

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



Annex E Combating WMD Functional Report

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(U) ANNEX E: COMBATING WMD

1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) “Unless the world acts decisively and with great urgency it is more likely than not that a WMD [weapon of mass destruction] will be used in an attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” This call to action is not meant to “instill fear but to break the cycle in which disaster strikes and a commission is formed to report on what our government should have done to prevent it.” When it comes to WMD, “we know the threat we face, we know our margin of safety is shrinking, we know what we must do to counter the risk . . . we need unity at all levels.”¹

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

¹ “World at Risk,” *Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism*, December 2008. (U)

(U) Most importantly, the USG, and by extension USCENTCOM, must be structured for success in CWMD activities. Current U.S. policy and practices in this regard are disjointed and unevenly prioritized across departments. Inter- and intra-departmental structures are not optimized for success, either as individual elements or when combined to provide coordinated efforts spanning all instruments of national power. This extends even to disparities in the terminology individual departments and agencies use to describe the same activities. U.S. policy must be properly and unequivocally communicated, then translated for effective departmental action in support of associated goals. The USG should adopt a common lexicon to promote more effective communication between departments. In conjunction with these broader USG initiatives, USCENTCOM could benefit from adoption of an inter-staff working group intended to combine the efforts of intelligence, operations, and plans/policy personnel working together, supported by a command-level Interagency Task Force (IATF), to support overall USG efforts.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

² The P5+1 nations are the five nuclear weapons states (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, United States) recognized in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, plus Germany. (U)

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Finally, the USG should expand efforts to ensure regional partners are postured for success in CWMD activities. DoS and DoD figure prominently in associated activities. USCENTCOM can provide key support to broader USG initiatives to expand regional outreach. Activities may include: coordinated, improved USG messaging through official and non-official government contacts and strategic communications; efforts to increase regional support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), including sponsorship of regional nations to membership in the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG); and increased emphasis on integrated defensive and response capabilities. In order to most effectively support these activities, the USG should focus on both improving coordination between departments providing outreach, and optimizing funding for those activities.

2. (U) PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

(U) This report was completed by the U.S. Central Command's Assessment Team (CAT) over a 100-day period from November 2008 to February 2009. It provides a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the USCENTCOM area of interest, a review of existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and suggested actions for USCENTCOM in the context of an illustrative plan for the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of coalition partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve policy goals.

(U) The Combating WMD Team consisted of members from USCENTCOM, the Department of State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and U.S. Strategic Command. It drew on intelligence analysis, existing U.S. and Coalition plans and policy guidance, relevant reports and studies (see Chapter 12 for a full list of reference and source materials), the expertise of its members, the broader U.S. Government community, non-governmental organizations, and academic institutions, and other consultations (see Appendix 4 for a full list of consultations).

(U) SCOPE NOTE: This report examines key areas of the CWMD mission relevant to USCENTCOM's AOR, but its comprehensiveness and scope were critically constrained by four factors.

- (U) First, the required classification of this document placed a severe restriction on the team's ability to write in depth on many important but extremely sensitive CWMD issues. In some cases, we were able to reference such issues, but only at higher levels of abstraction than was ultimately desirable.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

- (U) Third, our team made a decision to avoid completely a review of USCENTCOM operational war plans and instead to focus on the portions of CONPLAN 1099 that address CWMD activities in the steady-state environment. We are aware that several areas of concern addressed in this report may involve countries and scenarios for which specific war plans may exist. Evaluation of the effectiveness and appropriateness of those plans, however, exceeded not only the classification of this report, but also, in some cases, the access and expertise of Team members. As a practical matter, we believe that the U.S. response to adversarial WMD use would be extremely case-dependent and include activities specifically directed by the President of the United States, making them well beyond the scope of this report.
- (U) Fourth, given the extremely broad scope of the eight CWMD mission areas and the time and personnel resources available to generate this report, the Team made an early decision to focus primarily on areas of CWMD activity which had broad strategic importance, in which USCENTCOM played a major role or by which USCENTCOM was affected; and about which we had meaningful recommendations for change. Other mission areas such as Consequence Management are not covered in depth in this report.

(U) This report was developed in the format of a draft illustrative plan in order to impose sufficient rigor in analysis and recommendations. By providing a comprehensive, civilian-military context for USCENTCOM, this report is intended to mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short term solutions to long term problems.

(U) Disclaimer: This document does not represent the official position of U.S. Central Command, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or any other agency of the United States Government.

3. (U) SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Despite the obvious threat and the high-level pronouncements about its vital importance, the global CWMD mission is, in actual practice, inconsistently prioritized across the USG, and particularly within DoD. A lack of clear communication of USG CWMD policies and priorities throughout all levels of government has resulted in a mismatch between identified threats, stated policy goals, and U.S. plans and programs targeted at achieving them. Inconsistent and/or incompatible CWMD structures across USG agencies and departments also hinder success in the CWMD mission.

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

4. (U) PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS (This Section Not Used)

5. (U) STRATEGIC GOALS

(U) There are clear and direct linkages between the United States' enduring values and interests regarding global WMD proliferation, the strategic goals that allow us to protect those values and interests, and the subordinate goals that propel us toward our strategic objectives.

(U) Enduring Values and Interests

(U) The United States has an enduring interest in a world order that is stable, prosperous, and peaceful in which it can exercise influence and has freedom of action and commerce. The potentially catastrophic effects of WMD use by a state or non-state actor – mass casualties, economic and societal disruption, and radical alterations in the global geopolitical and/or military landscape – are directly inimical to these goals.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) The United States has committed in various treaties to work for the eventual elimination of all global WMD stockpiles – nuclear, chemical, and biological – including its own. It accepts the legal possession of nuclear weapons by itself, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China in the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, however, calls for all five states to work towards eventual nuclear disarmament. While this establishes the legal status of their nuclear weapons possession, in principle, as temporary, the treaty established no specific deadlines for this

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Strategic Goals

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Subordinate Goals

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

6. (U) OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

(U) Attainment of the three subordinate goals in the USCENTCOM AOR relies upon achieving ten concrete objectives (see Figure 1). However, as depicted in the graphic, most objectives are mutually supportive. Other AORs or regions may require the establishment of parallel or completely different objectives, but we do not consider those areas in this report.

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

³ In this context, “unsanctioned” WMD are those in the possession of any non-state actor, in the possession of a state in violation of treaty obligations or other global norms, or that otherwise pose a direct threat of being used to attack or coerce the United States and its allies. (U)



COMBATING WMD IN THE REGION




Figure 1: (U) Combating WMD in the Region – Goals and Objectives

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

7. (U) LINES OF EFFORT (This Section Not Used)

8. (U) RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

(U) Current Authorities

(U) A large, complex global architecture of non-proliferation and counterproliferation treaties, international and national laws, agreements, initiatives, and policies exist to combat the proliferation of WMD both within and outside the USCENTCOM AOR. This framework is reinforced by U.S. regional security policies and security cooperation programs, and specific, highly-focused USG diplomatic engagement on major issues like the Iranian nuclear program (through the P5+1 process).

Specific cases aside, this body of activities and approaches can be roughly divided into three broad categories: international measures, export control regimes, and bilateral measures. Refer to Tab A of the Situation Assessment at Appendix 1 for a list of major agreements and activities.

(U) Additional Authorities and Resources Required

(U) This report focuses on identifying key process and policy issues where sufficient guidance and/or instruments exist but are not being used optimally. It does not include an assessment of financial resources required to improve USG or USCENTCOM posture in CWMD. Therefore, we include few recommendations for additional authorities or resources.

1. (U) A clear prioritization of national CWMD policy by DoD and clear communication of that policy to the combatant commands.
2. (U) Personnel fully trained, and in sufficient numbers, to effectively populate key positions in OSD, joint military staffs, and the combatant commands in order to provide continuity of effort and effective execution of CWMD duties.
3. (U) Additional funding for outreach, training, and exercises in the USCENTCOM AOR, in an amount to be determined based on a current assessment of requirements.
4. (U) Additional funds, as required, to assist the Government of Iraq in destroying remnant CW, and in redirecting WMD expertise as appropriate.
5. (U) Expanded authority for CDR USCENTCOM to expend foreign assistance/training funds on “CWMD-necessary” programs and exercises.

9. (U) RISK AND MITIGATION (This Section Not Used)

10. (U) CONCLUSION

(U) USG Policy, Priority & Structure Should Match and then be Clearly Communicated

(U) The White House published the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Destruction* in December of 2002. This document provides Presidential guidance on combating the threat of WMD proliferation through activities based on three “pillars” – non-proliferation (NP), counterproliferation (CP), and consequence management (CM). This guidance, however, suffers from varying interpretations across the departments of the USG. Such variances lead to inconsistencies in the timeliness and level of the USG response. Steps to correct these inconsistencies cannot be taken unilaterally by individual departments, agencies, or military elements, and should involve National Security Council (NSC) oversight. This is particularly evident in a comparison of the *National Strategy to Combat WMD* (NS) with the *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) and the *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* (NMS). The NS’ emphasis on three pillars and the need for a proactive interdiction effort is not clearly replicated in either the NDS or NMS. The NS describes WMD in the possession of hostile states and terrorists as one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States, yet DoD’s associated plan is not included in the department’s list of 14 high priority plans. Six years after issuance of the NS, DoD and combatant command CWMD plans exist but have yet to be fully implemented. Reconciling

these representative policy ambiguities is an essential step in the overall effort to achieve follow-on goals.

(U) Specific to this report, this effort should ultimately focus on two objectives to achieve the appropriate level of coordination between elements of the USG: 1) the USG and USCENTCOM are structured for CWMD success, and 2) USG agencies establish a common WMD lexicon that facilitates implementation across the USG.

- (U) USG/USCENTCOM Structured for CWMD Success

(U) USG agencies must be organized in a way that facilitates synchronization of policy and actions with their agency counterparts while allowing agencies to coordinate tasking across their own directorates. Although each agency has the discretion to organize their respective subcomponents as they see fit, our team has noted that those agencies whose structures closely parallel one another seem to enjoy the most complete and timely situational awareness (e.g. DoS, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)) and the ability to respond within existing processes to the dynamic nature of WMD proliferation. At the DoS, CIA, NSA, NGA, and ONI, the lead for combating the threat of WMD lies with their respective counterproliferation divisions/offices – entities that have the word “counterproliferation” not only in their title but as their priority mission. These similar organizational structures not only facilitate effective interagency communication but allow for an appropriate level of deconfliction and coordination in the execution of their respective missions, and the timely and effective development, prioritization, and communication of policy across the USG.

- (U) USG Agencies Establish a Common Lexicon

(U) A “whole-of-government” approach to CWMD can only be successful if the appropriate agencies and departments communicate with one another. Communication is crucial because success relies on necessary deconfliction, coordination, and avoiding redundancy of effort. Jargon unique to different departments complicates the ability to communicate and coordinate. As a result, it can be difficult to coordinate USG interagency counterproliferation activities. This impediment to communication is subtle in most cases but can be drastic in others. Our observations suggest that communication on something as simple as “WMD” can mean different things to different agencies. This issue was the topic of discussion in the National Defense University’s “Occasional Paper 4” by its Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁴ In this paper, Deputy Director W. Seth Carus has identified more than 40 different definitions for WMD used by the USG and the international community. DoD

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

⁴ W. Seth Carus, “Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”; Occasional Paper 4, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University; January 2006. (U)

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

- (U) Partners Better Postured for Success

(U) Partner nations that share overall U.S. CWMD goals are a critical component in preventing the further proliferation of WMD. Positioning these partners for CWMD success to the greatest extent possible therefore needs to be a key element in the U.S. CWMD program. Efforts to this end face numerous challenges, including varying partner priorities on and awareness of necessary CWMD activities; inadequate partner funding, infrastructure, or other national capabilities; or – most dauntingly – geopolitical factors and considerations which make robust or overt participation in CWMD activities with the United States politically difficult for partners to undertake. Recommendations (in chapter 11) to overcome these challenges center on encouraging and facilitating expanded CWMD activities by U.S. partner nations and undertaking or intensifying specific projects to secure or eliminate WMD and to prevent the distribution of WMD expertise.

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Existing Stockpiles Secured and Destroyed

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

- (U) Outreach on CWMD Issues in the AOR is Enhanced.

(U) USCENTCOM is principally a supporting player in the USG's overall global CWMD activities. Nonetheless, USCENTCOM's extensive ties with allied and friendly countries in its AOR uniquely position it to inject CWMD messages, initiatives, and approaches into USG engagements with its regional partners. Most U.S. partners in the AOR have signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the other major non-proliferation agreements and cooperate, to varying degrees, with international CWMD efforts. USCENTCOM should build on this existing cooperation to strengthen regional commitments to global non-proliferation norms, to participate more actively in CWMD activities, and to support USG CWMD policies and approaches. Three tasks the USG and USCENTCOM can undertake to enhance CWMD outreach (detailed in chapter 11) are: improve coordination of regional CWMD messaging; expand regional participation in PSI activities by holding a Middle East Regional Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting; and encourage an Arab and a Central Asian regional partner nation from the USCENTCOM AOR to join the PSI OEG.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Regional WMD Programs must be Reversed or Countered**

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Terrorists and other non-state actors in the region have also stated their desire to acquire and use WMD against the United States and its interests. No regional non-state actor has thus far demonstrated a WMD capability, however, and there are numerous technical and operational barriers to the acquisition and use of certain types of WMD (most importantly nuclear weapons) by such groups. The AOR's political instability, interstate rivalries, periodic military conflicts, transnational terrorism, and border disputes combined with "ownership" of a significant portion of the world's energy resources both drive WMD proliferation and deepen the potential consequences of its use. Failing to reverse regional WMD proliferation poses serious risks for both the AOR and for the broader global non-proliferation regime. The most important of these include:

- (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Changing the calculus of states engaged in ongoing programs to acquire WMD, however, has historically been proven possible. In this light, we view reversing the nuclear gains made by Iran as achievable, though extremely difficult. Most of the steps necessary to continue and strengthen the U.S.-led international effort to curb Iran's nuclear program currently fall outside of USCENTCOM's responsibility.

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Stop and/or Counter Iran's nuclear weapons development

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Recommendations for the Iran issue in Chapter 11 do not contain specific activities for USCENTCOM but are included for consideration as tools to inform policy-makers and as

opportunities for USCENTCOM leaders to advocate, as appropriate, for USG activity in the region. Also, and as noted previously, the recommendations do not include any activities related to the use of military force in or with Iran. Any such activities would fall outside the scope of this report.

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Although it is highly unlikely that any single action or activity will achieve the goal of disarming Syria, there are broad descriptors of regional conditions under which the goal might be achieved. In any of these situations, **the USG should be positioned to respond with immediate assistance for Syrian WMD stockpile security and elimination, should diplomatic opportunities to extend such assistance appear.** A structure to provide this assistance already exists through programs like the DoS-managed Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund, but plus-ups of additional funding may be required, depending upon the scope of the opportunities that arise.

- (U) Regional WMD disarmament could conceivably be a negotiated element of a regional peace in which the Iranian nuclear situation and the Palestinian problem are both resolved, resulting in a political and cultural thaw, in the broadest sense, in Arab-Israeli tensions.
- (U) A dramatic change in the intentions and foreign policy orientation of Syria's regime that resulted in a bilateral peace treaty like that between Israel and Egypt in the 1970s could also result in the non-negotiated, de facto unilateral Syrian disarmament of its WMD. The lack of a real military threat from Israel and economic constraints on Syria's ability to support further WMD and military development could also lead to the atrophy of these programs.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

11. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) Structure the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff (JS), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) CWMD Elements Similarly to all other USG CWMD Organizations. The recent U.S. Senate confirmation hearing for the nominee to the position of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy included testimony from the nominee that an "expected realignment of [OSD(P)]" is forthcoming. Without specific knowledge of the details of this realignment, the authors of this report address only the current structure. OSD (Policy), the Joint Staff for Strategy, Plans, Policy (JS J5), and the DIA have created unique organizations that do not align themselves or communicate well on the CWMD problem with other departments in the USG or with the combatant commands. For example, on the policy side, OSD(P) has chosen to split the mission between two offices. One office (Transnational Threats) has grouped counterproliferation (CP) with counternarcotics and global threats under the belief that they are related because similar financial, transportation, and smuggling networks support these activities. The Intelligence Community (IC) and the other USG agencies working these issues, however, do not agree. What OSD has failed to realize is, for the most part, the proliferation of WMD and related technology is conducted through normal commercial channels while the same cannot be said of drug and terrorist activities. The other OSD(P) office (Counterproliferation) handles most of the multilateral/diplomatic outreach aspects of combating WMD with the exception of the

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which belongs to the Transnational Threats office. Many of today's organizational problems stem from organizational decisions made during the post-911 period when there was overwhelming (and uninformed) senior support for the CWMD mission. This has then translated into problems like the diffusion of CWMD expertise to other endeavors leading to a gradual atrophy of proficiency.

(U) The JS J5 has taken an entirely different approach by adopting the three pillars set forth in the National Strategy as separate branches under their CWMD Division. These NP, CP, and CM branches are further broken down into sections that address eight military mission areas⁵ (MMAs) that are unique to DoD. While no other department in the USG approaches CWMD activities through these divisions, DoD reasons that using the MMAs makes it easier to resource specific aspects of those activities. Our team does not have consensus on whether this approach actually optimizes DoD's planning and resourcing efforts or if there is some better method (e.g., along the three pillars). We do, however, agree that DoD's unique use of the eight MMAs complicates the department's coordination and communication both internally and with other USG departments and agencies.

(U) On the operational side, it is significant that the Joint Staff Directorate for Operations (JS J3) does not follow the three pillar or eight mission area structure. For the most part, however, our team observed that communications and information flow from the Joint Staff to the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) in J-3 channels works fairly well – probably a direct result of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and their relationships with interagency counterparts (i.e. CIA).

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) These different organizational structures do not facilitate effective communication/information flow within DoD, and make external coordination much more difficult. This disconnect is demonstrated by the lack of dissemination of the summaries of conclusion (SOCs) published from

⁵ The eight Military Mission Areas described in the *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* include: Offensive Operations; WMD Elimination; Active Defense; Passive Defense; WMD Interdiction; Security Cooperation and Partner Activities; Threat Reduction Cooperation; and WMD Consequence Management. (U)

Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) meetings at the NSC. Rarely are these documents shared by OSD and the Joint Staff attendees with the appropriate directorates/offices at the COCOMs.

(U) OSD(P) should take lead on resolving these issues for DoD. One of the quickest ways to impact DoD's approach to CWMD would be to take advantage of the change in U.S. Administration to ask for a clear policy statement concerning the issue, to set leadership intentions for relative priority of effort, and to reorganize OSD accordingly. Given that the President has expressed intent to appoint a "WMD Czar," we expect CWMD activities will continue to have a high priority in the current administration. Concerning DoD, reorganization would clarify the priority DoD places on the CWMD mission. In lieu of issuance of a new U.S. Administration CWMD National Strategy replacing the existing one, we believe the current three pillar approach would serve as the appropriate reorganizing foundation for OSD.

(U) Give Responsibility for Oversight of CWMD to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff should create a working group to consider assuming greater responsibility for all DoD missions derived from the *National Strategy to Combat WMD*. Although U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), designated by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to synchronize DoD CWMD planning, has produced a template – CONPLAN 8099 – for regional CWMD planning, the synchronization element of that plan does not extend to actual execution of those regional plans either individually or, if required, coordinated to address a transregional threat. CONPLAN 8099, considered a global plan, also does not include any requirement to execute operations in support of departmental or national policy. While most operational planning efforts for CWMD should rightfully be the responsibility of the geographic combatant commands who will execute them, the Joint Staff is, by statutory responsibility, in the best position to synchronize these efforts. The Joint Staff is the military's interface with the rest of the USG, provides situational awareness through its participation in the national decision-making processes, has the authority to task planning, and coordinates the employment of forces with the Secretary of Defense. There will also be roles for other entities and commands outside the Joint Staff (i.e., doctrine development is the province of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)). Our team recognizes that this is no minor undertaking, requiring the acquiescence of the service chiefs and combatant commanders, but without change, DoD will not be poised to maximize its contributions to countering the WMD proliferation problem. Once the mission has been transferred to the Joint Staff, the office or directorate tasked with accomplishing it will need to be appropriately staffed in numbers and senior representation. To ensure future CWMD coordination across its directorates, the Joint Staff should create a standing working group with members of the J-2 (Intelligence), the J-3 (Operations) and the J-5 (Strategy, Plans and Policy). Current reactions to proliferation cases of concern demonstrate that there is little interaction between these directorates on the CWMD problem. As stated above, the Joint Staff (J-3) is the only directorate who has proper representation at interagency fora and is able to translate that representation into proper situational awareness for the combatant commands.

(U) Appropriately Staff DoD CWMD Elements with Trained Professionals. Continuity of expertise in CWMD issues is critical for long-term success in related missions. The last five years have seen a gradual decrease in the number of Joint Staff action officers dedicated to this mission. This decline was a result of the CWMD mission being collocated with the counterterrorism (CT) mission in the J-5 Strategic Plans Division. The Joint Staff (J-5) has since separated the CP and CT missions, but in its current directorate CP continues to compete with other missions (e.g., Cyberspace)

for senior level attention. Counterproliferation of WMD is not a mission that can be ignored with the expectation that when an incident of significance occurs, it will receive the attention it deserves. Many of the subject matter experts in agencies other than DoD have been serving in this mission area for years, if not decades, as their primary professional focus. Visibility and an understanding of the transportation, financial, and commercial aspects of this mission cannot be quickly achieved. Appropriate training, at several different professional intervals, should be instituted for DoD personnel as part of PME and as part of indoctrination to critical positions. Training in USG interagency processes should be mandatory for all DoD personnel employed on joint duty staffs. There are also opportunities to take advantage of external educational courses such as National Defense University's Program for Emerging Leaders where CWMD and associated USG interagency processes receive ample coverage.

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) USCENTCOM has taken steps to address this coordination shortfall by drafting a charter for a working group that encompasses members from its J-2, J-3, and J-5 directorates, and others as required. The CAT CWMD team strongly supports the establishment of this working group. Adoption of this collaborative entity could help ensure that there is adequate and timely cross-directorate coordination on CWMD issues and will likely lead to more effective communication with OSD and the Joint Staff on relevant issues. The goals of the charter are situational awareness, a synchronization of policy and coordination action across directorates, and a recommendation of appropriate staffing of CWMD offices. USCENTCOM has a vested interest in streamlining this process since its area of responsibility contains one admitted nuclear weapons state, another state actively pursuing a nuclear program, and potentially several other countries with nuclear aspirations.

(U) The situation assessment at Appendix 1 contains a lengthy analysis of policies governing WMD in general. In order to address the conclusions of that analysis, we recommend that OSD rewrite the *National Defense Strategy* and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), and the Joint Staff rewrite the *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD*. It is critical that these documents accurately reflect national guidance, clearly declare policy priorities, and better shape DoD activities to support related efforts.

(U) In further support of the assessment's conclusion, we recommend USCENTCOM perform a review of the *USCENTCOM Theater Strategy* and the *USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan* for congruence with higher level guidance. The Theater Campaign Plan is not only supposed to

implement the *Guidance for the Employment of the Force* (GEF) and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* but should operationalize the *USCENTCOM Theater Strategy*. The *Theater Strategy* outlines five theater objectives that will bring stability to the AOR. Among these priorities is the objective to “counter the proliferation, acquisition, and use of WMD.” It is not clear that any of the seven pillars in the *Theater Campaign Plan* address this issue directly. Only two of the seven pillars address CWMD activities – the “Iran” and the “Prevent the Re-emergence of Destabilizing Capabilities” pillars.

(U) The NSC Charters an Interagency Working Group to Develop a Common WMD Lexicon for the USG. Membership in the working group should not be limited to only those who participate in the Interdiction and Counterproliferation PCCs. Consensus is needed on a much broader scale. For example, law enforcement agencies tend to use the WMD definition that includes explosives, citing one of the legal definitions in the U.S. Code (18 U.S.C. 2332a). On the other hand, the IC tends to use the definition contained in 50 U.S.C. 2302, which does not focus on the source material as being the most relevant aspect of WMD, but rather the creation of mass casualties. Other agencies like DoS include delivery systems (primarily ballistic missiles) in their practical definition of the term WMD. Given these differences, it would be easy to advocate a “start over” approach to defining WMD but it is also important to note that the various definitions for WMD are all variations of a few basic definitions. In addition to consistency within the USG, there is one additional factor for consideration – internationally accepted definitions of WMD. While some would argue that international standards have no place in USG interagency affairs, the reality is that the USG is a party and/or signatory to three treaties – the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – with this specific WMD definition:

“...atomic explosive weapons, radio active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have the characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.”⁶

(U) This Interagency Working Group should not only consider achieving consistency on the significant terms for CWMD-related activities but should serve as the leading edge of an “across the board” reorganization effort for parallel structures across the government. Their efforts would then be subject to a potential three-year review of interagency implementation. As stated earlier, the problem of a common lexicon is not limited to the definition of WMD, has benefits for the intelligence, diplomatic and operational aspects of the USG, and has repercussions beyond communication and common understanding.

(U) USCENTCOM act as a Catalyst for Change. We recommend USCENTCOM raise the “Structure for Success” and “Common Lexicon” issues for consideration concurrent with the changes that will certainly follow with new leadership in OSD. USSTRATCOM would be the logical lead for this effort based on its role as global synchronizer for COCOM CWMD planning, provided they are still the executive agent. If USSTRATCOM does not retain the synchronizer role, the Joint Staff should spearhead the effort to attain agreement within DoD and ultimately with the rest of the USG on terms related to CWMD. Two candidate terms for assessment of consistency are “WMD” and “interdiction.” Clear communication between DoD and the rest of the USG is hard to achieve when

⁶ W. Seth Carus, “Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”; Occasional Paper 4, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University; January 2006; p.3. (U)

caveats in the current *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* state things like “solely for the purpose of this publication” when discussing associated terms. While such statements allow the authors to limit the scope of their use of the WMD term, they add to the ambiguity.

(U) Better Coordinate Assistance. Efficient coordination of the numerous U.S CWMD-relevant assistance programs and funding sources can be a difficult undertaking. One key challenge is obtaining greater flexibility in how funds are allocated and expended while maintaining safeguards against misuse or redundancy of effort. Current USG legal authorities and practice, for example, require the allocation of money for specific purposes – e.g., the military cannot use Title 10 training money to train foreign non-military police and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) cannot use its funds to train foreign military personnel. This type of constraint makes mandatory a high degree of coordination across departments and agencies to make the most of opportunities to train foreign partner agencies or military entities that may lie outside a given USG entity’s area of authority and/or central responsibility. In practice, however, because the consensus-driven interagency coordination process can be difficult and time-consuming, departments and agencies tend to work independently in areas they can fully control, even if that results in a sub-optimal outcome from a whole-of-government perspective.

(U) Diligent work by practitioners to accomplish a given cross-agency mission often results in “creative work-arounds” to existing restrictions. Absent an ability to devise such a solution, the present formal recourse is to energize the National Security Council’s interagency coordination process. While such a high-level process may result in the resolution of larger issues, it is not appropriate or practical for resolving the host of smaller issues that often arise in the context of CWMD assistance programs. It is difficult to justify NSC engagement to resolve, for example, a tactical issue between USG agencies about whether or how to arrange for the training of twenty non-military first responders from Turkmenistan using DoD funds.

(U) The Combating WMD team recommends that COCOMs be given greater flexibility to allocate funds for WMD-related tasks. COCOMs should be allowed discretion to allocate some CWMD-earmarked funds to provide assistance to partner nations when they conclude that a priority CWMD mission in their AORs cannot be accomplished via the normal process of cross-department coordination in a sufficiently timely or robust fashion. Improving spending flexibility for COCOMs would be a DoD and USG-wide undertaking and require changes to departmental policy and U.S. law, including Title 10. Under the current DoD CWMD structure, USSTRATCOM would be the principal military advocate for such changes, although CDR USCENTCOM, who is responsible for the AOR under greatest threat from WMD proliferation, could be a powerful supporting voice. This type of broad effort would also benefit from the engagement of the expected White House-level “WMD Czar” with a mandate for USG-wide policy development and coordination.

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Expand the Inclusion of CWMD Activities in All Appropriate Military Exercises. U.S. partner nations rely heavily upon U.S. leadership, positive example, and technical expertise to ensure that their armed forces can carry out CWMD missions. Of DoD's eight CWMD military mission areas, however, only two – interdiction and consequence management – are commonly included in exercises, including those conducted with U.S. partner nations. The other six CWMD military mission areas are either not, in operational terms, specific to WMD (e.g., offensive strike operations against fixed targets) or are usually only included as lesser components of other exercises not principally focused on CWMD. Even when participating in PSI exercises that specifically center on interdiction of WMD-related shipments, combatant commands typically focus on only the tactics, techniques, and procedures directly related to interdiction, and not to other CWMD goals. Further, combatant commands are encouraged by instruction to support PSI exercises but are not allocated additional funds specific to those exercises. They must therefore be paid for out of general operating budgets. In order to ensure that CWMD activities are properly exercised, and that every exercise that can reasonably include a CWMD component does so, the relevant exercise planning DoD components – principally USCENTCOM, USJFCOM, the Joint Staff, and/or OSD – should ensure that CWMD mission sets are included as a matter of regular process in exercise development planning. Adequate funds should also be allocated to combatant commands to support wider incorporation of CWMD activities into exercises. We cannot assess in advance how much additional funding will be necessary, given that a formal operational analysis of how exercises might be expanded in this manner has never been done nor has a determination been made of how many additional CWMD-specific exercises might be necessary. However, imposing CWMD activities as another “unfunded exercise mandate” on the COCOMs which needs to be funded out of existing budgets will likely result in no improvement in the number or quality of such exercises.

(U) Fund and Expand Programs that Prevent VEO Production of WMD. Much of the work in this area is conducted at classification levels that preclude inclusion here. However, generally, CDR USCENCOM should impress upon policy makers the importance of fully exploiting these opportunities. Other programs that should be supported are DoS and Department of Commerce (DoC) efforts that enhance compliance with international export control measures and assist less sophisticated nations with development and implementation of national inventory and export controls.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Improve Coordination of Regional CWMD Messaging. USG policy initiatives on CWMD are communicated to and worked with foreign partners at many levels and channels of foreign interaction. Global, multilateral, and bilateral initiatives and negotiations are typically handled through ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs), the UN, and a host of other diplomatic channels. Cooperation and

coordination on export controls, border security, and customs issues draw in different agencies and players. Cooperation on WMD interdiction activities can be handled through diplomatic, intelligence, or law enforcement channels. Each of these actors has a different set of institutional, legal, and budgetary authorities and constraints that must be coordinated and deconflicted in order to maximize the chances for success. The failure to properly integrate messages across USG agencies and components will not only inevitably result in less than optimal performance, but itself also risks sending another, undesirable message – that the issue at hand is not important enough to be reinforced consistently through all channels and at all appropriate levels.

(U) Despite the multiple players and specific areas of organizational responsibility on the CWMD issue, USCENTCOM's relationships with regional leaders, both civilian and military, position it well to reinforce and enhance policy messages being communicated in other channels. Policy messages delivered by the right U.S. official to the right foreign interlocutor at the right time can maximize USG chances for success in achieving its objectives. A USCENTCOM visit to a regional partner state, for example, is a prime opportunity to reinforce broad, high-level policy messages on CWMD topics. The integration of various USG departments' issue-specific messages on CWMD topics to our regional partners or our regional adversaries can serve as a powerful "force multiplier" in terms of the impact of the U.S. message, as well as avoiding mixed messages about the importance of CWMD to the overall U.S. strategy and objectives in the region.

(U) USCENTCOM unfortunately does not currently inject CWMD topics into its regional interactions in an optimal fashion, i.e., one that is managed by a clear and consistent process that allows the entire USG CWMD community to send the right message at the right time. This shortcoming risks sending a mixed message that, although the United States has rhetorically identified WMD proliferation as one of the "gravest dangers" facing the nation and the world today, it is not really important enough to raise forcefully and consistently.

(U) In order to guard against this problem, a new approach is required. Since DoS is the lead federal agency for international outreach, DoS should develop an overall USG-wide strategic communications plan that includes themes and establishes reporting requirements for WMD-related issues. CDR USCENTCOM should support this effort. OSD must in turn develop a plan to execute DoD activities supporting the DoS overall plan, and direct COCOMs and Services to include strategic communications in existing plans as appropriate. National and departmental strategic communications plans must designate a strategic communications authority (i.e. an element in NSC, DoS, and/or DoD) and include requirements to provide information on the full range of WMD-related activities to that authority. The appropriate authorities, both national and departmental, will then determine how to best include appropriate information in sub-regional, regional, and global strategic communications messages. In addition, the determination authority must also have the power to recommend expedited release or disclosure of information while it is still timely. Specific elements of this should include the following:

- (U) CONUS-based senior policymaking entities – principally the NSC and DoS – should work more closely with OSD(P) and the Joint Staff to ensure that USCENTCOM's regional access, relationships, and resources are optimally used to communicate CWMD messages, and that feedback from USCENTCOM messaging is rapidly and clearly fed back to those CONUS-based entities.

- (U) The Joint Staff should ensure that USG CWMD policy developments, priorities, and process changes are adequately communicated to USCENCOM in a timely fashion, to ensure the proper updating and further communication of messages to regional partners.
- (U) USCENCOM should include a strategic communications section in its CONPLAN 1099.
- (U) USCENCOM should draft and maintain CWMD policy talking points that are current and available to every USCENCOM General or Flag Officer (GO/FO) for engagement with foreign interlocutors, regardless of the stated purpose of the engagement.
- (U) USCENCOM J-5 should establish as standard practice that all significant ongoing interactions between USCENCOM and its regional partners are reviewed to ensure that CWMD messages, where possible and appropriate, are injected into those interactions and consistent with broader, established USG and USCENCOM policies on CWMD. Also where possible and appropriate, USCENCOM J-5 should work to ensure that U.S. messages on CWMD parallel those of extra-regional partners (UK, Australia, etc.) working with us in the AOR.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

- (U) a statement of interdiction principles publicly endorsed by all participants that commits them to cooperate on WMD interdiction-related issues;
- (U) an Operational Experts Group (OEG), currently consisting of twenty countries, that meets at least once a year to discuss in depth interdiction-related issues and problems; and
- (U) a series of PSI exercises, both tabletop and actual, aimed at strengthening the practical capabilities of participating states' military, intelligence, and law enforcement services to conduct interdictions.

(U) PSI is not an operational mechanism for interdicting WMD, and there are no "PSI interdictions." PSI instead provides a forum within which states can work together to position themselves more effectively to conduct interdictions by strengthening their laws, policies, agency structures, and operational procedures; by exchanging information and ideas; and by facilitating the development of networks of officials in participating state governments and militaries who share a common knowledge and understanding of interdiction issues. PSI participants cooperate and coordinate actual interdictions through existing bilateral or multilateral diplomatic, military, intelligence and law enforcement channels.

(U) The OEG meetings – typically held at least once annually – are the primary vehicle for guiding PSI activities, discussing issues and problems, and sustaining participating states' focus on WMD interdiction. There are currently twenty OEG members (mostly European, with one from South America (Argentina) and four from East Asia (Japan, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand)), consisting principally of states with the greatest experience, institutional readiness, and military – principally maritime – capabilities to conduct interdiction operations.

(U) Restricting OEG meetings to twenty of the currently over ninety PSI participating states streamlines the meetings and prevents them from becoming unwieldy. Furthermore, papers, findings, and other results of OEG meetings are shared with all PSI participants that are not members of the OEG. Non-OEG states, however, generally neither provide significant input to the OEG nor are able to benefit from participating in the many discussion sessions and other informal meetings that take place during an OEG session. Aside from occasional operational exercises, there is really no institutional mechanism for non-OEG PSI endorsing states to participate regularly in PSI activities. This has facilitated the development of a de facto two-tier system within PSI – OEG countries that actively participate in the Initiative and non-OEG countries who engage in little sustained PSI-related activity beyond endorsing the statement of interdiction principles.

(U) In 2007, PSI participants attempted to broaden non-OEG participation and make the PSI more effective by agreeing to begin holding Regional Operational Experts Groups (ROEGs). ROEGs will consist of PSI participants from a specific global region, any additional PSI participants from outside the region that would like to participate (practically expected to include only a small number of major nations, e.g., United States, United Kingdom, France), and select non-PSI endorsers from the region. The first of these ROEGs will be hosted by U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in Miami in May 2009 and will focus on Western Hemisphere nations. Poland is also planning to host a European ROEG in June 2009.

(U) ROEGs are expected to serve four main purposes:

- (U) to more actively involve non-OEG participating states in PSI activities in order to strengthen their commitment to and preparedness for conducting interdiction activities;
- (U) to provide a multilateral forum for discussing region-specific interdiction issues, problems, and solutions;
- (U) to serve as a platform for outreach to non-PSI endorsing states on interdiction issues, with the maximum goal of getting them to endorse the statement of interdiction principals, and the minimum goal of allowing them to benefit from work already done by PSI participants; and
- (U) to maintain the effectiveness of the OEG by continuing to limit membership.

(U) Fifteen partner nations in the USCENTCOM AOR have endorsed PSI: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Another five countries in or bordering the broader Middle East region – Djibouti, Israel, Libya, Morocco, and Turkey – have also endorsed PSI.

This critical mass of twenty endorsers, many of which are located along major routes of proliferation activity but only one of which (Turkey) is in the OEG, provide a solid reason and basis for holding a Middle Eastern ROEG.

(U) A Middle Eastern ROEG could provide numerous benefits to the United States, its main allies outside the AOR, and to partners in the region. First, it will enhance the ability of individual regional partners to enforce their national sovereignty in the face of WMD trafficking by helping to strengthen their capacity to conduct interdictions. Second, it will make regional states more effective partners for the United States and other extra-regional players during jointly-conducted interdiction operations. Third, by providing regional partners with greater situational awareness and insights into evolving global legal and political developments, it will assist in any broader effort to develop an effective political consensus and normative or legal framework (e.g., future UN Security Council resolutions) for combating WMD proliferation. Fourth, it will send a signal to Iran, Syria, or other regional states of proliferation concern that countries within and outside the region are prepared to take stronger steps to curb WMD trafficking.

(U) Primary responsibility for coordinating PSI activities within the USG is shared by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS), with many other USG entities in the policy, intelligence, and law enforcement realms contributing to or participating in the process. Through the established DoD/DoS-led process for PSI, DoD and DoS should in 2009 identify a suitable regional PSI partner to host a Middle East ROEG, and encourage and assist, as necessary, that partner in holding the ROEG in 2010. USCENTCOM can facilitate this process by establishing the ROEG as a USCENTCOM priority important to CWMD efforts in the region, facilitating the holding of the ROEG through the participation of USCENTCOM personnel, encouraging regional partners to attend as part of USCENTCOM's regular bilateral interactions, and providing input to DoD and DoS on the best choice(s) for a host country.

(U) As an OEG member and experienced counterproliferation partner of the United States and its European allies, Turkey would be a good choice to host an initial ROEG. Holding the meeting in Turkey, which has relatively positive relations with Israel, would mitigate the political problem posed by an Israeli presence in other Islamic countries. Turkey's importance and role as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world would also have the benefits of attracting the attendance of major European PSI partners, facilitating participation and outreach to Middle Eastern countries, like Egypt, that have not yet endorsed PSI, and countering the perception that PSI is an exclusively U.S.-led effort.

(U) Sponsor an Arab and a Central Asian Regional Partner Nation from the USCENTCOM AOR for Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative Operational Experts Group. As previously detailed, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) currently consists of twenty countries and meets at least once a year to discuss in depth interdiction-related issues and problems. The OEG meetings are the primary vehicle for guiding PSI activities, discussing issues and problems, and sustaining participating states' focus on WMD interdiction.

(U) Turkey is the only country from the greater Middle East region that sits in the OEG, which largely consists of PSI participating states with the greatest experience, institutional readiness, and military – principally maritime – capabilities to conduct interdiction operations. As a result, it was proposed in the previous section that Turkey could be a good candidate to host the area's first Regional Operational

Experts Group (ROEG) and thus serve as a bridge between the OEG and the USCENTCOM AOR PSI participants. The lack of a USCENTCOM AOR country on the OEG, however, prevents partners among both the Arab and Central Asian nations of the AOR from having a voice and a view from the inside of PSI, from contributing regional perspectives to the discussions, and from serving to further legitimize the PSI in the region. We assess that an effective way to correct these shortcomings and to encourage AOR countries to be more active within PSI would be to enlist an Arab country and a Central Asian country join the OEG.

(U) As was noted in the previous section, keeping the OEG to a manageable size is important to ensuring its continued utility as PSI's coordinating body. However, as regional PSI activities expand via what is expected to become an increasing frequency of ROEGs, there will be a growing political and practical importance to ensuring regional voices are represented in the OEG. OEG members, by virtue of their more active involvement in PSI activities, have a greater stake in PSI's success, and are better positioned to conduct outreach to new potential PSI members, host future ROEGs, host or participate in PSI exercises, and to strengthen their own interdiction capabilities while at the same time urging others in their region to do the same.

(U) Any Middle Eastern or Central Asian state that joins the OEG will almost certainly lack the capabilities and well-developed institutions relevant to the interdiction mission that are possessed by most of the other OEG members. This raises the question of the appropriateness of their membership in the OEG in light of these shortcomings. We assess, however, that OEG membership will serve to encourage the new members to develop their capabilities and institutions, especially if actively guided and encouraged by other OEG members. Even if that is a drawn-out process, however, there is virtually no institutional cost or downside to adding one or two new members to an OEG already comprised of twenty countries. In addition, PSI will benefit politically from the presence of a more diverse body of OEG members, which will further undermine the characterization by some opponents of PSI or the OEG as an "all-Christian" or "all Western" club.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Negotiation COA :

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Sanctions COA:

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Countering COA:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

12. (U) AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

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Joint Working Group of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic International Studies, "Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security," December 2008.

The Manama Dialogue; speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates; Manama, Bahrain; 13 December 2008.

The Manama Dialogue; speech delivered by General David Petraeus, USA; Commander, USCENTCOM; 14 December 2008.

Note: Tab A to Appendix 1 also includes all of the relevant international treaties, multilateral regimes and USG initiatives/executive orders focused on the combating weapons of mass destruction issue. Although these documents form the non-proliferation/counterproliferation architecture, they did not specifically impact the development of the situational assessment.

13. (U) APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: CWMD SITUATION ASSESSMENT

APPENDIX 2: METRICS

APPENDIX 3: DETERRENCE AND DETERRENCE FAILURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

APPENDIX 4: CONTACTS

**(U) APPENDIX ONE to ANNEX E – Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
Situation Assessment**

1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(U) During the course of our research we discovered that despite loud and clear pronouncements from the highest levels of the USG concerning its vital importance, the global WMD issue remains a second tier priority, particularly within DoD. A lack of clear articulation and understanding of policy throughout all levels of government has resulted in a mismatch between leadership’s stated desires and U.S. efforts targeted at achieving them. To address these shortcomings, we recommend full clarification and declaration of USG policy goals, accompanied by coordinated actions to achieve those goals in a “whole-of-government” approach. The CWMD team does not advocate an immediate change to USG overall policy or other multilateral initiatives. Instead we propose effective and clear communication of national policies, translated effectively by departments and agencies, and a clear statement declaring the priority of the national goal. This should increase the level of dedication to combating the proliferation of WMD, WMD dual-use items, and WMD delivery systems, and better provide for unity of the government’s associated efforts in a “whole-of-government” approach. There are clear advantages to greater clarity and coherence of policy at all levels, including heightened emphasis on awareness of the regional proliferation landscape, greater effectiveness in operations planning and execution, greater synergy between USCENTCOM and other USG department/agency efforts, increased effects in reducing or reversing proliferation, and global recognition of the United

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(U) WMD development and acquisition programs are, in general, long-term, complex, and secretive undertakings. As a result, absent a nuclear explosive test or public declaration that a WMD weapons capability has been achieved, achievement milestones or “red lines” will likely not be easy to discern. There is widespread agreement that WMD proliferation and use should be prevented. Most countries, as demonstrated by the near universal acceptance of WMD-related multilateral treaties and conventions, agree that WMD in the wrong hands pose a grave threat to global security. WMD acquisition is also heavily influenced by security developments in the non-WMD realm. Current nation-state imperatives within the region make WMD reduction unlikely at best, and the Iranian nuclear program, as one regional example, will lead to changes in regional behavior. States determined to acquire WMD will do so in the face of significant external influences, including diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and other consequences of proliferation-related activities. Broader positive political and security developments in the AOR could lay the groundwork for some efforts to reduce the future proliferation threat thereby denying state and non-state actors acquisition opportunities. This may include such combined efforts as strengthening diplomatic efforts to portray countries and non-state actors who would misuse WMD as pariahs, universally enforcing sanctions, targeted financial countermeasures, and physical interdiction to affect proliferators’ ability to acquire items of concern. It is significant to note that during any policy effort to prevent, halt or reverse a state’s WMD-related activities, it is extremely difficult to determine *a priori* what combination of carrots and sticks will convince a state to change its WMD-acquisition policy. While the state’s overall security situation critically influences its need or desire for WMD, leadership policy choices and internal politics influence how that security situation is perceived and what risks and punishments it is willing to take. As a result, there are no guarantees of WMD security within the USCENTCOM AOR.

2. (U) DETAILED POLICY ANALYSIS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

adequately convey the intent of higher level guidance. (U) Despite these shortcomings, USCENTCOM planners have been able to create an executable plan, CONPLAN 1099, based on these documents. The only disadvantages associated with this increased emphasis on CWMD include the requirements to dedicate sufficient resources towards achieving stated goals and to clearly prioritize CWMD activities compared with other USG, to include DoD, activities. These changes should have

minimal financial impact on USCENTCOM but will require, at least, a realignment of USG resources and emphasis on WMD-related issues throughout all instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement. A summary of relevant documents follows.

(U) The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) states the United States must prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with WMD. It identifies Iran (et al) as a country under the rule of tyranny, and conveys the notion that tyrannies threaten our immediate security interests by their pursuit of WMD. It states we must deny WMD to rogue states (and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation). It lists “non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and improved protection to mitigate the consequences of WMD use” as parts of a comprehensive strategy required to combat the proliferation of WMD. It focuses U.S. strategy on denying states from acquiring the capability to produce fissile material suitable for making nuclear weapons, and to deter, interdict, or prevent any transfer of that material from states that have this capability to rogue states or to terrorists. It states there is no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran (and its nuclear program). It implies the United States should continue to lead international efforts to shut down WMD trafficking.

(U) The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NS) states WMD in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States, and that we must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. It states we must accord the highest priority to the protection of the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies from the existing a growing WMD threat. It identifies three pillars which comprise the National Strategy: Counterproliferation (CP) to Combat WMD use; Strengthened Non-proliferation (NP) to combat WMD proliferation; and Consequence Management (CM) to respond to WMD use. As a subset of Counterproliferation, it identifies interdiction as a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery systems. It requires enhancing the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations. It also describes the need for improved deterrence, defense and mitigation, active non-proliferation diplomacy, support for multilateral regimes and threat reduction cooperation, improved controls on nuclear materials, implementation of U.S. export controls, and use of non-proliferation sanctions. It also states all elements of the overall U.S. strategy to combat WMD must be brought to bear in targeted strategies against supplier and recipient states of WMD proliferation concern, as well as terrorist groups which seek to acquire WMD.

(U) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) states, essentially, that each geographic combatant commander is responsible for providing the single point of contact for all military activities in his AOR.

(U) The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is intended to translate national/presidential guidance into guidance usable by DoD for planning and execution of tasks to achieve national goals. However, the NDS does not accurately reflect the intent of the higher level guidance in the *National Security Strategy* or *National Strategy to Combat WMD*. Although the NDS does identify “prevent adversaries from acquiring or using WMD” as one of several means to achieve departmental objectives, it places WMD-related tasks on a lower level of priority than would be expected based on the content of both

the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy to Combat WMD*, signifying a lesser need to pursue associated efforts. The NDS does not discuss the three pillars (NP, CP, CM) as such, and of the three only mentions one (non-proliferation) by the name given in the higher level guidance. Concepts associated with CM are discussed, but only as they apply to improved protection. Discussion of issues that would translate to the counterproliferation pillar is unfocused, and there is no apparent attempt to link them to either the language or apparent priority established in the higher level guidance.

(U) *The National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* (NMS) references the National Strategy's (NS) three pillars, establishes nine military strategic goals and associated end states, and proposes four military strategic objectives (MSO) to support them. It establishes eight military mission areas (MMA) to conduct in order to achieve them. The consensus view is that USCENTCOM's overall plan was crafted in compliance with the guidance the command was given by the Secretary of Defense. However, our assessment produced two different points of view regarding the effectiveness and viability of the *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* (NMS) itself. Those viewpoints (expressed as opposing the NMS and supporting the NMS) are:

(U) Opposing

The first guiding principle in the NMS is for DoD to pursue a "layered defense," implying that Combating WMD is primarily a defensive, less proactive, activity. This conflicts with higher level guidance to be proactive globally. Another guiding principle is to use "capabilities-based planning," in essence placing military consideration for separate MMAs into the acquisitions/requirements community. This results in acquisitions professionals, rather than operations or plans specialists, performing assessments for individual missions. Yet another guiding principle is to use an "effects-based approach" which, as a planning concept, differs significantly from a capabilities-based approach. Which approach, then, should military planners use?

(U) By themselves, the four MSOs effectively describe what the NMS intends to accomplish in order to support the NS. However, the NMS blurs the clear intent of the NS' three pillars by creating eight separate MMAs, many of them not exclusive to combating WMD, intended to achieve the four MSOs. Of the eight MMAs, only three – Elimination, Interdiction, and Consequence Management – describe activities which are specific to efforts relating to adversary WMD. The other five can be applied to activities the military performs regardless of the target set. For example, active defense, as defined within the context of the *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD*, primarily means missile defense, air defense, special operations, and security operations, all of which may also be applied to conventional threats. Offensive Operations mirror those operations already in practice in USG war planning and execution for other targets, and include the same considerations examined when analyzing the consequences of executing a nuclear attack. Similarly, Passive Defense, Threat Reduction Cooperation, and Security Cooperation and Partnership Activities are primarily activities the USG would pursue regardless of whether or not they involved WMD. Therefore, although it is important for military planners to recognize that activities associated with all eight MMAs may involve adversary WMD, delivery systems, and related components, technologies, expertise, and personnel, Elimination Operations, Interdiction Operations, and WMD Consequence Management remain the three WMD-specific mission areas on which DoD should focus.

(U) Although not completely detracting from success, misalignment of MMAs in support of the three pillars of the NS can further confuse planners. For example, the National Strategy clearly describes interdiction as contributory to CP. The NMS allows interdiction to support both CP and NP. This by itself is not a significant issue until combined with staffing realities which drive limited personnel to service diverse MMAs stratified improperly either by pillar or function, particularly when communicating with interagency partners when pursuing the desired “whole-of-government” approach.

(U) Also problematic is DoD’s use of the term “Combating WMD” as a label to describe an actual mission rather than to describe a set of activities performed to achieve a desired military objective. The meaning of the title *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* can best be interpreted as the “DoD overall framework to address the problems posed by adversary pursuit or use of WMD.” By using “Combating WMD” as a single term meant to encompass the very diverse needs of supporting the three pillars – NP, CP, CM – DoD invites confusion into the planning and execution process. Simply posed, WMD are physical objects – how do you combat them? DoD would be better served by identifying any of its “Combating WMD” activities in terms of the three pillars. It may be helpful for DoD to conduct a mission analysis in order to sort out these relationships.

(U) DoD’s use of “Combating WMD” also makes effective communication with interagency and international partners challenging. The USG, exclusive of DoD, primarily aligns its efforts along the three pillars and uses those terms to define operational mission areas. The international community follows roughly the same pattern. Although DoD recognizes the three pillars, the format of the NMS and continued use of its unique jargon drives the department to use “Combating WMD” to describe any of the several activities that would otherwise be more effectively defined as NP, CP, and CM. In an enterprise described by senior leadership as requiring a “whole-of-government” approach, and characterized by interagency efforts where DoD is not the lead agency, DoD should align itself with more generally accepted terminology in order to more effectively integrate with the rest of the USG.

(U) Supporting

Although the NMS could create some confusion in a few USG agency headquarters, it assists planners and executors at the operational-level and below by providing a framework that facilitates the conversion of somewhat abstract CWMD concepts into an executable military plan in a format understood by all in the military.

(U) *The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)* states that it derives its theater or functional end-states, prioritized as appropriate for each command, from the *National Defense Strategy*, which as previously discussed does not include WMD-related issues as a strategic end-state. Despite this apparent lack of accurate reflection of, or linkage to, both the NSS and NS to Combat WMD, the GEF does contain, as the fourth of ten priorities, the global strategic end state “the use of WMD is deterred, the proliferation of WMD and associated technology is prevented, new WMD development is prevented, and WMD stockpiles are secure and being reduced.” The GEF recognizes USCENTCOM as “a critical theater of U.S. effort to build capable allies and partners, protect U.S. strategic access and interests, and prevent proliferation of WMD,” and places fourth (of six in priority order) the theater strategic end state “proliferation of WMD into and out of the AOR is prevented, use of WMD is

deterred, new WMD development is prevented, and WMD stockpiles are secure.” USCENTCOM specific planning guidance for Combating WMD directs comprehensive campaign planning for “...combating WMD and preventing the transfer of delivery systems and associated technology, expertise, and materials.” In essence, despite the lack of clarity and effective replication of national guidance in the NDS on which it is based, the GEF appears to properly guide the command in the relative priority and planning requirements to achieve USG combating WMD goals.

(U) *The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)* directs combatant command planning for specific issues and regions of concern. The “Combating WMD” contingency is not listed as one of the top 14 priority contingency planning requirements, although an associated, narrowly-focused, contingency beyond the scope of this assessment is. The JSCP designates USSTRATCOM the global synchronizer for CWMD planning and responsible for the DoD CWMD Campaign Plan. USSTRATCOM developed CONPLAN 8099 as a result of this directive. CONPLAN 8099 is primarily a “how-to” plan, reiterating goals stated in the GEF and NMS, and providing COCOMs guidance on how to develop their required regional (RWMD) plans. Following this framework, USCENTCOM developed CONPLAN 1099, designed to be the executable regional plan to support achieving goals stated in higher level guidance.

(U) To facilitate combatant command planning that adequately supports national goals, our team recommends that OSD rewrite the *National Defense Strategy* and the JSCP, and the Joint Staff rewrite the *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD*. It is critical that these documents accurately reflect national guidance, clearly declare policy priorities, and better shape DoD activities to support related efforts.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(U) Our team recommends an immediate review the *USCENTCOM Theater Strategy* and the *USCENTCOM Theater Campaign Plan* for congruence with higher level guidance. The Theater Campaign Plan is not only supposed to implement the GEF and the JSCP but operationalize the *USCENTCOM Theater Strategy*. The Theater Strategy outlines five theater objectives that will bring stability to the AOR. Among these priorities is the objective to “Counter the proliferation, acquisition,

and use of WMD.” Unfortunately, none of the seven pillars in the Theater Campaign Plan address this issue directly. Only two of the seven pillars address CWMD - the “Iran” and the “Prevent the Re-emergence of Destabilizing Capabilities” pillars.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(U) In general, the issues presented in the national strategies do not lend themselves to being easily formatted as a plan under the *Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)* process, or to being executed along the traditional military linear lines of effort. This task is further complicated by the global WMD architecture, a large, complex, and longstanding framework that cannot be accurately captured or explained in, or addressed by, military plans. Consequently, combating WMD effectively requires a fluid and flexible approach characterized by collaboration with the remainder of interagency without being encumbered by the rigid structure associated with military plans and planning. Again, without appropriate senior guidance, the combatant commands face challenges in planning, manning, and conducting operations targeting adversary WMD.

3. (U) ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN COMBATING WMD

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(U) A variety of means, both regionally- and globally-focused, exist to slow or restrain regional WMD programs. These include global non-proliferation norms and regimes, ongoing counterproliferation efforts, and security assurances and assistance from the United States and others to partners in the region. These efforts have been successful in raising the costs and complicating the attempts of regional states to expand their WMD programs and in reducing incentives other regional countries see in acquiring WMD. We assess that there are several key events that could occur in the next few years that will have a significant impact on their continued success in the regional proliferation landscape.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(U) **TAB A: Current Non-proliferation/Counterproliferation Policies and Activities**

(U) There is a large, complex global architecture of non-proliferation and counterproliferation treaties, laws, agreements, initiatives, and policies to combat the proliferation of WMD both within and outside the USCENTCOM AOR. Less well-appreciated is the danger posed by the proliferation of WMD dual-use and delivery system-related materials to, from, and between state and non-state actors, leading to the development and maturation of state WMD programs in various regions. This framework, however, encompasses all aspects of WMD and is reinforced by a plethora of U.S. regional security policies and security cooperation programs, and specific, highly-focused USG diplomatic engagement on major issues like the Iranian nuclear program through the P5+1 process. Export control cooperation has dramatically expanded in the past twenty years, while stronger safeguards against the diversion of WMD have reduced the ability of terrorists and other sub-state actors to acquire WMD-relevant items and material. Achievements such as the elimination of post-Soviet WMD arsenals outside Russia, the termination of Libya's WMD programs, and the removal of any threat posed by remnant WMD in Iraq all underline the success of U.S. and international NP/CP efforts. New tools like E.O. 13382, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction provide the promise of future improvement.

(U) Specific cases aside, this body of activities and approaches can be roughly divided into three broad categories: international measures; export control regimes; and bilateral measures.

(U) **International Measures:** The USG and most of its key allies support and facilitate the development of a web of international treaties, initiatives, and other commitments to stem WMD proliferation. These instruments establish international norms of behavior vis-à-vis the proliferation of WMD and related delivery systems, to include possession, security, and transfer of WMD and export controls on WMD related materials. Key elements of this category of measures include:

(U) Nuclear

(U) Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – The NPT is formally known as the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. The NPT legally recognizes five nuclear weapons states (the United States, UK, France, U.S.S.R./Russia, and China), with all other signatories agreeing to forswear the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The five weapons states in turn agree to share peaceful nuclear technology with the non-weapons states, and to undertake eventual nuclear disarmament. There are currently 189 countries who are parties to the treaty, only five of which are legally recognized as nuclear weapons states. There are only four states that are not parties to the treaty, two of which are within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (Israel and Pakistan).

(U) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – The IAEA was initially established in 1957 as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization. Frequently referred to as the United Nations "Atomic Watchdog", the IAEA is regulated by and reports annually to the UN. The IAEA works with member states to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies, including through the use of nonproliferation inspections regimes.

(U) Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) – The CPPNM is the only legally binding international instrument in the area of physical protection of nuclear material and specifically establishes measures to prevent, detect, and punish offenses related to nuclear material. As of June 30, 2008, there were 136 signatories to the convention.

(U) Convention on Nuclear Safety – This convention legally commits participating states operating land-based nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks (i.e. siting, design, construction, operation, etc.) to which states would subscribe. As of April 4, 2007, there were 65 signatories to the convention. It is significant to note that all countries currently operating nuclear power plants are parties to the convention. Convention signatories in the USCENTCOM AOR/AOI are Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, and Pakistan.

(U) Global Initiative (GI) to Combat Nuclear Terrorism – The GI was launched on July 15, 2006, to expand and accelerate the development of partnership capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to the global threat of nuclear terrorism. Since its inception, the GI has garnered support from 75 countries. In the USCENTCOM AOR/AOI, the following countries support GI: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, UAE, and Uzbekistan.

(U) Global Nuclear Detection Architecture – A global nuclear detection architecture is a comprehensive set of detection systems and the associated resources and infrastructure that, taken together, are intended to provide an appropriate, effective capability to detect and interdict radiological and nuclear threats. The key elements are awareness of nuclear threats, a multi-layered structure of detection systems, a well-defined and carefully coordinated network of interrelationships among them, and formal guidance for governing the architecture's design and evolution over time.

(U) Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) – The NSOI is a DoS initiative to conclude tailored action plans with other countries to prevent, detect, and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling.

(U) Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) – The GNEP is a DoE initiative that offers a responsible framework for both international and domestic use of nuclear power to reduce the risks associated with nuclear proliferation and the impacts associated with waste disposal. Internationally, GNEP comprises a partnership of countries with a common vision: to expand nuclear energy safely and peacefully.

(U) Chemical and Biological

(U) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) – The CWC is formally known as the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction*. The CWC is a binding treaty that outlaws the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. As of June 19, 2008, 184 states have signed and ratified the treaty. In the USCENTCOM AOR, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria are the only CWC non-signatories.

(U) Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – The OPCW is the CWC's supporting organization. The OPCW is responsible for promoting increased CWC membership,

organizing inspection procedures to verify compliance with the treaty, and providing technical support to countries who have inherited a legacy of chemical weapons stockpiles from previous governments.

(U) Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) – The BWC is formally known as the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction*. The BWC was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production of an entire category of weapons. The BWC commits signatories to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. There are currently 162 signatories.

(U) Missile

(U) Hague Code of Conduct (HCOG) – The HCOG is formally known as the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The HCOG seeks to bolster efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide and to further delegitimize such proliferation, and is intended to supplement the MTCR. As of February 2008, there were 128 subscribing states. The following USCENTCOM AOR states participate in the HCOG: Afghanistan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

(U) Other

(U) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) – PSI is a U.S.-developed initiative started in 2003 to strengthen global capabilities for interdicting WMD-related transfers to both state and non-state actors. PSI includes a Statement of Interdiction Principles that participating states endorse, an Operational Experts Group that meets periodically to discuss ways of enhancing national capacities to facilitate interdictions, and actual exercises aimed at honing the ability of participating states to carry out interdiction operations, either individually or in concert with other partners. PSI has to date been endorsed by 93 nations, nine of which have signed bilateral ship-boarding agreements with the United States to facilitate at-sea interdiction activity.

(U) WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) – The WMD-PPI is a DoD initiative launched in fiscal year 2003 and designed to enhance non-Russian FSU capabilities to prevent, deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials, and to respond effectively to trafficking incidents at the border. For USCENTCOM, the WMD-PPI has worked in the following countries: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

(U) United Nations Security Council Resolutions – In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1540 establishing for the first time binding obligations on all UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials. UNSCR 1540 was followed by a series of other non-proliferation resolutions which specifically target the WMD proliferation-related activities of North Korea (UNSCR 1718) or Iran (UNSCR 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835).

(U) Export Control Regimes: The USG has also led an international effort to establish several non-proliferation export control regimes. Unlike the international measures described above, which, in practice or aspiration, involve most or all countries of the world, the regimes focus on coordinating the

activities of only those countries capable of supplying WMD-relevant technologies. The regimes, which are not legally binding, are aimed at generating commonly-accepted export control lists and standards, information exchanges, and other types of cooperation to help facilitate the implementation of national-level export control policies. A common approach among nations capable of supplying proliferation-relevant technologies is essential to preventing WMD-seeking countries from exploiting differences in national laws to procure technologies from those suppliers with the weakest export controls. The key supplier regimes are as follows:

(U) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – The NSG establishes common guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports. It currently has 45 members. In the USCENTCOM AOR, only Kazakhstan is a member of the NSG.

(U) Australia Group (AG) – The AG’s goal is to reduce the spread of chemical and biological weapons by monitoring and controlling their export of a common list of technologies, and precursor chemicals required to produce them. There are currently 41 participating states, none of which is in the USCENTCOM AOR.

(U) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) – The MTCR is aimed at curbing the spread of missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used to deliver WMD payloads. There are currently 34 participating states, none of which is in the USCENTCOM AOR.

(U) Zangger Committee (ZC) – ZC member states agree to “faithfully” interpret Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT, which calls for the control of “especially designed or prepared equipment or material for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.” ZC members agree that items on this “trigger list” should be subject to export controls and trigger safeguards as a condition of supply. There are currently 36 members to the ZC.

(U) Bilateral Measures: USG has also undertaken a variety of internal and/or bilateral programs to attain its non- and counterproliferation objectives. These fall into six broad categories.

(U) Threat Reduction – The USG has a number of programs which fund or otherwise assist foreign partners with the removal or neutralization of WMD or related items in the partners’ possession. These programs directly reduce the threat from stockpiles and facilities of proliferation concern by removing the temptation to profit from the sale of such items, as well as the cost and risk of securing their storage locations to protect them from illicit diversion. Key programs include:

- (U) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) – A Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) initiative to secure and dismantle WMD and their associated infrastructure in the FSU. CTR provides funding and expertise for states in the FSU to decommission nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon stockpiles, as agreed by the Soviet Union under disarmament treaties. For USCENTCOM, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are two countries of focus. In recent years, the CTR has expanded its mission from WMD at its root source to preventing the movement of WMD through land and maritime border security.

- (U) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) – The GTRI is a DoE initiative that aims to remove and/or secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the world that pose a threat to the United States and to the international community.
- (U) Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) – The RRRFR eliminates stockpiles of Russian-origin Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) by assisting eligible countries to convert their research reactors from HEU to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel upon availability and qualification.
- (U) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program – The RERTR targets research reactors and medical isotope production processes worldwide for conversion to suitable LEU fuels and targets.
- (U) Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRRSNF) Acceptance Program – The FRRSNF eliminates stockpiles of U.S. origin spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors through repatriation to the United States.
- (U) Radiological Threat Reduction (RTR) Program – The RTR program identifies, recovers, and stores, on an interim basis, certain domestic radioactive sealed sources as well as other radiological materials that pose a security risk to the United States and/or the world community. The RTR also reduces the international threat posed by radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb.”

(U) Security Cooperation and Assistance – Security cooperation and assistance programs – such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Funding (FMF), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) – allow USG to transfer equipment to friends and allies in the USCENTCOM AOR that facilitates their development of CWMD-relevant capabilities, including ballistic missile defense and passive NBC protection. Security cooperation can also more broadly strengthen the conventional military forces of regional partners. Overall, cooperative programs work to make partners better able to deter external aggression, reduce their sense of vulnerability to intimidation or coercion by WMD-armed opponents, and curb their incentives to develop their own WMD programs.

(U) Export Control Cooperation and Assistance – USG agencies have multiple programs to cooperate with and assist foreign partners on many aspects of export control. These include providing financial assistance to acquire export screening and border security equipment, legal assistance to strengthen export control legislation and procedures, and training for export control personnel. Some countries in the USCENTCOM AOR, like Jordan, have been recipients of export control assistance, and bilateral cooperation with many countries on broader issues—for example, via the joint U.S.-UAE Counterproliferation Task Force—also exists. Key cooperative export control programs include:

(U) Container Security Initiative (CSI) – Under the DHS/Bureau of International Security (BIS) coordinated CSI, teams of officers are globally deployed to work with host nation counterparts to target containers that pose a potential threat to the United States. Announced in 2002, CSI is currently active in certain ports shipping a large volume of containers to the United States. In USCENTCOM’s AOR/AOI, those ports are Dubai, UAE; Port Salalah, Oman; Haifa and Ashdod, Israel; and Port Qasim, Pakistan.

(U) Transshipment Country Export Control Initiative (TECI) – Administered by the Department of Commerce (DoC), and in coordination with CSI, the Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program, and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, TECI seeks to prevent WMD proliferation and illicit diversion of sensitive U.S.-origin technology through global transshipment hubs. TECI works cooperatively with transshipment hubs governments to strengthen export control systems and prevent re-exports and transshipments of U.S.-origin items.

(U) Second Line of Defense (SLD) – DoE/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Second Line of Defense program to interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material through airports, seaports, and border crossings in Russia and other key transit states by helping states install and use radiation detection equipment at these sites and providing associated training and support. In USCENTCOM's AOR, Kazakhstan is a participant in SLD.

(U) Megaports Initiative – This subset of SLD includes installation of radiation detection equipment in some of the world's largest and busiest ports to help detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials throughout the global maritime system. In USCENTCOM's AOR/AOI, Pakistan, Israel, Oman, Dubai, and Egypt are participants in the Megaports Initiative.

(U) Counterproliferation Interdiction (CPI) – The USG works with friends and allies in the USCENTCOM AOR to interdict WMD-related shipments of proliferation concern, raising the cost and complicating the efforts of countries seeking to acquire WMD-related items. Interdiction activities span a range of cooperative channels, from intelligence to military to customs and law enforcement. As they often involve sensitive information and actions, they frequently remain unpublicized.

(U) Ship Boarding Agreements – Ship boarding agreements are bilateral agreements in support of PSI that authorize the boarding of maritime vessels suspected of carrying illicit shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials. In general, under these agreements, if a vessel is registered in the United States or the partner nation, either party can request confirmation of the nationality of the ship in question and, if needed, authorize the boarding, search, and possible detention of the vessel and its cargo.

(U) Proliferation Finance and Non-proliferation Sanctions – The USG's Executive Order 13382 is aimed at curbing WMD proliferation through the imposition of U.S. financial sanctions on foreign entities linked to proliferation activity. The USG also works with other international partners to restrict the access of proliferators to the international financial system. Various legal authorities, such as the Iran-North Korea-Syria Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA), also allow or require the USG to impose various other sanctions on entities determined to have provided proliferation-related items to countries of concern.

(U) APPENDIX TWO to ANNEX E – METRICS

1. (U) National CWMD policy, to include relative priority for associated activities, is effectively communicated to the COCOMs.
2. (U) OSD and the Joint Staff perform a mission analysis and ensure the results are captured in the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD.
3. (U) OSD and Joint Staff reorganize, as appropriate, based on mission analysis (#2 above).
4. (U) OSD directs COCOM CWMD planning efforts accordingly.
5. (U) COCOMs have properly transformed DoD CWMD policy into regional plans within 24 months of Secretary of Defense (SecDef) direction.
6. (U) Appropriate DoD entity assesses COCOM CWMD plans for synchronization and compliance with national policy within 24 months.
7. (U) WMD-related training for DoD personnel is developed and included at appropriate professional education levels.
8. (U) USG interagency process-related training is incorporated in DoD personnel training as part of indoctrination to key billets on joint duty staffs.
9. (U) DIOCC disseminates WMD-related intelligence consistently and effectively to all combatant command staffs.
10. (U) Combatant command staffs receive proper WMD-related intelligence from DIOCC and conduct cross directorate coordination with WMD counterparts.
11. (U) USCENTCOM establishes cross directorate Combating WMD working group.
12. (U) USCENTCOM assesses the Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan for congruence with higher level guidance, modifying each command document as required.
13. (U) The NSC establishes an interagency working group to develop a common USG lexicon for WMD-related activities.
14. (U) The NSC working group develops an approved common USG lexicon for WMD-related activities.
15. (U) The common lexicon is reviewed every three years for congruence and compliance with national level guidance.
16. (U) Combatant Commanders obtain greater flexibility to re-allocate funds within the command structure to support “CWMD necessary” activities.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

18. (U) CWMD is included in a greater number of exercises with partner nations, and the number of CWMD-specific exercises is increased.
19. (U) Sufficient funds are appropriated for mandated combatant command support for PSI and other CWMD exercises.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

22. (U) CWMD Strategic Communication plans at all levels are developed and executed.
23. (U) CWMD messages and feedback are communicated consistently to and from regional partners at appropriate levels.
24. (U) A Middle Eastern PSI ROEG is held in 2010.
25.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)
26. (U) Iran and appropriate members of the international community are engaged in meaningful, progressing efforts to achieve full transparency on the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Appropriate parties continue dialogue until a mutually-agreeable solution is reached.
27. (U) Iran fully and publicly complies with all aspects of the NPT, all IAEA safeguards to which it has already agreed, and allows periodic re-evaluation of its nuclear program by appropriate investigators as would other signatories to the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreements.
28. (U) Iran verifiably limits development, use, and maintenance of enrichment equipment sufficient to enrich uranium only to the level required for peaceful, civilian power generation.
29. (U) Iran completely complies with IAEA efforts to verify the scope of its enrichment activities.
30. (U) Iran fully and publicly complies with all aspects of the NPT, all IAEA safeguards to which it has already agreed, and periodic re-evaluation of its nuclear program by appropriate investigators as would other signatories to the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreements.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

34. (U) The United States has produced clearly articulated policy, specific to Iran's WMD and WMD delivery system programs, intended to provide guidance to USG departments and agencies for activities appropriate to achieving that policy's goals.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) APPENDIX THREE to ANNEX E – Deterrence and Deterrence Failure in the Middle East

(U) Much ink has been spilled in the preceding decades on the problem of WMD proliferation in the Middle East and its potential impact on regional security and stability. Underlying these assessments are a variety of observations and assumptions about the concept of military deterrence – the ability of a defender to prevent an attacker from employing military power against it through the creation of anticipatory concern in the attacker’s mind about the defender’s potential response. This annex explores the concept of military deterrence in the Middle East context, focusing on two key questions:

- What is the prevailing view of WMD-based deterrence in the Middle East?
- In what scenarios could regional WMD-based deterrence fail?

(U) The Prevailing View of WMD-Based Deterrence in the Middle East

(U) In its most basic form, “deterrence” is a commonsense concept that was intuitively grasped by military and political leaders for thousands of years before its “discovery” by 20th Century intellectual minds. The rise of a modern academic and technocratic community of strategic thinkers and planners, however, combined with the exponentially growing complexities of modern technological warfare and the apocalyptic stakes of a possible U.S.-Soviet nuclear conflict drove the post-World War II emergence of a vast body of academic and policy thought about deterrence. This thought shaped global strategic nuclear development and deployments, both by the superpowers and by second-tier nuclear powers who developed new strands of deterrence theory to suit their own geopolitical situations and ambitions.

(U) Despite its roots in the Cold War strategic nuclear debate, consideration of the deterrence concept was rapidly extended to include all forms of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms. In fact, as the Cold War progressed, concern about the vertical linkages between conventional, chemical and biological, and nuclear deterrence – as well as between various steps on the nuclear escalatory ladder, from tactical to strategic – increasingly drove actual U.S. and Soviet strategic planning and debate. Despite the growing sophistication of the deterrence concept, however, many thinkers concluded that the principal strategic concept governing nuclear rivalries was mutually assured destruction (MAD). MAD was a condition in which two opposing nuclear-armed states with the ability to annihilate one another are mutually deterred from attacking one another, resulting in a stable deterrence situation and little likelihood of nuclear conflict. These thinkers generally conceded the certain critical conditions made deterrence based on MAD more stable – most importantly, the existence of “second strike” retaliatory forces that could credibly survive an initial enemy attack, reducing the defender’s need to launch on warning of such an attack in order to preserve its counterstrike capability. However, to these strategists, the fundamental existence of MAD-based deterrence made fine-grain analyses of possible nuclear use scenarios moot. By essentially rendering a defender invulnerable, MAD stabilized strategic rivalries, made nuclear war “unthinkable” to the rational actor, and, in the minds of some, reduced the likelihood and severity of even lower levels of conventional conflict by making ultimate victory over a nuclear-armed adversary unobtainable.⁷

⁷ A seminal examination of the argument for the strategic stability generated by nuclear weapons possession can be found in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (W.W. Norton and Company, New York; 1995). (U)

(U) The general assumption that Israel had developed a nuclear weapons capability somewhere between the late 1960s and the early 1980s ushered in a wave of public thought on the impact that this development had on the Middle East region. Israel's nuclear opacity – its unwillingness to either confirm or deny that it possessed nuclear weapons or other forms of WMD – forestalled an informed public discussion by Israel's strategic planners and academics about the country's nuclear development and use doctrines. The resulting informational vacuum rendered the majority of the public discussion that did take place very speculative – informed, to varying degrees, by leaks about Israeli plans and capabilities and language and concepts derived from the U.S.-Soviet nuclear rivalry. Although a great diversity of views exists, a body of thinkers both in and outside of Israel eventually reached some measure of consensus on eight broad conclusions about the impact of Israeli nuclear developments and various actual and potential regional responses⁸:

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- (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

⁸ For examples of the diversity of views, see Etel Solingen's *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007). (U)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) In What Scenarios Could Regional WMD-Based Deterrence Fail?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(U) What follows is a conceptual discussion of scenarios in which it is conceivable that WMD could be used in the Middle East. For the purposes of this brief exploration of possibilities, we set aside scenarios in which actors that are assumed to be fundamentally “non-deterrable” use WMD, including:

- (U) an ideologically-motivated “irrational” actor launching a “bolt from the blue” attack knowing it will also result in his own destruction;
- (U) WMD being used by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) like Al Qaeda to conduct terrorist attacks against civilian or military targets;
- (U) an “accidental” WMD exchange resulting from a technological flaw in a delivery system or a false indication of an incoming enemy WMD attack.

(U) We judge that each of these dangerous scenarios has a small but presumably non-zero chance of occurring. Despite this, we were most interested in considering, however, a broader set of cases in which actors that are arguably “rational” use WMD based on imperfect motivating information; because they felt forced to act in order to maintain escalation dominance; or because they were forced to act in the absence of a clear understanding of enemy redlines. In such cases, a WMD exchange, while theoretically still “deterrable” (in that the “rationality” of the actors and thus MAD is assumed to still exist), might take place due to a failure of the way in which deterrence was formulated or implemented, rather than a technical failure or the outright rejection of the concept by one of the adversaries involved.⁹ The following four sub-sections describe these concepts in greater detail and provide illustrative scenarios in which the concept could lead to a WMD exchange.

⁹ Many theoretical works on deterrence would lump some or all of these scenarios under the general rubric of “miscalculation,” arguing that as with the non-rational or accidental use of WMD, “miscalculation” is a non-deterrable

(U) Imperfect Information: All countries involved in effective MAD-based deterrent relationships must believe that their opponents could and would inflict massive destruction upon them if attacked. The most basic scenario in which deterrence failure occurs, therefore, is one where imperfect information about enemy identity, capabilities or intentions leads one WMD-armed adversary to attack another, believing the latter is unable or unwilling to counterattack. Once the attack is underway, the second party unexpectedly retaliates.

(U) Imperfect information can come from many sources. The most important of these, however, are inaccurate or ambiguous intelligence, inaccurate assessments of an adversary's or one's own capabilities or intentions, or a deliberate attempt by the adversary to deny or deceive. In a real world situation, it is likely that these factors would overlap and possibly reinforce one another – for example, an adversary's attempt to deny its opponent information about its capabilities leads to the collection of inaccurate information, upon which inaccurate assessments are made. The opponent, now appearing either more vulnerable to an attack or more capable of conducting one, becomes a WMD target.

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

phenomenon that should not be termed a “failure” of deterrence. We reject this characterization as tautological, however, as it implies that all situations in which deterrence of a rational enemy fails result, by definition, from miscalculations of what it took to deter the enemy. Our view is that all political and military acts require calculation by non-omniscient individuals that base decisions on available factual information and estimates of other decisional parameters for which facts are either unknown (“how many nuclear weapons does the enemy have?”) or which, for practical purposes, do not exist (“is the enemy serious about carrying out its stated WMD use doctrine or not?”). In our scenarios, it is principally the gaps between the knowledge and judgments that each WMD possessor has about the capabilities, thresholds, motivations, and intentions of both itself and its opponent that determine whether deterrence will succeed or fail. (U)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(U) Lacking Knowledge of Redlines: Perhaps the most oft-cited scenario in which possessor states might use WMD is to prevent or deter regime change. The concept, fitting squarely into traditional deterrence analytical models, provides both an intuitively believable rationale for WMD acquisition and possession and a generally positive political message: if you don't try to change the regime of a WMD-possessing state by force, it will not use its WMD.

(U) Upon further analysis, however, this assertion is less comforting than it may initially seem. "Regime change" is an ambiguous concept. What is a regime – a leader, an oligarchy, a ruling ideology, or a system of government? How does a "regime" know that an enemy is attempting to "change" it? Except in certain narrowly-conceived circumstances (e.g. a sudden assassination of an absolute authoritarian ruler), changing a regime is also a process that can stretch for hours, days, weeks, or perhaps even months. At what point in this process does the regime leadership truly believe that its fate is sealed and that it must use WMD to deter or punish those trying to bring about its ultimate extinction? Is, for example, a pre-emptive conventional attack on a country's WMD a signal of an intention to change a regime or simple to "de-fang" its WMD arsenal? Is there any meaningful difference that would result in WMD use in one scenario and not in the other?

(U) The problem of the "regime change" scenario comes down to a longstanding and long-recognized dilemma in WMD strategy: redlines for WMD use. In order to establish stable deterrence, both attacker and defender require a clear recognition and understanding of the redlines under which both are operating, the crossing of which would trigger WMD use. In practice, of course, it is impossible to conceive of every possible political and military scenario and how it relates to WMD employment. However, the greater the degree to which redlines are clearly established, the less likely a conflict in the neighborhood (literally or figuratively defined) will trip over a previously unknown redline and trigger a WMD exchange.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(h), (b)(5)

(U) The result of this state of affairs is an increased possibility of misjudging a country's redlines and thus the chances of WMD use. The first two recent real-world examples described below detail situations in which a prior lack of knowledge of an adversary's redlines led to conflict and escalation. While neither involved a WMD exchange, the regional and internal dynamics revealed by these episodes highlight the potential dangers of future conflicts in the AOR which might actually have a WMD dimension. These examples underline the risk that, in other situations in the region, the same dynamic – the failure to predict accurately the conditions under which a state will develop, maintain, and/or use a WMD stockpile – could lead to a WMD exchange. The third example is a hypothetical scenario illustrating this risk.

- **(U) Example 1:** Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's failure to convince the international community that he had in fact truly abandoned his WMD programs by adequately complying with UN weapons inspectors ultimately resulted in the U.S.-led 2003 invasion that toppled his regime. Postwar reports suggest that even as U.S. forces were moving on Baghdad, Hussein did not believe that his regime was about to perish and was instead more concerned about the threat to him by internal foes, real or imagined. For its part, the United States assessed that Iraq still possessed quantities of CBW and ballistic missiles deployed for use as a last-ditch defense of Baghdad – assessments later proven to be false. Iraq was both unable to deter regime change with its suspected CBW and missile forces and unable to see that its actions would trigger the U.S.-led invasion – both of which fundamentally represented failures to understand U.S. redlines vis-à-vis Baghdad's WMD programs. The United States, in turn, overestimated the extent of Iraq's redlines for maintaining its WMD and missile stockpiles.
- **(U) Example 2:** In 2006, coincident with a serious uptick in fighting between Israel and Palestinian extremists in the Gaza Strip, a Hizballah operation to kidnap Israeli soldiers along the Israel-Lebanon border led to a major conflict between Israel and Hizballah. Israeli air forces struck Hizballah-related targets and Lebanese government infrastructure (the latter ostensibly to pressure the government to take action against Hizballah) throughout Lebanon, while Israeli ground forces entered southern Lebanon to reduce Hizballah strongpoints, forces, and military stockpiles in the region. Hizballah survived the conflict, but its freedom of action in southern Lebanon was reduced by the expanded presence of international peacekeepers. Hizballah's leadership later publicly admitted that it had not anticipated the scale of Israel's response to the initial actions. In turn, Israel's government came under much public postwar criticism for exhibiting a lack of coherent strategic thinking in planning and executing the conflict and failing to establish realistic and achievable objectives.
- **(U) Example 3:** During an Israel-Syria conventional conflict over the Golan Heights, Israel breaks through Syrian lines and the road to Damascus lies open before them. Assessing hastily and incorrectly that Israel intends to overthrow his regime, a panicked President al-Asad launches a CW attack on Israeli forces that inflicts massive military casualties at a time when

Israel had planned to halt its advance and withdrawn. Stung by Syrian “perfidy” and concerned about the maintenance of its deterrent posture against other WMD threats in the region, Israel uses nuclear or chemical weapons against Syria in retaliation. Although the Syrian attack took place against Israeli military personnel, Israel feels the need to launch a disproportionate WMD response against a somewhat broader range of Syrian targets (i.e. mobile missile sites, military garrisons, etc.) to send a message to other would-be WMD users that Israel has zero tolerance for such actions and to raise the potential costs for future WMD-equipped attackers.

(U) APPENDIX FOUR to ANNEX E – CONTACTS

- (U) Various members and offices of the U.S. Intelligence Community
- (U) USCENTCOM Assessment Team (CAT) sub-regional and functional teams, specifically Iran, Strategic Communications, Levant/Egypt, Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Intelligence, Counterterrorism
- (U) The U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD), Interagency Coordination division
- (U) Joint Staff J-3, Operations, Deputy Director for Global Operations, Strategic Operations Division
- (U) USCENTCOM, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate
- (U) National Defense University, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(U) APPENDIX FIVE to ANNEX E – GLOSSARY (This Section Not Used)