Document Approved for Release by US Central Command. See FOIA # 11-0170.

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team

Annex I
Command and Control Knowledge Management

February 2009

Classified by: Maj Gen Robert R. Allardice,
Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, USCENTCOM
Reason: ~~1.4a,c,d,e~~
~~Declassify on: 15 February 2034~~

ANNEX I: COMMAND AND CONTROL AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
2. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 6
3. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT 7
4. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS 9
5. STRATEGIC GOALS 9
6. OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION 12
7. LINES OF EFFORT 13
8. IMPLEMENTATION TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 17
9. APPENDICES 22
APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY 24
APPENDIX 2: AFGHANISTAN C2-KM ANALYSIS 27
APPENDIX 3: ARABIAN PENINSULA C2-KM ENGAGEMENT 84
APPENDIX 4: C2-KM SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION 87
APPENDIX 5: C2-KM SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT 97
APPENDIX 6: LIST OF REFERENCES 187

ANNEX I: COMMAND AND CONTROL AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Command and Control- Knowledge Management (C2-KM) – This report establishes a common understanding of C2-KM challenges within the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and recommends actions designed to strengthen unified action while clarifying roles and responsibilities among U.S. Government (USG) agencies, key allies, international organizations and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The report addresses Courses of Action (COAs) designed to optimize Political-Civilian-Military/Military Command and Control relationships within the USG and across the international community. Additionally, the report provides other C2-KM recommendations to improve synchronization, collaboration and information sharing throughout the USCENTCOM AOR.

(U) The Nature of the C2-KM Problem.

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) C2-KM Key Findings.

(U) Following is a summary of key findings resulting from the C2 KM Assessment:

- (U) Strong U.S. leadership in the AOR must be applied in ways that simultaneously enhance U.S. unilateral performance and sustaining unity of effort among the international community.
- (U) Stronger ties are required between U.S. and multinational Political-Civilian-Military coordination efforts using traditional Military Command and Control processes to increase AOR unity of effort.
- (U) Afghanistan-Pakistan unity of effort is hampered by a lack of an integrated international community approach for political, civilian and military activity.
- (U) U.S. policies and strategies for Pakistan and India are not well coordinated with the existing policies and strategies for Afghanistan.
- (U) Unregulated competition between elements of the USG adversely affects the level of successful engagement with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
- (U) There are insufficient U.S. policy directives for:

- (U) Effective transition of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) related C2 structures under the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA).
- (U) Use of Afghanistan and Pakistan policies and strategies as an organizing principle for the development of approaches to Central Asian States (CAS).
- (U) Unification of USCENTCOM, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Government, NATO and international community efforts related to piracy, counter-proliferation and transnational terrorism seams.
- (U) Unification of USCENTCOM Building Partnership Capacity with U.S. counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and counternarcotic initiatives.

(U) After assessing the current C2-KM constructs within the USCENTCOM AOR, the following themes emerged as most significant: Strategic civilian and military leadership for the campaign in Afghanistan; Enhanced unity of command in C2 structures/relationships in Afghanistan; USG and DOD bilateral engagement with theater regional partners; and, USCENTCOM implementation of AOR-wide C2 knowledge management practices. These themes are discussed in detail throughout this report.

(U) C2-KM Strategic Goals.

(U) As stated in the Theater Strategy, USCENTCOM has an enduring interest to promote stability within the region by capitalizing on areas of common interest among stakeholders such as security, economic prosperity, personal opportunity, and the non-proliferation of WMD. Given this interest, the following were identified as key C2-KM goals for USCENTCOM:

- (U) Improve unity of effort through enhanced processes and structures for Political, Civilian and Military integration and Military Command and Control in Afghanistan.
- (U) Unify U.S. military command structures for Afghanistan in order to ensure unity of command and provide for unified action with respect to other U.S. and international actors.
- (U) Improve the interoperability and integration of Political, Civilian and Military engagement and military support activities for U.S. whole of government approaches to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
- (U) Apply the knowledge management best practices for bilateral approaches to USCENTCOM participation in enhanced communities of interest (COIs) for information sharing and collaboration focused on key security cooperation, political, social and economic programs in the AOR.

(U) C2-KM Integrated Concept. This report proposes a C2-KM Integrated Concept with three Lines of Effort: U.S. and international community support to Afghanistan is improved; USG engagement with GCC states is improved; and, C2-KM principles and concepts adapted to USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). Objectives leading to these goals are recommended over a 5 years.

(U) This integrated concept for C2-KM differs from that published in the existing TCP by: proposing deliberate development of a C2-KM framework to maximize interagency, coalition, allies, and partnered state participation, inclusion and integration; developing strategic potential for communities of interest (COIs) and processes for addressing common issues within COIs; and, providing recommendations for methods that proactively leverage non-DOD and non-U.S. leadership.

(U) Specific Implementation Tasks. This report provides recommended tasks and other considerations for AOR-wide C2-KM in Paragraph 8. Selected key tasks include:

- (U) Select a U.S. Civilian Leadership approach for Afghanistan. This includes specific recommendations for refinement of U.S. political, civilian and military approaches within agreed constructs established in strategic agreements, compacts and strategies.

- (U) Identify the integrated strategic concept intended as the basis for U.S. policy for Afghanistan based upon the selected Civilian Leadership Approach. This includes recommendation for a Political-Civilian-Military Course of Action where the USG works within established U.N. and NATO processes to co-lead partners and the international community toward agreed ends. Multi-lateral agreements constitute the main organizing body of policy for multilateral action with the U.S. providing unilateral policies only for key gaps. U.S. policy is selectively integrated through those multilateral authorities as required. U.S. approaches are aggressively shared among and within the international community with enabling support provided by the U.S. within available resources.

- (U) Recommend the establishment of a high-level Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- (U) Recommend roles for the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- (U) Further unify U.S. Joint Forces under USFOR-A consistent with selected military command and control concepts. This includes recommendation for a Military C2 Course of Action for Afghanistan where the U.S. forces lead allies and coalition partners under established NATO / ISAF constructs. USFOR-A headquarters and U.S. joint functional components are reinforced as key enablers for ISAF and the multinational forces.

- (U) Fully resource the USFOR-A Joint Manning Document (JMD) based upon the selected military command and control concept.

- (U) Establish a C2-KM Synchronization Office at USCENTCOM in order to enhance and streamline engagement with the GCC countries in support of Security Assistance and coalition interoperability (initially bilaterally).

- (U) Establish AOR-wide C2-KM concepts including TCP-based assessments that can improve coordination with U.S. agencies and partner nations.

2. (U) PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

(U) This report was completed by the U.S. Central Command's Assessment Team over a 100 day period from November 2008 to February 2009. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the CENTCOM area of interest, a review of existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and suggested actions for U.S. Central Command in the context of an illustrative plan for the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of coalition partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve policy goals.

(U) The Team consisted of current and former members of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and Coalition military members. It drew on intelligence analysis, existing U.S. and Coalition plans and policy guidance, relevant reports and studies (see Appendix 6 for a full list of reference and source materials), the expertise of its members, the broader U.S. Government community, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and academic institutions, and consultations throughout the region, including with country teams, bilateral partners, local actors, and international and nongovernmental organizations.

(U) This report was developed in the format of a draft illustrative plan in order to impose sufficient rigor in analysis and recommendations. By providing a comprehensive, civilian-military context for U.S. Central Command, this report is intended to mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short term solutions to long term problems.

(U) Disclaimer: This document does not represent the official position of U.S. Central Command, the Department of Defense or any other agency of the United States Government.

(U) This Command and Control – Knowledge Management (C2-KM) Report seeks to establish a common understanding of the C2-KM problem associated with the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy. As a functional annex to the Draft Regional Plan it will:

- (U) Set conditions for unity command and action in order to provide an improved framework for unity of effort within a U.S. whole-of-government approach to activities in the USCENTCOM AOR.
- (U) Identify tensions and tradeoffs in organization design, considerations and policies and outline the advantages and disadvantages of potential courses of action.
- (U) Where necessary, clarify roles and responsibilities among U.S. Government (USG) agencies, key allies, international organizations and Combatant Commands (COCOMs).

(U) C2-KM functions are applicable to U.S. whole-of-government activities, as well as to the broader activities among the international community. As such, this assessment maintained a broad view of strategic and operational missions from across the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

(U) This C2-KM Report is a product of the overall USCENTCOM Assessment Team (CAT) process. Analyses were performed by a team of functional experts in broad consultation with other critical functions and regional subject matter experts. Primary access to in-theater sources and analyses was

achieved through cross-coordination, reconnaissance, interviews and briefings. Concepts and courses of action were developed and analyzed based upon the results of the assessment. These are provided for further consideration by COMCENTCOM, members of the CAT and their parent agencies.

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Following are the key findings of this C2-KM assessment which support this expression of the nature of the problem:

- (U) Strong U.S. leadership in the AOR must be applied, but that U.S. civilian and military leaders must deliver that leadership through approaches that simultaneously enhance U.S. unilateral performance, while sustaining unity of effort among the international community.

- (U) Stronger ties are required between U.S. and multinational Political-Civilian-Military coordination efforts to traditional Military Command and Control processes in order to increase unity of effort in the AOR. The USCENTCOM strategy for regional partner engagement must support a whole-of-government approach.

- (U) USG unity of effort for Afghanistan-Pakistan as a sub-region is hampered by a lack of an integrated USG and international community approaches for political, civilian and military activity.

- (U) U.S. policies and strategies for Pakistan and India are not well coordinated with the existing policies and strategies for Afghanistan.

- (U) Unregulated competition between elements of the USG adversely affects the level of successful engagement with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (See Appendix 3, Arabian Peninsula C2-KM Engagement).

- (U) The USCENTCOM Theater Strategy and the TCP do not sufficiently incorporate C2-KM constructs and assessment processes. Unity of effort can be improved through integration of basic KM within the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy, Campaign Plan and Regional Action Plans.

- (U) There are insufficient U.S. policy directives for:

    - (U) Effective transition of MNF-I related C2 structures under the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA).

    - (U) Use of Afghanistan and Pakistan policies and strategies as an organizing principle for the development of approaches to Central Asian States (CAS), especially with respect to engagement concerning the Northern Redistribution Network (NDN).

    - (U) Unification of USCENTCOM, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Government, NATO and international community efforts related to piracy, counter-proliferation and transnational terrorism seams.

    - (U) Unification of USCENTCOM Building Partnership Capacity efforts with the U.S. Government counterterror (CT), counterproliferation (CP), and counternarcotic (CN) initiatives.

(U) Additional relevant findings are provided within Appendix 4 (Situation Assessment) to this document.

(U) After assessing the current C2-KM constructs within the USCENTCOM AOR, the following themes emerged as most significant for further consideration by USCENTCOM:

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(See Tab A to Appendix 4 for a discussion of U.S. Civilian and Military Leadership Approaches)

- (U) Enhanced unity of command in C2 structures/relationships in Afghanistan. These require rationalization with existing strategies, policies, mandates, plans and priorities, and set the stage for transfer of authority / emphasis from military to civilian focus. There is a critical need to ensure that GIRoA is seen as a legitimate partner/leader in these structures and related processes.

- (U) USG, DOD bilateral engagement with theater regional partners needs to be enhanced and better aligned with the regional culture/norms.

- (U) USCENTCOM needs to establish an effective AOR-wide C2-KM concept (including TCP-based assessment) that can improve Political-Military (POL-MIL) / Civilian-Military (CIV-MIL) activities (e.g. Critical Infrastructure Security) in coordination with U.S. governmental agencies and partner nations.

4. (U) PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

(U) The following assumptions were identified as critical to C2-KM and extended coordination requirements across the USCENTCOM AOR:

- (U) The U.S. will sustain international and coalition relationships and will engage diplomatically to overcome the skepticism of multinational partners towards U.S. motives and commitment.
- (U) Key state partners, allies and international organizations (IOs) in the AOR will remain stable and cooperative to U.S. interests.
- (U) The USG will continue to invest heavily in the synchronization of all elements of national power and integration of international community partners and contributors.
- (U) The USG will continue to support NATO POL-MIL leadership for the multinational strategy supporting Afghanistan under the provisions of relevant United Nations Security Resolutions (UNSCRs) and the Afghanistan Compact.
- (U) The USG will continue to support UN and UNAMA leadership of the international community as they collectively support the Government of Afghanistan under of relevant UNSCRs and the Afghanistan Compact.
- (U) The Iraqi Security Framework Agreement (SFA) will remain a key factor in shaping international involvement with the Government of Iraq.

5. (U) STRATEGIC GOALS

(U) USCENTCOM has an enduring interest to build and sustain unifying COI through effective leadership and practices within the region in support of U.S. national interests and the international community (see Appendix 4, Tab B, and Tab C Communities of Interest). Given this interest, several strategic goals pertain to the function of C2-KM. Most are sufficiently embodied or inferred by more

general goals established in regional and sub-regional plans. Beyond those, the following C2-KM specific goals are recommended.

(U) UUU**10-25 Year C2-KM Strategic Goals:**

(U) AOR Wide

- (U) C2-KM architectures and assessment systems are fully incorporated with regional and sub-regional goals and Regional Action Plans (RAPs). C2-KM architectures transition into adaptive mechanisms capable of producing unified action in the face of dynamic regional and international interests, actions and threats.
- (U) C2-KM structures and coordination mechanisms for continuing U.S. support to Afghanistan are fully transitioned to the GIRoA (See Enclosure 1 to Tab A to Appendix 2 for discussion).
- (U) United States engagement with GCC successfully transitioned from bilateral to multilateral whole-of government exchange.

(U) 5 Year C2-KM Strategic Goals:

(U) AOR Wide

- (U) AOR-wide Unity of Effort Improved as USCENTCOM works effectively with interagency, allies and partners in pursuit of common interests.
- (U) Concepts for C2, KM, and coordination COIs are matured and fully incorporated within the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy, Theater Campaign Plan and relevant RAPs.

(U) Afghanistan-Pakistan

- (U) Unity of effort improved among the international community with the GIRoA assuming an effective leadership role within established mechanisms.

(U) Arabian Peninsula

- (U) USG and USCENTCOM engagement within a refined GCC COI is unified and effective. U.S. military and USG engagement on the Arabian Peninsula and with the GCC is streamlined and coordinated through USCENTCOM and associated U.S. Ambassadors to enhance senior leader dialogue and USG leverage.

(U) Iraq

- (U) C2-KM structures and coordination mechanisms for Iraq are fully transitioned to account for a GOI lead.

(U) 18 Month C2-KM Strategic Goals (with the exception of Iraq-related goals, these 18 month strategic goals are also established as objectives within the C2-KM Integrated Concept)**:**

(U) AOR Wide

- (U) USG policy integration mechanisms and military C2 established to effectively support control and coordination of whole-of-government activities (See Enclosure 1 to Tab B to Appendix 2 for discussion). This is established as Objective 7.
- (U) USCENTCOM and subordinates fully established to support coordination of inter-agency, coalition, alliance and partner nation activities. This is established as Objective 8.
- (U) USCENTCOM C2-KM processes and assessment processes established within the USCENTCOM TCP and relevant RAPs. This is established as Objective 9.

(U) Afghanistan-Pakistan

- (U) U.S. POL-CIV-MIL approaches are effectively established and understood among allies, coalition members, partners and the international community. This is established as Objective 1 for the C2-KM Integrated Concept.
- (U) U.S. and Multinational C2 enhanced and streamlined (See Enclosure 1 to Tab C to Appendix 2 for discussion on C2 for Afghanistan). This is established as Objective 2.
- (U) Critical capacities for Afghan governance established to provide for improved unity of effort within GIRoA. This is established as Objective 3.
- (U) Practical models are established for common procedures and military practices to bolster multinational command of U.S., NATO and coalition forces in support of ongoing COIN and nation-building efforts. This is established as Objective 4.

(U) Arabian Peninsula

- (U) Effective U.S. and GCC COIs established as a practical model for USCENTCOM C2-KM. This is established as Objective 5.
- (U) Multilateral Pilot Projects established between U. S. elements (e.g. DOD, DOS) and GCC partner nations. This is established as Objective 6.

(U) Iraq

- (U) Practical models are established for common military procedures and practices to bolster unified command of U.S., NATO and coalition forces in support of ongoing COIN and nation-building efforts
- (U) Iraq reintegrating with other regional entities, the U.S. and Allies and beginning to positively use its influence in the region.
- (U) MNF-I C2 architectures are adjusted according to evolving C2 and coordination requirements and authorities along the Combatant-to-Indigenous Civilian primacy continuum.

6. (U) OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

(U) The following refinement is recommended to the current USCENTCOM TCP C2 Concept:

- (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) The key distinctions between the C2-KM Integrated Concept and the existing TCP are:

- The Integrated Concept proposes deliberate development of a C2-KM framework to maximize interagency, coalition, alliance, and partnered state participation, inclusion and integration.
- The Integrated Concept addresses C2-KM issues specifically related to AOR-wide COIs.
- The Integrated Concept specifically leverages both USG and non-U.S. leadership.

(U) In order to implement the Integrated Concept, USCENTCOM and the USG must orient directly on the 5 Year C2-KM Strategic Goals. Tasks and objectives relating to the 5 Year C2-KM Strategic Goals these are organized along three Lines of Effort (LOEs)[1] :

- (U) LOE 1: U.S. and international community support to Afghanistan is improved.
- (U) LOE 2: USG engagement with GCC states is improved.
- (U) LOE 3: C2-KM principles and concepts adapted to USCENTCOM TCP.

(U) The following figure provides a graphic alignment of strategic goals, objectives and LOEs for the C2-KM Integrated Concept:

[1] (U) Strategic goals, objectives and tasks relating to USCENTCOM operations in Iraq were not the subject of focused analysis for this report, and are not explicitly included in this Integrated C2-KM Concept.



Figure 1 – C2-KM Integrated Concept

(U) Figure 1 illustrates three LOEs with sequenced objectives leading to the achievement of the 5 Year Strategic Goals. Interdependencies between objectives are considered. LOE 1 (outlined in blue) illustrates C2-KM actions applicable to Afghanistan; LOE 2 (outlined in green) illustrates C2-KM actions applicable to engagement with the GCC states. The third LOE (outlined in red) illustrates C2-KM applicable to actions taken AOR-wide. Some tasks continue beyond achievement of the objectives as illustrated by extended arrows suggesting further effort required to ensure achievement of the 10-25 Year C2-KM Strategic Goals.

7. (U) LINES OF EFFORT

(U) The following paragraphs expand on the concept of the LOEs noted above.

(U) **LOE 1** – Orients actions on achieving four objectives / near term goals for Afghanistan leading to achievement of the 5 Year Strategic Goal of: **U.S. and IC Support to Afghanistan is Improved**. The objectives / near term goals for this LOE are Objectives 1 through 4 as indicated above as 18 Month C2-KM Strategic Goals

- **(U) Objective 1 (POL-CIV-MIL Approach Established):** U.S. POL-CIV-MIL approaches are effectively established and understood among allies, coalition members, partners and the international community. Key to the achievement of this objective is the selection and implementation of a POL-CIV-MIL COA for USG approaches to Afghanistan

(Appendix 2 to this document provides COAs and analysis). The recommended POL-CIV-MIL COA is "U.S. AS A PARTNER" where the USG works within established U.N. and NATO mechanisms and processes to co-lead allies, coalition partners, donors and other international community participants toward agreed ends. Multi-lateral Compacts, agreements and the U.N. Integrated Approach constitute the main body of governing policy with the U.S. providing unilateral policies only as compensation for key gaps. U.S. policy is selectively integrated through both U.S. and multilateral authorities established under the Bonn Process, the Afghanistan Compact and the NATO charter. U.S. approaches (e.g. the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG)) are aggressively shared among and applied across and within the international community with enabling support provided by the U.S. within available resources.

(U) Selected Tasks include:

- (U) Resource C2-KM mechanisms at levels indicated by the requirements laid out in current policies, compacts, agreements and plans.
- (U) Establish coordination groups and required C2-KM processes to refine and integrate U.S. policies and strategies for the Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region considering the U.S. civilian and military leadership approaches desired.

(U) Further implementation tasks are provided at paragraph 8 of this report.

- **(U) Objective 2 (U.S. and Multinational C2 is Unified):** U.S. and Multinational C2 is unified through increased contributions and integration of C2 organizations and coordination methods. (See Enclosure 1 to Tab C to Appendix 2 for discussion on C2 for Afghanistan). Key to the achievement of this objective is the selection and implementation of a Military C2 COA for Afghanistan (Appendix 2 to this document provides COAs and analysis). The recommended Military C2 COA is "U.S. AS A PARTNER" where the U.S. leads allies and coalition partners under established NATO / ISAF constructs. USFOR-A headquarters and U.S. joint functional components are reinforced as key enablers for ISAF and the multinational forces. ISAF Regional Commands operate in geographically assigned areas of responsibility with higher levels of commitment to meet resource requirements. The U.S continues to provide enabling capabilities across the region. The following illustrates the recommended Military C2 structure:



Figure 2 - Recommended MIL C2 COA

(U) Selected Tasks include:

- (U) Establish appropriate support to NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), JFC Brunssum to establish multinational unity of command and unity of effort for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- (U) Create flexible USFOR-A C2 coordination processes to meet evolving C2-KM requirements for progressive transition to U.S. and Afghan civilian primacy (See Tab A (Overall Unity of Effort in Afghanistan) to Appendix 2 for discussion).

(U) Further implementation tasks are provided at paragraph 8 of this report.

- **(U) Objective 3 (GIRoA Governance / C2 capacities established):** Critical capacities for Afghan governance are established and resourced to provide improved unity of effort within GIRoA.

(U) Selected Tasks include:

- (U).Establish effective Finance and Commerce COI to assist in developing independence of GIRoA agencies and build systems of accountability.
- (U) Support capacity building within existing and emerging GIRoA structures and COIs at national, provincial, district and local levels.

- **(U) Objective 4 (Practical Models for Multinational Command / KM Established):** Practical models are established for common procedures and military practices to bolster multinational command of U.S., NATO and coalition forces in support of ongoing COIN and nation-building efforts.

  (U) Selected Tasks include:

  - (U) Develop Combined / Joint COI to create greater operational transparency between NATO-ISAF, UNAMA, coalition partners and GIRoA
  - (U) Establish international community coordination groups and C2-KM processes to integrate multilateral approaches for the Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region.

(U) LOE 2 – Orients actions on achieving two objectives / near term goals for GCC Engagement leading to achievement of the 5 Year Strategic Goal of: **USG and USCENTCOM engagement within a refined GCC COI is unified and effective.** The objectives / near term goals for this LOE are Objectives 5 and 6 as indicated above as 18 Month C2-KM Strategic Goals.

(U) Objective 5 (Effective GCC COI Established): Effective COIs established with the U. S. and GCC states as a practical model for USCENTCOM C2-KM point for coordination and collaboration.

(U) Selected Tasks include:

- (U) Establish a C2-KM Synchronization Office for security assistance and coalition interoperability within USCENTCOM with and initial focus on GCC engagement and COI development.
- (U) Develop and resource specific COIs for improved coordination and collaboration between GCC partners (Pilot Project approach).

- **(U) Objective 6 (Multilateral Pilot Projects Established - Information Exchanged w/ GCC):** The U.S. engagement with GCC successfully transitions from a bilateral to multilateral coordination and collaboration process.

  (U) Selected Tasks include:

  - (U) Promote the development of a true multilateral C2-KM enterprise (e.g. C4I based technical architecture(s) and agreed upon Information / Knowledge exchange policy-based rules.
  - (U) Select a limited set of U.S. information disclosure, release and FMS policies to test and evaluate a specific capability (COI) to transition to multilateral enterprise(s).

(U) LOE 3 – Orients actions on achieving three objectives / near term goals for AOR-wide C2-KM implementation leading to achievement of the 5 Year Strategic Goal of: **Concepts for C2, KM, and coordination COIs, are matured and fully incorporated within the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy, Theater Campaign Plan and relevant RAPs.** The objectives / near term goals for this LOE are Objectives 7 through 9 as indicated above as 18 Month C2-KM Strategic Goals.

- **(U) Objective 7 (C2-KM Concepts Adopted):** USG policy integration mechanisms and military C2 established to effectively support control and coordination of whole-of-government (See Enclosure 1 to Tab B to Appendix 2 for discussion).

  (U) Selected Tasks include:

  - (U) Assess list of candidate COIs at Tab C, Appendix 4 for implementation.
  - (U) Create best practice information sharing platforms to demonstrate, develop and document effective C2-KM techniques for cross AOR implementation

- **(U) Objective 8 (CENTCOM Integration w/ IC Partners):** USCENTCOM and subordinates fully established and resourced to support coordination of interagency, coalition, alliance and partner nation activities.

  (U) Selected Tasks include:

  - Establish and monitor USCENTCOM, interagency and coalition fulfillment of commitments to provide resources against approved C2-KM requirements.
  - Implement AOR-wide COI with full international community participation.

- **(U) Objective 9 (USG Whole of Government Approach Integrated):** USG and USCENTCOM C2-KM processes integrate policy, plans and resources established within the USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan and relevant RAPs.

  (U) Selected Tasks include:

  - (U) Operations and effects between U.S. Embassies and USCENTCOM forces synchronized.
  - (U) USCENTCOM Coalition Planning Group (CPG) effectively employed to enhance multinational and multilateral unity of effort in U.S. and USCENTCOM planning efforts.
  - (U) Interagency Task Force – Irregular Warfare (IATF-IW) effectively employed to enhance unity of effort in U.S. whole-of-government planning efforts.

8. (U) IMPLEMENTATION TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(U) The following tasks are compiled from roles and responsibilities established in Appendices 2, 3 and 4 and from the objectives indicated above.

(U) POL-CIV-MIL Tasks to enhance unity of effort for Afghanistan for recommendation through OSD to U.S. NSC. See TAB B for COAs and specific implementation details relating to each POL-CIV-MIL COA.

- Select a U.S. Civilian Leadership approach applicable the mid-to-long-term United States strategy for Afghanistan. Clarify United States intention to engage in this role through engaged U.S. departments, key allies and partners specifically including the office of the

- Identify the integrated strategic concept intended as the basis for U.S. policy for Afghanistan either as a revision to the U.S. MSP (applicable to COA A) or as a refinement to the body of multilateral policy and strategy already existing (applicable to COA B and C). **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to OSD and NSC**.

- Reinforce and support selected multilateral policy integration mechanisms for U.S. policy integration and implementation. Selectively target these for enabling support through the offices of the U.S. Embassy, USFOR-A, NATO, UNAMA or GIRoA to support effective integration and implementation of U.S. policy as a component of the overall Afghan strategy. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to U.S. Embassy Kabul, OSD and NSC.**

- Align U.S. civilian and military resources of the U.S. Embassy Kabul and USFOR-A to better support the secretariat functions of key multilateral policy integration mechanisms. Prioritize additional U.S. civilian capacities as deployed to this role. Seek NATO support for similar use of the NATO Senior Civilian Representatives (SCR) office in this role and the deployment of additional NATO and troop contributing nation (TCN) civilian capabilities in this role. For COA A, this support to non-U.S. policy integration mechanisms may be nominal. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Embassy to NATO, OSD and NSC.**

- Identify Civilian-Military integration best practices to share among international community partners including the U.S. Embassy Kabul / USFOR-A Integrated-Civilian-Military-Action-Group (ICMAG). Aggressively seek adoption and support of these best practices by NATO, UNAMA and GIRoA within the U.S. sector (Regional Command East (RC East)) and for RC South prior to the rotation and introduction of U.S. military headquarters scheduled in Fiscal Year 2010. Prioritize additional U.S. civilian capacities as deployed to this role and solicit support from NATO and TCNs to bolster CIV-MIL effectiveness across all RCs where applicable. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Embassy to NATO, USFOR-A, OSD and NSC.**

- Recommend the establishment of a high-level Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Provide USCENTCOM analysis of the considerations for its role, composition and synchronization with relevant military strategies, NATO CSPMP, and UNAMA's Integrated Approach. Establish effective mechanisms for military liaison and support to the function of the Contact Group through the U.S. Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad. As applicable and within established authorities, implement authoritative policy emanating from the Contact Group through the U.S. NSC, U.S. Ambassadors and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to OSD and NSC.**

- Recommend roles for the U.S Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan consistent with recommendations for a POL-CIV-MIL coordination COA. Provide U.S.

interagency deputies consistent with that role. Provide qualified personnel to enhance function of Afghanistan–Pakistan policy integration. As applicable, initiate processes for redrafting key strategic documents, agreements and compacts including the Afghanistan Compact to incorporate the intent for employment of the U.S Special Representative in this role. Develop a plan for the transition of key POL-CIV-MIL functions of the Special Representative to established mechanisms upon completion of his assignment in that role. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to OSD and NSC**.

- Recommend to OSD and NSC further analysis and recommendations concerning:
    - Resourcing U.S. Embassy Kabul with the funds and qualified civilian personnel to become an effective "COIN Embassy" as required to effectively lead the whole-of-government COIN Campaign.
    - Assigning the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission Director as overall Director for Development Assistance for the USG, with responsibility for all U.S. development and economic assistance.
    - Assigning qualified U.S. Department of State (DOS) officers at the brigade and ISAF Regional Command levels, with authority over U.S.-provided Provincial Reconstruction Team civilian activities. .
    - Increasing funding for and flexible management of civilian agency quick impact projects at the PRT and district levels, and coordinate its use with DOD Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds.
    - Facilitating the development of the COIs, co-locate military and civilian strategic communication assets into single a office located in the Embassy Public Diplomacy section that coordinates with ISAF.
    - Utilizing the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) as the principal coordination mechanism for international contributions. The U.S. should appoint an experienced senior-level U.S. official to the ARTF.

(U) MIL C2 tasks to enhance unity of effort for Afghanistan for action by USCENTCOM in coordination with NATO, COCOMs, Services, OSD to U.S. NSC. See TAB C for COAs and specific implementation details relating to each MIL C2 COA.

- (U) Unify U.S. Joint Forces under USFOR-A consistent with selected MIL C2 COA. **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination USFOR-A, CENTCOM Components, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, USJFCOM, CJCS and OSD.**
    - (U) Clarify and minimize restrictions on the subordination U.S. Special Operations Forces Component – Afghanistan (SOC-A) to the operational control (OPCON) of USFOR-A. Include under the tactical control (TACON) of SOC-A all CT TF assets operating in the USFOR-A CJOA.

- (U) Establish USFOR-A as Coordinating Authority with TACON for military operations occurring under the direction of the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP).

- (U) Establish a Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) or subordinate to COM USFOR-A in order to unify USFOR Land Component Operations for RC South and RC East upon U.S. assumption of NATO rotational command in RC South in 2010.

- (U) Establish Combined Force Air Component Command (CFACC) or enhanced Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) subordinate to CDR USFOR-A in order to unify USFOR-A decision making and joint targeting relative to air and intelligence integration for operations.

- (U) Fully Resource the USFOR-A Joint Manning Document (JMD). **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination CENTCOM Components, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, USJFCOM, Military Services, CJCS and OSD.**

  - (U). Consolidate USFOR-A operational authority within Afghanistan over operations in RC South and RC East. **(Applicable only to MIL COA 1)** Establish three star Deputy Commander of USFOR-A as Combined Force Land Component Commander with OPCON over RC S and RC E. Assign concurrently as NATO / ISAF Deputy Commander for Operations (DCOM Ops) with Coordinating Authority over operations for all ISAF and ODRP operations. **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination with USFOR-A, ARCENT, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

  - (U) For all COAs, Coordinate revision and full resourcing of a JMD for USFOR-A to accomplish its assigned mission and responsibilities. A higher prioritization for joint and service manning, and the maximum stabilization of U.S. and multinational personnel is critical, especially for key billets.

  - (U) Coordinate the development of an expanded JMD applicable to CFLCC and CFACC consistent with its intended employment COA. Work thorough JFC Brunssum and SHAPE to refine multinational contributions and the NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) documents necessary to sustain these component integrated headquarters.

- (U) Establish plan and milestones for transition of U.S. military-led PRTs to a civilian-led PRT command structure, with the military in a supporting role, where security conditions permit. **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination with USFOR-A, U.S. Embassy Kabul, ARCENT, USCENTCOM, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

- (U) Establish plan and milestones for placement of qualified mentors at levels of the Afghan National Army (ANA) directly reportable through Regional Command Advisory

Group (RCAG) to CSTC-A in coordination with ISAF RCs. This recommendation does not apply to additional 'partnering' activities. **Action: USFOR-A / ISAF in coordination with A/MoD, A/MOI, A/NSC, USCENTCOM, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

- (U) Establish plan and milestones for full transition of USFOR-A / ISAF operational control (OPCON/OPCOM) to ANSF with USFOR-A / ISAF designated as supporting. **Action: USFOR-A / ISAF in coordination with A/MoD, A/NSC, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

- (U) Establish a subunified command for USFOR-A **(Applicable only to MIL COAs 1 and 2)**. Request authority to establish a subordinate unified command (a Joint or Multinational Force (JFC/MNF) to the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (applicable primarily to COAs 1 and B2. **Action, USCENTCOM in coordination with SHAPE / EUCOM to provide initial estimates for CJCS Action to OSD and NSC.**

(U) Tasks to enhance unity of effort for Arabian Peninsula C2-KM Engagement.

- (U) Reinforce frequent and persistent senior leader engagements between the United States and each partner nation. These senior leader engagements should be consultative in order to build the relationships and trusts. The COCOM Commander and the United States Ambassador need to agree the critical areas of United States national interests as well as partner nation interest. Follow-on engagements by other USG entities need to be aligned with these areas established between the COCOM and United States Ambassador. **Action, USCENTCOM for coordination with U.S. Embassies/DOS.**

- (U) Establish a C2-KM Synchronization Office at USCENTCOM in order to enhance and streamline engagement with the GCC countries in support of Security Assistance and coalition interoperability (initially bilaterally). The C2-KM Synchronization Office would provide the focal point for engagements (DOD and associated whole-of-government engagements) in concert with the National Security objectives and Strategic guidance within the theater, defined by the Combatant Commander and the United States Ambassador. This new organization is expected to facilitate and manage engagement on operationally based requirements supporting the integration of cross-cutting Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partnership Capacity. **Action, USCENTCOM for recommendation to OSD for concept approval and resource analysis (additional personnel and budgetary requirements). Resource analysis to also evaluate USCENTCOM staff reorganization in support of this effort.**

- (U) Leverage existing bilateral initiatives (e.g. Bilateral Air Defense Initiative) which have applicability for multilateral C2-KM information exchange and provide operational benefits for all participants. Resource pseudo-enterprise (see Appendix 3) capability where USCENTOM performs as the rational hub connected to multiple partners bilaterally. Consider Pilot Project approach as a means to acquire funding. **Action, USCENTCOM for consultation with select GCC partners on for a Pilot Project concept and coordination with OSD for Pilot Project funding.**

- (U) Review Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system to improve processes in support of COCOM objectives **Action: USG (DOS, DOD) US CENTCOM.**

(U) Tasks to enhance AOR-wide application of C2-KM concepts:

- (U) Incorporate Knowledge Management principles and tools for into the TCP. USCENTCOM needs to establish an effective AOR-wide C2-KM concept (including a TCP-based assessment) that can improve Political-Military / Civilian-Military activities (e.g. Critical Infrastructure Security) in coordination with U.S. governmental agencies and partner nations. This activity includes addressing the development of COIs within the TCP RAPs. **Action, USCENTCOM for coordination with U.S. Embassies/DOS.**

- (U) Identify C2-KM functions/COIs of common interests with regional partners (e.g. protection of critical energy infrastructure or customs and trade) that could be established bilaterally with multilateral implementation capability. COIs development should establish repeatable frameworks (templates) that can be applied in the across multiple civilian and military disciplines (Recommended COIs in Tab B to Appendix 4). Develop and align COIs along USCENTCOM TCP Lines of operation and stated regional partner equities (e.g. Goals and Objectives identified in the GCC Charter). **Action, USCENTCOM for coordination TCP analysis and military disciples. DOS (e.g. USAID) with interaction with NGOs and International Organizations and regional partners for civilian disciple COI development and coordination.**

9. (U) APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX 2: AFGHANISTAN C2-KM ANALYSIS

Tab A: Overall Unity of Effort Analysis for Afghanistan

ENCL 1: Overall Unity of Effort Analysis for Afghanistan (PPT)

Tab B: Afghanistan – Pakistan -- POL-CIV-MIL COAs

ENCL 1: Afghanistan – Pakistan -- POL-CIV-MIL COAs (PPT)

Tab C: Military C2 COAs

ENCL 1: Military C2 COAs (PPT)

APPENDIX 3: ARABIAN PENINSULA C2-KM ENGAGEMENT

APPENDIX 4: C2-KM SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

Tab A: Leadership Approaches

Tab B: Communities of Interest

Tab C: Candidate COIs

Tab D: Information Capture and Knowledge Management Tools

Tab E: NATO – USCENTCOM Modeling

APPENDIX 5: C2-KM SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Tab A: C2 and Knowledge Management Principles

Tab B: Integrated Causal Assessment Modeling

Tab C: Sub-Unified Command Structure

Tab D: Communities of Interest

Tab E: NATO-USCENTCOM Modeling

Tab F: Deterrence and Prevention

Tab G: Learning and Adapting
Tab H: Three Needs Model for Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange
APPENDIX 6: LIST OF REFERENCES

APPENDIX ONE: GLOSSARY

The purpose of this Appendix is to provide a listing of the Terms used throughout the Command and Control-Knowledge Management Annex. Most of the terms used throughout the Annex, Appendices and Tabs are standard U.S. military and associated terminology that encompass joint activity in both U.S. joint and allied joint operations, however, additional terms have been either developed or specifically defined for the purposes of the C2-KM Annex.

List of Terms:

alliance — The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 3-0)

coalition — An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)

combatant command — A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 5-0)

combatant command (command authority) — Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. (JP 1)

combined — Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) (JP 1)

command — 1. The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. (JP 1)

command and control — The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called **C2.** (JP 1)

Community of Interest (COI) — Distributed, collaborative and inclusive groupings working to discover, synthesize and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information in order to: take better decisions; implement change and create effects. (Tab A to Appendix 5 to C2-KM Annex)

counterinsurgency — Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called **COIN. (JP 1)**

counterdrug — Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called **CD** and counternarcotics (**CN**). (JP 3-07.4)

counternarcotics. See counterdrug. (JP 3-07.4)

counterproliferation — Those actions (e.g., detect and monitor, prepare to conduct counterproliferation operations, offensive operations, weapons of mass destruction, active defense, and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military forces, friends, and allies. (JP 3-40)

counterterrorism — Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called **CT.** (JP 3-05)

GIRoA — Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

interagency — United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also interagency coordination. (JP 3-08)

knowledge management — A cross-disciplinary organic enterprise connecting and integrating social, cultural, communication and technical processes – including trust, obligation, commitment, and accountability – to facilitate creative learning and adaptation and leverage information capture and knowledge exchange (ICKE) by connecting communities 'who-need to-know' with those 'who-need-to-share' with those 'who-need-to-use'. (Tab A to Appendix 1 to C2-KM Annex)

multinational — Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners (JP 5-0)

multinational force — A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1)

non-governmental agencies (NGOs) — Legally constituted organizations created by physical or legal persons with no participation or representation of any government. In the cases in which NGOs are funded totally or partially by governments, the NGO maintains its non-governmental status insofar as it excludes government representatives from membership in the organization. USAID refers to NGOs as private voluntary organizations.

unified action — The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

unified command — A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense

with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1)

unity of effort — Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

APPENDIX TWO: AFGHANISTAN C2-KM ANALYSIS TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction. The nature of C2-KM problem for Afghanistan is extremely complex, layered by international, organizational, political influences and effects of divergent interests. Under current conditions, these combine to greatly inhibit progress of the U.S. and allies in defeating Al Qaeda, and other Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in the region, and hinder GIRoA from establishing itself as a legitimate civilian government.

(U) Purpose: This document provides analyses of selected C2-KM options to better meet C2-KM functional requirements for the campaign in Afghanistan.

a. (U) Political-Civilian-Military (POL-CIV-MIL) and military C2 (MIL C2) factors are considered from various perspectives including that of the U.S. Government (USG), the international community, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

b. (U) This analysis considers options for integrating U.S. POL-CIV-MIL efforts for Afghanistan, and military C2 architectures necessary to support them. Three POL-CIV-MIL approaches and three military C2 COAs are analyzed revealing the relative advantages and disadvantages for each COA.

c. (U) Regardless of the COA selected, an appropriate U.S. leadership approach must also be applied to make clear the U.S. administration's intention for the relative prioritization of U.S.-promulgated strategies, policy and plans among existing multilateral and multi-national compacts, alliances and agreements and coordination constructs.

(U) The Tabs and associated Enclosures to this Appendix analyze C2-KM issues for the Afghanistan campaign and provide recommendations for near term actions by USCENTCOM and others. It considers these C2-KM issues from several key perspectives including those of USCENTCOM, GIRoA, the U.S. government, and the international community. The results of this analysis have been used as the basis for selected C2 recommendations made in Annex G to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Sub-Region Plan.

(U) Unity of Command, Action and Effort. Unity of effort and unified action depend on the convergence of military, governmental and non-governmental activities aimed at achieving common objectives.

a. (U) The degree of achievable unity of effort exists along a continuum spanning from a condition of competition at one end to the ideal of 'unified action' at the other end where interests, intentions and actions are effectively applied to produce desired outcomes. The following figure illustrates this:



Figure 1 – Unity of Effort Continuum

b. (U) As this figure illustrates, unity of effort requires first a coalescence of interests, translated into intentions, and then into conforming and productive actions. When these interests, intentions and actions are placed under military control, it is anticipated that unified action can be achieved. However, given that only a fraction of interests and actions are subordinated to military control, the potential for whole-of-government and international community delivery on unity is far more limited. Additionally, where key divergences in interest or approach preclude fuller convergence, unity may accumulate only to cooperation or deconfliction.

c. (U) Given the diverse and dynamic nature of interests, intentions and actions among interagency and multi-national actors joined in Afghanistan, unity of effort has proven problematic. In many specific cases, competition rather than coordination dominates. The international community and GIRoA currently operate from a condition of coordination / deconfliction because interests, visions, intentions and actions are not aligned.

d. (U) Success in Afghanistan requires both higher levels of unity of effort in political and civilian approaches to the Afghan campaign, as well as improved unity of action for the military effort.

(U) The Nature of the C2-KM Problem for Afghanistan.

a. (U) As indicated in the introduction, the nature of C2-KM problem for Afghanistan and the resulting 'unity gap' are highly complex problems.

i. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) U.S. and multinational military C2 structures in Afghanistan suffer from chronic deficiencies. C2 structural flaws are only symptoms of deeper flaws in the underlying C2 and unity of effort concepts. Foremost among the conceptual flaws is that the international community (including the USG) has not sufficiently developed a collective understanding of the Afghan problem or the strategic approaches necessary to solve it. The resulting incomplete, unclear, or aspirational strategies preclude the

establishment of clear policy underpinnings needed for unified action among the U.S. and international community.



b. (U) The present situation finds the international community (including United States) striking an uncomfortable compromise between maximizing efforts in Afghanistan through unilateral strategies, actions and mechanisms rather than working through imperfect multilateral strategies and mechanisms established under the Afghan government's vision, the Afghanistan Compact, the JCMB process, NATO strategies and the ISAF campaign plan. As a result multilateral approaches have become even less effective and the mechanisms for coordination among the international effort have atrophied.

c. (U) There is now an opportunity to recommend changes that may construct more effective MIL C2 structures, develop more synchronized USG whole-of-government approaches and more provide effective support to the multilateral campaign.

d.

e.

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

f.



Figure 3 - Strategic and Operational Dimensions to Unity of Effort

(U) Discussion of C2-KM Options and Analysis. There are six main issues considered in our comparison and combination of the nine possible POL-CIV-MIL / MIL C2 combinations. Advantages and disadvantages related to the following factors will determine the degree of unity of effort achieved.

a. (U) First, how do the proposed approaches or architectures contribute to unity of effort in the implementation of U.S. policy?

b. (U) Second, how might coalition partners and the international community respond to the degree of U.S. leadership in each combination?

c. (U) Third, how are key U.S. efforts such as counterterrorism and other COIN/CT efforts in Pakistan affected by the degree of U.S. leadership in the overall regional approach?

d. (U) Fourth, how do the proposed approaches and architectures affect civilian/military coordination among U.S. government agencies and partner nations?

e. (U) Fifth, how is the requirement for U.S. enabling support to alliance partners, coalition partners and the international community affected by the choice of approaches and architectures?

f. (U) Sixth, how do decisions made for the POL-CIV-MIL approach or the MIL C2 architecture for Afghanistan affect the potential strength of global coalitions and U.S. strategies for cooperative security and defense?

(U) Methodology. This analysis considered the unity of effort challenge as viewed through nine "lenses," or perspectives represented by key stakeholder groups. These included:

- CENTCOM Forces

- U.S. Joint Forces
- Multinational (Alliance / Coalition) Forces
- U.S. Whole-of-Government
- The NATO POL-MIL Coalition of ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs)
- The Military Coalition in Combination with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
- International Community Aligned under UNAMA
- The Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA)
- Global

(U) In each case, the advantages and disadvantages of each COA were considered from these perspectives to demonstrate how each COA might affect the six main issues of interest listed above in paragraph 7. Tabs 2 and 3 of this ANNEX represent the detailed description of the analysis of POL-CIV-MIL and MIL C2 COAs. Following is a short summary of that analysis.

a. (U) POL-CIV-MIL COAs and Analysis Summary.

i. (U) The U.S. administration should select an acceptable POL-CIV-MIL approach and apply appropriate civilian leadership to facilitate the integration of U.S. efforts with other key international community political actors and the GIRoA. The following figure illustrates the relationship between a decision on the U.S.'s POL-CIV-MIL approach and the practical implementation of that decision as it pertains to the USG and international community's efforts in Afghanistan.

Decision Path for Afghan POL-CIV-MIL Unity of Effort Options



(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (U) COA B. U.S. AS A PARTNER. The U.S. works within United Nations (UN) and NATO constructs to co-lead allies, coalition partners, donors and other international community. Multi-lateral Compacts, agreements and UN Integrated Approach constitute key policy integration constructs with U.S. providing additional unilateral policies as compensation for key gaps. U.S. policy is selectively integrated through U.S. and multilateral fora. U.S. approaches (e.g. the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG)) are aggressively shared among and applied w/in the international community with enabling support from the U.S.

- (U) COA C. U.S. AS AN ENABLER. The U.S. works through a Multi-lateral / multi-national force approach with Afghanistan Compact, security sector reform (SSR) co-leads among the international community respected and enabled by USG. U.S. policy is integrated through a progressive series of previously agreed multilateral forums. U.S. activities prioritize USG initiatives (e.g. the U.S. MSP and the ICMAG) with multi-lateral compacts and agreements are supported within capabilities. The U.S. assumes the added leadership responsibility of providing enabling capabilities across the region within their capabilities.

iii. (U) The following chart displays the analysis from selected perspectives:

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



b. (U) MIL C2 COAs and Analysis Summary.

i. (U) Whether or not the POL-CIV-MIL approaches are resolved, USCENTCOM must still ensure that appropriate MIL C2 architectures are applied as needed to achieve unified actions with other key coalition, alliance and partnered forces specifically including NATO and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The following figure illustrates the relationship between a decision on the U.S.'s MIL C2 approach and the other political-military (POL-MIL) influences on the practical employment of U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A).



Figure 6 – MIL C2 Decision Path

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (U) COA 2. U.S. AS A PARTNER. For this COA, the U.S. as the lead of relatively autonomous allies and coalition partners. Each partner is responsible for a geographic area of military responsibility (AOR) corresponding with established regional and functional commands. The U.S. provides unique enabling capabilities. This is similar to the current U.S.-led Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) construct, except that the lead force is multinational under NATO

and that there is no envisaged role for a subordinate multi-national corps. This is also most similar among the COAs to the current plans for USFOR-A / ISAF.

- (U) COA 3. U.S. AS AN ENABLER. For this COA, the U.S. operates as a component of a Multi-national force with allies and coalition partners in assigned AORs. U.S. takes on added leadership responsibility of providing enabling capabilities across the region. This construct is similar to Balkans Implementation Force (IFOR) approach.

iii. (U) The following chart displays the results of that analysis from 4 of the 9 perspectives considered:

		(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)		



(U) Analysis of Afghan POL-CIV-MIL and MIL C2 COA Combinations. As established throughout the preceding analysis, selection of POL-CIV-MIL coordination approaches and MIL C2 architectures are interrelated decisions. The following discussion aggregates the advantages and disadvantages of all available COAs in order to reveal the net balance of risk and consequence associated with each set of choices.

a. (U) The following figure depicts the nine combinations resulting from the COAs considered:



b. (U) Each COA combination has distinct advantages and disadvantages to the U.S., alliance, coalitions, GIRoA, and the international community. The sum of these advantages and disadvantages is different depending on the selected perspective (see paragraph 5 above).





(U) Implementation Tasks and Responsibilities. The following are compiled from roles / responsibilities established in Tabs B and C of this Appendix.

a. (U) POL-CIV-MIL Tasks for recommendation through OSD to US NSC.

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (U) Identify the integrated strategic concept intended as the basis for US policy for Afghanistan either as a revision to the US MSP (applicable to COA A) or as a refinement to the body of multilateral policy and strategy already existing (applicable to COA B and C). **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to OSD and NSC**.

- (U) Reinforce and support selected multilateral policy integration mechanisms for US policy integration and implementation. Selectively target these for enabling support through the offices of the US Embassy, USFOR-A, NATO, UNAMA or GIRoA to support effective integration and implementation of US policy as a component of the overall Afghan strategy. Enclosures 2 and 3 to this TAB provide an example of Terms of Reference and draft concept that might be established through NATO headquarters for revitalization of the NATO Caucus, but might adapted for a Group of Principals (GoP) or other deliberative group. This is less critical for COA C, which may simply aim to operate within established processes

under a GIRoA / UNAMA lead. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to US Embassy Kabul, OSD and NSC.**

- (U) Align US civilian and military resources of the US Mission to Kabul and USFOR-A to better support the secretariat functions of key multilateral policy integration mechanisms. Prioritize additional US civilian capacities as deployed to this role. Seek NATO support for similar use of the NATO Senior Civilian Representatives (SCR) office in this role and the deployment of additional NATO and troop contributing nation (TCN) civilian capabilities in this role. For COA A, this support to non-US policy integration mechanisms may be nominal. For COA B and C, US and NATO enabling support is increasingly critical if any satisfactory policy integration effects are expected. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to US Embassy Kabul, US Embassy to NATO, OSD and NSC.**

- (U) Identify Civilian-Military integration best practices to share among international community partners including the US Embassy / USFOR-A Integrated-Civilian-Military-Action-Group (ICMAG). Aggressively seek adoption and support of these best practices by NATO, UNAMA and GIRoA within the US sector (Regional Command East (RC East)) and for RC South prior to the rotation and introduction of US military headquarters scheduled in Fiscal Year 2010. Prioritize additional US civilian capacities as deployed to this role and solicit support from NATO and TCNs to bolster CIV-MIL effectiveness across all RCs where applicable. For COA A and COA B, this is critical for the effective prosecution of US policy in RC E and RC S through 2011. For COA C, focus can be maintained in RC E until introduction of a US headquarters as RC S. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to US Embassy Kabul, US Embassy to NATO, USFOR-A, OSD and NSC.**

- (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (U) Recommend to OSD and NSC further analysis and recommendations concerning:

    1. (U) Resourcing U.S. Embassy Kabul with the funds and qualified civilian personnel to become an effective "COIN Embassy" as required to effectively lead the whole-of-government COIN Campaign. This should include assigning senior civilians with appropriate technical and leadership skills to have overall coordination responsibility for each of the following areas: Counternarcotics, Rule of Law, and Border Management. U.S. Embassy should be prepared to support the critical functions of key mechanisms identified within a selected POL-CIV-MIL approach consistent with COAs identified above. Support Embassy Kabul's request to increase U.S. civilian staffing and provide related force protection. Continue to build the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) to increase civilian capacity. Where Embassy Kabul requests cannot be expeditiously met, consider filling these billets with DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce personnel.

    2. (U) Assigning the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission Director as overall Director for Development Assistance for the USG, with responsibility for all U.S. development and economic assistance (including Treasury, Justice, Commerce, etc, programs and coordination of DOD CERP funding).

    3. (U) Assigning qualified U.S. Department of State (DOS) officers at the brigade and ISAF Regional Command levels, with authority over U.S.-provided Provincial Reconstruction Team civilian activities. Provide for enhanced coordination of civilian-military activities at each level through an expansion of the ICMAG and through clearly defined command chains.

    4. (U) Increasing funding for and flexible management of civilian agency quick impact projects at the PRT and district levels, and coordinate its use with DOD CERP funds.

    5. (U) Facilitating the development of the COIs, co-locate military and civilian strategic communication assets into single a office located in the Embassy Public Diplomacy section that coordinates with ISAF.

    6. (U) Utilizing the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) as the principal coordination mechanism for international contributions. The U.S. should appoint an experienced senior-level U.S. official to the ARTF.

- (U) Military Unity of Command Tasks for action by USCENTCOM in coordination with NATO, COCOMs, Services, OSD to US NSC. See TAB C for COAs and specific implementation details relating to each MIL C2 COA.
    - (U) Unify U.S. Joint Forces under USFOR-A consistent with selected MIL C2 COA. **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination USFOR-A, CENTCOM Components, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, USJFCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

1.
2.
3.
4.

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

    - (U) Fully Resource the USFOR-A Joint Manning Document (JMD). **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination CENTCOM Components, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, USJFCOM, Military Services, CJCS and OSD.**

1.

(b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (U) For all COAs, Coordinate revision and full resourcing of a JMD for USFOR-A to accomplish its assigned mission and responsibilities. A higher prioritization for joint and service manning, and the maximum stabilization of U.S. and multinational personnel is critical, especially for key billets.

3. (U) Coordinate the development of an expanded JMD applicable to CFLCC and CFACC consistent with its intended employment COA. Work thorough JFC Brunssum and SHAPE to refine multinational contributions and the NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) documents necessary to sustain these component integrated headquarters.

- (U) Establish plan and milestones for transition of U.S. military-led PRTs to a civilian-led PRT command structure, with the military in a supporting role, where security conditions permit. **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination with USFOR-A, U.S. Embassy Kabul, ARCENT, USCENTCOM, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

- (U) Establish plan and milestones for placement of qualified mentors at levels of the ANA directly reportable through Regional Command Advisory Group (RCAG) to CSTC-A in coordination with ISAF RCs. This recommendation does not apply to additional 'partnering' activities. **Action: USFOR-A / ISAF in coordination with A/MoD, A/MOI, A/NSC, USCENTCOM, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

- (U) Establish plan and milestones for full transition of USFOR-A / ISAF operational control (OPCON/OPCOM) to ANSF with USFOR-A / ISAF designated as supporting. **Action: USFOR-A / ISAF in coordination with A/MoD, A/NSC, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

- (U) Establish a subunified command for USFOR-A **(Applicable only to MIL COAs 1 and 2)**. Request authority to establish a subordinate unified command (a Joint or Multinational Force (JFC/MNF) to the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (applicable primarily to COAs 1 and B2. **Action, USCENTCOM in coordination with SHAPE / EUCOM to provide initial estimates for CJCS Action to OSD and NSC.**

List of TABS:
TAB A: Overall Unity of Effort Analysis for Afghanistan
TAB B: AFG-PAK POL-CIV-MIL COAs
TAB C: US AFG-PAK C2 Structure COAs

TAB A: OVERALL UNITY OF EFFORT ANALYSIS FOR AFGHANISTAN TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX I

(U) The attached PowerPoint File provides further detail on the analysis of Unity of Effort Issues for Afghanistan.

Click on slide below to Enclosure 1 and start the presentation



TAB B: AFG-PAK POL-CIV-MIL COAS TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction. This section presents key factors, discussion and analysis of Courses of Action (COAs) and other relevant initiatives for a U.S. Political-Civilian-Military (POL-CIV-MIL) approach to the AF-PAK region. As introduced in the C2-KM report, the nature of C2-KM problem for Afghanistan is extremely complex, layered by international, organizational, political influences and effects of divergent interests which combine to inhibit progress of the U.S. and allies in defeating Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in the region, and hinders GIRoA from establishing itself as a legitimate civilian government. Each of the provided COAs and initiatives highlight important trade-offs. The balance of opportunities and risks shifts considerably based on the issues is analyzed from a USG, NATO, and international community/UNAMA perspective. Impacts on the U.S.'s global defense strategies and security cooperation are also relevant.

(U) There are several actions that make sense from all perspectives. These are detailed in paragraph 9 of this Tab. This document also provides recommendations for other POL-CIV-MIL and diplomatic initiatives which are common to all COAs, and other actions relevant to specific COAs. Appendix 2 fully integrates the outputs of this analysis with MIL C2 analysis provided in Tab C.

(U) Methodology.

a. (U) There are six main issues considered in our comparison of the three COAs for POL-CIV-MIL approaches as established in Paragraph 6 to Appendix 2 of this report. Taken together, the advantages and disadvantages represented by these factors will determine the degree of unity of effort achieved

b. (U) The advantages and disadvantages were considered through nine "lenses," or perspectives represented by groupings of stakeholders as outlined in Paragraph 5 of Tab A to Appendix 2. For this POL-CIV-Mil analysis, three such stakeholder perspectives were considered primary: the U.S. Government (USG); the NATO POL-MIL Alliance; the international community as organized for support of Afghanistan under the Afghanistan Compact; and finally, through the geo-strategic perspective of global security cooperation. Advantages and disadvantages for each COA were identified for each perspective and then aggregated across perspectives to demonstrate the overall or net strategic effects of each. As a result, this analysis reveals the potential risk and consequence associated with each COA. Attachment 1 to this Tab contains the PowerPoint representation of the POL-CIV-MIL analysis.

(U) The Afghan POL-CIV-MIL Environment.

a. (U) Given the dynamic development of the U.S. and international strategic approaches for support to GIRoA and Afghanistan, a confusing array of policy sources, policy integrating mechanisms, and policy implements comprise a constellation of key players on the Afghan POL-CIV-MIL playing field. Figure 1 is a characterization of that array.



Figure 1 – The Policy Integration Playing Field for Afghanistan

b. (U) Given this confusing array and the great diversity of sovereign interests represented by the many key policy sources, sensible approaches to policy integration are required. Failing this, policies will suffer from contradiction by key partners, or the decisions taken to integrate them will devolve to the policy implements – like ISAF and the PRTs – for execution.

c. (U) The following figure illustrates this problem and indicates why U.S. policy implementation has not been consistently successful over time. Because there are few effective mechanisms by which the U.S. and international community policy agendas are developed and integrated, the resulting body of policy must be integrated and interpreted by the policy implements themselves or subordinated to urgent issues and the GIRoA agenda.



Figure 2 - Diverse Policies / Divergent Outcomes

d. (U) To relieve the policy implements from the sole responsibility to both integrate and interpret policy, COAs are established which specify distinct integration pathways by which U.S. policy might be preserved intact and implemented with due consideration for both U.S. policy effectiveness, and the net effectiveness of the multilateral, multinational endeavor. These can each be best characterized as U.S. leadership approaches, either as a unitary leader among the international community, as a partner and prima inter pares among key stakeholders, or as a peer leader / enabler working within agreed multilateral constructs (See Enclosure 1 to this Appendix and Tab A to Appendix 4: U.S. Military and Civilian Leadership Approaches for more information).

e. (U) The following figure depicts the relationship between some of the key stakeholders for the strategies supporting Afghanistan under current agreements and coordination constructs. Note that not all of these stakeholders are active or effective under current usage. Additionally, different mechanisms may imply distinct U.S. policy outcomes in terms of span of control or responsiveness.



Figure 3 - Key POL-CIV-MIL Coordination Structures for Afghanistan

(U) Description of POL-CIV-MIL COAs.

a. (U) COA A: **U.S.AS LEADER**. An expanded U.S. Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) for Afghanistan as the dominant policy integration document when applied in combination with OEF and NATO ISAF operational plans. U.S. provides the bulk of donor capability and exerts influence over GIRoA, UNAMA and other donors in their agreed roles. This situation is similar to Iraq POL-CIV-MIL arrangement prior to Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA).

i. (U) Under this COA, U.S. policy is emphasized as the priority for implementation among all considerations and is preserved intact as the predominant approach among all strategies for mid and long-term progress in Afghanistan. Key to the preservation and strength of U.S. policy is that its integration and implementation be subjected to the fewest possible non-U.S. fora which currently include the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Afghan National Security Council (A/NSC). It also avoids U.S. policy integration through the offices of the Externals Advisory Committee (EAC) and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), both associated with implementation under the Afghanistan Compact.

ii. (U) This allows for execution of U.S. policy by key U.S. policy implements with the least possible interference from limiting or conflicting policies emanating from NATO, GIRoA or others among the international community. Figure 2 demonstrates the key policy integration mechanisms that would best support this outcome:



Figure 2: COA A – U.S.as Leader

iii. (U) The expected outcome is that the body of U.S. policy will prevail through more effective implementation, while adapting under U.S. leadership to the expressed interests and policies of strategic partners.

iv. (U) This U.S. leadership approach and the level of emphasis on U.S. policy requires strong diplomacy and the marginalization of current processes and deliberative for a that might otherwise demand the revision of key compacts and agreements relating to Afghan strategy including the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and the Afghanistan Compact.

b. (U) COA B. **U.S.AS A PARTNER.** The U.S. works within UN and NATO constructs to co-lead allies, coalition partners, donors and other international community Multi-lateral Compacts, agreements and UN Integrated Approach constitute primary policy integration constructs with U.S. providing unilateral and or bi-lateral compensation for key gaps. U.S. approaches (e.g. the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG)) are aggressively shared among and applied w/in international community with enabling support from the US.

i. (U) Under this COA, U.S. policy is subjected to integration through agreed multi-lateral mechanisms and preserved primarily through diplomacy carried out in the related deliberations. U.S. policy serves as a key component of the overall agreed strategy for mid and long-term progress in Afghanistan. Once again, key to the preservation and strength of U.S. policy is that its integration and implementation be subjected to the fewest possible non-favorable fora which include the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Afghan National Security Council (A/NSC). But, as a practical measure, U.S. policy is subjected selectively and sequentially to multilateral integration under the auspices of a revitalized NATO Caucus and the JCMB.

ii. (U) This allows for more effective execution of integrated multi-lateral policies by key US, NATO and international community implements with manageable interference from limiting or conflicting policies emanating from NATO, GIRoA and others.

iii. (U) The expected outcome is that the U.S. policy strongly informs the strategy of key allies and partners, and therefore the collective where consensus is built through U.S. participative leadership.

iv. (U) Figure 3 demonstrates the key policy integration mechanisms that would best support this outcome:



Figure 3: COA B – U.S. as Partner

v. (U) This U.S. leadership approach and the level of emphasis on U.S. policy requires strategic patience and an investment in diplomacy within selected policy integrative fora which have to date shown little potential for satisfactory direction over the Afghan strategy. However, it does preserve the coordination constructs established by in key compacts and agreements relating to Afghan strategy specifically including UNSCRs, the Afghanistan Compact, and the NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan (CSPMP).

c. (U) COA C. **U.S. AS AN ENABLER**. The U.S. works through a Multi-lateral / multi-national force approach with Afghanistan Compact, security sector reform (SSR) co-leads among the international community respected and enabled by USG. National and multi-lateral compacts and agreements are supported in balance. U.S. efforts focus on USG initiatives (e.g. the U.S. MSP and the ICMAG) as the primary basis for POL-CIV-MIL integration. National and multi-lateral compacts and agreements are supported in balance. The U.S. assumes the added leadership responsibility of providing enabling capabilities across the region within their capabilities. The U.S. takes on added leadership responsibility

of providing enabling capabilities across the region within their capabilities. This situation is similar to the political conditions of the Dayton Accords / Implementation Force (IFOR).

i. (U) Under this COA, U.S. policy is subjected to integration through agreed multi-lateral mechanisms and preserved primarily through diplomacy carried out in the related sequential deliberations. Similar to COA B, U.S. policy serves as a key component of the overall agreed strategy for mid and long-term progress in Afghanistan except that it is subjected sequentially to the broadest possible integration within multilateral fora to achieve the maximum consensus among strategic partners in the campaign, culminating in decisions made by the JCMB. Given the severe impingement this process might suggest on U.S. and partner policy implementation, strong unilateral initiatives must pertain.

ii. (U) This allows for the highest possible consensus for an agreed multilateral approach – a Common COIN Strategy – but, potentially, the least effective execution of U.S. policy.

iii. (U) The expected outcome is that the U.S. policy informs the strategy of the GIRoA and the international community collective, where consensus is built through U.S. participative leadership. But, because of the diversity associated with the several parties to that consensus, the net departure from U.S. policy is likely to be substantial. As such, there will remain a heavy reliance of unilateral compensation for implementation shortfalls on the part of the USG and all key stakeholders.

iv. (U) Figure 4 demonstrates the key policy integration mechanisms that would best support this outcome:



Figure 4: COA C – U.S. as an Enabler

v. (U) This U.S. leadership approach and the level of emphasis on U.S. policy requires extreme strategic patience and a flexible mechanism for policy implementation outside of the multilateral effort. It also relies on policy integrative fora which have to date shown little potential for satisfactory direction over the Afghan strategy. However, it does maximize the emphasis on use of coordination constructs established by in UNSCRs, the Afghanistan Compact, and the NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan (CSPMP) and places the greatest possible ownership for the COIN strategy on GIRoA.

(U) Results. Several broad conclusions emerged from this analysis.

a. Policy and civilian-military integration effectiveness are functions of the degree of control associated over the integration of a set of policy inputs, combined with an understood sense for prioritization among the inputs. Policy integrated under a single, coherent POL-CIV-MIL construct will likely be delivered more effectively than through shared integration across other actors, agents and partners which require additional time and energy for integrating policy and promulgating implementation guidance. The tradeoff for U.S. policy control and responsiveness can be measured in the total strategic potential of all key stakeholders associated with policy implementation as illustrated in Figure 5.



Figure 5 - Tradeoffs in Strategic Potential for U.S. Policy Control & Responsiveness

b. (U) Given this, COA A is likely to be the most effective to a USG policy thrust. However, consideration of the same issue from a UNAMA / international community perspective might indicate that USG effectiveness does not directly correlate with international community and, or GIRoA effectiveness or maximized strategic potential for the entire campaign. From the global perspective, a USG-dominated approach might, despite its localized effectiveness, impact negatively on the strategic potential for international

community engagement in the USCENTCOM AOR for other cross-cutting issues, or for key collective security concerns in other regions.

c. (U) The effectiveness of U.S.-driven policy integration efforts certainly depends on the degree of authority granted the U.S. by other nations and agents. Such authorities may require codification under revised compacts, agreements or multi-lateral policies to be respected. Under COA A, the U.S. can integrate substantial bodies of policy without lengthy negotiation involving all partners. An example of this can be seen in the US's management of the ANSF development portfolio. Under COA B, the U.S. participates to exert effective influence in the various policy integration processes alongside many engaged partners. Under COA C, such policy coordination will be conducted bilaterally among all the relevant nations, agencies and partners.

d. (U) Strategic success depends both on the willing acceptance of alliance and coalition partners and the international community to the degree of U.S. policy dominance. In general, coalition partners and the international community have non-convergent strategic goals and interests that must be understood and where possible integrated if the mission is to have legitimacy, even if it is effective from a USG perspective. Therefore, COA B may offer the best compromise between, legitimacy, inclusion and therefore effectiveness.

e. (U) Some national policies, such as counterterrorism, or counternarcotics or detention may be difficult to submit to effective multi-lateral policy integration and control, especially if the partner nations have strongly divergent orientations toward execution of related policies. COA A imposes the fewest constraints on prosecution of specialized U.S. policies, while COA C will probably indicate significant constraints on such policies, and might require compensatory unilateral policy action.

f. (U) In general, coalition partners will require U.S. policy impetus on many issues including ANSF development and other military support policy, as well policy enabling support, such as Strategic Communications or Diplomacy under all of the COAs. The burden of providing such key capabilities increases with the number of partners to be supported, and the degree to which their POL-CIV-MIL requirements are convergent with the US. Therefore, the challenge of providing U.S. enabling support to its partners will be least under COA A and greatest under COA C.

(U) <u>POL-CIV-MIL analysis summary</u> (Full analysis is provided at Enclosure 1 to this Tab).

a. (U) There are three significantly distinct options for pursuing POL-CIV-MIL integration effectiveness and unity of effort in Afghanistan: **U.S. as a Leader** - a US-dominated POL-CIV-MIL approach; **U.S. as a Partner** - a balanced US, UNAMA, NATO approach; and **U.S. as an Enabler** - a loosely organized multilateral approach. Each of these indicate important trade-offs in total policy integration effort required for effective implementation of policy, and the balance is considerably different when taken from a USG, NATO, international communities/UNAMA or global perspectives.

- COA A exerts greater USG ownership over policy integration. This results in greater policy performance in Kabul, with a potential decrement to USG efforts elsewhere in the AOR or globally where the U.S. is unable to exert dominant influence.

- COA C cedes policy integration responsibility to a loosely organized coalition of like-minded nations and organizations supporting UNAMA and GIRoA. This partly diminishes localized effectiveness of U.S. policy while potentially enhancing the integration of other partner's policies both locally and globally.

- COA B obviously strikes a balance between COAs A and C. Calculating the tactical, operational and strategic net gain in U.S. policy effectiveness should bear heavily and any COA selection.

b. (U) Once selected, an appropriate U.S. leadership approach must be applied to make clear the intention for integration of USG policy, and to clarify the intent for relative prioritization of U.S. policy among other divergent considerations. Leadership for COA A would be as a dominant unitary leader. COA B indicates leadership from within established multi-lateral constructs as prima inter pares. COA 3 indicates leadership as a peer among equals under established multi-lateral constructs. Further discussion of leadership approaches is provided at TAB A (Leadership Approaches to APPENDIX 2 of this ANNEX.

c. (U) Figure 6 depicts the process path by which such a decision may be taken for any of the available COAs in the fullest strategic context. It demonstrates that U.S. policy direction and leadership approaches must be selected at the highest levels, and that these will then begin to suggest the relevance of one COA over another given the consideration of all factors analyzed in the preceding discussion.



Figure 6 - POL-CIV-MIL Decision Path

d. (U) This demonstrates that COAs A and B are favored under conditions where a new USG Afghan policy is the desired primary policy thrust for the Afghan campaign, while COAs B and C are more relevant to any decision made to operate / optimize within the established and agreed political constructs.

(U) Additional POL-CIV-MIL Initiatives.

a. (U) The U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

i. (U) Given the recent announcement and pending employment of the newly designated U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is anticipated a specific role must be identified specifically for his participation in POL-CIV-MIL coordination in Afghanistan, and more generally for his diplomatic agenda in the greater region.

ii. (U) There are two basic options which suggest themselves for integration of the Special Representative into the POL-CIV-MIL environment illustrated on Figure 1 above:

- Empower the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan with the authority to direct overall USG efforts in the region.

- Empower the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan to enhance diplomacy achieve greater unity of effort for USG efforts in

the region in concert with key states, donors and other actors. As a compliment to this, establish an Afghanistan-Pakistan 'War Czar"' within the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), reportable directly to the President.

iii. (U) Both options require providing the Special Representative with a robust staff and senior deputies from among key U.S. government departments including the military. Both options also indicate the need to coalesce efforts within the NSC to better support the integration of U.S. policy and strategy relevant to his portfolio.

iv. (U) The first option maximizes the authority of the Special Representative with respect to all U.S. actions in Afghanistan. It would require that the Special Representative be granted authority to report directly to the President and assume selected National Command responsibilities currently reserved to the Secretary of Defense and the Director for National Intelligence (DNI) for the direction of U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and DNI assets. It would also require the adjustment of key international compacts and agreements relating to the U.S. role in the JCMB, and in coordination with NATO. It would also for their eventual re-adjustment upon completion of his performance in that role. This Special Representative employment option is most consistent with the implied U.S. civilian leadership approaches and POL-CIV-MIL COA A discussed above.

v. (U) The second option is most consistent with enhancing extant POL-CIV-MIL processes and mechanisms for Afghanistan without overhauling or preempting them. It also provides maximum flexibility to the Special Representative to act on developing U.S. initiatives. It requires no realignment of authorities among U.S. executive departments. It is also most consistent with the implied U.S. civilian leadership approaches and POL-CIV-MIL COAs B and C discussed above.

vi. (U) This cursory analysis seems to recommend [need to be sure we want to recommend the proconsul option or not], and that the Special Representative's diplomatic portfolio be linked to a high-level Contact Group established for the expressed purpose of maximizing his role.

b. (U) The Contact Group.

i. (U) In order to best support the employment of the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, a high-level Contact Group should be established to provide an effective integration point for his diplomatic initiatives with the diplomatic agenda of key partners, states and organizations. This Contact Group is applicable to all POL-CIV-MIL COAs.

ii. (U) Key Foreign Ministers or their immediate deputies should comprise the Contact Group, with NATO, the European Union (EU), and the UN also considered. It should be exclusive to the group of influential high-level ministers that would best support the integration and support of U.S. strategies and policy initiatives. However, its

composition must also reflect consideration of key International Organizations (IOs) specifically including the World Bank and the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP).

iii. (U) The Contact Group's efforts must be carefully synchronized with the U.S. foreign policy agenda and the U.S. military strategy as well as the Political-Military agendas of NATO, the NATO CSPMP, donor Coordination through the External Action Committee (EAC), the overall functioning of the JCMB, and the continuation of the Bonn Process. It should also consider the political roadmap established by the United Nation's Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) in the form of their published Integrated Approach.

(U) Implementation Tasks and Responsibilities.

a. (U) Select a U.S. Civilian Leadership approach applicable the mid-to-long-term U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. Clarify U.S. intention to engage in this role through engaged U.S. departments, key allies and partners specifically including the office of the UN Secretary General. Initiate process for redrafting key strategic documents, agreements and compacts including the Afghanistan Compact to reflect the change in U.S. approach (applicable primarily to COA A). **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to OSD and NSC.**

b. (U) Identify the integrated strategic concept intended as the basis for U.S. policy for Afghanistan either as a revision to the U.S. MSP (applicable to COA A) or as a refinement to the body of multilateral policy and strategy already existing (applicable to COA B and C). **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to OSD and NSC**.

c. (U) Identify multilateral policy integration mechanisms to be leveraged in the process of U.S. policy integration and implementation. Selectively target these for revitalization through the offices of the U.S. Embassy, USFOR-A, NATO, UNAMA or GIRoA to support effective integration and implementation of U.S. policy as a component of the overall Afghan strategy. Enclosures 2 and 3 to this TAB provide an example of Terms of Reference and draft concept that might be established through NATO headquarters for revitalization of the NATO Caucus, but might adapted for a Group of Principals (GoP) or other deliberative group. This is less critical for COA C, which may simply aim to operate within established processes under a GIRoA / UNAMA lead. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to U.S. Embassy Kabul, OSD and NSC.**

d. (U) Align U.S. civilian and military resources of the U.S. Mission to Kabul and USFOR-A to support the secretariat functions of multilateral policy integration mechanisms. Prioritize additional U.S. civilian capacities as deployed to this role. Seek NATO support for similar use of the NATO Senior Civilian Representatives (SCR) office in this role and the deployment of additional NATO and troop contributing nation (TCN) civilian capabilities in this role. For COA A, this support to non-U.S. policy integration mechanisms may be nominal. For COA B and C, U.S. and NATO enabling support is increasingly critical if any satisfactory policy integration effects are expected. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Embassy to NATO, OSD and NSC.**

e. (U) Identify Civilian-Military integration best practices to share among international community partners including the U.S. Embassy / USFOR-A Integrated-Civilian-Military-Action-Group (ICMAG). Aggressively seek adoption and support of these best practices by NATO, UNAMA and GIRoA within the U.S. sector (Regional Command East (RC East)) and for RC South prior to the rotation and introduction of U.S. military headquarters scheduled in Fiscal Year 2010. Prioritize additional U.S. civilian capacities as deployed to this role and solicit support from NATO and TCNs to bolster CIV-MIL effectiveness across all RCs where applicable. For COA A and COA B, this is critical for the effective prosecution of U.S. policy in RC E and RC S through 2011. For COA C, focus can be maintained in RC E until introduction of a U.S. headquarters as RC S. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Embassy to NATO, USFOR-A, OSD and NSC.**

f. (U) Recommend the establishment of a high-level Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Provide USCENTCOM analysis of the considerations for its role, composition and synchronization with relevant military strategies, NATO CSPMP, and UNAMA's Integrated Approach. Establish effective mechanisms for military liaison and support to the function of the Contact Group through the U.S. Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad. As applicable and within established authorities, implement authoritative policy emanating from the Contact Group through the U.S. NSC, U.S. Ambassadors and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to OSD and NSC.**

g. (U) Recommend a diplomacy role for the U.S Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan consistent with recommendations for a POL-CIV-MIL coordination COA. Provide U.S. interagency deputies consistent with that role. Provide qualified personnel to enhance function of Afghanistan–Pakistan policy integration. As applicable, initiate processes for redrafting key strategic documents, agreements and compacts including the Afghanistan Compact to incorporate the intent for employment of the U.S Special Representative in this role. Develop a plan for the transition of key POL-CIV-MIL functions of the Special Representative to established mechanisms upon completion of his assignment in that role. **Action, CENTCOM for recommendation to OSD and NSC.**

h. (U) Recommend to OSD and NSC further analysis and recommendations concerning:

i. (U) Resourcing U.S. Embassy Kabul with the funds and qualified civilian personnel to become an effective "COIN Embassy" as required to effectively lead the whole-of-government COIN Campaign. This should include assigning senior civilians with appropriate technical and leadership skills to have overall coordination responsibility for each of the following areas: Counternarcotics, Rule of Law, and Border Management. U.S. Embassy should be prepared to support the critical functions of key mechanisms identified within a selected POL-CIV-MIL approach consistent with COAs identified above. Support Embassy Kabul's request to increase U.S. civilian staffing and provide related force protection. Continue to build the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) to increase civilian capacity. Where Embassy Kabul requests cannot be expeditiously met, consider filling these billets with DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce personnel.

ii.(U) Assigning the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission Director as overall Director for Development Assistance for the USG, with responsibility for all U.S. development and economic assistance (including Treasury, Justice, Commerce, etc, programs and coordination of DOD CERP funding).

iii. (U) Assigning qualified U.S. Department of State (DOS) officers at the brigade and ISAF Regional Command levels, with authority over U.S.-provided Provincial Reconstruction Team civilian activities. Provide for enhanced coordination of civilian-military activities at each level through an expansion of the ICMAG and through clearly defined command chains.

iv. (U) Increasing funding for and flexible management of civilian agency quick impact projects at the PRT and district levels, and coordinate its use with DOD CERP funds.

v. (U) Facilitating the development of the COIs, co-locate military and civilian strategic communication assets into single a office located in the Embassy Public Diplomacy section that coordinates with ISAF.

vi. (U) Utilizing the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) as the principal coordination mechanism for international contributions. The U.S. should appoint an experienced senior-level U.S. official to the ARTF.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX I

(U) The attached PowerPoint File provides further detail on the analysis of Unity of Effort Issues for Afghanistan.

Click on slide below to Enclosure 1 and start the presentation

TAB C: US AFG-PAK C2 STRUCTURE COAS TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction. This section presents an analysis of the Military Command and Control (MIL C2) initiatives and Courses of Action (COAs) proposed for US Command and Control architectures in the AF-PAK region. Each of these indicate important trade-offs in total military unity of command required for execution of defense and security policy, and the balance is considerably different when taken from a U.S. Government (USG), NATO, International Community/UNAMA or global perspectives. Once selected, an appropriate U.S. leadership approach must be applied to make clear the intention for employment of U.S. joint forces in the multinational environment, and to clarify the intent for relative prioritization of U.S. strategies and plans among other divergent considerations.

(U) Methodology.

a. (U) There are six main issues considered in our comparison of the three COAs. There are six main issues considered in our comparison of the three COAs for MIL C2 approaches as established in Paragraph 4 to Tab A to Appendix 2. Taken together, these factors contribute to be unity of effort and command within the region.

b. (U) These factors were considered as viewed through nine prescribed "lenses," or perspectives represented by key stakeholder groupings as outlined in Paragraph 5 of Tab A to Appendix 2. Four such perspectives were considered primary: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the USG overall, the multinational coalition or alliance, and the international community at large, specifically the United Nations; and finally, through the geo-strategic/global perspective. In each case, the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA were identified according to the various perspectives. These were then aggregated to indicate overall effects of each proposed COA across stakeholders, to develop a comprehensive understanding of how each COA affects the six main issues of interest with the goal being to allow CENTCOM and U.S. civilian leadership to make informed decision with an understanding of the consequence and probability associated with each choice. Attachment 1 to this document contains a representation of our analysis as a stand-alone PowerPoint presentation.

(U) The Afghan Military C2 Playing Field.

a. (U) Given the incremental deployment of U.S. and multinational forces to the Afghan theater over the last 8 years, and their gradual transition to NATO under ISAF, a vast array of C2 nodes exist with an equally broad variety of command and support relationships. Figure 1 is a characterization of the multinational MIL C2 playing field as it exists in Afghanistan.



Figure 4 – The Military C2 Playing Field for Afghanistan

b. (U) Given the array of interests and missions represented by the many C2 mechanisms shown here, holistic approaches to C2 integration are required. Failing this, military missions will continue to suffer from unnecessary or unclear distribution of authority across multiple headquarters resulting in the lack of potential for unified action. Additionally, optimal MIL C2 integration can only occur in the greater context of an effective Political-Civilian-Military (POL-CIV-MIL) integration concept. Tab B to this same Appendix discusses the POL-CIV-MIL analysis in detail.

c. (U) To solve for the lack of unity of command and the poor potential for unified action represented by the current MIL C2 status, 3 COAs were considered which identify C2 architectures by which U.S. military strategy and policy might be best implemented with due consideration for U.S. unity of command, multilateral, multinational operational effectiveness, and unified action. These can each be characterized as U.S. military leadership approaches, either as a unitary leader among the military coalition, as a partner and prima inter pares among the various coalitions and alliances, or as a peer leader / enabler working within the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the NATO / ISAF coalitions (See Enclosure 1 to this Appendix and Tab A to Appendix 4: U.S. Military and Civilian Leadership Approaches for more discussion).

(U) Description of COAs.

a. (U) COA 1: **U.S. AS LEADER**. The U.S. military forces are employed as the dominant partner in the coalition. The U.S. provides the bulk of combat capability and directs allies and coalition partners in limited and discrete roles. This is envisioned as similar to the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) construct.

i. (U) This requires the establishment of an expanded comprehensive U.S. military strategy for Afghanistan which is expanded from the current documents to entail a holistic counterinsurgency (COIN) approach applicable to all aspects of U.S. and multinational military engagement in Afghanistan. Once produced, this document would provide for the authoritative direction of U.S. military operations of all combatant forces in Afghanistan, with USFOR-A established as the primary supported component of the U.S. Joint Force. It would also be the authoritative basis for coordination among coalition, alliance and partnered military forces.

ii. (U) Under this strategy, the U.S. provides the bulk of military capability and exerts influence on coalition, alliance and partnered military forces in their supporting roles. These multinational forces are subordinated (NATO OPCOM or TACOM) inasmuch as possible to the command of USFOR-A functional components (land, air and SOF). Where this is not achievable, robust supported / supporting relationships are established. This situation is similar to the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) construct.

iii. (U) Key to the preservation and strength of the U.S. strategy that its execution be subjected to the fewest possible non-U.S. intervening headquarters. It must also avoid undue influence by the initiative of the Afghan Ministries of Defense (A/MoD), Interior (A/MoI), the Afghan National Security Council (A/NSC), and the JCMB.

iv. (U) This allows for execution of the U.S. strategy by USFOR-A and supporting U.S. Joint Force components with the least possible opportunity from limiting or conflicting strategies emanating from NATO, GIRoA or others. Figure 2 demonstrates the MIL C2 architectures that would best support this outcome:



Figure 1: COA 1 – U.S. as Leader

b. (U) COA 2. **U.S. AS A PARTNER.** The U.S. as the lead of relatively autonomous allies and coalition partners. Each partner is responsible for a geographic area of military responsibility (AOR) corresponding with established regional and functional commands. The U.S. provides unique enabling capabilities. This is similar to current the U.S.-led Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) construct, except that the lead force is multinational under NATO and that there is no envisaged role for a subordinate multi-national corps. This is also most similar among the COAs to the current plans for USFOR-A / ISAF.

i. (U) This also requires the refinement of the U.S. military strategy for Afghanistan which is expanded from the current documents to a holistic Counterinsurgency (COIN) approach applicable to all aspects of U.S. and multinational military engagement in Afghanistan. This document would provide for the direction of U.S. military operations of all combatant commands in Afghanistan, with USFOR-A established as the primary supported component of the U.S. Joint Force. It would also be the primary basis for coordination among coalition, alliance and partnered military forces with due consideration for their own strategies. The ISAF OPLAN, Campaign Design Update NATO CSPMP and the USG Integrated Guidance for RC-East (as of 5 Oct 2008) provide a strong basis for the required comprehensive military strategy.

ii. (U) Under this strategy, the U.S. still provides the bulk of military capability and exerts influence over among coalition, alliance and partnered military forces in their supporting roles, but respective of their shared command prerogatives in that effort. These multinational forces operate primarily through NATO/ ISAF architectures in supported/supporting roles with USFOR-A components. This situation is similar to the current OEF/NATO coordination concept where selected USFOR-A operations are technically precluded from coordination with ISAF forces.

iii. (U) Key to the preservation and strength of the U.S. strategy under this COA is that its execution be subjected to the fewest possible non-U.S. intervening headquarters and that it be sufficiently flexible to minimize seams between USFOR-A and multi-national force operations and approaches. However, it must flexibly adapt to the influences and initiatives of alliance, coalition and partnered military forces specifically including the ISAF Regional Commands (RCs), the A/MoD and A/MoI, as well as the A/NSC, and the JCMB.

iv. (U) This allows for execution of the U.S. strategy by USFOR-A and supporting U.S. Joint Force components with the flexible mitigation and adaptation to limiting or conflicting strategies emanating from NATO, GIRoA or others. Figure 2 demonstrates the MIL C2 architectures that would best support this outcome:



Figure 2: COA 2 – U.S. as Partner

c. COA 3. **U.S. AS AN ENABLER**. The U.S. operates as a component of a Multi-national force with allies and coalition partners in assigned AOR's. U.S. takes on added leadership responsibility of providing enabling capabilities across the region. This construct is similar to Balkans Implementation Force (IFOR) approach.

i. (U) This COA requires review of USFOR-A Support Plans, the ISAF Campaign Design Update, ISAF OPLANs, and NATO CSPMP to ensure that these form an integrated military strategy for Afghanistan which is in turn supported by USCENTCOM and U.S. Joint Forces. This ISAF Campaign Design document would serve as the conceptual foundation for U.S. and multinational military forces operating within Afghanistan; as well as, serve as the primary coordination instrument for other coalition and partnered military forces.

ii. (U) Under this strategy, the U.S. provides substantive military capability influence within established military constructs while contributing to refinement of NATO/ISAF strategy over time. In this manner, the U.S. honors the shared command prerogative of both the coalition and greater alliance. Multinational forces can also operate via the NATO/ISAF architecture in supported/supporting roles with USFOR-A components. This situation reflects minor refinement to the current NATO/ISAF relationship, while isolating selected USFOR-A activities related to counter-terror (CT), counter-narcotic (CN), detention operations (DO) and Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) support to the Afghan National Police (ANP).

iii. (U) Key to the preservation of U.S. strategy under this COA is the ability to refine input commensurate to the relative weight of U.S. effort over time in relation to other

multinational support. As the execution of this strategy is subjected to multiple non-U.S. headquarters and planning processes, this approach must maintain the flexibility necessary to moderate the widening of operational seams between USFOR-A and multinational force strategies over time. Additionally, the strategy must be responsive to the influences and initiatives of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), SHAPE, A/MoD and A/MoI, the A/NSC, and JCMB.

iv. (U) This approach allows USFOR-A to execute a multilateral strategy while effectively supporting U.S. Joint Force components under a coalition/ alliance construct. Figure 3 demonstrates a MIL C2 architecture that best support that outcome:



Figure 3: COA 3 – U.S. as an Enabler

(U) Results. Several broad conclusions emerged from this analysis.

a. (U) Mission responsiveness in general is a function of span of military control. A single directive command authority is normally more responsive than a collaborative command structure, which requires additional time and energy for coordinating decisions. Therefore, COA 1 is likely to be the most tactically responsive. From a global perspective, a USG-dominated military C2 architecture might, despite localized effectiveness, adversely impact on the strategic potential for cross-cutting military and security missions across the CENTCOM AOR.

b. (U) Strategic success depends both on mission success and on the willing acceptance of coalition partners and the international community to the degree of U.S. command leadership. In general, coalition partners and the international community have competing

strategic goals and interests that must be understood if the mission is to have legitimacy, even if it is militarily efficient. Therefore, COA2 may offer the best compromise between efficiency and legitimacy.

c. (U) Some national military missions, such as counter-terrorism, may be difficult to submit to coalition or multinational control, especially if the partner nations have different orientations toward combating terrorism. COA 1 imposes the fewest constraints on prosecution of the U.S. counter-terrorism mission, while COA 3 probably limits the degrees of freedom for U.S. CT activities most.

d. (U) The ease of U.S. CIV-MIL coordination probably depends on the degree of U.S. directive authority. Under COA 1, the U.S. can coordinate CIV-MIL activities without lengthy negotiation involving its partners. Under COA 2, the U.S. command can facilitate CIV-MIL coordination among the partners. But under COA 3, such coordination will have to be conducted individually among all the agencies and partners.

e. (U) In general, coalition partners will require critical U.S. enabling support, such as logistics, intelligence, or information operations, under any of the COAs. The burden of providing such key critical capabilities increases with the number of partners to be supported, and the degree to which their operational requirements are similar. Therefore, the challenge of providing U.S. enabling support to its partners will be least under COA 1 and greatest under COA 3.

(U) Military C2 analysis summary.

a. (U) There are three significantly distinct options for achieving improved unity of command for Afghanistan: A U.S.-dominated approach; a balanced U.S./NATO approach; and a thoroughly multilateral/multinational approach under established ISAF constructs. Each of these indicate important trade-offs in unity of command for the direction of the military strategies. The balance of opportunity vs. risk is considerably different when taken from CENTCOM, Multilateral/Multinational, International Community/UNAMA or global perspectives.

- (U) COA 1: This COA solidifies U.S. unity of command and maximizes the potential for unified action under COMCENTCOM. This results in greater performance where the U.S. military footprint can be established and sustained. It also suggests the marginalization of NATO support to force generation and sustainment with the gradual diminishment of multinational military contributions for both COIN as well as BPC. This bears transactional costs to the U.S. including a loss of NATO/coalition burden-sharing and the diminishment of NATO role for other global missions.

- (U) COA 2: This COA strikes a balance between COAs 1 and 2 and makes modest MIL C2 concessions to the multinational character of the military engagement by MIL C2/force integration consistent with established NATO / ISAF constructs. This results in sub-optimal military performance from a U.S. Joint Force perspective, but

represents the maximum deliverable effectiveness from a U.S. led NATO-based coalition operating under stringent multinational political constraints. This bears no specific transactional costs as it is relatively consistent with the currently agreed NATO role for this mission.

- (U) COA 3: This COA allows for liberal distribution military command authorities throughout the NATO alliances and other Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) under a classic multinational construct. The results in highly suboptimal integration of joint military actions, but maximum TCN ownership of assigned missions and AORs. This leverages the greatest potential breadth of contributions to the coalition, while accepting the limitation this imposes on the localized effectiveness of U.S. military strategies. Good-will in the coalitions and in the NATO alliance are maximized with the preservation of their greatest potential for contribution to other USCENTCOM and global security endeavors.

b. (U) Current political agreements and commitments to NATO, combined with the USG's expressed intent to exert greater international leadership for coalition efforts in Afghanistan seem to indicate the favorability of COA B. However, if mitigated through selection of a more or less aggressive POL-CIV-MIL COA as discussed in Tab B to this Appendix, COAs 1 or 3 might be indicated as more suitable.

c. (U) As with the POL-CIV-MIL approach, once a U.S. MIL C2 approach is selected, an appropriate U.S. leadership approach must be applied to make clear the intention for the employment of U.S. Joint Forces in concert with multinational forces, and to clarify the intent for relative prioritization of U.S. military strategy among other divergent considerations. Leadership for COA 1 would be as a dominant unitary leader. COA 2 indicates leadership from within established multinational military constructs as prima inter pares. COA 3 indicates leadership as a peer among equals under established multinational constructs. Further discussion of leadership approaches is provided at TAB A (Leadership Approaches to APPENDIX 4 of this Annex.)

d. (U) Figure 4 depicts the process path by which such a decision may be taken for any of the available COAs in the fullest strategic context. As implied earlier, it demonstrates that U.S. military C2 constructs are clearly implicated by decisions at the highest levels, and that these will then begin to suggest the relevance of one COA over another given the consideration of all factors analyzed in the preceding discussion.



Figure 4 - POL-MIL-CIV Decision Path

(U) This demonstrates that COAs 1 and 2 are favored under those conditions where a new USG Afghan policy is the desired primary policy thrust for the Afghan campaign, while COAs 2 and 3 are more relevant to any decision made to operate / optimize within the established and agreed political constructs.

(U) Common to all COAs is the need for robust resourcing for an effective USFOR-A.

(U) Implementation Tasks and Responsibilities.

a. (U) Unify U.S. Joint Forces under USFOR-A consistent with selected MIL C2 COA.

i. (U) For COA 1:

1. (U) Clarify and minimize restrictions on the subordination U.S. Special Operations Forces Component – Afghanistan (SOC-A) to the operational control (OPCON) of USFOR-A. Include under the tactical control (TACON) of SOC-A all CT TF assets operating in the USFOR-A CJOA.

2. (U) (U) Establish USFOR-A as Coordinating Authority with TACON for military operations occurring under the direction of the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP).

3. (U) Establish a Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) or subordinate to COM USFOR-A in order to unify USFOR Land Component Operations for RC South and RC East upon U.S. assumption of NATO rotational command in RC South in 2010.

4. (U) Establish Combined Force Air Component Command (CFACC) or enhanced Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) subordinate to COM USFOR-A in order to unify USFOR-A decision making and joint targeting relative to air and intelligence integration for operations.

ii. (U) For COA 2:

1. (U) Clarify and minimize restrictions on the subordination U.S. Special Operations Forces Component – Afghanistan (SOC-A) to the operational control (OPCON) of USFOR-A. Include under the tactical control (TACON) of SOC-A all CT TF assets operating in the USFOR-A CJOA.

2. (U) Establish Combined Force Air Component Command (CFACC) or enhanced Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) subordinate to COM USFOR-A in order to unify USFOR-A decision making and joint targeting relative to air and intelligence integration for operations.

iii. (U) For COA 3:

1. (U) Clarify and minimize restrictions on the subordination U.S. Special Operations Forces Component – Afghanistan (SOC-A) to the operational control (OPCON) of USFOR-A. Include under the tactical control (TACON) of SOC-A all CT TF assets operating in the USFOR-A CJOA.

2. (U) Revert OPCON of Army Engineering District (AED), Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and SOC-A to USCENTCOM or parent CENTCOM functional component headquarters with Coordinating Authority for their operations in Afghanistan established at USFOR-A.

iv. (U) Action: USCENTCOM in coordination USFOR-A, CENTCOM Components, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, USJFCOM, CJCS and OSD.

b. (U) Fully Resource the USFOR-A Joint Manning Document (JMD).

i. (U) For COA 1:

1. (U) Coordinate the development of an expanded JMD applicable to USFOR-A and ISAF as a single command entity consistent with its intended employment COA. Build this around a standing US HQ, preferably a U.S. Army Corps with C2 enablers similar to NATO constructs used in Operation

ALLIED FORCE and KFOR. Work thorough JFC Brunssum and SHAPE to refine multinational contributions and the NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) documents necessary to sustain this integrated headquarters.

2. (U) Coordinate the development of an expanded JMD applicable to CFLCC and CFACC consistent with its intended employment COA. Work thorough JFC Brunssum and SHAPE to refine multinational contributions and the NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) documents necessary to sustain these component integrated headquarters.

ii. (U) For COA 2:

1. (U) For COA 2, Coordinate revision and full resourcing of a JMD for USFOR-A to accomplish its assigned mission and responsibilities. A higher prioritization for joint and service manning, and the maximum stabilization of U.S. and multinational personnel is critical, especially for key billets.

2. (U) Coordinate the development of an expanded JMD applicable to CFLCC and CFACC consistent with its intended employment COA. Work thorough JFC Brunssum and SHAPE to refine multinational contributions and the NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) documents necessary to sustain these component integrated headquarters.

iii. (U) For COA 3: USFOR-A still requires a fully resourced JMD to accomplish its assigned mission and responsibilities. Establish a higher prioritization for joint and service manning, and the maximum stabilization of U.S. and multinational personnel is critical, especially for key billets.

iv. (U) **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination CENTCOM Components, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, USJFCOM, Military Services, CJCS and OSD.**

c. (U) Consolidate USFOR-A operational authority within Afghanistan over operations in RC South and RC East. **(Applicable only to COA 1)** Establish three star Deputy Commander of USFOR-A as Combined Force Land Component Commander with OPCON over RC S and RC E. Assign concurrently as NATO / ISAF Deputy Commander for Operations (DCOM Ops) with Coordinating Authority over operations for all ISAF and ODRP operations. **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination with USFOR-A, ARCENT, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

d. (U) Establish plan and milestones for transition of U.S. military-led PRTs to a civilian-led PRT command structure, with the military in a supporting role, where security conditions permit. **Action: USCENTCOM in coordination with USFOR-A, U.S. Embassy Kabul, ARCENT, USCENTCOM, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

e. (U) Establish plan and milestones for placement of qualified mentors at levels of the ANA directly reportable through Regional Command Advisory Group (RCAG) to CSTC-A in

coordination with ISAF RCs. This recommendation does not apply to additional 'partnering' activities. **Action: USFOR-A / ISAF in coordination with A/MoD, A/MOI, A/NSC, USCENTCOM, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

f. (U) Establish plan and milestones for full transition of USFOR-A / ISAF operational control (OPCON/OPCOM) to ANSF with USFOR-A / ISAF designated as supporting. **Action: USFOR-A / ISAF in coordination with A/MoD, A/NSC, JFC Brunssum, SHAPE/EUCOM, CJCS and OSD.**

g. (U) Establish a subunified command for USFOR-A **(Applicable only to COAs 1 and 2)**. Request authority to establish a subordinate unified command (a Joint or Multinational Force (JFC/MNF) to the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (applicable primarily to COAs 1 and B2. **Action, USCENTCOM in coordination with SHAPE / EUCOM to provide initial estimates for CJCS Action to OSD and NSC.**

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB C TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX I

(U) The attached PowerPoint File provides further detail on the analysis of Unity of Effort Issues for Afghanistan.

Click on slide below to Enclosure 1 and start the presentation



ENCLOSURE 2 (DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) FOR A REVITALIZED NATO CAUCUS) TO TAB C (AFG-PAK POL-CIV-MIL COAS) TO APPENDIX 2 TO C2-KM ANNEX TO REGIONAL PLAN

NOTE – THIS DRAFT DOCUMENT IS ADAPTED FROM AN INACTIVE ISAF STAFF ACTION FROM FEB 2008.

Draft Terms of Reference (TOR) for a Revitalized NATO Caucus.[2]

REFERENCES:

A: ISAF Briefing - Practical Steps for Engaging the GIRoA with More IC Coherence.
B: The Afghanistan Compact
C: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1776
D: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1746
E: NATO OPLAN 10320 Revise 1
F: NATO Senior Civilian Representative Terms of Reference

1. There are currently no effective mechanisms by which the International Community (IC) strategic agenda in Afghanistan can be managed to improve the coherence of collective IC engagement with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The IC agenda is typically dominated by urgent or a collection of bi-lateral issues and, or the GIRoA agenda as managed separately in Afghan deliberative bodies which include the Cabinet, the National Security Council (NSC), the Policy Action Group (PAG) and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) Secretariat. This results in poor leverage for IC positions, and poor support for refinement to the Afghan agenda.

2. Enhanced mechanisms are required to better support fulfillment of the IC's collective responsibility to coordinate activities consistent with United Nations' Assistance Mission Afghanistan's (UNAMA's) charter to synergize IC support to the GIRoA. The NATO Caucus or a similar IC collective forum offers an established but latent mechanism to support this function.

3. A revitalized NATO Caucus would directly support IC coordination as well as UNAMA Integrated Approach agenda-building and management.

a. Purpose: The NATO Caucus is established to provide an enhanced platform for deliberation over and coordination of integrated policies, strategies and inputs from NATO / ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) to enhance the collective pursuit of aims established in the NATO Comprehensive Strategic POL-MIL Plan (CSPMP) as these apply to the UNAMA Integrated Approach, the Afghanistan Compact and other international agreements.

(1). The desired deliverable of the NATO Caucus is to produce, where possible, singular and coordinated policy and strategy inputs to multilateral and Afghan policy deliberations. Where this is not possible, the NATO Caucus will seek to quantify key distinctions and alternatives among recommended IC approaches, and develop mitigation concepts for the potential conflict between disparate stakeholder interests.

(2). The NATO Caucus maintains a long-term agenda as appropriate to coordinate NATO and TCN support and inputs to the functioning of the JCMB, as well as key Afghan deliberations in the Policy Advisory group (PAG) or Afghan Cabinet, and other strategic consultative fora.

[2] This reference suggests the NATO Caucus as the mechanism for revitalization, but might equally apply to any similar high-level international community (IC) forum with mission representatives assigned in Kabul at ambassadorial rank who have substantial stake in Afghanistan and a designated seat at the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB). This might occur alternatively as a Group of Principals (GoP) or other groupings under the direction of an agreed chairperson or co-chairs. For a UNAMA led GoP, the UNSRSG might perform in this role.

(3). Once a policy position is taken within the NATO Caucus, members are informally obligated to work toward consolidation of IC support consistent with NATO Caucus recommendations to include the modification of supporting plans, strategies and action plans.

b. Scope: The scope of issues considered and addressed by the NATO Caucus includes all Governance, Security, Development and Regional Cooperation subjects for which NATO TCN stakeholders provide resources and support to the GIRoA.

(1). This explicitly includes military and political engagement for domestic and regional issues.

(2). A long-term agenda is constructed which reflects agreed priorities established within relevant multi-lateral strategic documentation.

(a). All NATO TCN unilateral, bilateral and multilateral programs are relevant elements for consideration inasmuch as these impact on the overall progress to Governance, Security and Development objectives according to relevant strategies and campaign roadmaps.

(b). The Benchmarks and Milestones of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and the implications of iterative measures taken against these provide a solid but non-exclusive basis for the NATO Caucus Agenda. The JCMB and PAG mid-to-long range agendas should also be appropriately reflected within NATO Caucus priorities.

(3). The role UNAMA will be respected based on their authority established under UNSCR 1746 to "promote more coherent international engagement in support of Afghanistan."

(4). The role and outputs of the Externals Advisory Committee (EAC) will be respected as the key IC forum for coordination of donor support to Afghan programs and its outputs will duly inform the agenda and function of the NATO Caucus and its members.

c. Authority: The authority of the NATO Caucus is primarily established[3] under the Secretary General (SecGen) of NATO by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Further authorities deriving from the offices of Commander ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) are applicable within their NATO-assigned duties. Respect for NATO Caucus authority is an individual NATO Caucus member responsibility and prerogative. Decisions of the NATO Caucus are not binding, but rather offer the opportunity to coordinate and harmonize approaches among sovereign and diverse stakeholders.

d. Organization: The NATO Caucus is organized with the following functions:

(1). NATO Caucus Chair:

(a). The NATO Caucus Chair is a shared office between the Commander, International Security Assistance Forces (COMISAF), and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (NATO SCR). The NATO Caucus Chair is effective by representation of any one of these two individuals as they equally share ownership for effectiveness of the NATO Caucus function. The UNSRSG may also be included as a co-chairman when conducted in open format.

(b). The NATO Caucus Chair convenes and chairs the NATO Caucus on both a periodic and exceptional basis, directs activities in support of the conduct of NATO Caucus meetings, accepts NATO TCN inputs on behalf of the NATO Caucus through the NATO

[3] CRITICAL NOTE: This NAC approval action has not yet been requested or approved at any level in NATO.

Caucus Deputies Committee (NCDC) and recommends approval for and promulgates NATO Caucus decisions and positions on behalf to the membership.

(2). NATO Caucus Deputies Committee (NCDC):

(a). The NCDC is comprised of: a single and appointed deputy of each of the two Chairs and deputies or executive representatives of the NATO TCNs. When conducted in open format, this might also include deputies of UNAMA, the European Union (EU) and World Bank (WB) missions to Afghanistan based upon their appointed role as rotational chairpersons of the EAC.

(b). The NCDC provides for the continuity of function and the prioritization of activities within the NATO Caucus Secretariat and established Work Groups. This sets conditions for effective NATO Caucus meetings as they occur, the establishment and maintenance of the mid and long-term NATO Caucus Agenda, and the effective delivery of coordinated products to and by the NATO Caucus over time.

(3). NATO Caucus General Membership: General membership includes all NATO TCN member ambassadorial mission representatives or their duly qualified delegates. Members of the NATO Caucus Chair are concurrently GoP general members. When conducted in open format, membership may also include deputies of UNAMA, the European Union (EU) and World Bank (WB), or other parties based upon the NATO Caucus agenda.

(4). NATO Caucus non-members. Temporary participation by non-members including outside experts and Afghan government officials with the approval of any member of the NATO Caucus Chair. This temporary status is effective for only one NATO Caucus session or event at a time. Invitation for extended participation by outside parties must be agreed by all members of the NATO Caucus Chair and a majority of the general membership.

(5). NATO Caucus Secretariat (NCSec):

(a). The NCSec is a virtual organization comprised of deputies, executive assistants and, or advisors to the NATO Caucus members. Core membership of the NCSec is formed by designated “secretaries” from ISAF and the NATO SCR office with the primary responsibility for continuity of function assigned to the NATO SCR.

(b). The NCSec provides for the effective communications between the NATO Caucus Chair, the NCDC and the NATO Caucus general membership. Within their capacity, they perform any work necessary to set conditions for effective NATO Caucus meetings including the maintenance of the mid and long-term NATO Caucus Agenda, and the delivery of coordinated products to and by the NATO Caucus over time.

(c). The NCSec identifies requirements for the establishment of WGs to facilitate further work beyond the capacity of the NCsec and provide oversight to WGs when in session.

(d). The NCSec prepares, distributes and maintains minutes, motions and other documentation as required.

(6). NATO Caucus Work Groups (WGs):

(a). WGs may be established by the NATO Caucus Chair and NATO Caucus members based on the indicated need for supporting integrated staffing by the NATO Caucus. Required composition of WGs will be determined on the basis of the subject at hand. ISAF and the NATO SCR office and the NCSec will fully support the function of approved WGs as an established core work force. WGs will not exclude participation by any NATO Caucus general members or duly qualified delegates.

(b). WGs perform designated analyses, coordination and planning at the direction of the NATO Caucus. This will be coordinated and reportable through the NCSec although there may be exceptional instances where WGs report directly to the NCDC or the NATO Caucus Chair.

e. Frequency and Location:

(1). NATO Caucus Meetings:

(a). Are open to the NATO Caucus Chair, the NCDC and the NCSec and NATO Caucus general membership.

(b). Do not require a plurality of the Chair or a quorum except in the case of exceptional meetings which must be convened by a plurality of the Chair, and a quorum of NATO Caucus general membership.

(c). Will take place for approximately 2 hours on a monthly basis unless determined otherwise by the NATO Caucus Chair.

(d). Will occur within the ISAF headquarters compound unless otherwise coordinated through the NCSec.

(e). In exceptional cases, NATO Caucus meetings may be convened out of cycle or at alternative locations when this is identified as necessary for urgent coordination of NATO TCN issues and is consistent with rules governing the requirement for a plurality of the Chair to convene the exceptional meeting, and the availability of a quorum.

(2). NCDC Meetings:

(a). Will occur on an informal basis for approximately 1 hour bi-weekly, and formally only as required.

(b). Will occur at the ISAF Compound unless coordinated otherwise through the NCSec.

(c). May convene on an exceptional basis at the direction of the NATO Caucus Chair or any NCDC member contingent upon the availability of a quorum of NCDC membership.

(3). NCSec Meetings:

(a). Will convene for one hour on a weekly basis and otherwise as required or directed by the NCDC or Chairpersons.

(b). Will occur at the ISAF Compound unless coordinated otherwise through the NCSec.

(4). WGs: Will convene only as and where required to perform assigned and agreed functions in support of the NATO Caucus.

f. NATO Caucus Protocols.

(1). Classification of Proceedings and Rules of Attribution.

(a). Unless indicated otherwise, NATO Caucus Proceedings and documentation will be handled as Sensitive, For Official Use Only, and Unclassified, not to be distributed beyond the NATO Caucus member organizations and governments. This does not include implementation partners.

(b). General members may request through the Chair the release of specified information to agents outside the NATO Caucus. Subject to this approval, NATO Caucus Chairs and members may not, either under national and or organizational prerogatives divulge NATO Caucus working products or positions until they are established by approval of the NATO Caucus general membership.

(c). As a rule, all comments, discussions and products of NATO Caucus deliberation are fully attributable to their source within the rules for handling indicated above, and with full respect for the potential sensitivity of the issues. General members may request in advance and be granted by the NATO Caucus Chair a temporary non-attribution status for any period of dialogue. This non-attribution status will not extend beyond the immediate session. Records and, or minutes will neither reflect the subject matter or the participants in any discussion where non-attribution is requested and approved.

(2). The NATO Caucus Agenda.

(a). Maintenance of a robust and ambitious NATO Caucus agenda is the key to maintenance of NATO Caucus priorities, and the anticipation of necessary deliverables to external deliberative processes.

(b). The Agenda will be established by approval of the Chair, and modified by recommendation and approval of the NATO Caucus general membership.

i. Additions, deletions or changes to the NATO Caucus agenda may be made at the discretion of the NATO Caucus Chair.

ii. Changes may also be made by the recommendation and approval of the NATO Caucus membership.

iii. The NCDC and NCSec may suggest agenda changes in performance of their roles but have no authority to recommend or approve these apart from their separate roles as a NATO Caucus general members when applicable.

(c). NATO Caucus general members may raise any issue outside the published agenda for discussion as “Any Other Business” (AOB) during a NATO Caucus session subject to the moderation by the NATO Caucus Chair.

(d). As a courtesy to attending non-members, these may also offer items for discussion under AOB, but may not nominate subjects for the agenda except through a sponsoring general member.

(3). NATO Caucus Deliverables. The primary NATO Caucus deliverable will be policy statements or communiqués describing the NATO Caucus recommended approaches on the support, or non-support of stakeholder and, or Afghan programs and policies. These documents are for use of the NATO Caucus general membership and are provided for the information of the NATO TCNs, NATO HQ and the SecGen. Additional deliverables may include analyses, discussion papers, and or alternative policies and strategies.

(4). Approval Rules.

(a). As indicated previously, decisions and official positions of the NATO Caucus are not binding on stakeholders, but are critical to informing the collective approach of all NATO Caucus members to UNAMA and the GIRoA and should be carefully considered.

(b). Approval of a policy, position paper, communiqué or any other NATO Caucus deliverable can only be achieved by the recommendation of a plurality of the NATO

Caucus Chair, and the active approval by a majority of the NATO Caucus general membership.

(c). Reasonable time will be provided for all general membership to form a full response on any issue, or modify a response previously submitted. Normally, one week will be provided as a standard waiting period but his may be accelerated by coordination among the general membership. Since decisions are not binding, delays will not exceed a period of one month unless agreed by a plurality of the NATO Caucus Chair and a majority of the general membership.

(d). Each member organization is entitled to a single vote on any motion within the NATO Caucus. That vote is only accepted as final upon its iteration by the senior member of the organization or the expiration of the designated waiting period for that decision.

(e). During the deliberation period for any issue, and prior to the promulgation of NATO Caucus decisions and products, all NATO Caucus members are entitled to access to other members' positions on a motion, statements of concurrence and non-concurrence. As requested by individual members, inputs may be attached as statements of dissent or non-concurrence with any NATO Caucus deliverables.

(f). The NCSec will accept and maintain a record of the approval process for all NATO Caucus issues. This record will be made available for all NATO Caucus membership.

(5). Plurality of the Chair.

(a). Routine NATO Caucus events and the programmed agenda may be convened and proceed under the direction of any one member of the NATO Caucus Chair.

(b). A plurality is achieved for the Chair by the participation of both NATO Caucus Chairpersons, or those formally designated and recognized by parent organizations in an "acting" role in their stead.

i. For routine meetings, decisions and non-exceptional deliberations, a plurality of the Chair may be achieved either through direct participation, or by correspondence during the authorized waiting period.

ii. For exceptional NATO Caucus events and deliberations, a plurality of the Chair is required in attendance.

(6). Quorum Rules.

(a). Routine and exceptional NATO Caucus events must be supported by a quorum of the general membership.

i. For routine decisions and non-exceptional deliberations, a quorum may be achieved either through direct participation, or by correspondence during the authorized waiting period.

ii. For exceptional events and deliberations, a quorum can only be achieved when 50% or more members are physically present.

(b). There is no restriction on individual substitution of NATO Caucus general membership for purposes of determining that a quorum is achieved as long is the delegate is an official member of the parent organizations and otherwise qualified to participate in the proceedings.

(c). The NCSec will record the achievement of a quorum for all proceedings.

(7). Majority Rules.

(a). NATO Caucus decisions and recommendations must be supported by a majority of the general membership.

(b). A majority is achieved when 50% or more of the active formal members or their organizational delegates actively support a movement, measure or initiative. Abstentions and absences may not count toward a majority.

(c). There is no restriction on substitution for individual representation by NATO Caucus general membership for purposes of achieving a majority.

(d). As indicated in Approval Rules above, minority positions will be eligible for attachment and distribution to all NATO Caucus deliverables at the request of the individual NATO Caucus general members.

(e). A majority may be voided within the reasonable waiting period by the reversal of an affirmative position by any NATO Caucus member, and or by the substitution of a former abstention with a negative position. This voiding action may be retracted by members if they do so within the reasonable waiting period. Changes to NATO Caucus member positions on any issue under deliberation will be expeditiously communicated to all NATO Caucus membership upon receipt.

(f). The NCSec will record by individual NATO Caucus member the position on recommended issues, the achievement of a majority on any position, or failure of the motion, any NATO Caucus member position changes voiding a majority, and the notification of NATO Caucus members of such changes.

(8). Attendance Rules.

(a). Organizational delegates of the NATO Caucus general membership are strongly encouraged to participate in all NATO Caucus Meetings. Where this is not possible, duly appointed deputies are strongly encouraged. Nonetheless, attendance and participation will be credited toward a quorum by the attendance of any qualified delegate of the organization without prejudice.

(b). NATO Caucus general members may participate with multiple attendees at any proceeding but must remain sensitive to the need for singularity of general member positions, and the limited space available to seat all other required participants. Singular and authoritative membership should be the norm.

(c). The NCSec will prepare and distribute minutes in an expeditious manner in order to minimize the requirement for advisors and administrative assistants to accompany NATO Caucus delegates on a regular basis.

g. Modification to the Terms of Reference.

(1). Once approved, these terms of reference may be modified by the recommendation of any NATO Caucus member, the Plurality of the NATO Caucus Chair, and approval by a majority of the NATO Caucus general membership.

(2). Periodic review should occur no later than 120 days from approval for this document and semi-annually thereafter. Review will invite and include recommendations from all NATO Caucus general membership. Results of that review are reportable by the NCSec to the general

membership and may be subjected to approval processes as nominated by any qualified member.

(3). Copies of these TOR may be provided For Official Use only to agents of the UNAMA, GIRoA and all other engaged national, international and private organizations recognized as having a stake in the coordination of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan.

Cosigned By: NATO SecGen / SACEUR / COMJFCB / COMISAF / NATO SCR

ENCLOSURE 3 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX I

(U) The attached PowerPoint File provides further detail on the ISAF Draft Product Entitled "Practical Steps for Engaging the GIRoA with More IC Coherence."

Click on file icon below to open Enclosure 3.



APPENDIX THREE: ARABIAN PENINSULA C2-KM ENGAGEMENT TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction. United States National interests require a continued strategy of engagement with regional partners. Additionally, in order to have long term effectiveness and increased emphasis on a whole-of government approach is required when we engage our regional partners. Security cooperation activities set conditions for potential military operations by assuring basing and maintaining defense relationships that support United States interests in the AOR. They also help sustain a campaign against terrorism. Sub-regional travel teams reported that each of the traditional USCENTCOM's regional partners on the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries), as well as Jordan and Egypt (Levant) view Iran as their number one strategic threat. This reinforces the requirement to maintain and strengthen enduring relations in order to execute the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy and strategic vision; enhance security in the region; and prevent the rise of future VEOs.

(U) Discussion. There has been recent emphasis within DOD to move our engagement initiatives with the GCC countries to a multilateral process versus the existing bilateral process. However, a major theme emerged from the Arabian Peninsula team that specifically indicates that attempts to convince or coerce GCC countries and other regional partners into multilateral forums is a counter-productive approach to engagement at this time.

(U) The GCC (as an organization) is a weak forum for cooperation; individually, they maintain adversarial relations which preclude progress on multilateral fronts. Each understandably, has the same top priorities: preservation of the regime and protection of the homeland. In this respect, multilateralism does not, in their view, meet their needs or cultural norms. Their culture is based on and requires the establishment of long term relationships and trust. Therefore, in order to be effective, our engagement must operate within the regional norms, processes and culture that exist today: the culture requires bilateral engagement. Additionally, the GCC nations have very few decision makers and most of those decision makers are members of, or directly tied to, the ruling family. These decision makers and others, who are not decision makers, are constantly being sought out by various members of DOD (e.g. COCOM HQ, Components, Services and Agencies) and civilian entities (DOS and private industry) each with their own agenda, with little to no coordination. This approach is overwhelming; frustrates the process; extends the decision making cycle; and is not implementing desired capabilities with a long term-strategic vision in concert with the USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). Therefore, gaps are developing from a unity of effort and whole-of-government approach.

(U) Recommendations. In order to close the gaps, we need to reinforce/enhance the current bilateral engagement strategy, develop a more coherent whole-of-government approach (with the introduction of Communities of Interest into our discussions) and focus on bilateral projects that have multilateral capability and then leverage accomplishments from these bilateral projects to establish the foundation and trusts required for multilateral cooperation. In order to accomplish an enhanced bilateral strategy and set the foundation for multilateral undertakings the following are recommended:

- (U) Introduce into the USCENTCOM TCP and Regional Action Plans the development and establishment of Communities of Interest as a C2-KM process/tool.

- (U) COIs should be aligned along the existing nine Lines of Operation established within the Theater Campaign Plan. (Recommended COIs can be found in TAB B to Appendix 4 to the C2-KM Annex).
- (U) Establishment of U.S. and GCC partner (bilaterally with each) COIs in concert with the GCC charter and objectives could establish trusts and the foundation for transitioning to multilateral engagements.

➢ (U) Reinforce frequent and persistent senior leader engagements between the United States and each partner nation.
- (U) These senior leader engagements should be consultative in order to build the relationships and trusts.
- (U) The COCOM Commander and the United States Ambassador need to agree the critical areas of United States national interests as well as partner nation interest. Follow-on engagements by other USG entities need to be aligned with these areas established between the COCOM and United States Ambassador.

➢ (U) Streamline the C2-KM engagement process and focus/synchronize the efforts between the United States and the limited decision makers within each country.
- (U) Establish a C2-KM Synchronization Office at USCENTCOM.
  - (U) A cross-directorate/cross-cutting Building Partnership Capacity; Theater Security Cooperation; and operational requirements and interoperability based organization.
  - (U) Strengthening partner relationships requires long-term United States commitment to create unity of effort on: Foreign Military Financing/Foreign Military Sales (FMF/FMS); Combined/Multinational Exercises; Defense and Military Contacts; Deterrence and Prevention and Humanitarian Assistance Programs.
  - (U) This C2-KM Synchronization Office would be the primary office responsible for establishing and coordinating DOD and fostering whole-of-government efforts with the GCC states.
  - (U) This organization would establish and reinforce the C2-KM messages in concert with the National Security objectives and Strategic guidance within the theater, defined by the Combatant Commander and the United States Ambassador. Continuity of relationships and messages are crucial.

➢ (U) Leverage existing bilateral initiatives (e.g. Bilateral Air Defense Initiative) which have applicability for multilateral C2-KM information exchange and provide operational benefits for all participants.
- (U) United States establishes a C2 structure with like/similar capability with multiple partners bilaterally. In this venue, the United States becomes a rational hub connected to multiple partners.
- (U) As trusts and agreements are made between the United States and two or more partners, information can be exchanged between partners through the United States as the hub. When this form of information exchange becomes more of the norm versus the exception, this C2-KM architecture performs as a pseudo-enterprise. The hub or

the role of the hub is required for information exchange but the hub does not inhibit or limit the exchange of information between partners.

- (U) As the relationships with the architecture mature and trusts (as well as policies, e.g. non-mission specific multilateral information release/exchange) are developed, the partners collectively modify their roles as partners around the hub but co-equals within an enterprise. Each partner within the enterprise freely shares indentified information sets. What is provided by one partner is available for all partners equally.

(U) Figure 1 below graphically depicts the concept of a pseudo-enterprise (two or more bilaterals with the United States as the hub) to a true enterprise wherein multilateral exchange of information/processes is realized.



Figure 1 - Bilateral to Multilateral Compared

(U) The establishment of enterprise level (to include pseudo-enterprise) architectures and COIs will provide a deterrence environment against VEOs. This approach should be viewed as a template that repeatable within the Regional Action Plans, and individually with any one partner. The development of COIs that create 'transparencies' between nations, ministries, agencies, private interests and NGOs are to be encouraged. When possible, work with key allies outside the region to achieve a common multilateral understanding.

APPENDIX FOUR: C2-KM SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction. The USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) is designed to implement guidance provided from higher-level documents, notably the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and to operationalize the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy. Currently, the TCP is organized along nine lines of operation and ten categories of resources, which represent the "ways and means" by which USCENTCOM aims to achieve the five theater objectives (ends). The TCP is designed to drive military actions while suggesting whole-of-government actions and programs that work in concert to achieve the Theater Strategy's objectives over a ten year period.

(U) Discussion. The purpose of this Appendix is to provide supporting C2-KM themes identified during the assessment (e.g. five leadership approaches to achieve unity of effort) and to recommend locations within the TCP where Knowledge Management principles can be used to establish Communities of Interest (see TAB B for description of COI) and enhance the ways, means, and ends described within the TCP. As noted above, there are nine lines of operation are specified within the TCP. Those lines of operation are:

1) (U) Counterterrorism Operations
2) (U) Partnership Capability/Capacity Building
3) (U) Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Strike Operations
4) (U) Combating WMD Operations
5) (U) Force Protections and Risk Mitigation
6) (U) Force Posture
7) (U) Freedom of Operation/Access Security
8) (U) Multinational and Interagency Support
9) (U) Strategic Communications

(U) From the TCP, three Regional Action Plans (RAPs), Levant; Arabian Peninsula; Central and South Asia, provide for tailored approaches in order to achieve mission accomplishment. Additional operational plans are also developed as required to meet operational requirements.

(U) The addition/inclusion of C2-KM based Communities of Interest represent a new approach and set of tool (ways and means) for USCENTCOM to conduct its operations and engagements throughout the theater. It is our recommendation that C2-KM (as defined in this Annex) and COI concepts be included into the TCP, the RAPs, and when appropriate operational plans. TAB C outlines potential C2-KM COIs that merit further development and consideration. In addition to the TCP and RAP, there are additional COI that directly affect C2-KM aspects of operations in Afghanistan.

List of Tabs:
TAB A: U.S. Civilian and Military Leadership Approaches
TAB B: Defining Community of Interest
TAB C: Candidate Communities of Interest
TAB D: Potential Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange Tools

TAB A: U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP APPROACHES TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction: Unity of effort as a function of leadership.

(U) Shared understanding, unity of command and unity of effort are the critical deliverables of any C2 and KM coordination arrangements. However, C2, KM and other coordination mechanisms alone and without a 'unifying vision' cannot produce unity. Foremost to achieving effective degrees of unity is a unifying vision from which individual and collective shared understanding can be realized. Without this, unity of effort will only be achieved in a relative and unsatisfactory sense.

(U) There are many reasons that it will be difficult to achieve a fully unified strategic vision across the USCENTCOM AOR; amongst U.S. allies and coalition partners. The adoption of an effective and U.S. 'unifying- vision' depends either upon the unilateral establishment of its own vision, or on the adoption of another parties' vision as the primary basis for organization of efforts and activities. The latter option would additionally require the concurrent development of a supplementary unifying-USG-vision.

(U) Discussion. In support of a U.S. unifying vision, effective civilian and military 'leadership approaches' then need to be applied toward its implementation. The USG has five primary options for leadership approaches:

1) (U) *Unitary leadership*: establishing and maintaining authority for a unifying vision and for coordinating all collective efforts supporting that vision.
2) (U) *Leadership from within as prima inter pares:* using established multilateral mechanisms to achieve improvements to a given unified vision over time. This also requires the establishment of external parallel mechanisms for control of key sovereign activities not necessarily reconcilable with the established unifying vision.
3) (U) *Leadership from within as a peer:* requires the establishment of external parallel mechanisms for control of key sovereign activities not necessarily reconcilable with the established unifying vision.
4) (U) *Leadership as follower / supporter*: actively supporting a unifying vision established by another. This may still require the establishment of external parallel mechanisms.
5) (U) *A combination:* dynamically combining the leadership approaches (indicated above) to take full advantage of opportunities for temporary convergence or of multilateral strategic efforts.

(U) Once a leadership approach is selected, it may not apply universally to all aspects of the problem, whether nested or otherwise related. Consequently, a rational layering of leadership may be required. Failure to choose an appropriate leadership model also creates potential costs in legitimacy, unity or both. Failure to conform consistently to one model or another may bear other transactional costs in terms of good faith and transparency – unifying trusts – amongst the Alliance or coalition.

(U) Selection of a leadership approach within the United States whole-of-government effort should be less difficult. Yet, there are substantial identifiable divergences of vision and approach among USG agencies, including combatant commands, military services, and theater functional components that demonstrate: first, a lack of clarity concerning the actual designation of lead agencies and secondly,

lack of acceptance and subordination to a supported or supporting lead. The enhancements to C2, KM and coordination mechanisms recommended in the C2-KM Annex to the Regional Report is intend to correct, where possible, these indicated deficiencies.

(U) The USG's selected leadership approach will have implications on the flexibility of the DOD and USCENTCOM (and its Alliance and coalition partners) ability to select their own military C2, KM and coordination style. If the USG selects a partnered nation's vision as the primary basis for unification of efforts, then it is logical that DOD and USCENTCOM will need to follow suit.

(U) The C2-KM Annex considers USG and U.S. military leadership approaches as applied to USCENTCOM strategies. It infers no recommendations with regard to changing those models where they appear to be aligned. In the first order, it was evident that such a fundamental leadership decision has either not been taken mistakenly, or has not been enforced effectively with respect to realizing unification of efforts in Afghanistan. This is seen most clearly in the USG's seeming inability to recognize or internalize the importance of the NATO Comprehensive Strategic POL-MIL Plan (CSPMP) for Afghanistan.

(U) As a first and most fundamental issue for C2, KM and coordination, the United States administration must decide, for itself, its leadership approach vis-à-vis the campaign in Afghanistan. It then needs to rationalize the integration of its strategic vision with those of the GIRoA, UNAMA, NATO and coalition partners in order to achieve acceptable (and understood) levels of unity of effort. The same applies, albeit less urgently for other unified vision issues, across the USCENTCOM AOR.

(U) <u>USG Leadership Approaches in Afghanistan</u>

(U) In Afghanistan, the USG has opted to accept, with some reservation, a GIRoA lead for their stabilization and support roles under the rubric of the Bonn Process, the Afghanistan Compact and its key strategic steering implement, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). As a member of a coalition which comprise the JCMB (under the authority established in the Afghanistan Compact) the U.S. has opted to provide leadership intermittently from within (as prima inter pares) based upon the relative weight of its investment. However, much leadership relevant to the dynamic JCMB portfolio is also directed through other bilateral and multilateral avenues. While this leadership approach may be highly suited to the USG and justifiable on certain levels, it may not be optimal given the criticality of the JCMB to efficient multilateral progress, and given NATO's concurrent role in the JCMB and its overarching authority among the alliance to establish and maintain a unifying vision for ISAF nations. Given this, the USG's civilian leadership approach seems in contradiction to established processes and strategic commitments. Reconsideration and rationalization of this civilian leadership model will bear on the military leadership options that might logically follow.

(U Two leadership approach combinations currently suggest themselves for all-of-government leadership within the international community:

1) (U) The current arrangement where the USG asserts its leadership and unifying vision as prima inter pares among all actors including GIRoA, UNAMA, NATO and coalition partners (based upon its weight of investment in the campaign).

- Alignment of United States sovereign interests and activities are often only coincidental with strategy and direction established within the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the UNAMA Integrated Approach, the NATO CSPMP, and the priorities and direction established by the JCMB.
- Substantial military activities remain aligned only under the USG national vision. It is not immediately clear that these leadership alignments have been undertaken deliberately with a clear view of the advantages and disadvantages of any other approach.

2) (U) The second is an arrangement whereby the USG supports the Afghan unifying vision (as a prima inter pares within the NATO alliance, again justified by the weight of effort) but otherwise accedes to the leadership of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the JCMB and the GIRoA (maintaining a parallel vision and sovereign initiatives only where urgently necessary).

- USG efforts would focus on support to the maintenance and prosecution of the NATO CSPMP as preeminent strategic vision based upon a premise that the CSPMP, the UNAMA Integrated Approach and the ANDS visions at the core remain responsive to USG concerns over time[4].

(U) Once selected and enforced, it is strongly suggested the USG civilian leadership approach 'mirrors' its organizations and structures alongside / sympathetic to the military leadership model and aligned to existing NATO and ISAF constructs.

(U) If the first civilian leadership approach is selected (USG asserts leadership as prima inter pares with all multilateral partners including GIRoA and NATO), the logical U.S. military approach would be to assume authority as prima inter pares among other military structures including NATO / ISAF, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), other coalition members, and where relevant, Pakistani military forces. This is the classic model of U.S.-led coalition warfare, and it would be best accomplished by thorough unification of U.S. military authorities under a single U.S. Forces Afghanistan commander as either a robust combined-joint task force (CJTF), or as a sub-unified command with effective coordination elements among the lesser partners involved in the strategic endeavor. This carries transactional costs with respect to the straining of relations within the NATO alliance. It also suggests an increasing divergence of strategic vision sufficient to break the alliance's long-term commitment to the campaign. Finally, the USG's first among equals approach suggests difficulty in building future enabling relationships with all international military forces and the ANSF as their own strategic capabilities mature.

(U) If the second civilian leadership approach is selected (USG accedes as a follower / supporter of NAC / NATO leadership), the logical U.S. military approach would be to continue the current military trend toward improved integration and subordination under NATO constructs with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and regional war on terror (RWOT) initiatives organized in parallel where urgently required, and managed rigorously to mitigate their impact on unification under NATO. ISAF maintains its role as prima inter pares with respect to ANSF, and leadership as a peer with Pakistan

[4] It is clear that this leadership alignment has been avoided to date at a cost of poor alignment with the vision and initiatives of all other actors in Afghanistan. This is seen most clearly in the USG's political divergence from NATO, and the strong bilateralism acted out through the USG's approach to the GIRoA.

military forces where applicable. This would also be best accomplished by thorough unification of U.S. military authorities under a single U.S. Forces Afghanistan commander as a robust combined-joint task force (CJTF), accompanied by a robust and separate U.S. Forces Command Afghanistan (USFOR-A) which remain distinguishable in their strategic role, and yet joined under a single dual-hatted commander. This approach carries costs associated with the need for maintenance of more substantial forces and effort operating against OEF and RWOT mission sets which fall beyond the permissible NATO / ISAF remit. Simultaneously, this provides the highest possible prospects for return on legitimacy with respect to operation within UN Security Council mandates, while maintaining solidarity within the NATO alliance, as well as among other coalition partners and the ANSF. This approach also offers the most flexible transition platform for the enabling relationship between international military forces and ANSF as their strategic capabilities mature.

(U) Other leadership models including U.S. unitary leadership; U.S. military leadership as a follower / supporter with a coalition; or combination leadership arrangements may be wholly appropriate in the current scenario given the disproportionate United States investment, the critical need for strategic continuity and the need to maintain the apparent legitimacy of the Bonn and Afghanistan Compact processes. USG and U.S. military leadership approaches are not well indicated by linear arguments as there are profound tradeoffs for any selected option. Additionally, the selection of USG civilian models/structures will have significant impact on effective options for U.S. military leadership.

(U) Analysis of the leadership approach options associated with Afghanistan indicates the potential favorability of substantial subordination of USG vision to that established by the NATO in the context of the Afghanistan Compact. This then would indicate the bolstering of U.S. military leadership approaches under an achievable NATO construct. Recommendations related to C2, KM and coordination will assume this as the USG position, but will explicitly consider and assess the alternatives.

(U) Conclusion. The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that the USG or any other strategic partner is obliged to wholly embrace any imperfect aspect of a published unifying vision established under any authority. National and sovereign prerogatives must remain and will demand room for critical exceptions to unification under any banner. Those exceptions form the essence of a necessary supplementary USG vision to those critical vision statements maintained by NATO, UNAMA, and the GIRoA. Nonetheless, wholesale rejection of, or withhold of U.S. support to generally acceptable unifying vision or the mal-alignment of military C2 within the USG civilian leadership approach seem the most illogical courses of action.

(U) The United States administration must ultimately decide and sustain a decision for an effective leadership approach for the campaign in Afghanistan. Barring such a decision, any old or new USG strategic vision for Afghanistan will fail to deliver sustainable unity of understanding, effort, or command despite the provision of effective C2, KM and coordination structures.

TAB B: COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction. The term Communities of Interest (COI), for a variety of reasons, has become something of a euphemism – a catch all – to mean many things to many people and organizations. For the purposes of the C2-KM Annex to the Regional Plan the following definition of COI is used.

> **Communities of Interest are: Distributed, collaborative and inclusive groupings working to discover, synthesize and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information in order to: take better decisions; implement change and create effects.'**

(U) Discussion. The objective of a Community of Interest is to effect coordination, integration, and inter-connection (associations) between individuals, organizations and/or states in order to establish a learning organization where a collaborative environment fosters new ideas, understanding, and ways to execute a commander's intent or collective objectives (military-military, military-civilian or civilian-civilian). These efforts can take place through personal, face-to-face interactions (e.g. establishment of a working group) or through a virtual, distributive process. Each COI must have a Charter that states its objective (end-state), objectives or enduring concepts.

(U) A detailed discussion that lead to the development of the definition of Community of Interest above can be found in Appendix D, to Annex 5 (C2-KM Situation Assessment).

TAB C: CANDIDATE COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction. The following list is provided as a preliminary outline of potential Communities of Interests (COIs) to that should be considered for inclusion in the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), Regional Action Plans (RAPs) and on-going operations and efforts within USCENTCOM AOR. This are not intended to stem specific efforts in building new organizations but to establish the target to focus attention from interested parties across organizations. Additionally, recommended cross-walks to TCP lines of operation (LOOs) are provided.

a. (U) TCP and RAP:
- (U) Education and Culture COI (LOO #2 and #8)
- (U) Customs and Trade COI (LOO #2 and #8)
- (U) Economic and Financial Affairs COI (LOO #1, #2, #8)
- (U) Critical Infrastructure/Energy Protection COI (LOO #1, #2, #8)
- (U) Maritime Port Security COI (LOO #1, #2, #4, #7, #8)
- (U) Anti-Corruption COI (LOO #1, #2, #8)
- (U) Counter-Narcotics COI (LOO #1, #2, #8)
- (U) Counter Illegal Finance COI (LOO #1, #2, #8)
- (U) Senior Level Collaboration COI (LOO #1, #2, #8)

b. (U) Afghanistan:
- (U) A Transition Service Office COI (3-Star level)
- (U) Civilian-military Strategic Communications COI (2-Star level)
- (U) Combined civilian-military Anti-Corruption Office COI (2-Star level)
- (U) Combined civilian-military Counter Narcotics and Counter (Illegal) Finance COI (1 or 2 Star/SES level)
- (U) Reconstruction and Stabilization Synchronization and Resourcing COI

c. (U) Afghanistan-Pakistan:
- (U) Development of Tripartite Process COI
- (U) Peace Jirga Process Coordination COI
- (U) Reconstruction and Development Synchronization and Resourcing COI

d. (U) Central and South Asia :
- (U) Northern Distribution Network (NDN) Coordination COI
- (U) Regional Security Cooperation COI
- (U) Economic / Trade Development / Integration

e. (U) USCENTCOM/U.S. Africa Command:
- (U) Counter Piracy Synchronization COI

TAB D: POTENTIAL INFORMATION CAPTURE-KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE TOOLS TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX I

(U) Introduction. Information capture is an implicit requirement of knowledge exchange. It is also a part of a continuous process enabling people of differing interests to exchange their information, thereby creating the transparencies necessary to create knowledge for exchange. In Afghanistan, for example, while internal-national learning has been well applied by U.S. forces at the operational and tactical level (based upon 'lessons learned', pre-deployment training, exercises, application and post-deployment debriefing), this does not necessarily apply to Allies or even between coalition partners (e.g. between RC(E) and RC(S)). The situation is often even more pronounced with international organizations and NGOs; whose people often stay longer, but often in less well structured and supported environments. Put together as a whole, it is clear that individual units and commands are learning, but the capture and knowledge exchange of this learning may not be evaluated against national or regional plans; sub-goals and objectives. A critical component of a commander's portfolio must include an effective mechanism for evaluating the impact of plans and actions

(U) Discussion. While each of the sub-regional and functional plans have associated metrics, purposefully focused on the subordinate goals and objectives, what is lacking as a comprehensive and consistent methodology (Information Capture-Knowledge Exchange tools) and set of measures applicable across the entire USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) that would provide consistent visibility that these goals, objectives and metrics are in fact supporting and provide progress toward U.S. national and strategic goals. A number of tools are available to support Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange. Three tools may be worthy of additional consideration, specifically, the Global Modeling System developed by the Office of Naval Research and two interagency tools Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments and Afghanistan Sustainable Infrastructure Planning.

a. (U) Graphical Modeling System (GMS) was developed enable non-linear information capture in order to show entity-temporal relationships (from which Gant Charts can be produced). Additionally, GMS supports the ability to capture, visualize, manipulate and manage information via a dynamic electronic environment. Through intelligent use of GMS and other tools, the intention is to help improve communications between the participants in linear and non-linear temporal relationship development, technology transfer, transition, and insertion arena, specifically:
    1) (U) Increase transparency to ensure that communications are more robust and better understood
    2) (U) Help depict the alignment of entity relationships with the requirements being addressed
    3) (U) Provide means to depict schedule and synchronization issues between active programs

b. (U) GMS is currently being used by UK MoD (Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl)) and was used by the C2-KM team during the Assessment Phase in order to capture and visualize the complex political, military and civilian relationships covering a variety of scenarios.

c. (U) The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) tool contains metrics needed to encompass governance, security, economics, social and rule of law sectors, providing the ingredients required if not to manifest causality, at least to identify trends in the overall environment toward strategic goals, against which to evaluate impact. For example, if the goal is "External (regional) Destabilization has been Diminished", a generic measure would be "Domestic political actors have received political direction and/or resources from authorities or groups based in other states/regions". The tailored measure for Afghanistan might be "Per month, on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being low and 5 being high), what is the degree to which the governors in Laghman, Nangarhar, Khost, Kunar provinces have received political direction from political or religious groups or individuals based in Pakistan Northwest Frontier Regions?". The data for this measure would be collected via the MPICE "expert knowledge" methodology. Further tailoring and parameterization could be applied to include different provinces, alternative government representatives, alternative actors, collection time scale, and/or methodology.

1) (U) A similar rigorous set of measures should be configured, and systematically collected against the entire AOR. While the MPICE Framework and tool are not optimally configured to the USCENTCOM AOR, its comprehensive and analytical nature would serve to inspire enterprise level consideration of a dense array of measures necessary to sense the condition of the environment. These measures, if collected methodically over time, would assist the Commander in generating insight into conflict environments and gauge progress along the continuum from violent internal conflict to self-sustaining peace.

2) (U) Funding has already been allocated to apply the MPICE capability across Afghanistan by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to evaluate strategic progress nationally and provincially. The goals and objectives established by the USCENTCOM Assessment Team will be captured in these measures.

d. (U) The Afghanistan Sustainable Infrastructure Planning (ASIP) Toolkit, could facilitate the development of implementation plans for the CAT assessment. A system of systems approach is being combined with value chain and critical path methodologies to create a capability focused sustainable results. This tool is applicable across the USCENTCOM AOR and pertains to many lines of operation and mission elements. ASIP provides a rigorous, structured operational planning methodology that DOD can use with USG, coalition and partner nations to effectively prioritize and sequence diplomacy, defense and development tasks to ensure progress towards objectives at all levels, particularly in countries emerging from conflict or declining toward conflict, that:

- (U) Rationally identifies primary drivers of growth, development, and stability
- (U) Utilizes critical path mapping to identify enablers, barriers, dependencies and sequencing
- (U) Focuses on identifying and reinforcing positive trend-producing mechanisms that ensure self-sustainability, with tools such as 'asset-based community development' techniques, and strategic information operations
- (U) Accounts for the significance of *how* operations are implemented
- (U) Adapts to the receptiveness of the AOR to inputs, and/or identifies ways to shape the AOR to increase its receptiveness to inputs

(U) This results in operational and tactical objectives that support strategic objectives; prioritized and sequenced tasks in direct support of these objectives at all levels; and mitigation of resource expenditures that do not support these objectives.

APPENDIX FIVE: C2-KM SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT TO ANNEX I

NOTE THIS SITUATION ASSESSMENT WAS FINAL DRAFT AS OF 16 DECEMBER, 2008. ELEMENTS OF THAT DRAFT HAVE BEEN EXCISED. THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED FOR REFERENCE ONLY AND DOES NOT REFLECT THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS PROVIDED THROUGHOUT THE OTHER APPENDICES OF THE C2-KM REPORT

1: **Strategic Context**
- USCENTCOM Major Policy/Strategy Thrusts
- Assumptions
- Recent Developments and Historical Context
- The Nature of the C2 / KM Environment

2: **Command and Control – Knowledge Management Situational Assessment Sum**mary

3: **Assessment of Current Policies and Activities**
- Afghanistan-Pakistan
- Other Sub-Regions
  - Iran
  - Iraq
  - Egypt / Levant
  - Horn of Africa / U.S. Africa Command Seam
  - CAS / USEUCOM Seam
  - Arabian Peninsula / GCC Countries

4: **Assessment of Strategic C2 Relationships**
- Arabia Peninsula Focus Area

5: **Possible Shifts in Course: Establishment of a Sub-Unified like Command**
- Assessment of Possible Military Command and Control Structures
- Proposed Military Command and Control – NATO

6: **Initial Assessment of Possible Courses of Action**

7: **Other Considerations**
- Proposed Military Command and Control – Countering, Preventing and Deterring

8: **TABS**

A: Knowledge Management Principles
B: Integrated Causal Possibility Model
C: Sub-Unified Command
D: Communities of Interest
E: NATO-USCENTCOM Command Modeling
F: Preventative Deterrence
G: Learning and Adaptation
H: Three Needs Model

'The true institutional difficulty is in bringing the agencies together to answer all the questions. Nevertheless this must be done if the use of force is to have a result that leads to the [desired] outcome rather than reinforcing the opponents' position.'[5]

General Sir Rupert Smith

Strategic Context

(U) Command and Control (C2) is defined as the "exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission." Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Currently there is not an agreed upon definition of Knowledge Management (KM) within the Department of Defense however, the United States Army has published principles of KM which we have loosely used as our guide throughout our assessment[6], see also Appendix A:

(U) We approached this assessment with a broad strategic level overview of the entire USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) while including a larger view of the Area of Influence (AoI) necessitated by the supporting efforts, overlaps and seams between Allied and coalition military forces; other national, international agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

(U) Early in the assessment effort, research revealed an apparent lack of Unity of Effort in Afghanistan and this was identified as the primary issue we need to address. Additionally, we determined that we had to look beyond the current counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counter-narcotics, and stabilization/reconstruction efforts and assess, from a C2 context, the health of our habitual long-term relationships in the AOR. These relationships are key in support of U.S. National interests and failing to prevent the rise of future threats to security in the region.

(U) The impact of the financial crisis gripping the global economy should not be underestimated. Previous estimates suggested a brief downturn followed by a return to growth. This early prediction appears increasingly invalid. The international institutions designed to manage the global economy have failed or are failing. Governments, even those who use whole-of-government approaches in an attempt to manage this crisis, may lack the tools to affect the desired outcomes. Realizing they cannot effect change on their own, nations are collaborating, integrating and synchronizing efforts in order to survive. The fact that the United States Government is currently proposing to spend $2 Trillion on this crisis greatly impacts our ability to adjust USCENTCOM Strategy in ways we think could bring increased success.

[5] Smith, Gen Sir R., 'Unity of Force', Allen Lane: Penguin Publishing, 2005, p. 386.
[6] From which we developed the following view of Knowledge Management as "a cross-disciplinary organic enterprise connecting and integrating social, cultural, communication and technical processes – including trust, obligation, commitment, and accountability – to facilitate creative learning and adaptation and leverage information capture and knowledge exchange (ICKE) by connecting communities 'who-need to-know' with those 'who-need-to-share' with those 'who-need-to-use'."

USCENTCOM Major Policy/Strategy Thrusts

(U) The USCENTCOM Theater Strategy is to promote stability within the region by capitalizing on areas of common interest among stakeholders such as security, prevention of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO), economic prosperity, personal opportunity, and the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

(U) The strategic vision is for a region where nations recognize that improved security leads to increased stability and reduces conflict. Increased cooperation between regional and international partners will help to isolate, prevent, counter, deter, or defeat state and non-state actors who use violence in pursuit of their goals. Frictions caused by religious, political and social diversity may persist, but their disruptive impacts will be mitigated through cooperation and prevention VEO activities. The resulting increased economic opportunities, of mutual benefit to all parties, will further strengthen regional ties.

(U) Based on the depth and breadth of the C2 portfolio and the nature of the existing environments, we focused our efforts on the following C2 relationships:

1) (U) Afghanistan and Pakistan sub-region and the relationships between USCENTCOM, NATO/ISAF, USEUCOM SACEUR
2) (U) Arabian Peninsula and the Levant
3) (U) Iran WMD Deter (C2 and KM Structures to best facilitate deterrence)
4) (U) Improvements to Knowledge Management process and structures

(U) A more detailed assessment of the other sub-regions should be considered[7].

Assumptions:

(U) The following assumptions were derived from the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy:

- (U) External powers' enduring regional interests will impact C2, Coordination, and Knowledge Management structures

- (U) Competing interests and values may complicate the formulation of effective cooperation with key region partners. Given that many regional governments do not embrace our principles of government, these issues can complicate our relations.

- (U) The United States must develop enduring international and coalition relationships mindful of skepticism within the region of our motives and commitment.
  - (U) The level of international support has considerable influence on the ability to achieve stability.
  - (U) Legitimacy is as much a function of reputation and perception as legal protocols.
  - (U) The risk of losing future generations to violent extremist ideologues is significant.

[7] HOA/AFRICOM; CAS/EUCOM; Russia

- (U) The United States must synchronize all elements of national power and integrate with partners in the international community.
  - (U) Military force alone cannot be decisive in maintaining security and stability; it can set limited conditions in appropriate circumstances.
  - (U) All elements of power, including those of the international community, should be planned and coordinated prior to taking military action.
  - (U) The Interagency effort must be adequately resourced and unified behind common objectives.
  - (U) Dialogue with all protagonists is essential to manage friction and identify and exploit opportunities.
  - (U) Coordinated strategic communications are essential throughout interagency efforts and among coalition partners.
  - (U) Establish a network of USG agencies, international and regional partners, and organizations to defeat a network of VEOs.

- (U) In OEF, command structures require close coordination between USCENTCOM and NATO to be deconflicted and coordinated between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- (U) While stated as the USCENTOM Theater Strategy and strategic vision, the values identified are long standing for the region and germane to the national interests of the United States, Allied, coalition partners and international organizations.

(U) Within the context of this assessment the following are also germane:

- (U) Afghanistan and Pakistan are at a turning point that requires a new focus of effort.
- (U) Success in Afghanistan and Pakistan sub-region requires not only a military solution but a whole-of-government approach.
- (U) We assume it is a given that if we disengage, Afghanistan will not succeed as a state and Pakistan may fail as a state.
- (U) A Command and Control Structure that provides unity of effort without fracturing the coalition can be established.
- (U) United States National interests require a continued strategy of engagement with regional partners.
- (U) The focus of time, money, and other national resources in the current effort to turn around the financial crisis will have a negative impact on resource flow to USCENTCOM.

Recent Developments and Historical Context

(U) With the 9/11 attacks some seven years behind us, years of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and major disaster assistance efforts like those conducted during Hurricane Katrina have created momentum to amend U.S. national security structures and practices. The Executive Branch analysis of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina led the White House to call for "increased and improved planning, coordination, and command and control, and greater unity of effort, integration, and interoperability." The Iraq Study Group also found that success in Iraq "demands Unity of Effort by

government agencies." There is a clear need within United States Government institutions to transform organizational cultures and processes to deal with current national security issues.

(U) The realization that there is a need for change is not limited to United States Government institutions. In 2004, the government of Denmark took the initiative and put forward to NATO the concept that has come to be known as the comprehensive approach. The United States joined seven other NATO nations in support of the initiative in 2006. The comprehensive approach calls for integration of all elements of national and international power: political, diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, social, commercial and military. The comprehensive approach calls for NATO to provide the military element and other national, international, and nongovernmental actors provide the civilian elements. In 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, the Council in Permanent Session was tasked to implement the action plan so the concept is moving forward, albeit at a much slower pace than had been hoped for.

(U) On October 1, 2007, U.S. Africa Command was declared at "initial operating capability" (IOC). The command has established an organizational structure integrating DOD military and civilian personnel facilitating an interagency approach to security issues in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. The command established two deputies to the command, one interagency civilian and one military. The deputy to the commander for civilian-military activities is a senior Department of State official who supervises U.S. military coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and directs command civilian-military plans, programs, outreach and strategic communications efforts. The whole-of-government approach was the template used to construct this newest U.S. Unified Command and there may be many lessons to be learned in the months and years ahead that will benefit other Unified Commands as they pursue whole-of-government solutions to issues inside their areas of operation.

(U) The Iraq Joint Strategic Assessment Team Draft Joint Campaign Plan and Final Report, Annex H, Organizational Effectiveness and Transition section (dtd 20 April 2007), pointed to lack of unity of command between U.S. Mission in Iraq and Multi-National Forces Iraq as a cause for lack of unity of effort in Iraq. The report drills down into structural overlaps and gaps in organizational structures that led to a lack of coordination and synchronization between the U.S. Mission in Iraq and Multi-National Forces Iraq. The improvements to authorities, structures, vertical and horizontal integration efforts have improved those operations and may provide some insights to developing structures in Afghanistan and other nations in the USCENTCOM AOR. Having said that, the report points out how unique the Iraq problem set is and this assessment team finds that such a comment is true of all problems. While there are no doubt universal lessons to be learned, there is not likely to be a universally applicable structural solution that will solve unity of effort problems at the strategic or lower operational/tactical level in Afghanistan.

(U) The recent developments in the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater drew our attention early in our study. NATO has staked its reputation on stabilizing Afghanistan, failure could have significant consequences not only for the people of Afghanistan but for the future of the Alliance itself[8]. Additionally, in attempting to increase international support to Afghanistan, we may have made the 'regional security' C2 Structures more complicated; making it even more difficult 'to address common interests and protect shared interests'. At the same time, the recent establishment of U.S. Forces-

[8] UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Ninth Report, 2008

Afghanistan (USFOR-A), can appear to be a positive movement toward a C2 structure that provides Unity of Command/Unity of Effort (See Figure 1). However, while this creates a dual-hatted American 4-Star, Commander ISAF and U.S. forces, it does not provide for a unified command structure in Afghanistan. The commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (CDR USFOR-A) now reports through two separate chains of command[9]'. The current structure falls short in enabling Unity of Effort between Allied and coalition military forces; other national, international agencies and NGOs.



Figure 1 - Unity of Command/Unity of Effort

<u>The Nature of the C2 / KM Environment</u>[10]

(U) The USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility is a challenging and dynamic region, including: lack of unifying authorities; overly complicated control structures; cultural issues; power dynamics; lack of trust; policy conflicts; lack of transparency and bilateral constraints. Issues were complicated enough in both Iraq and Afghanistan before our involvement. It would be nice to think that OEF and OIF brought with them a Unity of Effort and so Command. Evidence arising from both the Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan situation assessment reports suggests this has not been the case. Instead of resolving some of the long-standing pernicious C2 problems our efforts have frequently served to exacerbate these issues. Yet, there have been some examples of real success as when General Petraeus took over as Commander MNF-I. His first action was to tackle the systemic failures of C2 that bedeviled his own military commands. In so doing, he was able to create and to project the essential

[9] Afghanistan-Pakistan Team Situation Assessment Report.
[10] USCENTCOM Theater Strategy, 11 June 2008

Unity of Effort about which the other entities – Iraqi government structures, inter agencies, Allies and NGOs – might form.
(U) Unfortunately, on many occasions during assessment team travel individuals have been approached by ambassadors and senior mission leads within Allied embassies / regional governments imploring the U.S. to take a unified and comprehensive C2 position and lead in Afghanistan. In each and every instance they see the need for and seek a whole-of-government, comprehensive approach led, coordinated and wherever possible directed by the U.S.

Command and Control – Knowledge Management Situational Assessment Summary

(U) As stated earlier, we approached this assessment with a broad strategic level overview of the entire USCENTCOM AOR while including a larger view of the Area of Influence as a support effort looking at the overlaps and seams between Allied and coalition military forces; other national, international agencies and NGOs. The most significant findings of this sub-regional situational assessment with respect to C2 and KM are summarized as:

- (U) U.S. interests require increased emphasis on a whole-of-government approach supporting our strategy of engagement with regional partners.
- (U) Lack of Unity of Command and Unity of Effort hinder operational effectiveness - most clearly revealed in Afghanistan-Pakistan.
- (U) Coordination with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is complicated by C2, Coordination, and engagement platforms and competing approaches within USCENTCOM, USG and international partners.
- (U) Insufficient concepts for Communities of Interest (COI) and divergence of interest among agencies and partners lie at the core of the C2-KM problem.
- (U) C2 structures and coordination mechanisms can be established that provide Unity of Effort without fracturing the coalition.

(U) These findings lead directly to the greater realization that the USCENTCOM AOR will remain challenging. Any sound strategy will require continuous analysis, frequent assessment, and constant review of command, control coordination and knowledge management approaches to ensure it remains relevant and capitalizes on emerging opportunities.

STRATEGIC GOALS

(U) Deriving from the assessment of the current situation within the AOR and the available strategic documentation, near and mid-term strategic goals relating to Command, Control, Coordination and Knowledge Management would include:

18 Month Strategic Goals:

- (U) **U.S. Unity of Command / Unity of Effort within the AOR rationalized.** Sub goals related to this include: U.S. and Multi-national C2 enhanced and streamlined where feasible; MNF-I and USFOR-A adjusted according to evolving C2 and coordination requirements and authorities along the Combatant-to-Indigenous Civilian primacy continuum; USG Mechanisms and military C2 established to effectively support control and coordination of whole–of- government activities;

Unity of Command / Unity of Effort assessment procedures established within USCENTCOM Campaign Plan Assessment processes.

- (U) **USCENTCOM and subordinates fully employed and integrated with Interagency, coalition and partners (including partner nations);** Sub goals related to this include: Interagency and Coalition participation fully integrate; Operations and effects between U.S. Embassies and USCENTCOM forces synchronized; Key interagency Communities of Interest and actions in the AOR identified and prioritized for engagement; Need to Know – Need to Share – and Need to Use roles established among key COIs; Multinational Unity of Command and Unity of Effort within the AOR improved through effective support to NATO and JFC Brunssum; USCENTCOM Coalition Planning Group (CPG) leveraged to enhance Unity of Effort in U.S. and USCENTCOM planning efforts; Interagency Task Force – Irregular Warfare (IATF-IW) leveraged to enhance Unity of Effort in U.S. whole-of-government planning efforts.
- (U) **Contributions of coalition, partner nations and NGOs understood and leveraged within USCENTCOM plans (derived from USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP)).**
- (U) **Partner nations effectively assisted in controlling their sovereign space, reducing ungoverned areas, and eliminating terrorist safe-havens.** One sub goal related to this includes: Partners are effectively assisted in setting conditions that will enable economic development and prosperity.
- (U) **USCENTCOM KM learning mechanisms established and applied within key Regional Action Plans.** One sub goal related to this includes that: USCENTCOM KM learning mechanisms established and applied within key Regional Action Plans.

5 Year Strategic Goals:

- (U) **USCENTCOM working effectively with interagency, allies and partners in pursuit of common interests (derived from CC TCP modified).** Sub goals related to this include that: USCENTCOM will support policies of U.S. partners that are in accord with U.S. interests, including support for good governance in the AOR. USCENTCOM will assist partner nations in controlling their sovereign space, reducing ungoverned areas, and eliminating terrorist safe-havens by optimizing contributions of partner nations and NGOs.
- (U) **Concepts for C2, KM, and coordination COIs are matured and fully incorporated within USCENTCOM Theater Strategy.**

(U) Longer term goals for command, control, coordination and knowledge management have not been identified within this assessment, as these are sufficiently inferred within the more general goals associated with the theater and sub-regional strategies.

Situation Assessment Key Observations and Indicated Actions

(U) From this analysis, several observations were made with respect to Unity of Command and Unity of Effort. These have resulted in the identification of the following three discussions of Key Issues related to gaps and opportunities that may form a logical basis for development of other strategic options to mitigate or exploit the observed conditions. As a component of further analysis and planning, these will require further development into feasible, acceptable and suitable courses of action.

- (U) **<u>Key Issue 1</u>: For Afghanistan-Pakistan, *Unity of Effort* gaps and opportunities exist:**
  - (U) **Unity of Command / Military**
    - (U) USFOR-A is not currently resourced or envisaged to take on key OPCON roles
    - (U) C2 caveats from U.S. joint forces (e.g. Air and SOF) not unified within USCENTCOM's span of authority
    - (U) NATO investment in a comprehensive POL-MIL plan (CSPMP) provides useful and broadly agreed focus for military efforts
    - (U) U.S. military activities relating to Pakistan might be effectively integrated through USFOR-A
  - (U) **Unity of Effort / U.S. Whole-of-Government:**
    - (U) Strong USFOR-A and U.S. Embassy Kabul co-leadership is not apparent but needed; Synchronization with U.S. Embassy Islamabad similarly critical
    - (U) U.S. Embassy Kabul strides toward integration under Integrated CIV-MIL (ICMAG) processes show great promise. RC South CIV-Mil Planning Cell (CMPC) also demonstrates value
    - (U) Practical nesting of USG efforts within United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Integrated Approach, ISAF and NATO constructs is vital for COIN
  - (U) **Unity of Effort / International Community and Afghan Government / Pakistan Government:**
    - (U) UNAMA is taking key strides toward improved integration via Integrated Approach processes
    - (U) Participation by key partners (including USG) often falls short of needed support
  - (U) **Initial Concept to Address this Issue: Expand USG Investment in *Unity of Effort*:**
    - (U) Take tough measures to mitigate Afghan / Pakistan *Unity of Command* Gaps: Bolster U.S. Unified C2 over for all U.S. joint forces engaged for COIN and Nation-building
    - (U) Reinforce nascent trend toward improved interagency and international community integration
- (U) **<u>Key Issue 2</u>: For the Arabian Peninsula and the GCC, *Unity of Effort* gaps and opportunities exist:**
  - (U) **Unity of Effort / Military and U.S. Whole-of-Government**
    - (U) Despite USCENTCOM efforts, DOD, and Service agencies present multiple points of contact to Arabian Peninsula Partner nations
    - (U) Regional culture requires focused long term relationships

- (U) **Unity of Effort / International Community**
  - (U) Partner nations ministries, agencies, private interests have limited exchange and information sharing apart from bilateral engagement
  - (U) Work with key allies outside the nation to achieve a common multilateral understanding

- (U) **Initial Concept to Address this Issue:**
  - (U) Develop & adequately resource robust organizations within USCENTCOM to coordinate C2 interoperability that enhance defense capability with the U.S. and initially Bilateral Interoperability.
  - (U) Establish single Points-of-Contact representing CDR USCENTCOM and the U.S. Ambassador in each country.
  - (U) Encourage DOS to create conditions for the formation of COIs that enable and encourage multilateral 'transparencies' with the Gulf Cooperation Counsel.
  - (U) Align the efforts to effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between the U.S. and Member States on matters of common interests to enhance cooperation on Environment Education, Culture, Economic, and Financial affairs.
  - (U) Recommend establishment of U.S. whole-of-government approach / formal organizational structure concentrated supporting mutual trusts and U.S. National Interests.
  - (U) Encourage the development of COIs that create 'transparencies' between the nations, ministries, agencies, private interests and NGOs.
  - (U) Work with key allies outside the region to achieve a common multilateral understanding.

- (U) **Key Issue 3:** C2 and KM gaps and opportunities exist for delivering *Focus* and *Convergence* with respect to theater-wide Unity of Effort:
  - (U) **Unity of Command, Focus and Convergence:**
    - (U) Immature concepts for COIs and KM limiting means for focusing upon Unity of Effort.
  - (U) **Unity of Effort U.S. Whole-of-Government:**
    - (U) Despite 9/11 Recommendations, no Information-Knowledge Model for 'Need-to-Know; Need-to-Share and Need-to-Use (3NM) developed (see Appendix I).
    - (U) As a result of lack of COI/KM/3NM Modeling, no models developed for Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange (ICKE) and learning within/between COIs.
    - (U) Without which, information/knowledge being lost and Unity of Effort impaired.
  - (U) **Unity of Effort / International Community:**
    - (U) International cooperation often frustrated by USG Stove-Pipes and demarcation
    - (U) Similarly confused by lack of a common picture and shared understanding

- (U) Despite much good will, the participation by key partners (including USG) often falls short of needed support to enable cross-COI learning and adaptation

- (U) **Initial Concept:**
  - (U) Develop models and adopt common procedures and practices to bolster U.S. unified Command and Control for all U.S. joint forces engaged for COIN and nation-building.
  - (U) Continue to work towards developing new inclusive groupings that might create shared understanding through the exchange of knowledge and sharing of information.

Assessment of Current Policies and Activities – Afghanistan-Pakistan

'Current command relationships represent the second largest departure from the Unity of Command principle in 60 years...the largest departure having occurred during the Vietnam War'.

Colonel Ian Hope (Canadian Light Infantry)[11]

(U) Attempts at increasing international support to Afghanistan made the Command and Control Structure more complicated and, as correctly stated by Colonel Ian Hope, represents a C2 structure that violates the principle of the Unity of Command. In our desire to internationalize security efforts in Afghanistan, allowing us to increase our resource pool and international legitimacy, we gave rise to the facilitation and endorsement of a bifurcated command and control structure in Afghanistan. Multinational efforts under the UN banner provide legitimacy but can do so at the price of vastly complicating C2/Coord/planning and integration efforts. As witnessed in Afghanistan, NATO/International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) were given the security and stabilization mission and U.S. forces retained the counterterrorism mission. The lack of coherent and consistent operational schemes under the NATO/ISAF and the CJTF-76 structures created the conditions allowing VEOs to re-establish a base of operations in Afghanistan. The dysfunctional command structure created when NATO/ISAF was brought in made it more difficult to neutralize and prevent inroads made by VEOs. It is our assessment that the current NATO/ISAF/USFOR-A structure, with its lack of required authorities, resources and complicating component structures, is not likely to enable accomplishment of stated objectives in Afghanistan.

(U) As stated before, the recent establishment of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) appears to be a positive step in improving C2 structures in Afghanistan. Beyond this, there are also other positive indicators of pockets of integrated planning[12]. For example, RC(E) State's S/CRS (State Department's Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) interagency planning team was tasked to ensure USG interagency efforts were effectively synchronized towards a common purpose and provide an overarching common USG planning and assessment framework. The ICMAG brief, of 8 December 2008, identified a number of crucial C2 Structures, including: 'defining common purposes; nesting interagency provincial plans and developing processes and products to support continuity (and thereby Unity of Effort)'. The ICMAG also identified the need for significant provincial and regional changes requiring national level action, which is a critical element of a dynamic, agile C2 infrastructure. In a complementary UNAMA Integrated Approach Meeting[13], including leads from ISAF, USFOR-A and

[11] Hope, I., 'Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War', Strategic Studies Institute, US Army, Nov 08.
[12] USG Integrated Planning for RC(East), Integrated Civ-Mil Action Group (ICMAG), briefing Dec 08, 2008.
[13] 7 December 2008

CSTC-A, it was concluded that 'the main efforts' should concentrate upon 'development and security; including exit strategies for PRTs'. The approach recommended identifies a C2 structure capable of delivering: 'leadership by the government; joint planning at national, provincial and district levels; prioritization and sequencing'. While a 'New Approach' (whole-of-government, Comprehensive Approach) is called for, we 'require new means for enabling international whole-of-government, civilians and military personnel to consult with each other'. This requires establishing of policies, authorities, procedures, resources, communications equipment, facilities that facilitate habitual joint interagency/multinational/international agency planning and coordination. All of these will require new C2 structures and processes.

(U) We assess that in the Afghanistan Theater we have some of the authorities, some of the organizations and some of the resources necessary to establish effective C2. But the military commander needs additional authorities to effect Unity of Command. There are organizational overlaps, seams and gaps that will require bringing together holistically the military commander, the U.S. Ambassador, the Afghanistan Government and the leaders of Allies, coalition partners, regional neighbors and International organizations. The greatest threat to success is the C2 resource gap to put in place the structures and processes required to support accomplishment of the mission from the strategic through to the tactical. In other words, current C2 structures and processes must be adjusted so that they reflect strategy (means to ends), rather than C2 structures and processes driving the strategy.

(U) Despite the construction of border coordination centers, the reinvigoration of the Tripartite Commission and other forums for coordinating military activity, there is no senior U.S. military officer with responsibility for overseeing military activities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan[14]. Put simply, there is not a single commander with unified command authorities and resources. The current structure falls short in enabling Unity of Effort between Allied and coalition military forces, and other national, international agencies and NGOs. Furthermore, the Pakistan-Afghanistan country teams reportedly do not regularly meet to integrate plans and coordinate strategies. During assessment team travels, team members covering Afghanistan were approached with the idea of creating integrated civilian-military action groups in Pakistan to work with the teams in Afghanistan. Another proposed idea is the establishment of a senior U.S. Envoy to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose office would help support such a unifying agenda. We find buried in both ideas pieces of the puzzle needed to build a coherent, integrated comprehensive approach to both countries.

Assessment of Current Policies and Activities – Other Sub-Regions

(U) Beyond the Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region, we must acknowledge that the presence of U.S., Allied and coalition forces on the Eastern and Western flanks of Iran have led that nation to use all available means (political, diplomatic, military and economic) to negate what it feels is a U.S. led threat to its sovereignty (e.g. nuclear weapons program under the guise of nuclear power production, demonstrations of ballistic missile capability, and training and financing of VEOs). Sub-regional travel teams reported that each of the traditional USCENTCOM's regional partners on the Arabian Peninsula--Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries) and Jordan--view Iran as their number one strategic threat. This reinforces the requirement to maintain and strengthen enduring relations and bilateral security cooperation

[14] Afghanistan-Pakistan Team Situation Assessment Report.

initiatives in order to execute the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy and strategic vision, enhance security in the region, and prevent the rise of future VEOs.

Iran

(U) Command and Control and Knowledge Management focus for Iran centered on strengthening relations and bilateral security cooperation initiatives with partners on the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, other USCENTCOM AOR countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Jordan) should be brought into the framework as we press for an enhanced policy of deterrence. The bilateral nature of our relationships will complicate this effort, but a Coordination Structure comprised of whole–of-government, Allied and coalition military forces, and other national, international agencies and NGOs, could be established to synchronize efforts, applying the right levers at the right time in the right pressure in the right place. The U.S. would need to lead this effort and perform as the hub of this group of nations. The links to other nations and institutions provides and even more complicated structure that requires deeper study by this or a separate team.

Iraq

(U) The Command and Control structure in the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO) is starting a transition from a structure developed to support combat operations to a structure better suited to supporting security assistance programs. USCENTCOM and MNF-I staffs are currently developing proposals for new structures, but these proposals are tightly controlled due to the sensitive nature of elements of these proposals. The C2 & KM team was not afforded access to these proposals.

Egypt and the Levant

(U) The Egypt and Levant Team pointed out that Iran is viewed as the 'common strategic threat'. At the same time, the U.S. is very unpopular with the 'man in the street'. While the governments are willing to work with us (some more willing than others) they must pay close attention to the sentiment of their populations. The suggestion from the C2 and KM team is to continue current efforts in the Sub-Region and enhance synchronization with other U.S. Government agencies and NGOs. The one possible 'game changer' in the Sub-Region is to re-establish direct U.S. engagement with Syria.

Horn of Africa / U.S. Africa Command Seams

(U) AFRICOM has assumed command responsibilities for the Horn of Africa once carried out by USCENTCOM. There are still questions about boundaries, 'certainly at sea across the littoral,' and habitual links need to be established between USCENTCOM, USAFRICOM, USSOCOM and USEUCOM. If we wish to apply whole-of-government approach, we should establish habitual links, such as synchronization conferences, 'e.g., teleconferences with Joint, Interagency Task Forces from each of these commands'.

Central Asian States -- USEUCOM Seams

(U) USEUCOM's focus of effort in the Caspian Sea Region provides great opportunity for USCENTCOM and USEUCOM to achieve synergy and focus of effort throughout the Caucasus region

and Central Asia. USPACOM with its focus on China could also assist USCENTCOM efforts in the CAS through a synchronization of efforts. If we wish to apply whole–of-government approach, we should establish habitual links, such as synchronization conferences, 'e.g., tele-conferences with Joint Inter Agency Task Forces from each of these commands'.

Arabian Peninsula / Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

(U) A major theme emerging from the Arabian Peninsula Team highlighted the following:

A. (U) Individually, each country understandably has the same top priority: protection of the homeland. In this respect, multilateralism does not, in their view, address or meet their needs and cultural norms.

B. (U) Therefore, at this stage and for some time to come we will only be able to improve engagement through enhancing and focusing upon the existing bilateral engagement process. We should assist the GCC nations in dealing with their national interests by adopting a coherent U.S. whole–of-government approach.

C. (U) Therefore, we need to establish (functional) Points-of-Contact (POCs) to assist in developing coordinating structures for conducting the major portions of DOD, civilian (State), and commercial activities, in liaison with USCENTCOM[15].

D. (U) The GCC nations have very few decision makers. Our lack of streamlined functional POCs within their architectures is overwhelming to their decision makers, increasing decision-time and extending the decision making process for these decision makers.

E. (U) These single POCs need to be established and defined by the Combatant Commander and the U.S. Ambassador in each country. By doing so at that level and then enforcing/requiring engagement to be conducted through those POCs (aka expediting services), the products and services being offered will be in concert with the National Security objectives and Strategic guidance within the theater. Continuity is crucial[16].

Assessment of Strategic C2 Relationships

(U) This assessment was conducted by a team of four C2 subject matter experts (2 serving, current academic researchers; 2 operational C2 evaluators, instructor and designer: a sailor, airmen, soldier, and Marine). The assessment was conducted through detailed analysis of all materials made available, high-level modeling and wargaming within time-resource constraints.

(U) This section provides our assessment. During Phase I of the assessment, we decomposed and recomposed the C2 relationships within and related to the USCENTCOM AOR. A strategic-level

[15] An information capture and knowledge exchange processes must be established and instituted in conjunction with the Ambassadors in order to support CDR USCENTCOM's shared policies and goals. This may include the development of an enterprise wide information sharing system to support DOD and Whole of Government efforts. NOTE: one must be careful not to allow IT to determine the processes structures and thereby strategy. Strategy should drive any IT based solution in accordance with the processes and structures deriving from the strategy.
[16] Arabian Peninsular trip report.

Integration Model (Figure 2) utilized information from our initial analysis to identify three possible outcomes for consideration.

(U) We posit three possible outcomes:

- (U) U.S. and Western Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Political and Security influences are preserved and strengthened, across the AOR
  - (U) NATO maintains credibility – Regionally and in Afghanistan
  - (U) The U.S. and West remain in the region for the time required to accomplish the mission within an affordable and agile footprint

- (U) A shared collective understanding is achieved, specifically amongst the U.S., its Allies, and the countries and communities within the USCENTCOM AoI.
  - Focused Unity of Effort
  - Focused Unity of Command
  - Focused Unity of Action

- (U) Regional Stability
  - Afghanistan Succeeds; Pakistan does not fail; VEOs prevented from forming
    - Al Qaeda and WMDs 'Out' and prevented from reforming / emerging.
    - U.S. / West / India / China 'In'.
    - Russia and Iran 'Deterred'[17].



Figure 2

[17] The Maxim 'Out'; 'In' and 'Deterred' extends from that used by Lord Ismay (NATO's first Secretary General) for NATO to: 'keep the Russians out; the Americans in, and the Germans down'.

(U) Our thinking is that Russia and Iran will be a part of the problem, a part of the solution, or more likely parts of the problem and the solution. In the ideal world, it would benefit us for them to be more a part of the solution than the problem. Real world conditions suggest that these countries will be problems and we will need to 'deter and prevent'. Using an extension of the existing deterrence model, we might also play into a 'spectrum of preventative-deterrence' (see Appendix F) aimed at defusing existing tensions, buying time (beyond the simple application of broad-brush sanctions), and enabling both escalation and de-escalation. We have been unable to find a historical example of a properly integrated, agile and sensitive influence command and control model that could allow for this, however achieving this structure should be a goal.

(U) An assessment of the existing networks was made, from which the Integrated Causal Possibility Model (ICPM)[18] was run for various Regional Stability options[19] (see Appendix C). This model suggests the current structure displays considerable dis-functionality and thereby risk. If government and international institutions were working as we wish (providing whole-of-government solutions), one would expect to see the U.S. interests[20] better supported by the Inter-Agencies and Allies. This is, after all, the mutually supporting whole-of-government, Comprehensive Approach we all claim to seek.

(U) This assessment confirmed, as is well known, that U.S. interests are uniquely vulnerable to a number of potential event-driven-risks, notably from elements inside Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it also indicated that the brunt of U.S. defenses have been borne by DOD and key military Allies – many of whom have been 'at the point' since 9/11. Put simply, as modeled and war gamed, these organizations/institutions do not appear well supported by other departments, agencies and Allies, individually or collectively. Combined, our assessment confirmed that the incoming Commander has an opportunity to effect real change but may have limited time in which to do so.

(U) The assessment further identified that 'the few' – the key Allies, Inter-Agencies and USCENTCOM – are fast approaching exhaustion; unable to sustain at these relatively modest levels for many more months let alone years. This impacts the trusts upon which the post WWII model (the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and NATO) is based and upon which their effective command and control, focus, and convergence rests.

(U) The initial modeling we conducted revealed a number of potential dynamics. The ICPM assessment confirmed the assessment team trip reports, namely:

a. (U) The need to burden share inter-agency; inter-government and across institutions.

b. (U) The need to reform existing national institutions in order to maintain the fight. The U.S. needs to be better supported from within as well as without. From without, could there be an enhanced role for another major Western power, such as France, in the USCENTCOM AOR? Improved connections between DOS, SecDef, National Security Council (NSC), Department of Treasury (DoT), USAID, USCENTCOM, the other COCOMs are necessary. This will require

[18] This modeling was based upon developing relationships and trusts between different entities and considers possibilities; not probabilities, and flows rather than predictions.
[19] 'AQ Out' and 'Iraq and Russia Deterred'.
[20] As represented by the President of the United States (POTUS) and CINC.

rebuilding and re-engendering trusts nationally and internationally. It will also require increased resources.

c. (U) The need to reform international institutions – most notably NATO and the Bretton Wood Institutions (World Bank and IMF). This will require new partners, while the GCC countries may well prove instrumental. To date, they are reluctant to provide any additional support. Reform needs to be triaged in terms of what the U.S. and West can do, prevent and effect; what it might like to do and what it will find hardest to do. For example, changes to NATO and the Bretton Wood Institutes might be possible; whereas change to the UN may not.

(U) Based on USCENTCOM's five theater objectives (Enhance Stability; Defeat VEOs; Counter WMD; Enable Economic Development; and Build Partnership Capacity), three key recommendations emerged:

a. (U) The assessment suggests that removing AQ from the field of battle has the greatest effect. It also identifies the need to concentrate the appropriate Command and Control and whole-of-government structures and resources, initially at least, on Afghanistan.

b. (U) In terms of priorities, our assessment suggests:

1) (U) First dealing with AQ and therefore sustaining a long and light effort in Afghanistan and South West Asia.

2) (U) Dealing with AQ, first, should free up capacity in the West for institutional reform that will potentially allow for the bringing in of China, India and Iran (through the dislocation, management and ultimate removal of WMD programs).

(U) The primary command and control focused opportunity for USCENTCOM is to establish Unity of Command in the Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region, provide the commander authorities much like the Sub-Unified Commander in Korea[21].

[21] Subunified Command: In accordance with JP1 a Subordinate Unified Command also called a Subunified Command is a command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for the unified commands. Subordinate Unified Command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control assign commands and forces within the assigned operational area.



Figure 3 – Illustration of Complex Mil-Civ Relationships

(U) Figures 3 and 4 are intended to be illustrative; Figure 3 chiefly to give some indication of the complex links behind each of the organizations represented in Figure 4.



Figure 4 – Example of Unity of Command Relationships

(U) The Commander must have the authority for conducting all military missions in the Afghanistan and Pakistan area of operations, thereby achieving Unity of Command. Possible lay-downs (transparencies) are suggested in Figure 4. To the right of the diagram lie the envisaged – but not

prescribed[22] – entities that might be formed under the Ambassador to Afghanistan and Chief of Mission. The Ambassador is modeled with two deputies; the Head of Mission (HoM), undertakes many of the existing functions of a Chief of Mission; and a second Deputy as the Head, Reconstruction and Stabilization Group – Afghanistan (RSG-A). Significantly, the Ambassador and Commander, Headquarters-Combined Forces Afghanistan (H-CFA); CoM and Deputy Commander (DCOM); Deputy Commander for Operations (DCOMOPS) and Head (Hd) RSG-A provide the theater strategic focus by which convergence can be achieved. A more detailed assessment of this recommended Sub-Unified military Command and the possible adjacent Governmental and Non-Governmental Mission under the Ambassador is found in Appendix C.

(U) In order to deliver the above recommendations an integrated comprehensive Strategic Communications (StratCom) program will be required. A StratCom Community of Interest (COI)[23] (see Appendix D) coordinated directly by both the Chief of Mission and DCOMOPS, and given focus and convergence by both Commander H-CFA and the Ambassador is suggested. There may be benefit in establishing similar COIs between USCENTCOM Headquarters and all other embassies in the AOR. The importance of these type of StratCom entities and its governance in terms of the overall success of the mission cannot be underestimated.

(U) We assessed that a Combined Joint Interagency Task Force headquarters needs to be established in Pakistan in order to more effectively coordinate all aspects of Coalition engagement and cooperation with the COIN campaign in Pakistan[24]. Additionally, an Integrated Coordination Structure with DOS, USAID, Partner Nations, NGOs and private sector entities also needs to be established. This will enable the DOD, other elements of the USG, and our Allies to work in concert with international partners to achieve a more stable environment allowing political and economic growth to take place.

(U) A single military command, working in concert with an Integrated Coordination Structure, properly aligned and staffed, will deliver Unity of Effort leading to increased whole-of-government effectiveness and create efficiencies and learning models (see Appendix G) that provide the ability to sustain the effort and attain long term goals. The graphic depiction of this is found in Figures 3 and 4 above.

Arabia Peninsula Focus Area

(U) We assessed the second focus area (opportunity) is the enhancement of security cooperation activities, specifically in the Arabian Peninsula. These activities need to be viewed as critical resources in achieving the command's objectives as applied across all of USCENTCOM's identified lines of operation. Security cooperation activities set conditions for potential military operations by assuring basing and maintaining defense relationships that support U.S. interests in the AOR. They also help sustain a campaign against terrorism. In order to successfully execute activities that provide the greatest operational benefit to combating, preventing and deterring VEOs, further coalition building, preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and promotion of regional security, we need to create indigenous capability for nations to disrupt and defeat extremist networks.

---

[22] NOTE: The C2 and KM team have taken advice from State representatives as to how a future embassy might be structured and will continue to work with State representatives in the next phase to further refine and harmonize these concepts.
[23] Seen to be: 'distributed, collaborative and inclusive groupings working to discover, synthesize and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information in order to: take better decisions; implement change and create effects.'
[24] Afghanistan-Pakistan Situational Assessment Report.

(U) Our assessment is that U.S., Allied and USCENTCOM influence in this region is vital but has become significantly stressed. It has been observed especially by the Arabian Peninsula Sub-Regional Team that the Arabian Peninsular countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Jordan), are overwhelmed and confused with the ever increasing number of interlocutors, agents, and agencies asking for time in support of their unique programs.

(U) Specifically, amongst the GCC and Jordan, there needs to be a focus on leveraging existing bilateral agreements and arrangements. We assess that emphasis on strengthening these bilateral agreements and the introduction of COIs, as part of the USCENTCOM TCP, can evolve the conditions necessary for multilateral cooperation and coordination. This will not be a short term (less than five year endeavor). Figure 5 represents a notional approach where bilateral activities are developed and strengthened and establishes the environment whereby multilateral C2-KM environments are established.



Figure 5 – Notional Approach

(U) Strengthening partner relationships requires long-term U.S. commitment to create focus and convergence on: Foreign Military Financing/Foreign Military Sales (FMF/FMS); Combined/ Multinational Exercises; Defense and Military Contacts; Deterrence and Prevention and Humanitarian Assistance Programs. It must be noted that there are those in the USG and DOD who believe that we must change our engagement strategy into a multilateral approach in the region (ala NATO). At best, it is assessed that this will be a **generational-process**. The GCC is a weak forum for cooperation. GCC nations maintain adversarial relations which will preclude progress on a multilateral front, inject suspicion as to our motives, hinder the strengthening of bilateral programs and may even drive these partners to enhance their bilateral interactions with Iran, Russian and Chinese vendors. Therefore, if we truly want effective engagement in this region, our engagement must operate within this paradigm

and the regional norms, processes and culture that exist today: the culture requires bilateral engagement. While multilateral engagement and processes must be accounted for, we assess that a 10 – 15 year strategy must be adopted if we are to obtain and cultivate multilateral coordination framework consensus with the GCC nations.

Possible Shifts in Course: Establishment of a Sub-Unified like Command

(U) The Focus and Convergence, Command and Control Entity Relationship Model at Figure 3 was configured specifically with interoperability and integration as well as U.S. Forces joint doctrine in mind. The concept of a Sub-Unified like Command[25] at the Theater level can only be delivered by the U.S. Essentially, the Commander of CFA – a 4 Star General – is being given authorities similar to those afforded to Combined Forces Command – Korea, see Figure 4.

(U) We judge that Unity of Command and thereby Effort will be highly difficult to achieve in Afghanistan through NATO. Even if we did create Unity of Command through NATO this would not deliver Unity of Effort throughout USCENTCOM's AOR. If we do not create conditions for NATO to succeed we may not prevail in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Afghanistan will not succeed as a state; VEOs may gain sanctuary; and Pakistan may also fail as a state. The proposal therefore is that the relationship model developed at Figure 4 can be established by the U.S.. At the same time, it is suggested that the assumption is made that NATO and coalition allies will be included unless they desire to opt out[26]. It is our assessment that to achieve this Unity of Command and Effort, the U.S. must accept national caveats and move on wherever possible to other permissible options. Some of these may not be feasible or permissible within a formal Sub-Unified Command. As such, we suggest a Sub-Unified "like" Command, where the commander has the authority required to "successfully" complete his mission.

Assessment of Possible Military Command and Control Structures

(U) To go into greater detail on civilian arrangements would a) presume too much and b) potentially prescribe means and methods that may not be needed or are ineffective. A Military Command Relationship Model at Figure 6 is shown below that includes possible military ranks and equivalent civilian grades.

(U) The military organization aims to:

a. (U) Create conditions 'for the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission'.

b. (U) Create military conditions that achieve Unity of Command and increase the chance to succeed in accordance with standing national and international (UN) mandates and in support of

[25] As noted: Subunified Command, in accordance with JP1 a Subordinate Unified Command also called a Subunified Command is a command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for the unified commands.

[26] Of note, both Canada and Netherlands are not mandated currently to stay in Afghanistan beyond 2010. For nations seeking not to opt out, the following national lay-down – based upon integrating existing command responsibilities and as considered for civilian Communities of Interest – is suggested (see Appendix C).

the civilian authorities and the U.S. Ambassador from which conditions for Unity of Effort and Action might emerge.

c. (U) Create conditions that will enable other Allies and entities, including the Afghan Central and Regional Governments and their representatives, to interoperate and, as circumstances permit, to integrate across the civilian-military and political-diplomatic-economic seams.

d. (U) Provide supporting and secure environments in which different entities and COIs can meet, plan and execute selected courses of action.

e. (U) Provide a hub for the focus of thinking and convergence of ideas from which effective planning and decision taking may emerge.

f. (U) Provide conditions enabling the transition of military responsibilities to Afghan / civilian authorities and international organizations as circumstances permit.

(U) By applying the existing structures and model as far as possible and practicable the intention has been to encourage opportunities for interoperability; enable existing relationships to be maintained wherever permissible; and open opportunities for new ones to form. With this in mind, the following national lay down – matched wherever possible to Command and Control structures in Afghanistan as of Nov 08 – are suggested:



Figure 6 – Notional C2 Structure

(U) The above example intends to be inclusive by creating senior command responsibilities for key Allies based on current participation:

a. (U) The creation of two Deputy Commander positions: a DCOM under the French and DCOMOPS under the UK – as was the case in IFOR and SFOR between 1996-98.

b. (U) Creating shared civilian-military entities – including:

1) Strategic Communications;
2) Transparency and Finance;
3) International Security Cooperation;
4) A combined DCoord and DCOS position on Stability;
5) A combined DCoord and DCOS position on counternarcotics;
6) A combined DCoord and DCOS position on Medical-Diplomacy;
7) Counter Finance.

Initial Assessment of Possible Courses of Action

(U) The three COAs presented have been developed under the assumption that they will be operable under existing or future UN Mandates and U.S. Initiating Directives:

COA 1: (U) Provide the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan the authorities and resources creating Unity of Command of Command in the Afghanistan Theater. As a minimum, establish Air, Maritime, Land and Special Operations Components in order to plan and execute USFOR-A directed missions. Develop military-civilian COI providing whole-of-government approach that includes Afghanistan and national, international agencies and NGOs, allied and coalition military forces.

COA 2: (U) Establish a military Unified Command structure under NATO and an adjacent civilian-diplomatic Integrating Coordinating Structure including whole-of-government approach with national, international agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with Allied and coalition military forces; whereby USCENTCOM cedes authority in Afghanistan-Pakistan to NATO, specifically Secretary General and SACEUR.

COA 3: (U) Establish a Sub-Unified Command under USCENTCOM (with responsibility for Afghanistan and Pakistan) with Allied and coalition military forces fully integrated into Combined Forces Headquarters and operational component[27] structures; create an adjacent Integrating and Coordinating Structure, including whole-of-government approach with national, international agencies and NGOs.

(U) Taking each of the above proposals in turn it is our assessment that:

COA 1:

- (U) Advantages:
  - This represents a continuation of current C2 initiatives being taken forward for implementation by COM ISAF.
  - It maintains USFOR-A 4-Star in the Afghanistan Theater (currently dual hated as COMISAF) and if additional authorities are granted to USFOR-A commander, it can provide component commanders and their staff to conduct integrated planning and execution of U.S. assigned missions under command authority of CDR USFOR-A.
  - It is the least disruptive and most realizable C2 structure in the short term and at a minimum maintains the current Unity of Effort across the Afghanistan AOR.

- (U) Disadvantages:
  - This COA exclusively addresses Unity of Command for U.S. military operations, only. While it is an important move forward for USFOR-A, it may fall short of providing seamless military integration, after all we will still have two separate military structures in Afghanistan.
  - If you still have to work hard to create unity of effort among the military entities, it may prove difficult to establish the platform we desire for building long term COI with Afghanistan and national, international agencies and NGOs.
  - It does not directly address the inclusion of other COI within existing Command Structures, USFOR-A with USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM to name but a few.

[27] To include: Air, Maritime, Land and SOF.

- It is essentially a model based upon the goal of reinforcing existing seams between military, diplomatic, economic, development and political entities; it does not move aggressively towards greater interoperability and integration.
- This COA is likely to face pushback from some USCENTCOM components and USSOCOM

COA 2:

- (U) Advantages:
  - It addresses both Unity of Command and Unity of Effort at the Grand Strategic Level for military and civilian-diplomatic structures.
  - It creates a single military commander and single military staff to support planning and execution in the Afghanistan.
  - It should prove easier to develop COI with Afghanistan and national, international agencies and NGOs, when there is a single military entity commanding and controlling all military operations in Afghanistan.

- (U) Disadvantages:
  - NATO has a theater specific political mandate; constrained to the borders of Afghanistan and without a mandate to look beyond.
  - This is not in line with current U.S. prosecution of the CT effort outside the borders of Afghanistan.
  - NATO, while a valuable military alliance, has not in general proved to be as agile a learning organization as the U.S. military, which can be very problematic when conducting COIN operations.
  - NATO may also have a slower decision cycle
  - This COA takes this current responsibility for Afghanistan from the Commander USCENTCOM
  - After departure of current Commander ISAF (U.S.), the U.S. may not have command of the NATO force in Afghanistan.

COA 3:

- (U) Advantages:
  - A hybrid of COA 1, this provides a single Coalition Commander with U.S. and ISAF staff combined into a single organization focused on accomplishing missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan
  - Achieves Unity of Command and greatest potential to achieve Unity of Effort
  - Streamlines military actions (planning and execution) and establishes platform to build COI with Afghanistan and national, international agencies and NGOs, and other military organizations (USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM to name but a few).

- (U) Disadvantages:
  - Will require NATO approval for extending the theater of operations beyond Afghanistan.
  - Will require expenditure of untold amounts of political capital

- May decrease perceived legitimacy of operations, therefore requiring a comprehensive international strategic communications initiative

Other Considerations

(U) Proposed Military Command and Control – Countering, Preventing and Deterring

(U) During the course of our assessment the issue of counterproliferation and countering weapons of mass destruction was examined. The two subjects are highly connected but also distinct. Within the USCENTCOM AOR, Pakistan is in declared breach of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and known to possess nuclear weapons. Iran is an aspirant nuclear weapons power and another Israel, outside the AOR but known to possess nuclear weapons, feels threatened by Iran's advancing weaponization program. USCENTCOM therefore finds itself at the center of these three related and interconnecting programs and so in need of having the commands, people and policies in place for effective consequence management when and should the situation arise.

(U) Additionally, deterrence and prevention has been identified as a USCENTCOM driver, one that can enable a sustained long and light effort in Afghanistan and South West Asia. Whilst it is important that nuclear deterrence and prevention policies are kept separate there are clearly overlaps. As part of our assessment, see Appendix F, it was identified that 'Prevention and Deterrence' need to be seen in terms of a Network; possessing their own indigenous Capacity to maintain and sustain over time'. As USCENTCOM has observed, one needs a network to counter, prevent or deter another network. Our assessment is that effective prevention and so deterrence is therefore seen to rest upon the judicious exercises of soft and hard powers simultaneously to create the desired effects. In order to effectively prevent and deter, effective command and control is fundamental to achieving one's aims.

(U) Improvements to Command and Control structures for USCENTCOM and the Afghan Theater of Operations have much wider implications. The efficacy and agility of a unified command structure will in the long term contribute significantly to: preventing VEOs from forming; and deterring and preventing VEOs and aspirant nuclear weapons' nations from acquiring WMD. Our recommendation is therefore two fold:

a. (U) That establishing effective Unity of Command, via the granting of additional authorities to Commander USFOR-A, creation of a Sub-Unified "like" Command, under USCENTCOM, or a establish a unified headquarters (Headquarters-Combined Forces Afghanistan) under NATO. The exercise of effective command and control throughout the theater will, in itself, greatly assist to create the conditions necessary to prevail in Afghanistan, and 'prevent and deter' VEOs from forming.
b. (U) In recognition of USCENTCOM's longstanding commitment to and highly developed thinking on countering weapons of mass destruction, a USCENTCOM theater wide COI is established and staffed at the two star level with responsibility for:
    1) 'Deterring and preventing' nations and VEOs from acquiring WMD, and;
    2) For developing theater-wide diplomatic, civilian-political-military WMD management policies, and;
c. (U) For consequence management – including the removal and making safe of WMDs located, apprehended or provided to the U.S. or its Allies.

Additional Considerations

(U) The following issues may warrant additional consideration:

a. (U) Internal C2 (Corps versus Division Regional Commands)
b. (U) Special Envoy for Afghanistan-Pakistan
c. (U) Unified Command Plan Changes (e.g. Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China)
d. (U) MNF-I Transitional C2 Structures

Tabs

Tab A: C2 and Knowledge Management Principles
Tab B: Integrated Causal Assessment Modelling
Tab C: Sub-Unified Command Structure
Tab D: Communities of Interest
Tab E: NATO-USCENTCOM Modeling
Tab F: Deterrence and Prevention
Tab G: Learning and Adapting
Tab H: Three Needs Model for Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange

Tab A: C2 and Knowledge Management Principles to Appendix 5 to Annex I

(U) It should be stated at the outset that there is no agreed definition for Knowledge Management (KM). The US Army[28] comes closest to providing a useful and working approach to 'Knowledge Management Principles that transcend technology advancements, mission, policy or organizational changes'. Therefore from the work identified and quoted below and for the purpose of this assessment – the following view of KM is suggested as:

> A cross-disciplinary organic enterprise connecting and integrating social, cultural, communication and technical processes – including trust, obligation, commitment, and accountability – to facilitate creative learning and adaptation and leverage information capture and knowledge exchange (ICKE) by connecting communities 'who-need to-know' with those 'who-need-to-share' with those 'who-need-to-use'.

(U) It should be noted that these knowledge management principles, 'organized around the main tenets of knowledge management: people / culture, process, and technology working to facilitate knowledge sharing', quite naturally show considerable compatibility and symbiosis with the view developed for Communities of Interest as:

> Distributed, collaborative and inclusive groupings working to discover, synthesize and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information in order to: take better decisions; implement change and create effects.

(U) US Army principles 'embrace an enterprise focus' that, itself, provides a network physical focus that '*connects those who know with those who need to know' by 'leveraging knowledge transfers from one-to-many across the Global Army Enterprise*'. These '*principles are organized around the main tenets of knowledge management: people / culture, process, and technology working to facilitate knowledge sharing*'. This corresponds to the model suggested as a basis for sharing and integrating information (and intelligence) as part of this assessment and called the Three Needs Model (3NM): 'Need-to-Know; Need-to-Share and Need-to-Use'. The Army identifies Knowledge Management to be:

- (U) *A discipline that promotes an integrated approach to identifying, retrieving, evaluating, and sharing an enterprise's* tacit and explicit *knowledge* assets to meet mission objectives. The objective of the principles is to *connect those who know with those who need-to-know by leveraging knowledge* transfers from one-to-many across the Global Army Enterprise.

(U) <u>The Army describes the KM end state to be</u>:

- (U) *The creation of a culture of collaboration and knowledge sharing* in the Army where key information and knowledge is 'pushed and pulled' within the global enterprise to meet mission objectives – an Army where good ideas are valued regardless of the source, knowledge sharing is recognized and rewarded and the knowledge base is accessible without technological or structural barriers.

28

(U) Two overriding principles have been used to inform our assessment of Knowledge Management:

1. (U) That according to Bunge[29], '…cognition is personal, but knowledge is social'.

2. (U) That according to Szilard[30]: 'information is costly to acquire and use'.

(U) Placing these two maxims together, one can argue that:

- (U) *Knowledge is social* and, like information, is costly to acquire and use.

(U) This overriding principle has frequently been overlooked by managers seeking quick-win technical solutions very often at the expense of people and culture within which knowledge actually resides. As commented by Erickson and Kellogg[31]:

- (U) *Knowledge management* is not just an information problem, but *is, as well, a social problem that involves people, relationships, and social factors like trust, obligation, commitment, and accountability*. This view raises a considerable challenge for those interested in designing systems to support knowledge management.

(U) <u>In broad terms Rocha and Bollen[32], describe Knowledge Management to be</u>:

- (U) *A means to recognize users; characterize information resources; exchange knowledge* between users and information resources and a conversation process.

They note:

1. (U) As information resources become more and more complex, we cannot expect a simple one-way-query to work well. Instead, we need a means to combine the interests of the user with the knowledge specific to each information resource.

2. (U) *We also want [Information Systems] to adapt to their community of users* (COU – linking potentially to our concepts for a COI), *as well as to exchange and re-combine knowledge leading to evolvability and creativity*.

<u>Coates[33] takes a more direct line on Knowledge Management</u>:

- (U) *Knowledge management is concerned with communication within an organizational system*, i.e., everything that is connected with the business. There is no problem if you already

[29] Bunge, M.A., "Ten Modes of Individualism – None of Which Works - And Their Alternatives". *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 2000. **30**(3): p. 384-406.
[30] Szilard, L., "On the Increase of Entropy in a Thermodynamic System by the intervention of Intelligent Beings – the Critique", (Rapoport A. and M. Knoller trans.). Behavioral Science (1964(1929)), 9:302-2310.
[31] Erickson, T and W. A. Kellogg, 'Knowledge Communities: Online Environments for Supporting Knowledge Management and its Social Context', IBM. T.J. Watson Research Center, 2001.
[32] Rocha, L.M., and J. Bollen., ' Biologically Motivated Distributed Designs for Adaptive Knowledge Management'. In: Cohen I. and L. Segel (Eds.) .*Design Principles for the Immune System and Other Distributed Autonomous Systems*. Santa Fe Institute Series in the Sciences of Complexity. Oxford University Press, 2000. In Press.
[33]Coates, J.F., 'Person-to-Person Enterprise', 0895-6308/01/$5.00 © 2001 Industrial Research Institute, Inc.

communicate; it's the people you don't normally communicate with who are the focus of knowledge management.

Hazewinkel[34] writes:

- (U) What is far less known is how expensive this (totally insufficient) [knowledge] business is. In spite of today's horrible prices for scientific books it is still true that attaching metadata to it (in salary of personnel and other expenses (overhead) is more than the price of the book.

McOwat and Holland-Smith[35] comment:

- (U) Knowledge Management: the forms of management appropriate to organizations that:
  - *create knowledge* through the learning of their staff,
  - seek economic benefit by exploiting knowledge, directly or indirectly

- (U) Knowledge Services exists… *to facilitate learning.*
  - To deliver this, Knowledge Services need:
    - a *business model* that explicitly recognizes value added, learning as a core competence.
    - to train the staff, and help them to develop the model through technical assessment.
    - To develop products, services, delivery, organization.

And McOwat[36] also writes separately:

- (U) Enterprise Model:
  - *A layered set of related activities that co-evolve over time*, stimulated by changes in the environment *including creation / discovery / invention*: evolution of knowledge stimulated by interaction with "world knowledge".

On Knowledge discovery and innovation, Kostoff[37] writes:

- (U) To overcome cross-discipline transmission barriers, and thereby enhance innovation, systematic methods are required to heighten awareness of experts in one discipline to advances in other disciplines. *Most desirable are methods that incorporate / require cross-disciplinary access as an organic component*.

[34] Hazewinkel, M., 'Mathematical knowledge management is needed', Keynote speech at the November 2003 MKM meeting in Edinburgh, original version: 12 February 2004.
[35] McOwat, D.M, D.J. Holland Smith, 'A business model for Knowledge Services?', Presentation toUK MOD Dstl Knowledge Services Management Team,23 Oct, 2003.
[36] McOwat, D.M.,''Enterprise Modelling', presentation to UK MOD DERA, July 2000.
[37] Kostoff, N,ONR. 'Stimulating Innovation', Submitted by Invitation to: INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, ~ 2000.

TAB B: INTEGRATED CAUSAL ASSESSMENT MODELING TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX I

(U) This model applies Graphical Modelling System (GMS) and the integrated causal possibility modeling to undertake situational assessment modeling of the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) as it relates and interacts internationally. Having set out and developed the models some conclusions and recommendations are drawn of potential relevance to USCENTCOM, the United States and its Allies.

Integrating Model

(U) The USCENTCOM AOR view was first developed during Phase I using GMS:



Figure 1: USCENTCOM AOR VIEW

(U) The most significant inputs were extracted from Figure 1, from which an Integration Model was derived, Figure 2. The model derived above is based upon the Integrated Causal Model and System Identification – using inputs and desired outcomes to assess what might be required within the integration model. Essentially this is a process of first understanding the composition; then decomposing the model and finally recomposing it in terms of delivering the desired outcomes using the Integrated-Causal-Possibility Model[38] (ICPM)[39]. As presented at the end of Phase I, three outcomes (and sub-outcomes) were suggested:

[38] Keller, R., N. Carrigan, S.R. Atkinson, P. Johnson and P.J. Clarkson, ' Collaboration and Information Sharing in NEC Networks' NECTISE Paper Presented at NECTISE Conference, October 2008.
[39] Atkinson, S.R., N. Carrigan, R. Keller, A. Maier, P. Johnson, P.J. Clarkson, 'Trusts, Collaboration and Being Within Enabled Networks' Draft Nov 2008, to be presented at Complex 09, Fenruary 2009.

- (U) U.S. and Western Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Political, and Security, Economic Influences are Preserved and Strengthened, across the AOR.
  - NATO maintains credibility – Regionally and in Afghanistan
  - The United States and West are able to remain in the region for the time required to accomplish the mission within an affordable and agile footprint.

- (U) A shared collective understanding is achieved, specifically amongst the United States and its Allies and those countries and communities within the USCENTCOM Area of Influence (AoI)

  - Focused Unity of Effort (Efficient and Effective).
  - Focused Unity of Command.
  - Focused Unity of Action.

- (U) Regional Stability.
  - Afghanistan Succeeds; Pakistan does not fail; VEOs prevented from forming.
    - AQ and WMDs 'Out' and prevented from reforming/emerging.
    - U.S. / West / India / China 'In'.
    - Russia and Iran 'Deterred'.



Figure 2: USCENTCOM Integration Model

(U) The Maxim 'Out'; 'In' and 'Deterred' extends from that used by Lord Ismay (NATO's first Secretary General) for NATO to: 'keep the Russians out; the Americans in, and the Germans down'. It is no longer possible – given the interaction and connectivity of the modern world – to simply contain or keep Russia and Iran down. Clearly both countries are part of the solution and, ideally, they would

be working with us. If that is possible then we would wish to deter them from doing things not in our interests. This is an extension of the existing nuclear deterrence model but might also play into a 'spectrum of deterrence' aimed at defusing existing tensions; buying time (beyond the simple application of broad-brush sanctions) and enabling both escalation and de-escalation. A properly integrated, agile and sensitive influence command and control model should allow for this.

(U) This ICPM assessment was run in terms of what the AOR might look like if AQ was out of the equation and Iran and Russia deterred; not what 'we' could do to influence and determine outcomes. The integrating nature of the global world immediately became apparent. It is simply not possible to address Security and Military (S / M) matters in isolation to Political and Diplomatic (P / D) and Economic and Financial (E / F). Three pre-curser stages were therefore recommended to the Integration Model: a New Economic and Financial Model (NEFM); a New Security and Military Model (NSFM) and a New Political and Diplomatic Model (NPDM). Noting the recent and ongoing financial crisis, arguably the NEFM review – with the consideration of a Bretton Woods II – has already begun. Similarly, a New NATO Model (NNM) is work in progress. The Three Needs Model (3NM) and the Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange model – representing an extension of the 'I' in DIME – were introduced during CAT Phase I and are addressed at Appendix I will be the subject of a separate paper.

ICPM Assessments

(U) The ICP Model was developed first in GMS in order to identify more clearly clustering opportunities and linkages. Based upon Figures 1 and 2, details were entered into the CPM model in terms of developed Type A (high likelihood; high impact – control) and Type C (high likelihood; low impact – informal) network-models. In broad terms, details for each node and link were entered as shown above – based upon shared trusts and the perceived likelihood and effect (impact) of information flowing through the model. This extends from the premise that 'knowledge is social' and therefore the interaction of the different actors exchanging information should, if working effectively, lead to knowledge generation and then exchange and so capture. Both the network constructs and treating information, trusts and knowledge in this way are part of a promising, albeit emerging, research program.

Dynamic social Assessment
Actor
Information link
Likelihood of information propagation
Trust in information received
Organization hierarchy
Information Effect
Information propagation

Table 1: Change Assessment considering Dynamic Change

(U) The integration model identified hierarchies, actors and links for which assessments were made in= terms of their closeness and perceived impacts upon other nodes from which it was possible to model trusts within the organization and how they might affect outcomes and information propagation.

As Now

(U) An assessment of the existing networks was made, from which the following possibility-network-model was generated:



Figure 3: Possibility-Network-Model, 'As Now'

(U) The above model suggests considerable dis-functionality and thereby risk. If government and international institutions were working, one would expect to see The President (representing U.S. interests) supported by the Inter Agencies and Allies. As it is, the United States is seen to have open flanks with AQ, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Russia – even noting the coupling between U.S. whole-of-government and USCENTCOM and, notably, France.

(U) Figure 4 indicates that one of the most agile and effective nodes – able to absorb and multiply; change and vary; occupying the pivotal centre ground – is AQ. To the top right (under ROK) on both plots is a cluster of nodes capable of effecting change but not necessarily easily modified or adaptable, including the Central Asian States (CAS), Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, KSA, the GCC, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Japan and ROK. The West – including Russia and China and the major USG and international institutions appear to be fixed (bottom left under IND (India)); unable either to effect change or vary and modify. The worst of all positions. Table 2 below assess the 'As Now' network in terms of clusters; broken down into Direct Links; Likelihood; Impact and Risk. The Type A Cluster shows the strongest clustering and the countries and institutions shown are similarly sub ordered in terms of their strength-of-clustering.



Figure 4: In-Out Effectiveness (left) and Variation (right) Profiles

(U) Table 2 bears out Figures 3 and 4. Unites States interests are uniquely vulnerable to a number of potential event-driven-risks / shocks, notably from combinations of Iraq, Pakistan, the KSA and AQ. United States defenses are based upon a few agencies, COCOMS and Allies all of whom have been at the point of the various wars fought since 9/11.

Assessment / Cluster	Direct Link	Direct Likelihood	Direct Impact	Direct Risk
A	Germany, Poland, France, AQ, Turkey, NL, **CAN**, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen	UN, Lebanon, **POTUS**, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Russia, **USEUCOM**, Israel	**DOS**, Pakistan, **UK**, **POTUS**, **SecDef, USCENTCOM**, Iraq, KSA, AQ	Iraq, **SecDef, POTUS, USCENTCOM, UK**, Pakistan, KSA, AQ
B	Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, GCC, KSA, Iran, SCO, China	Germany, EU, France, Poland, **CAN**, NL, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen	Egypt, **OSD, JCS, NSC, DIN**, Syria, Israel, Lebanon	China, **Australia, USPACOM**, Japan, ROK
C	Russia, AFG, Pakistan, India, **UK**, EU, CAS, UN, BWI, **DoT**, **USAID,** OSCE	**DOS**, Iraq, **SecDef**, DIN, AFG, **USCENTCOM, UK**, Pakistan, KSA, AQ	Jordan, **DoT**, GCC	**USAID**, India, SCO, CAS, Afghanistan, OSCE
D	**USEUCOM, USPACOM, USCENTCOM, DIN, DOS, OSD, NSC, JCS, POTUS, SecDef**	**Australia**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK, China, GCC, **DoT**, BWI	Poland, UN, France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, **USEUCOM,** NATO, **SACEUR,** SecGen	Poland, France, EU, Germany, Russia, Turkey, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen
E	ROK, Japan, **Australia**, Iraq	India, SCO, CAS, OSCE	India, EU, BWI, AFG, Iran, CAS, SCO, China, OSCE	**DIN, NSC, DOS**, UN, Lebanon, Iran, Syria,
F		Jordan, Egypt	NL, **USAID**, **CAN**, **Australia**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK	Jordan and Egypt
G		**NSC, JCS, OSD,**		**OSD, USEUCOM**,

		USAID		Israel
H				GCC, **DoT**, BWI, **JCS**, **CAN**, NL

Table 2: Possibility-Network-Model Assessment 'As Now'

(U) You will note a set of clusters (Direct Link column) identifying different network within the whole. The strongest clusters are ordered based on the strength of the cluster with Cluster-A stronger then Cluster-B and then in order of the strongest clustering entity (e.g. Germany in Figure 2).

(U) From Figure 2, specific states and agencies do not appear well supported, individually or collectively – particularly when it is considered that the UK, United States, SecDef and USCENTCOM (along with DOS) are the most likely to be impacted by any shocks occurring in / from Pakistan, Iraq, KSA and AQ. The United States also finds itself, with USEUCOM – and the UN – to have a high likelihood of having to deal directly with Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Russia and Israel. This could be overwhelming in the first essential four months. Significantly this Table also indicates strong existing connections between France and Germany. The Direct Links show the United States well supported by its interagencies but not necessarily by Allies and International Institutions. The problem is that many of these agencies – and Allies and supporting international institutions – are wrongly placed to be in the fight alongside the Unites States. In effect, the trusts that held the Post World War II institutions and grand bargain together – the UN, the Bretton Woods Institutions and NATO – appear not to be performing. And without trust there is little or no room for maneuver or agility; the West and its institutions appear fixed.

Less AQ

(U) The adapted 'Ismay maxim': 'Out; In and Deterred' was applied to AQ in order to consider what the world might look like if this pernicious organization was 'removed' or nullified. By working trans-nationally and trans-culturally – originally based upon a business model – AQ initially proved adept at both spreading and cloning itself. In so doing it exposed the inability of existing state structures and international / national institutions to respond to it with both discretion and agility, as shown in the 'As Now' model, Figure 3. The removal of AQ therefore had a significant effect in freeing up the model and restoring some of its agility. Figure 5 shows U.S. interests better protected and coupled than they were in Figure 3, albeit still exposed in part to shocks from Israel, Iran, the financial system – as represented by the Bretton Wood Institutions (BWI) – Russia, Afghanistan and, to an extent, Iraq. Significantly, it may be possible to bring the UN more effectively into play with the removal of AQ, as shown by its coupling with Iraq.



Figure 5: Possibility-Network-Model, 'AQ Out'

(U) More significantly, perhaps, it was possible to generate a Trusts-Likelihood figure that it was not possible to generate for the 'As Now' model because there were too few trusts and minimal likelihood for effective action – the results were 'off the plot'.

Figure 6: Trust (y) versus Likelihood (x) Plot for 'AQ Out'

(U) In Figure 6, the United States (under ROK) along with the Joint Chiefs, NSC, OSD, DOS, DIN, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, SACEUR, NATO, the UN, BWI and key Allies – including also Russia and Iran – occupies a position of high likelihood with some trust. In other words they have some room for maneuver – agility – that was not present previously. The top left position – under Jordan and including SecDef, USAID, (NATO) SecGen, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan – shows high trust but little likelihood for being able to take effective action. The middle left position – under Japan

and including DoT, USEUCOM and Canada – is also largely fixed, with some trust but no likelihood for action. The final position, bottom right – under India and including France and China – has a high likelihood for taking action but are not necessarily well connected and so trusted to do so.

(U) Removal or nullification of AQ from the equation has a significant impact, see Figure 7. It places the Unites States, SecDef, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), NSC, OSD, DOS, DIN, DoT, USAID, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USEUCOM, SACEUR, NATO, UN, BWI, EU,SCO, UK, AUS, CAN, NL, France, Poland, Germany, Russia, China, Iran and India in the more central position (left under IND) – better able to effect change. To the top right (under ROK) is a cluster of nodes capable of effecting change, including the CAS, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, KSA, the GCC, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Japan and ROK. Israel, meanwhile, finds itself 'remoted' and fixed (top left); at the point of the spear but unable to adapt. In terms of adaptation, all nodes with the exception of the Unites States (right, top right) find themselves fixed, bottom left; only the Unites States (top right) appears freer to adapt and lead international change.



Figure 7: In-Out Effectiveness (left) and Variation (right) Profiles

(U) A cluster examination of the network is shown at Table 2. The United States continues to remain directly vulnerable to shock, specifically from China, GCC, Iran, KSA, Economic and Financial (BWI) and Pakistan, joined by USCENTCOM. The UK is less at risk except from Russia but may be better able to deal with Russia along with Poland, Turkey, NATO, SACEUR and SecGen. Two important clusters emerge – the threat from Afghanistan is much reduced and potentially contained by India, SCO and the CAS. At the same time, Syria and Iraq have become more the concern of OSD, DIN, SecDef and the NSC. Interestingly and understandably, the risk to Israel may actually be increased with the removal of AQ, rather than reduced; probably reflecting the opportunity the removal of AQ might allow to create change opportunities in the region. In terms of direct impact, the EU, BWI, Poland, Canada, NL, UK, UN, Sec Gen and NATO potentially become more effective players; whereas the United States (NSC, SACEUR, DOS, USAID, SecDef and USCENTCOM) may find themselves better able to deal with Iraq. The likelihood of interaction with the United States remains the same, notably from Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Russia and Israel; supported by USEUCOM. At the same time, the UK, DOS, NSC, DIN, SecDef and USCENTCOM might find themselves better able to take action in Afghanistan and Iraq, whilst influencing the KSA. With regard to direct links, Germany, Poland, France, Turkey, NL, Canada, NATO, SACEUR and SecGen are linked directly with

Russia and so, potentially, better able to deal with any issues arising. The linkage between the SCO and China with the Middle East increases, with potential ramifications for the MEPP, Lebanon and Iran in addition to increasing Sino influence over the KSA and the GCC. The United States remains directly connected as previously with the remaining COCOMs, the Joint Chiefs, DIN, NSC, DIN and SecDef. Given the changing pattern of risks and opportunities – with regard to the UN and BWI – this might not be ideal.

Assessment / Cluster	Direct Link	Direct Likelihood	Direct Impact	Direct Risk
A	Russia, Germany, Poland, France, Turkey, NL, **CAN**, NATO, **SACEUR**, **SecGen**	Lebanon, **POTUS**, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Russia, **EUCOM**, Israel	BWI, EU, Poland, **CAN**, NL, **UK**, UN, SecGen, NATO	China, GCC, **USCENTCOM**, Iran, **POTUS**, KSA, BWI, Pakistan
B	Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, GCC, KSA, Iran, SCO, China	**UK**, **DOS**, AFG, KSA, **NSC, DIN**, **SecDef, USCENTCOM,** Iraq	AFG, Pakistan, CAS, Turkey, Germany, Iran, China, SCO	**OSD**, Syria, Iraq, **DIN, SecDef, NSC**
C	**USEUCOM, USPACOM, USCENTCOM, DIN, NSC, JCS, POTUS, SecDef**	Poland, EU, Germany, France, UN, **CAN**, NL, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen	**SACEUR**, **OSD**, **NSC, DOS, USAID, POTUS**, Iraq, **SecDef, USCENTCOM**	**USEUCOM**, Israel
D	AFG, Pakistan, India, **UK**, EU, CAS, UN, BWI, **DoT, USAID**	SCO, CAS, Pakistan, China, GCC, **DoT**, BWI	Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, France, KSA, GCC	Jordan, Egypt
E	ROK, Japan**, AUS**, Iraq	India, **Australia**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK	India, **AUS**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK	Lebanon, Germany, EU, France, UN, **DOS, USAID**
F		Jordan, Egypt	**DIN, USEUCOM,** JCS, DoT	India, SCO, CAS, AFG
G		**JCS, OSD, USAID**		Poland, Russia, Turkey, **UK**, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen
H				**AUS, USPACOM,** Japan, ROK
I				**CAN**, NL, **JCS, DoT**

Table 3: Possibility-Network-Model Assessment 'AQ Out'

Russia Deter

(U) The 'Russia Deter' model reduced Russia's perceived less benign influence in the AOR and in Europe and increased the influence over Russia from the United States and the West. This is likely to prove hard to do (than remove or nullify AQ) – particularly during a time of prolonged and deep recession. AQ was assumed to remain functional and operating as it does today.

(U) Figure 8, indicates that United States interests are better protected as a result, effectively surrounded by Allies, COCOMs and the Inter Agencies (UK, Australia, Canada, SecDef, DOS and NATO) and coupled with SACEUR. At the same time, the UK is coupled closely with Russia – for

which there would be obvious risks – and the DOS and USCENTCOM with AQ; essentially cutting off AQ from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. At the same time, a number of COCOMs and Inter Agencies remain 'out of the fight', whilst India is coupled even more closely with Afghanistan. The essential economic-financial coupling – as represented by the BWI, DoT and EU and to an extent, the UN, KSA, GCC and China – remains worryingly loose. Significantly, deterring Russia does not improve the Trusts and Likelihoods within the network – which continue to remain 'off the plot'. In other words, unlike removing AQ – essentially an *atrust*[40] within the global and local network – deterring Russia does not, in itself, return confidence to the AOR and regions malignly affected by AQ and, to a degree, Iran.

(U) Figure 9 confirms the position regarding the continuing malign influence of AQ on the international system; showing considerable similarity to Figure 4. Again, as for Figure 7, AQ and all the other nodes find themselves fixed bottom left (on the variation plot) – unable to adapt; whereas the United States, top right, may be able to change.



Figure 8: Possibility-Network-Model, 'Russia Deter'

(U) In terms of change effectiveness, AQ remains in the important central position, able to both absorb and multiply – and so influence other more fixed nodes. The United States and India appear fixed, bottom left (Effectiveness plot) and the remaining nodes remain effective but unable to adapt.

(U) Deterring Russia does, nonetheless, free up some capacity and capability. For example, the United States remains at risk to shocks from Iraq, Pakistan, AQ and to an extent the KSA but risks are better shared by SecDef, USCENTCOM and the UK. At the same time, whilst China presents risk to USPACOM, USPACOM is better coupled with Australia, Japan and the ROK. Significantly, this

[40] In this regard an 'atrust' is seen to be 'without trust'. As an 'atrust system', it actively creates disbelief and destroys, through mistrust, any benevolence between systems and users.

model suggests an emerging and important role for USAID in partnership with India, the SCO (with Russian support) and the CAS to manage and influence Afghanistan. At the same time, the EU and NATO find themselves, with the major European countries – old and new – better able to deal with Russia and any shocks arising.



Figure 9: In-Out Effectiveness (left) and Variation (right) Profiles

(U) Significantly, Israel appears less vulnerable to shock and potentially better aligned to both USEUCOM and OSD; whilst Lebanon, Iran and Syria find themselves coupled more closely with DIN, NSC, DOS and the UN – with potential significant benefits. By and large, the Economic-Financial models are less utilised in terms of shock and risk management.

Assessment / Cluster	Direct Link	Direct Likelihood	Direct Impact	Direct Risk
A	Germany, Poland, France, AQ, Turkey, NL, Canada, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen	**DOS**, Lebanon, **POTUS**, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Russia, **USEUCOM**, Israel	**DOS**, Pakistan, **UK**, **POTUS, SecDef, USCENTCOM**, Iraq, KSA, AQ	Iraq, **SecDef, POTUS, USCENTCOM, UK**, Pakistan, KSA, AQ
B	Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, GCC, KSA, Iran, SCO, China	Iraq, **SecDef, DIN**, AFG, **USCENTCOM, UK**, Pakistan, KSA, AQ	Egypt, **OSD, JCS, NSC, DIN**, Syria, Israel, Lebanon	China, **AUS**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK
C	Russia, AFG, Pakistan, India, **UK**, EU, CAS, UN, BWI, **DoT, USAID**	Poland, EU, Germany, France, UN, CAN, NL, NATO**, SACEUR**, SecGen	Jordan, **DoT**, GCC	**USAID**, India, SCO, CAS, AFG
D	**USEUCOM, USPACOM, USCENTCOM, DIN, DOS, OSD, NSC, JtChs, POTUS, SecDef**	**AUS, USPACOM**, Japan, ROK, China, GCC, **DoT**, BWI	Poland, NL, Germany, UN, France, Russia, Turkey, **USEUCOM**, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen	Poland, France, Germany, EU, Russia, Turkey, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen
E	ROK, Japan, **AUS**, Iraq	India, SCO, CAS	India, EU, BWI, AFG, Iran, CAS, SCO, China	**DIN, NSC, DOS**, UN, Lebanon, Iran, Syria
F		Jordan, Egypt	**USAID, CAN, AUS**,	Jordan, Egypt

			USPACOM, Japan, ROK	
G		**NSC, JCS, OSD, USAID**		**OSD, USEUCOM**, Israel
H				GCC, **DoT**, BWI, **JCS, CAN**, NL

Table 4: Possibility-Network-Model Assessment 'Russia Deter'

(U) With regard to Direct Impact, the United States may remain vulnerable to Pakistan, Iraq, the KSA and AQ but sharing this position with DOS, the UK, SecDef and USCENTCOM. Potential impacts from Syria, Israel and Lebanon might be better absorbed by OSD, JCS, NSC, DIN; also utilising Egypt. Russia's impact is absorbed largely by the NATO European powers, including Turkey, and Iran and Afghanistan possibly balanced by India, the EU, the BWI, the CAS, the SCO and China. USAID and USPACOM remain hardly impacted. In terms of Likelihood, the United States with DOS and USEUCOM and Turkey are very likely to have dealings with Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Russia and Israel. At the same time, SecDef, DIN, USCENTCOM and the UK are more likely to be in contact with Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, AQ and the KSA. With regard to Direct Links, AQ finds itself largely bounded by the NATO powers but this, to an extent, does allow China more of a free hand in the Middle East and Iran, which may be undesirable. Arguably, a more benign Russia might play a more positive role in Pakistan, the CAS and Afghanistan; linking to India, the UK, the EU, the UN, the BWI, DoT and USAID.

Iran Deter

(U) A third option examined is for deterring Iran which may, given the connectivity of Iran across the Middle East and into South West Asia and the Caucasus be even more problematic than deterring Russia or removing AQ. Figure 10 indicates that deterring Iran may also have the negative consequence of emboldening AQ. As shown, the United States finds itself more at risk from both AQ and Russia and potentially Afghanistan and Pakistan – and less protected from the COCOMs, Inter Agencies and Allies than it may be now. In other words, deterring Iran may in this instance be the wrong thing to do – arguably creating opportunities for Iran to couple more closely with the GCC and Pakistan with Afghanistan. Both of which may have undesired outcomes. The UK finds itself further distanced from the United States and USCENTCOM and uncomfortably coupled with AQ; between DOS. At the same time NATO, SACEUR, SecGen and USEUCOM find themselves remoted from the EU, Germany, the BWI, Turkey and the UN. Even USCENTCOM finds itself to an extent isolated and disconnected both from Afghanistan and Iraq. The Inter Agencies, by and large, are isolated and away from the main action with only USAID, SecDef and USCENTCOM remaining relatively close.



Figure 10: Possibility-Network-Model, 'Iran Deter'

(U) This is largely born out by the Trusts-Likelihood model shown below, in which the United States the COCOMs and main Allies find themselves trusted and able to take some action (lower, middle right); SecDef, Australia, Canada, Afghanistan, KSA, Iran and Lebanon find themselves less trusted and so lacking influence, even if able to act (bottom right); China, France, Russia and DOS find themselves partly influential / trusted but unable to act and the JCS, NSC, DIN, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey and AQ find themselves being highly trusted – and therefore influential – even as and probably because they are less able / unable to act.

Figure 11: Trust (y) versus Likelihood (x) Plot for 'Iran Deter'

(U) Figure 12 also bears this out: AQ finds itself (left, middle top right) able to effect change even if unable to adapt; whereas Israel (left, top left) finds itself at the centre of international attention but unable to change. Nevertheless the majority, including the United States, find themselves able to effect

change (left, middle under IND) whilst the CAS, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, KSA, GCC, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Japan and ROK (left, top right) are better able to effect change. This is borne out in the right-hand figure, where all entities bar the President may find themselves fixed and unable to adapt, bottom left; whilst the United States may be in a better position both to adapt and create change effects. Table 5, below tends to confirm this.



Figure 12: In-Out Effectiveness (left) and Variation (right) Profiles

(U) Whilst deterring Iran might reduce the risks faced by the United States, largely from Iraq, AQ and Pakistan – as supported by USCENTCOM, the UK and to an extent KSA – it potentially increases the risks faced by NATO and the EU regarding Russia in Europe and increase the risks faced by Israel and so, ironically, to the MEPP. At the same time, the United States is likely to be impacted by Pakistan, Iraq, the KSA and AQ as supported by DOS, SecDef and USCENTCOM. In terms of Likelihood, whilst Russia's impact may be reduced, it is far more likely to come into play – potentially with AQ, Lebanon and Syria – possibly unbalancing the efforts of SecDef, USEUCOM and Turkey. By and large, deterring Iran also means reducing the impact of the EU, NATO and major European Powers on other parties. Nevertheless, deterring Iran does potentially allow for alignment with the UK, USCENTCOM, DOS, NSC and DIN over Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq – albeit at the expense of Indian, Chinese, the CAS and SCO involvement. Finally, in terms of direct links deterring Iran appears to have the effect of maintaining more rigidly existing geopolitical alignments rather than freeing them up.

Assessment / Cluster	Direct Link	Direct Likelihood	Direct Impact	Direct Risk
A	Germany, Poland, France, AQ, Turkey, NL, **CAN**, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen	**SecDef**, AQ, Lebanon, **POTUS**, Syria, Turkey, Russia, **USEUCOM**, Israel	**DOS**, Pakistan, **UK, POTUS, SecDef, USCENTCOM**, Iraq, KSA, AQ	Poland, France, EU, Germany, Russia, Turkey, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen
B	Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, GCC, KSA, Iran, SCO, China	Poland, EU, Germany, France, UN, **CAN**, NL, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen	Egypt, **OSD, JCS, NSC, DIN**, Syria, Israel	**OSD, USEUCOM,** Israel

C	Russia, AFG, Pakistan, India, **UK**, EU, CAS, UN, BWI, **DoT, USAID**	Iran, Pakistan, **UK**, AFG, **DOS, NSC**, KSA, DIN, **USCENTCOM**, Iraq	Jordan, **DoT**, GCC	Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, **NSC, DIN**
D	**USEUCOM, USPACOM, USCENTCOM, DIN, DOS, OSD, NSC, JCS, POTUS, SecDef**	**AUS, USPACOM**, Japan, ROK, China, GCC, **DoT**, BWI	Poland, UN, France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, **USEUCOM**, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen	China, AUS, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK
E	ROK, Japan, **AUS**, Iraq	Jordan, Egypt	Iran, EU, BWI, AFG, India, CAS, SCO, China	Iran, GCC, **DoT**, BWI
F		India, SCO, CAS	NL, **USAID, CAN, AUS, USPACOM**, Japan, ROK	**JCS**, CAN, NL
G		JCS, OSD, USAID		Iraq, SecDef, **POTUS, USCENTCOM, UK,** Pakistan, KSA, AQ
H				SCO, India, CAS, AFG, UN, **DOS, USAID**

Table 5: Possibility-Network-Model Assessment 'Iran Deter'

Out, Deter

(U) A combined model; deterring Iran and Russia and removing AQ was run as shown by Figure 12, below. The shape and alignment of the network offers significantly more protection to United States interests but this is potentially more to do with the fact that the existing threats have been 'removed or reduced' than the existing nodes and linkages have actively adapted or changed. Nonetheless, United States interests are better protected except, potentially, from the bottom of the network towards China and Iran. Some of the coupling is interesting: BWI with the United States; UK with DOS and UN; India and KSA linking to Turkey. On the other hand, many of the key Inter Agencies and Allies – such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, USAID, USEUCOM, USPACOM, JCS OSD and NSC – remain remoted. What this suggests is that there is much more to do – essentially to bring in the Inter Agencies and Allies more effectively into play.



Figure 12: Possibility-Network-Model, 'Out, Deter'

(U) Removal of AQ and deterring Iran and Russia does create change, some of it unexpected. With regard to Trusts and Likelihood, Figure 13, with the removal of the threat from AQ and Iran, USCENTCOM, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq find themselves being highly trusted – and therefore influential – but much less effective and so less likely to act (top left); NATO, the UN, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey are less trusted and influential and equally unable to act (lower left); Japan, China, Russia, the Joint Chiefs and DIN find themselves able to act but mistrusted (bottom right) whilst the remaining COCOMs, Agencies and Allies are likely to act but not necessarily trusted to do so (middle right). Near identical patterns are seen occurring in the Effectiveness and Variation model as shown by Figure 12, but with the removal of AQ; essentially the United States remains isolated.

Figure 14: Trust (y) versus Likelihood (x) Plot for 'Out-Deter'

(U) Table 6 hi-lights the potential continuing isolation and lack of interaction – shared understanding – between the United States, Agencies (e.g. USAID) and Allies.

Assessment / Cluster	Direct Link	Direct Likelihood	Direct Impact	Direct Risk
A	Russia, Germany, Poland, France, Turkey, NL, **CAN**	**UK**, NATO, SecGen, **SACEUR**, Turkey, Russia, **USEUCOM**, Israel	**SACEUR, OSD, NSC, DOS, USAID, POTUS**, Iraq, **SecDef, USCENTCOM**	Iran, AFG, **SecDef**, Iraq, **USCENTCOM, POTUS**, KSA, BWI, Pakistan
B	Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, GCC, KSA, Iran, SCO, China	EU, BWI, CAS, Iran, Pakistan, UN, AFG, **DOS, USAID**	**USEUCOM**, Russia, Poland, **CAN**, NL, **UK**, UN, SecGen, NATO	Germany, France, EU, Turkey, **UK**, Russia, NATO, **SACEUR**, SecGen
C	**USEUCOM, USPACOM, USCENTCOM, DIN, DOS, OSD, NSC, JCS, POTUS, SecDef**	KSA, Lebanon, **POTUS, NSC, DIN**, Syria, **SecDef, USCENTCOM**	Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Turkey, Germany, France, Iran, KSA, GCC	India, China, **AUS**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK
D	AFG, Pakistan, India, **UK**, EU, CAS, UN, BWI, **DoT, USAID**	Iraq, SCO, India, China, **AUS, USPACOM,** Japan, ROK	Jordan, Egypt	**OSD**, GCC, **JCS, DoT**
E	ROK, Japan, **Australia**, Iraq	Jordan, Egypt, GCC, France, Germany	AFG, EU, BWI, India, CAS, Pakistan, SCO, China	Poland, **CAN**, NL
F		**OSD, JCS, DoT**	**DoT, DIN, JCS, AUS, USPACOM,** Japan, ROK	Syria, **DIN, NSC**, Lebanon, UN, **DOS, USAID**
G		Poland, **CAN**, NL		**USEUCOM**, Israel
H				SCO, CAS
I				Jordan, Egypt

Table 6: Possibility-Network-Model Assessment 'Out-Deter'

(U) The United States, supported by USCENTCOM and SecDef, continues to be at risk from Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the KSA and potential Economic-Financial crises as indicated by the BWI. Iraq continues to have considerable impact but arguably this is increasingly misplaced as other more likely issues regarding the economy, Russia, Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, the KSA, Lebanon and Syria emerge. At the same time, in terms of direct links, the United States remains linked exclusively to the Inter Agencies and COCOMs whilst ceding authority and responsibility for Afghanistan and Pakistan to the EU, UN, the SCO, India and China. Potentially the worst of both worlds: taking risks without being able to influence or impact the solutions.

Taking Stock

(U) The models developed above were based upon possibility-combinations and sought to provide indication of some of the potential flows that changing relationships and trusts may make to the AOR. Significantly, the models developed from the 'As Now' representation suggested what the AOR might look like if one or a combination of the more disruptive players goes away or is deterred. In other

words, they remove themselves from the field of battle without 'us' changing or doing anything different in any way. This is most unlikely. This situational assessment does, however, suggest that there is a significant need if not urgency to change if we are better to allocate resources to tasks and so burden share. This has been given even greater added impetus by the continuing financially driven economic crisis.

(U) Given existing linkages, the United States appears particularly vulnerable to event-driven shock. This is largely due to the understandable dysfunctionality of government, which tends to surround the incumbent rather than to accept additional responsibilities for managing risk and placing itself in harms way. Many governments and institutions established since WWII, including the UN and arguably the BWI, are suffering from similar atrophy – unable to exert unity of command, effort and action and so relying on the few to take on their burdens. The problem is that 'the few' – the key Allies, Inter Agencies and USCENTCOM – are fast approaching exhaustion; unable to sustain at these relatively low levels for many more months let alone years. This has impacted the trusts upon which the post WWII model was based and upon which their effective command and control – focus and convergence – rests.

(U) The financial crises now impacting the global economy should not be underestimated. The international institutions designed to protect and manage the global economy have failed or are failing – essentially fulfilling one of UBL's stated aims: 'to bankrupt the West'. More worryingly, existing institutions appear particularly vulnerable to event-driven shocks and so to manipulation by those organizations and authorities wishing to do the West harm.

(U) The Liberal virtues come at a price: they are precious values that every so often we have to fight for and defend. Now, arguably, is just such a time. In many regards, combining Clausewitz and Sun Tsu, we no longer know ourselves and so cannot understand our enemies: "to know ones' enemy; one must first know oneself". This lack of self-awareness has often prevented us from seeing and therefore doing and adapting to what we know instinctively to be necessary. Whilst our values may be enduring, the means for maintaining and sustaining them in adversity change. The assumption has tended to be that the means are our values and therefore our ends; resulting in capability and technology driven strategies, rather than strategy driven competencies, actions and effects. We may have in many regards become as fixed as the Soviet Union had by the mid 1980s.

(U) This initial Situational Assessment ICP Modeling has revealed a number of potential dynamics, chief amongst them being that, we ourselves need to change and adapt. Significantly this assessment suggests the following:

- (U) The need to burden share inter agency; inter government and across institutions. For example, USCENTCOM finds itself at war and largely unsupported by the other COCOMs and having to go 'cap in hand' to the single service chiefs for its resources. Is this right?

- (U) The need to reform existing national institutions so as to protect in order to sustain in order to maintain the fight. The United States and the institutions of his office need to be better supported from within as well as without. For example, better connecting between DOS, SecDef, NSC, DoT, USAID, USCENTCOM, the COCOMs and their areas of thematic and regional

responsibility and developing the role of France in NATO. This will require rebuilding and re-engendering trusts nationally and internationally.

- (U) The need to reform international institutions – most notably the Bretton Wood Institutions. This will require new partners two of whom, the KSA and GCC countries, may well prove instrumental but – to date – are proving reluctant to support any further. Reform needs also to be triaged in terms of what the United States and West can do and effect; what it might like to do and what it will find hardest to do. For example, changes to NATO and the BW Institutes might be possible; whereas change to the UN may not.

(U) This assessment began with the premise: Out; In; Deter. This may remain the right principle however three key recommendations emerge:

- (U) It may be easier and achieve more short term gains – from which longer term changes may be enabled – to remove or at least largely reduce the threat from AQ than deterring Iran or Russia. In terms of gains, removing AQ from the field of battle appears to have the greatest effect; arguably at least cost. This reaffirms the need to concentrate – initially at least – on Afghanistan.

- (U) Deterring Iran might be the wrong thing to do. It might, in fact, be better to bring Iran in as part of the solution along the lines suggested by Brzezinski. This will require a new Grand Bargain regarding WMD but, might, in itself create the conditions necessary for wider change and alliances in the region. Not by simple displacement and balancing but through a new 'asymmetric concert of powers' between, notably, Turkey, Pakistan, KSA, Syria, Iran and Iraq. At present Iraq is not a major regional player – as shown by this assessment – its re-integration will be an important indication of United States and Western success.

- (U) In terms of priorities, this assessment suggests:
    - First dealing with AQ and prevailing and so sustaining, long and light, in Afghanistan and South West Asia.
    - Using the 'agility' this restores to the West as a basis for institutional reform that will, at the same time, allow for the bringing 'in' of China, India and Iran through the dislocation, management and ultimate removal of WMD programs (both in Iran and Pakistan). France may be a pivotal catalyst in achieving this.
    - Using the above programs to create the new conditions and opportunities for deterring Russia and other emerging trans-national threats.

(U) More work is needed to model the New Economic-Financial, Security-Defense and Political-Diplomatic Models – including NATO and 3NM / ICKE – in terms of command and control and focus and convergence bodies. Nonetheless, as interim conclusion this suggests the 'Out; In Deter' model as amended might have merit:

- (U) AQ and WMDs 'Out'.
- (U) United States / West / India / China / Iran / International Institutions (BWI/NATO) 'In'.
- (U) Russia and Emerging Threats 'Deterred'.

TAB C: SUB-UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURES TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX I

(U) Sub-Unified Command: In accordance with Joint Publication 1-02 (JP1) a Subordinate Unified Command, also called a Sub-Unified Command, is a command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for the unified commands. Subordinate Unified Command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control assign commands and forces within the assigned operational area.

(U) Building from our assessment and combining with the JP1 definition for a Subordinate Unified Command and the State Departments' Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization paper, dated 22 January 2007, unclassified, the following Focus and Convergence, Command and Control entity-relationship model was developed:



Figure 1: Focus and Convergence, Command and Control Entity-Relationship Model (in GMS)

(U) To the right of the diagram lie the envisaged – but not prescribed[41] – entities that might be formed under the Ambassador and Chief of Mission. The Ambassador is seen to have two deputies – one, the Head of Mission (HoM), Afghanistan Facilitation, Coordination and Humanitarian Support (AFC-HS), who undertakes many of the existing functions of a HoM; the other, a new entity represented as being

[41] An information capture and knowledge exchange processes must be established and instituted in conjunction with the Ambassadors in order to support CDR USCENTCOM's shared policies and goals. This may include the development of an enterprise wide information sharing system to support DOD and Whole of Government efforts. NOTE: one must be careful not to allow IT to determine the processes structures and thereby strategy. Strategy should drive any IT based solution in accordance with the processes and structures deriving from the strategy.

Head Reconstruction and Stabilization Group – Afghanistan (Hd RSG-A). Significantly, the Ambassador and Commander, HQ Combined Forces Afghanistan (COM HQ-CFA); HoM and Deputy Commander.

(U) DCOM and Deputy Commander Operations (DCOMOPS) and Hd RSG-A are seen to be working hand in glove; joined wherever feasible, permissible and possible. In terms of the entities suggested by this assessment:

- (U) A DHead of Non-Governmental Organizations Community of Interest (COI), coordinated directly by the HoM with no coordinating, focus, convergence or other lines going to the military side of the house. Civilian-Military relationships for this entity are seen to exist and be coordinated specifically and exclusively by the Head of Mission in liaison with the Deputy Commanders, as necessary or requested through the Head of Mission.

- (U) A Deputy Head (DHead) of the Regional (neighboring countries, ethnic groups and governing institutions) COI, coordinated by the HoM and given focus by the Afghan national and regional governments, and convergence advice from both DCOM and DCOMOPS.

- (U) A DHead of International (including coalition forces, other Allies, and International organizations such as the UN and NATO) COI, coordinated by the HoM and given convergence from both DCOM and DCOMOPS.

- (U) A DHead Inter-Agency Management System (IAMS) with responsibility for coordinating the Deputy Coordinators (DCoords), International Security Cooperation and the [suggested] Partner Development [Clusters] North, South, East, West and Center.
  - With the exception of the DCoord / Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) Stability and International Security Cooperation entity and DCoord Afghanistan National Police (ANP) Programs, all the other entities (Strategic Planning, Planning Integration, Operations Support, Resource Mobilization and Partner Development) under DHead IAMS are as recommended / suggested by State[42].

(U) A number of new combined entities providing the glue between both halves are also suggested:

- (U) A significant recommendation is the establishment of a Strategic Communications (StratCom) COI under the lead of a DHead; coordinated directly by both the Deputy Head of Mission, AFC-HS and DCOMOPS, SH-CFA and given direction, focus and convergence by both COM, SH-CFA and the Ambassador (Chief of Mission, AFC-HS). The importance of this entity and its governance in terms of the overall success of the mission cannot be underestimated.

- (U) An equally significant recommendation is the establishment of a Transparency and Finances (TransFin) COI under the lead of a DHead; coordinated directly by both the Deputy Head of Mission, AFC-HS and DCOMOPS, SH-CFA and given direction, focus and convergence by both COM, SH-CFA and the Ambassador (AFC-HS). This entity will both provide for: agile funding in support of Civilian-Military operations; overview and direction to

[42] State Department, 'Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization' paper (UNCLAS), dated 22 January 2007

Counter Financing efforts, in country. A recent COMISAF commented 'he could have achieved much more given bags of money but had been unable to do so, given the budgeting constraints under which he and State were tied.'

- (U) As recommended in a Defense Horizons publication[43], a combined Medical Diplomacy (MedDip) entity is established under the lead of both a DCoord and DCOS; given focus and convergence by both the Ambassador and the SOF Component Commander.

- (U) Counter Financing (CF) is created under the lead of a DCoord; given focus and convergence by the DHead (TransFin) and the SOF Component Commander.

- (U) Counternarcotics (CN) is similarly stood up as a combined entity under the lead of both a DCOS and DCoord; given focus and convergence by both the Ambassador and the SOF Component Commander.

- (U) The existing International Security Cooperation entity becomes a joint entity under the Coordination of the Deputy Head, IAMS with convergence and focus / advice coming from the Land Component Commander.

- (U) The existing DCOS Stability becomes a joint entity under a combined DCoord and DCOS; commanded by the Land Component Commander as Coordinated by the Deputy Head, IAMS.

(U) To the left of the figure lie the existing military C2 entities, as of November 2008 below the COS. Additions to the military structures occur above the COS and include the provision of Air, Maritime[44], SOF and Land Component Commanders. The Air, Maritime, SOF and Land Component Commanders come directly under the Commander, as coordinating with DCOM (Air and Maritime) and DCOMOPS (Land, with overview of SOF). The Land Component Commander – with the exception of SOF and CT (directly under the COM and SOF Component Commander) – commands the DCOS and Regional Commands (RCs). Some additions and refinements are made to the existing C2 model:

- (U) DCOS CT assumes the responsibilities of Task Force Counterterrorism and the Task Force itself is subsumed directly under Commander, SH-CFA and the Special Operations Force (SOF) Component Commander.

- (U) DCOS SOF assumes the responsibilities of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJOSTF-A) and is subsumed directly under the Commander and the SOF Component Commander.
- (U) DGC Afghan National Police (ANP) Programs becomes DCoord ANP Programs under the coordination of DHead, Inter-Agency Management System (IAMS) with focus and convergence provided by both DCOS (Afghan National Army) ANA Training and DCOS ANA Programs.

[43] Thompson, D.F., 'The Role of Medical Diplomacy in Stabilizing Afghanistan', Defence Horizons, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU, May 2008.
[44] The addition of a Maritime Component Commander reflects both reality in terms of the existing provision of tactical air support and a potential over-the-horizon future envisaged by sustaining 'long and light' within a much reduced footprint.

- (U) DCOS Air takes on the existing Combined Air Power Transition Force on behalf of the Afghanistan Air Force.

- (U) DCOS Logistics and Engineering assumes responsibility for both Joint Logistics Command and the Afghan Engineer District.

- (U) DCOS ANA Training assumes the responsibilities for the DGC ANA Training Centre.

- (U) DCOS ANA Programs assumes the responsibilities for DGC ANA Programs.

Sub Unified Command

(U) The Focus and Convergence, Command and Control Entity Relationship Model at Figure 1 was configured specifically with interoperability and integration in mind. The concept of a Sub-Unified Command at the Theater level can only be delivered by the United States. It will be difficult to grasp at the United States national level as well as by NATO and Coalition Allies. Essentially COM SH-CFA – a 4 Star General – is being given the same rights and privileges afforded to USCENTCOM as COM MNF-I, with direct right of access to SecDef. In Iraq this was easier to deliver since the United States had retained full Command Authority across the theatre and had not ceded responsibilities to another authority, such as NATO in Afghanistan. At the same time it must be recognized that Unity of Command and thereby Effort will not be delivered in Afghanistan through NATO – in fact quite the reverse. In which case we may not prevail and, as a result, Afghanistan will not succeed as a state and Pakistan may also fail as a state. The proposal therefore is that the Relationship Model developed at Figure 1 can be stand alone and stood up by the United States, only, if NATO and Coalition Allies do not wish to participate. At the same time, it is suggested that the assumption is made that 'NATO and Coalition Allies will be included unless they give indication of desiring to opt out'. Unity of Command and Effort will require alignment of national caveats. Some of these may not be feasible or permissible within the proposed sub-Unified Command. Whilst accommodations should be made wherever possible to allow for inclusion, the United States and its key combat Allies, such as France, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, Poland (and Australia) must be prepared to go it alone – within an adaptable NATO framework – if that is what it takes. For nations seeking not to opt out, the following national lay-down – based upon integrating existing command responsibilities and as considered for civilian Communities of Interest – is suggested:



Figure 2: Potential National Lay-Down for Afghanistan Entity-relationship Model

<u>Proposed Military Command and Control - Afghanistan</u>

(U) To go into greater detail on civilian arrangements would a) presume too much and b) potentially prescribe means and methods that may not be needed and, or, ineffective. A less complex, Military Command Relationship Model, broken out from the Entity-Relationship models at Figures 1 and 2, is shown below for the military; including also ranks and equivalent civilian grades.

(U) The above model aims to:

- (U) Create conditions 'for the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission'.

- (U) Create the permissible military conditions necessary to achieve Unity of Command in accordance with standing UN mandates and in support of the civilian authorities and the United States Ambassador from which conditions for Unity of Effort and Action might emerge.

- (U) Create conditions that will enable other Allies and entities, including chiefly the Afghan and Regional Governments and their representatives, to interoperate and, as circumstances permit, to integrate across the civilian-military seams.

- (U) Provide supporting and secure environments in which different entities and Communities of Interest can meet to resolve differences and agree courses of action.

➢ (U) Provide a lead for the focus of thinking and convergence of ideas from which effective planning and decision taking may emerge.

➢ (U) Provide conditions enabling the transition of military responsibilities to Afghan / civilian authorities as circumstances permit.



Figure 3: Possible Military Command Relationship Model – Afghanistan

(U) By applying the existing structures and model as far as possible and practicable the intention has been to enable opportunities for interoperability; enabling existing relationships to be maintained wherever permissible and opening up opportunities for new ones to form. With this in mind, the following national lay down – matched wherever possible to Command and Control structures in Afghanistan as of Nov 08 are suggested:

(U) This lay-down intends to be inclusive by creating senior command responsibilities, including:

➢ (U) The creation of two Deputy Commander positions: a DCOM under the French and DCOMOPS under the UK – as was the case in IFOR and SFOR between 1996-98.

➢ (U) Specifically including France in senior command positions.

➢ (U) Transferring responsibility for ANP Programs to the civilian community represented by the U. S. Ambassador.

➢ (U) Creating shared civilian-military entities – including Strategic Communications, under a suggested UK lead; International Security Cooperation (under the existing Polish lead) and a combined DCoord and DCOS position on Stability.



Figure 4: Possible Allied Command Relationships – Afghanistan

Abbreviations

AAF	Afghanistan Air Force
AFC-HS	Afghanistan Facilitation, Coordination – and Humanitarian Support
Ambassador	Chief of Mission, , Afghanistan Facilitation and Coordination – Humanitarian Services (AFC-HS).
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANG	Afghanistan National Government
ANP	Afghanistan National (including regional) Police
ARG	Afghanistan Regional Government
CCoord	Chief of Coordination
COI	Community of Interest
COMSH-CFA	Commander, Supreme HQ – Coalition Forces Afghanistan
COS	Chief of Staff
CT	Counterterrorism
DCOMOPS	Deputy Commander Operations
DCOM SH-CFA	Deputy Commander, SH-CFA
DCoord	Deputy Chief of Coordination
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DHead	Deputy Head
Hd RSG-A	Head, Reconstruction and Stabilization Group - Afghanistan
HoM	Head of Mission, Deputy to the Ambassador as Chief of Mission
HQ-CFA	Supreme HQ – Combined Forces Afghanistan
IAMS	Inter-Agency Management System
PD	Partner Development
RC	Regional Command
RSG-A	Reconstruction and Stabilization Group - Afghanistan
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SecDef	Secretary of Defense (United States)
SecGen	NATO (Dark Blue); UN (Light Blue)
Sec of State	Secretary of State (United States)
SOF	Special Operations Force
StratCom	Strategic Communications
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command

TAB D: COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX I

(U) The term Communities of Interest (COI), for a variety of reasons, has become something of a euphemism – a catch all – to mean many things to many people and organizations. Therefore – from the work identified and quoted below and for the purpose of this assessment – the following view of COI will be used:

'Distributed, collaborative and inclusive groupings working to discover, synthesize and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information in order to: take better decisions; implement change and create effects.'

(U) In accordance with DOD CIO Memorandum[45], 'DOD Net Centric Data Strategy', May 9, 2003 and DOD 8320.02-G[46], COIs are:

- (U) *Collaborative groups of users* who *must exchange information in pursuit of their shared goals*, interests, missions, or business processes and who therefore *must have a shared vocabulary* for the information they exchange[1].

- (U) Focus *groups for gaining semantic and structural agreement* on shared information[2].

- (U) *Mechanisms for decomposing information* sharing problem spaces *into manageable parts* that can be *addressed by those closest* to the individual parts[2].

- (U) *Effective within* a 'narrow-as-reasonable-scope' of *shared agreement*[2].

(U) The first formal use of the 'communities' term in UK MoD's Applied Research Programme was within the Shared Information Environment (SIE) work[47]:

- (U) Communities describe *a group* of people *with common interests working together* (and sharing information) distributed across a number of physical locations[48].

In a technology symposium on the future of C2, Tirrell[49] writes:

- (U) *COIs implement change and explore validity* and concepts [that form] the basis for requirements *validation* and generation.

Along a similar vein, Fischer[50] writes, inter alia:

---

[45] DOD CIO Memorandum, 'DOD Net centric Data Strategy', May 9, 2003.
[46] DOD 8320.02-G, 'Guidance for Implementing Net-Centric Data Sharing', April 12, 2006.
[47] Johnson, K., 'Initial Version of the Information Concept (Shared Information Environment)', QINETIQ/KI/SEB/CR010172, October 2001.
[48] Markham, G., 'Communities and their contribution to agile mission grouping',2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.
[49] Tirrell, R.P., Lt Col USMC. , 'Amphibious Expeditionary Warfare C4I Modernization', 2001 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.
[50] Fischer, G., 'Communities of Interest', Department of Computer Science and Institute of Cognitive Science University of Colorado, Boulder24th Annual Information Systems Research Seminar In Scandinavia (IRIS'24), Ulvik, Norway, August 2001.

- (U) COIs [are] multiple, different, *representational domains* for the *synthesis and integration* of knowledge by *mutual learning*, face to face; as *mediated* physically and computationally.

On Command and Control, Chirala[51] offers:

- (U) COI are one of the *principal components for decision making* [and] future Command and Control [processes] will have facilities for Community of Interest where interested parties can get related information in a *real-time* manner, and each party can contribute to the discussion and share information with each other.

On a more pragmatic and philosophical basis, Atkinson and Moffat[52] write:

- (U) COI, like small world networks, *are scaled and clustered* about certain pre-ordained groups [in order, amongst other things]: *to create formal*, rule-based *depositories of power* that *act to encourage [informal trust-based] networks…through which power can be distributed* in a bounded and scaled way.

COIs are Not

(U) The term Communities of Interest have to some degree been captured by interested parties wishing them to represent or to be what they want them to mean. For example, the DOD Chief Information Officer has used the concept to provide an authority for doing things: 'groups of users must exchange information…and must have a shared vocabulary.' There is no 'must' in 'community of interest': the 'need-to-do' *must* come from within. The introduction of this type of terminology appears aimed at replacing command and control for community of interest. Clearly the two do overlap and, within an effective COI, there does need to be a coming together of the *rule-based* [Type A] and the *trust-based* [Type C] networks. But the one without the other does not, in isolation, make a Community of Interest. It is the integration of the two – the informal and formal networks – that enables the emergent effects of near-real-time information sharing and sensemaking; improved decision making / taking and change implementation.

(U) DOD 8320.02-G provides a detailed technological listing driven largely by its own vocabulary. In other words, suggesting that it is the technology and capability that delivers a COI and not the members; their culture and mutually agreed common interests. This reinforces the view, discussed above, that COI may be interpreted to mean Command and Control; suggesting that it may simply be a matter of buying a certain piece of technology and adopting its taxonomy in order to create knowledge and share information. In fairness, DOD 8320.02-G, C4.5, does consider latterly the promotion of trust but in terms of accessing and assessing the authority of the data to determine whether the contents can be trusted; giving rise, again, to largely technical (as opposed to socio-cultural) means for 'metadata verification'. At the same time, the paper also states at C4.5.1.2: 'While COIs can promote trust through implementation of the activities described…this guide does not provide COIs the authority to share information in any way that is prohibited by law, policy, or security classification'. This appears to be contradictory and raises specific questions as to the ownership of the information and knowledge

[51] Chirala, R.C., 'A Service-Oriented Architecture-Driven Community of Interest Model', Department of Computer Science & Engineering Arizona State University, 2004.
[52] Atkinson S.R., CDR RN, and Professor J. Moffat., 'The Agile Organization', CCRP, 2005.

derived by COIs and its classification or aiding the user. It would simply be impractical and destroy all the necessary trusts required to enable an effective COI if, as implied in other sections and statements, the Chief Information Officer owned or was assuming ownership of all the information. This also goes against the useful Bunge-Szilard maxim: 'that knowledge is social and, like information, is costly to acquire and use'.

(U) Communities of Interest need to serve various purposes, significant amongst them being the bringing together of a range of people in order to design and plan at the tactical, operational, strategic and interconnecting levels. Not everyone can do this and not everyone should or can be expected to share common interests. The problem with a capability-driven approach to strategy, discussed above, is that strategy is about 'tailoring ends to means'; not 'ends to means'. At the same time, 'if strategy is formulated without due regard to process it will fail. Similarly, if process, namely decision-making, is allowed to replace decision-taking, there will be no strategy in anything but name[53]'. This is the other side of the coin, for there are those who see Communities of Interest as being comfortable meeting spaces for long erudite and academic discussions that displace decisions and leave people feeling good about themselves. This is specifically not what COIs are about either. They are there to 'sensemake; make / take better decisions; implement change and create effects'. It is this imperative to identify and agree common interests that should enable 'mutual working in pursuit of manageable shared goals'. Just as strategy will fail if it is capability and technology driven, so it will fail if the processes put in place seek to displace or mistake decision-taking for decision-making. In both cases, the technology and process needs to aid and not displace or replace the conditions necessary for enabling an effective COI.

(U) The issue of group versus team dynamics – when a group becomes a team or vice versa – needs to be considered. In none of the terminology are COIs considered as teams; more normally they are described as groups. Phase changes do occur as a group matures and is tested; after which time, team attributes may develop. In the initial phases – as people join and leave the COI – it is probably *healthier* that they remain as a group; providing a degree of interoperability and *agility*. As the group matures, specialist skills develop within it. At this stage, the COI moves from being an *interoperable*, *informal* group to becoming a more *integrated*, *formal* team. If *agility* (and interoperability and integration) is to be maintained, it will be essential for these networks to remain connected – attributes that should *emerge* in a healthy environment.

(U) In sum Communities of Interest exist already and can be enabled to work as effective sensemaking; decision-making-taking; change and effect agents. This cannot be done in isolation to process or technology but both should be designed to aid and support the social entity – the community of interest – so created: 'knowledge is social'.

[53] Atkinson S.R., CDR RN, and Dr A. Goodman., 'Influencing network decision taking', UKDA CCRP Occasional Series, 11/2008.

TAB E: NATO – USCENTCOM MODELLING TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX I

(U) This assessment used the Integrated Causal Possibility Model (ICPM) to examine the potential outcomes that would be realized by making SACEUR, USCENTCOM and USEUCOM one and the same in terms of a new Supreme Allied Command. This could only be delivered as part a new Transatlantic Grand Bargain but it is sensed both that 'a new transatlantic that bonds the United States and Europe more closely[54]' might be possible given the combined effects of a prolonged engagement in Afghanistan and the prospects of a prolonged, deep economic recession. This would need to be delivered and finessed by the United States but it is the type of 'Grand Bargain' that has previously been successful in determining outcomes, as during both WWI (under France) and WWII (under the United States and Eisenhower). Congress would clearly need to be involved noting that: 'Congress can influence the conduct of major military operations in three ways: by the size and capabilities of the forces lawmakers raise and support; by explicit goals they set and by recommendations they may make regarding the conduct of the war[55]'. Clearly this would involve significant political capital. At the same time, there are potentially significant risks of failing to prevail in Afghanistan to NATO and thereby to the transatlantic compacts – including the Bretton Woods Institutions – that have held the world's major powers largely at peace since 1945. A perceived failure of NATO – no matter what the realities – in terms of Europe at this time and given a more expansionist Russia could send all the wrong messages. These messages would be read correctly and incorrectly by our enemies but, overall, would have the effect of decreasing our security and effectiveness in terms of both prevention and deterrence. This short paper examines the question of combining SACEUR, USCENTCOM and USEUCOM as a Sub-Unified Command tasked specifically for one term with the successful prosecution of the war in Afghanistan and the removal of AQ largely from the Field of Battle.

Assessment

(U) This assessment used the ICPM to determine the possible outcomes of combining SACEUR, USEUCOM and USCENTCOM into one body. It did not change any of the other relations to the 'As Now' model against which other changes were assessed. The Possibility-Network-Model is shown below:

[54] Kugler, L.K., and H. Binnendijk, 'Toward a New Transatlantic Compact, Defense & Technology paper 52, NDU, Aug 2008.
[55] Stevenson, C.A., 'Congress at War', NDU Press, Potomac Books, Inc, Washington, 2007 Edition



Figure 1: Possibility-Network-Model, 'The COCOM Trinity'

(U) Assessment was also undertaken in terms of the clusters formed organically by the different assessed entities:

Assessment / Cluster	Direct Link	Direct Likelihood	Direct Impact	Direct Risk
A	Germany, Poland, France, AQ, Turkey, NL, **CAN, NATO, SACEUR, SecGen**	Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, KSA, **DIN**, **NSC**, Syria, **SecDef**, Iraq	Afghanistan, Iran, EU, BWI, India, CAS, Pakistan, SCO, China	**DOS**, **SACEUR**, **SecDef**, **POTUS**, **USCENTCOM**, **UK**, Pakistan, KSA, AQ
B	Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, GCC, KSA, Iran, SCO, China	GCC, **OSD**, **JCS**, **DoT**	Poland, Russia, Germany, Turkey, **USEUCOM**, NL, **CAN**, UN, **SecGen**, **NATO**	Afghanistan, EU, Germany, Turkey, CAS, Iran, SCO, Russia
C	Russia, AFG, Pakistan, India, **UK**, EU, CAS, UN, BWI, **DoT, USAID**	China, **AUS**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK, SCO, CAS	France, **DOS**, **SACEUR**, **UK**, **POTUS**, **SecDef**, **USCENTCOM**, Iraq, KSA, AQ	India, China, **AUS**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK
D	**USEUCOM, USPACOM, USCENTCOM, DIN, DOS, OSD, NSC, JCS, POTUS, SecDef**	Iran, AQ, **USCENTCOM**, **POTUS**, **SACEUR**, Russia, Turkey, **USEUCOM**, Israel	Egypt, **OSD**, **JCS**, **NSC**, **DIN**, Syria, Israel, Lebanon	Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, **NSC**, **DIN**
E	ROK, Japan, **Australia**, Iraq	EU, BWI, **UK**, India, Pakistan, UN, Afghanistan, **DOS**, **USAID**	**USAID**, **AUS**, **USPACOM**, Japan, ROK	Poland, France, NL, **CAN**, UN, **SecGen**, **NATO**
F		Germany, France, Poland, **CAN**, NL, **SecGen, NATO**	Jordan, DoT, GCC	**USEUCOM**, Israel
G				GCC, **DoT**, BWI,

				JCS, OSD, USAID

Table 1: COCOM Trinity

(U) This analysis along with examinations of Trusts and Likelihood within the network; including effectiveness and adaptability indicated the following:

> (U) That although there was no significant difference in the overall effectiveness (the direct linkages remained the same as now, which was expected), for which structural changes to existing political, diplomatic, economic, financial, military and security – including NATO – would be required; combining the three commanders;
> (U) Significantly reduced the likelihood of negative existential impacts upon the United States by better supporting U. S. interests, see Figure 1 where U. S. interests are effectively supported by the major agencies and Allies.
> (U) Better aggregating and sharing risks amongst the Allies and agencies, thus potentially reducing the impact of shocks and helping to prevent event-driven crises.
> (U) Assisted in bringing France closer into the Alliance and therefore into the fight.

Hard but Simpler

(U) This assessment suggests that one of the major changes that could be made to existing structures short of their radical reform would be to combine the offices of USCENTCOM with those of USEUCOM and SACEUR into a single Sub-Unified Command at the Grand Strategic – as opposed to Strategic-Operational – level. This is likely to be much easier than creating significant changes – albeit much needed – within existing national and international institutions. The various conflicts we are engaged in began as discretionary wars; not of national survival. Their duration – now into their 8th and 7th years respectively – has caused great strains on all our existing national and international institutions of state. The wars have become – effectively for NATO but possibly also for the UN and other International Institutions – 'wars of non-discretionary, institutional survival'. For example, NATO's effectiveness as a deterrent to expansionist ambitions from Russia and elsewhere will be greatly diminished if it is seen not to prevail in Afghanistan. This will affect its efficacy and therefore the trusts we and the international community place in it. At the same time, reform of our national and international institutes is going to be hard to do and time consuming and we have run out of time. The proposal of combining SACEUR, USCENTCOM and USEUCOM – noting both SACEUR and NATO SecGen are due to change in mid 2009 – would potentially make a profound and winning difference to the various campaigns. It would not be without challenge but could, at the same time, leverage the space and time needed to effect the deeper changes sensed to be increasingly necessary. Other Integrated Causal Assessment has shown that other than creating changes from within and without, only defeating AQ will enable the opportunity to improve our international effectiveness. The Grand Bargain envisaged would be a one-off but, given France's efforts to re-engage the Transatlantic community and the goodwill generated by the President elect this it is considered that could – just – be feasible. If it were to be delivered it might presage the changes many see to be necessary whilst, at the same time, enabling the earlier removal of AQ.

TAB F: DETERRENCE AND PREVENTION TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX I

(U) The question we asked ourselves and believe it is possible to answer yes to: 'is it possible to use an understanding of Complex Adaptive Systems and the flows of soft and hard powers to prevent and deter?'

The traditional Threat equation is:

Threat = Capability + Intent / Will (A)

Another equation of note is that of Warning Time:

Warning Time = Decision Time + Readiness and Preparation Time + Deployment Time (B)

Command and Control

Atkinson and Moffat[56] posit that:

> **Control is a function of rules, time, and bandwidth; whereas, Command is a function of trusts, fidelity, and agility.** (C)

(U) They go on to conclude that 'in an open loop organization where there is little or no interaction between the commanded and the controlled, the only way to achieve the aim is by means of securing the bandwidth and mass necessary to buy enough time for the desired effect to be realized'. Command can be imbalanced by control. Where command and control are interactive, they are more in balance and it is possible to offset requirements for time and bandwidth through fidelity and agility'. Therefore:

> **Control is a function (f) of Command, as command is of Control.** (D)
>
> There is also a third important equation regarding Command and Control:
>
> **One imposes Control at the cost of Command – but the reverse does not apply.** (E)
> (one can Command and Control but not Control and Command)

(U) The key issues to fall out from this are that command and control are essentially functions of each other and also of different parameters. Moreover, while control represents hard and thereby measurable variables, Command does not.

Symmetric Equations

(U) Placing the Threat equation in context with the Warning Time equation, it can be concluded that both equations work best if at all when considered as part of a control system where all the variables can be measured linearly. If the equations are treated linearly in this way, it can be suggested that:

[56] Atkinson, S.R., and Moffat, J., 'The Agile Organization', CCRP, 2005.

Warning Time = some function (f) of Threat. (F)

And therefore:

Decision Time + Readiness and Preparation Time + Deployment Time = some function (f) of Enemy [Capability + Intent / Will]. (G)

(U) It can be suggested that opportune and timely Decision Making is key to effective Prevention and so Deterrence. A parent soon learns that one never threatens unless one has the Capability to threaten and the Will and Intent to carry out the threat immediately and on provocation. It is no good even shortly after the event. And one must never threaten without being willing or able to carry out the threat immediately. This is a fundamental 'rule' of preventative-deterrence. Our enemies have come to understand this. They know full well that the International System under Chapter 7 precludes largely against such action, particularly against non-state actors, and thereby places them in the 'driving seat'. Even if Chapter 7 action is authorized, it will always be after the event when it can no longer act as a deterrent.

(U) Nuclear Deterrence works because, once attacked, there is no decision to take. Up against 'conventional' and non-state threats conventional deterrence does not work because our Decision Making cycles – national or international – are too slow, cumbersome and largely known, if not calculable by the enemy. If we want an effective preventative-deterrence against conventional and non-state threats, we need to have the Capability and Will and Intent to undertake the threatened action in a timely way. This comes down largely to Decision Making. You do this; I will do that – no question; make no mistake. The poise and loitering capability of an effective surface fleet are express examples of preventative-deterrence, which aircraft or submarines alone are not. They are there – the decision has been taken to deploy them – decisions now lie with the operational and tactical command, on the scene, to respond as directed and, or, circumstances determine. The enemy does not know precisely what these directions are – and ambiguity, an essential ingredient of prevention and so deterrence, is maintained.

(U) More significantly, if we want an effective preventative (and so interactive) deterrence we need to overtly demonstrate our capabilities and Intent / Will through regular exercising of our Decision Makers – making it clear that we will and can react as threatened, if threatened, while maintaining our ambiguities. This was the principle behind the Doge's Arsenale. So indicating to the enemy that they may also be within our 'control system' (not we within theirs). This will require having a preventative-deterrence system in place ready to react the moment a threat appears on the radar screen. The threat does not have to be specified – more the actions in response.

(U) As discussed, Equation (A) – though useful – breaks down in a number of instances. Previously, networks have been considered neither as capabilities nor as indications of intent and will. In actuality, networks connect Capabilities to Intent / and Will – or rules to trusts, the hard to the soft. They are an essential element of the equation and they tend towards the informal and diffuse, making quantitative assessments difficult. Nevertheless, networks have capacity – depth, breadth, numbers, nodes, clusters, type, richness, crossovers, gatekeepers, quartermasters, go-betweens, gamekeepers, financiers, secretaries and so on. Each of these different perturbations shows separately on the 'radar'. Some of these are more noticeable than others – the problem being that only recently have we started to look in

the right places; for the right things. And our means and methods of data capture – that need to precisely record timing and sequences – are not yet there. Networks are forming under our very noses and we very often cannot detect them until too late.

(U) Returning to the Threat Equation, if we want a more useful and perhaps less linear assessment we need to consider adding Network Capacity. Such networks often provide the power as both capacitor and connector (or charge) between Capabilities and Intent / Will or supply to demand and the hard to the soft:

Threat $_{NW}$ = Capability + Capacity $_{NW}$ + Intent / Will (H)

(U) Networks, based upon trusts, will form to provide a particular function if the context exists for them to do so – the delivery of drugs for example. Since Capability and 'ready' access to it is now at a 'low constant', the only variable from equation (A) that can be targeted in the 21st Century is that of Intent and Will. If the Intent and Will are there and the Capability exists, networks will form to supply demand. Once networks have formed, it becomes increasingly difficult to disable them – and impossible to stop. That is the situation existing today, which effectively reduces the Threat equation to:

Threat $_{NW}$ = Capacity $_{NW}$ + Intent / Will. (J)

Combining equations (G) and (H):

[Decision Time + Readiness and Preparation Time + Deployment Time] $_{NW}$ = some function (f) of Enemy [Capability + Capacity $_{NW}$ + Intent / Will]. (K)

(U) Extracting from equation (G), given a fixed and prevalent Capability (a 'low constant'):

[Decision Time + Readiness and Preparation Time + Deployment Time] $_{NW}$ = some function (f) of Enemy [Capacity $_{NW}$ + Intent / Will] (for a prevalent / ubiquitous capability) (L)

Drawing from equation (L) it can be concluded:

To deal with a network threat, one needs to be networkable.

That Readiness and Preparation and Deployment Times tend to be 'fixed', linear and quantitative and not particularly networkable, per se – although they benefit from being networked and highly interactive with decision makers.

In which case, the key variable becomes Decision Time – other than when forces are forward / pre-deployed. In other words:

Own [Decision Time] $_{NW}$ needs to = some function (f) of Enemy [Capacity $_{NW}$ + Intent Will]. (M)

(U) Returning to equations (C) and (D) it can be concluded that a network threat about a fixed, prevalent, ubiquitous and thereby constant 'Low Capability' cannot be controlled – 'Control

Deterrence' will not work. In which case one is left with needing to influence through some form of 'Command Prevention' – aimed specifically at diverting, changing or re-directing the Will and Intent of the enemy so that hostile networks will not form in the first place. Or, if they do, that they form in non-threatening and supportive ways.

There are other ways of looking at equation (M) in terms of its inferred management:

To control Decision Time in some way (and treating Capability as a 'low constant') so that Enemy [Capacity $_{NW}$ + Intent / Will] is no longer a threat – in other words, the Threat becomes 'far out' and manageable within longer decision cycles.

To <u>prevent</u> the Enemy [Capacity $_{NW}$] to deliver the Threat so that, even if the Intent / Will remains, there is no capacity to deliver – along the lines of 'Oderint Dum Metuant' (let them hate so long as they fear).

<u>Prevent</u> or negate the Intent / Will forming against you – so even if the Capacity $_{NW}$ [and Capability] exists it poses no Threat.

Create some form of 'zero sum', whereby Enemy [Capacity $_{NW}$ + Intent / Will] nullify each other (in other words the very ownership of nuclear weapons becomes so risky as to outweigh any gains; ownership costs and risks become simply too high. A form of self policing.) and in other words one is left to manage a threat based only upon the 'low constant' of Capability.

To treat Decision Time not as a discontinuous linear temporal entity to Readiness and Preparation and Deployment Time but as part of an interactive – therefore networked – and so <u>preventative</u> whole.

(U) With the exceptions of (a) and (e) above – which could be treated as either 'Control or Command Deterrence' – all other variations are essentially forms of Command Prevention. In other words they rely on the building of trusts (or indeed *atrusts*) from within organizations , over time.

(U) Observations (a) and (e) are all the more noteworthy because of their bi-polarity. As a result, and specifically referencing equation (e), both may also be key to forming a future preventative-deterrence policy. For example:

Treating (a) and (e) as forms of 'Control Deterrence', one could remove Decision Time from the equation through a forward positioning policy.

Or,

Treating (a) and (e) as forms of 'Command Prevention' where one gets inside the other's decision making cycle through either self policing (combined with a forward Control Deterrence policy) or by disruption of the enemies 'will' and desire to form hostile networks.

(U) Observation (f) is perhaps the most interesting. Essentially it treats Deterrence as part of a continuous-whole response and does not seek to break it down into its different entities. This

combines both command and control forms of deterrence – connecting the soft to the hard – and allows for temporal discontinuities to be exploited. In other words to buy time for decision-making through the exercising of an interactive forward deterrence policy while taking decisions early, based upon ones own Capabilities and Intent / Will – not being driven by those of the enemy. Most advantageously, it places the enemy more within ones own decision-making cycle, than they in yours'. Addressed comprehensively and given appropriate capabilities it has the advantage of being highly agile and adaptable. This form of 'Comprehensive Deterrence' considers Warning Time as part of a networked 'whole' response – providing deterrence based upon an immediate, effective response.

Soft and Hard Interaction

(U) Key to 'Comprehensive Deterrence' is the interaction of one's own soft and hard power and the interplay of Command upon Control and Capabilities upon Intent / Will. Crucially it places the enemy within and as part of one's own decision cycle, not you of theirs.

(U) If, as extracted from Clausewitz, peoples are not subordinated as instruments of policy but still interact in a non-linear way, then one transitions from a *chaotic* system to a *complex* system with emergent behavior'. In other words as concluded previously, a secure environment may emerge and, or, pervade if:

> '**Peoples are not subordinated as instruments of policy but are enabled to *connect* and *interact* in complex non-linear ways across the spectrum of *hard* and *soft* power in order to achieve their own equilibrium between their emergent *trusts* and associated *rules*.**'(N)

As has been paraphrased to be:

'No Rules without Trusts.' (O)

Abstracting further, it is possible to suggest that:

'War is nothing but continued interaction through the exclusive connection of hard power'. (P)

Equations (N), (O) and (P) begin to put soft flesh on the harder skeletal frames described by the earlier equations from which it is possible to provide a division in terms of hard and soft:

HARD	**SOFT**
Rules	Trusts
Control	Command
Capability	Intent & Will
War	Peace
Time	History (Temporal Discontinuities)
Bandwidth	Fidelity
Mass	Agility
Readiness & Preparation and Deployment Time	Decision Time

(U) The above table is not exhaustive and is useful only up to a point. The key perspective to take from it is that connections need to exist between both hard and soft values and powers to create effect. This is recognized implicitly within both the Threat and Warning Time equations that seek to combine Intent and Will and Decision Time with hard and thereby measurable Capabilities (including Readiness & Preparation and Deployment Time). Networks and networks of networks provide a highly efficient means of connecting and combining the hard to the soft to create effects.

(U) Networks have Capacity. This is significant because it suggests that we need to consider Threat more as a Networked or networkable entity – in other words as 'Threat Capacity'. Similarly, Warning Time needs to be seen as having networkable capacity. The logical conclusion from such an approach is that Threat can vary over time in terms of its virulence but is ever present – in other words it possesses Temporal Discontinuities and so also ambiguities. Similarly, both Prevention and Deterrence (based upon our response to the Threat and Warning Time) needs to possess Temporal Discontinuities – ambiguities – if it is to be effective in response.

(U) Threat and Warning Time need therefore to be considered in terms of their network capacity. Networks tend to pervade – strengthen over time – or fade away. In other words, they have a capacitive effect that means charged with the right Intent / Will and Capability they become a power source in their own right – combining both soft and hard values / power. As a capacitor in an electric circuit, a network can be used to store power (similar to a battery) and to release this energy as 'switched' either to stabilize or energize the circuit. This leads to the following conclusions:

> **Networks act as Capacitors for storing hard and soft values / power**. (Q)
>
> **Effects (be they Threats or Deterrence) combine Capabilities with Intent and Will**. (R)

Therefore:

> **Threat needs to seen in terms of a Network possessing its own Capacity**. (S)
> (This recognizing that the Threat equation combines soft and hard power / values)

and:

> **Prevention and Deterrence need to be seen in terms of a Network; possessing their own indigenous Capacity to maintain and sustain over time**. (T)
> (This recognizing that Warning Time – a key component of Prevention and Deterrence – similarly combines hard and soft values / power).

(U) Thinking along temporal and thereby linear and continuous lines gave rise to Western notions of war and peace described in Ecclesiastes (ch. 3, v. 1), as 'a time of war and a time of peace'. Essentially, these were the notions that were assumed within the Peace of Westphalia and taken into its major construct – International Law; notions of the State and the division of religion from state and from politics. All three constructs assumed that conditions of war and peace were finite and capable of being contained and so described and ruled upon. This is not now and has rarely if ever been the case.

Preventative-Deterrence Continuum

(U) Significantly, Clausewitz, amongst others, saw both peace and war as continuums – temporal discontinuities – that went on at all times in one form or another: 'Der Krieg ist nichts al seine Fortsetzung des politischens Verkehrs mit Einmischung anderer Mittel[57]' or 'War is nothing but a continuation of politics with the admixture of other means'. This suggests that Clausewitz not only saw war and peace as part of a continuum of temporal discontinuities but also that they remained connected – one with the other: the soft to the hard. In other words, one could not deal with war without dealing with peace (and vice versa). This is essentially the basis of Grotius' Just War Theory which, whilst pre-dating and informing the other Westphalian constructs, is distinct from them in terms of its temporal and connective understanding. Effective prevention and so deterrence therefore is about the judicious exercises of soft and hard powers simultaneously to create the desired effects. In other words, just as for the Doge's Arsenale, the effective exercise of command and control – prevention and deterrence – is fundamental to achieving one's aims. Failure of command to control and so deter is rapidly identified and commanders who are controlled cannot prevent or deter. The Command and Control structure therefore devised for USCENTCOM and the Afghanistan ToO has much wider implications – and its efficacy and agility will contribute significantly both to preventing VEOs from forming and both preventing and deterring aspirant nuclear weapons nations, be they allies of foes.

[57] Clausewitz von Karl, 'Vom Kriege' Bk 8, ch 6, sect. B.

TAB G: LEARNING AND ADAPTING TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX I

(U) This appendix examines the requirements for enabling learning and so adaptation within our organizations and institutions; principally as applied to operational theatres. In Afghanistan, for example, while internal-national learning, based upon 'lessons learned', pre-deployment training, exercises, application and post-deployment debriefing and decompression, has been well applied by U.S. Forces, this does not necessarily apply to Allies or even between coalition partners, say between RC(E) and RC(S). The situation is often even more pronounced with U.S. agencies and other international organizations and NGOs; whose people often stay longer, frequently in less well structured and supported environments. Put together as a whole, whilst it is clear that individual units and commands are learning, the organization as a whole may not be. The concept of a Sub-Unified Command will help frame the structures and processes necessary to create Unity of Effort. The ability of the new Command and its parallel civilian Communities of Interest (COI[58]) will only sustain over time if it continues to learn and so adapt. Two of our three outcomes are: to prevail and to stay 'long and light' within 'an affordable and agile footprint' and to enable a 'shared collective understanding' upon which to achieve, 'Focused Unity of Effort, Command and Action'. This will not be achieved if the command and control, focus and convergence institutions we establish are incapable of learning. This paper examines the practical steps and initiatives that might be taken within the Commands to better achieve learning and adaptation across the sub-region.

Knowledge Management

(U) Many people bandy about terms such as Knowledge Management without having a principled understanding of what it actually means. Based upon the cutting-edge work of the U.S. Army, the following view of Knowledge Management was developed for this strategic assessment:

> 'A cross-disciplinary organic enterprise connecting and integrating social, cultural, communication and technical processes – including trust, obligation, commitment, and accountability – to facilitate creative learning and adaptation and leverage information capture and knowledge exchange (ICKE) by connecting communities 'who-need to-know' with those 'who-need-to-share' with those 'who-need-to-use'.

(U) The Three Needs Model (3NM) – Need to Know; Need to Share and Need to Use – and the ICKE Models will be developed separately but clearly play a significant role in achieving command, sub-region learning and adaptation. Placed together with our understanding of KM (above) and for Communities of Interest (below) and one potentially has the makings of a powerful learning organization but one that will require command and leadership to deliver. Based upon a number of related studies, COIs are seen to be:

> 'Distributed, collaborative and inclusive groupings working to discover, synthesize and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information in order to: take better decisions; implement change and create effects.'

[58] A developed understanding of COIs was undertaken for this Strategic Assessment and based upon a number of related studies.

(U) As we envisage, COIs form in order to 'discover, synthesis and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information' and it is the role of Knowledge Management to facilitate, aid and support these, principally, social processes in order to 'facilitate…learning and adaptation'.

Implementation

(U) Even if we are to get all the strategy and vision pieces right across the sub-region, this will count for nothing if we are unable to create change on the ground. This brings into sharp focus the question of 'how leaders are selected' and people are educated and trained for effective delivery which is all about the issue of determining those who will cope; those who may (with help) and those who cannot. If the behavior of people on the ground is bad – be they soldiers or aid deliverers – this will become the dominant factor. There is evidence that this has occurred in part in Afghanistan and which, from our knowledge of previous campaigns, can become a dominant feature: disuniting main effort and command and hindering strategic implementation, often in the full glare of negative reporting. 'The true institutional difficulty is in bringing the agencies together to answer all the questions. Nevertheless this must be done if the use of force is to have a result that leads to the [desired] outcome rather than reinforcing the opponents' position[59].'

Acting Alone?



Figure 1: Basic Stress Curve

(U) The straight forward stress curve is shown below, Figure 1. 'As pressure mounts so does our performance (A) until we eventually reach our peak (B). Give us more and more pressure and we think we can carry on being more and more productive (C). However in actual fact we are not. We actually start to show adverse reactions or stress. At first we may be irritable or snappy; make silly mistakes and be unable to think clearly. However if the pressure continues this becomes worse, our performance drops and we can start to exhibit a variety of physical symptoms (D)[60]'.

[59] Smith, Gen Sir R. *Unity of Force* (Allen Lane: Penguin Publishing 2005), p. 386.
[60] Banks, I, Dr, 'Brain Manual', Haynes, 2006, p. 3.

(U) The inference taken from the Basic Stress Curve, Figure 1, is that, ideally, we operate within an optimum performance zone, about (B). Our personal resilience may therefore be considered in terms of our ability to operate within this zone – along the 'Resilience Curve'. If we are pushed too far, we reach the Point of Cascading Failure – the Humpty-Dumpty position (D) – beyond which we face collapse and are unlikely to be able to return to 'Optimum Performance' without much help.

(U) The basic Individual Competency against Time Curve is shown in Figure 2. It suggests that most people starting a new job arrive with a certain knowledge and ability. As they work themselves into the appointment, their level of competency (based upon their knowledge and ability and increasing confidence) grows to a certain point when it begins to level off. If a 'shock' occurs to the person during this time, their competency takes a knock, from which it never recovers to the position it was beforehand, creating a Competency (Cy) gap. Moreover, if the shock occurs earlier rather than later, one takes longer to recover. The implication taken from Figure 2 is that the better trained and educated and so prepared the individual is, the more likely they are going to be able to cope and the later into a job they are likely to face a shock.



Figure 2: Individual Competency-Time Curves

<u>No 'I' in Team</u>

(U) Figure 2 does not take into account the Basics Stress and Optimum Performance Curve, Figure 1, or the point of Cascading Failure. It also fails to take into account the supporting mechanisms provided by the work environment – the positives of good leadership and a fully functioning team.



Figure 3: Individual versus Team / Program Performances

(U) Figure 3 indicates that other dynamics are at play. In the one instance an individual faces a shock of one kind or another where the team and command closes around the person in support. The individual is not blamed. This has a significant impact. The individual bounces back more quickly and even learns from his experience to become actually more competent; even showing an overall 'Competency Gain'. In the other example, the individual is not supported and also blamed by the command or the team. This individual bounces back slower; probably fails to learn from failure – the hallmarks of an adaptive system – and shows an overall 'Competency Loss'. Service-personnel returning from the Falklands were analyzed in terms of stress. The theory being suggested at the time was that those from broken families might suffer more stress related symptoms than those from more stable families. They did not – they were in fact the same. What was found, however, was that individuals from a stable and supporting background bounced back more quickly.

(U) There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from this. The first is that the better operationally-educated the individual is, the more likely they are to be able to cope and so the later into a job are they likely to suffer a shock. The later into a job, the more quickly an individual will recover and the impact upon their overall competency levels will be much reduced than if they took an earlier shock. A hallmark of a Complex Adaptive System is that it learns from failure: they are safe-to-fail structures; not failsafe ones. Failsafe systems, as opposed to fail-to-safe ones, cannot learn from failure; they interact linearly and overtime become constrained – ruled – and highly complicated, existing always on the edge of chaos. This point of chaos equates to the 'Point of Cascading Failure' beyond which an individual if sufficiently shocked and stressed may be unable to recover. Put simply, 'if failure is not an option; then neither is adaptation'. Think about it.

Programming for Success

(U) A crucial observation for most senior designers, planners and commanders was made by Frankenberger and Badke-Schaub's[61] study into the information-handling behavior of designers with respect to the design situations they were in and distinguishing between routine work and critical situations. They report that designers contact their colleagues for information in nearly 90% of the critical situations. They argue that the information needs of design engineers can be adequately supported by software tools only during routine work and that during critical situations, social interaction cannot and should not be substituted for. This understanding would appear also to complement both Bunge[62] – who observes: '…cognition is personal, but knowledge is social' and Szilard[63] who warns: 'information is costly to acquire and use'. The knowledge of an organization is within its social-networks; not its computers or communication systems, no matter how sophisticated or large their bandwidth. It is relatively simple to examine the formal communications-signal network. It is far harder to examine the social-networks that underlie and inform the formal; far harder still to satisfy support requirements under critical situations. Given this as a perspective, a crucial questions for our senior commands becomes the Ghost Buster question: 'who are you going to call?' If you have no one to call – there is no programmatic support – then, essentially, you are performing as a singleton with all the risks that that entails.

(U) The implications of this are significant – the role of the team and command in allowing people to ask coping questions; recover quickly and to learn from their experience actually means that their overall competency can improve beyond that which it would have done before. Indeed they can recover much more quickly than in an otherwise poorly led and unsupportive work environment, as shown below, Figure 4.

(U) Figure 4 shows individuals operating within and outside their Optimum Recovery Curve. The one individual at the centre of the curve suffers a shock but is operating within it and in a supporting environment that supports rather than blames and castigates failure. The other individual is outside their recovery curve. When the shock hits, this individual does not have the supporting environment around them or the command and leadership structures to support them. The shock pushes them into the region of chaos and to the *Humpty-Dumpty Position* of cascading failures, where they are no longer able to cope as they are blamed for failure and, in their efforts to respond, frequently add to the original failure rather than learn from it. The other position (E) is when an under-loaded, poorly led individual responds to inadequate direction and support by getting bored and doing their own thing – *going off piste*, to play another game.

[61] Frankenberger, E., and P. Badke-Schaub., "Information Management in Engineering Design –Empirical Results from investigations in industry". In: Proceedings of the *International Conference on Engineering Design.* P. 911-916. Munich, Germany, 1999.
[62] [10] Bunge, M.A., "Ten Modes of Individualism – None of Which Works - And Their Alternatives".*Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 2000. **30**(3): p. 384-406.
[63] Szilard, L., "On the Increase of Entropy in a Thermodynamic System by the intervention of Intelligent Beings – the Critique", (Rapoport A. and M. Knoller trans.). Behavioral Science (1964(1929)), 9:302-2310.



Figure 4: Failsafe or Safe to Fail?

Planning for Effect

(U) It is generally recognized that, hitherto, our pace of change has been too slow to cope and so respond agilely to the threats and actions of our opponents. To change will take leadership from the top, which means essentially changing the 'connective tissue[64]' of our institutions to allow for adaptation. This in turn will require our organization becoming ability and not rank conscious – the hallmarks of a wartime military – and preferring its experienced specialists and experts appropriately. This needs to be understood within all our assessment and planning teams, as does the Rule of 5Cs[65]: 'Capacity, Capability, Coherence, Consistency and Continuity have a Quality and Quantity all of their Own (as attributed to Stalin)'. There is evidence that often we do not apply the rule sufficiently, with the result that the next 'group in' are unable to pick up from the previous one and essentially go back to scratch: creating a time and competency lag – essentially the hall-marks of a non-learning institution. To overcome this, one needs to plan to provide the right education and learning between teams – from the start – so that the 'next-one-in' does not have to start all over again. This means dynamic learning between generations at the same time as educating new teams coming in.

(U) Through a huge effort, including; longer tours (up to 15 months) and the integrated application of learning from lessons learned, the U.S. Armed Forces have got this. The problem is that many of their Coalition partners and U.S. agencies and International Organizations and NGOs with which they work have not. As a result, seams develop between commands and PRTs and parent organizations that mean we remain less than the sum of our parts. The above diagram is intended to conceptualize some of the problems. Short Tour lengths of 6 months (TC 1) tend to show limited competency gains, towards the

[64] Attributed to Ms Donna Hopkins, State Department, speaking 13 Dec 06.
[65] Atkinson, S.R., and M. Shama, 'Learning and Adapting to Modern Conflicts', ARAG Publications for Marshall Centre, Comprehensive Approach to Modern Conflict Conference, Munich, March 2007.

last two months of each tour[66] - when they typically move from being a group to a team. If the next generation comes in 'from scratch', they begin largely at a similar level of 'education-operation' competency as the previous group. If there is no or limited learning between the groups, then the 'effectiveness decay' is near vertical. The group's competency and effectiveness increases but, in their tour, they never show a sustained improvement over their predecessors and this again collapses on handover to the next group. Without enabling dynamic social learning between groups and training / education establishments one has improved competency gains from about the four month point onwards, but this again collapses back on handover.



Figure 5: Planning for Effect

(U) There is evidence to suggest that many of our organizations may not in fact be learning, as shown by our 'competency loss'. They may, in actuality, 'flat lining' at the lower effectiveness and competency levels within a readily recognizable and identifiable band, known also to those opposing us – who, immersed in the local environment, do not have tour lengths and 'memory loss': they do not stop learning. Clearly there is an imperative to provide improved cross-institutional and agency operation-education to groups deploying so as to ensure dynamic social learning between groups. An aspect of this learning process is to create the environments in which people can learn and to ensure that people are 'not preferred' against when they do operational tours away from their 'capitals' and

[66] Based upon work by Paul Sternberg, the Morgan Professor of Biology at Caltech: 'that ideas take approximately eight weeks (two months) to work through the mind and to be expressed.' In a tactical-operational setting, it is suggested that these same ideas, if any good and can be acted upon, take another two months to be applied and another two months to be enacted.

that, when they return, we make use of their knowledge – essentially enabling inter-group learning and inter-institution learning. This is the only way in which we are likely to be able to show 'cascading' improvements in our effectiveness and competency across generations, groups and institutions. This dynamic social learning also provides teams with their collective memory, without which any group find will it hard if not impossible to learn.

Learning for Effect

(U) Abstracting from President Eisenhower:

> 'We have been measuring things instead of planning, researching, designing, instrumenting, learning and "sensemaking[67]": in preparing for battle…plans are useless but planning is indispensable" '.

(U) Our ability to learn and adapt brings into focus the way in which our institutions are aggregated: 'formal organizations that cannot change to ensure that their context remains trusted will not endure – to endure they need networks to influence and lead change. Networks without power do exist and endure (they may fade away), but to be effective, they need the blessing of formal organizations[68]'. This inter-relationship between the formal hierarchical organizations and their surrounding more informal, scaled and therefore small-world networks appears crucial to sensemaking. These networks are based more upon trusts rather than rules. Without them and the vital connection between the two, we will not make sense and so learn. In his examination of Party-Army relations in Mao's China, Fang Zhu concludes that: '…the more authoritarian the regime, the more focused the elite will be on power and status rather than policy making. Candid policy debates require strict legal and procedural protection, without which it is simply too risky for elites to act solely on their ideological convictions and policy concerns[69].' In other words, Zhu observed that, 'without the legal and procedural protection' of the People's Republic of China, a context in which 'the elite could meet to 'debate' their 'ideological convictions and policy concerns' would not exist. It was the formal organizations of Mao and the PRC that needed to bless such a Small World Network – or in our terms Communities of Interest – of the elite with the safe context necessary for 'candid policy debate' Thus, in blessing a network, formal organizations also need to provide the authority and power for creating and protecting its networks, whilst accepting the risk of failure to itself. In some instances, crucially those involving high personal risks, a network will not form unless protected by its associated organizations[70].

(U) Amongst Churchill's' trusted Communities of Interest was Bletchley Park – one of his crucial sensemakers. The question becomes, 'we have done this before - can we do it again?': 'What the NSA really needs to do, say Arquilla[71] and others, is to build a new Bletchley Park. Just as Bletchley attracted Alan Turing, inventor of the modern computer, the NSA needs to summon the Turings' of our day[72].' This is essentially what 'Lt. Gen. David Petraeus' then as the new U.S. commander in Iraq did in 2006:'…assembling a small band of …intellectuals…sharply critical of its top commanders. Army officers tend to refer to the group as "Petraeus guys". Essentially, the Army is turning the war over to

[67] 'Planning is a part of sensemaking', Understanding Command and Control', Alberts & Hayes, CCRP, p. 61and 'sensemaking and learning are part of researching and designing'.
[68] Atkinson, S.R, and J. and Moffat, 'Agile Organization' CCRP, 2005.
[69] Zhu, Fang. *Gun Barrel Politics*. Boulder, CO, USA: Westview Press, 1998. p. 229.
[70] Atkinson & Moffat, Ibi
[71] John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey.
[72] Michael Hirsh 'The NSA's Overt Problem So Many Conversations, So Few Clues to the Terrorists', Washington Post, January 1, 2006.

its dissidents[73].' If we ignore this lesson, we have a very real warning from history if we get this wrong: 'Information became ever more filtered, ever more dangerous to the messenger[74]: Hitler refused to acknowledge the consequences of his own actions, and the German people realized far too late that they were trapped by a terrifying confusion [created by the complicated chaos] of cause and effect[75].' Hence the need for organizations and institutions in which we can learn and so adapt – Communities of Interest – and the process and means by which we can do so – Knowledge Management.

Implications

- (U) Individuals ideally operate within their *Optimum Performance-Pressure Resilience Curve*.
- (U) If over-pressured or under-loaded, individuals can reach a point of *Cascading Failure* beyond which they can no longer cope or they are no longer working competently where needed.
- (U) *Operational-Education* gives individuals an ability to learn and so to cope.
- (U) The better Operationally-Educated the individual, the later they are likely to suffer a shock and the quicker they are likely to recover to a much higher level of competency than if shocked earlier.
- (U) If the individual is not supported by their team or well-led / commanded they will show limited learning gain and experience competency loss; taking considerably longer to recover.
- (U) If the individual receives a shock and is in a supportive, well-led organization not only can they *learn* from the experience but they can recover much more rapidly and go on to achieve improved levels of competency – the hallmarks of a *Complex Adaptive System*.
- (U) If the individual is operating outside their *Optimum Recovery Curve* and is poorly supported and badly-led they are unlikely to be able to recover from shock: they will be pushed to a chaotic *Humpty-Dumpty Position* of cascading failure beyond which they can no longer cope (D/F and E).
- (U) If the individual is operating within their *Optimum Recovery Curve* and suffer a shock; if they are well supported and well-led they can recover and show both Learning and Competency Gains.
- (U) *Complex Adaptive Systems* are the hallmarks of networks and not formal, hierarchical and ruled structures.
- (U) A ruled and controlled operational environment is unlikely to be able to learn and so to cope with failure and shock – it is non-adaptive.
- (U) An individuals' ability to cope and to learn is based upon three vital components:
    - Their *Operational Education*.
    - Their ability to find and work within their *Optimum Resilience Curve*
    - The support of their *Network* and the quality of *Command* and *Leadership*.

Two significant command and leadership considerations were also identified:

- (U) It is our assessment that 6 month tours may be too short and 15 months potentially too long; whilst 12 months may be about right.
- (U) There is a need to create cross functional, command inter-entity learning at the regional, national and international levels. How can lesson-learning replace the generally post-event lessons learned?

[73] Thomas E. Ricks, 'Petraeus gathers learned advisers', Washington Post, 5 Feb 2007.
[74] Atkinson and Moffat, Ibid, p. 78.
[75] Beevor, Anthony. *Berlin*. New York, NY, USA: Penguin Books. 2002, p. xxxiv.

(U) The above require careful negotiation but needs to be a key command, leadership and planning consideration if we are to deliver Unity of Effort, Command and Action in the Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region.

TAB H: THREE NEEDS MODEL FOR INFORMATION CAPTURE AND KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX I

(U) It is our assessment that despite the recommendations arising from both the 9/11 and Butler reports that there has been insufficient analysis, modeling and work done to develop what the 9/11 rightly observes as the 'Need-to-Know; Need-to-Share; Need-to-Use' model (we call the Three Needs Model (3NM) and which both reports recommend, within 'trust based, virtual networks' that encourage interaction, 'dissent and alternative or minority hypotheses, or uncertainty' to majority reporting. This we judge to be the hallmarks of a healthy organization where dissent is seen also to be an expression of loyalty to the organizations represented and their people; to be encouraged. Moreover, it is also our assessment that the Need-to-Know model is not replaced by the Three Needs Model. Organizations and states have certain knowledge – the crown jewels – that they have every right to protect. What our assessment suggests is the need to develop new methodologies for sharing and using information across domains.

Been There

(U) The 9/11 Report[76] writes: 'as presently configured, the national security institutions of the U.S. government are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold War. The United States confronts a very different world today. Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses[77]'. It is our assessment that similar configurations have continued to impair Unity of Effort and Command in our operational theaters; most notably in Coalition enterprises where international legitimacy is often sacrificed at the expense of efficiency and effectiveness – and so unity of effort. 'The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the [national government and international institutions are] currently structured. Lines of operational authority run to the expanding executive departments, and they are guarded for understandable reasons….The result is that each agency or department needs its own intelligence apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is hard to "break down stovepipes" when there are so many stoves that are legally and politically entitled to have cast-iron pipes of their own. Recalling the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986, Secretary Rumsfeld reminded us that to achieve better joint capability, each of the armed services had to "give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives." Today, he said, the executive branch is "stove-piped much like the four services were nearly 20 years ago." He wondered if it might be appropriate to ask agencies to "give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort[78]."[79]' The 9/11 Commission went on to observe[80] that the: '…system …requires a demonstrated "**need to know**" before sharing. This approach assumes it is possible to know, in advance, who will "**need to use**" the information. Such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Those Cold War assumptions are no longer appropriate. The culture of agencies feeling they own the information they gathered at taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead feel they have a duty to the information—to repay the taxpayers' investment by making that information available…Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing,

[76] 9/11 Commission Report, 2004.
[77] 9/11 Report p. 399
[78] Donald Rumsfeld prepared statement to 9/11 Commission, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 20.
[79] 9/11 Report, p. 403
[80] 9/11 Report pp 417

with risks (criminal, civilian, and internal administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing information. No one has to pay the long-term costs of overclassifying information, though these costs—even in literal financial terms— are substantial. There are no punishments for *not* sharing information. Agencies uphold a "**need-to-know**" culture of information protection rather than promoting a "**need-to-share**" culture of integration[81]'. A recommendation arising from the 9/11 Commission was that: 'The President should...coordinate the resolution of the legal, policy, and technical issues across agencies to create a "**trusted information network**."[82]'

(U) In the UK and as a result of the investigation into Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Butler Report[83], was commissioned. Building on the 'need-to-share', the report stated: '…it will be essential to continue to bring to bear all sources of intelligence in a coordinated way. We have noted…that success in the cases we studied came through close collaboration between all involved to piece together the intelligence picture, **with teams able to have shared access to all available intelligence**'. The report went on to say:, 'However we consider that it would be helpful through day-to-day processes and the use of new information systems to create a **'virtual' network** bringing together the various sources of expertise in Government on proliferation and on activity to tackle it, who would be known to each other and could consult each other easily[84]'. The Butler Report also raised the question of 'better machinery for bringing to the attention of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) dissenting opinions' and recommended, inter alia, the: 'consideration of the provision of proper channels for the expression of dissent within the UK MOD Defense Intelligence Service through the extension of the remit of the Staff Counselor, who provides a confidential outlet for conscientious objection or dissent within the intelligence agencies, to cover DIS civilian staff and the Assessments Staff[85]'. The Report went on to state: '…we note that the US Government does from time to time attach degrees of confidence and notes of dissent to its National Intelligence Estimates. These may help to prevent readers from attaching more certainty to judgments than is justified and intended. While not arguing for a particular approach to the language of…assessments and the way in which **alternative or minority hypotheses, or uncertainty, are expressed**, we recommend that the intelligence community review their conventions again to see if there would be advantage in refreshing them.[86]'

Knowledge Management and Communities of Interest

(U) Our previous assessments led us to develop the following view of Knowledge Management (KM) to be:

> 'A cross-disciplinary organic enterprise connecting and integrating social, cultural, communication and technical processes – including trust, obligation, commitment, and accountability – to facilitate creative learning and adaptation and leverage information capture and knowledge exchange (ICKE) by connecting communities 'who-need to-know' with those 'who-need-to-share' with those 'who-need-to-use'.

(U) As part of this work, we also assessed Communities of Interest (COI) to be:

> 'Distributed, collaborative and inclusive groupings working to discover, synthesize and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information in order to: take better decisions; implement change and create effects.'

(U) As we envisage, Communities of Interests form in order to 'discover, synthesis and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information' and it is the role of Knowledge Management to facilitate, aid and support these, principally, social processes in order to 'facilitate…learning and adaptation'.

Integration versus Interaction

(U) Many social scientists call for integration without really understanding the costs of integration and when, in actuality, they are calling for a new model to replace an existing model that has failed in some way[87]. This form of multi-modeling – often based upon non causal and non-empirical 'evidence' – essentially replaces integration with what might be termed multi-modeling. Work undertaken by UK MoD, considered the following idea for integration, which was used in preparing the Defense Strategic Guidance, 2005:

> 'The ability of networked systems, units or forces to provide and accept services from other systems, units or forces by uniting procedures, rules and information so that, when formed, the force operates together more effectively, capably and seamlessly as a whole[88].'

(U) Nonetheless, Integration comes at a cost very often of flexibility and agility as one moves from high end interactivity within groups and across their seams and boundaries to a position where substitution – or interoperability – is no longer an option. For example, in a Coalition Enterprise certain nations may bring specific capabilities or permissible means of approaching issues or problems that would be impermissible and, or, not tenable within an integrated environment, as expressed below:



Figure 1: The Arc of Interoperability

(U) The above Arc of Interoperability suggests that for many organizations , 'high-end Interaction' is the best that they might achieve – even within national institutions – and that integration (which essentially means becoming subordinate in some way) is a step too far. We see this not just between intelligence organizations and states but also between the military and other Inter Agencies; between coalition partners and frequently between the Inter Agencies and NGOs and NGOs and the Military[89]. The fact that Integration, however defined, comes at a cost means that most organizations will be willing to share information if it is to be used for a common understandable purpose but are not willing for their partners to know all they have to know about subjects and matters that represent and define their own Intellectual Property. It is these networks we assess that both the Butler and 9/11 Reports had in mind when they spoke of 'trust based, virtual networks' that, in our view, encourage interaction. It is exactly this type of healthy interaction that we had in mind with regard to the combination of COI and KM. As we envisage, Communities of Interests form in order to 'discover, synthesis and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information' and it is the role of Knowledge Management to facilitate, aid and support these, principally, social processes in order to 'facilitate…learning and adaptation'.

[89] Although interestingly it is our observation that, probably for reasons of proximity, relations between NGOs and the Military at the tactical and operational levels are often far closer and more understanding than between NGOs and their Inter Agency contacts.

Transparencies

(U) When many of us older soldiers, sailors, and Marines grew up, we used acetates to build up complex operational pictures. In effect this was achieved by building up different operational layers by laying transparencies on top of each other to build up the final picture. This was through a process of interactive information exchange and knowledge capture (ICKE) that we see as being typical within a Community of Interest. Essentially, each picture – acetate or view-foil – was declaratory of the position of a particular agency with regard to a specific objective or target. Information was declared so as to de-conflict activities and, more specifically, to avoid conflict (for example friend-on-friend). This was an interactive process that enabled integration of resources for a specific purpose, often geographically and temporally defined. It did not mean full access to every one's information or a right to know by all parties to everything known by each other. Indeed such systems, where they exist, are rapidly swamped by information to the point where they can often barely deconflict; resulting in so called, 'friendly fire' incidents. Calls for transparency, we therefore conclude, are often misplaced and even nonsensical when what may actually be needed is 'transparencies; not transparency, per se'. In other words, the building up of an integrated picture through the interactive-declared 'transparencies' of individual positions – through a COI – rather than demanding transparency from, by and to all. This leads to an integrated approach to a specific problem – without the costs of global integration, which will nearly always be impossible to achieve in any case.

The Three Needs Model

(U) As identified, there is an increasing need to re-examine existing and develop new methods for information capture and knowledge exchange as also mandated in the 9/11 and Butler (UK) Reports. This needs to find ways of respecting rights and privileges established previously in terms of *need-to-know*, whilst developing procedures for *sharing* and for *using*. This, in turn, led us to the concept of the Three Needs Model (3NM) described in terms of *Need-to-Know*; *Need-to-Share* and *Need-to-Use* – as identified but not specified in the 9/11 Report. Previous recommendations have been made to move from need-to-know to need-to-share but very little work has been to develop these concepts, or implement them, whilst recognizing and preserving understandable need-to-know rights and privileges. It is our assessment, that Communities of Interest as we consider them to be, have a specific role to play regarding information capture and knowledge exchange, as supported by Knowledge Management. Furthermore, we see effective Communities of Interest combining the three needs: 'Need-to-Know (N2K); Need-to-Share (N2S) and Need-to-Use (N2U)' within their constructs, building upon and from their 'declared transparencies' to achieve an integrated picture. Communities of Interest can exist to Know or to Share or to Use Information and exchange Knowledge. It is our assessment that they can only be effective when all three come together in a COI. As example, during the Foot and Mouth epidemic in the UK in 2001, the UK Government was able to combine its departments in order that they knew what was happening and could share information between them at the strategic level. The problem was that they did not have the 'doers' at the operational and tactical levels to implement change and so affect the course of the infection. This was ultimately and largely supplied by the British Army (with sailors and airmen); frequently operating at the junior officer and corporal level. This remains the case when comparing military organizations , who have depth at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, with Inter Agencies, who have depth at the strategic level but patchily at the operational and little at the tactical levels, with NGOs, who are often tactically rich but operationally constrained. If we can find ways of combining these different needs to know, share and use within a COI, it should be possible to affect the changes we all know and desire to deliver.

Information Vectored Exchange (IVE)

(U) Proposals were developed for what was termed an 'information vectored exchange' which sought to identify and so, to an extent, distinguish between different types of information and opportunities for exchange. The model also built upon concepts for the serial vectoring opportunities for such information exchange, to develop a seven stage IVE model (in gms) detailed in Figure 3. This model, in turn, combined notions for Type A (Control); Type B (Command) and Type C (Informal) networks in terms of Need-to-Know (A); Need-to-Share (B) and Need-to-Use (C). In this model, Figure 2, the Command function is seen to both connect and arbitrage between the Need-to-Know (Type A) and Need-to-Use (Type C), i.e. between Control and Informal Networks. In an effective and competent organization, Type B networks are seen to have emergent properties resulting from and contributed to by healthy interaction between Type A and Type C Networks. The Three Needs Model shows both multi-loop exchange and the push and pull of information, see Figure 2.

(U) The models below examine what a 3NM and IVE model might look like and how it may possibly operate. Essentially, the Need-to-Share network is shown acting as the vectoring component within the model; pulling, pushing and so enabling information flow from and between the Need-to-Know and Need-to-Share models shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Need-to-Know; Need-to-Share; Need-to Know (3NM) Model

(U) Essentially, the Need-to-Share network is shown acting as the vectoring component within the model; pulling, pushing and so enabling information flow from and between the Need-to-Know and Need-to-Share models shown above. Figure 3 below suggests such a seven layered IVE model for information and exchange.



Figure 3: Information Vectored Exchange (IVE) for Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange

Level	Information	Exchange
Informal	Non-formalised information	Ad hoc meetings, gatherings, gossip
Open	Freely accessible information	Non-exclusive gatherings
Formal	Formalised information (papers, news etc)	Inclusive Membership
Serial	Information streams – newscasts etc	Streamed (consecutive-temporal) meetings
Vectored	Calibrated / directed Information	Calibrated / directed meetings and discussions
Classified	Codified information	Meetings held in camera at pre-determined levels
Closed	Limited access information	Limited access meetings

Table 2: Information Exchange

(U) The IVE Model developed in Table 2 and Figure 1 posits a way of moving towards a more *inclusive* exchange of information between tightly controlled Type A Networks (N2K) and the informal and less controlled Type C Networks (N2U) – whilst protecting and preserving rights and privileges. Command and Control, Coordination, *Focus* and *Convergence* – CFC vice C2 – Type B (N2S) Networks are seen to occupy the *vital space* between the N2K and N2U models. The main intention of the N3 model is to provide the informal-formal processes and protocols for resolving factional differences that exist in any healthy organization.

The Three Needs Model:Organizing for Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange

(U) Type A (Control) Networks lend themselves to technological applications, specifically where rules and procedures are required to determine and protect information flows. Over the past fifteen years or so, technology has driven science, with the result that data-based-technologies have been seen more as 'ends in themselves' than as means. More an end result than an aid to achieving it. This has had the effect of displacing the social dimensions of the network; increasingly, Type A networks have become unknowing and, worse perhaps, unknowable. And as this has occurred, the opportunities for leaking or suborning the system have increased. Almost the reverse has been the case for Type C (Informal) networks which have exploded because they are seen as a means and not an end to communication and social interaction, for example Face Book.

(U) Most governments have, in their *being*, departments that occupy part of the Need-to-Share networks, such as StratCom. The problem is, that these departments / agencies are not part of a comprehensive, 'whole' program. They are individually located, poorly structured and often controlled in such a way that they are made more 'pink than green – closed than open' (see Figure 3). In such an environment, they are rarely respected (or trusted) and frequently become the scapegoat – useful messengers to be shot. Consistency of message and continuity of people becomes erratic and difficult to sustain – further disrupting and weakening the narrative. Because of the dysfunctional nature of many of our institutions, the reaction to failure has rarely been to learn and adapt but rather to react and control.

(U) In actuality, it is our assessment that Type B Need-to-Share Networks exist on the edge of Type A, Need-to-Know, networks and similarly on the edges of Type C networks (not centrally as shown): they are 'double-edge' networks. Other work has identified that Type B networks have emergent properties – emerging from the combination of functional Type A and Type C networks. When Type A and B networks are non-functional and interaction between the two is constrained and untrusting, functional Type B networks do not emerge. Moreover, whilst an organization might determine its Type A networks it can, at best, only influence Type C networks. The main responsibility for creating Type B edge-networks therefore rests with the organization itself.

(U) To place people on the edge of an organization and keep them there, three principle requirements are seen to exist – each of which has to be in operation, simultaneously:

- (U) There needs to be underlying (extra-organizational) 'societal' trusts in processes, procedures and protocols – in some instances rules – to encourage and protect edge-individuals. Current mandated (what is not prohibited is permissible type) legislation does not achieve or provide for this.

- (U) Organizations need to be able to recognize, create, reward and promote ability within their formal, ranked structures – to be, primarily, ability as opposed to rank conscious – and to identify, recruit and select individuals on the basis of 'ability not preference'. Specifically, these individuals need to be protected and separated from formal career lines and processes – in some cases individual managers. On selection and appropriate positioning, organizations then need to create 'secure, sure and safe' reporting and 'handling lines' that will enable edge-individuals and their associated networks and programs to exist – 'to be' – over the long term.

- (U) Individuals need to be identified, educated, trained and kept alive but, in the end of the day, their organization needs to understand that only a small percentage of people, perhaps between 2-10%, can or indeed would wish to work in such domains. And they can easily be prevented from doing so. Their reward is often little more than 'being' enabled and allowed to be members of such networks.

(U) Need-to-Share networks, working essentially between and across the 'open-to-closed' information domains, need to have certain protected privileges, protocols and processes. This is essentially what is meant by vectoring. In other words, contained within the serial streams are meta-state vectors that relate directly – and so can be immediately distinguished – to the meta-datums established within both the Type A and Type B networks. In this way, information can be processed and acted upon accordingly; knowledge formed and information exchanged. Simply creating an organization and placing it on the edge without previously establishing appropriate meta-datums within both networks and the connecting meta-state vectors (protocols, processes and procedures) will not allow for the organization as a whole to function. The Type B networks will quickly be killed off. Similarly, expecting the Type B networks to cover the complete edge without concentrating on key nodes, will spread resources too thinly and lead to dis-functionality. The solution would appear to be to create the conditions from which Type B networks might emerge and be scaled and then coupled appropriately.

(U) Bletchley Park is a case in point. Created very much to work on-the-edge (as a Type B network), by all accounts it functioned brilliantly from its inception up and until 1942. Then it went into sharp decline and, by the end of the war, was a shadow of its former self. Why? Four reasons appear uppermost: first, its very success caused jealousies within the otherwise privileged Type A communities; secondly, these jealousies led to rules and processes being introduced that, thirdly, acted to prevent the Type B networks forming and so, fourthly, inhibited the sharing and using of information and so exhibiting emergent behavior. This may also have been impacted by the US infusion occurring at around same time (change on change); the organizational-cultural changes this brought with it and the weakness of Churchill's position in 1942 (after Singapore). The combined effect was to reduce the trusts and increase the controls and rules placed upon Bletchley Park – although, interestingly, its outstations were largely unaffected and, it is our assessment, some continued to perform well long after the end of WWII.

A Move to Re-Integration

(U) Significant questions remain regarding *system identification*, *enabling* and *disabling* and *composition* and *de-composition*. As has been suggested, organizations have often not done the vital system identification work, first, in terms of what is incoming and outgoing and what is wanted and, as importantly, not wanted. Equally peoples' perceptions of information and information systems vary significantly, frequently to the detriment of the organization as a whole. For example, the development of Strategic Communications within government structures. At the same time, a lack of scientific [*decompositional*] understanding (when it comes to the creation and sustaining of successful edge-networks capable of undertaking this type of work effectively) has led to stasis and sometimes worse. Effectively, organizations and networks have been disabled rather than enabled. Re-integration will require a scientific understanding of what we want to do in terms of system identification; broken down further with respect to enabling / disabling and composition / decomposition. A better understanding of information; what it represents and how it is exchanged will greatly assist this work.

It is our assessment that, whilst more work is required to develop the above models – including moving from transparency to transparencies and from value to values based judgments – that the above models, including our understanding of Communities of Interest and Knowledge Management offer us a way to re-engage our institutions in ways and means that might truly deliver Unity of Effort; Unity of Command and so Unity of Action.

APPENDIX SIX: LIST OF REFERENCES TO ANNEX I

BOOKS

(U) Beevor, Anthony. Berlin. New York, NY, USA: Penguin Books, 2002.

(U) Chirala, R.C., A Service-Oriented Architecture-Driven Community of Interest Model, Department of Computer Science & Engineering, Arizona State University, 2004.

(U) Coates, J.F., Person-to-Person Enterprise, Industrial Research Institute, Inc., 2001.

(U) Erickson, T and W. A. Kellogg, Knowledge Communities: Online Environments for Supporting Knowledge Management and its Social Context, IBM, T.J. Watson Research Center, 2001.

(U) Johnson, K., "Initial Version of the Information Concept: Shared Information Environment" as quoted in the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium: The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies. Worcestershire, UK: 2004.

(U) Rocha, L.M., and J. Bollen, "Biologically Motivated Distributed Designs for Adaptive Knowledge Management," in Design Principles for the Immune System and Other Distributed Autonomous Systems. Edited by Cohen I. and L. Segel (Eds.) Santa Fe Institute Series in the Sciences of Complexity. Oxford University Press, 2000.

(U) Smith, General Rupert. Utility of Force. New York: Penguin Publishing, 2005.

(U) Stevenson, C.A. Congress at War Washington: NDU Press, 2007.

(U) Tooby, J., and L. Cosmides. "The Psychological Foundations of Culture" in The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Edited by H. Jerome, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, OUP, 1992.

(U) Zhu, Fang. Gun Barrel Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.

ARTICLES

(U) Atkinson, S.R, and Goodman, A., "Influencing Network Decision Taking, Advanced Research and Assessment Group," Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Nov 2008.

(U) Atkinson, S.R., N. Carrigan, R. Keller, A. Maier, P. Johnson, P.J. Clarkson, "Trusts, Collaboration and Being Within Enabled Networks" Draft Nov 2008, to be presented at Complex, 09 Feb 2009.

(U) Bunge, M.A., "Ten Modes of Individualism – None of Which Works - And Their Alternatives." Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2000. **30**(3): p. 384-406.

(U) Cordesman, Anthony H. Security Cooperation in the Gulf: Actions Rather than Words and Good Intentions. Center for Strategic & International Studies Briefing, Nov 5, 2008.

(U) Fischer, G., Communities of Interest. Department of Computer Science and Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado, Boulder. Presented at the 24th Annual Information Systems Research Seminar In Scandinavia (IRIS'24), Ulvik, Norway, Aug 2001.

(U) Frankenberger, E., and P. Badke-Schaub. "Information Management in Engineering Design –Empirical Results from investigations in industry." Presented at the International Conference on Engineering Design. Munich, Germany, 1999.

(U) Hazewinkel, M., "Mathematical knowledge management is needed." Keynote speech at the November 2003 MKM meeting in Edinburgh, 12 Feb 2004.

(U) Hope, I., Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Nov 08.

(U) Keller, R., N. Carrigan, S.R. Atkinson, P. Johnson and P.J. Clarkson, "Collaboration and Information Sharing in NEC Networks" NECTISE Paper Presented at NECTISE Conference, Oct 2008.

(U) Kostoff, N. ONR. "Stimulating Innovation." Submitted by Invitation to the International Handbook of Innovation, 2000.

(U) Kugler, L.K., and H. Binnendijk, "Toward a New Transatlantic Compact, Defense and Technology." Paper 52, National Defense University, Aug 2008.

(U) Markham, G., "Communities and their contribution to agile mission grouping." Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 2004.

(U) Michel, L.G., "Defense Transformation a la Francaise and US Interests." Strategic Forum No. 233, National Defense University, Sep 2008.

(U) McOwat, D.M. "Enterprise Modeling." Presentation to DERA, Jul 2000.

(U) McOwat, D.M, and D.J. Holland Smith, "A business model for Knowledge Services?" Presentation to DSTL Knowledge Services Management Team, 23 Oct 2003.

(U) Szilard, L., "On the Increase of Entropy in a Thermodynamic System by the intervention of Intelligent Beings – the Critique." (Rapoport A. and M. Knoller trans.) Behavioral Science (1964).

(U) Tirrell, R.P., Lt Col USMC "Amphibious Expeditionary Warfare C4I Modernization," Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 2001.

(U) Thompson, D.F., The Role of Medical Diplomacy in Stabilizing Afghanistan. Defense

Horizons, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, May 2008.

GOVERNMENT

(U) 9/11 Commission Report: Mar. 23, 2004.

(U) AR 25-1: Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology Management: 15 Jul 2005.

(U) CCR 10-2 -- USCENTCOM Organization and Functions: 07 Feb 2007.

(U) CCR 10-3 -- Terms of Reference for Component Commanders: 29 May 2007.

(U) CCR 10-5 -- USCENTCOM Command and Control (C2) Interoperability Element (CCIE): 15 Jun 2008.

(U) CCR 12-2 -- Security Assistance Policy, Administration and Management: 05 Feb 2009.

(U) CJCSI 3151.01B Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements: 31 Oct 2008.

(U) DOS, 'Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization' paper (UNCLAS), dated: 22 Jan 2007.

(U) DOD Directive 5144.1, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII)/DOD CIO): 2 May 2005.

(U) DOD Directive 8320.03, Unique Identification Standards for Net-Centric Department of Defense: 23 Mar 2007.

(U) JCS Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: 17 Oct 2008.

(U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces: 10 Jul 2001.

(U) Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations: 13 Feb 2008.

(U) Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters: 16 Feb 2007.

(U) Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning: 26 Dec 2006.

(U) Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communication System: 20 Mar 2006.

(~~S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR~~) USCENTCOM FRAGO 07-565 ESTABLISHEMENT OF USFOR-A: 041701Z OCT 08.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCF~~I) USCENTCOM FRAGO 09-1433 COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS IN IRAQ: 031939Z JUL 08.

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ United States Central Command Theater Strategy: Jun 2008.

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) United States Central Command Theater Campaign Plan: Oct 2008.

(U) Government of the United Kingdom. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Report of a Committee of Privy Counselors. Chairman: The Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell KG GCB CVO Ordered by the House of Commons, to be printed: 14th Jul 2004.

(U) Government of the United Kingdom. House of Commons Select Committee on Defense: Ninth Report 2008.

(U) USG Integrated Planning for RC (East), Integrated Civ-Mil Action Group (ICMAG), briefing 8 Dec 2008.

WEBSITES

(U) Army Knowledge Management Principles, posted on Army Knowledge On-Line (AKO) https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/doc/10713107.