation’s strategy and plans for the region, cooperatively work toward common support for each other through the development of formal processes, plans, and agreements to support achievement of mutual interest in the region.

13.2. (U) Coordinating instructions.

- All initiatives should be developed within a conceptual framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military and makes the most effective use of their different strengths.
- Where possible, improvements in the near term should use existing policy and military guidance to make improvements.

14. (U) AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

14.1. (U) Appendix 1 provides a list of source documents used in the development of this annex.

15. (U) APPENDICES

Appendix 1 (References List)

Appendix 2 (Contingency Basing)

Tab A (Iraq Basing)

Enclosure 1 (Iraq Basing Concept)

Tab B (Afghanistan Basing)

Enclosure 1 (Afghan Basing Concept)

Tab C (MILCON Legal Issues)

Tab D (CCPL)

Appendix 3 (Enduring Basing)

Tab A (MPPL)

Appendix 4 (Lines of Communications)

Appendix 5 (Theater Retrograde, Reposture, Redeployment, Rebasing, and Reset)

Appendix 6 (Setting Logistics for Afghanistan)

Appendix 7 (Enduring Support Organizations and Optimized Processes)

Appendix 8 (Expand Logistics Efforts to Improve Regional Stability)

Tab A DLA Market Surveys Central Asia)

Appendix 9 (USCENTCOM Theater Response Force)

Tab A (Potential Contingencies for Theater response)

Tab B (PTDO Equipment Sets and APS5 Status)

Appendix 10 (Maritime Operations)

Tab A (Operational Guidance for the Maritime Force)

Tab B (Maritime Posture Afloat)

Tab C (Background on Anti Piracy Operations)

Tab D (Fuel Support to India and Pakistan navies)

Appendix 11 (Increased Access to Planning Expertise)

Appendix 12 (Consultations)

Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment as of 20 Dec 08)

Tab A (National and Command Guidance)

Tab B (Key Assumptions)

Tab C (Charter, Definitions, and Goals)

Tab D (Berry Amendment and Buy American Act)

Tab E (Logistics Initiatives)

Enclosure 1 (Theater Logistics Transformation)

Enclosure 2 (Log Common Operating Picture)

- Enclosure 3 (Afghanistan Plus Up Logistics Planning)
- Enclosure 4 (Iraq Theater retrograde and reposturing)
- Enclosure 5 (Northern Distribution Network)
- Enclosure 6 (Joint Theater Support Contracting Command)
- Enclosure 7 (Streamlining Foreign Military Sales)
- Tab F (Basing)
 - Enclosure 1 (Capabilities at GDPP Locations)
 - Enclosure 2 (HN Agreements and assessment at GDPP Locations)
 - Enclosure 3 (Afghanistan Contingency Basing)
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- Tab G (Theater Response Requirements)
 - Enclosure 1 (Theater Response Force Status)
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 - Enclosure 3 (Potential Contingencies for Theater Response Force)
- Tab H (Maritime Posture Afloat)
- Tab I (Lines of Communication)
- Tab J (Expanded Planner Access)

(U) Appendix ONE (References) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

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Appendix TWO (Contingency Basing) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Subordinate Goal. Contingency basing/infrastructure are reshaped to meet evolving needs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

4. (U) Key Assumptions.


(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

5. (U) Objectives.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

6. (U) Tasks by Objective with recommended lead responsibility and supporting Lines of Effort (LOEs).

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)



7. (U) Metrics for Success.

7.1. (U) Two year projection of contingency force posture requirements developed, approved within GFMP, and sourced.

7.2. (U) Revised Afghanistan Basing Strategy published and approved addressing new conditions under SFA and new policy guidance.

7.3. (U) Revised Iraq Basing Strategy published and approved addressing new conditions under SFA and new policy guidance.

7.4. (U) Contingency Construction Authority (CCA) cap increased or waiver authority granted to SECDEF.

7.5. (U) Line item approval of contingency construction projects eliminated and replaced with lump sum approach.

7.6. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The spending limit on the use of operation and maintenance (O&M) funds for unspecified minor construction changed from \$750,000 to \$3,000,000 when it's in support of a declaration of war or a contingency operation.

7.7. (U) USG policy guidance for Iraq and Afghanistan consolidated and updated.

7.8. (U) OPORD 07 and OPORD 09 revised and reissued based updated policy guidance.

8. (U) Resources.

8.1. (U) The additional contingency MILCON funding required to support approved force posture changes and current operational requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq are identified at Tab D.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

9. (U) Additional Authorities or revised authorities required. Altering current authorities for the approval and expenditure of contingency MILCON funding is a key element in increasing responsiveness and flexibility to adjust to changing operational requirements.

9.1. (U) Optimally we'd like to have Congress provide USCENTCOM with an annual lump sum for MILCON approved projects instead of the current line item approval process. This would provide commander's the flexibility to meet changing operational requirements within allocated funding instead of requesting reprogramming for approved funding or cancelling the project.

9.2. (U) Increase the annual CCA threshold and/or give SECDEF waiver authority to increase the cap as in previous years (prior to FY08).

9.3. (U) Allow the use of CCA at long term overseas bases that support contingency operations. Optimally, would like waiver authority for entire AOR, since the current interpretation of the law rules prevent us from building emergent capacity at key bases supporting OEF and OIF.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

10.1. (U) Responsiveness of infrastructure development to meet operational needs is hindered by lack of decentralized authorities with increased levels of funding.

10.2. (U) Outdated, conflicting, and over abundance of policy and military planning documents significantly increases the difficulty in developing and issuing timely and accurate guidance to operational units.

10.3. (U) Delays in policy decision-making and publication, military and civilian plan development, and a cumbersome non responsive requirements development and approval process constrains rapid response to changing conditions and operational requirements.

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures.

11.1. (U) OBJ #1 - Improve process for developing and articulating demands and sourcing all U.S. forces and MILCON funding in the AOR for contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11.1.2. (U) Risk mitigation

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11.1.2.2. (U) Use annual Integrated Priority List (IPL) process to address force requirement shortfalls within current force structure.

11.1.2.3. (U) Seek coalition participation to meet identified force requirements where possible to reduce the strain on U.S. force providers.

11.1.2.4. (U) Use expeditionary means where possible to meet MILCON requirements. MILCON requirements should be supported by a funding strategy that emphasizes priority requirements and is consistently enforced in the advancement of requirements.

11.1.2.5. (U) Seek HN or coalition funding support for appropriate shared infrastructure development.

11.2. (U) OBJ # 1.2 - Adjust Iraq basing strategy to meet operational requirements under the recently signed Security Framework Agreement.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11.2.2. (U) Risk mitigation:

11.2.2.1. (U) Adjust operational plans to meet reduced operational capacity at the same level of risk or accept more operational risk.

11.2.2.2. (U) Adjust MILCON authorities to provide more flexible MILCON development.

11.2.2.3. (U) Adjust force posture in and out of theater to provide immediate response capability.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11.3.2. (U) Risk mitigation.

11.3.2.1. (U) Adjust operational plans to meet reduced operational capacity at the same level of risk or accept more operational risk

11.3.2.2.(U) Adjust MILCON authorities to provide more flexible MILCON development.

11.3.2.3 (U) Adjust force posture in and out of theater to provide immediate response capability.

11.4. (U) OBJ #1.4 - Adjust MILCON authorities to meet near term operational requirements for contingency operations.

11.4.1. (U) Operational risk is incurred when MILCON requirements are not funded or not funded in a timely manner.

11.4.2. (U) Risk mitigation:

11.4.2.1. (U) Adjust operational plans to meet reduced operational capacity at the same level of risk or accept more operational risk.

11.4.2.2. (U) Look for other funding sources for MILCON development to meet requirement.

11.5. (U) OBJ # 1.5 - Provide updated consolidated USG Policy guidance for operation in Iraq and Afghanistan that captures recent changes and drives updated military planning.

11.5.1. (U) No additional risk is incurred because we are operating now in this environment. Long term though we are not as efficient in operations without adjusted guidance.

11.5.2. (U) Risk mitigation.

11.5.2.1. (U) Move forward with adjusted military planning documents even if you have no USG approved policy document(s).

Tabs:

A – Iraq Basing

B – Afghanistan Basing

C – Military Construction

D – USCENTCOM Contingency Priority List

Tab A (Iraq Basing) Appendix 2 (Contingency Basing) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. **(U) Purpose.** This Tab provides an overview of the current basing strategy to support U.S. and Coalition operations in Iraq and potential guidance for the adjustment of a basing strategy to reflect recent decisions on the U.S. Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and the Security Agreement. This is a constantly evolving process and conditions based to meet the operational needs of the force in Iraq. The current basing concept employed by MNF-I is described in Encl 1 to this Tab and includes a listing of the key support locations as of Nov 2008 that are required to support the current operational requirements. The approach advanced in this (shrink and share) remains valid, but must be adjusted to meet the terms of the agreement. This listing is being revised to meet these requirements. A list of facilities that the U.S. wants access was provided to the Government of Iraq (GOI) on 1 Jan 09. In June 09 another list outlining the intent for base turnover will be provided to the GOI. The information at Encl 1 shows the predecisional intent and the known data from the previous strategy.

2. (U) Situation.

2.1. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The current strategy focuses on providing basing to meet operational requirements, but has been influenced in the past by political pressure within the U.S. to reduce and turnover bases without full consideration of the operational requirements of the force. Last year MNF-I adopted a “shrink and share” approach to basing focused on theater wide support thru access while enabling the turnover of bases to GOI as rapidly as possible. This approach provided more latitude for MNF-I to address operational requirements to a greater degree while still addressing the political requirements to turnover bases because of resource concerns. This strategy continues to out lined primary locations as hubs. The primary difference in between this approach and previous approaches is sustaining access to other bases (spokes) to meet operational requirements while transitioning bases to the GOI to enable Iraqi forces (vice the focus on resource reduction). MNF-I continues to aggressively pursue transition of bases to Iraqi elements while retaining access (vice ownership) of bases. This supports the operational strategy of transitioning control to Iraq Security Force (ISF) by moving to Partnership and then Strategic Overwatch phases in different geographic spaces in Iraq. Base planning also expanded over the last 2 years to be more inclusive and consider requirements such as the Golden hour response for medical, C4 I infrastructure impacts, SOF requirements and other tenant organizations requirement.

2.2. (U) Existing Basing Concept and Intent. Key information pertaining to the existing basing strategy is outlined below.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2.4. (U) Basing Planning Factors. Key Facts, assumptions, limitations and risks are provided below.

2.4.1. (U) Facts:

- U.S. force drawdown will be conditions-based.
- Counterinsurgency (COIN) Mission will vary between Lead, Partner and Overwatch, in some form or combination of those three mission sets, through 2008 and into 2009.
- Base closings affect Operational Detachment Alpha (ODAs), Military Training Teams (MiTTs), Training Teams (TTs), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and others who will still be operating. All of them will require access to or support from MNF-I provided enablers.
- The current base closure model timeline for small/medium bases is 150 days.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2.4.7. (U) Other stakeholder requirements (i.e. TTs, PRTs, GRD, SOF, Comms) increasingly affect basing decisions.

- Specific bases may not close or transfer as soon as possible depending on stakeholder requirements.
- Some stakeholders will be supported exclusively by contractor due to geographic separation.
- Some stakeholders will see an increase in the distance traveled from base to duty location which may impact their mission.
- Some bases may have to remain at a reduced or smaller state in order to maintain certain infrastructure (i.e. TTs, PRTs, GRD, SOF, Comms).

3. (U) Recommendations.

3.1. (U) The recent signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) requires reexamination of operational strategy and the supporting basing strategy. MNF-I is aware of this and is rapidly working to readjust both operational and basing strategies to meet these new requirements. The elements listed above remain valid but other factors will need to be considered in the adjustment of the basing strategy. A shift in the approach from a primary focus on support for combat operations to a primary focus on Partner Security Force training and support of Iraqi forces will affect their basing strategy.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3.3. (U) A new basing strategy should emphasize the following guiding principles:

3.3.1. (U) Demonstrate good faith and confidence building measures with GoI.

3.3.2. (U) Understand importance of Baghdad footprint to GoI.

3.3.3. (U) Remove combat forces from cities, villages, and localities, but maintain proximity to key population centers, provincial capitals, and ISF HQs

3.3.4. (U) Provide the commander flexibility to respond to crisis and change.

3.3.5. (U) Support ongoing operational requirements and multiple mission sets.

3.3.6. (U) Discern and adapt to GoI desires WRT heritage, moral, and political sensitive bases, particularly in Baghdad (VBC & IZ).

3.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

following approach is recomme

3.4.1. (U) Purpose: Successfully negotiate base returns in compliance with security agreement to:

- Build GoI confidence in U.S. intentions
- Demonstrate good faith in order to preclude a referendum on U.S. presence
- Facilitate further negotiation

3.4.2 (U) Method:

- Executing our engagement strategy, primarily via reconvening CBB
- Negotiating in ways that demonstrate goodwill
- Conducting Red Team analysis of possible GoI objectives for negotiations
- Mutually defining key terms
- Resolving issues with bases on private property

3.4.3. (U) End State:

- All combat forces out of cities, villages, and localities by 30 Jun 09
- U.S. Government (USG) able to present second list on 30 Jun 09 to GoI
- Conditions set so that:
 - GoI and Iraqi people have favorable view of base return process though compliance with security agreement
 - GoI is open to further negotiation for a post 2011 security agreement

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3.5.3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ End State: All U.S. forces are:

-
-

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3.6. (U) In developing the basing strategy to support the terms of the SFA they following definitions must be clearly defined and understood by both sides

3.6.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Define the term Combat forces

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)


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

Encl 1 – Current Iraq Basing Concept

Encl 1 (Iraq Basing Concept) Tab A (Iraq Basing) Appendix 2 (Contingency Basing) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. This enclosure provides pictorial depictions of key basing concepts under the existing basing strategy, the existing primary locations tracked in the existing basing strategy, and MNF-I considerations as they assess the impact of changes required under the Security Framework Agreement.

2. (U) MNF-I Basing Concept.





SECRET // REL TO USA, NICF

2.2. (U) Base Closure/Transfer Process. This chart outlines the process for closing or transferring a base. The goal of base closure or transfer is to ensure that property is returned to the original owner, if possible, or used in the best interest of the Iraqi people. Coalition forces will close bases that have no identified receiver and transfer bases that have an approved GoI receiver. Variations of closure and transfer options are available under the “shrink and share” concept. Those options are outlined in this enclosure. Base closure timelines and are provided in the next paragraph.

2.3. (U) Base Shrink and Share Examples. The following slides depict various shrink and share scenarios that will develop as we begin to transfer portions of bases to the ISF.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Tab B (Afghanistan Basing) Appendix 2 (Contingency Basing) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. This Tab provides an overview of the current basing strategy to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan as of 12 Dec 08, and recommended guidance for the development of future contingency basing in Afghanistan. This is a constantly evolving process and conditions based to meet the operational needs of the force in Afghanistan. The basing concept employed by USFOR-A and its subordinate commands and the listing of the key support locations that is required to support the current operational requirements are provided below. This document provides a baseline for planning in Afghanistan.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

1.2. (U) There remains a significant requirement for contingency basing in Afghanistan to support U.S. and coalition operations. The contingency basing outlined below is for this contingency only and are not enduring or permanent beyond the execution of OEF with the exception of the two bases listed above.

2. (U) Basing Concept and Intent.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3. (U) Concept and Intent.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

4. (U) Basing Planning Factors.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

4.2. (U) Base closings affect Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODAs), Embedded Training Teams, Police Mentor Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and others who will still be operating. All of them will require access to or support from U.S. provided enablers.

4.3. (U) The GIRoA will remain incapable of providing reliable basic life support services to coalition forces.

4.4. (U) FY08 Contingency Construction Authority (CCA) is capped at \$200M.

4.5. (U) OSD is the Military Construction (MILCON) reprogramming authority.

4.6. (U) The planning timeline to receive MILCON Funds is two years.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

4.8. (U) There is a requirement to standardize quality of life initiatives.

4.9. (U) Basing decisions are impacted by the relationship between conditions based force adjustments, force rotation/redeployment support, materiel disposition requirements and the balance between combat sustainment and contractor provided support. Force adjustments will only occur as conditions allow.

5. (U) Basing Definitions. There are several types of bases in Afghanistan designed to meet the operational requirements of U.S. operating forces. The definitions are listed below and are nested in the Basing definitions for enduring requirements outlined in JP 1 (FOS, CSL) and the definitions listed in USCENTCOM Sand Book (COB, COS, COL).

5.1. (U) Forward Operating Base (FOB): a base used to support tactical operations normally with established support facilities. It is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or an extended period and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip. A FOB can act as a central distribution hub for other FOBs or Combat Outposts (COPs) throughout the CJOA. Depending on the size of the population and the extent of support, these are generally equivalent to a Contingency Operating Site (COS). Major FOBs are equivalent to Contingency Operating Bases (COBs).

5.2. (U) Combat Outpost (COP): a combat outpost is usually occupied by a platoon/battery/company/troop-sized element capable of quick reaction ISO operations, security, civic assistance, or humanitarian assistance relief. A COP will be dependent upon a FOB for logistical support and is characterized by limited infrastructure. A COP may consolidate to a FOB as a contingency matures or may be turned over to host nation forces for continued improvement. This is equivalent to a Contingency Operating Location (COL).

5.3. (U) Firebase (FB): designed to provide indirect fire artillery support to operations in areas beyond the normal range of fire support. A firebase can be expanded to a COP or FOB over time with significant increase in infrastructure and communications. Typically, a firebase is a platoon-sized location capable of sustaining long-term establishment and future operations. This is equivalent to a Contingency Operating Location (COL).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

7. (U) Key recommendations to support the development of basing and infrastructure in Afghanistan.

7.1. (U) Develop and source a USFOR-A JMD with the capability to fully develop an Afghanistan wide basing strategy and coordinate related infrastructure with ISAF, coalition partners and USCENTCOM staff.


7.2. (U) Gain U.S. Government (USG) approval of force posture changes and infrastructure funding to support force posture increases.

7.3. (U) Consolidate and revise USG policy and military planning guidance for operations in Afghanistan to ensure basing strategy development support USG policy and military objectives.


7.4. (U) Support identified additional contingency funding request for additional infrastructure that supports approved posture increases at designated locations in Afghanistan.

Encl 1 (Current AFG Basing Network) Tab B (AFG Basing) Appendix 2 (Contingency Basing) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Tab C (Military Construction (MILCON) Legal Issues) Appendix 2 (Contingency Basing to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations))

1. (U) Purpose: To summarize the funding authorities, limitations and requested improvements to the Military Construction (MILCON) process.

2. (U) Description of the Process.

2.1. (U) The funding authorities we most frequently use for new MILCON requirements are Global War on Terror (GWOT) MILCON or Contingency Construction Authority (CCA). MILCON projects at Global Defense Posture (GDP) locations may also be submitted under the standard (or baseline) POM budgetary process. We occasionally use reprogramming authorities (Title 10 Sections 2803 – Emergency construction and 2808 – Construction authority in the event of a declaration of war or national emergency), but these require canceling lower priority projects in order to free up MILCON funds.

2.2. (U) GWOT MILCON- This is the primary means to get new MILCON funding. This authority is tied to the Supplemental funding authorities Congress has approved in support of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The budgetary request and approval timeline is such that a GWOT project identified today would be funded in about 18 months and at least 28-36 months from today for construction delivery. This is clearly not responsive enough to support operational decisions that require completion of MILCON projects sooner than 24 months out.

2.3. (U) CCA is the best tool available to meet near-term MILCON requirements. With CCA, Congress provided Department of Defense (DoD) a temporary wartime authority to use Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds overseas to perform construction that in normal circumstances would require specific congressional funding and authorization on a by-project basis. CCA is limited to projects in Iraq and Afghanistan and has limited ability to meet requirements that are needed sooner than 6 – 9 months out. This limitation is due to the length of time it takes between identifying the requirement and securing OSD approval as well as the acquisition and construction processes. The other major limiting factor of CCA is the funding limit.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

2.5. (U) CCA also has the following restrictions:

- The construction must be necessary to meet urgent military operational requirements of a temporary nature in support of declared wars or national emergencies.

- CCA is not permitted at locations where “the U.S. is reasonably expected to have long –term presence.” OGC interprets this to exclude CCA at all USCENTCOM master plan locations. Per our request, the Senate’s draft of the 09 NDAA permits CCA at BAF and KAF in Afghanistan.
- The level of construction is the minimum necessary to meet the temporary requirement.

2.6. (U) As stated above, reprogramming authorities require canceling lower priority projects. Section 2803 allows Service Secretaries to reprogram up to \$50M annually from unobligated appropriated MILCON funds. Similarly, Section 2808 reprogramming actions must use unobligated appropriated MILCON funds, but require SECDEF approval and there is no cap on the annual amount. In both cases, Congressional notification is required.

3. (U) Recommended Improvements to MILCON funding:

3.1. (U) Optimally we’d like to have Congress provide USCENTCOM with an annual lump sum for MILCON instead of the line item approval process. This would provide CDRs’ the flexibility to meet changing operational requirements within allocated funding instead of requesting reprogramming for approved funding.

3.2. (U) ncrease the annual CCA threshold and/or give SECDEF waiver authority to increase the cap as in previous years (prior to FY08).

3.3. (U) Allow the use of CCA at long term overseas bases that support contingency operations. Optimally, would like waiver authority for entire AOR, since the current interpretation of the law rules prevent us from building emergent capacity at key bases supporting OEF and OIF.

3.4. (U) Increase the spending limit on the use of operation and maintenance (O&M) funds for unspecified minor construction from \$750,000 to \$3,000,000 when it’s in support of a declaration of war or a contingency operation. This would allow for greater flexibility in the USCENTCOM AOR by allowing O&M funds to be used for smaller projects, such as water treatment plants or utility projects. This would also help mitigate the impacts of war induced inflation of construction costs.

Tab D (Contingency Priority List-CPPL) Appendix 2 (Contingency Basing) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

Project Title	CC Prior	Name	Base Name	CURRENT PA (\$1000)	CUM (\$000)	FY	FUND STGY
Rotary-wing Ramp and Taxiway, Ph 1	1	AFG	Kandahar	\$25,000	\$25,000	2009	CCA
Strategic Airlift Apron	2	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$47,000	\$72,000	2009	CCA
Rotary-wing Ramp and Taxiway, Ph 1, Bastion	3	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$25,000	\$97,000	2009	CCA
CAS Apron	4	AFG	Kandahar	\$37,000	\$134,000	2009	CCA
Upgrade ASP/MSA	5	AFG	Kandahar	\$20,000	\$154,000	2009	CCA
RSOI Expansion	6	AFG	Kandahar	\$16,000	\$170,000	2009	CCA
ECP and Access Road South Park	7	AFG	Kandahar	\$9,400	\$179,400	2009	CCA
Runway	8	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$97,000	\$276,400	2009	CCA
Runway	9	AFG	Shank	\$22,000	\$298,400	2009	CCA
Airlift Apron	10	AFG	Shank	\$8,600	\$307,000	2009	CCA
Runway	11	AFG	Garmsir-Dwyer	\$25,000	\$332,000	2009	CCA
Airlift Apron	12	AFG	Garmsir-Dwyer	\$6,700	\$338,700	2009	CCA
Runway	13	AFG	Wolverine	\$20,000	\$358,700	2009	CCA
Airlift Apron	14	AFG	Wolverine	\$6,700	\$365,400	2009	CCA
South Park Infrastructure, Ph 1	15	AFG	Kandahar	\$30,000	\$395,400	2009	CCA
BDE Housing (1500) & Relocate Sustainment BN	16	AFG	Kandahar	\$25,000	\$420,400	2009	CCA
Oil Platform FP Team Life Support	17	Iraq	ABOT	\$29,391	\$449,791	2009	CCA
Relocate CL I Yard	18	AFG	Kandahar	\$11,000	\$460,791	2009	CCA
Rotary-wing Ramps & Taxiways, Ph 1, Shank	19	AFG	Shank	\$36,000	\$496,791	2009	CCA
500M CCA Line			1 Projects		\$496,791		
Rotary-wing Ramps &	20	AFG	Sharana	\$39,000	\$535,791	2009	GWOT

Taxiways, Ph 1, Sharana							
Runway	21	AFG	Tarin Kowt	\$17,000	\$552,791	2009	GWOT
Airlift Apron	22	AFG	Tarin Kowt	\$7,400	\$560,191	2009	GWOT
CAS Apron	23	AFG	Bagram	\$32,000	\$592,191	2009	GWOT
Multipurpose Division/BDE HQ Facility	24	AFG	Kandahar	\$23,000	\$615,191	2009	GWOT
Rotary Wing Ramps and Taxiway, Ph1, TK	25	AFG	Tarin Kowt	\$26,000	\$641,191	2009	GWOT
Rotary Wing Ramps and Taxiway, Ph1, Maywand	26	AFG	Maywand-Ramrod	\$26,000	\$667,191	2009	GWOT
AV Maintenance Facility, Tombstone	27	AFG	Helmand, Tombstone	\$11,200	\$678,391	2009	GWOT
AV Maintenance Facilities, Shank	28	AFG	Shank	\$11,200	\$689,591	2009	GWOT
AV Maintenance Facilities, Sharana	29	AFG	Sharana	\$11,200	\$700,791	2009	GWOT
Temporary West Munitions Storage Area	30	Qatar	Al Udeid	\$14,000	\$714,791	2009	GWOT
Rotary-wing Ramp and Taxiway, Ph 2	31	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$49,000	\$763,791	2009	GWOT
Rotary-wing Ramp and Taxiway, Ph 2	32	AFG	Kandahar	\$49,000	\$812,791	2009	GWOT
Fuel Distribution, Ph 1	33	AFG	Shank	\$8,000	\$820,791	2009	GWOT
Strategic Airlift Apron	34	AFG	Kandahar	\$84,000	\$904,791	2009	GWOT
CAS Apron	35	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$39,000	\$943,791	2009	GWOT
Munitions Storage Area Bastion	36	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$49,000	\$992,791	2009	GWOT
Fuel Operations and Storage	37	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$2,100	\$994,891	2009	GWOT
Fuel Distribution, Ph 1, Bastion	38	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$8,000	\$1,002,891	2009	GWOT
Fuel Distribution, Ph 1, Maywand	39	AFG	Maywand-Ramrod	\$8,000	\$1,010,891	2009	GWOT

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Fuel Distribution, Ph 1, Tarin Kowt	40	AFG	Tarin Kowt	\$8,000	\$1,018,891	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (1,100 PAX), Ph 1, (AV BDE)	41	AFG	Helmand, Tombstone	\$8,700	\$1,027,591	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (1,100 PAX), Ph 1, Shank	42	AFG	Shank	\$7,800	\$1,035,391	2009	GWOT
Housing Replacement (1,100 PAX), Ph 1	43	AFG	Kandahar	\$8,700	\$1,044,091	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (1,100 PAX), Ph 1(BCT HQ, RSTA SQDN)	44	AFG	Maywand-Ramrod	\$10,800	\$1,054,891	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (450 PAX), Ph 1, Altimur	45	AFG	Altimur	\$3,500	\$1,058,391	2009	GWOT
C-IED Road Kapisa Supply Route	46	AFG	Various	\$68,000	\$1,126,391	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (1,100 PAX), Ph 1, Qalat	47	AFG	Qalat, Zabul	\$8,900	\$1,135,291	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (775 PAX), Ph 1, Airborne	48	AFG	Airborne	\$5,600	\$1,140,891	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (500 PAX), Ph 1, TK	49	AFG	Tarin Kowt	\$5,200	\$1,146,091	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (700 PAX), Ph 1, Joyce	50	AFG	Joyce	\$5,200	\$1,151,291	2009	GWOT
Medical Facility Upgrade, Tarin Kowt	51	AFG	Tarin Kowt	\$1,950	\$1,153,241	2009	GWOT
South Park Drainage, Ph 1	52	AFG	Kandahar	\$16,500	\$1,169,741	2009	GWOT
BDE HQ, Bastion	53	AFG	Helmand, Bastion	\$7,800	\$1,177,541	2009	GWOT
BDE HQ, Shank	54	AFG	Shank	\$7,800	\$1,185,341	2009	GWOT
BDE HQ, Tombstone, Ph 1	55	AFG	Helmand, Tombstone	\$7,800	\$1,193,141	2009	GWOT
Medical Facility,	56	AFG	Garmsir-Dwyer	\$2,000	\$1,195,141	2009	GWOT

Garmsir							
Rotary-wing Ramps & Taxiways, Ph 2, Shank	57	AFG	Shank	\$24,000	\$1,219,141	2009	GWOT
Rotary-wing Ramps & Taxiways, Ph 2, Sharana	58	AFG	Sharana	\$29,000	\$1,248,141	2009	GWOT
Construct Drainage System, Ph 1	59	AFG	Bagram	\$18,500	\$1,266,641	2009	GWOT
Temp Housing (880 Pax), Ph 2, BAF	60	AFG	Bagram	\$20,000	\$1,286,641	2009	GWOT
SOF Alpha Ramp Facilities	61	AFG	Bagram	\$10,800	\$1,297,441	2009	GWoT
Power Plant Expansion (20MW)	62	AFG	Bagram	\$33,000	\$1,330,441	2009	GWOT
Install Utilities, Ph 1	63	AFG	Kandahar	\$27,000	\$1,357,441	2009	GWOT
\$1.5B anticipated max funding for FY09 GWoT/ CCA	72.1				\$1,357,441		

Appendix THREE (Enduring Basing) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Subordinate Goal. Required enduring posture and access is established and secured in the AOR.

2. (U) Executive Summary. Development of access and basing in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) has evolved along two lines. One is legacy access and basing emanating from post DESERT STORM requirements in the Gulf. The second is from access and basing acquired to support contingency operations under OEF and OIF. This evolution created access and basing tied to current contingency efforts only and affects the ability of the Department as a whole to secure long term access; plan and source long term enduring access and basing; coordinate development of basing and infrastructure within the region; and secure support of key host nations. This subordinate goal addresses the need to develop U.S. Government (USG) coordinated strategies for key nation engagement on bilateral security relationships with supporting basing and posture; the need to renew agreements to sustain access and develop new agreements to secure access beyond current contingencies; adjust the current Departmental process to align with the department's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) to support funding and Departmental planning for Global posture; and development of a planning process to improve combined base and infrastructure planning within the region.

3. (U) Discussion.

3.1. (U) For the purpose of this plan basing includes two areas - posture and access in the USCENTCOM AOR. Posture is defined as basing, forces with required equipment, pre-positioned (PREPO) equipment, infrastructure and facilities, C4I and sustainment. Access includes agreements and Host nation support that provide required access and freedom of action.

3.2. (U) USCENTCOM is a theater in conflict. Existing basing and access in the region generally evolved along two lines:

- One is legacy access and posture generally located in the Gulf region as a result of post-DESERT STORM development focused on execution of military operations against Iraq and Iran.
- The other line is additional access, especially in Iraq and Central and South Asia, as a result of ongoing contingency operations under Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

3.3. (U) Most of today's access and posture efforts though are driven by the need to meet current operational requirements under OEF and OIF. The existing posture has evolved over time to meet increased operational needs and was not based on an established USG-approved long term strategy. Contingency basing, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, has evolved over time to meet these changing operational needs and conditions. Although basing strategies have been developed to support these operations, there is a need to be able to rapidly change these strategies in response to changing operational needs. These rapid changes are not always supported by a peace time funding and approval process that is often slow to respond. Contingency basing efforts are more fully described under Subordinate goal #1 (Appendix 2).

3.4. (U) Posture initiatives, especially those developed along the second line, are generally viewed by host nation (HN) and U.S. organizations as contingency requirements and, as such, are largely funded through U.S. contingency funding or HN funding and seen as temporary in nature to support current operations. Although this has provided necessary support in the near term, the approach does not support the development of or meet long term basing requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR.

3.5. (U) Negotiations are exclusively bilateral in the region and unlikely to change in the near term based on the preferences of each host nation. Even security organizations such as the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) offer little support for the advancement of basing and framework operations in the USCENTCOM AOR.

3.6. (U) SD directed the development of a Department of Defense (DoD) process for synchronizing Global Posture Development. Initiated in 2003, to answer Congressional questions about long term strategy for global posture moves to further inform BRAC decisions, it has evolved over time to a slightly more formal process with guidance directed in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP). The process for annual Departmental action with respect to synching this is still undefined outside this guidance and is not nested in the PPBES system to drive funding decisions. Further formalization and definition of total Department of Defense (DoD) action within and annual process over a two year PPBES cycle is still required to ensure full synchronization of DoD efforts for global posture development and resourcing.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

3.8. (U) U.S. policy and planning guidance for development of posture and access in the region is defined in two capstone documents – the GEF (signed by President of the United States) and the JSCP (signed by the Chairman). The JSCP and the Logistics Supplement to the JSCP provides guidance on logistics operations and support. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) defines the geographic space and the broad responsibilities for the Combatant Commander. These are implementation documents directing USG military activities and planning in support of the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and National Military Strategy (NMS). Additional information on implementation of posture efforts within the DoD PPBES is also defined in the Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF). Additionally, posture and access is driven in part to meet operational needs in support of the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy.

3.9. (U) USCENTCOM GDPP was submitted to the Joint Staff in July 2008, and is still in staffing within DoD. It is viewed as the single source document for enduring access and posture planning in

USCENTCOM. It includes posture development within each sub-region to include a recommended approach to improvement of enduring access and posture within Central and South Asia.

3.10. (U) While sustaining access and posture required to address current operational needs is critical, it is essential that we reshape posture and access to meet future long term needs in the region. This includes the need to:

- Address our long term security relationships with key nations in the region to ensure we sustain current access and securing long term enduring access beyond contingencies with refinement of existing agreement or development of new agreements.
- Formalize a DoD process for synchronizing global posture development.
- Coordinate our efforts within the region with key coalition partners to find efficiencies, recognizing that most regional nations prefer to deal bilaterally.

4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Key Assumptions.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

5. (U) Objectives.

5.1. (U) OBJ # 2.1 – U.S. Government (USG) coordinated strategies for the engagement of key partners on enduring posture and access needs are approved and implemented.

5.2. (U) OBJ # 2.2 - Existing agreements are renewed to sustain existing required access.

5.3. (U) OBJ # 2.3 - A formal annual DoD process that validates COCOM posture plans, directs DoD implementation of these posture plans and synchs DoD global posture development efforts is formalized and implemented.

5.4. (U) OBJ # 2.4 - Combined military cooperation is expanded to provide increased situational awareness and improve cooperation on enduring base development in the USCENTCOM AOR.

6. (U) Tasks by Objective with recommended lead responsibility and supporting Lines of Effort (LOEs).

6.1. (U) OBJ # 2.1 - USG coordinated strategies for the engagement of key partners on enduring posture and access needs are approved and implemented.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Develop draft USG strategies for engaging key regional nations on enduring USG/HN security relationships to include posture and access development (KU, QA, UAE, KSA, KYR, KAZ, UZB, IRQ)	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Initiation task
2	Coordinate Country Team position on draft USG strategies for engaging key regional nations on enduring USG/HN security relationships to include posture and access development (KU, QA, OM, UAE, KSA, KYR, BAH, KAZ, UZB, IRQ)		Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1
3	Develop command approved draft USG strategies for engaging key regional nations on enduring USG/HN security relationships to include posture and access development (KU, QA, OM, UAE, KSA, KYR, BAH, KAZ, UZB, IRQ)		Strategy and Plan Development	Task 2
4	Coordinate DoD position on draft USG strategies for engaging key regional nations on enduring USG/HN security relationships to include posture and access development (KU, QA, OM, UAE, KSA, KYR, BAH, KAZ, UZB, IRQ)	CCJ5/JSJ5/OSD-P	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 3
5	Coordinate IA positions on draft USG strategies for engaging key regional nations on enduring USG/HN security	OSD-P	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 4

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
	relationships to include posture and access development (KU, QA, OM, UAE, KSA, KYR, BAH, KAZ, UZB, IRQ)			
6	Publish USG strategies for engaging key regional nations on enduring USG/HN security relationships to include posture and access development (KU, QA, OM, UAE, KSA, KYR, BAH, KAZ, UZB, IRQ)	OSD-P	Implementation	Task 5
7	Determine forums for advancing discussions on security relationship and posture and access issues using existing bilateral forums where possible (Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD); Joint Military Committee (JMC); Military Cooperative Council (MCC); etc)	OSD-P/CCJ5	Implementation	Task 6
8	Conduct bilateral discussions with each key nation to determine common agreement on future posture and access	OSD-P/CCJ5	Diplomatic	Task 7
9	Revise posture and access planning under GDPP to reflect revised approach coming from common agreement in bilateral forums	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 8
10	Draft agreements that reflect common understanding of future posture and access	CCJ5/4/SJA	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 8
11	Coordinate and gain approval of agreement(s) within USG	OSD-P/JSJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 10
12	Seek HN approval of new agreements	Department of State (DoS)/ Office Secretary of Defense (OSD)/CCJ5/4 as agreed to	Diplomatic	Task 11

6.2. (U) OBJ # 2.2 - Existing agreements are renewed to sustain existing required access

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Develop draft agreements to sustain existing posture and access through agreement renewal (OM, KYR, BAH)	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Initiation task
2	Coordinate Country Team position on draft agreements to sustain existing posture and access through agreement	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
	renewal (OM, KYR, BAH)			
3	Develop command approved draft agreements to sustain existing posture and access through agreement renewal (OM, KYR, BAH)		Strategy and Plan Development	Task 2
4	Coordinate DoD position on draft agreements to sustain existing posture and access through agreement renewal (OM, KYR, BAH)	CCJ5/JSJ5/OSD-P	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 3
5	Coordinate IA positions on draft agreements to sustain existing posture and access through agreement renewal (OM, KYR, BAH)	OSD-P	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 4
6	Approve draft agreements to sustain existing posture and access through agreement renewal (OM, KYR, BAH)	OSD-P	Implementation	Task 5
7	Determine forums for advancing discussions on approved USG agreements to sustain existing posture and access through agreement renewal (OM, KYR, BAH)	OSD-P/CCJ5	Implementation	Task 6
8	Conduct bilateral discussions with each key nation to determine common agreement on future posture and access	OSD-P/CCJ5	Diplomatic	Task 7
9	Revise posture and access planning under GDPP to reflect revised approach coming from common agreement in bilateral forums	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 8
10	Finalize agreements that reflect common understanding of future posture and access	CCJ5/4/SJA	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 8
11	Coordinate and gain approval of agreement(s) within USG	OSD-P/JSJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 10
12	Seek HN approval of new agreements	DoS/OSD/ CCJ5/4 as agreed to	Diplomatic	Task 11

6.3. (U) OBJ # 2.3 - A formal annual DoD process that validates COCOM posture plans, directs DoD implementation of these posture plans and synchs DoD global posture development efforts is formalized and implemented

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Conduct Annual GDPP (Global Defense Posture Plan) development conference with USCENTCOM staff and components	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Initiation task

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1b	Conduct annual conference on MILCON project development list (MPPL)	CCJ4	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1a
1c	Continue annual submission of COCOM Theater Posture Plans (called GDPP in USCENTCOM) plans for OSD validation of COCOM requirements	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1b
1d	Conduct formal JPEC review of annual GDPP within DoD	JS	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1c
1e	Validate plan or direct changes in GDPP submission annually and recognize these as enduring validated posture requirements	OSD-P	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1d
1f	Adjust GDPP as directed for Departmental action within PPBES	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1e
1g	Direct Services to address (not direct funding) validated requirements in Budget submissions	OSD/JS J8	Implementation	Task 1f
1h	Finalize annual budgeting decisions on MILCON funding	OSD-C	Implementation	Task 1g
1i	Publish Departmental policy guidance annually and budgeting guidance biannually to support global posture development of prioritized and approved posture requirements from previous submission.	OSD-P/C	Implementation	Task 1h
1j	Adjust GDPP development based on policy and budgeting guidance	CCJ5P	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1i
1k	Implement directed posture and access requirements as directed	USCENTCOM	Implementation	Task 1i
1l	Repeat Task 1a annually	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1i
2	Develop and publish a CJCSI on Theater Posture Plan development process and requirements that details specific requirements within an annual process for all DoD organizations.	JS	Implementation	Initiation task
3	Refine guidance in the GEF and JSCP on TPP development and submission.	OSD-P/JSJ5	Implementation	Initiation task
4	Continue to conduct quarterly GPEC meetings hosted by OSD-P and the DJS to focus on implementation of directed GDP guidance and determine any mid course adjustments to previous guidance/direction.	OSD-P/JS	Implementation	Initiation task

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
5	Expand GDPP development process to include other partner nations ICW OBJ #4 below	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Initiation task

6.4. (U) OBJ # 2.4 - Joint and combined military cooperation is expanded to provide increased situational awareness and improve cooperation on enduring base development in the USCENTCOM AOR.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Coordinate for attendance at posture coordination conference for Five Eyes Partners to share current enduring posture plans for the region	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Initiation task
1b	Conduct annual conference to provide institutional awareness of each countries posture development plans	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1a
1c	Use information to coordinate internal Command posture planning and determine possible common areas for shared support and increased efficiency	CCJ5/Functional CC Staff as appropriate	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1b
1d	Conduct bilateral mil to mil discussions to determine bilateral approach to posture development at enduring locations	Functional CC Staff as appropriate	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1c
1e	Conclude military to military agreements where possible to improve support	Functional CC Staff as appropriate	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1d
1f	Draft bilateral Government to Government agreements between Five Eyes countries	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 1e
1g	Coordinate USG approval of bilateral agreements	OSD-P	Diplomatic	Task 1f
1h	Conclude bilateral agreements	OSD-P	Diplomatic	Task 1g
1i	Implement agreements	CC	Implementation	Task 1h/1e
2a	Determine potential coordination requirements desired outside of Five Eyes	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Initiation task
2b	Seek approval for military to military coordination with additional partner nations on posture and access in the region	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 2a
2c	Conduct bilateral military to military discussions to determine bilateral approach to posture development at enduring locations	CCJ5/Functional CC Staff as appropriate	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 2b
2d	Conclude military to military	Functional CC Staff	Strategy and	Task 2c

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
	agreements where possible to improve support	as appropriate	Plan Development	
2e	Draft bilateral Government to Government agreements between countries	Functional CC Staff as appropriate	Strategy and Plan Development	Task 2d
2f	Coordinate USG approval of bilateral agreements	OSD –P	Diplomatic	Task 2e
2g	Conclude bilateral agreements	OSD-P	Diplomatic	Task 2f
2h	Implement agreements	CC	Implementation	Task 2g/2d

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

- 7.1. (U) Current access agreements renewed in OM, KYR, BAH.
- 7.2. (U) Annual Theater Posture Plan developed, submitted, and approved by OSD.
- 7.3. (U) TPP used in annual PPBES process for MILCON resourcing.
- 7.4. (U) Formal DoD Global Defense Posture process documented in Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) and used in annual review and approval process.
- 7.5. (U) Approved U.S. Government (USG) strategies for engagement of KU, QA, UAE, KSA, KYR, KAZ, UZB, IRQ approved.
- 7.6. (U) KU, QA, UAE, KSA, KYR, KAZ, UZB, IRQ engaged on long term access and posture.
- 7.7. (U) Long term posture and access approved for KU, QA, UAE, KSA, KYR, KAZ, UZB, IRQ.
- 7.8 (U) Coalition posture development conferences conducted annually at Five Eyes (FVEY) level.
- 7.9. (U) Coalition posture development conferences expanded to expand to other critical regional partners.
- 7.10. (U) Bilateral agreements for cooperative posture and infrastructure development and use developed and implemented.

8. (U) Resources.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

- 8.2. (U) Costs associated with other subordinate goals will require additional travel funding, some of which is funded by each nation. Costs estimate will require determination of number of personnel and number of trips and is undetermined at this time.

9. (U) Additional Authorities or revised authorities required. Current authorities are deemed sufficient.

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

10.1. (U) Current OSD position restricts any renegotiation of existing Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) which counters many HN wishes and stymies future access and posture discussions.

10.2. (U) Current baseline funding for COCOM proposed GDPP MILCON must be advanced through Service components to be included in Service budgets or introduced late in Programming and Budgeting Review process that disrupts Service and departmental Budgeting. This can be mitigated by providing specific funding to GDPP and allocated by OSD based on their prioritization of all COCOM proposed overseas MILCON projects or OSD directing the funding of COCOM proposed overseas MILCON projects within Service budgets based on their prioritization.

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures.

11.1. (U) Timing of discussions on long term access and posture may jeopardize current support provided by HN. This can be mitigated by delaying discussions until current support is not as critical to current operations. Planning will have to recognize current capabilities and plan within this framework.

11.2. (U) USG baseline funding may not be available for MILCON projects. This can be mitigated by continued use of O&M funding for expeditionary measures where possible and seeking HN funding and USG supplemental funding where possible.

Tab A – USCENTCOM Master Plan Priority List (MPPL)

Tab A (MPPL) Appendix 3 (Enduring Basing) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

FY10-15 MPPL by Base

Data as of 23 Jun 2008

Afghanistan

Bagram

MPPL	MPPL Project No.	Service	St us	FY	Project Title	PA \$M	Fund Stgy
001	UH 08-0100	AFCENT	Maintained	2008	Parallel Taxiway (Phase II)	\$21.40	GWOT
002	UH 08-0101	AFCENT	Maintained	2008	East Side Helo Ramp Expansion	\$44.40	GWOT
003	UH 07-3004	AFCENT	Maintained	2008	Strategic Aircraft Ramp	\$43.00	GWOT
005	68067	ARCENT	Maintained	2008	Power Plant	\$41.00	GWOT
010	64128	ARCENT	Maintained	2008	Base Ops (Admin) Compound	\$13.80	GWOT
012	68082	ARCENT	Maintained	2008	ASP	\$62.00	GWOT
016	64131	ARCENT	Maintained	2008	Bagram Base Roads \$	27.00	GWOT
018	70042	ARCENT	Maintained	2008	Aircraft Maintenance Hangar	\$5.10	GWOT
020	69393	ARCENT	Maintained	2008	Fuel System Phase 3 (South 2.1Mgal TS1)	\$23.00	GWOT
021	69395	ARCENT	Maintained	2008	Fuel System Phase 4 (South, 1.5 Mgal JP8)	\$21.00	GWOT
025	72240	ARCENT	New	2008	Power Plant Expansion (20MW)	\$35.00	Title X 2808
026	72271	ARCENT	New	2008	BAF Exp Housing Replacement Phase 1 (2790pn)	\$60.00	Title X 2808
027	72272	ARCENT	New	2008	Construct Barracks #10	\$5.20	Title X 2808
028	72244	ARCENT	New	2008	Extend East Side Power Line	\$1.25	Title X 2808
029	72243	ARCENT	New	2008	Construct Drainage System, Phase 1	\$18.50	Title X 2808
030	72241	ARCENT	New	2008	Construct New Roads	\$36.00	Title X 2808

16 2008 Projects \$457.65 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$457.7

034	70037	ARCENT	Maintained	2009	SOF HQ Complex	\$19.00	Baseline
036	69396	ARCENT	Maintained	2009	Fuel System Phase 5	\$22.00	Baseline
037	70023	ARCENT	Maintained	2009	Fuel System Phase 8	\$26.00	Baseline
038	UH09-100	AFCENT	Maintained	2009	C130 Maintenance Hangar	\$27.40	Baseline
039	Baseline	UH09-0101	AFCENT	Maintained	2009	Cargo Handling Area Expansion	\$8.80
040	Baseline	UH09-0102	AFCENT	Maintained	2009	Refueler Ramp	\$21.00
042	72650	ARCENT	New	2009	BAF Exp Housing Replacement Phase 2 (4210pn)	\$90.00	GWOT

7 2009 Projects \$214.20 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$214.2

044	71488	ARCENT	New	2010	Coalition Operations Center	\$49.00	Baseline
046	\$17.00	UH 10-0101	Baseline	AFCENT	Maintained	2010	Passenger Terminal
048	71489	ARCENT	New	2010	CMU Barracks Phase 11-15 (800 pn)	\$18.50	Baseline
049	72606	ARCENT	New	2010	BAF Exp Housing Replace Phase 3 (4210pn)	\$91.00	GWOT
057	71493	ARCENT	New	2010	Perimeter Fence and Guard Towers	\$7.00	Baseline
058	69398	ARCENT	Changed	2010	East Fuel System Phase 6 (Retail ops/storage)	\$12.00	Baseline
059	69403	ARCENT	Changed	2010	North Fuel System Phase 7 (Lab)	\$5.00	Baseline
060	72095	ARCENT	New	2010	CJSOAO Operational Support Facility	\$2.60	Baseline
061	72126	ARCENT	New	2010	SOF HQ Support Facilities	\$30.00	Baseline
062	71491 A	RCENT	New	2010	APS Compound	\$38.00	Baseline

10 2010 Projects \$270.10 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$270.1

063	69404	ARCENT	Maintained	2011	Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC)	\$2.61	Baseline
064	UH 11-0104	AFCENT	New	2011	Fighter Hangar	\$21.00	Baseline

065	Baseline	UH 11-0103	AFCENT	New	2011	Medevac Ramp and Fire Station	\$16.00	
066	71602	ARCENT	New	2011	CMU Barracks Phase 16-20		\$19.00	Baseline
068	71606	ARCENT	New	2011	Improve ECP 1		\$8.00	Baseline
069	71604	ARCENT	New	2011	East Side Utilities Infrastructure		\$30.00	Baseline
070	71605	ARCENT	New	2011	East Side Electrical Distribution		\$11.00	Baseline
074	\$11.80	UH 11-0101	AFCENT	New	2011	Consolidated Rigging Facility		
076	68083	ARCENT	Maintained	2011	Consolidated Community Support Area (DFAC,		\$16.00	Baseline
077	72125	ARCENT	New	2011	SOF Alpha Ramp Facilities		\$9.70	Baseline
079	72242	ARCENT	New	2011	Army Aviation HQ Facilities		\$20.00	Baseline

11 2011 Projects \$165.11 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$165.1

44 Bagram Projects \$1,107.06 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$1,107.1

Kandahar AF

MPPL MPPL Project No. Service Status FY Project Title PA \$M Fund Stgy

014	LYAV 07-3001	AFCENT	Maintained	2008	ISR Ramp		\$26.30	GWOT
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1 2008 Projects \$26.30 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$26.3

043	72591	ARCENT	New	2009	KAF Exp Housing Replacement Phase 1 3348pn		\$77.00	GWOT
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1 2009 Projects \$77.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$77.0

078	72603	ARCENT	New	2011	KAF Housing Replacement Phase 2 (3348?pn)		\$79.00	GWOT
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1 2011 Projects \$79.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$79.0

3 Kandahar AF Projects \$182.30 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$182.3

Bahrain Manama

MPPL MPPL Project No. Service Status FY Project Title PA \$M Fund Stgy

045	P928	NAVCENT	Changed	2010	Waterfront Development, Phase II		\$42.81	Baseline
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1 2010 Projects \$42.81 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$42.8

067	P935	NAVCENT	Changed	2011	Transient Qtrs TQ3 15,200 SM		\$31.03	Baseline
075	P908	NAVCENT	Maintained	2011	Operations Support Facility		\$36.32	Baseline
081	P936	NAVCENT	Maintained	2011	Transient Qtrs TQ4 15,200 SM		\$26.68	Baseline

3 2011 Projects \$94.03 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$94.0

084	P909	NAVCENT	Maintained	2012	Waterfront Utilities, Phase I		\$41.42	Baseline
085	P906	NAVCENT	Changed	2012	Aviation Maint & Logistics Facilities		\$77.54	Baseline
089	P937	NAVCENT	Changed	2012	Bachelor Enlisted Qtrs 2 18,200SM		\$32.79	Baseline PDM
090	P938	NAVCENT	Changed	2012	Bachelor Enlisted Qtrs 3 18,200 SM		\$32.11	Baseline PDM

4 2012 Projects \$183.86 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$183.9

091	P940	NAVCENT	Changed	2013	Combined Dining Facility 3,400 SM		\$10.81	Baseline
092	P934	NAVCENT	Maintained	2013	Transient Qtrs TQ-2 Addition 1970SM		\$3.69	Baseline
094	P950	NAVCENT	Maintained	2013	NSA Composite Security Facility		\$29.66	Baseline
096	P910	NAVCENT	Maintained	2013	Waterfront Utilities, Phase II		\$18.85	Baseline

4 2013 Projects \$63.01 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$63.0

101	P939	NAVCENT	Changed	2014	Bachelor Enlisted Qtrs 4		\$33.56	Baseline
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1 2014 Projects \$33.56 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$33.6

13 Manama Projects \$417.27 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$417.3

Kuwait

Al Jaber AF

MPPL	MPPL Project No.	Service	Status	FY	Project Title	PA \$M	Fund Stgy
K16	ACVZ 09-3001	AFCENT	Maintained	9999	WRM Compound Fence and Infrastructure	46.00	HN

1 9999 Projects \$46.00 HN Total \$46.0/US Total: \$0.0

Ali As Salem

MPPL	MPPL Project No.	Service	Status	FY	Project Title	PA \$M	Fund Stgy
K08	AEWV 08-1054	AFCENT	New	9999	Upgrade Echo 8 Gate	\$10.63	HN
K09	AEWV 06-3002	AFCENT	Maintained	9999	C130 Maintenance Hangar	\$15.00	HN
K10	AEWV 08-3004	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Hot Cargo Pad	\$4.00	HN
K11	AEWV 08-3006	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Tactical Airlift Ramp	\$70.00	HN
K12	AEWV 08-3007	AFCENT	Maintained	9999	POL Storage / Distribution	\$25.00	HN
K13	AEWV 08-3008	AFCENT	Maintained	9999	Munitions Storage Complex	\$45.00	HN
K14	AEWV 07-3005	AFCENT	Maintained	9999	Fire Water Distribution System	\$3.38	HN
K15	AEWV 08-3005	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Sewage Package Plant	\$2.00	HN
K17	AEWV 06-3001	AFCENT	Maintained	9999	Level II/III Hospital, Regional. AAS or W. Mubarak	\$12.60	HN

9 Ali As Salem Projects \$187.61 HN Total \$187.6/US Total: \$0.0

Arifjan

MPPL	MPPL Project No.	Service	Status	FY	Project Title	PA \$M	Fund Stgy
022	70025	ARCENT	Maintained	2008	Theater Communications Facility	\$30.00	GWOT

1 2008 Projects \$30.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$30.0

055	71484	ARCENT	New	2010	APS-5 HBCT Facilities (8 PEB) 200x600	\$82.00	Baseline
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1 2010 Projects \$82.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$82.0

K02	62866	ARCENT	New	9999	APS-5 Large Maintenance Facility	\$35.00	HN
K03	62934	ARCENT	Maintained	9999	Base Operations Admin Buildings	\$6.70	HN
K04	71485	ARCENT	New	9999	APS-5 2015 (8)	\$26.00	HN
K05		ARCENT	Maintained	9999	Utility Upgrades	\$9.60	HN
K06	61574	ARCENT	Changed	9999	APS-5 Controlled Humidity Warehouses, 6 each	\$37.00	HN

5 9999 Projects \$114.30 HN Total \$114.3/US Total: \$0.0

7 Arifjan Projects \$226.30 HN Total \$114.3/US Total: \$112.0

Kuwait Naval Base

MPPL	MPPL Project No.	Service	Status	FY	Project Title	PA \$M	Fund Stgy
K07	71610	ARCENT	New	9999	Water Craft Storage	\$2.00	HN

1 9999 Projects \$2.00 HN Total \$2.0/US Total: \$0.0

West Mubarek AB

MPPL	MPPL Project No.	Service	Status	FY	Project Title	PA \$M	Fund Stgy
K01	MMDN 08-3001	AFCENT	Maintained	9999	Relocate KCIA APOD	\$115.00	HN

1 9999 Projects \$115.00 HN Total \$115.0/US Total: \$0.0

Kyrgyzstan

Manas AFB

MPPL MPPL Project No. Service Status FY Project Title PA \$M Fund Stgy

013	BRVN 07-0101	AFCENT	Maintained	2008	Strategic Airlift Ramp	\$30.30	GWOT
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1 2008 Projects \$30.30 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$30.3

041	BRVN09-0100	AFCENT	Maintained	2009	Hot Cargo Pad	\$6.00	Baseline
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1 2009 Projects \$6.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$6.0

2 Manas AFB Projects \$36.30 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$36.3

Oman

Masirah AF

MPPL MPPL Project No. Service Status FY Project Title PA \$M Fund Stgy

019	PKVV 07-0001	AFCENT	Maintained	2008	Expeditionary Beddown Site work	\$6.30	GWOT
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1 2008 Projects \$6.30 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$6.3

AI Musanah AB

MPPL MPPL Project No. Service Status FY Project Title PA \$M Fund Stgy

047	AMAB 08-3000	AFCENT	Changed	2010	WRM relocation from Seeb	\$47.00	Baseline
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1 2010 Projects \$47.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$47.0

082	AMAB 11-0001	AFCENT	Changed	2011	Airlift Ramp and Fuel Facilities	\$69.00	Baseline
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1 2011 Projects \$69.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$69.0

095	AMAB12-10001	AFCENT	New	2013	WRM Complex (Long Range)	\$176.00	Baseline
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1 2013 Projects \$176.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$176.0

098	AMAB14-10001	AFCENT	New	2014	Taxiway and Engine Runup Pad	\$50.00	Baseline
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099	AMAB11-0001	AFCENT	Changed	2014	Strategic Airlift Hub	\$69.70	Baseline
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2 2014 Projects \$119.70 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$119.7

103	AMAB12-0002	AFCENT	New	2015	Temporary Beddown Area	\$15.90	Baseline
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1 2015 Projects \$15.90 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$15.9

6 AI Musanah AB Projects \$427.60 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$427.6

Qatar

AI Udeid

MPPL MPPL Project No. Service Status FY Project Title PA \$M Fund Stgy

017	ALUA 07-3010	SOCOM	Maintained	2008	Logistic Storage Warehouse	\$6.60	GWOT
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023	ALUA 073008	AFCENT	New	2008	Facility Replacement	\$40.00	GWOT
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024	ALUA 07-3004	AFCENT	Changed	2008	North Ramp (previously CAS Ramp)	\$60.40	GWOT
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3 2008 Projects \$107.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$107.0

033	ALUA 59-900	SOCOM	Maintained	2009	SOF Joint Use Training Facility	\$9.20	Baseline
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1 2009 Projects \$9.20 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$9.2

050	ALUA 07-3006	AFCENT	Changed	2010	Millennium Village Ph 2, 7 Dorms and support.	\$181.00	Baseline
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1 2010 Projects \$181.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$181.0

086	LUA 08-3006	AFCENT	Changed	2012	Millennium Village PH 3, 7 Dorms	\$112.00	Baseline
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1 2012 Projects \$112.00 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$112.0

Q01	ALUA 07-3002	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Parallel Runway	\$143.00	HN
Q02	ALUA 07-3003	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Munitions Storage Complex	\$97.00	HN
Q03	ALUA 08-3001	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Expand Tactical Ramp	\$29.50	HN
Q07	ALUA 08-3035	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Supply Warehouse/Admin	\$10.00	HN
Q08		AFCENT	New	9999	Data Control Center/ Tech Control	\$6.60	HN
Q09		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Comm Facility and Storage	\$7.90	HN
Q10		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Flight line DFAC	\$14.00	HN
Q11	ACC 05-3018	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Pax Terminal, RSO&I	\$15.00	HN
Q12		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Mission Support Facility	\$19.20	HN
Q13	ALUA 08-3030	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Cargo Marshalling Yard 3	\$2.20	HN
Q14	ALUA 08-3050	AFCENT	Changed	9999	MHE Maintenance Facility & Parking	\$2.50	HN
Q15	ALUA 08-3003	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Taxiway Expansion	\$9.80	HN
Q16		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Airlift AMU and Squadron Ops	\$7.00	HN
Q17		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Engine Run-up Pad	\$2.50	HN
Q18	ACC 05-3022	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Contingency/Mobility Equip Storage	\$18.75	HN
Q19	ALUA 07-	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Back Shops and Chute House	\$11.80	HN
Q20	ALUA 08-3034	AFCENT	Changed	9999	C2 Ramp	\$19.90	HN
Q21	ALUA 08-3046	AFCENT	Changed	9999	ISR Parking Apron	\$22.60	HN
Q22		AFCENT	Changed	9999	C2 Hangar	\$20.00	HN
Q23		AFCENT	Changed	9999	C2 AMU and Squadron Ops	\$8.00	HN
Q24		AFCENT	Changed	9999	ISR Maintenance and Support Facilities	\$32.00	HN
Q25	ACC 05-3016	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Universal Hangar and Taxilane	\$23.00	HN
Q26	ALUA 08-3047	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Universal Hangars (2) and Taxilane	\$24.50	HN
Q27		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Fire Station	\$14.00	HN
Q28		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Flightline Clinic	\$7.50	HN
Q29	ALUA 08-3038	AFCENT	Changed	9999	WRM Compound	\$80.00	HN
Q30	ALUA 11-0006	AFCENT	New	9999	AGE Equipment Maint Facility	\$1.60	HN
Q31		AFCENT	New	9999	Fighter Ramp	\$130.00	HN

28 9999 Projects \$779.85 HN Total \$779.9/US Total: \$0.0

34 AI Udeid Projects \$1,189.05 HN Total \$779.9/US Total: \$409.2

As Sayliyah

MPPL	MPPL Project No.	Service	Status	FY	Project Title	PA \$M	Fund Stgy
Q04	71575	ARCENT	New	999	APS 2015 Warehouse (6 each)	\$36.00	HN
Q05	71576	ARCENT	New	9999	Small Maintenance Facility	\$15.00	HN
Q06	71494	ARCENT	Changed	9999	Power Plant Upgrade	\$3.00	HN

3 As Sayliyah Projects \$54.00 HN Total \$54.0/US Total: \$0.0

UAE

Al Dhafra

MPPL	MPPL Project No.	Service	Status	FY	Project Title	PA \$M	Fund Stgy
072	DHAF 07-7001	AFCENT	New	2011	Replace Expeditionary Fuel Line	\$6.80	Baseline

1 2011 Projects \$6.80 HN Total \$0.0/US Total: \$6.8

U01	ALDH 05-3001	AFCENT	Changed	9999	ISR Complex	\$65.00	HN
U02		AFCENT	Maintained	9999	Air Defense Site - Billeting	\$67.00	HN
U03	DHAF 03-3016	AFCENT	Changed	9999	Tank Truck Offload and Fuel Bulk Storage.	\$70.20	HN
U04		AFCENT	Maintained	9999	Combined Flightline Operations Facility	\$3.00	HN
U05		AFCENT	Maintained	9999	Chilled Water Loop System	\$2.50	HN
U06		AFCENT	Maintained	9999	Combined Emergency Svc Center	\$5.33	HN
U07		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Communications Manhole System	\$5.30	HN
U08		AFCENT	Changed	9999	Refueler Maintenance Hangar	\$26.00	HN

8 9999 Projects \$244.33 HN Total \$244.3/US Total: \$0.0

9 AI Dhafra Projects \$251.13 HN Total \$244.3/US Total: \$6.8

134 Projects Total \$4,248.0 US Total = \$2,704.9 HN Total = \$1,543.1

Appendix FOUR (Lines of Communication (LOCs) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations))

1. (U) Subordinate Goal. Existing Lines of Communication (LOCs) Expanded/Improved and New LOCs developed.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

3. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

3.4. (U) The concept of operations involves three Commodity Movement Methods (CMM):

- CMM 1: Direct Commercial Prime Vendor Delivery. DLA is the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and will monitor delivery of supplies. Prime vendor accepts the risk and ownership of cargo until it reaches the final destination. Estimated time to begin movement is 30 days from time directed to execute. Estimated delivery time is 40 to 60 days dependent on the source of supply.
- CMM 2: Ship cargo via Universal Service Contract (USC) carriers. USTRANSCOM modify USC 05 to establish rates for routes (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, etc). USTRANSCOM is OPR for establishing routes, monitoring movement and diplomatic agreements. Diplomatic permissions from each country may be needed before moving containers on select routes. Estimated delivery time is 40 to 60 days dependent on the source of supply.
- CMM 3: Ship cargo via Third Party Logistics (3PL) carriers. Diplomatic permissions from each country may be needed before moving containers on select routes. Estimated delivery time is 40 to 60 days dependent on the source of supply.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

4. (U) Key Assumptions.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

5. (U) Objectives.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

5.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) OBJ #3.3 –

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

6. (U) Tasks by Objective with recommended lead responsibility and supporting Lines of Effort (LOEs).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

8. (U) Resources.

8.1. (U) U.S. dollars for infrastructure (e.g. wash racks, staging areas, etc), leases, fees, and goods and services.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

9. (U) Additional Authorities or revised authorities required. Approved USG-HN documents allowing transient.

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures for this subordinate goal.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)



Appendix FIVE (Theater Retrograde, Reposture, Redeployment, Rebasing, and Reset) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

- 1. (U) Subordinate Goal** - Necessary logistical planning and support is in place to support Theater Retrograde, Reposture, Redeployment, Rebasing, and Reset (5Rs).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

- 3. (U) Discussion.**

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

4. (U) Key Assumptions.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

8. (U) Resources.

8.1. (U) National resources are available (e.g. funds, personnel, materiel, common-user transportation).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

9. (U) Additional Authorities or revised authorities required.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures for this subordinate goal.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Appendix SIX (Setting conditions in Afghanistan) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

4. (U) Key Assumptions.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

5. (U) Objectives.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

8. (U) Resources.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures for this subordinate goal.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Appendix SEVEN (Enduring Support Organizations and Optimized Processes) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) **Subordinate Goal.** Enduring support organizations and optimized processes are established.
2. (U) **Executive Summary.** Effective integration of logistics at the theater level with a relatively flat, joint command structure is critical to the success of sustaining land, sea, air, and special operations forces. Instead, a complicated Combat Service Support (CSS) network exists, task organized for the two combined joint operating areas that attempts to maximize existing national, service, and theater capabilities or infrastructure to propel combat, reconstruction, and engagement operations forward. A single theater-wide, operational level Joint Task Force -Logistics (JTF-Log) will provide the Commander U.S. Central Command (CDR USCENTCOM) with a single entry point for theater operational logistics, unity of effort, and economy of force. An envisioned, JTF-Log will plan, prepare, and execute operational-level distribution and sustainment (including contracting) in support of operations throughout the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). USCENTCOM requires a strategic, theater-wide information access and information sharing logistics portal that provides a theater-wide Logistics Common Operational Picture (LOGCOP). While service logistics systems have evolved and are successful, there is not currently an information system to support strategic, theater wide combine/joint logistics operations that provide accurate real-time logistics information. The LOGCOP is supportive of the Theater JTF-LOG. The Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) is an initiative to synchronize operational contract support across the USCENTCOM Theater of operations. The JTSCC will replace the existing Joint Contracting Command -Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) with a focus on theater-wide contracting. Upon creation of a JTF-Log, the JTSCC could become a subordinate organization providing a single organization for theater logistics and contracting.

3. (U) **Discussion.**

3.1. (U) Joint Task Force – Logistics.

3.1.1. (U) The necessity to sustain military forces will always be a critical capability that COCOM commanders require to obtain victory over enemy forces and to build trust and confidence with our allies and regional partners. Logistics, interoperability issues, and command and control (C2) continue to challenge and complicate operations for the U.S. military and our allies alike. To meet these challenges COCOM's require highly trained, rapidly deployable and responsive logistics commands with Theater-wide asset visibility that can expand and contract to meet full spectrum operations and effectively partner with land, maritime, air, special operations components, and coalition forces in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. Currently, there is no single joint or lead service headquarters for comprehensive, multifunctional, and fully synchronized, integrated Joint Theater logistics sustainment coordination. Instead a complicated CSS network exists, task organized to support two Combined Joint Operating Area (CJOAs) that attempts to maximize existing national, service, and theater capabilities or infrastructure to propel combat, reconstruction, and engagement operations forward. Effective synchronization and integration of logistics at the theater level with a relatively flat, joint command structure with a single view of logistical assets is critical to the success of sustaining land, sea, air, and special operations forces.²

². A senior member of the team had the following comment: As proposed, JTF-Logistics at end state is a hybrid of the lead service concept and not a truly integrated functional headquarters that maybe required in the Central Command Area of

3.1.2. (U) To optimize and synchronize Joint Theater sustainment, distribution, and Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward movement (JRSO) operations to increase agility and responsiveness in support of future contingency operations requires a single theater-wide, operational level Joint Task Force - Logistics (JTF-Log) with Theater level Logistics Common Operational Picture (LOGCOP) capability. An envisioned JTF-Log will plan, prepare, and execute operational-level distribution and sustainment (including contracting) in support of operations throughout the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). This will provide the CDR USCENTCOM with a single entry point for theater operational logistics, unity of effort, and economy of force.

3.1.3. (U) A Joint logistics construct must:

- Set subordinate command up for success.
- Address areas and functions not assigned to subordinate commands and on cross-cutting issues and responsibilities.
- Strengthen war fighter confidence that the right capabilities (forces, equipment, material) will be at the right place at the right time.
- Mature theater distribution/sustainment architecture to support operations.
- Synchronize all AOR logistics operations from strategic through tactical levels.
- Right-size CSS footprint in support of strategic over watch posture.
- Be able to support and be supported by the Service Components and coalition partners and organizations.
- Conform to USC Title 10 requirements and Department of Defense (DoD) Joint logistics transformation initiatives.

3.1.4. (U) Currently the phased approach to a joint logistics construct is:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Responsibility. It is basically just another term for doing what the services and the Central Command headquarters are doing now. By nature a JTF is supposed to have an objective focus mission and not an enabling focus. JTF-Logistics may not be able to provide the combatant and service component commanders the strategic/operational level combat service support required. None of our principles of war focus on sustainment, because it applies to all of them. Sustainment is joint in nature already. We should not violate unity of command, to obtain a logistics unity of effort as proposed. Whether we speak of service, joint, multinational, or hybrid logistics command and control concepts, they have to be able to sustain victory over our enemies. Recommend that further mission analysis be conducted on the need for a Joint Logistics Command and that it include non-logisticians in the process.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3.2. (U) Logistic Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP).

3.2.1. (U) USCENTCOM requires a single theater-wide, operational level Joint logistics common operational picture (LOGCOP) portal to optimize and synchronize sustainment, distribution, and Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward movement (JRSO) operations to enable agility and responsiveness in support of future contingency operations in multiple CJOAs when USCENTCOM reaches strategic over watch posture. USCENTCOM lacks interoperable information technology (IT) to integrate joint logistics planning, more effectively integrate logistics support to joint operations, optimize Service component resources, improve in-transit and cross-service asset visibility, enable cross-service situational awareness, improve service supply chain interoperability and complementary support, reduce redundant supply chains and improve Joint contracting capacity and accountability. There is no DoD standard LOGCOP portal to optimize and synchronize theater-wide common user logistics, common user land transport, contracting and foreign military sales operations. Current Global Combat Support System-Joint (GCSS-J) does not provide AOR level logistics collaboration, and a logistics Common Operating Picture, and support the decision making process.

3.2.2. (U) USCENTCOM, in concert with Joint Staff J4, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) will develop a user friendly, point and click Theater-wide, Combatant Command/CJTF operational and strategic level Joint LOGCOP. Initial phase of LOGCOP development will begin with the design of USCENTCOM J4 watch board and the initial mapping of functional business processes associated with Class III bulk fuel, Class V munitions, and air/surface intra-theater distribution. Development will be coordinated through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved GCSS-J agile development process. USJFCOM as USCENTCOM's agent, will develop the LOGCOP requirements management plan, functional requirement mapping processes, and serve as USCENTCOM's team integrator. USJFCOM will coordinate USCENTCOM LOGCOP integration requirements through DISA by means of requirements New Requirements Request Form (NRRF) process for high level requirements identification and Use Case and User Story outlining detailed functional requirements. USCENTCOM LOGCOP functional process mapping, integration and operational testing will be a collaborative effort between user and developer. LOGCOP development effort began July 2008 and will continue through July 2010 as follow-on functional business processes are developed and integrated in support of CJTF-Log.

3.3. (U) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC).

3.3.1. (U) This is an initiative to synchronize operational contract support (OCS) across the USCENTCOM Theater of operations. Due to Title 10, Services initially executed operational contract support for their own forces during OIF/OEF. The absence of a joint management organization for OCS within both CJOAs resulted in virtually no synchronization of contracting efforts, created unnecessary competition for resources, and produced an inefficient contract support environment. USCENTCOM formed the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq in 2004 to mitigate these challenges. In 2005, Afghanistan came under their purview, thus forming what is now known as JCC-I/A. The JCC-I/A has OCS responsibility for two CJOAs, but is a major subordinate command of, and is collocated with, MNF-I. This presents complexities with contracting unity of effort and synergy since MNF-I is

focused on a single CJOA. OCS for OIF/OEF is directly tied to supporting efforts in other AOR countries such as Kuwait and Pakistan. JCC-I/A has no visibility over OCS in these supporting countries and, thus, no synchronization of contracting efforts across theater is being performed.

3.3.2. (U) Joint doctrine for OCS (JP4-10) prescribes establishing a JTSCC as a possible contracting organizational option for more oversight of larger complex contingency operations that involve different Service forces. The JTSCC, by design, is a joint functional command that has C2 authority over designated Service component theater support contracting organizations and contracting personnel in an AOR. This creates an opportunity to “rethink” the current contract management organizational structure to gain efficiencies and better synchronization of OCS throughout the theater.

3.3.3. (U) A JTSCC gives the CDR USCENTCOM a single entity responsible for contracting. A JTSCC:

- Provides a strategic alignment of contracts within the AOR.
- Ensures standardized acquisition strategies, management and policies/procedures.
- Saves dollars through consolidation of like contracts, avoids duplication, and reduces competition of resources.
- Is expandable for future operations.
- Increases the Cdr’s ability to link contracting support to civil-military aspects.
- Addresses Congressional concerns on centralized contract management/oversight.

3.3.3.1. (U) The JTSCC is an independent effort from the CCJ4’s theater logistics transformation initiative, but they complement each other. Upon creation of a JTF-Log, the JTSCC could become a subordinate organization thus providing the GCC a single POC for logistics and contracting.

3.3.3.2. (U) To date CCJ4, MNF-I CJ1/4/8, ARCENT G4, and JCC-I/A recommended the JTSCC concept move forward for further analysis on the feasibility of implementing a JTSCC. CCJ4 hosts a working group with the initial priority of conducting a gap analysis and identifying the benefits of establishing such an organization. Subsequent priorities will be to address major issues and, if approved, develop an implementation plan. The JTSCC initiative has merit for improving theater operational contract support management.

4. (U) Key Assumptions.

4.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Joint Task Force-Log.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

5. (U) Objectives.

- 5.1. (U) OBJ # 6.1 – USCENTCOM Theater Joint Task Force – Logistics (JTF-LOG) is established.
- 5.2. (U) OBJ # 6.2 – Logistics Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP) is developed.
- 5.3. (U) OBJ # 6.3 – Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) is established.

6. (U) Tasks by Objective with recommended lead responsibility and supporting Lines of Effort (LOEs).

- 6.1. (U) OBJ # 6.1 – USCENTCOM Theater Joint Task Force – Logistics (JTF-LOG) is established.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Phase 1: Establish USCENTCOM Theater-wide Army Single Logistics Command and Control NLT 3d QTR FY 09.	CCJ4	Implementation	
2	Phase 2: Establish USARCENT Joint Enabled Theater Sustainment Command NLT 2Q FY 10.	CCJ4	Implementation	
3	Phase 3: Establish USCENTCOM Joint Task Force Logistics Command NLT 1Q FY 12.	CCJ4	Implementation	Sub Goal 6 j Obj 3

- 6.2. (U) OBJ # 6.2 – Logistics Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP) is developed.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	USCENTCOM J4 ICW USJFCOM and	USJFCOM	Implementation	

	DISA identify and map data requirements and IT system feed to develop a Theater Class III bulk fuel LOGCOP with appropriate management metrics to visualize and manage distribution within the USCENCOM AOR NLT June 09.			
2	USCENTCOM J4 ICW USJFCOM and DISA identify and map data requirements and IT system feed to develop a Theater Class V munitions LOGCOP with appropriate management metrics to visualize and manage distribution within the USCENCOM AOR NLT Aug 09.	CCJ4	Implementation	
3	USCENTCOM J4 ICW USJFCOM and DISA identify and map data requirements and IT system feed to develop a Theater Distribution LOGCOP with appropriate management metrics to visualize and manage distribution within the USCENCOM AOR Sep 09.	CCJ4	Implementation	
4	USCENTCOM J4 ICW USJFCOM and DISA identify and map data requirements and IT system feed to develop a Theater Prepositioned material and equipment set capability LOGCOP with appropriate management metrics to visualize and manage distribution within the USCENCOM AOR Jan10.	CCJ4	Implementation	
5	USCENTCOM J4 ICW USJFCOM and DISA identify and map data requirements and IT system feed to develop a Critical Commodity LOGCOP with appropriate management metrics to visualize and manage distribution within the USCENCOM AOR NLT Apr 10.	USJFCOM	Implementation	Sub Goal 6 Obj 1

6.3. (U) OBJ # 6.3 – Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) is established.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Using the Working Group (WG) approach, continue to socialize the concept and resolve issues and concerns voiced by the Contracting Community of Interest (COI)	CCJ4	Strategy and Plan Development	Sub Goal 6 Obj 1
2	USCENTCOM ICW ARCENT, AFCENT, NAVCENT, MARCENT,	CCJ4	Strategy and Plan	

	JCC-I/A and the Army's Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) continue to develop and NLT May 09 finalizes the CONOPS based on the WG charter.		Development	
3	Brief Senior Leaders (USCENTCOM J4, ARCENT, AFCENT, JSJ4) on the benefits of this organizational construct and obtain their approval/buy-in of the JTSCC concept NLT Aug 09.	CCJ4	Strategy and Plan Development	
4	Decision Brief to USCENTCOM Command Group NLT Sep 09.	CCJ4	Implementation	
5	Implementation Planning/USCENTCOM FRAGO with IOC NLT Dec 09	CCJ4	Implementation	Sub Goal 7 Obj 3

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

7.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Metrics: JTF-LOG.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

8. (U) Resources.

8.1. (U) Joint Task Force-Log.

- U.S. Army Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) with its Expeditionary Sustainment Commands (ESC).
- Involvement of National Partners – USTRANSCOM, DLA, DCMA.

8.2. (U) LOGCOP.

- Continuation of USJFCOM project management through Joint War fighter Challenge.
- Continuation of DISA technical development support.
- Involvement of Component and National partner SME.
- Joint Staff J4 KBL technical development support.

8.3. (U) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC).

- Operation and Maintenance funding for the HQ.
- Additional manning requirements.

9. (U) Additional Authorities or revised authorities required.

9.1. (U) Joint Task Force-Log.

- A joint logistics construct is supported by U.S. law, Joint doctrine, and Army doctrine all of which allows a combatant commander to tailor the organization to meet his mission requirements.
- U.S. Code, Title 10 provides the COCOM authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. Joint doctrine allows the COCOM Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) - authority to issue directives necessary to optimize use or reallocate resources, prevent or eliminate redundant facilities or overlapping functions. It also states the COCOMs may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate joint force Commander (JFC) as required to accomplish the JFC's assigned mission. Joint Pub 4-0 states a COCOM may establish a JTL element to integrate and synergize logistic capabilities. Options include: augment J-4, use a service organization, delegate to a JTF commander, and establish a stand alone logistics agency.

- Army doctrine for a Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) allows that a TSC is capable of planning, controlling, and synchronizing all operational-level sustainment operations for the JFC.

9.2. (U) LOGCOP.

- Services support to allow for data mining of Service IT logistics systems.
- USJFCOM and DISA project management of implementation and required modification of Global Combat Support System-Joint (GCSS-J) to provide AOR level logistics collaboration.

9.3. (U) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) is IAW JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support and provides the necessary doctrine for implementation.

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

- (U) Joint Task Force-Log.
 - CONOPS must support CDR USCENCOM's Theater Strategy and Campaign Plan.
 - Organization must conform to USC Title 10 and capitalize on DoD Joint Logistics transformation initiatives.
 - Organization must yield a reduction in current CSS HQ footprint.
 - Organization must deliver Enterprise-wide visibility and provide access to real-time, shared information about requirements, resources, and processes.
 - Theater OPTEMPO limits ability to conduct exercises and experimentation to validate "good ideas."
 - Organization won't touch Components' tactical level logistics units.
 - Coalition interoperability management.
- (U) LOGCOP.
 - Theater IT systems and bandwidth must be capable of fully supporting fully developed USCENCOM GCSS-J LOGCOP with associated system software.
 - Theater OPTEMPO limits ability to conduct component process mapping and user tests below the COCOM staff level.
 - USCENCOM requires a theater-wide information access and information sharing logistics GCSS-J portal in order to enable theater-wide logistics C2.
 - Will require significant development to the information available through GCSS-J and mold it into information package that is timely, relevant, and accurate that supports all CDR USCENCOM decision support templates.
- (U) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC).
 - Will require implementing new C2 relationships (base already formed with JCC-I/A).
 - Will require the development of a JMD (JCC-I/A already has a JMD).
 - Will generally require an increase in the number of HQ staff personnel needed (current estimate is an additional 42 personnel).
 - Services' contracting officers may not be familiar with policies and procedures of the joint command (JCC-I/A standard policies/procedures already established).
 - Conflict between C2 and contracting authorities may engender a conflict of interest (JCC-I/A already working under this type of arrangement).

11.1. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures for this subordinate goal.

11.1. (U) Risk and mitigation – Reluctance and/or resistance to change

- Reluctance and/or resistance to change from organizations or institutions due to potential shifts in command relationships; authorities; responsibilities; and resources. Recommended improved logistics organizations and processes will enhance our ability to execute requirements rapidly and successfully. JTF-Log, LOGCOP, and JTSCC may be viewed by USCENTCOM commands, the Services, and national partners as a loss of authority and resources.
- An effective information campaign is required to socialize the merits of each initiative and an understanding of how each will benefit all concerned.

11.2. (U) Risk and mitigation – Loss of the LOGCOP objective.

- Loss of the LOGCOP objective to provide AOR level logistics collaboration, and a logistics “Common Operating Picture. The LOGCOP will never be “all things to all people” for tactical, operational, and strategic level logistics managers.
- To ensure the LOGCOP’s success development must be tailored to the operational level of logistics management. LOGCOP must be easy to use with little to no training and intuitive in order for the management information system is effective. Proposed LOGCOP initiatives must be scrutinized by USCENTCOM for applicability at the operational level to ensure that the program’s objectives are achieved.

11.3. (U) Risk and mitigation – Establishment of JTSCC.

- As with the initial establishment of JCC-I/A, Service components view joint initiatives from a Service parochial perspective...that is the JTSCC initiative being a threat to their current Service contracting constructs and Title 10 authorities.
- Senior leaders in USCENTCOM and the Services have initially concurred with the JTSCC initiative, albeit with concerns. The current JTSCC workgroup is socializing issues and are attempting to working mitigations and compromises. Regardless of the implementation decision, numerous positive aspects of the effort will continue, to shape operational contract support synchronization among JCC-I/A and the various Service components.

Appendix EIGHT (Expand Logistics Effort to Improve Regional Stability) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Subordinate Goal. Security, governance, economic development, and building partnership capacity are improved by using logistics efforts.

2. (U) Executive Summary. Building partnership capacity throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR) to improve security, governance, economic development, and regional stability can be assisted by expanding logistics, engineering, and contracting efforts. Objectives include identification of the range of potential actions that can be taken to use host nation assets for the procurement of supplies and services; use of transportation capabilities, including market surveys; and refinement of the procurement process and capacity of joint/service contracting agencies/organizations to support this initiative. Benefits to the U.S. are a potential reduction of our logistical footprint; reduction in strategic and intra-theater lift requirements; achieve economies of scale; stimulate the local economy; and save U.S. resources. Counter benefits are U.S. taxpayer dollars being spent outside the U.S. or given to non-U.S. companies. Expanding these functions also allows us to retain or acquire access and other necessary host nation support.

3. (U) Discussion.

3.1. (U) Expanding logistics, engineering, and contracting to improve security, governance, economic development, and building partnership capacity throughout the AOR. These three functions generate jobs; stimulate the economy; and thereby contribute to creating a stable government environment. A benefit to the U.S. is a potential reduction of our logistical footprint; reduce strategic and intra-theater lift requirements; achieve economies of scale; stimulate the local economy; and save U.S. resources. The counter benefits are U.S. taxpayer dollars being spent outside the U.S.; given to non-U.S. companies; Congressional involvement and audits. Expanding these functions also allows us to retain or acquire access and other necessary host nation support. The stimulus to the economy is achieved in various ways:

- Actual influx of cash for goods, services, fees, land and facility leases (e.g. fuel contracts). Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) currently has a combined estimated daily economic impact in Central Asia, Russia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan of \$2.0M. This economic impact is for the procurement, delivery, and storage of fuel. To accomplish this DESC a combination of international, regional, and host nation companies. All contracts were awarded in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and existing authorities.
- Use of host nation transportation networks and assets that allow for jobs (e.g. use of air/seaports, bottled water plants).
- U.S. or host nation funded construction projects that not only benefit U.S. requirements, but also contribute to the host nation (e.g. bridges).
- Creation of new host nation companies (e.g. trucking, fuel and cold storage) to provide a service to the U.S. and coalition forces.

3.2. (U) Opportunities to consider:

- Northern Distribution Network (NDN) initiative – purchase required items from the local economy (e.g. construction materials, bottled water, fresh fruits and vegetables).

- Jordan Lines of Communication (LOC) – use of their repair facility instead of retrograding materiel to the U.S. or Europe.
- Transfer or donation of excess articles, equipment, and material to authorized host nations to support both security assistance and development initiatives.
- The advent of contractors on the battlefield allows us the opportunity to hire the local workforce for both skilled and unskilled labor requirements.
- In coordination with the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) support expanded economic development and capacity building to achieve regional stability.

3.3. (U) Some major activities that can contribute to this effort are:

- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) through prime vendor contracts (subsistence, fuel, etc). (Tab A)
- USTRANSCOM through transportation contracts.
- Joint and Service contracting agencies/commands.
- Engineering projects (e.g. base camp and runway constructions).
- Lease agreements for facilities, land, or services (e.g. use of Manas airfield and surrounding lands).
- Service contracts (e.g. Army LOGCAP).
- The implementation of the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) and JTF-Log (App 6) will assist in expanding logistics and contracting to improve security, governance, economic development, and building partnership capacity.

3.4. (U) To coordinate and synchronize the efforts of the organizations listed above will require the Joint Staff to designate USCENTCOM as the lead so as to obtain unity of effort with Department of Defense (DoD) supporting organizations.

3.5. (U) Use of locally acquired goods and services by national level providers is constrained by the Berry Amendment and Buy American Acts. Evaluation of offers is highly complex and specific to the facts of the acquisition such as: the particular items being procured; if Berry Amendment or an appropriation act domestic sourcing restriction applies; if domestic offers were received; if foreign offers were received; if subject to the Trade Agreement Act; and if offers from qualifying or Trade Agreement countries were received.

4. (U) Key Assumptions.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

5. (U) Objectives.

5.1. (U) OBJ # 7.1 – The availability and quality of host nation supplies and services are determined to support economic development and building partnership capacity.

5.2. (U) OBJ # 7.2 – The availability and quality of host nation transportation capabilities are determined to support economic development and building partnership capacity.

5.3. (U) OBJ # 7.3 – The process and capacity for rapid coordination between joint and service contracting agencies/organizations within theater, within the U.S. Government (USG), and the coalition are established and working effectively to support the procurement of local supplies, services, and transportation.

6. (U) Tasks by Objective with recommended lead responsibility and supporting Lines of Effort (LOEs).

6.1. (U) OBJ # 7.1 – The availability and quality of host nation supplies and services are determined to support economic development and building partnership capacity.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Identify the range of potential actions that can be taken to support the procurement of local supplies and services, including market surveys and baseline by commodity of current host nation procurements NLT 15 June 2009	DLA	Strategy and Plan development	Sub Goal 3 Obj 1-3 Sub Goal 4 Obj 1 Sub Goal 5 Obj 1 Sub Goal 6 Obj 1, 3
2	Determine legality of potential actions	DLA	Strategy and Plan development	
3	Determine additional costs of potential actions	DLA	Strategy and Plan development	
4	Determine ability to include these potential actions under future contracts	DLA	Strategy and Plan development	
5	Adjust future contracts to address potential actions	DLA	Strategy and Plan development	
6	Conduct Information Operation (IO) campaign to inform the host nation and the region of U.S. efforts to stimulate the economy	DLA	Strategy and Plan development	

6.2. (U) OBJ # 7.2 –Availability and quality of host nation transportation capabilities are determined to support economic development and building partnership capacity.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Identify the range of potential actions that can be taken to support the use of host nation transportation capabilities, including market surveys and baseline by mode of current host nation capabilities NLT 15 June 2009	USTRANSC OM	Strategy and Plan development	Sub Goal 3 Obj 1-3 Sub Goal 4 Obj 1 Sub Goal 5 Obj 1,3 Sub Goal 6 Obj 1, 3
2	Determine legality of potential actions	USTRANSC OM	Strategy and Plan development	
3	Determine additional costs of potential actions	USTRANSC OM	Strategy and Plan development	
4	Determine ability to include these potential actions under future contracts	USTRANSC OM	Strategy and Plan development	
5	Adjust future contracts to address potential actions	USTRANSC OM	Strategy and Plan development	
6	Conduct IO campaign to inform the host nation and the region of U.S. efforts to stimulate the economy	USTRANSC OM	Strategy and Plan development	

6.3. (U) OBJ # 7.3 – The process and capacity for rapid coordination between joint and service contracting agencies/organizations within theater, within the USG, and the coalition are established and working effectively to support the procurement of local supplies, services, and transportation.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Using current authorities, outline required coordination process and requirements for effective execution of procurement of host nation supplies and services; use of transportation; including market surveys and baseline by of current host nation capabilities NLT 15 June 2009. Includes coordination within theater, within the USG, and the coalition and USG	CCJ4	Strategy and Plan development	Sub Goal 3 Obj 1-3 Sub Goal 4 Obj 1 Sub Goal 5 Obj 1

	organizations at the national level (State, Commerce, and USAID as a minimum). Incorporate requirements into the Theater Campaign Plan. Issue guidance to procurement organizations to utilize selection criteria that apply more weight in a selection decision for host nation suppliers.			Sub Goal 6 Obj 1, 3
1b	Provide recommended process adjustments and additional requirements for approval and sourcing based on current authorities. Develop policy similar to Afghan/Iraq First for sourcing theater wide implementation. Includes legality of potential actions.	CCJ4	Strategy and Plan development	
1c	Gain approval of adjusted process and additional requirements.	OSD/JS	Strategy and Plan development	
1d	Formally document USG approved coordination process and source additional approved requirements	JS	Implementation	
1e	Source additional requirements. To include the Joint Staff designating USCENTCOM as the lead so as to obtain unity of effort with DoD supporting organizations.	JS	Implementation	
1f	Execute approved coordination process	All	Implementation	
2a	Using expanded authorities, outline required coordination process and requirements for effective execution of procurement of host nation supplies and services; use of transportation. Includes coordination within theater, within the USG, and the coalition and USG organizations at the national level	CCJ4	Strategy and Plan development	
2b	Provide recommended process adjustments and additional requirements for approval and sourcing based on current authorities. Includes legality of potential actions	CCJ4	Strategy and Plan development	
2c	Gain approval of adjusted process and additional requirements	OSD/JS	Strategy and Plan development	
2d	Formally document USG approved coordination process and source additional approved requirements	JS	Implementation	

2e	Source additional requirements	JS/Services/ COCOMs	Implementation	
2f	Execute approved coordination process	All	Implementation	

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

- 7.1. (U) The initial goal is to complete the market surveys and baseline by 15 June 2009.
- 7.2. (U) Using existing authorities increase host nation procurements up to 15 percent of the total OIF/OEF requirements above the baseline by 15 December 2009 for objectives 1 and 2.
- 7.3. (U) Refined processes and increased capacity for established by 15 January 2010.
- 7.4. (U) Using revised authorities have a minimum of 30 percent of the requirements sourced from host nation resources by 15 December 2010 for objectives 1 and 2.

8. (U) Resources.

- 8.1. (U) Additional man spaces and infrastructure/support equipment may be required at each organization to execute assigned coordination requirements. Where ever possible, existing resources in existing coordination cells should be used to execute newly assigned coordination responsibilities.
- 8.2. (U) Additional costs for pursuing host nation supplies, services, and transportation can be expected.
- 8.3. (U) USAID support is required to conduct how to do business with the U.S. Government seminars with prospective host nation suppliers.

9. (U) Additional Authorities or revised authorities required. Overly Restrictive Language - requires clearer, more expansive language on what defines use of host nation sources by the national provider and subordinate commanders through use of Commanders Emergency Response Fund.

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

10.1. (U) The Berry Amendment “restricts the Department from using appropriated funds or funds otherwise made available to the Department for the procurement of certain items that are not grown, reprocessed, revised, or produced in the U.S.” It applies to end items and components (e.g. food, clothing, textiles, tents, natural and synthetic fibers and fabrics, and hand or measuring tools). If the amendment is not followed an anti-deficiency violation will occur. Key points:

- Most restrictive and applies to DoD only (use of GSA contracts still would apply to DoD).
- Applies to end products and components (e.g. components for clothing and textiles such as rubber sole in shoes, buttons, and zippers).
- Waiver criteria and authority is high; approved by OSD (AT&L) for DLA. Use of waiver has mandatory notification procedures for some products.
- Exceptions exist but are used judiciously so as not to give an appearance of purposely evading Berry.

- Very high political interest in the amendment.
- DLA must request approval from AT&L for a domestic Non-availability Determination.
- The Buy America Act is applicable if the cost is \$3000 and above (the micro-purchase threshold); for supplies used in the U.S.; end product must be manufactured in the U.S. and 50% more of components must be from U.S. or qualifying countries. This act applies to the USG wide. Exceptions exist to the act:
- Non-available articles listed in the FAR 25.104 are a class determination.
- Insufficient domestic offers to meet the requirement.
- Public interest.

10.2. (U) Free Trade Agreements and the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement constitute the Trade Agreement Act consisting of over 45 countries. The end product does not have to be wholly manufactured in a Trade Agreement Act country, but must have been substantially transferred in that country.

10.3. (U) Trade Agreement Act. The Buy American Act does not apply if the Trade Agreement Act applies. Meaning the end product is covered and country is listed.

10.4. (U) Buy American Act does not apply if end product is provided from one of 21 qualifying countries exempt from the Buy American Act as a result of DoDs MOU and International Agreement.

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures for this subordinate goal.

11.1. (U) Risk. Continued undermining of regional stability by delaying improvements in economic development, and building partnership capacity remains the most critical element of risk. Resistance to change from organizations or institutions (e.g. Joint Staff, Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), USTRANSCOM, Congress) due to potential shifts in authorities; responsibilities; and resources. Use of host nation resources is explicable tied to access - land, facilities, infrastructure, commercial enterprises, and availability of a work force and material. USG competition and/or demand for critical resources and enablers. Often there are not enough resources and enablers to meet all of the requirements. This competition will also impact the host nation, allies, and partner nations in their abilities to resource requirements in the theater and contribute to overall mission success.

11.2. (U) Risk Mitigation. Mitigation falls into three broad areas: identification and prioritization of requirements; creating a balance between the use of host nation, global, and domestic resourcing to expand logistics; and expanding existing authorities.

- USCENTCOM will have to articulate its requirements and show the prioritization with predicted impact of not receiving resources to mission success. This will facilitate the national provider in determining if the use of host nation, allies, and partner nation's abilities to contribute and/or share resources or if domestic resourcing is best in meeting the requirement.
- Having a balance between sources of supply allows national providers to rapidly respond to operational requirements; create redundant sources of supply; allows use of existing trade agreements; global reach back capability; and build partnership capacity.

- Measures include expanding wartime funding authorities for commanders in current operations, revising acquisition authorities to meet new requirements in support of developing USG strategies are potential solutions to this element of risk.

Tabs:

A - DLA Market Surveys in Central Asia

Tab A (Defense Logistic Agency Market Surveys in Central Asia) Appendix 8 (Expand Logistics Effort to Improve Regional Stability) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Executive Summary. Ensuring access through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) remains the primary objective of identifying and pursuing local procurement opportunities. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) continues to be the leader in generating business through their Prime Vendors within the Central Asia sub-region with their existing Class I and fuel contracts estimated at \$410.3M U.S. Government (USG) per year. On-going market surveys are identifying potential sources of supplies and services in the Central Asian sub-region. As market surveys are completed by DLA results will be made available to all concerned. The larger USG buying community (e.g. JCCI/A, service components, Army Corps of Engineers, USAID, and GSA) other than DLA can also make a positive impact on the levels of procurement within Central Asia. DLA is actively working with the USCENTCOM J-4, OSD Policy, OSD AT&L, JCC-I/A, and DPAP to produce policies to direct all DoD procuring activities to source products within Central Asia.

2. (U) Discussion.

2.1. (U) Ensuring access through the NDN remains the primary objective of identifying and pursuing local procurement opportunities.

2.2. (U) DLA has already been the leader in generating business opportunities through their Prime Vendors within the Central Asia sub-region including Russia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

- Procurement, delivery, and storage of fuel (TS1/JP8, Diesel, and Mogas) in support of U.S. and coalition forces is estimated to have a daily range between \$1.1M and \$1.7M (Russia \$695k - \$973k; Central Asia \$417 - \$695k).
- Current Class I contracts in place within Kyrgyzstan, supporting Manas Air Base results in approximately \$8.4M per year, with \$892k for bottled water from Uzbekistan. During the upcoming market survey in Kyrgyzstan, the team will determine if bottled water can be sourced from that country. Support of U.S. Marines in Georgia as part of the Georgia Security Stabilization Operations Program results in approximately \$336k per year.
- DLA is currently working a Blanket Purchase Agreement contract for bottled water in Azerbaijan in support of exercise “Regional Response” which could result in \$15k per year.

2.3. (U) To date, DLA has completed market surveys in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan and is on target to conduct a market survey in Kazakhstan in February. The market survey for Kyrgyzstan has been accelerated to late February/early March. The DLA market surveys are from a DLA perspective using a “best value” approach, based on USCENTCOM driven quality standards. Results of completed market surveys are:

- Azerbaijan only bottled water was approved by the veterinarian.
- Uzbekistan had promising procurement possibilities in two areas Class I and Class IV items.
 - Class I. Baked items, cooking oils, fresh fruits and vegetables, in addition to beverages (e.g. water, Coca-Cola/Nestle products, and boxed milk). The Uzbeks fully understand they need to do more work in cleansing, packaging, and storage processes in order to meet U.S./European standards. DLA has articulated the standards and way ahead to meet them to the Uzbek business community.

- Class IV. Potential supplies for building and construction items (e.g. nails, barbed wire, cement, PVC pipe, reinforced steel bars and paint). Uzbek business community needs to provide quality and pricing information for future consideration.
- (U) A larger buying community exists within the USG (e.g. JCCI/A, service components, Army Corps of Engineers, USAID, and GSA) other than DLA which can have a positive impact on levels of procurement within Central Asia. DLA has coordinated with GSA to bring their purchasing potential into this effort. Organizations with local procurement capability and responsibility such as JCCI/A, AFCENT, ARCENT, and the Army Corps of Engineers, are also critical to generating business in Central Asia. Other elements of the USG (e.g. State and USAID) need to consider expanding procurement activities to include Central Asia. U.S. Chief of Missions need to consider sponsoring seminars or conferences on how to do business with the USG.
- (U) DLA is actively working with USCENTCOM J-4, OSD Policy, OSD AT&L, JCCI/A and DPAP to produce policies that direct all DoD procuring activities to source products within Central Asia.

3. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

3.2. (U) Risk Mitigation. The economic integration of Central Asia into the regional and global economy is important to long-term efforts to stabilize this sub-region. Free flow of goods and people through Central Asia combined with economic development can reinforce internal stability, opening the door to political liberalization. Encourage meaningful investment into small businesses, and community development projects. Stable countries with strong economies are less likely to deny access to goods and services. Continue open dialogue concerning with Russia and China over our mutual concern for regional stability and defeating extremists.

Appendix NINE (USCENTCOM Theater Response Force) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3.4. (U) Recent decisions, such as the Iraqi/US Security Agreement, the Army strategy on future PREPO locations and composition, and increases in force posture in Afghanistan require reshaping of forces in theater to include the need to reexamine a Theater Response Force. Proper establishment and shaping of a Theater Response Force can enable OEF and OIF Commanders to reshape force structure to meet new policy guidance at a reduced risk if they have a ready and capable force available to respond to unforeseen and quickly evolving situations.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

4. (U) Key Assumptions.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

5. (U) Objectives.

5.1. (U) OBJ # 8.1 – Approval gained for and establishment of a modification of the current approved Theater Response Force to meet USCENTCOM Commander’s near term needs and mitigate risk incurred by reshaping force posture in Iraq and Afghanistan.

5.2. (U) OBJ # 8.2 – Approval gained for and establishment of a Theater Response Force for the long term that balances regional sensitivity to U.S. presence with need for rapid response.

6. (U) Tasks by Objective with recommended lead responsibility and supporting Lines of Effort (LOEs).

6.1. (U) OBJ # 8.1 – Approval gained for and establishment of a modification of the current approved Theater Response Force to meet Commander U.S. Central Command (CDR USCENTCOM) near term needs and mitigate risk incurred by reshaping force posture in Iraq and Afghanistan.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Coordinate with MNF-I, USFOR-A, and USCENTCOM Service Components to determine the correct mix of capabilities for a recommended TRF to meet current	CCJ3	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task Linked to Sub Goal #1 and 2

	conditions using semiannual TPP conference process.			
1b	Submit refined TRF requirements to for review an approval.	CCJ3	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1a
1c	Gain U.S. Government (USG) approval of TRF.	JSJ3	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1b
1d	Source approved TRF in Global Force Management Process (GFMP).	JSJ3	Implementation	Task 1c
1e	Submit RFFs to establish capabilities.	CCJ3/ Components	Implementation	Task 1d
1f	Establish TRF through formal orders.	CCJ3	Implementation	Task 1e
2	Coordinate HN support for TRF change	CCJ5	Diplomatic	Task 1a
3a	Review TRF requirements semi annually as part of the GFM process.	CCJ3	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1f
3b	Refine RFFs based on GFMP decisions.	CCJ3	Implementation	Task 3a
3c	Issue order modification based on GFMP decisions.	JSJ3/CCJ3	Implementation	Task 3b

6.2. (U) OBJ # 8.2 - Approval gained for and establishment of a Theater Response Force for the long term that balances regional sensitivity to U.S. presence with need for rapid response.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Use approved TRF in Obj 1 to develop baseline TRF posture for future steady state and surge planning figures in GDPP.	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task Linked to Obj 1 of this sub goal and to Subordinate goals #1 and #2
1b	Gain approval of GDPP.	CCJ3	Strategy and Plan development	Subordinate Goal #2
2	Coordinate HN support for TRF changes in GDPP.	CCJ5	Diplomatic	Task 1a
3	Review TRF modifications annually as part of GDPP development process.	CCJ3	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1b

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

7.1. (U) TRF requirements defined and approved to meet near term requirements under OEF and OIF.

7.2. (U) Near Term TRF sourced and available to meet mission requirements.

7.3. (U) Long term base line TRF defined and approved under GFM.

7.4. (U) Long term TRF sourced and available to meet mission requirements.

7.5. (U) GFM process responds rapidly to adjust and source TRF based on changing conditions in theater

8. (U) Resources. Current TRF is discussed in paragraph 2 above. The increase in resources will fluctuate over time to meet evolving changes in environment and operational requirements and will be refined using analysis outlined in tasks above.

9. (U) Additional or revised authorities required.

9.1. (U) Current authorities are deemed acceptable.

9.2. (U) The only adjustment required is to expand access and freedom of action in the long term at designated support locations in theater. This is discussed in greater length in Appendix 3.

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

10.1. (U) Limited access to and freedom of action at land based support locations will affect deployment and freedom of action of TRF.

10.2. (U) Limited capabilities of partner security forces in theater increases operational requirements for U.S. forces.

10.3. (U) Limitations on use of partner security forces outside of their borders increases requirements for U.S. operational forces in theater.

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)


11.4. (U) Over time build partner capacity in theater and rely on their response to meet operational requirements.

Tabs:

A – Potential Contingencies Theater Response

B – PTDO Equipment Sets and Army APS-5 Regeneration Status

Tab A (Potential Contingencies Theater Response) to Appendix 9 (USCENTCOM Theater Response Force) To Annex J (Basing, Logistics and Framework Operations)



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2. (U Potential contingencies.



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Tab B (PTDO Equipment Sets and Army APS-5 Regeneration Status) to Appendix 9 (USCENTCOM Theater Response Force) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide status on Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) equipment sets and Army Pre-positioned Stocks-5 (APS-5) regeneration.

2. (U) Discussion.

2.1. (U) USCENTCOM PTDO equipment set requirements were developed by the Theater Posture OPT. The PTDO equipment sets referred to in this paper constitute a USCENTCOM operational requirement and as such are unique to other enduring APS prepositioned in the theater.

2.2. (U) USCENTCOM plans and validates land force PTDO equipment requirements to HQDA via USARCENT.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3. (U) Recommendations.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Appendix TEN (Maritime Operations) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

- 1. (U) Subordinate Goal.** A long term U.S. and coalition maritime posture afloat is established that is responsive to traditional maritime missions and new missions sets in the USCENTCOM AOR.
- 2. (U) Executive Summary.** Maritime posture afloat continues to be a key capability required for the successful execution of military requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR. This posture provides increased flexibility, meets unique maritime mission sets, and improves our ability to meet operational requirements while balancing regional sensitivities to large land based U.S. force posture. Missions for maritime posture afloat continue to evolve and expand and there are projected requirements well beyond the current contingency effort. Additionally, the development of a coalition maritime force to respond to contingency requirements is a success story under OEF and OIF. This subordinate goal addresses the need to sustain current coalition maritime posture afloat, develop additional required capacity, and adjust capacity as conditions change in the USCENTCOM AOR. It also addresses the need to empower this capacity with improved and decentralized authorities and improved coordination processes between organizations involved in maritime interdiction operations. Finally it cites a need to improve commercial enterprise efforts to avoid, deter, and defend against increased threats to maritime commercial shipping.
- 3. (U) Discussion.**
 - 3.1. (U) Maritime forces afloat in the USCENTCOM AOR operate in a complex and dynamic environment. They must focus attention and action on the ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously countering violent extremist organizations and disruptive nations in the region. To be effective, we must synchronize naval operations in order to deter and counter disruptive countries, provide conditions in time and space which enhance regional stability, support on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and defend against and/or defeat violent extremism.
 - 3.2. (U) To achieve this, USNAVCENT will seek to strengthen partner nation capabilities through exercises and theater security cooperation activities. In addition, we must posture sustainable, trained, ready U.S. and coalition forces capable of immediate response to emergent conditions or events to counter threats and, when ordered, to win decisively.
 - 3.3. (U) A robust, capable, and empowered maritime force is a critical element for the successful execution of the USCENTCOM Theater strategy and the development of a maritime strategy (Tab A). Maritime posture provides flexible operational capabilities that do not trigger regional sensitivities to the same level as land based forces (Tab B).
 - 3.4. (U) There is an interlocking and reinforcing quality to open sea lines of communication, as freedom and safety in the maritime domain generate stability and prosperity on land. Free trade and international investment help socialize non-democratic nations into an interdependent liberal world system. Today, shipping is the heart of the global economy with more than 80 percent of the world's trade traveling by sea.

3.5. (U) Today there are numerous challenges facing the United States, our Allies, global partners, and the international community in fighting piracy, maritime insurgency, and terrorism on the high sea (Tab C and D). These challenges range from definition of terms; what the actual threats are; potential impacts on free trade and the global economy; authorities to act; and overall capability to address these threats. Specifically, identifying those authorities currently available to aggressively confront these threats; which range from national measures through bilateral agreements to and including the U.N. Charter. All of which continues to contribute to an unprecedented level of cooperation among nations to combat these threats globally.

3.6. (U) The responsibility for military activities in maritime space in the USCENTCOM AOR is designated in the Unified Command Plan and specific maritime missions are included in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). At present though the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy does not treat maritime space as a designated sub region with its own unique force posture, activities, and assigned responsibilities in the same manner that it treats land based sub regions in the USCENTCOM designated AOR. Designating this area as a sub region and assigning it to the NAVCENT Commander with assigned specific missions and responsibilities would facilitate planning within USCENTCOM and at component level and allow all USCENTCOM elements to more effectively address the unique aspects of maritime force and space.

3.7. (U) The integration of coalition forces under the Combined Force Maritime Component Command (CFMCC) and the highly successful synchronization of coalition maritime forces in to effective military organizations focused on missions within maritime geographic space is a significant success story coming out of OEF and OIF. The coalition contributions of maritime forces and the synchronization and employment of each individual country caveats (which have reduced significantly over time) must be maintained beyond OEF and OIF to address the significant requirements and threats that affect many partners' national interests.

3.8. (U) To effectively execute assigned missions and provide for a more secure and stable maritime environment , we must address four areas:

- The maritime force must have the capacity to address all threats and accomplish assigned missions rapidly and successfully.
- The maritime force must have the required authorities at the lowest level possible to execute assigned missions and address emerging threats.
- The maritime force must be linked in a formal responsive coordination process and framework to execute assigned missions and address emerging threats.
- The commercial fleet must take additional measures to avoid, deter, and address threats to commercial shipping.

4. (U) Key Assumptions.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

5. (U) Objectives.

5.1. (U) OBJ # 9.1 – A coalition maritime force with the capacity to successfully execute all assigned missions is established and functioning effectively in the USCENTCOM AOR.

5.2. (U) OBJ # 9.2 – The coalition maritime force has the required authorities at their level to rapidly and successfully execute assigned missions in all territorial and non territorial waters within the USCENTCOM AOR.

5.3. (U) OBJ # 9.3 – The process and capacity for rapid coordination between organizations within theater, within the USG, and between adjoining COCOMs are established and working effectively.

5.4. (U) OBJ # 9.4 – Actions to avoid and respond to threats to commercial shipping have been taken by commercial organizations.

6. (U) Tasks by Objective with recommended lead responsibility and supporting Lines of Effort (LOEs).

6.1. (U) OBJ # 9.1 – A coalition maritime force with the capacity to successfully execute all assigned missions is established and functioning effectively in the USCENTCOM AOR.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Reassess the theater strategy and Campaign Plan to address	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan	Initiation task; linked to

	the need for a maritime space as a designated and assigned sub region		development	subordinate goals 1, 2, and 10
2	Assign the maritime sub-region to the NAVCENT with specific planning guidance to develop a maritime strategy that incorporates all assigned missions	CCJ3/5	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1
3	Develop a draft USCENTCOM Maritime strategy and submit to USCENTCOM for approval	NAVCENT	Strategy and Plan development	Task 2
4	Publish maritime strategy and use to define force requirements under GFM process	CCJ3/NAVCENT	Strategy and Plan development	Task 3
5	Conduct force generation conferences at least annually to determine level of coalition participation, force availability, force capability to meet current and future missions beyond OEF and OIF. Use base line force outlined at Tab 2 as base line force for steady state maritime force	CCJ3/5/NAVCENT	Implementation	Task 4
6	Develop specific agreements for commitment, employment, and support of coalition maritime forces.	NAVCENT/CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Task 5
7	Conclude agreements at lowest level possible	NAVCENT/CC/JS	Diplomacy	Task 6

6.2. (U) OBJ # 9.2 – The coalition maritime force has the required authorities at their level to rapidly and successfully execute assigned missions in all territorial and non territorial waters within the USCENTCOM AOR.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Assess desired changes in authorities to address changes in paragraph 8 below.	NAVCENT/CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task
1b	Develop request for change in authorities and provide for review and approval	NAVCENT/CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1a
1c	Determine ability to provide expanded authorities at the lowest level within existing legal authorities and policy	JS/OSD	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1b

	guidance			
1d	Publish USG approved document on expanded authorities	JS/OSD/CCJ3	Implementation	Task 1c
1e	Seek additional bilateral concessions restricting actions against specific threats in territorial waters of key nations	JS/OSD	Diplomacy	Task 1c
1f	Seek any additional concessions on actions against specific threats of flagged vessels.	JS/OSD	Diplomacy	Task 1c
1g	Conclude bilateral agreements outlining expanded authorities	JS/OSD	Diplomacy	Tasks 1e,f

6.3. (U) OBJ # 9.3 – The process and capacity for rapid coordination between organizations within theater, within the USG, and between adjoining COCOMs are established and working effectively.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Using current authorities, outline required coordination process and requirements for effective execution of maritime interdiction operations against all threats. Includes coordination within the maritime force, between the Maritime force and USCENTCOM, between adjoining COCOMs, and between COCOMs and USG organizations at the national level (CT, Intel etc)	CCJ3/NAVCENT	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation task
1b	Provide recommended process adjustments and additional requirements for approval and sourcing based on current authorities.	CCJ3	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1a
1c	Gain IA approval of adjusted process and additional requirements	OSD/JS	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1b
1d	Formally document USG approved coordination process and source additional approved requirements	JS	Implementation	Task 1c
1e	Source additional requirements	JS/Services/	Implementation	Task 1c

		COCOMs		
1f	Execute approved coordination process	All	Implementation	Task 1c
2a	Using expanded authorities, outline required coordination process and requirements for effective execution of maritime interdiction operations against all threats. Includes coordination within the maritime force, between the Maritime force and USCENTCOM, between adjoining COCOMs, and between COCOMs and USG organizations at the national level (CT, Intel etc)	CCJ3/NAVCENT	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation task; also linked to OBJ #2
2b	Provide recommended process adjustments and additional requirements for approval and sourcing based on expanded authorities.	CCJ3	Strategy and Plan development	Task 2a
2c	Gain IA approval of adjusted process and additional requirements	OSD/JS	Strategy and Plan development	Task 2b
2d	Formally document USG approved coordination process and source additional approved requirements	JS	Implementation	Task 2c
2e	Source additional requirements	JS/Services/ COCOMs	Implementation	Task 2c
2f	Execute approved coordination process	All	Implementation	Task 2c

6.4. (U) OBJ # 9.4 – Actions to avoid and respond to threats to commercial shipping have been taken by commercial organizations.

#	Task	Lead	Category	Task
1	Determine additional costs of identifying the range of potential actions that can be taken by	USSTRANSCOM	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task
3	Determine organizational potential actions and counter threats to commercial. Potential actions	USSTRANSCOM	Strategy and Plan development	Task 2
4	Determine capability to provide these potential actions based on projected threats, and	USSTRANSCOM	Strategy and Plan development	Task 3
5	Adjust future contracts to	USSTRANSCOM	Implementation	Task 4

	address potential actions			
6	Consult with commercial organizations on the willingness to voluntarily implement potential actions	USTRANSCOM	Implementation	Task 1

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

7.1. (U) Theater Strategy adjusted to designate maritime sub-region and assign specific responsibilities and missions to USCENTCOM components.

7.2. (U) USCENTCOM Maritime strategy and sub-regional action plan approved.

7.3. (U) Current coalition maritime posture afloat secured.

7.4. (U) Existing coalition maritime posture afloat expanded to provide adequate capable capacity for all missions assigned.

7.5. (U) Current authorities decentralized to lowest level to enable more rapid response and action against maritime threats.

7.6. (U) Additional authorities coordinated and approved within current legal authorities.

7.7. (U) Bilateral coordination between countries to allow for maritime force action against maritime threats in territorial waters outlined in formal approved agreements.

7.8. (U) Capacity for rapid coordination between NAVCENT and USCENTCOM on maritime missions established.

7.9. (U) Capacity for rapid coordination between USCENTCOM and adjoining COCOMs on maritime missions established.

7.10. (U) Capacity for rapid coordination between USCENTCOM and National command and control organizations on maritime missions established.

7.11. (U) Commercial organizations take voluntary actions to avoid, defer, and defend commercial shipping.

7.12. (U) Department of Defense (DoD) contracts altered to enforce protective measures for avoidance, deterrence and defeat of specific maritime threats.

8. (U) Resources

8.1. (U) Additional required maritime force posture resources must be determined after full mission analysis of all assigned missions. This can be detailed in the force generation process and adjusted over time to meet mission requirements.

8.2. (U) Additional man spaces and infrastructure/support equipment may be required at each organization to execute assigned coordination requirements. Where ever possible, existing resources in existing coordination cells should be used to execute newly assigned coordination responsibilities.

8.3(U) Additional costs for defensive measures and alternate routes can be expected. Although there are expectations of cost increase because of these measures there should be some savings because of reduced insurance rates and fewer losses over time that are currently being passed to the customer (DoD).

9. (U) Additional Authorities or revised authorities required. The following areas must be addressed in maritime operations.

9.1. (U) Overly Restrictive Language.

- Requires clearer, more expansive language on what defines a threat vessel, in which disabling and destructive fire can be used against.
- EXORD ROE should use the most expansive terminology by using the terminology and definitions in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or other guiding International documents.
- Should allow for limited self-defense operations ashore and the transfer of U.S. detained Person Under Control (PUC's).

9.2. (U) Level of authorization is kept too high and will limit operational responsiveness

- Possible detention of designated individuals (terrorist, pirates, etc.), vessels (pirate or vessels transporting individuals/designated material), weapons/equipment should not require JCS coordination for every event – should be at Combined Task Force (CTF) level.
- Clear procedures for PUC's at CTF decision level... either turn over to accepting country or transfer back ashore (minus vessel, weapons and equipment).
- Disposition of persons and property should not require OSD-P coordination.

9.3. (U) Rules of Evidence defined so that we use the proper CONOPS and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to have the right assets capable of complying with the rules.

- Intent is for U.S. to not have jurisdiction.
- Procedures to turn evidence over to third-party countries.

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures for this subordinate goal.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11.2. (U) Risk Mitigation. Mitigation falls into three broad areas: increased coordination with other combatant commands, our allies, global partners, and the international community; increased authorities combined with greater delegation to task force commanders; and increased capacity building.

- Acts of piracy, maritime insurgency, or terrorism on the high sea, often affect more than one country, which increase the complexity of pursuit and apprehension of suspects challenging. Whether dealing with weapons, narcotics, or human smuggling; piracy against ships; some form of coordination, agreement, or level of cooperation is required among the other combatant commands, allies, global partners, and the international community. Consensus on the issue of enforcement of international maritime law and interdiction of vessels where international water meet territorial seas is needed to manage regional maritime security. Further it leads to the development of joint operating areas on the maritime and land seems with the adjacent geographic combatant commands to achieve unity of command and unity of effort. Increased coordination with U.S. Transportation Command through its service component Military Sealift Command can assist in the rigorous flag-state enforcement of maritime security regulations to compel commercial counter-piracy measure compliance through its contracts. Multinational shipping corporations often choose flags of convenience for low cost and lax enforcement. In theory, if mariners heed warnings; comply with regulations; and implement prudent counter-piracy measures this could eliminate the market for pirates, making the practice unprofitable.
- Enforcing international law at sea remains a politically delicate task. Pursuing “bad actors” at sea requires that naval forces operate within the accepted law of the sea principle. Not all threats can be responded to the same. Naval, coast guard, or policing forces may not respond to terrorism on the high seas in the same way, as it’s likely to piracy against shipping or maritime interdiction in support of trade sanctions or the movement of weapons of mass destruction under international law. Increased authorities derived from existing international agreements

greatly accelerate the process by which either naval forces, coast guard, or law enforcement officials from one state can board suspect vessels flying the flag from another, especially when the flag state is unable to exercise control over the vessel due to its location or other factors, or maintain contact with the suspect vessels entering national waters. Additionally, increased authorities will lead to holding “bad actors” accountable, demonstrates that responsible governments are willing to maintain order and stability in their maritime area of influence. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816 serves as an example of the increased authorities required. To allow a task force commander freedom of action requires the delegation of authorities for swift and effective retribution to be brought against the threat. The combined increase and delegation of authorities will contribute to an increase in maritime security capacity building.

- All nations have a common interest in taking action against acts of piracy, maritime insurgency, or terrorism on the high sea, because all benefit from a stable maritime environment. Coastal and maritime nations can use the combined increase and delegation of authorities in building maritime capacity to improve regional stability and enforcement of international law at sea. By operating under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has become the de facto constitution for the world’s oceans, contributes to increased capacity building in the deterrence of incidents; reduce the maritime domain’s vulnerability; preserves freedom of the sea which underpins global prosperity, peace, and security; and protects sea lines of communication. By the U.S. leading and supporting international efforts contributes to greater maritime security cooperation. Increased maritime capacity provides the combatant commander flexibility for unforeseen events in the region (e.g. NEO, humanitarian assistance, consequence management). A concerted effort on the part of the world’s maritime nation’s navies and coast guards to turn the tables on acts of piracy, maritime insurgency, or terrorism on the high sea, is required. The risk for “bad actors” must be far greater than the potential reward. This means increased presence through patrols, sensible rules of engagement founded in international law, and a willingness to accept some losses in an effort to rid the oceans of these “bad actors.”

Tabs:

- A – Commander NAVCENT Operational Guidance for the Coalition Maritime Force
- B – Maritime Posture Afloat
- C – Background Anti-Piracy Operations 2002-2008
- D – Fuel Support to Indian and Pakistan Navies

**Tab A (Commander NAVCENT Operational Guidance for the Coalition Maritime Force)
to Appendix 10 (Maritime Operations) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics and Framework
Operations)**

1. (U) U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) operates in a complex and dynamic environment. We must focus attention and action on the ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously countering violent extremist organizations and disruptive nations in the region. The overall intent is to synchronize naval operations in order to deter and counter disruptive countries, provide conditions in time and space which enhance regional stability, support on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and defend against and/or defeat violent extremism. To achieve this, USNAVCENT will seek to strengthen partner nation capabilities through exercises and theater security cooperation activities. In addition, we will posture sustainable, trained, ready U.S. forces capable of immediate response to emergent conditions or events and, when ordered, to win decisively. This document contains COMUSNAVCENT's vision, mission, guiding principles, and operational objectives, and explains our lines of operation.
2. (U) Vision. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command will advance the interests of the United States and the security and prosperity of the region by building and effectively employing forward, capable, and Coalition-focused forces across the full spectrum of maritime operations. We will endeavor to prevent conflict but remain prepared to win decisively when directed.
3. (U) Mission. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command conducts persistent maritime operations to forward U.S. interests, deter and counter disruptive countries, defeat violent extremism and strengthen partner nations' maritime capabilities in order to promote a secure maritime environment in the USCENCOM area of responsibility.
4. (U) Operational Objectives. COMUSNAVCENT's operational objectives are:
 - 4.1. (U) Regional Maritime Security Maintained. This means coercive behavior by disruptive countries is nullified; violent extremists and their facilitators are disrupted, defended against or defeated; criminal activity such as piracy and smuggling is countered; maritime infrastructure is protected; and legal, peaceful and safe use of the seas occurs.
 - 4.2. (U) Regional Access Ensured. This means normal interactions among countries, businesses and citizens are taking place and the unencumbered use of the maritime domain is available to naval forces (at sea and ashore) and commercial entities alike.
 - 4.3. (U) Violent Extremism Countered. This means violent extremists, regardless of motivation, are sought out and neutralized and underlying factors contributing to extremism are addressed in partnership with regional countries.
 - 4.4. (U) Regional Nations' Maritime Capabilities Strengthened. This means littoral states have acquired, properly sustained and effectively employed equipment suitable to their missions and operating environment with such assistance from and exercising with U.S. and Coalition forces as they may desire.

4.5. (U) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation Degraded. This means transfer of equipment, precursor material, and knowledgeable individuals has been disrupted in the maritime arena.

5. (U) Lines of Operation. To execute the mission and achieve our operational objectives, actions will be conducted along the following lines:

5.1. (U) Partnership, Strength and Presence (PSP). As part of a broader USCENTCOM policy towards disruptive countries: Partnership focuses on ways to cooperatively underwrite security such as through Theater Security Cooperation activities; Strength is demonstrating the capability to counter coercive and disruptive behavior through deterrence operations and stressing exercises; and Presence refers to the benefits of being persistently close at hand in peace and crisis.

5.2. (U) Maritime Security Operations (MSO). USNAVCENT will deny maritime lines of communication to transnational terrorist networks. Our presence in this region contributes to security, thereby underwriting stability that in turn facilitates global commerce and regional prosperity. MSO is our best opportunity to work with our partners to deny violent extremist and their facilitators free use of the sea. MSO activities include maritime counterterrorism; surveillance and reconnaissance; the defense of offshore and onshore critical marine systems and infrastructure; counter-smuggling; counter-piracy; and consequence management.

5.3. (U) Struggle Against Violent Extremists (SAVE). USNAVCENT will defeat violent extremists in the maritime/littoral environment and defend U.S. interests by conducting continuous operations that deny violent extremist organizations littoral freedom of maneuver. This includes the full range of proactive actions across the maritime environment to prevent, preempt, and defeat violent extremist organizations. Force protection is also a part of SAVE. We have no illusions about the intent of violent extremists; they will plan and conduct operations against us whenever they are able. By projecting a difficult target at all times while on duty and on liberty, we may deter and even disrupt an attack.

5.4. (U) Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. USNAVCENT will support combat operations ashore in order to transition security responsibilities to the Government of Iraq and set conditions for security and strengthened governance in Afghanistan. This includes protecting the oil platforms and preparing the Iraqis to replace us, as well as providing support to Navy Individual Augmentees.

5.5. (U) Joint Task Force (JTF) - Crisis Response (CR)(on order). When directed, COMUSNAVCENT will serve as JTF Commander to conduct Crisis Response operations in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility in support of USCENTCOM guidance. JTF-CR supports Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations; Oil Spill Response; Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; and Foreign Consequence Management.

6. (U) From the overarching guidance in this document, USNAVCENT will develop formal guidance starting with our Theater Strategy and our Maritime Campaign Plan. In turn, USNAVCENT and U.S. Fifth Fleet will develop, issue and maintain plans, orders and other more specific directives. Lastly,

subordinate Task Force Commanders will issue applicable supplementary direction derived from the above.

7. (U) This Commander's Guidance reflects my vision, thoughts, and principles while highlighting the touchstones against which we will prioritize our efforts. We are the only numbered fleet engaged in combat while preventing greater conflict. We are a command that works for a better future and our nation is counting on us to prevent first and when directed, win decisively.

Tab B (Maritime Posture Afloat) to Appendix 10 (Maritime Operations) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. Purpose. In addition to the posture planned for at Global Defense Posture Plan (GDPP) designated locations, USCENTCOM's posture strategy is dependent on maritime posture afloat. This maritime posture afloat supports ongoing operations in theater and steady state and surge requirements outlined in paragraph 4 below. This posture provides the Commander U.S. Central Command (CDR USCENTCOM) great flexibility and freedom of action and is assumed as part of the steady state posture (met by use of rotational forces 1.0) to be present in theater.

2. (U) Discussion. Maritime posture afloat continues to be a key element of the USCENTCOM strategy. The coalition integration of multiple nations to support ongoing operations is a success story for coalition building under OIF and OEF. Issues involving authorities for maritime interdiction to include counterproliferation (CP) and piracy restrict capabilities of this maritime force from fully pursuing their assigned tasks. Sustaining this coalition beyond current contingencies would be a tremendous enabler given the restricted access to land based support locations because of regional sensitivities to U.S. forces, the great flexibility the Commander has with a robust maritime force in the theater, and the tremendous freedom of action a maritime force afloat provides across the AOR with organic movement capability and the ability to project land and air from these platforms. Every effort should be made to sustain this maritime coalition to meet future challenges, secure the requisite authorities to enable their rapid and successful action, and reshape this capability over time to meet the enduring missions sets required of this force in the future.

3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

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(b)(1)1.4a

4. (U) Future Coalition Maritime Force Posture Afloat.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Tab C (Background Anti-Piracy Operations 2002-2008) to Appendix 10 (Maritime Operations) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Executive Summary. On 9 December 2002, the Spanish frigate *Navarra* was patrolling the Arabian Sea as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It boarded a small Cambodian-registered vessel, the *So San*, which displayed no flag or markings and had refused to heave to after several requests. The vessel later turned out to belong to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and was manned by North Korean nationals bound for Yemen, carrying a concealed cargo of 151 short-range SCUD missiles armed with conventional warheads, along with other materials for making explosives not listed on the ship manifest. The *Navarra* seized the vessel and escorted it to the U.S. base at Diego Garcia, which ignited protests from the Yemeni and DPRK governments. At one point the DPRK claimed this was an act of unpardonable piracy. The *So San's* interdiction and her subsequent release demonstrates how complicated it is to apply interdiction in international waters. Maritime security plays a dynamic role in international relations. Piracy has taken an increasing toll on international shipping globally in 2008, especially off the Horn of Africa where 110 ships were attacked, 42 seized, and 14 were still being held by pirates at years end. Estimated ransom paid was \$30 million. Shipping officials from around the world called for a military blockade along Somalia's coast to intercept pirate vessels heading out to sea in November 2008. Effectively responding to this threat requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses diplomatic, information, military, and economic support for operations, logistics, investigations, and prosecutions.

2. (U) Discussion.

2.1. (U) There is an interlocking and reinforcing quality to open sea lines of communication, as freedom and safety in the maritime domain generate stability and prosperity on land. Free trade and international investment help socialize non-democratic nations into an interdependent liberal world system. Today, shipping is the heart of the global economy with more than 80 percent of the world's trade traveling by sea.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2.3. (U) While the U.S., our Allies, global partners, and the international community address these challenges; naval forces are gathering to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. Countries as diverse as Great Britain, India, France, Russia, China, Germany, Malaysia, and the United States have naval forces in the waters or en route. More assertive action has already occurred in recent months by the Indian and German navies. With more than a dozen warships now patrolling the Gulf of Aden combined with a recent U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing an international force to conduct operations against pirate havens in Somalia will allow swift and effective retribution to be brought against them.

2.4. (U) A perception exists that any linkage between piracy and international terrorism does not exist; and that piracy is a localized problem; being nothing more than high seas criminal activity, better addressed by law enforcement agencies than naval forces. Overlooking the fact that most acts of piracy occur outside a state's jurisdiction or territorial waters, where only military vessels and aircraft may exercise the right to board and seize pirate ships including the property on board; arrest the crews; and submit the matter to either civil or criminal courts.

2.5. (U) The International Maritime Organization (IMO) remains the recognized international body with the mandate to establish a global counter-piracy plan. This organization provides an accepted, common framework for action and represents the best method for establishing and sustaining an international regime or force to eliminate piracy. Existing international conventions that support counter-piracy measures were originated through the IMO forum. National or regional initiatives can be worked through the IMO to ensure localized multinational efforts contribute to a global counter-piracy effort. Benefits include increased capacity building, interoperability, standard reporting procedures, and improved cooperation among countries.

2.6. (U) Multinational shipping corporations, insurers, and vessel masters must all bear some of the burden of responsibility to deter piracy. The commercial sector enjoys profits facilitated by maritime security and has the means to act against piracy. The IMO promulgates standard, proven counter-piracy practices; with shippers and vessel masters routinely ignoring them. For example, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) makes periodic unclassified threat assessments the U.S. State Department and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) incorporate into special warnings to mariners. In the case outside of Somali territorial waters, ONI urged mariners to avoid the piracy prone areas by at least 200 nautical miles as early as 2005. Considering that numerous vessels were well within the 200 miles when attacked or seized by pirates, it appears that some vessel masters chose to ignore the warning at their peril; to avoid excess costs (e.g. fuel) of using indirect routes. Ship owners are clearly not doing enough to protect their vessels and crews; they must invest in counter-piracy systems (e.g. ship-wide alarm/surveillance systems; anti-boarding devices; long-range acoustic devices, water cannons, etc). The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, whose members own 2,900 tankers, or 75% of the world's fleet, opposes installing defensive measures on merchant ships because it could escalate the violence and put crews at greater risk.

2.7. (U) The 5 November 2005, piracy attempt against U.S.-flagged *Seabourn Spirit* serves as a testament to counter-piracy best practices. Carrying several hundred vacationers, this cruise liner escaped hijacking by Somali pirates; when the attack failed because the captain reacted to the approaching vessels immediately, heading out to open sea at full speed, while conducting evasive maneuvers to prevent a boarding. The pirates gave chase, fired rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons at the liner, and did not break off its attack until the *Seabourn Spirit* employed a long-range acoustic device, which generated a focused painful noise. This attack occurred in international waters and there were no police, coast guard, or naval forces to provide immediate assistance.

2.8. (U) Less than a year later, a dhow plying the trade route between India and Africa was seized in international waters by ten Somali pirates armed with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons. The sixteen Indian crew members were fortunate that the USS *Winston S. Churchill* (DDG-

81) encountered the besieged dhow, the *Churchill's* immediate mission was clear: gain control of the vessel and detain the pirates. Once the pirates were in custody, the way ahead became less clear as the destroyer's captain, the U.S. government, and more broadly the international community confronted the myriad diplomatic and legal challenges of piracy suppression in the 21st century. Who would investigate and prosecute the case? Where would the pirates be held and by whom? What about the Indian crew members? All of them witnesses to the crime. What would happen to the dhow and cargo? The pirates were eventually transferred to Mombasa, Kenya and later convicted in a Kenyan court with a sentence to seven years imprisonment. The successful interdiction by the *Churchill* sparked a global effort to develop updated authorities for confronting piracy.

2.9. (U) The Egyptian bulk carrier *Wadi al-Arab*, with 31 crew members, was passing through the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and Somalia en route to Asia when pirates in a speedboat began pursuing it on 25 December 2008. A passing ship alerted the IMB piracy reporting center in Kuala Lumpur which requested assistance from a multinational naval force in the area. In response the German Navy frigate *Karlsruhe* deployed a helicopter, causing the pirates to flee; but not before shooting and wounding one of the ships crew. On 1 January 2009, pirates attacked a cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden, taking hostage 28 crewmembers, according to the IMB. Four other attacks in the seven-day period ending 5 January were thwarted by international warships or military aircraft. In two other incidents, the crews of targeted ships took evasive action and prevented hijacking. "The merchant ships have been doing a great job stepping up and using" defensive measures according to 5th Fleet Commander, in a statement 8 January 2009.

2.10. (U) Pirates freed the Saudi Arabian oil supertanker *Sirius Star* after a \$3 million dollar ransom was paid 9 January 2009, ending one of the more high profile recent pirate attacks in the waters off of East Africa. The supertanker, with a crew of 25, was fully laden with a cargo of crude oil valued at more than \$100 million, when pirates seized the vessel. Seized in mid-November 2008, the *Sirius Star* was seized more than 450 miles off Africa's east coast, further south than most recent attacks in and around the Gulf of Aden.

2.11. (U) The U.S. Navy announced it would create an anti-piracy task force in the latest military response to attacks in waters off Somalia, and is asking other nations navies to join in. It is planned for the task force to have initial operating capability by mid-January. Forming this task force is the first attempt to officially coordinate the growing international naval presence. A military solution will not be enough to curtail piracy, because the majority of the ocean's surface is beyond state jurisdiction. Effective piracy repression demands international action, coordination, and legal authorities.

2.12. (U) Enforcing international law at sea requires cooperation among coastal states and maritime nations. Agreed guidelines can be complicated by geo-politics; principles of cooperative actions are often reduced to acceptable common denominators. One means is through adapting existing international maritime law through various mechanisms. Current prevention and suppression of threats to maritime security are given authority by:

- The Charter of the United Nations;
- 1958 Convention on the High Seas;
- 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention
- 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);

- 2001 IMO Doc. A 922(22), “Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.”
- 2003 Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP);
- Multilateral agreements and arrangements (e.g. Proliferation Initiative; International Ship and Port Facility Security Code)
- Bilateral agreements and arrangements (e.g. Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation), and
- National measures (e.g. U.S. statute, Executive Orders, and Presidential findings).

2.13. (U) The U.N. Security Council took historic action against maritime piracy when it passed Resolution 1816, which was decided under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and therefore legally binding on all states, called on them to cooperate in counter-piracy actions off the coast of Somalia. This resolution authorized operations inside Somalia’s territorial waters to deny the area as a safe haven for pirates who operate outside the 12-mile limit. It also provides for the disposition and logistics of person-under-control detained as a result of counter-piracy operations.

3. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures.

3.1. (U) Risk. Continued undermining of regional stability and an adverse impact on the global economy. Piracy’s devastating effects extend beyond the immediate threat to ships, people, and property off the Horn of Africa. It endangers sea lines of communication, disrupts freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce. Global energy markets are affected because 30 percent of the world’s daily oil supply is carried on tankers through the Gulf of Aden on their way to the Suez Canal. The sea lines running between Yemen and Somalia constitute the main link between Europe and Asia.

3.2. (U) Risk Mitigation. Mitigation falls into three broad areas:

- Increased coordination with other combatant commands, our allies, global partners, and the international community. Acts of piracy, maritime insurgency, or terrorism on the high sea, often affect more than one country, which increase the complexity of pursuit and apprehension of suspects challenging. Whether dealing with weapons, narcotics, or human smuggling; piracy against ships; some form of coordination, agreement, or level of cooperation is required among the other combatant commands, allies, global partners, and the international community. Consensus on the issue of enforcement of international maritime law and interdiction of vessels where international water meet territorial seas is needed to manage regional maritime security. Further it leads to the development of joint operating areas on the maritime and land seams with the adjacent geographic combatant commands to achieve unity of command and unity of effort. Increased coordination with U.S. Transportation Command through its service component Military Sealift Command can assist in the rigorous flag-state enforcement of maritime security regulations to compel commercial counter-piracy measure compliance through its contracts. Multinational shipping corporations often choose flags of convenience for low cost and lax enforcement. In theory, if mariners heed warnings; comply with regulations; and implement prudent counter-piracy measures this could eliminate the market for pirates, making the practice unprofitable.
- Increased authorities combined with greater delegation to task force commanders. Enforcing international law at sea remains a politically delicate task. Pursuing “bad actors” at sea requires

that naval forces operate within the accepted law of the sea principle. Not all threats can be responded to the same. Naval, coast guard, or policing forces may not respond to terrorism on the high seas in the same way, as it's likely to piracy against shipping or maritime interdiction in support of trade sanctions or the movement of weapons of mass destruction under international law. Increased authorities derived from existing international agreements greatly accelerate the process by which either naval forces, coast guard, or law enforcement officials from one state can board suspect vessels flying the flag from another, especially when the flag state is unable to exercise control over the vessel due to its location or other factors, or maintain contact with the suspect vessels entering national waters. Additionally, increased authorities will lead to holding "bad actors" accountable, demonstrates that responsible governments are willing to maintain order and stability in their maritime area of influence. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816 serves as an example of the increased authorities required. To allow a task force commander freedom of action requires the delegation of authorities for swift and effective retribution to be brought against the threat. The combined increase and delegation of authorities will contribute to an increase in maritime security capacity building.

- Increased capacity building. All nations have a common interest in taking action against acts of piracy, maritime insurgency, or terrorism on the high sea, because all benefit from a stable maritime environment. Coastal and maritime nations can use the combined increase and delegation of authorities in building maritime capacity to improve regional stability and enforcement of international law at sea. By operating under UNCLOS, which has become the de facto constitution for the world's oceans, contributes to increased capacity building in the deterrence of incidents; reduce the maritime domain's vulnerability; preserves freedom of the sea which underpins global prosperity, peace, and security; and protects sea lines of communication. By the U.S. leading and supporting international efforts contributes to greater maritime security cooperation. Increased maritime capacity provides the combatant commander flexibility for unforeseen events in the region (e.g. NEO, humanitarian assistance, consequence management). A concerted effort on the part of the world's maritime nation's navies and coast guards to turn the tables on acts of piracy, maritime insurgency, or terrorism on the high sea, is required. The risk for "bad actors" must be far greater than the potential reward. This means increased presence through patrols, sensible rules of engagement founded in international law, and a willingness to accept some losses in an effort to rid the oceans of these "bad actors." For the pirates, the red flag must fly from every mast, signaling to each and every pirate, "no quarter given."

Tab D (Fuel Support to Indian and Pakistan Navies) to Appendix 10 (Maritime Operations) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Executive Summary. The U.S. Navy announced it would create an anti-piracy task force (Combined Task Force 151) in the latest military response to acts of piracy in waters off Somalia, and is asking other nations navies to join. It is planned for Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) to have initial operating capability by mid-January. Forming this task force is the first attempt to officially coordinate the growing international naval presence. Fourteen nations have sent their navies, working either bilaterally or by themselves or in part of a coalition. Fuel support is critical in obtaining participation of smaller navies' participation in CTF 151. USCENTCOM has accepted Indian Navy participation in support of anti-piracy operations. USCENTCOM requested Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) establish procedures to allow fuel to be issued or sold to participating nations for CTF 151, as required. Both Indian and Pakistan have indicated a desire to participate in CTF-151 if U.S. fuel support can be obtained. As of 23 January 2009, 593,000 U.S. gallons of fuel had been sold to the Indian Navy for its participation in anti-piracy operations. The Pakistan Navy currently participates in CTF 150 whose mandate is counterterrorism and has a bilateral agreement with U.S. CENTCOM for fuel support.

2. (U) Discussion.

2.1. (U) The U.S. Navy announced it would create CTF 151 in the latest military response to acts of piracy in waters off Somalia, and is asking other nations navies to join. It is planned for the task force to have initial operating capability by mid-January. Forming CTF 151 is the first attempt to officially coordinate the growing international naval presence and replaces the diversion of assets from CTF 150 which has a counterterrorism mandate.

2.2. (U) Twenty-one nations have sent their navies, working either bilaterally, by themselves or in part of a coalition. Countries as diverse as Great Britain, India, France, Denmark, Russia, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and the United States have naval forces in the waters or en route. All of the nations are operating under the authorities from existing U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). However, different nations may have more restrictive rules of engagement than the UNSCRs, essentially operating under national authorities.

2.3. (U) USCENTCOM requested DESC establish procedures to allow fuel to be issued or sold to participating nations for CTF 151 as required.

2.4. (U) Both Indian and Pakistan have indicated a desire to participate in CTF-151 if U.S. fuel support can be obtained. USCENTCOM has accepted Indian Navy participation in support of anti-piracy operations. In mid-December 2008 DESC at USCENTCOM request established billing procedures to allow for the participation of the Indian Navy. As of 23 January 2009, 593,000 U.S. gallons of fuel had been sold to the Indian Navy for its participation in anti-piracy operations.

2.5. (U) The Pakistan Navy currently participates in CTF 150 and has a bilateral agreement with USCENTCOM for U.S. fuel support. As part of a Government of Japan contribution to CTF 150, in addition to a surface combatant, there is an oiler which provides fuel to participating nations at no charge.

2.6. (U) DESC currently is carrying an estimated \$5.0 million dollar debt from the Pakistan Navy participation in CTF 150 as a result of the USCENTCOM bilateral agreement.

2.7. (U) U.S. Ambassador Islamabad believes participation of both countries navies in CTF 151 could be used as a potential avenue to normalize India-Pakistan military to military relations, improve communications between both countries, and reduces any miscalculations.

3. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures.

3.1. (U) Risk. Invitation to the Pakistan Navy could lead to an Indian Navy withdrawal from CTF-151. Pakistan-India rivalries could lead to operational gaps that put U.S., allied, or participating nations naval forces or commercial shipping at risk. Increased absorption of debt by DESC on behalf of the U.S. Government (USG) for non-payment by both nations.

3.2. (U) Risk Mitigation. Mitigation can be accomplished by having the Indian and Pakistan naval forces maintain the status quo of participating in only one of the CTFs. All nations have a common interest in taking action against acts of piracy, maritime insurgency, or terrorism on the high sea, because all benefit from a stable maritime environment. Both Indian and Pakistan contribute to this stability by their nation's participation. USCENTCOM in coordination with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command can mitigate the final risk to DESC and the USG by being prepared to absorb the debt incurred by nations participating in these CTFs.

Appendix ELEVEN (Increased Access to Planning Expertise) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Subordinate Goal. Planner access to functional and regional expertise is expanded to support whole-of-government plan development at USCENTCOM.

2. (U) Executive Summary. This subordinate goal addresses the need for planner access to functional and regional expertise throughout the planning process to fully inform directed military planning for the region and inform whole-of-government planning within the U.S. Government (USG). USCENTCOM planner's access to these experts has been restricted totally or limited to specific windows of time usually late in the planning process. The intent is to develop formal linkages to interagency (IA) expertise, military expertise in service organizations, non-governmental experts in regional or functional areas, coalition planning expertise, and reinstitute bilateral military planning with key nations within the region. In many cases, this can be accomplished through formal agreements between organizations with little to no additional cost but several efforts require additional manpower and funding to successfully achieve the stated goal. Successful achievement of each tasker will provide ready access to additional expertise earlier in the process and provide for more comprehensive plan development within USCENTCOM and the USG.

3. (U) Discussion.

3.1. (U) Successfully achieving USG objectives requires rapid comprehensive plan development and execution. This is often very complex planning and requires application of more than the military element of power. Often military success at an operational level can be achieved, but strategic level success requires whole-of-government and Partner Nation planning and implementation. The following areas need to be addressed:

- Lack of early interagency involvement in planning. The process that enables early military planner access to functional and regional planner expertise and other military planners of key partner nations often is non-existent, but even if it is achieved is not timely and is ad hoc and driven by strength of personality of planners involved. There is no specific formal process established to allow for this access early in planning and access is granted only on a case by case level at the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DoD). There is broad guidance that requires COCOMs to request access in In-Process Review (IPR) A in the Adaptive Planning process, but this is viewed by members of the interagency (e.g. Department of State) as late in the process and not focused on the shaping of initial guidance to include goals, objectives and strategies. The current process provides these elements as a given to Interagency members and is viewed as a demand for participation in strategies and plans that are already shaped outside of their comfort levels or beliefs. The result too often is lack of cooperation by the interagency (e.g. Department of State, Department of Justice) on military planning and to inform military planning.
- Lack of access to functional and regional experts. The availability of functional and regional experts on a Military COCOM staff is limited and often not available to the various planning efforts under way at a COCOM. At any point in time, multiple planning teams are in different stages of development on directed planning efforts. There is limited availability of regional experts from J5 Security Cooperation (desk Officers), J2 intelligence analysts, and other staff functional experts – counterterrorism (CT), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

(CWMD), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Consequence Management (CM), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), funding, etc) to support plan development. Most of the planners even if they have advanced civil schooling lack the ability to plan at the theater strategic level and none have the broad base of knowledge required to incorporate all elements of national power in plan development.

- Informal and ad hoc coordination with U.S. service and joint planning organizations. USCENTCOM has initiated a limited outreach program to establish linkages to service schools and joint academic organizations. Some coordination has occurred but it has been limited and ad hoc. Formal coordination with planning, strategy and analytical service organizations such as Center for Army Analysis and Center for Navy Analysis as well as Joint Advanced Warfighting (JAW), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), School of Aerospace Studies (SAS), and School of Amphibious Warfare (SAW) have proven to be helpful in the past but are done only on a case by case basis.
- Lack of access to other partner nation planners. There has been a significant effort to incorporate partner nation planners in to planning at USCENTCOM. Restrictions due to over classification and connectivity continue to hamper our ability to utilize the significant expertise in the development of plans.
- Curtailment of bilateral planning. USCENTCOM used to conduct bilateral planning with key regional nations to build military to military relationships and advance requirements such as access and host nation support. Current operations consumed the bilateral planning capacity and coordination to support on-going operations. Recent USCENTCOM efforts to develop a Kuwait National Security Strategy and a Kuwait National Military Strategy and then operationalize these strategies in plan development increased our ability to influence a key partner and develop stronger relationships.

3.2. (U) Increased planning requirements and increased complexity combined with limited expertise and limited availability of resident expertise impacts on plan development at USCENTCOM. This plan recommends pursuing the following areas to achieve this subordinate goal.

- Continue to push for early and formalized interagency support for Adaptive Planning.
- Examine ways to determine available regional and functional experts required to support varied planning efforts and develop programs to ensure their ready availability to support plan development.
- Establish formal linkages to service institutions to habitually support long term projects that support USCENTCOM requirements.
- Examine ways to embed collation planners in directorate staffs to expand planner capacity and increase planning and regional and functional expertise.
- Develop capacity to initiate bilateral planning on a routine basis to solidify military to military relationships and coordinate the development of regional security framework.

4. (U) Key Assumptions.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

5. Objectives.

5.1. (U) OBJ # 10. 1 - Interagency support for COCOM Planning is expanded, formalized and is available earlier in the planning process.

5.2. (U) OBJ # 10.2 - Programs to provide access to regional and functional experts required to support varied planning efforts are established and funded.

5.3. (U) OBJ # 10.3 - Formal linkages to U.S. military service institutions to habitually support long term USCENCOM planning requirements are established.

5.4. (U) OBJ # 10.4 – USCENCOM staff integrated in all directorates with coalition planners.

5.5. (U) OBJ# 10.5 – Bilateral military planning with key nations reinstated to solidify military to military relationships and support plan development.

6. (U) Tasks by Objective with recommended lead responsibility and supporting Lines of Effort (LOEs).

6.1. (U) OBJ # 10.1 – Interagency support for COCOM Planning is expanded, formalized and is available earlier in the planning process.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Use existing availability of Interagency (IA) planners to support USCENCOM planning by using current DoD program PROMOTE COOPERATION	CCJ5	Sustain	Initiation Task
1b	Coordinate for IA planners to support USCENCOM planning by using	JSJ7	Implementation	Task 1a

	PROMOTE COOPERATION			
2a	Revise current CJCSI to formalize and support current DoD efforts under Adaptive Planning to expand IA cooperation early and continually in the planning process	CCJ5/JSJ7	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task
2b	Publish revised CJCSI and implement expanded IA cooperation	JSJ7/OSD	Implementation	Task 2a
2c	Coordinate with IA agencies to determine and develop increased capacity to support increased IA planning support	JSJ7/OSP- P	Implementation	2b
3	Request additional funding for TDY to support planner seminars as required to support JSCP directed priority planning efforts IAW CJCSI	CCJ5	Implementation	Initiation Task
4a	Develop expanded USCENTCOM Joint Manning document (JMD) for increased IA expertise in the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)	CCJ3/CCJ1	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task
4b	Submit request for expanded IA expertise	CCJ1	Implementation	Task 4a
4c	Coordinate with IA organizations for manning o personnel request	JSJ1/7/OSD	Implementation	Task 4b
4d	Integrate additional approved IA expertise in to Coalition Coordination Cell (CCC) and the Planning process	CCJ3	Implementation	Task 4c

6.2. (U) OBJ # 10.2 – Programs to provide access to regional and functional experts required to support varied planning efforts are established and funded.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Determine requirements for functional and regional experts to support USCENTCOM planning	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task Linked to OBJ 1

1b	Develop Program of Record (POR) to provide funding for experts	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1a
1c	Submit POR for funding approval	CCJ8	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1b
1d	Approve funding for POR	JSJ8/OSD	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1c
2a	Determine additional infrastructure to support additional manning		Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task Linked to OBJ 1
2b	Coordinate development of contracts based on funding approval	CCJ5	Implementation	Task 2a
2c	Acquire additional infrastructure to support additional manning	CCJ5/CCHQ USCENTCOM HQ CMDT	Implementation	Task 2b
2d	Hire required expertise	CCJ5	Implementation	Task 2c

6.3. (U) OBJ # 10.3 – Formal linkages to U.S. military service institutions to habitually support long term USCENTCOM planning requirements are established.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1a	Conduct visits to Service institutions to determine capability and desire to support	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation Task Linked to OBJ 1
1b	Develop formal MOUs with these institutions to guide planning support	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1a
1c	Finalize support agreement	CCJ5	Implementation	Task 1b
1d	Execute Planning support	Service Organizations	Implementation	Task 1c

6.4. (U) OBJ # 10.4 – USCENTCOM staff integrated in all directorates with coalition planners.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Direct greater coalition integration in to USCENTCOM staff	CCCOS/CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation task
2	Develop adjusted Manning document for coalition integration based on directorate response to alter JMD	CCJ5CCC/CCJ1	Strategy and Plan development	Task 1
3	Determine additional infrastructure required to	CC Directorates /HQ CMDT	Strategy and Plan	Task 2

	support manning		development	
4	Solicit support from coalition nations for coalition positions within directorate	CCC/CCJ1	Diplomatic	Task 3
5	Determine additional funding to support coalition	CCJ5CCC	Strategy and Plan development	Task 4
6	Solicit additional funding to sustain coalition augmentation under a Program of Record	CCJ8/JSJ8	Implementation	Task 5
7	Approve additional funding under Program of Record	JSJ8/CCJ8	Implementation	Task 6
8	Man positions based on coalition response	CCJ5CCC/CCJ1	Implementation	Task 7

6.5. (U) OBJ# 10.5 - Bilateral military planning with key nations reinstated to solidify military to military relationships and support plan development.

#	Task	Lead	LOE	Linkage
1	Respond to key nations request for bilateral planning using available planner expertise	CCJ5	Diplomacy	N/A responds to request using available capacity at CC staff and components on a case by case basis
2	Task CC staff and components within current capacity to support bilateral planning efforts	CCJ5	Implementation	Task 1
3	Allocate additional travel funds for TDY associated with limited bilateral planning effort		Implementation	Task 2
4	Develop adjusted Joint Manning Document to develop Special Plans Division to create long term capacity to support full bilateral planning efforts	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Initiation task
5	Seek Approval of adjusted JMD from Joint Staff	CCJ1/JSJ1	Implementation	Task 4
6	Approve JMD for Special Plans Division	JSJ1/CCJ1	Implementation	Task 5
7	Establish Special Plans division	CCJ1/5	Implementation	Task 6

8	Coordinate bilateral planning schedule ICW development of Theater Security Cooperation Planning	CCJ5	Strategy and Plan development	Task 7
9	Coordinate with HN to execute bilateral planning efforts	CCJ5	Diplomacy	Task 8
10	Execute bilateral planning session	CCJ5/ CC staff/ Component Staff	Implementation	Task 9
11	Bilateral Terms of Reference (TORs) are revised or developed and signed detailing possible military cooperation in contingencies	CCJ5/OSD/JS/HN	Implementation	Task 10

7. (U) Metrics for Success.

7.1. (U) Interagency support for COCOM Planning formalized and published.

7.2. (U) Interagency planners fully support COCOM planning throughout the planning process and support plan development and implementation.

7.3. (U) Dedicated regional and functional experts are supporting USCENTCOM planning efforts and plan development throughout the planning process.

7.4. (U) MOUs signed and implemented between USCENTCOM and Service academic and analytical organizations supporting USCENTCOM planning efforts as required.

7.5. (U) USCENTCOM JMD revised and implemented to reflect addition of key coalition planners as embedded staff.

7.6. (U) Terms of Reference (TORs) detailing bilateral cooperation in contingencies are signed with each key nation (KSA, KUW, BAH, QAT, UAE, OMN).

8. (U) Resources

8.1. (U) OBJ # 10.1 - Interagency support for COCOM Planning is expanded, formalized and is available earlier in the planning process. Funding for additional TDY expenses is required but no additional funding for man spaces is required. No estimate is currently available for additional TDY. Most of this coordination can occur within current Adaptive Planning initiatives either in place but limited (PRPOMOTE COOPERATION) or proposed IA coordination (use of Core Groups for each COCOM).

8.2. (U) OBJ # 10.2 - Programs to provide access to regional and functional experts required to support varied planning efforts are established and funded.

- Functional experts initially desired are Economic, Governance, Diplomatic, counterterrorism, Consequence Management.
- Regional experts initially desired would support Levant, Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, and South Asia.
- This would require ~10 personnel at a ~ cost of \$250K per year = ~\$2.5M for planning only.

8.3. (U) OBJ # 10.3 - Formal linkages to U.S. military service institutions to habitually support long term USCENTCOM planning requirements are established. This requires development of formal MOUs for support from service educational institutions and Service analysis organizations (CAC, CNA, etc). It may require additional travel funding to support visits but much can be done with virtual planning coordination using electronic means to limit travel. No estimate of additional travel funding is available.

8.4. (U) OBJ # 10.4 - USCENTCOM staff integrated in all directorates with coalition planners. This has been done to a limited degree to date but functional and regional expertise can be provided by using existing coalition relationships to expand directorate planning capacity. Cost may vary by country from no additional cost to the U.S. to full USG funding support for poorer nations. No estimate is available.

8.5. (U) OBJ# 10.5 - Bilateral military planning with key nations reinstated to solidify military to military relationships and support plan development. Prior to Sep 11, CCJ5 had a Special Plans Division that handled all bilateral planning efforts with key Gulf nations. Manning included a division chief and 4 Military Action Officers to coordinate with USCENTCOM staff, components, and HN military staffs. Bilateral planning was put on hold and the existing capacity was used to support the extensive increase in contingency planning. The cost of additional man spaces plus and annual travel budget of ~ \$200K are the estimated resources required to fully reinstitute bilateral planning without reducing currently required planning capacity.

9. (U) Additional or revised authorities required. Current authorities are deemed appropriate. No changes recommended. Expanded coordination with the IA is an objective that is currently limited but this can be resolved within process refinements and will not require new specific authorities.

10. (U) Constraint/Limitations.

10.1. (U) Current process for IA coordination is undefined and limited in scope. Often relies on getting approval from SECDEF by request from the commander. Direct coordination is approved on a case by case basis late in the planning process. Relies on IA agency desire to participate.

10.2. (U) No additional funding is available for initiatives listed above. Must use existing funding and this often limits ability to include other experts in planning processes.

11. (U) Risk and risk mitigation measures.

11.1. (U) No new risk is incurred by failing to initiate recommended programs above. We are currently operating within this environment but operating less efficiently.

11.2. (U) Current risk can be mitigated by instituting and funding formal programs above. Failure to fund programs above can be mitigated to a small degree by:

11.3. (U) Reorganizing existing U.S. and coalition planner capacity to priority efforts to include bilateral planning.

11.4. (U) Assigning lead for bilateral planning requirements to service components and augmenting with available USCENTCOM staff on a case by case basis.

11.5. (U) Requesting service organizations and other USG agencies to fund their support for priority planning efforts.

11.6. (U) Reallocating available USCENTCOM travel funds to priority planning coordination efforts with the interagency (DoS) on a case by case basis.

11.7. (U) Developing informal relationships with regional and functional experts that are willing to assist without compensation.

Appendix TWELVE (Consultations) to Appendix J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose: This Appendix provides the details of Organizations and Personnel consulted during the CAT Situational Assessment and/or report process.

2. (U) Personnel Consulted.

#	Name	Organization	Subject
1	(b)(6)	CSPO, Defense Energy Support Center (DESC)	Berry Amendment
2	(b)(6)	SES, J3/4, Defense Logistics Agency	Northern Distribution Network (NDN)
3	(b)(6)	Deputy Director Operations, DESC	Supply Chains, Fuel
4	(b)(6)	Liaison Officer, DESC	Lines of Communication (LOC) Infrastructure, NDN
5	(b)(6)	YA-3, CCJ4 Plans	Logistics (Log)
6	Wing Cdr (b)(6) (b)(6)	Defense Logistics Operations, United Kingdom Ministry of Defense	Log, Access, Basing. Host Nation Support (HNS), Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs), Agreements.
7	Capt (RN) (b)(6)	DACOS J4 PJHQ	Log, Access, Basing
8	LTC (b)(6)	NATO SHAPE AMCC	LOCs & Transit Agreements
9	(b)(6)	USAFCENT POLAD	Manas, AB
10	(b)(6) LTC (b)(6) Maj (b)(6)	DCM, U.S. Embassy Astana Dept of Justice Senior Law Senior Commercial Officer Export Control and Border System Chief Office Military Cooperation Threat Reduction Office	Kazakhstan
11	(b)(6) Lt Col (b)(6)	HM Ambassador, Kazakhstan Defence Attache	Kazakhstan
12	(b)(6)	International Finance Corporation, World Bank	Central Asia economic issues
13	(b)(6)	U.S. AID, Almaty	Kazakhstan: Education, Health,

#	Name	Organization	Subject
14	(b)(6)	UNHCR Regional Rep	Central Asian States
15	(b)(6)	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	Central Asia Influenza
16	(b)(6)	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Central Asia economic issues
17	(b)(6)	U.S. AID Bishkek, Kryrgyzstan Society and State Advisor Millennium Challenge	Kyrgyzstan
18	(b)(6)	DCM, U.S. Embassy Kryrgyzstan First Secretary	Kyrgyzstan
20	1 Lt (b)(6)	Office of Military Cooperation UN Resident Coordinator, Kryrgyzstan (UN Displaced Persons)	Kyrgyzstan
21	(b)(6) and key Staff	Hd UK DFID Commander 376 th AEW and Base Cdr Manas	Kyrgyzstan Manas AB, Kryrgyzstan
22	(b)(6)	U.S. AID Turkmenistan Country Representative	Turkmenistan
23	(b)(6)	U.S. Embassy Turkmenistan Economic Officer	Turkmenistan
25	(b)(6)	EU Regional Coordinator for Cooperation	Central Asia
26	(b)(6)	U.S. AID Uzbek Country Rep	Uzbekistan
27	(b)(6)	DESC-DL	Fuel, NDN, Supply Chains
28	(b)(6)	DESC-B	Fuel, Central Asia
29	(b)(6)	Liaison Officer, DESC	Fuel Supply Chain
30	(b)(6)	Liaison Officer, DESC	Support to the Indian Navy, Fuel

Appendix THIRTEEN to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations) Situational Assessment

1. (U) Strategic Context.

1.1. (U) Purpose. This document provides an assessment of Basing, Logistics, and Framework operations in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility AOR as of 19 Dec 2008. It outlines the current state of these activities and the current environment affecting these functions, provides insight in to higher level guidance, identifies challenges and opportunities, and makes initial recommendations on areas to explore in the development of the follow on Report. Information that is redundant to information in the report has been deleted and noted.

1.2. (U) Key Terminology used within this planning effort.

1.2.1. (U) Basing will focus on posture and access in the USCENTCOM AOR. Posture is defined as basing, forces with required equipment, PREPO equipment, infrastructure and facilities, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information (C4I), sustainment. Access includes agreements and host nation (HN) support that provide required access and freedom of action.


1.2.2. (U) Logistics includes those support functions, activities, resources, and requirements necessary to sustain current operations and prepare for future contingencies and operations within the USCENTCOM AOR. Although sustainment planning figures are included at land based Global Defense Posture (GDP) locations under basing this addresses capabilities required to support log functions including internal and external Lines of Communications (LOC) and logistics focused organizations.

1.2.3. (U) Framework operations addresses any additional requirements to support the execution of assigned responsibilities in the USCENTCOM AOR not covered in other work groups. It can include desired changes in processes, capabilities or authorities. At a minimum it will address maritime posture afloat, theater response force requirements, and access to expanded capacity via internal capabilities first and external capabilities second (e.g. contracts with academia).

1.3. (U) Current Situation.

1.3.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Basing.

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
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1.5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Recent Developments and Historical Context.

- The execution of OEF and OIF significantly increased the posture, access, logistics, and en route requirements to support U.S. operations in the region. Historically, the U.S. maintained a minimal force in the region because of sensitivities to visible U.S. presence and basing and access relied largely on legacy access and capabilities from post DESERT STORM development in the Gulf region. This focus did not support USCENTCOM well as they tried to execute the initial stages of OEF. No formal basing was established prior to 9/11 and this significantly hindered the execution of military operations. This lack of available and required access continues to increase risk to operations as we rely on limited LOCs to provide critical support to forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- The increased focus on building partnership capacity to support the broad range of operational requirements and a reduction of the burden on United States and coalition force posture requires new access, posture, and logistics to address periodic partnership training efforts across the region. The focus in the past was centered on the Gulf nations. The continued focus of the Gulf nations, coupled with the emerging focus on the other sub-regions, will require a shift from a Gulf region focus to an AOR-wide approach with new access and posture requirements.

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2. (U) Assessment.

2.1 (U) Identify Current U.S. Government (USG) Policies and Activities.

- U.S. policy and planning guidance for development of posture and access in the region is defined in two capstone documents – The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP signed by the Chairman). The JSCP and the Logistics Supplement to the JSCP provides guidance on logistics operations and support. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) defines the geographic space and the broad responsibilities for the Combatant Commander. These are implementation documents directing USG military activities and planning in support of the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and National Military Strategy (NMS). Additional information on implementation of posture efforts with in the DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) is also defined in the Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF). Additionally, posture and access is driven in part to meet operational needs in support of the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy. Key elements of guidance from the GEF and JSCP are included in Appendix 1.
- While sustaining access and posture required to address current operational needs is critical, it is essential that we reshape posture and access to meet future long term needs in the region. This includes the need to address our long term relationships with each key nation in the region and address Department of Defense (DoD) approaches to sustaining and funding posture. Finally, where possible, we should coordinate our efforts within the region with other key coalition partners looking for efficiencies, recognizing that most regional nations prefer to deal bilaterally.
- USCENTCOM provided DoD an initial GDPP for the region that provides a long term end state for desired posture and access beyond current operations. Most of today’s access and posture efforts though are driven by the need to meet current operational requirements under OEF and OIF. Negotiations are exclusively bilateral in the region and unlikely to change in the near term based on the preferences of each host nation. Even security organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) offer little support for the advancement of basing and framework operations in the USCENTCOM AOR.
- Logistics is explicably tied to access. Access allows for availability of land, facilities, infrastructure, civilian and military capacity/capability (e.g. airfields, ports), transient, over flight rights, use of LOCS, commercial enterprise, availability of a work force and material, and contracts with vendors. This access further allows the United States military to reduce its logistical footprint, reduce strategic and intra-theater lift requirements, achieve economies of scale, stimulate the local economy, and save U.S. resources.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2.3 (U) Assessment of USG and Host Nation Policies and Activities

2.3.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Basing.

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
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


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2.4. (U) Major Risks.



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2.5. (U) Major Opportunities.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

2.6. (U) Critical Gaps in Knowledge/Intelligence

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

3. (U) Advantages/ Disadvantages in Shifting Course and Constraints

3.1. (U) Overview of Advantages and Disadvantages to Shifting Course. The initiatives recommended above will require changes in requirements, responsibilities, organizations, processes, and authorities. The overall intent is to provide operational commanders with increased flexibility, freedom of action, and allow for more efficient execution of required operations/activities in the AOR in support of USG policy objectives while improving the ability of DoD to project long term requirements, support contingency operations, and use other capabilities to improve military planning and execution of military operations and activities. Overall, these initiatives may not be positively viewed by organizations such as OSD, the Joint Staff, and Congress because this approach will introduce new long term costs, force requirements, and requires a shift of authorities and potential reorganization to support these initiatives. Partner nation acceptance will also vary and needs to be considered.

3.2. (U) Basing.

3.2.1. (U) Advantages.

- Enables a rapid and flexible response capability for the execution of all military activities to include Theater Security Cooperation, contingencies, and major combat operations.
 1. Signals an enduring commitment to the Middle East, Central and South Asian States; recognizing that strategic patience is necessary to achieve and sustain stability.
- Allows the USG and Allies to assist regional partners in improving capabilities through bilateral and multilateral arrangement, treaties, and international law.
 2. Supports departmental long-term efforts to define and source COCOM requirements.

3.2.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Disadvantages.

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3.3. (U) Logistics.

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3.4. (U) Framework Operations.

3.4.1. (U) Advantages.

- Establishes an adaptive Theater Response capability that balances U.S. presence with the need to respond quickly to mission requirements.

- ICW U.S. allies and regional partners extends maritime security. Supports policies of those nations and international organizations (e.g. EU) that are willing and able to stem the flow of illegal human, drug, and arms trafficking, and piracy.
- Increases coordination with the interagency and multinational partners. Allows for the synchronization of all elements of national power and integration with Allies and regional partners.
- Increases protection of trade routes that will ensure the flow of vital goods and strategic resources into and out of the region.


3.4.2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Disadvantages.

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3.5. (U) Legal, Budgetary, and Political Environment:

3.5.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Legislative restrictions.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3.5.2. (U) Sanctions. No specific sanctions were noted but there continues to be specific limitations by country on the type of activity, types of force presence, and level of support for U.S. operations in the region.



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

4. (U) Tabs

- A - National and Command Guidance**
- B - Key Assumptions**
- C - Charter, Definitions, and Goals**
- D - Berry Amendment and Buy America Act**
- E - Logistics Initiatives**
- F - Basing**
- G - Theater Response**
- H - Maritime Afloat Posture**
- I - Lines of Communication (LOCs)**
- J - Expanded Planner Access**


**Tab A (National and Command Guidance) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J
(Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)**

1. (U) Purpose: This annex provides key national and command level guidance pertinent to the development of basing, framework Operations and logistics in the USCENTCOM AOR. These capabilities are generally required to support all military activities in the region but key points that specially address our work group requirements are highlighted in red below.

2. (U) Discussion: The following critical guidance is used in USCENTCOM to guide the development of posture and access in the AOR.

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2.4. (U) Theater Strategic Imperatives – The USCENTCOM Strategic Imperatives for action are:

- Contribute to the security conditions that establish the foundation for enduring regional stability
- Ensure the free flow of strategic resources
- Support USG initiatives to advance principled, pragmatic governance
- Work with allies and partners in pursuit of common interests.

2.5. (U) Strategic Principles. (U) The USCENTCOM Theater Strategy is based on six principles:

- Enduring Commitment. The United States has an enduring commitment to the Middle East, the Levant and the Central and South Asian States; recognizing that others will challenge U.S. pre-eminence, with both state and non-state actors remaining irreconcilable to U.S. objectives.
- Strategic patience is necessary to achieve and sustain stability
- The United States aspires to remain first among equals while avoiding the role or perception of a regional hegemonic power.
- Flexible Force Posture. The United States will maintain sufficient presence in the region to protect vital national interests and provide support to regional allies.
- The United States must balance a presence that is having a tangible effect in improving security and stability with one that may garner support for our competitors and adversaries.
- U.S. forces will remain postured and prepared to defeat both irregular and conventional threats.
- International, Coalition Cooperation. The United States must develop enduring relationships mindful of skepticism within the region of our motives and commitment. The United States is committed to working with others in pursuit of common objectives; however preemptive and unilateral action remains an option.
- The level of international support has considerable influence on the ability to achieve stability. Coalition members defining their interests and level of support is a pre-requisite for success.
- Legitimacy is as much a function of reputation and perception as legal protocols.
- The risk of losing future generations to violent extremist ideologues is significant.
- Building Partner and Collective Security Capability. The United States will assist partners in developing the capability to achieve their security objectives
- The United States and Allies will help partners improve their capabilities and emphasize cooperation as a basis for enduring stability through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, treaties, and international law.
- Building Partner Capacity in Governance and Economy. Legitimate, representative governance and economic development are preconditions for establishing enduring stability.
- There is an appetite among states and citizens in the region for access to Western capital, expertise, technology, and business skills. International investment and access to associated resources encourages security and stability.

- USCENTCOM will support multinational and interagency efforts to improve regional governance and economic development.
- Coordinated International and Interagency Effort. The United States must synchronize all elements of national power and integrate with partners in the international community.
- Military force alone cannot be decisive in maintaining security and stability; it can set limited conditions in appropriate circumstances.
- All elements of power, including those of the international community, should be planned and coordinated prior to taking military action.
- The Interagency effort must be adequately resourced and unified behind common objectives.
- Dialogue with all protagonists is essential to manage friction and identify and exploit opportunities.
- Coordinated strategic communications are essential throughout interagency efforts and among coalition partners.
- Establish a network of USG agencies, international and regional partners, and organizations to defeat a network of VEOs.

2.6. (U) USCENTCOM Theater Objectives - There are five theater objectives that will set the conditions for achieving the strategic vision.

- Promote common interests in order to enhance stability.
- Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)
- Counter the proliferation, acquisition and use of WMD.
- Assist in setting the conditions that will enable economic development and prosperity.
- Prepare U.S. and partner forces to respond to emerging challenges
- Objective 1: Promote Common Interests in order to Enhance Stability - Regional security and stability can best be achieved when relationships are based on common interests.
 - Economic and security benefits are potentially available to all nations in the region, but these benefits cannot be fully realized in an environment of unrest, suppression, and subversion. Support and cooperation from the United States encourages the development of a region where nations and individuals can fulfill their potential. USCENTCOM seeks to turn adversaries into competitors and competitors into allies.
 - Governments are responsive to the needs of their people.
 - Assist governmental institutions in their ability to provide basic services.
 - States respect each other's sovereignty.
 - Facilitate the acknowledgment and enforcement of international borders and the sanctity of governments.
 - Stable representative governments support rule of law and human dignity.
 - Promote adherence to internationally accepted behaviors.
 - Favorable progress is made in the MEPP.
 - Encourage broad support for resolving core issues.
 - Regional actors are drawn into mutually beneficial relationships.
 - Promote an environment that emphasizes cooperation vice competition.
 - Ability to operate from global commons is assured.
 - Air, land, sea, space, and cyber access is assured.
 - Friendly governments are not threatened by insurgencies.
 - Encourage non-democratically-aligned governments to transform more towards a representative structure that respects and empowers its people.

- Strengthen governments’ ability to marginalize insurgents.
 - Destabilizing hegemonic influence is deterred.
- Encourage symmetric growth in the power and influence of regional governments to prevent emergence of hegemony.
 - The flow of illicit trade is restricted.
 - Support policy and the security apparatus of nations willing and able to stem the flow of illegal human, drug, and arms trafficking within their borders and on the high seas
- Objective 2: Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations - VEOs are committed to preventing the establishment of free and open societies. While elimination of these VEOs may not be possible, they must be rendered ineffective. USCENTCOM must battle VEOs on multiple levels: physical engagement, denying support via resources and safe havens, and discrediting the extremist ideology and way of life. USCENTCOM efforts will continue to support the larger USG campaign against terrorism.
 - Moderate Muslims are able to reconcile or neutralize extremists.
 - Assist moderates in promoting peaceful reconciliation.
 - Irreconcilable extremists are isolated or eliminated.
 - Defeat of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) given highest priority.
 - Work with allies to render inoperative, capture, or kill irreconcilable extremists.
 - Foreign Terrorist flow is disrupted.
 - Assist willing governments in securing national borders.
 - Identify and counter sources of foreign terrorist recruitment.
 - Partner nations are willing and able to counter extremists.
 - Provide support to nations willing to combat extremists.
 - Promote intelligence sharing among regional stakeholders.
 - Extremists are opposed in the physical, ideological, and cyber domains.
 - Employ all instruments of national power preemptively to frustrate VEO’s objectives.
 - VEO resources, freedom of movement, and safe havens are restricted.
 - Enhance partner capabilities to control sovereign space and ungoverned border areas to counter support to VEOs.
 - State sponsorship of VEOs is discouraged.
 - Hold states that provide support or sanctuary to VEOs accountable.
- Objective 3: Counter the Proliferation, Acquisition, and Use of WMD - WMD use is the most catastrophic regional threat and preventing its proliferation, acquisition, and use will remain a priority mission. WMD-related issues generate a profound psychological and potentially physical impact on long-term regional security and stability. At the strategic level, the world’s nuclear power states all have an interest in supporting non-proliferation efforts. At the operational level, some partner nations have increased their interest in development of nuclear technology. At the tactical level, the possession of WMD by non-state actors presents the most dangerous threat to the United States, its partners, and allies. USCENTCOM will work with allies and the interests of international organizations in combating WMD (CWMD) throughout the region.
 - Development, proliferation, and use of WMD and associated technologies are prevented.
 - Employ all available means to halt the acquisition, transfer, or use of WMD.
 - Existing WMD stockpiles are secured.
 - Assist partner nations in ensuring the physical security of existing WMD.

- Nation states are signatories to and abide by international arms control agreements, export control regimes, and international standards.
 - Urge states to adhere to internationally recognized WMD non-proliferation standards.
- WMD stockpiles and production capacity are curtailed or eliminated.
 - Encourage states to safely destroy stockpiles and production capacity with the goal of ultimately eliminating their WMD capability.
- Partner nations willing and able to independently combat WMD threats.
 - Enable partner nations with CWMD training, resources, and intelligence sharing capabilities to detect, disrupt, and defeat hostile entities that seek to acquire or use WMD.
- Objective 4: Assist in Setting the Conditions that will Enable Economic Development and Prosperity - A healthy economic environment is crucial to regional stability. The U.S., with help from allies and regional partners, has provided a security umbrella enabling global trade. Continued protection of trade routes will ensure the flow of vital public goods into and out of the region. USCENTCOM will support USG and international efforts to develop enduring regional prosperity.
 - Strategic resources move freely into and out of the region.
 - Enhance partner nations' ability to counter threats to all LOCs.
 - Regional infrastructure enables the flow of legal commerce.
 - Protect, improve, and build redundant roads, pipelines, ports, and airfields.
 - Legitimate economic transactions are protected.
 - Rule of Law systems enhanced to safeguard legitimate physical and electronic transactions.
 - (U) Promote/multi and bilateral trade agreements enhancing economic cooperation.
 - Cultivate free trade agreements reducing bureaucratic and political barriers.
 - Cultivate intra-theater agreements for access to natural resources.
 - An economically interdependent environment where conflict is seen as counter to national interests.
 - Promotes the mutual benefits of economic trade.
 - Objective 5: Prepare United States and Partner Forces to Respond to Emerging Challenges - Regional stability and security will be contingent upon our partners developing their own capabilities and infrastructure for use in combined operations. The U.S. will act unilaterally when necessary; but adopting a partnership approach is more efficient and provides a platform for international legitimacy, trust, goodwill, and moral support. USCENTCOM will assist our allies in developing appropriate and credible defense capabilities.
 - Coalition and U.S. freedom of action is preserved.
 - Establish and maintain basing and access agreements.
 - Joint and combined interoperability are improved.
 - Advocate common operational systems and procedures.
 - Regional partners' security forces are equipped and trained for relevant threats.
 - Assist partners in developing forces for realistic threats, acknowledging the limited nature of resources.
 - Allies and partners are assured of U.S. commitment.
 - Convey U.S. commitment to participate in regional security and stability.
 - U.S. military presence is minimized while crisis response capability maintained.

- Assist partners in improving security capabilities, while limiting the U.S. footprint, by properly positioning forces within and adjacent to the region.
- Enhance regional consequence management capabilities.

Tab B (Key Assumptions) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) **Purpose:** This provides a list of key assumptions pertinent to the development of Basing, Framework Operations and Logistics in the USCENTCOM AOR.

2. (U) **Discussion:** The following assumptions are to be considered during basing, framework Operations and Logistics plan development.

2.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Theater Strategy Assumptions

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- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

2.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Access Assumptions

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- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2.3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Generic Logistical Assumptions:

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Tab C (Charter, Definitions, and Goals) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose: This Appendix outlines the proposed charter for the team, provides definitions, and defines the Short Term (~18 Months), Intermediate (~5 Years), and Long Term Strategic Goals for each of the three focus areas by Line Of Effort.

2. (U) Discussion: The following charter and definitions are provided to guide the work group efforts.



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2.1.3. (U) Framework Operations. Defined in Tabs G, H, J. Framework operations includes:

- Desired Theater Response Requirements (Tab G)

- Maritime Posture Afloat (Tab H)
- Access to an increased planning capacity using other DoD and Service institutions and contracted subject matter experts.(Tab J)

2.2. (U) Lines of Effort (LOEs)

- Diplomatic efforts
- Strategy and Policy development/approval
- Sustaining existing capabilities and access
- Implement of approved efforts/activities


2.3. (U) Proposed Near Term Goal (18 months). Working within the interagency, partner nations, supporting COCOMs and DoD Agencies, define and reshape contingency and enduring theater posture and required access while adjusting authorities, organizations, LOCs, and processes to successfully achieve all assigned current mission requirements in a more responsive, efficient manner.

2.4. (U) Proposed Intermediate Goal (5 Years). Working within the interagency, partner nations, supporting COCOMs and DoD Agencies, sustain a flexible, expandable network with the required enduring posture (basing, forces with equipment, PREPO, infrastructure and facilities, C4I, sustainment), access (agreements and HN support), LOCs (internal and external), while refining adjusted authorities and joint logistic C2 organizations to successfully achieve all assigned current and future mission requirements in a more responsive, efficient manner.

2.5. (U) Proposed Long Term Strategic Goal. With interagency, partner nations, supporting COCOMs and DoD Agencies, maintain enduring posture, access, Lines of Communication (LOCs) (internal and external), authorities and joint logistic C2 organizations that enable successful execution of assigned responsibilities and provides required freedom of action at a moderate level of risk.

2.6. (U) Subordinate Goals with working Objectives.

2.6.1(~~S// REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Basing.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Tab D (Berry Amendment and Buy America Act) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. This appendix discusses the aspects of the Berry Amendment and the Buy America Act related to DoD's ability to procure selected material or items in support of military operations.

2. (U) Discussion.

2.1. (U) The Berry Amendment and the Buy America Act fall under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 25 Foreign Acquisition and DFARS 225.7002.

2.2. (U) The Berry Amendment "restricts the Department from using appropriated funds or funds otherwise made available to the Department for the procurement of certain items that are not grown, reprocessed, revised, or produced in the U.S." It applies to end items and components (e.g. food, clothing, textiles, tents, natural and synthetic fibers and fabrics, and hand or measuring tools). If the amendment is not followed an anti-deficiency violation will occur. Key points:

- Most restrictive and applies to DoD only (use of GSA contracts still would apply to DoD)
- Applies to end products and components (e.g. components for clothing and textiles such as rubber sole in shoes, buttons, and zippers).
- Waiver criteria and authority is high; approved by OSD (AT&L) for DLA. Use of waiver has mandatory notification procedures for some products.
- Exceptions exist but are used judiciously so as not to give an appearance of purposely evading Berry.
- Very high political interest in the amendment.
- DLA must request approval from AT&L for a domestic Non-availability Determination.

2.3 (U) The Buy American Act is applicable if the cost is \$3000 and above (the micro-purchase threshold); for supplies used in the United States; end product must be manufactured in the U.S. and 50% more of components must be from U.S. or qualifying countries. This act applies to the USG wide. Exceptions exist to the act:

- Non-available articles listed in the FAR 25.104 is a class determination
- Insufficient domestic offers to meet the requirement
- Public interest
- Free Trade Agreements and the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement constitute the Trade Agreement Act consisting of over 45 countries. The end product does not have to be wholly manufactured in a Trade Agreement Act country, but must have been substantially transferred in that country.
- Trade Agreement Act. The Buy American Act does not apply if the Trade Agreement Act applies. Meaning the end product is covered and country is listed.
- Buy American Act does not apply if end product is provided from one of 21 qualifying countries exempt from the Buy American Act as a result of DoD's MOU and International Agreement.

3. (U) Assessment. Use of locally acquired goods and services by national level providers is constrained by the Berry Amendment and Buy American Acts. Evaluation of offers is highly complex and specific to the facts of the acquisition such as: the particular items being procured; if Berry

Amendment or an appropriation act domestic sourcing restriction applies; if domestic offers were received; if foreign offers were received; if subject to the Trade Agreement Act; and if offers from qualifying or Trade Agreement countries were received. Specific Berry Amendment exceptions can be found in DFARS 225.7002 exceptions.


Tab E Major Logistics Initiatives to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. This appendix discusses several logistics initiatives and provides a critical assessment of each. Each initiative is detailed in enclosures 1-7 of this tab

2. (U) Discussion.

2.1. (U) USCENTCOM J4 is pursuing several initiatives to enhance joint logistics support to the war fighter. This tab will discuss those initiatives and their impact to both theater and regional support.

2.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Usually, in support of USCENTCOM operations there are some basic themes and needs to providing logistical support:



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

2.4. (U) These themes, needs, and planning factors combined with the basic key logistics assumptions (See Tab B) are critical to providing logistical support in this austere, but improving theater of operations.

3. (U) Assessment recommendation. It is the recommendation of the logistics assessment team that each of the initiatives described in this tab are beneficial to improving logistics support to the war fighter. Therefore each initiative merits continued planning and upon approval the necessary resources to implement.

Enclosures

- 1: Theater Logistics Transformation
- 2: Logistics Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP)
- 3: Afghanistan Plus Up Logistics Planning
- 4: Theater Reposture and Retrograde
- 5: Northern Distribution Network (NDN)
- 6: Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC)
- 7: Streamlining Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

Encl 1 (Theater Logistics Transformation) to Tab E (Major Logistics Initiatives) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)


1. (U) Purpose. To provide a status review and assessment of an initiative to ultimately establish a Joint Task Force-Logistics in the USCENTCOM Theater of Responsibility (AOR).

2. (U) Discussion.

2.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Background.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)



2.4. (U) Authorities. A joint logistics construct is supported by U.S. law, Joint doctrine, and Army doctrine. Allows a combatant commander to tailor the organization to meet his mission requirements.

- U.S. Code, Title 10 provides the COCOM authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- Joint doctrine allows the COCOM Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) - authority to issue directives necessary to optimize use or reallocate resources, prevent or eliminate redundant facilities or overlapping functions. It also states the COCOMs may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate joint force Commander (JFC) as required to accomplish the JFC's assigned mission. Joint Pub 4-0 states a COCOM may establish a JTL element to integrate and synergize logistic capabilities. Options include: augment J-4, use a service organization, delegate to a JTF commander, establish a stand alone logistics agency.
- Army doctrine for a Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) allows that a TSC is capable of planning, controlling, and synchronizing all operational-level sustainment operations for the JFC.

2.5. (U) The planning effort identified several Joint Logistics Functions with corresponding Joint Common Support Capabilities listed below:

- Deployment & Distribution
 - Move the Force
 - Sustain the Force
 - Operate the JDDE
- Supply
 - Manage Supplies and Equipment
 - Inventory Management
 - Munitions
 - POL(Bulk)
- Maintain
 - Repair
 - Rebuild
- Logistics Services

- Food Service
- Water & Ice Service
- Basecamp Services
- Operational Contract Support
 - Contract Support Integration
 - Contractor Management
- Engineering
 - General Engineering
 - Geospatial Engineering

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Encl 2 (CENTCOM GCCS-J Logistics Common Operating Picture Portal C2 Enabler) to Tab E (Major Logistics Initiatives) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide a status review and assessment of an initiative to create a LOGCOP that will enhance logistics command and staff decisions and recommendations. This initiative is supportive of the theater.

2. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Encl 3 (Afghanistan Plus Up Logistics Planning) to Tab E (Major Logistics Initiatives) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide a status review and assessment of the logistics planning effort related to the Afghanistan Plus Up. This effort is supportive of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the Central Asian States regional area.

2. (U) Discussion.

2.1 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Background.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Encl 4 (Iraq Theater Reposture and Retrograde) to Tab E (Major Logistics Initiatives) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide a status review and assessment of the Iraq Theater Reposture and Retrograde planning effort. This effort is supportive of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and potentially the swing of OIF forces and sustainment stocks to Afghanistan ISO OEF.

2. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Consume, Redistribute (or Redeploy), Transfer (ICW Base Transfer), Donate (to GoI or NGO Entity, and Dispose (DRMS/Destroy-sell).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

Encl 5 (Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Tab E (Major Logistics Initiatives) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide a status review and assessment of the NDN initiative. This effort is supportive of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the Central Asian States sub region.

2. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

Encl 6 (Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) to Tab E (Major Logistics Initiatives) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide a status review and assessment of the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command initiative. This effort is supportive of USCENTCOM Theater Area of Responsibility.

2. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

2.4. (U) New joint doctrine for OCS (JP4-10) prescribes establishing a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) as a possible contracting organizational option for more oversight of larger complex contingency operations that involve different Service forces. The JTSCC, by design, is a joint functional command that has C2 authority over designated Service component theater support contracting organizations and contracting personnel in an AOR.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3. (U) Assessment. If approved, recommend the establishment within the next 6-12 months. As the theater logistics transformation initiative is refined and implemented align the JTSCC under that headquarters.

Encl 7 (Streamlining Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Tab E (Major Logistics Initiatives) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide a status review and assessment of the FMS process in support of OIF and OEF.

2. (U) Discussion.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Tab F (Basing) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

1. (U) Purpose. Basing in the USCENTCOM AOR is pursued along two lines within the USCENTCOM staff and components. Enduring basing is advanced using the Department of Defense Global Defense Posture initiative and outlined within the Theater Posture Plan called the Global Defense Posture Plan (GDPP). It is Annex D to the Theater Campaign Plan. The initial submission was provided to OSD and the Joint Staff for their review and comment in July 2008 and is currently under review

2. (U) Discussion. This Tab examines two types of basing - enduring and contingency. The definitions of these types are included in JP1.02 (enduring) and the USCENTCOM Sandbook (contingency).

2.1 (U) Enduring basing. Encls 1 and 2. Outlines existing or planned bases in the USCENTCOM GDPP and discusses two elements – posture and access

- *Posture* - For the purposes of this work group and posture development within USCENTCOM posture includes the following elements
 - Basing
 - Forces and their Equipment
 - PREPO equipment
 - Infrastructure and facilities
 - C4I
 - Logistics and Sustainment
- *Access* - For the purposes of this work group and posture development within USCENTCOM access includes the following elements
 - Agreements
 - Host nation support

2.2. (U) Contingency basing. Encls 3 and 4. Addresses contingency basing in two countries only – Iraq and Afghanistan. The assessment will capture current contingency basing in these countries as defined by the Component Commanders and identify key issues with each for further examination.


Encls

- 1 - Capabilities at Enduring GDPP Locations
- 2 - HN Agreements and Assessment at GDPP Locations
- 3 – Afghanistan Contingency Basing
- 4 - Iraq Contingency basing


**Encl 1 to Tab F (Basing) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)
GDPP 08 Locations and Descriptions**

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)


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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)




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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

**Encl 2 (Host Nation Agreement, Assessment, and Support) to Tab F (Basing) to Appendix 13
(Situational Assessment) to Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)**

1. (U) **Purpose**. This Tab provides a summary of host nation support, existing agreements within the current GDPP countries.
2. (U) **Discussion**. This Tab provides a by country assessment of GDPP designated within the AOR.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)




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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

Encl 3 (AFG Contingency Basing) to to Tab F (Basing) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

(U) Information in this Encl is redundant to information provided in report (Annex J). See full information provided in Tab B, Appendix 2 to Annex J.

Encl 4 (Contingency Basing Iraq) to Tab F (Basing) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)

(U) Information in this Encl is redundant to information provided in report (Annex J). See full information provided in Tab A, Appendix 2 to Annex J.

**Tab G (Theater Response Requirements) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment)
Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)**

1. (U) Purpose. The posture defined below reflects USCENTCOM's current theater response requirements. The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of possible contingencies in the USCENTCOM AOR, and describe response forces and pre-positioned equipment sets available through Dec 08.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3.6. (U) Current Status of Response Forces through Dec 08. See Encl 1.

3.7. (U) PTDO Equipment Sets and APS-5 Reconstitution. See Encl 2 of this paper.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

ENCLS:

- 1: Theater Response Force Status
- 2: PTDO Equipment Sets and APS-5 Reconstitution
- 3: Potential Contingencies

**Enclosure 1 (Force Status/Theater Response) Tab G (Theater Response Requirements)
to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)**

1. (U) Purpose: The Table below provides the status of Theater Response Forces Status through December 2008:

2. TABLE 1: ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

**Enclosure 2 (PTDO Equipment Sets/Army APS-5 Regeneration Status/Theater Response)
Tab G (Theater Response Requirements) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment)
Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)**

(U) Information in this Encl is redundant to information provided in report (Annex J). See full information provided in Tab B, Appendix 9 to Annex J.

**Enclosure 3 (Potential Contingencies/Theater Response) Tab G (Theater Response
Requirements) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment) Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and
Framework Operations)**

(U) Information in this Encl is redundant to information provided in report (Annex J). See full information provided in Tab A, Appendix 9 to Annex J.

**Tab H (Maritime Posture Afloat) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment)
Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)**

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

3. (U) Mission Support.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

4. (U) Current Force Posture and Capability and Future Maritime Force Posture Afloat. Information is redundant to information provided in report (Annex J). See full information provided in Appendix 10 to Annex J.

5. (U) Status of any current host nation consultations or negotiations. The principal document covering NAVCENT relationships are Access Agreements which state the terms of access and include SOFA protections and Implementing Agreements.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

**Tab I (Lines of Communications (LOC) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment)
Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)**

1. (U) Purpose. Multiple Lines of Communications (Air, Ground and Sea) exist to support the Global Defense Posture Plan (GDPP), the Theater Campaign Plan, and contingency Operations. In the aggregate there is sufficient redundancy and flexibility to mitigate strategic/operational risk. This Appendix identifies those LOCs where a concern exists and ways to mitigate the risk through Multimodal and Intermodal solutions.

2. (U) Discussion. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Key concerns are listed below by type of LOC.

- Air Lines of Communications (ALOCs):
 - Central Asia and Pakistan. Sustaining over-flight access from the Central Asian States and Pakistan is essential for risk mitigation in maintaining support direct delivery to Bagram and Kandahar. This is especially true in the event that over-flight access to Pakistan is lost. Manas AB is a critical air hub ISO OEF. Recommend the development of a coordinated USG strategy for approaching the Central Asian and Pakistan Governments on maintaining over-flight access.
 - Turkey. Sustaining over-flight access of Turkey from the EUCOM air bridge is essential for maintaining support direct delivery to Afghanistan and Iraq. Existing CONPLANS are sufficient to maintain support but critical coordination is required with both USTRANSCOM and AFCENT concerning basing locations (both military and commercial) aircraft repositioning and support requirements, to include MOG, fuel storage, and bed-down. Aircraft returning to Turkey can not carry OIF cargo.
- Ground Lines of Communications (GLOCs):
 - Pakistan. Recommend the development of a coordinated USG strategy for approaching the Government of Pakistan on maintaining the transit ground capability. We anticipate that the financial benefits of commercial transit of military equipment and supplies will decrease as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is developed. This has already occurred with fuel procurement and delivery to Afghanistan. Continued improvement of GLOCs in Central Asia will mitigate the risk posed by LOC interruption on Pakistan.
 - Jordan. Recommend the development of a coordinated USG strategy for approaching the Government of Jordan on expanding transit ground capability. We anticipate an increased requirement to support the direct delivery to locations inside of Iraq and the retrograde of material/equipment to support the reposturing of forces and the eventual reset. This will increase the economic growth of Jordan and could support potential delivery of FMS.
 - Turkey. Recommend the development of a coordinated USG strategy for approaching the Government of Turkey to increase the transport ground capability through the Habur Gate. All supplies, equipment, and retrograde crosses at the Habur Gate. This remains the limiting factor of this GLOC.
- SLOCs – Continue to be the most cost effective transportation method. Passage through three critical chokepoints is required to sustain operations in the USCENTCOM AOR and provide the free flow of critical strategic resources such as petroleum products. The Maritime Force Posture Statement indicates sufficient forces are currently available to maintain control of the sea. As indicated in the GDPP, key ports are also identified to

provide key military and commercial access to sustain maritime posture and other maritime movement requirements both military and commercial. Recommend the development of a coordinated USG strategy for approaching the Government of Iraq to increase the capabilities at the Port of Umm Qasr, the Government of Jordan on increasing capabilities and access to the Port of Aqaba, and finally the Government of Oman on increasing the capabilities at the Port of Salah. Additionally we should continue to pursue the development of regional maritime capable partner security forces and sustain the maritime coalition activity to ensure continued free flow of maritime assets in the region.

- Multimodal and Intermodal solutions will be an important part to the Theater Distribution Plan (TDP). This is especially important to land lock countries, e.g. Afghanistan. In the event that a major transportation node becomes interrupted, multiple backup solutions need to be in place. The common solution tends to rely on airlift initially, but this is not the most efficient method and can not sustain a large force over time because of typical LIMFACs like distances that reduce ACL, MOGs at APODs, refueling capabilities and over-flight rights. To regain a sustained logistics flow alternate SPODs need to be utilized that take advantage of existing cargo handling, warehousing, and transload capabilities. Intra-theater airlift (air bridge), alternate GLOC or rail networks can then be used to close supplies. Because access is so critical, multimodal and intermodal CONOPs with contingency contracts need to be exercised from time to time to identify shortfalls. Cold starting one of these CONOPs will increase risk to overall success.

**Tab J (Expanded Planner Access) to Appendix 13 (Situational Assessment)
Annex J (Basing, Logistics, and Framework Operations)**

1. (U) Purpose. Provide and assessment planning capability gaps caused by lack of planner access early on to available government, partner nation and non-governmental expertise required to improve military planning at USCENTCOM and recommend potential initiatives for examination in the plan.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)