

# U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



## Building Partner Capacity Functional Report

*February 2009*

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Reason: ~~1.4a,c,d,e~~  
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ANNEX H: BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY  
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**ANNEX H: BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY (BPC)**

**1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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<sup>1</sup> The BPC team utilized language from the 2008 Guidance for the Employment of the Force to categorize countries in the region as critical partners or actors of concern. Critical partners are those whose coordination or assistance is required to achieve goals/end states. Actors of concern threaten the attainment of goals/end states.

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## **2. (U) PURPOSE, SCOPE & METHODOLOGY**

2.1. (U) This report was completed by the U.S. Central Command's Assessment Team (CAT) over a 100 day period from November 2008 to February 2009. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the USCENTCOM area of interest, a review of existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and suggested actions for USCENTCOM in the context of an illustrative plan for the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of coalition partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve policy goals.


2.2. (U) The BPC Team consisted of members from across civilian and military agencies/departments of the U.S. Government (USG) to include the Department of State, USAID, USCENTCOM, and the U.S. Air Force, as well as Coalition Partners from the UK and Canada. This annex draws upon current U.S. policy documents, primarily the 2008 Guidance for the Employment of Forces (GEF), the 2008 USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan and the DoS and USAID Joint Strategic Plan for FY 2007-2012 (see Appendix 15 for a full list of reference and source materials). Limited resources constrained the scope of this Annex to eight key countries and an analysis of cross-cutting issues affecting the USCENTCOM AOR.

2.3. (U) The BPC Team began by reviewing existing strategic guidance from DoS, DoD, and USCENTCOM. The Team assessed the importance of individual countries in the USCENTCOM AOR against the Global Employment of Forces (GEF) regional end states while accounting for changes to the strategic environment since the GEF was published. Ongoing review of the CAT regional and functional assessments, interviews with Washington and USCENTCOM-based stakeholders, and a literature review of international academic and think tank reports helped the team identify country-specific BPC priorities, cross-cutting issues and structural impediments to effective, rapid and flexible BPC engagement (see Appendix 16 for a full list of consultations). The Team applied the GEF BPC focus areas (Appendix 4) to both the cross-cutting regional themes and the eight prioritized countries to develop a proposed BPC framework. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the BPC methodology.

2.4. (U) This report was developed in the format of a draft illustrative plan in order to impose sufficient rigor in analysis and recommendations. By providing a comprehensive, civilian-

military context for U.S. Central Command, this report is intended to mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short-term solutions to long-term problems. This annex demonstrates that viewing the problem set from a BPC perspective can contribute to the attainment of USCENTCOM strategic goals more effectively than the more military focused TSC approach. Broad recommendations are made to shift from the traditional TSC paradigm to an approach that places increased value on international and whole-of-government considerations.

Disclaimer: This document does not represent the official position of U.S. Central Command, the Department of Defense or any other agency of the United States Government.



**Figure 1. (U) CAT BPC Team Methodology**

### 3. (U) SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

3.1. (U) The BPC Team situation assessment provided an opportunity for a fresh examination of USCENTCOM’s role in building partner nation capacity. Central to the team’s assessment was the view of BPC as a strategic enabler, and as such, how opportunities exist for BPC-related activity to be leveraged in the attainment of all GEF mandated end states. BPC is a particularly important tool set to prevent conflict during military Phase 0 (steady state) operations.

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3.7. (U) Overall, BPC has a significant role to play in the pursuit of long-term strategic objectives in the AOR. There are few shortcuts and BPC, by its very nature, will be a multi-year effort that takes place against a backdrop of complex national and sub-regional dynamics, cultures and historical legacies. The impact of a particular program may only be measureable several years after its inception.

3.8. (U) Effective BPC will be dependent on a series of structural and legislative reforms that overcome constraints posed by USG bureaucratic processes, Congressional oversight requirements and earmarks, and limited production capacity in the defense industry to respond to un-programmed requirements.

**4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS**

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**5. (U) OVERARCHING OBJECTIVES**

5.1. (U) BPC is a key enabling activity that does not have an independent strategy but is conducted in support of broader political and military objectives. The evolution from TSC to BPC should result in increased unity of effort with USG and international partners. The overarching goals listed below provide context and a timeframe for change.

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
5.2. (U) Overarching Intent: Build and develop partner nation capacities to support and advance those national and regional security objectives that protect U.S. strategic interests and increase regional and partner stability.

5.3. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Subordinate/time related objectives:

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## 6. (U) BPC FRAMEWORK

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**Figure 2. (U) BPC Framework and Organizational Construct**

**6.2. (U) SHAPE.** This area involves high level activities, such as diplomacy and development, to facilitate BPC activities at the strategic and operational level.

(U) **State Fragility and Safe Havens**



(U) **Existence of Informal (Non-State) Security Actors**



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
(U) *Inadequacy of Existing and Nascent Security Apparatus*

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<sup>7</sup> Security sector actors include military, law enforcement, intelligence, and border security forces/services as well as governmental management and oversight bodies.

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**Figure 3. (U) Illustrative ANSF Right Sizing**

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(U) Integrated Border Management

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<sup>8</sup> These include: SOCOM and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA); Naval Expeditionary Warfare Command; Specialized MEUs/Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG); the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI); and/or Ministry of Defense Advisor Program (MODA).

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(U) *The Need to Protect Hydrocarbon Resources*

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(U) Environmental Concerns

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(U) Counter-Proliferation/Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

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
(U) Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)

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(U) Lack of Effective Regional Security Initiatives

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**Figure 4. Cooperative Security – Alignment of Interests**

(U) ***Bilateral Relationships Exploited***

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
**7. (U) OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION (THIS SECTION NOT USED)**

**8. (U) PRIORITY COUNTRY EVALUATION**

(U) As identified in the situation assessment, eight countries constitute both critical partners and actors of concern, per guidance in the GEF. Applying the above BPC framework and the GEF BPC focus areas should yield better alignment with stated regional objectives and increase interagency unity of effort. Appendices 6 – 13 describe the major BPC problems and engagement strategies as identified by the regional teams.

**8.1. (U) Afghanistan**

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**(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Recommendations:**

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8.2. (U) Egypt




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8.3. (U) Iraq


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**8.4. (U) Lebanon**



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**8.5. (U) Pakistan**



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8.6. (U) Saudi Arabia

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**8.7. (U) Uzbekistan**

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**8.8. (U) Yemen**

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**9. (U) STRUCTURAL REFORM**

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**9.3. (U) Recommendations:**

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**10. (U) RISK AND MITIGATION**

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**10.2. (U) Afghanistan**

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<sup>9</sup> Currently, the personnel best equipped to manage these mission are those with high demand-low density skill sets, limiting their availability to participate in longer-term missions.

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**10.3. (U) Yemen**

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**10.4. (U) Egypt**

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**10.5. (U) Arabian Peninsula**

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**11. (U) CONCLUSIONS (THIS SECTION NOT USED)**


12. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) RECOMMENDATIONS

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<sup>10</sup> Other USG agencies that conduct BPC activities include the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, Energy, State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and U.S. Agency for International Development.



**13. (U) AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES (THIS SECTION NOT USED)**

**14. (U) APPENDICES**

- Appendix 1 Situation Assessment for BPC
- Appendix 2 Authorities, Programs and Resources for BPC Security Systems
- Appendix 3 Building Partner Framework
- Appendix 4 Guidance for the Employment of the Force BPC Focus Areas
- Appendix 5 BPC Tool kit
- Appendix 6 Afghanistan
- Appendix 7 Egypt
- Appendix 8 Iraq
- Appendix 9 Lebanon
- Appendix 10 Pakistan
- Appendix 11 Saudi Arabia
- Appendix 12 Uzbekistan
- Appendix 13 Yemen
- Appendix 14 Cross-cutting Issues/Objectives
- Appendix 15 Reference Documentation
- Appendix 16 List of Contacts

**(U) APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX H: SITUATION ASSESSMENT FOR BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY (BPC)**

**(U) Reference Documents:**

- U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development: Strategic Plan 2007-2012
- U.S. Department of State Mission Strategic Plans (2008) for countries within USCENTCOM AOR
- U.S. Department of Defense Guidance on the Employment of the Force (GEF) 2008
- United States Central Command Theater Strategy dated 11 June 2008
- United States Central Command Theater Campaign Plan dated October 2008
- U.S. Government Security Force Assistance (Draft Pre-Decisional Working Paper 26 Nov 08)

**1. (U) INTRODUCTION**

(U) Building Partnerships (BP) seeks to set the conditions for interaction with regional partners, allies, competitors or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities.<sup>11</sup> A whole-of-government effort, BP covers a wide range of activities in the USCENTCOM AOR that advance constructive security engagement, mitigate threats to international stability, and strengthen U.S. posture in the region. DoD activities in BP cascade from national-level policy documents and objectives for the services and combatant commanders as provided in the GEF that was published in 2008.

(U) The USG does not have a consistent lexicon for BP which leads to confusion in understanding and execution. DoD has begun to articulate a vision for BP. Its objective is to mobilize and sustain cooperation by working in partnership to achieve common security goals, prevent the rise of security threats and promote a constructive security environment. Based on guidance from OSD and the Joint Staff (JS) and for the purposes of this exercise, BP is an overarching goal that requires Building Partnership Capacity (BPC), Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Security Force Assistance (SFA), and Security Assistance (SA).

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<sup>11</sup> As defined in the Joint Capability Areas.

## Building Partner Hierarchy




Figure 1. (U) Building Partner Hierarchy

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## 2. (U) STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

(U) The starting point for the situation assessment is a review of extant strategic guidance in order to frame subsequent analysis. The two key strategic documents that have been reviewed are the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Joint Strategic Plan for FY 2007-2012 and the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF).

(U) DoS and USAID Joint Strategic Plan strategic goals are identified as:

- Strategic Goal 1: Achieving Peace and Security.
- Strategic Goal 2: Governing Justly and Democratically.
- Strategic Goal 3: Investing in People.
- Strategic Goal 4: Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity.
- Strategic Goal 5: Providing Humanitarian Assistance.
- Strategic Goal 6: Promoting International Understanding.
- Strategic Goal 7: Strengthening Consular and Management.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ The USCENTCOM end states articulated within the GEF are:

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(U) The CAT BPC team conducted an analysis of the USCENCOM tasks in the GEF, reviewed the USCENCOM Theater Campaign Plan (Oct 2008), and considered feedback from CAT sub-regional teams. The methodology involved assessing the importance of all the states in the USCENCOM AOR against the regional end states, accounting for changes to the strategic environment since the GEF was published and analyzed the BP considerations. The BPC team categorized countries in the region as critical partners, actors of concern, and both a critical partner and an actor of concern. Critical partners are those whose coordination or assistance is required to achieve end states for USCENCOM. Actors of concern threaten the attainment of USCENCOM goals. States not categorized did not threaten USCENCOM end states nor contribute in a manner considered vital to their accomplishment.


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### **3. (U) SUB-REGIONAL OVERVIEW**

(U) The following is a brief review of current USCENCOM TSC initiatives coupled with select key findings from sub-region and other functional team initial assessments. Issues involving individual countries are addressed in their respective sub-regional sections.

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(U) Levant and Egypt



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(U) Central Asia

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(U) Arabian Peninsula

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**(U) Afghanistan-Pakistan**

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(U) To date, Pakistan has enjoyed a degree of free rein with respect to its FMF and CSF. A directed USG approach is required to ensure that assistance is transparent and directed towards mutually agreed upon objectives. An example includes identifying the need to direct resources to other MOI and MOD issues that address internal security issues that are the responsibility of the Pakistani Government to perform. A comprehensive U.S. Government strategy derived from the *Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008* that aligns and integrates all elements of USG assistance is required to achieve foreign policy objectives in the region. Such a strategy would inform a robust interagency action plan.

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(U) **Afghanistan.** BPC activities are based on the very extensive effort to build the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This effort is largely centered on the work of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to build both the armed forces and police forces and allow the Afghans to increasingly participate in the security of the country. The effort to build security forces by CSTC-A is completely funded by the U.S. and coalition partners. These TSC efforts in the near- to mid-term must improve and increase in order to build security force capacity within the country to defeat the counterinsurgency and criminal activities.

(U) Afghanistan will remain dependent on international donations for security for the foreseeable future. This will require a long-term vision for partnership support for the country by the international community not only for finance (such as the ANSF Trust Fund) but also for training support. In the near- to mid-term, ANSF capacity will grow to address the counterinsurgency in the country. This force, however, is unsustainable in the long run and will require re-balancing and right-sizing to ensure police primacy is assumed for internal security matters while the ANA / ABP transitions to deal with integrated border management. Over the near- to mid-term, planning and coordination efforts for the ANSF must also focus on a DDR-like transition.

(U) There remains a need to improve the capacities of the Afghan Government. This includes planning, budgeting, national, and district level governance.

(U) **Iraq**

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(U) Security Cooperation with Iraq is based extensively on building the Iraq Security Forces capability to conduct COIN operations and to improve the reach and competence of security-related institutions such as the court system. The security force effort is largely centered on the work of the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) to build both the Armed Forces and police to allow the Iraqis to secure their own country. The United States financed this effort until 2007 when Iraq established its nationally-funded FMS program. The

U.S. still carries most of this burden, but Iraq's share is rapidly increasing. Coalition partners are closely involved in this as well.

(U) Near-term BPC remains focused on a COIN strategy. Simultaneous planning for a transition to a steady state security posture needs to occur. A first step is to reconcile U.S. and Iraqi visions for longer-term internal and external security. Mid- to long-term goals will center on the building of Iraqi security sector capacity to properly deal with these challenges. This will involve development of balanced, affordable and right-sized organization in the MoD and MoI designed around a sustainable and professionalized model. This BPC effort will require a continued multi-agency / international effort to help define, shape, and execute a force re-shaping that sees a transition to police primacy.

#### 4. (U) MAJOR FINDINGS

(U) **Centrality of BPC to other functional areas.** BPC is at the core of an intricate USG and international network of assistance and capacity building programs. The graphic below is illustrative of the complexity of these relationships but is by no means is exhaustive. *Analysis suggests that BPC is fundamentally intertwined with functional areas, sub-regional planning, and other U.S. Government and international efforts to achieve similar objectives.*




Figure 2. (U) BPC Analysis

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(U) **Personnel.** Current TSC programs are managed at the Country Team level by Security Assistance Officers (SAO). Trained to manage traditional security assistance programs, SAOs may not be well prepared to participate or contribute to wider interagency BP efforts. Moreover, SSR and Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions may require a new cadre of advisors from across the USG who can operate from the ministerial to the tactical level, are multi-lingual and possess sufficient cultural awareness. SFA missions (including CT) often require personnel with high demand-low density skill sets which results in short deployment times when what is required is long-term engagement to build the required organizational change for enduring capacity. This undermines efforts to achieve key objectives. *Analysis suggests that there is a disconnect between the skill sets required to manage SA programs and those required to conduct more robust BPC efforts.*

(U) **Realistic Expectations.** Effective BPC is likely to be a multi-year effort that takes place against a backdrop of complex national and sub-regional dynamics, cultures and historical legacies. The impact of a particular program may only be measureable several years after its inception. In addition, BPC must take into account the absorptive capacity of host nation counterparts. Therefore there needs to be confidence that capacity building initiatives will be resourced over the long term despite the shorter term government budgetary process. *Analysis suggests that BPC activities in support of USCENTCOM's longer-term objectives need to be identified and resourced early. This may force a reallocation to activities previously considered of less importance than war fighting.*


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(U) USCENTCOM is faced with a number of seam issues, including borders with three separate Geographic Combatant Commands (U.S. Africa Command, USEUCOM, and USPACOM) as outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), as well as with USSOCOM. Seams also exist between DoS and USAID, which have different regional boundaries, and with coalition partners. These structural seams result in an increased number of actors with equity in any regional issue. Additionally, actors within other AORs, such as Russia, China, India and Israel, have interests in the USCENTCOM AOR that effect policy and strategy.

**(U) Renewed Emphasis on Preventive Engagement.** Theater objectives beyond war fighting require a renewed emphasis on shaping the security environment. Building partner capacity to provide security is more cost effective in the long term than crisis intervention. Steady-state (Phase 0) activities designed to promote security and preclude crises are key to sub-regional objectives. Though the BPC team observed it unlikely that funding for TSC/BP will increase, it is perceived that increased funding for BPC activities could diffuse conflict and preclude USCENTCOM campaign plan execution. *Analysis suggests that CDR USCENTCOM has the opportunity to reinvigorate BPC within the AOR.*

**(U) Coherence with International Partners and Organizations.** While mechanisms exist to provide information on international partner and organization activities, many times they are not properly employed or understood. International coordination occurs at the embassy country teams, in Washington and through multiple international organizations (UN, NATO, etc.). USCENTCOM may not be privy to the information that resides in these arenas. Formal and informal networks should be better understood and exercised if a coherent approach to BPC is to include not only the whole USG, but the activities of partner nations and international organizations.

**(U) Cross Cutting Themes**



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
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**(U) Illicit actor flows.** The movement of illicit and extremist groups across borders affects Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. Effective responses require whole-of-government efforts.

- *Integrated border management.* Opportunities exist for USG and international partners to support the development of integrated border management capabilities in these nations. Effective border management requires collaboration among partners in security, customs, and immigration with explicit links to the justice system to ensure the free flow of people and goods while curtailing illicit traffic which enables criminal and VEO activities. It also requires interoperability among military and police forces charged with border security.

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(U) **Emerging security concerns.** Activities designed to build prevention, mitigation and management capabilities in response to transnational security concerns (such as pandemic influenza, natural or man-made disasters) present opportunities for shared cooperation amongst sub-regional partners. BPC activities should be designed to link civilian and military capabilities at the national and regional levels. Key areas for potential BPC develop including environmental security and disaster and consequence management and response.

## 5. (U) CONCLUSION

(U) BPC is at the core of an intricate interagency and international network of assistance and capacity building programs that are essential for regional security. The goal of BPC is to support those strategic objectives articulated within the GEF for the USCENTCOM AOR and further detailed in the USCENTCOM Theater Campaign plan. However, unity of effort for BPC activities is frustrated by differences in lexicon and institutional equities across the USG and international actors. Current TSC activities need to be reexamined to ensure proper alignment of resources with USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan objectives.

**(U) APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX H: AUTHORITIES, PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES FOR BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF PARTNER SECURITY SYSTEMS**

**1. (U) DISCUSSION**

(U) Building partner nation security and justice capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the United States to promote international stability, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the war against terrorism, and meet other national security challenges. Building partner capacity is especially critical in the USCENTCOM AOR where adversaries like Al Qaeda confront the United States and our allies with terror and other asymmetric means. We know they have the ability to operate within the borders of partner nations and likely will not be overcome by the direct application of U.S. military force alone. Too often, such adversaries and their nation-state supporters can quickly and effectively propagate terror and stage political, social, and economic campaigns.

(U) Effective partners are essential for disrupting terrorist networks and other transnational threats around the globe, thereby preventing crises that would require the deployment of U.S. forces. BPC increases the capacity of coalition partners and friendly nations, thus enabling those nations to work towards common security goals, share burdens in joint missions, manage ungoverned spaces and external threats, and address security issues without direct U.S. involvement.

**(U) *KEY FINDING: Our assistance programs, authorities, processes, and resources need to be supplemented and improved to meet today's U.S. strategic requirements.***

**2. (U) EXISTING AUTHORITIES AND PROGRAMS**

(U) Current legislation provides the basic framework for effective foreign assistance aimed at building the capacity of foreign governments and the training and equipping of foreign security forces and institutions. However, this assistance, its authorities and processes, and resources have not kept up with the current U.S. strategic need.

(U) The primary tools for building the capacity of partner security forces in the USCENTCOM AOR may be summarized as follows:

(U) Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA):

- Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
- Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

(U) Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA):

- International Military Education and Training (IMET)
- International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
- Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programming (NADR)
- Economic Support Funds (ESF)

- Development Assistance (DA)
- Transition Assistance (TI)

(U) Under the National Defense Authorization Act (various years):

- Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
- Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)
- Section 1206 Train and Equip
- DoD Counternarcotics Program (DoD CN)
- CT Fellowship Program (CTFP)

(U) The ability to flexibly adapt to new strategic challenges has been affected by additional legislation that too often has as its sole purpose to impose restrictions and limitations. The complex mix of legislation, including sanctions legislation that restricts foreign assistance outside of the basic FAA and AECA authorities, impose unhelpful constraints on the President's flexibility; many of these sanctions (e.g., Uzbekistan) should be modified or repealed. Annual appropriations also contain yearly congressional earmarks that limit our ability to put funding towards critical priorities, emerging threats, or new opportunities. ***In order to build adequate partner capacity, USCENTCOM should continue to support broader DoD efforts to advocate for increased resources (annual appropriations) for all BPC programs, especially FMF, IMET, INCLE, and Section 1206 and 1207.***

(U) As previously noted, current authorities for the BPC programs listed above allow the United States to address most of the situations and needs with respect to training and equipping foreign militaries and security forces. However, we must continue to seek minor adjustments to existing authorities in order to keep up with the current U.S. strategic need. Our inability to adapt our authorities will weaken the ability of the USCENTCOM Commander to enable partners to take on the task of defeating terrorist threats, promoting international security, and advancing U.S. interests, thereby increasing the strain on U.S. forces and potentially endangering our servicemen and women.

### **3. (U) CHANGES TO EXISTING LEGISLATION**

(U) Since 2002, the Departments of State and Defense have proposed new legislation to supplement existing legislation to help improve the ability of the USG to train, equip, and build the capacity of foreign security forces or to help governments provide operational support to the war on terrorism. Indeed, these efforts have led to the creation of various programs of central importance to USCENTCOM, including: ASFF, ISFF, CTFP, Coalition Support Funds, Global Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Section 1206 and 1207.

(U) More recently, the Administration proposed the following three legislative proposals that would directly have a positive impact on security system capacity building efforts. ***For FY 2009, Congress did not approve these legislative changes. However, USCENTCOM should continue to recommend the following changes:***

**(U) Establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to better support coalition partners in the Global War on Terror.** The United States needs to be able to stockpile additional war fighter equipment (such as night vision devices, communication equipment, and body armor), or to expedite the award of contracts to procure such equipment, so it will be readily available when it is required for transfer to coalition and other partner nations. Advance purchases will focus on high-demand war fighter support equipment that has long procurement lead times. Long procurement lead times are often the main limiting factor in our ability to provide coalition partners with critical equipment to make them operationally effective.

(U) This proposed legislation would create an improved mechanism that builds on aspects of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) (authorized by the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Public Law 97-113, and de-capitalized in 1993). This proposed revision to existing SDAF legislation would allow DoD to pre-purchase equipment for sale or temporary use to its partners, using funds that have been made available to DoD through appropriations by the Congress or by using donations from non-USG sources (e.g., foreign governments, international organizations, and private donors). Under this authority, DoD could accept orders from other federal agencies such as the Department of State to purchase or provide temporary use of equipment to coalition partners for Global War on Terror purposes like counterterrorism, stability operations, border security and peacekeeping activities.

**(U) Amend authorization for Section 1206 to increase the funding authorization level to \$750M, and to allow assistance to non-military security forces.** Counterterrorism and stability operations are often conducted by security forces in addition to the military forces of partner nations. While the existing section 1206 authority allows training of military forces essential to ongoing counterterrorism or stability operations, its effectiveness would be enhanced with the proposed modifications that take into account the significant financial requirements and the command structure of foreign forces (note: relevant forces are not always under military command). This proposed change would increase the USG's ability to meet time-sensitive requirements to build the capacity of foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations or stability operations.

**(U) Authorize reimbursement of salaries for reserve components in support of security cooperation missions.** The global war on terror (GWOT) has created more requirements for training foreign security forces than can be met with active duty U.S. military forces. Members of the Reserves, including the National Guard, provide a ready source of expertise for humanitarian assistance and demining, IMET, and such other security cooperation missions as counterterrorism. However, except in cases of national emergency, Reserve and Guard budgets normally support only two weeks of active duty per year for each Reserve member. As a result, to use Reserve members for security cooperation missions outside of the funded two weeks of active duty, Reserve members must be paid from other funds. Sources of funds from current appropriations, such as Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid, IMET and Foreign Military Financing, are available, along with such non-U.S. sources as foreign country national funds. The proposed change would allow DoD to use these other funds to pay Reserve members to perform missions that build global partnerships and help win the war on terror. This proposed modification would increase flexibility by providing permissive authority for the reimbursement of the salaries of Reserve, National Guard, or other members of the Armed Forces who may be

ordered to active duty in situations where Department of Defense Appropriations do not fund their salaries.


(U) Authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer under the authority of an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), on a lease or loan basis, items identified as Significant Military Equipment (SME) for personnel protection or to aid in personnel survivability to nations participating with U.S. Armed Forces in military operations. This proposal would meet a critical need to provide interoperability and adequate personnel protection to coalition partners in combined operations with U.S. forces. Congress provided similar authority on a temporary basis for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and expanded it to encompass situations outside Iraq and Afghanistan where partners are participating in combined operations with the United States as part of a peacekeeping operation under the Charter of the United Nations or another international agreement. This proposed change would make permanent the authority of the Department of Defense to transfer under Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), on a lease or loan basis, items identified as Significant Military Equipment (SME) for personnel protection or to aid in personnel survivability to nations participating with U.S. Armed Forces in military operations if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines in writing that it is in the national security interests of the United States to provide such support. *USCENTCOM should consider further modifying this proposal by allowing SME to be leased or loaned to partners engaged in CT operations regardless of whether they are participating with U.S. forces.*

#### **4. (U) CHANGES TO FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) PROCESSES**

(U) For the vast majority of the BPC programs outlined in this annex, the equipment and technical/tactical training is procured and delivered through the foreign military sales (FMS) system. The FMS system is designed to provide defense articles and services to foreign recipients by “piggybacking” onto the U.S. military’s procurement system. Thus, the defense articles and services in high demand by partner forces are often in high demand by U.S. forces as well (e.g., night vision devices, armored vehicles, OCIE). To exacerbate the situation, many defense articles are only produced by one or a handful of companies leading to a classic problem of high-demand, low-supply.

(U) The FMS system is also mired by deliberative procedures for issues such as determining releasability and foreign disclosure, calculating price and availability, and the LOR (Letter of Request)-LOA (Letter of Offer and Acceptance) process. Most of these FMS processes were designed with the best of intentions to be deliberate -- the FMS system was never envisioned to be a war-time supply system. And certain issues of low-supply cannot be addressed without a significant increase in the U.S. defense industrial base. That said, the USG can and should take a closer look at the every step of the FMS process to see what *policy* changes can be made to speed up the FMS process. *Therefore, in addition to legislative changes proposed in this paper (such as the stockpiling initiative), USCENTCOM should recommend the creation of an interagency team to thoroughly examine every aspect of the FMS process.*

(U) APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX H: BUILDING PARTNER FRAMEWORK



**(U) APPENDIX FOUR TO ANNEX H: GEF FOCUS AREAS**

**(U) Guidance for the Employment of the Force Focus Areas** are designed to link the command's security cooperation activities to the achievement of its prioritized theater or functional strategic end states. Focus areas identified within the eight categories are not listed in priority order, but they should be broadly treated as security cooperation priorities for the associated combatant command.

- **(U) Operational Access and global Freedom of Action.** This category focuses on gaining unfettered access to and freedom of action in all operational environments, realigning the U.S. global defense posture, gaining host nation support in key countries, and supporting larger U.S. political and commercial freedom of action and access needs. Typically, attaining operational access requires considerable precursor activity such as high-level visits, political-military negotiations and bilateral exercises to set the conditions for success.
- **(U) Operational Capacity and Capability Building.** This category focuses on improving the capabilities and performance of U.S. partners by building usable, relevant, and enduring capabilities to improve a partner's ability to provide for its own security needs, contributing to regional initiatives, participating effectively in coalition operations, and reducing the burden on – and risk to – U.S. forces.
- **(U) Interoperability with U.S. Forces/Support to U.S. Capabilities.** This category focuses on developing command control, operational and technical capabilities; doctrine; and tactics, techniques and procedures with partner nations so that the United States and partner forces can operate effectively and interchangeably in designated combined operations.
- **(U) Intelligence and Information Sharing.** This category focuses on the specific kinds of intelligence or information the United States seeks from or wishes to share with a partner or partners.
- **(U) Assurance and Regional Confidence Building.** This category focuses on activities that assure allies and partners and enhance regional security by reducing the potential for inter- or intra-state conflict. This category also focuses on expanding the community of like-minded states.
- **(U) Defense/Security Sector Reform.** This category focuses on efforts to assist allies with transforming their defense/security establishments in such a way that they become publicly accountable, well-managed and subject to the rule of law.
- **(U) International Defense Technology Collaboration.** This category focuses on engaging in armaments cooperation activities with friendly and allied nations to build partnership capability and to achieve military operation interoperability objectives. Armaments cooperation increases operational effectiveness, reduces DoD's costs of developing and producing weapons systems, provides access to the best technologies worldwide, strengthen alliance relationships, and bolster the domestic and allied defense industrial bases.
- **(U) International Suasion and Collaboration.** This category focuses on activities that develop positive political-military relationships with key security influencers; offsets counterproductive

political and military influence in key regions and international organizations; and reinforce with partners the congruence of U.S. policy objectives and activities. In multilateral relationships, building positive relationships with the institutions themselves and strengthening their ability to contribute to international stability is as important as fostering individual partnerships with key countries. Toward these ends, the United States will work with countries that are regional leaders, or exert a strong influence within multilateral institutions, and leverage the clout of regional institutions.

**(U) APPENDIX FIVE TO ANNEX H: BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY TOOLKIT**

<b>GEF BPC Focus Areas</b>	<b>CAT BPC TOOLKIT</b>	
Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action	<u>USCENTCOM / DoD (Title X / XXII)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Defense and Military Contacts</li><li>- Facilities and Infrastructure Support Projects</li><li>- International Agreements</li><li>- Security Assistance (FMS/IMET/FMF/1206/1207)</li><li>- National Guard State Partnership Program</li><li>- Humanitarian Assistance</li></ul>	<u>DoS / USAID Foreign Asst Objs<sup>13</sup></u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Health (including avian influenza)</li><li>- Disaster Readiness</li><li>- Migration Management</li><li>- Environment (natural resources)</li><li>- Trade and Investment</li><li>- Macroeconomic Foundation for Growth</li><li>- Infrastructure (energy, communications, transport)</li><li>- Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation</li><li>- Good Governance</li></ul>
Operational Capacity and Capability Building	<u>USCENTCOM / DoD (Title X / XXII)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Security Assistance (FMS/IMET/FMF/1206/1207)</li><li>- Other Programs &amp; Activities (CTFP, IIAP, DEIC, PFP)</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Exercises</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Training</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Education</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Experimentation</li><li>- Information Sharing/Intelligence Co-operation</li></ul>	<u>DoS / USAID Foreign Asst Objs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Combating WMD</li><li>- Counternarcotics</li><li>- Transnational Crime</li><li>- Rule of Law and Human Rights</li><li>- Good Governance</li><li>- Protection, Assistance and Solutions (humanitarian assistance)</li><li>- Health (including avian influenza)</li><li>- Infrastructure (energy, communications, transport)</li><li>- Disaster Readiness</li><li>- Counterterrorism</li><li>- SSR</li></ul>
Interoperability with U.S. Forces/Support to U.S. Capabilities	<u>USCENTCOM / DoD (Title X / XXII)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Information Sharing/Intelligence Co-operation</li><li>- Other Programs &amp; Activities (CTFP, IIAP, DEIC, PFP)</li><li>- Security Assistance (FMS/IMET/FMF)</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Exercises</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Training</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Education</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Experimentation</li><li>- Facilities and Infrastructure Support Projects</li></ul>	<u>DoS / USAID Foreign Asst Objs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Counterterrorism</li><li>- Combating WMD</li><li>- Counternarcotics</li><li>- Transnational Crime</li><li>- Disaster Readiness</li></ul>
Intelligence and Information Sharing	<u>USCENTCOM / DoD (Title X / XXII)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Counternarcotics Assistance</li><li>- Counter/Non-Proliferation</li><li>- Information Sharing/Intelligence Co-operation</li></ul>	<u>DoS / USAID Foreign Asst Objs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Counterterrorism</li><li>- Combating WMD</li><li>- Counternarcotics</li><li>- Transnational Crime</li></ul>

<sup>13</sup> Derived from the Foreign Assistance Framework.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Defense and Military Contacts</li><li>- Other Programs &amp; Activities (CTFP, IIAP, DEIC, PFP)</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Health (including avian influenza)</li></ul>
Assurance and Regional Confidence Building Focus on building common understanding of threats  Expanding the community of like minded states	<u>USCENTCOM / DoD (Title X / XXII)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Combined/Multinational Exercises</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Experimentation</li><li>- Defense and Military Contacts</li><li>- Defense Support to Public Diplomacy</li><li>- Information Sharing/Intelligence Co-operation</li><li>- International Agreements</li><li>- International Armaments Cooperation</li><li>- Other Programs &amp; Activities (CTFP, IIAP, DEIC, PFP)</li><li>-</li></ul>	<u>DoS / USAID Foreign Asst Objs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Counterterrorism</li><li>- Combating WMD</li><li>- Transnational Crime</li><li>- Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation</li><li>- Infrastructure (energy, communications, transport)</li><li>- Environment (natural resources)</li><li>- Health (including avian influenza)</li><li>- Migration Management</li></ul>
Defense/Security Sector Reform	<u>USCENTCOM / DoD (Title X / XXII)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Combined/Multinational Education</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Exercises</li><li>- Combined/Multinational Training</li><li>- Defense and Military Contacts</li><li>- Defense Support to Public Diplomacy</li><li>- Information Sharing/Intelligence Co-operation</li><li>- National Guard State Partnership Program</li><li>- Security Assistance (FMS/IMET/FMF/1206/1207)</li><li>- Other Programs &amp; Activities (CTFP, IIAP, DEIC, PFP)</li><li>-</li></ul>	<u>DoS / USAID Foreign Asst Objs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Counterterrorism</li><li>- Combating WMD</li><li>- Transnational Crime</li><li>- SSR</li><li>- Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation</li><li>- Rule of Law and Human Rights</li><li>- Good Governance</li><li>- Political Competition and Consensus -Building</li><li>- Civil Society</li></ul>
International Defense Technology Collaboration	<u>USCENTCOM / DoD (Title X / XXII)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Facilities and Infrastructure Support Projects</li><li>- International Armaments Cooperation</li><li>- Defense and Military Contacts</li><li>- Security Assistance (FMS/IMET/FMF/1206/1207)</li><li>- International Agreements</li></ul>	<u>DoS / USAID Foreign Asst Objs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Economic Opportunity</li></ul>
International Suasion and Collaboration	<u>USCENTCOM / DoD (Title X / XXII)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Defense and Military Contacts</li><li>- Information Sharing/Intelligence Co-operation</li><li>- Defense Support to Public Diplomacy</li><li>- Humanitarian Assistance</li><li>- International Agreements</li><li>- Security Assistance (FMS/IMET/FMF/1206/1207)</li></ul>	<u>DoS / USAID Foreign Asst Objs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation</li></ul>

(U) APPENDIX SIX TO ANNEX H: AFGHANISTAN

1. (U) OVERVIEW

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(U) The United States and our international partners have a brief opportunity to begin reversing Afghanistan's downward trajectory. Longer-term nation-building aspirations in Afghanistan remain important, but must be clearly subordinated to the immediate need of establishing an acceptable level of security and restoring the government's legitimacy. 2008 funding for the ANSF is \$2.75B with a 2009 request for \$5.6B. A substantial influx of additional U.S. military forces in 2009/2010 and accelerated expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) will enhance our ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations and insulate the Afghan population from the insurgents' reach.

(U) The ANA is a broadly respected national institution, and continues to make steady progress with the support of the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). In the past year, ANA units have demonstrated their increasing capacity by taking the lead in a number of operations. Nonetheless, deployed ANA units remain heavily reliant on Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), of which there is a critical and persistent shortfall. ANA support capabilities, particularly airlift, logistics and fire support, are poor or non-existent. Additionally, sustaining institutions are still developing. In short, the ANA will be reliant on some level of support from international forces for at least the medium-term future. As several officials noted to the CAT, it is critical that international forces aggressively partner with ANA units in their areas of responsibility throughout all phases of the planning and conduct of operations.

(U) The current projected ANA end-strength is 200,000 personnel by late 2012, though this number is likely to be revised upward at some point. Strength as of early 2009 is approximately 68,000. There is political pressure, from both Afghan community and the international community, to deliver as many ANA as quickly as possible. However, accelerating ANA growth will risk trading quality for quantity. Moreover, the ANA has substantial shortages of

experienced officers and senior noncommissioned officers. Further acceleration in the growth of the ANA could exacerbate this problem.

(U) Afghan National Police (ANP) development and legitimacy are lagging. Projected end strength is 86,000. The ANP are often viewed by the population and ISAF as part of the security problem rather than the solution, though some polling data suggests this perception may be shifting. Fundamentally, the ANP currently lack the capability, training, equipment, professionalism, and resistance to corruption to fulfill their role. They are in most cases incapable of holding areas newly cleared of insurgents. Mentoring of the ANP is essential, but this mission also is critically under-resourced. To date, most NATO and European Union (EU) countries have proven unwilling to commit their capabilities to police training. CSTC-A, in coordination with the DoS and other international partners, has struggled to field the requisite number of Police Mentoring Teams (PMT). ANP logistics capacities are embryonic at best, leaving ANP to forage for itself. Pay is often late or not a living wage, forcing officers into criminality and predation to provide for their families.

(U) Goals:

- Near-Term (18 months): Insurgents have reduced community support and are unable to significantly disrupt the movement of people and goods. Transnational terrorist groups are unable to operate effectively in Afghanistan. Momentum is achieved in the delivery of peoples' basic security needs, with the ANSF playing an increasingly prominent leadership role in operations.
- Mid-Term (5 years): Insurgents are sufficiently marginalized such that they no longer pose an existential threat to the Afghan state. Transnational terrorist groups are unable to operate in Afghanistan. ANSF assumes the overall lead for security, with limited coalition support.
- Long-Term (20 years): The Afghanistan government is able to provide sustainable security to its people through a loyal and professional ANSF. CT efforts to ensure terrorist threats are rapidly neutralized by Afghan authorities, with support from the United States as necessary.

### 3. (U) CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

### 3. (U) FOCUS AREAS

(U) Concept: Recognizing that the insurgency can ultimately only be defeated by local forces, a critical mission of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is to continue to expand the size, capabilities, and professionalism of the ANSF, such that they can lead the fight against the insurgency, and provide for security and stability throughout Afghanistan in the mid to long-term. Emphasis will be placed on partnering U.S. and international units with ANSF counterparts and providing sufficient training and mentoring teams to develop the ANSF.

(U) The issues identified above should drive a BPC strategy for Afghanistan based around the GEF-identified BPC focus areas of:

- Operational Capacity and Capability Building

(U) Accelerated expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) will enhance our ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations and insulate the Afghan population from the insurgents' reach. The ANA is planned to grow to 200,000 and the ANP is planned to grow to 86,000. More than 6,000 ANP have been trained through Focused District Development (FDD) program. Either or both the ANA and ANP end-strengths are likely to be further adjusted.

(U) For the foreseeable future, the cost of building and sustaining the ANSF will be beyond the ability of the Afghan government. It will be crucial for DoS and DoD to determine how the international community can be engaged to shoulder a portion of this financial burden.

(U) USCENTCOM should elevate the priority placed on resourcing the ANSF development mission. Partnering U.S. military units with the ANSF is critical, but so is mentoring and training the ANA and ANP. Mentoring and training requirements must be grounded in a long-term ANSF development strategy that identifies a desired ANSF end-strength – rather than intermediate force-level goals – and clarifies the anticipated growth and sustainment costs of the ANSF. An ANSF development strategy, with associated resource requirements, will enable policymakers to more effectively engage the international community in sharing the financial burden of the program. Moreover it will allow policymakers and the Congress to explain to U.S. taxpayers the anticipated long-term financial commitment to Afghanistan and the role of developing the ANSF in our eventual exit strategy.

- Defense/Security Sector Reform

(U) CSTC-A and U.S. Embassy Kabul should develop a joint long-term security sector reform strategy that identifies ANSF (to include ANA, ANP, ANBP, etc.) end-strengths and long-term

sustainment costs; targets ministerial level reform (to include mentoring and advising) of the MOD, MOI, MOJ, among others; latches up non-state security providers to ensure transparency and accountability; and bundles security and justice service across the country. The strategy ultimately should recommend a transition plan to steady state engagement and a traditional security assistance relationship.

(U) The ANP continue to be viewed as unprofessional, biased and ineffectual despite increased focus on criminal justice reform. Embassy Kabul and CSTC-A should review current ANP support efforts, ensure that the ANP development plan is integrated with the ANA planning process, and seek additional and sustained funding.

(U) CSTC-A and USAID should evaluate the APPP, develop monitoring and oversight mechanisms and consider efforts to support non-state security providers outside Wardak province.

**4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) RECOMMENDATIONS**

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) APPENDIX SEVEN TO ANNEX H: EGYPT**

**1. (U) OVERVIEW**

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) U.S.-Egyptian political relations have eroded in recent years. U.S. Government's policies of promoting democracy have resulted in the GOE refusing \$200M in ESF due to "conditionality." Consequently, USAID developmental assistance has virtually ceased. Leading Egyptian civil society groups are also spurning U.S. Embassy contacts. Ultimately, U.S. interests sit astride a political/economic/social "fault line." The United States has a strong interest in supporting a peaceful and democratic political succession and also in continuing support for the regime of the 80-year old Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's regime, which is increasingly becoming ineffective domestically and regionally. Inherent in U.S. policy toward Egypt is tension between desires to promote human rights and further democratization and the continuing stability and security of the regime.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**2. (U) CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**3. (U) FOCUS AREAS**

(U) The issues identified above should drive a BPC strategy for Egypt based around the GEF-identified BPC focus areas of:

- Operational Access

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

- Capacity and Capability Building

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**4. (U) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

- (U) International. No other countries play a significant role in the development of Egypt's security capacity. Small-scale efforts by international partners to help secure the Gaza border are the sole international effort with any relevance to USG efforts.
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Interagency.

- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)
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**5. (U) SUB-OBJECTIVES**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ METRICS

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

7. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RECOMMENDATION

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) APPENDIX EIGHT TO ANNEX H: IRAQ**

**1. (U) OVERVIEW**

(U) The signing of two bilateral agreements, the Security Agreement (SA) and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), represent the symbolic beginning of a new strategic relationship between Iraq and the United States.

(U) As U.S. military forces are withdrawing from Iraq, the reduction in hard power will raise the risk of creating a vacuum that will result in a significant reduction of U.S. influence, unless the soft power represented by a large advisory and assistance presence is at least sustained at current levels, including military/police transition teams (MiTTs/SPTTs/PTTs), provincial/regional reconstruction teams (PRTs), and ministry advisory teams (MATs).

(U) BPC is a key element of the integrated soft power plan which must fill that potential vacuum  
Key challenges:

- Legitimacy of the GOI to Iraqi people: Maintain security and stability while building the capacity and facilitating the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government
- Acceptance of Iraq by its neighbors / reintegration into the region and the international community
- Credibility of U.S. Policy
- Substantial Security Gains
- Multiple drivers of instability
- Ministerial Capacity continues to lag
- Governmental performance remains weak
- Security Agreement (SA) and Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) set new parameters / redefine the environment:
- Reduced U.S. control and influence
- Balancing risk during implementation of SA: Loss of operational flexibility – reduction of combat forces creates seams and gaps balanced with Iraqi, Arab, and international perception of U.S. lack of good faith damages U.S. – Iraqi relations / U.S. – Arab relations or lends momentum to AQAM narrative
- Defining Steady-State Security Cooperation Presence
- Reduction of U.S. military footprint in Iraq by 2011 is the biggest predictable change in force disposition within USCENTCOM over the next decade
- Significant obstacles impede Iraqi regional reintegration (both diplomatic and economic) – Iraq will likely not be able to overcome on its own.

(U) Overall Strategic Goal for Iraq: A stable, secure, and prosperous Iraq at peace with its neighbors, participating in an enduring strategic partnership with the U.S. and serving as an exemplar for regional acceptance of the credibility of U.S. commitments.

- Near term (USM-I / MNF-I Objective): Strategic partnership developed with Iraq that culminates in a stable, secure, prosperous, and democratic Iraq that reflects its society and culture, is an ally in the war on terror and a contributor to peace and stability in the region.
- Mid term (recommended): A stable, secure, independent and prosperous Iraq, contributing to regional stability, in an enduring partnership with the U.S., and serving as an exemplar for regional acceptance of the credibility of U.S. commitments.
- Long term (from NSVI): Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.
- Long term (proposed): Democracy in Iraq strengthened and developed, Iraq assumes full responsibility for its security, the safety of its people, and Iraq remains at peace internally and with the region.

## **2. (U) CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

(U) Among the cross-cutting issues applicable to Iraq, in recommended order of priority, are:

- Countering Iranian Influences
- State Fragility and Safe Havens
- Hydrocarbon/Critical Energy Resource Security
- Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
- Integrated Border Management and Security
- Lack of effective regional security
- Inadequacy of existing and nascent security apparatus
- Strategic Access

## **3. (U) FOCUS AREAS**

(U) The issues identified above should drive a BPC strategy for Iraq based around the GEF-identified BPC focus areas of:

- Capacity Building.

(U) The primary purpose of increasing the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is so that it can provide for its internal security, monitor and control its territory and borders, successfully defend against terrorists and other security threats. This effort addresses both the cross-cutting issues of countering Iranian influence and VEOs, as well as contributes to decreasing state fragility.

(U) While, in the short-term, and particularly while the GOI is under the influence of Shia Islamist parties, it is unlikely that Iraq will return to being a “bulwark against Iran”; increasing ISF capacity should also result in the long-term in Iraq once again providing “strategic depth” to the Arab World against Iranian influence.

(U) Building capacity and capability should not be limited to the ISF and the security ministries, but should continue to be extended to other key ministries and to provincial/regional governments in Iraq as required in order to counter state fragility.

(U) In addition to the traditional capacity building tools such as FMS, IMET, CTFP, Combined Exercises and State/AID efforts; it is critical that the current advisory presence in Iraq represented by the Transition Teams (TTs), the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Ministerial Advisory Teams (MATs) continue to be resourced by the USG and the International Community.

- Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action.

(U) Operational access in order to counter Iranian influence and VEOs is currently allowed until 31 December 2011, but defined by the constraints of the SA. Iran will continue to attempt to maximize its political, economic and cultural influence on Iraq. Iraq is home to a large 'Twelver' Shia population, as well as the most important Shia Shrines in the world. These facts, when added to Iraq's location adjacent to Iran and astride key ground lines of communication from that country to Syria, and to Shia communities in Lebanon and the Arabian Peninsula, will result in Iraq always being of critical importance to Iran.

(U) Iraq's colonial past, and its current post-OIF relationship with the USG, will complicate the issue of operational access and make it unlikely that any international agreements will be signed in the near future that guarantees that access. It must be acknowledged that in Article 24 of the SA the USG commits to withdrawing all U.S. forces from Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011; and in Section I of the SFA commits to "not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq".

(U) It is critical that the United States demonstrate respect for Iraqi sovereignty and be perceived as acting in accordance with the SA. It is also very likely that future Iraqi governments will find it in their interest to grant the U.S. operational access in order to increase ISF operational capacity, but that from our perspective will also serve counter Iranian influence and VEOs. USCENTCOM should begin identifying and prioritizing those activities that establish and optimize the conditions for long-term success on the access question, including bilateral/multilateral exercises and training.

- Assurance and Regional Confidence Building

(U) Eventual reintegration of Iraq into the Arab World, as well as its inclusion in a regional military alliance such as the GCC+3 (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq), focused on common interests and a common understanding of the threats, would facilitate accomplishing U.S. objectives in the region. Multilateral exercises and training may be initially more successful in areas such as counter-terrorism, border security/migration management and public health (avian influenza for example).

- Intelligence and Information Sharing

(U) Formal intel and info sharing arrangements with Iraq should continue to be pursued in order to attain the shared situation awareness and common understanding of threats necessary to counter Iranian influence and VEOs. This is complicated by the nascent “identity civil war” and the dominance of ethno-sectarian over national identity.

- Defense and Security Sector Reform

(U) Although focused on the issues of state frailty and the nascent security apparatus, this will also contribute to the development of the ISF as a credible national institution where the peoples of Iraq are fairly represented, and where promotion/success is based on merit vice tribal/ethno-sectarian identity.

(U) In 1936, the Iraqi Army was the first military in the Arab World to conduct a coup d’état, and during the Saddam era was hijacked by the Ba’th Party. The development of a military and security services that stay out of the political process, under constitutional control (vice extra-constitutional authoritarian organizations such as the Prime Minister’s Office of the Commander-in-Chief (OCINC) or the Minister of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA), and are loyal to Iraqi interests must be supported.

(U) Execution of activities in Iraq tied to transforming its defense establishment will probably get even more complicated in the near future, again given the dynamic in its relationship with the U.S. and other Western partners. However, such transformation ought to remain a goal and USG agencies should seek opportunities to, in a low-key fashion, to facilitate progress, even if modest. Activities include IMET, combined exercises, defense contacts, and State/AID efforts in the security sector reform arena. Internationalization of this effort, preferably under NATO, would be particularly desirable.

- International Suasion and Collaboration

(U) This set of activities should carry a high-priority for execution by USG agencies in Iraq. This line of effort will be the principal tool to achieve the international and regional support to apply leverage on Iraqi internal and external actors that will be required to accomplish U.S. objectives. Activities to support this focus area will be high-level visits, and defense contacts that facilitate the Department of State lead in this area.

## **5. (U) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

- International. All U.S. and international activities in Iraq are colored, or perceived to be colored, by the extremely problematic political dynamics concerning the intervention in Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict, both of which have resulted in “occupations”. The concept of a “new strategic narrative” is designed to restore U.S. credibility internationally, but especially in Iraq and the region.
- U.S. Government civilian agencies. The withdrawal schedule for U.S. combat forces that is inherent in the SA has resulted in a “rush” by the U.S. civilian agencies to also withdraw

from Iraq. If “soft power” elements also withdraw from Iraq on this schedule, the risk to stability in Iraq and the accomplishment of U.S. objectives becomes unacceptably high.

## 6. (U) SUBORDINATE GOALS

(U) Objective 1: Improve regional perceptions of U.S. credibility and increase acceptance of U.S. policies.

- Sub-Objective: New Strategic Narrative adopted, framed by the combined SA/SFA, as the basis for the theater vision for Iraq, and sets the guiding strategic principles for operational planning and our actions.
- Sub-Objective: Strategic communications and public diplomacy efforts reinvigorated – leveraging expectations of a new narrative.
- Sub-objective: Hard power replaced by soft power, encouraging an international effort.

(U) Objective 2: Iraq re-integrated into international and regional communities in ways that do not destabilize itself or the region

- Sub-Objective: Military and security institutions developed that contribute to regional stability.
- Sub-objective: Iraq aligns itself with moderate regional regimes and balances malign influence

(U) Objective 3: Governance institutions and processes continue to mature.

- Sub-Objective: Civilian agencies’ (e.g., State, USAID) programs maintain momentum for reform
- Sub-Objective: GOI lead in policy dialogue with IFIs increased
- Sub-Objective: Economy further liberalized with emphasis on job creation and private sector-led growth
- Sub-objective: Provincial Engagement Strategy continues as PRT footprint contracts

## 7. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) RECOMMENDATIONS

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) APPENDIX NINE TO ANNEX H: LEBANON**

**1. (U) OVERVIEW**

(U) Lebanon's physical, political and social geography is among the most complex and difficult in the entire region. Lebanon has struggled for decades to become a viable, sovereign nation and has been an unwilling playground for the region's malign actors. Political leaders still represent sectarian identities that are becoming more pronounced and patronage continues to dominate the political process. Sunnis and Shia tensions are more pronounced in Lebanon than in any other Arab country outside Iraq. The populace, especially the younger population, has little confidence in its government. The Government of Lebanon (GOL) lacks the ability or will to reform the existing complicated political system.

(U) The only arm of the GOL that possesses some degree of legitimacy is the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). It is viewed as non-sectarian institution and a symbol of national unity. Beyond this symbolic value, the LAF has countered Sunni extremists (AQ and others) in the Palestinian camps, which the GOL sees as its biggest internal threat. However, the LAF does not have the ability to defeat Hizballah. Further, the Internal Security Forces (ISF), does not command the same respect as the LAF and is derided as the "Hariri Sunni Militia" by opponents of the March 14th coalition.

(U) The emergence of the LAF as a fully credible national institution dedicated to the defense of Lebanon is a vital step toward reducing Hizballah's justification for maintaining weapons. This does not imply that the LAF need take on Hizballah, only that it increases its own capabilities to support the state, thereby gaining more legitimacy in the eyes of the Lebanese populace. U.S. aid to the LAF has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Lebanon since the Lebanese Civil War. Since 2005, the United States has intensified efforts to upgrade the equipment and training of the LAF.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(U) Goals:

Long-term, 5-Year strategic: Lebanon is a viable state with reduced Hizballah influence

Short-term, 18 month goals:

- Strategic defense review for Lebanon developed
- Lebanese security forces' ability to counter non-Lebanese extremists is strengthened, and their role as a reliable symbol of national security is enhanced
- Support amongst Lebanese Shia for Hizballah is undermined

**2. (U) CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

(U) The cross-cutting issues applicable to Lebanon, in recommended order of priority, are:

- Countering Malign Iranian Influence – this is the most salient cross-cutting in Lebanon, manifesting itself as Iran’s relationship with Hizballah and its disruptive effects.
- Countering Violent Extremist Organizations – this applies principally to Palestinian and other Sunni groups, given the Leaf’s widely-agreed upon role in suppressing these organizations. The effort in arming the LAF is not principally intended to confront Hizballah, but rather to provide an alternative and therefore reduce Hizballah’s raison d’être.
- Inadequacy of State Security Apparatus – this refers to the identified shortcomings in the LAF and the ISF.
- State Fragility – in Lebanon, this is largely a political issue that is intensified by sectarian disputes.
- Border Management and Security – Lebanon’s border with Syria is porous and insecure. The lack of central government control over the border with Israel and the areas around the southern border has been the cause of much conflict.

### 3. (U) FOCUS AREAS

(U) The issues identified above should drive a BPC strategy for Lebanon based around the GEF-identified BPC focus areas of:

- Capacity Building: The purposes of increasing capacity building in the LAF and the ISF are three-fold and clearly tied to cross-cutting issues:
  - Build capabilities of the LAF to credibly defend the country, reducing the validity of Hizballah’s justification for maintaining its arms. This effort addresses directly the cross cutting issue of countering Iranian influence. In that it is a long-term effort, it ties as well into resolving the other identified cross-cutting issues of state fragility and inadequate security structures.
  - Improve capability of ISF and LAF to confront violent Sunni and Palestinian extremists. This capacity-building effort addresses the cross-cutting issue of confronting violent extremists. This is a both a long and short term effort.
  - Strengthen the perception of the LAF as a credible national institution. This is a long-term endeavor, with implications for improving state fragility, addressing inadequate security structures, and – given the dynamic with Hizballah – countering Iranian influence.

(U) Traditional capacity building tools such as FMS/FMF, IMET, CTFP, Combined Exercises, and State/USAID efforts such as good governance and counterterrorism are tools with which the United States can most effectively concentrate its efforts. One important program that ought to be continued is the Comprehensive Training Program.

(U) The key to success is a U.S. commitment to underwrite this effort in a sustained, robust fashion. FMF levels have fluctuated over the past three fiscal years. If Lebanon is a one of the key locations for confronting Iranian influence, then sustained resourcing of BPC efforts in support of the LAF and ISF is fully warranted. A commitment made by the Administration, after consultation with Congress, to a level of support in the FMS and INL accounts in particular, would send a strong message to Lebanon and would greatly improve predictability in planning.

- Defense and Security Sector Reform (SSR)

(U) SSR in Lebanon would optimally focus on improving MOD and ISF institutions and processes. Reform in the ISF is particularly warranted. SSR efforts are ideal for alleviating the identified cross-cutting issues of inadequate security structures and state fragility. SSR work also builds capacity to address cross-cutting issues of countering Iranian influence and VEOs, particularly defense-led activities such as IMET, combined exercises, and defense contacts. However, priority should be to State/AID efforts grouped in the in the security sector reform focus area. If the Lebanese can be so persuaded, a traditional security sector reform program should be strongly considered. A start would be to conduct an interagency SSR assessment.

#### 4. (U) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

- International

(U) Lebanon is a foreign policy priority for many states. France has long been closely tied to Lebanon, owing to its colonial connections and French ties to Lebanon's Christian community. Saudi Arabia and other key Arab states have been strongly supportive of Lebanon's Sunni community, in particular since the "Cedar Revolution" in 2005. Iran maintains its close ties to Hizballah and Syria continues its efforts to wield its influence in the country. The UN's involvement, generally focused on the south, is substantial. Israel views Lebanon as a vital security interest for which it has gone to war on several occasions in the past 30 years.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**5. (U) SUB-OBJECTIVES**

(U) Identified sub-objectives include:

- Capabilities of the LAF built to credibly defend the country, reducing the validity of Hizballah's justification for maintaining its arms.
- Capabilities of ISF and LAF improved to confront violent Sunni and Palestinian extremists.
- Perception of the LAF strengthened as a credible national institution.

**7. (U) METRICS**

- Popular support in Lebanon, particularly among the Christian and Sunni communities, for Hizballah as a counter to Israel is reduced.
- VEOs in Lebanon are contained and do not threaten the stability of the country or lead to Israeli intervention.
- Popular support for the LAF is high.

**8. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) RECOMMENDATIONS**

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**(U) APPENDIX TEN TO ANNEX H: PAKISTAN**

**1. (U) OVERVIEW**

(U) Pakistan faces significant challenges, to include sectarian violence, growing extremism, endemic power shortages, a faltering economy, corroding infrastructure, and weak civilian political institutions, all of which undermine the Pakistan government's ability to delivering basic services.

(U) While the United States increasingly views relations with Pakistan as an element of our Afghanistan and global CT strategies, the major focus of Pakistan's defense procurement programs is countering India. These competing visions complicate efforts to develop a sustainable U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(U) Pre-1990 BPC efforts in Pakistan focused on building conventional capacity to counter a Soviet threat. In both cases the Pakistanis entered into these relationships with an eye on using the capabilities provided by such efforts in the confrontation with India. Current and future BPC efforts in Pakistan should instead concentrate on the development of military and security force capabilities that will allow them to conduct sustained COIN operations both internally and along its borders.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(U) The strategic objective is a stable, democratic Pakistan at peace with its neighbors and in control of all of its territory. More specifically we seek:

- A peaceful and politically-stable democratic Pakistan fostered that supports U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
- The Pakistani government is committed to combating socio-economic divisions within its society and providing justice and opportunity to its citizens.

- Friendly and cooperative bilateral relations established between Pakistan and both Afghanistan and India.

## 2. (U) CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

## 3. (U) FOCUS AREAS

(U) A BPC approach to Pakistan must focus on three inter-related efforts:

- Concentrating U.S. support to Pakistan on a comprehensive bolstering of Pakistani counter-insurgency capabilities to include Ministry of Interior Civil Armed Forces.
- Pressing upon Pakistani military and government officials the need to refute support to VEOs as an affront to international norms of behavior and a threat to internal stability.
- Building the capability and capacity of Pakistan's national institutions to expand the reach of government into the FATA and across Pakistan more broadly.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

- (U) Intelligence and Information Sharing:
  - Formal intelligence- and information-sharing arrangements with Pakistan are essential to improving operational effectiveness on both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Such arrangements also help to overcome mutual suspicions. Intelligence sharing arrangements address all four identified cross-cutting issues.
- (U) Defense and Security Sector Reform:
  - Comprehensive approach to Pakistan security sector reform (military, civil armed forces, law enforcement, and domestic intelligence) is negotiated. Pakistan's Ministry of the Interior gains parallel status to the Ministry of Defense in U.S.-Pakistan security sector engagement, consistently informed by U.S. engagement with Pakistan's Ministry of Justice. The United States and allies identify resources and conditions available to support security sector reform over a 10 year span.

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**4. (U) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

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- (U) The United States is a net primary beneficiary, potentially *the* primary beneficiary, of foreign participation in IMET. The IMET program inculcates generations of future security sector leaders with an appreciation for American culture and values essential to enhancing cooperation on future exigent operational and strategic issues.

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**(U) APPENDIX ELEVEN TO ANNEX H: SAUDI ARABIA**

**1. (U) OVERVIEW**

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(U) Saudi Arabia has faced an existential threat from a serious entrenched terrorist movement with direct ties to Al Qaeda that has targeted the country's domestic political order, the U.S.-Saudi relationship, the oil infrastructure and U.S. regional interests. Sustained and serious Saudi anti-terrorism programs, supported by our robust bilateral counter-terrorist cooperation, have seriously eroded terrorist capabilities and organizations, and have led to a significant reduction in terrorist incidents.

(U) The Saudis continue to prefer Western equipment and training and have forged deep and enduring military-to-military relationships with the United States and United Kingdom. The U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia is the largest of its kind in the world.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(U) BADI and AMD- related security mechanisms demonstrate to our partners that we are regularly gauging and working to counter the Iranian threat in a cooperative and creative way. As missile defense is truly and inherently defensive in nature, we are simply seeking to enable our partners to deny Iran's ability to coerce or threaten them.

(U) U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia is limited to security and military assistance programs that help advance our common strategic interests and extend capacity, stability and reach of the Saudi central and regional governments. These include train and equip programs to counter terrorism, deter regional aggression, protect against proliferation of nuclear material, protect critical infrastructure, and dominate key air and shipping routes.

(U) U.S. credibility and image is enhanced through the quality and quantity of military engagement. The success of U.S. activities on the Arabian Peninsula depends upon developing

and maintaining interpersonal relationships between senior U.S. military, civilian leaders and host nation leaders, as well as the relationships between resident U.S. personnel and their counterparts. Likewise, the extensive FMS-funded training that is incidental to weapons transfers increases the exposure of Saudis to the United States.

## **2. (U) CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

- Hydrocarbon/Critical Energy Resource Security. Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil exporter and possesses 25 percent of the world's proven reserves.
- Countering Iranian Influences. Saudi Arabia is a critical partner of the United States in countering malign Iranian influence throughout the AOR. Consultation with Saudi Arabia is necessary on efforts to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions and regional influence.
- VEOs. Saudi Arabia has suffered greatly from a determined and dangerous threat by AQ-associated militants. Its rehabilitation program for reformed violent extremists has become the example for other countries.
- Lack of effective regional security. Like other Gulf States, Saudi Arabia prefers to deal with the United States on a bilateral basis. There is no real commitment to strengthening the institutions of the GCC.
- Integrated Border Management and Security. Saudi Arabia shares long border with difficult countries, such as Iraq and Yemen. Control of those borders is problematic.
- Inadequacy of Existing Security Apparatus. Following the attack on the Abqaiq oil facility, the Saudis have expressed concerns over, and sought help in, securing critical oil infrastructure.
- Operational Access and Freedom of Navigation. Saudi Arabia has a uniquely important geostrategic position and has on-hand basing infrastructure.

## **3. (U) FOCUS AREAS**

(U) The issues identified above should drive a BPC strategy for Saudi Arabia based around the GEF-identified BPC focus areas of:

- (U) Capacity and Capability Building. Capacity building in the Saudi Arabia security forces should be focused on three areas:
  - Critical infrastructure protection. Support to the MOI in this endeavor is crucial.
  - Air and missile defense. BADI and AMD-related security mechanisms demonstrate to our partners that we are regularly assessing and working to counter the Iranian threat in a cooperative and creative way.
  - Counter-terrorism. Sustained and serious Saudi anti-terrorism programs, supported by our robust bilateral counter-terrorist cooperation, have seriously eroded the terrorist's capabilities and organizations, and have led to a significant reduction in terrorist threats to the Kingdom.
  - Traditional capacity building tools such as FMS and Combined Exercises are tools in which the USG can most effectively concentrate its efforts on infrastructure protection and air and missile defense. Capacity building efforts address the cross-cutting issues of hydrocarbon security, VEOs, border management, and the inadequacy of security structures.

- (U) Interoperability with U.S. Forces/Support to U.S. Capabilities:
  - Saudi Arabia’s acquisitions of high-end weapons systems provide an opportunity in this category of cooperative efforts. The greatest challenge is releasing such weapons as Saudi Arabia is often precluded from purchase of certain weapons systems due to U.S. concerns over the regional military balance.
- (U) Intelligence and Information Sharing
  - The sharing of intelligence information is both an enabler and a confidence building measure. An active two-way exchange can capitalize on the host nations' unique access and regional perspective, unavailable by any other means.

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

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5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RISK

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6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RECOMMENDATIONS

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## (U) APPENDIX TWELVE TO ANNEX H: UZBEKISTAN

### 1. (U) OVERVIEW

(U) Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Uzbekistan was widely viewed as the state in Central Asia with the greatest potential to build itself into a modern nation. However its economic prospects have dimmed as a result of its elite's resistance to economic reforms, corruption, unfriendly investment climate and an oppressive political atmosphere. Its relationship with the United States since 2001 has charted a dizzying course, with a tremendous increase in defense-related contacts after the 9/11 attacks followed by a slow regression until 2005 when Tashkent asked the United States to vacate the base at Karshi-Khanabad. Military relations have seen a moderate uptick in 2008, when Uzbekistan responded positively to U.S. entreaties to support a ground line of communication through Uzbekistan into Afghanistan.

(U) The overarching strategic goal in Uzbekistan is to assure strategic access while successfully promoting political and economic reform.

### 2. (U) CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

(U) Among the cross-cutting issues applicable to Uzbekistan, in recommended order of priority, are:

- Strategic Access
- Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
- Narcotics Trafficking and Production
- Integrated Border Management and Security
- Environmental Concerns

### 3. (U) FOCUS AREAS

(U) The issues identified above should drive a BPC strategy for Uzbekistan based around the GEF-identified BPC focus areas of:

- (U) Operational Access:
  - Uzbekistan's location adjacent to Afghanistan and astride key lines of communication into that country account for its importance and the necessity of continued BPC efforts. These efforts should include increased defense and military contacts centered on the access question, especially the National Guard State Partnership Program, the conclusion of international agreements as required guaranteeing that access, and consideration of bilateral exercises, best conducted by USSOCENT, to establish conditions for success.
- (U) Capacity and Capability Building:
  - Activities associated with this focus area will promote improvement of Uzbekistan's effectiveness in addressing the cross – cutting areas of VEOs, Narcotics Trafficking, and Border Security. FMS, IMET, CTFP, Combined Exercises, and State/AID efforts such as Good Governance and Counter-Terrorism are tools in which the USG can most effectively concentrate its efforts.

- (U) Intel/Info Sharing:
  - Intel and info sharing arrangements with Uzbekistan, if feasible given the dynamics in the political relationship, have the potential for significantly enhancing efforts to address the identified cross-cutting issues. These include VEOs, Narcotics Trafficking, and Border Security, and Environmental Concerns.
- (U) Defense and Security Sector Reform:
  - Execution of activities in Uzbekistan tied to transforming its defense establishment may not be feasible, again given the dynamic in its relationship with the United States and other Western partners. However, such transformation ought to remain a goal and U.S. agencies should seek opportunities to, in a low-key fashion, to facilitate progress, even if modest. Activities include IMET, combined exercises, defense contacts, and State/AID efforts in the security sector reform arena.
- (U) International Suasion and Collaboration:
  - This set of activities should carry a high-priority for execution by U.S. agencies in Uzbekistan. This line of effort will be the principal tool to achieve the access desired from Uzbekistan to assure lines of communication into Afghanistan. Activities to support this focus area will be high-level visits, and defense contacts.

#### 4. (U) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

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
#### 5. (U) SUB-OBJECTIVES

- (U) Identified sub-objectives include:
- Access assured to facilitate lines of communication into Afghanistan
  - Capacity to combat the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and any similar Violent Extremist Organizations operating in Uzbekistan increased
  - Capacity of Uzbekistan to provide for Integrated Border Management and Narcotics Trafficking and Production improved
  - Uzbek efforts at promoting environmental clean-up and stewardship encouraged and supported

**6. (U) METRICS**

- Access through Uzbekistan is assured and operationally viable.
- VEOs in Uzbekistan do not threaten efforts in Afghanistan, the U.S. homeland or its allies and partners.
- Narcotics and illicit flows into and out of Uzbekistan are limited.
- Uzbekistan's leaders accept the need to promote good environmental stewardship and clean-up, and take action.

**7. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) RECOMMENDATIONS**

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**(U) APPENDIX THIRTEEN TO ANNEX H: YEMEN**

**1. (U) OVERVIEW**

(U) Yemen is unique in the Arab world, with socio-economic indicators resembling those of the poorest African nations, and governance limitations that compare with the world's most unstable states, including Afghanistan.

(U) U.S. national security and economic stability are inextricably linked with that of the Arabian Peninsula, where Yemen – with its 1100-mile border with Saudi Arabia – continues to flirt with failed-state status.

(U) The internal challenges facing the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), each of which has the capacity to ignite future conflict, include widespread political discontent in the South, a protracted armed rebellion in the north, and a steadily worsening national economic situation exacerbated by rapidly diminishing oil revenues and water resources.

(U) Despite some encouraging steps towards meaningful political and economic reform, to include relatively free and fair Presidential and local council elections in 2006, Yemen has failed to consolidate these gains, or to capitalize effectively on the support of the international community.

(U) Yemen is sliding towards instability and potential failure. If more help is not provided in the near-term, increased risks and regional instability are likely. Relatively small investments now will pay off if they prevent the failed state scenario from playing out.

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(U) Goals:

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**2. (U) CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**3. (U) FOCUS AREAS**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Capacity-building:

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ SUB-OBJECTIVES**

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ METRICS

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

7. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RISK:

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

8. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RECOMMENDATIONS:

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) APPENDIX FOURTEEN TO ANNEX H: BPC CROSS – CUTTING ISSUES/OBJECTIVES**

**1. (U) SHAPE**

**(U) State Fragility and Safe Havens**

**(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Challenge:** Failed and failing states are often unable to protect their populations, provide public goods and services, ensure their own territorial integrity, or prevent illicit flows (people and goods) across borders. The inability or unwillingness of the central government in fragile states – such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Yemen – to project power beyond the capital begets ungoverned or “under-governed” spaces where criminal, extremist and/or insurgent activities can flourish. In addition to providing physical safe havens and transit routes for criminal and extremist organizations, fragile states also facilitate illicit access to financial, logistics, personnel, and communications networks. U.S. and international efforts to address state failure must move beyond targeted (kinetic) geographic interventions to strategic approaches that assist the central government to (re)establish its authority throughout its territory.

**(U) BPC Objectives:** PREVENT state failure; REINFORCE (legitimate) state building activity; and DENY VEOs the opportunities for safe havens or safe passage.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) Existence of Informal (Non-State) Security Actors**

**(U) Challenge:** Weak governance can lead to situations where alternate, informal or traditional actors (e.g., militia, religious or tribal structures, private security companies, etc.) provide critical social, security, and justice services in lieu of the state or local government. These actors generally enjoy a higher level of legitimacy than the formal sector and offer services that are not or cannot be funded through the central government. In many cases, these actors actually contribute to peace and stability in the regions they control. Alternatively, irredentist or secessionist groups may ultimately use their status to challenge the existence of the state, either through political and/or violent means. In addition, these undemocratic or extremist groups may support transnational terrorist groups seeking allegiances or safe havens.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) Inadequacy of existing and nascent security apparatus**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) BPC Objective:** Support efforts to TRANSFORM (build/re-build, right-size, reorient, reform, develop) partner security sectors so that they respect civilian leadership, are appropriately sized, balanced, trained and resourced, and function according to the rule of law.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

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<sup>14</sup> These include SOCOM and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA); Naval Expeditionary Warfare Command; Specialized MEUs/Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG); the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and/or Ministry of Defense Advisor Program (MODA).




Figure 3: (U) ANSF Right Sizing

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Primary BPC Focus Areas:

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

2. (U) PROTECT

(U) Integrated Border Management

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Issue: The movement of illicit and extremist groups and material across borders (including maritime) undermines domestic and regional security and provides freedom of action to VEOs and insurgents. Yet the free flow of people and goods provides economic opportunities. Vulnerabilities include:

- Unguarded borders and maritime boundaries
- Limited customs and immigration procedures
- Lack of interdiction capabilities
- Lack of effective coordination between states

**(U) BPC Objective:** To provide partners with the capacity to effectively INTEGRATE management and security of their borders to ALLOW the free flow of legitimate traffic (people and goods) but DENY the flow of illicit traffic that enables criminal and VEO activities.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) The Need to Protect Hydrocarbon Resources**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) BPC Objective:** The capacity to PROTECT critical energy resources and lines of communication is provided to partners.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) Environmental Concerns**

**(U) Challenge:** Environmental issues ranging from scarcity or competition for natural resources to consequence management of natural and/or man-made disasters pose significant threats both at the regional and national levels. Regional conflicts also have elevated environmental considerations to ensure the health and safety of all personnel (military and civilian) in the region.

**(U) BPC Objectives:** To assist partners so that natural resources are CONSERVED and protected, the likelihood of conflict arising from environment-related issues is DIMINSHED, historical and/or cultural locations are PROTECTED, and long-term environmental problems are MINIMIZED.

**(U) Concept Summary:** The development and prioritization of clear national policies both in the United States and in partner nations should increase the dedication to safeguard natural resources, minimize environmental impacts when conducting military operations, and respond to and mitigate incidents. Most countries in the AOR do not have plans to address environmental and/or historical/cultural site security on a “government-wide” basis, but are starting to develop basic programs in this area.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Primary BPC Focus Areas:**

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) Counter-Proliferation/Weapons of Mass Destruction**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) BPC Objectives:** Weapons of Mass Destruction, its technology and its material do not reach state or non-state actors; these organizations are DENIED the ability to threaten national and regional security; and in the event WMD is used, U.S. allies and partners are PREPARED in their ability to mitigate and execution operations in a WMD environment.


(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**3. (U) DETER/DEFEAT**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **The Need to Counter Iranian Influences**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) Countering Violent Extremist Organizations**



(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) BPC Objectives:** VEOs are DISRUPTED to a level where they are unable to undermine regional/national stability; partner nation capacity to increase their self-reliance in combating extremism is BOLSTERED.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

#### 4. (U) EXPLOIT

**(U) Lack of effective regional security initiatives**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) BPC Objective:** Co-operation on regional security initiatives that enhances regional security is ESTABLISHED and REENFORCED, thereby allowing the United States to reduce force posture/deployment and allow partner nations to take greater responsibility for their own national and regional security.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)




Figure 3: (U) Cooperative Security – Alignment of Interests

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Primary BPC Focus Areas:

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) Bilateral relationships exploited**

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

**(U) APPENDIX FIFTEEN TO ANNEX H: REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION**

1. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development: Strategic Plan 2007-2012
2. U.S. Department of State Mission Strategic Plans (2008) for countries within USCENTCOM AO
3. U.S. Department of Defense Guidance on the Employment of the Force (GEF) 2008
4. United States Central Command Theater Strategy dated 11 June 2008
5. United States Central Command Theater Campaign Plan dated October 2008
6. U.S. Government Security Force Assistance (Draft Pre-Decisional Working Paper 26 Nov 08)
7. Report to Congress, *Secretary of Defense Report on the Development of an Integrated Interagency Structure or Organization for Combatant Commands*, dated October 2007

**(U) APPENDIX SIXTEEN TO ANNEX H: LIST OF CONTACTS**

1. NATO SHAPE delegation - Cdr [redacted (b)(6)] and Col [redacted (b)(6)]
2. OSD-Policy/Global Security Affairs – Mr. [redacted (b)(6)]
3. Department of State – Mr. [redacted (b)(6)]
4. US Agency for International Development – [redacted (b)(6)]
5. J5, HQs, US Central Command - LTC [redacted (b)(6)]
6. J5, HQs, US Central Command - LTC [redacted (b)(6)]
7. J5, HQs, US Central Command - Lt Col [redacted (b)(6)]
8. J5, HQs, US Central Command - MAJ [redacted (b)(6)]
9. J5, HQs, US Central Command - MAJ [redacted (b)(6)]
10. J5, HQs, US Central Command - MAJ [redacted (b)(6)]
11. J5, HQs, US Central Command - Mr. [redacted (b)(6)]