

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



Annex D Counterterrorism Functional Report

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ANNEX D: COUNTERTERRORISM
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ANNEX D: (U) COUNTERTERRORISM (CT)

1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

¹ The Afghanistan/Pakistan Sub-Regional team report addresses this problem in more detail.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

² See Appendix 5: Additional Challenges for a more in-depth treatment of the GCC seam issue.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (U) PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

(U) Purpose: This document provides an assessment of current counterterrorism strategies, plans, and operations within the USCENTCOM AOR. In addition, it provides recommendations for USCENTCOM's CT way ahead in order to achieve national strategic objectives. This report analyzes USCENTCOM's strategy and plans with regard to national strategy documents including the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the National Implementation Plan, and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror.

(U) Scope: While this report is focused on USCENTCOM's CT strategy and efforts, the transnational nature of the terrorist threat makes these recommendations applicable outside the AOR. The need for a holistic approach to combating terrorism requires close integration between the U.S. military, other government agencies (DoS, Justice, etc), and partner nation efforts. Although primarily concerned with how to improve USCENTCOM operations, some of the analysis in this document provides recommendations that transcend USCENTCOM's purview and authorities. In these cases, the recommendations are intended to help USCENTCOM frame the problem and advocate possible solutions.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

(U) The Threat

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

³ Dr. Audrey Cronin has proposed a “conservation of enemies” to avoid the conflation of terrorist threats and better focus U.S. CT efforts (per meeting with CT Functional Team, National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington D.C. on 07 February 2009). Our emphasis on AQ throughout this report tries to be consistent with this approach. At the same time, we acknowledge the threat to U.S. interests of other terrorist groups such as LT and Hizballah.

⁴ While AQ has been unable to perpetrate a “spectacular” attack on the U.S. homeland since 9/11, the United Kingdom and Spain have suffered AQ-inspired attacks.

⁵ AQ is not the only beneficiary of the current situation in Pakistan. Aided by both sympathetic and apathetic elements within the government, LT continues to operate with relative freedom.





Figure 1. (U) AQ Not Bounded by USCENTCOM AOR



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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Dramatic Changes Required

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS⁶

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. (U) STRATEGIC GOALS

(U) The long term CT goal for USCENTCOM is to help create an environment where: 1) all USCENTCOM states are capable of, and willing to, conduct their own CT efforts, and 2) terrorism is not considered a legitimate tactic. In the short term, a strategy that denies safe-havens and disrupts and defeats the network while countering violent extremism is the best safeguard of the homeland and U.S. interests.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ In order to adequately address the terrorist threat, USCENTCOM should adopt

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

⁶ Adapted from United States Central Operations Command. CONPLAN 1075. Tampa, FL, 2008.


6. (U) OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Supporting Functional Efforts

(U) This concept incorporates the work of other Functional Teams (Diplomacy, Development, Economics and Governance, Building Partner Capacity, Rule of Law, and Strategic Communications) as supporting efforts. These are depicted by stars in the graphic below as they pertain to underlying factors or our Lines of Effort.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



7. (U) LINES OF EFFORT

(U) To achieve the stated strategic goals, USCENCOM should work along two lines of effort:

- Disrupt and Defeat Terrorist Networks and Safe-havens
- Counter Violent Extremist Ideology

Additionally, there is one major supporting line of effort:

- Building Partner Capacity

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Although disruption of terrorist networks is necessary to ensure protection of U.S. interests, it is insufficient to turn the tide of the conflict alone. In support of current and continued disrupt and defeat actions the violent extremist narrative must be locally countered and discredited throughout the region. Our counter messaging efforts must be in synch with other USG efforts that cross regional boundaries (GCCs, DoS bureau boundaries, etc.). Achieving sustainable effects in CVE efforts requires a national CVE strategy that marshals existing efforts against prioritized targets and audiences. Under this national CVE framework, USCENTCOM should play a supporting role to the Department of State and support efforts, primarily at the Country Team level, to develop sufficient understanding of the primary VE actors and their support infrastructure, the local countervailing voices already engaged in CVE, and existing U.S./Coalition CVE efforts.

(U) Building partner capacity (BPC) is crucial, as successful BPC initiatives will allow the transition from a U.S.-led CT effort to a multinational CT effort, where each nation is responsible for and capable of policing its sovereign territory. The United States must increase the abilities of partner nations to provide services, address grievances, and increase their capabilities to combat terrorism and CVE. These BPC efforts will allow the United States to minimize the number of combat personnel deployed throughout USCENTCOM's AOR. The struggle against terrorists will be solved locally, nationally, and regionally, rather than by a global U.S. military campaign.

(U) LINE OF EFFORT 1: DISRUPT AND DEFEAT TERRORIST NETWORKS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Safe-Havens**



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) The relevant Sub-Regional Plans provide details and specific recommendations related to safe-havens. In addition, we would emphasize the following points:

(U) **Pakistan**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Nesting CT operations into a larger COIN strategy represents a significant challenge. See Appendix 4 for a detailed discussion of the issue and a proposed approach.

(U) **Iraq**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Yemen

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Disrupt Terrorist Networks

(U) Disrupting terror networks outside the combat theaters is problematic. Issues of sovereignty, capacity, and will of foreign governments can frustrate U.S. CT efforts, and must be addressed with individual nations on a case by case basis. There is no “one size fits all” solution – some nations lack will, some lack capacity, and all possess varying degrees of comfort with letting US forces operate overtly within their territory, even in a “train and assist” mode.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Counter Malign Iranian Influence**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Build Partner Capacity (BPC) (Supporting Effort)**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) In addition to military support for partner security forces (specifically CT forces), this should also include building other partner capacities with a “whole of government” approach. These efforts would improve partner nation capability to deal with organized crime, corruption, and illicit financial transactions that enable terrorist networks, improve border and port of entry security, and improved legal institutions and statutes to enable prosecution of terrorist activities.

(U) We endorse the country priorities in the BPC Team’s functional plan. We also strongly endorse that plan’s proposed reforms of the security assistance process.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **LINE OF EFFORT 2: COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Advocate the Development of a National CVE Strategy**

(U) This strategy should include:

1. (U) A common statement of the problem and agreed-upon definitions of key terms and concepts (extremism, violent extremism, counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, etc.).
2. (U) The establishment of a CVE-related National Security Council (NSC) official responsible for strategic guidance, setting national CVE priorities and overall accountability (to include proper staffing and funding). This official must be able to influence all departments and agencies involved in CVE.
3. (U) The designation of the Department of State/CT to lead and coordinate CVE efforts at the operational level and manage funding.¹⁶ While led strategically from the top, CVE efforts should be planned and implemented locally by U.S. Country Teams, and coordinated through the RSI.¹⁷

(U) **Institutionalize USCENTCOM's Supporting CVE Roles and Improve Internal Processes**

(U) While USCENTCOM has initiated various CVE-related programs, the long-term nature of CVE does not naturally suit the mission-oriented mindset of the military, nor its expertise. USCENTCOM should focus on the specific areas where it can add value (outlined below).

¹⁶ We note favorably DoS/CT's nascent Strategic Empowerment Initiative which aims to bring both USG and private sector resources to bear in addressing underlying causes of terrorism.

¹⁷ U.S. Country Teams have local expertise, and should be responsible for developing specific plans for their nations.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Lead and Share a Deeper Understanding of the CVE Operating Environment**

(U) VE is a complex combination of drivers that can only be addressed with a clear understanding of the local dynamics and concerns of indigenous communities. USCENCOM, with its already robust intelligence and cultural appreciation of the region, should lead USG efforts to build and share a more comprehensive CVE COP along three main lines of effort:

1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Map violent extremism and its drivers (“Red”, or threats).
USCENCOM must develop a deeper understanding of the primary VE ideologues/ideologies, their support infrastructure (i.e. facilities, financial sources, etc.), and their messaging components, by:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **METRICS**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ The following list of metrics will help to ensure USCENCOM is making progress along both the Denial & Disrupt (LOE 1) and the CVE (LOE 2) lines of effort.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

8. (U) RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

9. (U) RISK AND MITIGATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



10. (U) CONCLUSION (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

11. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

12. (U) AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

(U) In the course of research and data collection for this assessment, the following sources were extensively referenced:

(U) Strategies and Plans

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(U) **Books and Articles**

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- Tellis, Ashley J. Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008.
- United States Army. Division Commander’s Guide to Information Operations in OIF and OEF: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 2007.

13. (U) APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: DETAILED SITUATION ASSESSMENT

APPENDIX 2: CONTAIN MALIGN IRANIAN INFLUENCE

APPENDIX 3: DETAILED PAK/AFG CT SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

APPENDIX 4: INTEGRATING CT INTO STABILITY OPERATIONS

APPENDIX 5: ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES

APPENDIX 6: TRAVEL AND CONSULTATIONS

(U) APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D: DETAILED SITUATION ASSESSMENT

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


Figure 4. (U) States of the AOR

(U) “Stable” States – Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Fragile States – Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Weak States – Central Asian States

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Unique Challenges - Terrorist Groups with Political and/or Soft Power

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D: CONTAIN MALIGN IRANIAN INFLUENCE

(U) **Bottom Line Up Front**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **The Problem**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Background**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **CMII Mission Essential Tasks**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Campaign Objectives**

1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ 5-Year:

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) 18-Month:

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Concept of the Operation




Figure 5. CMII Concept of Operation

(U) Key Tasks and Sub-Ordinate Lines Of Effort (LOE)

(U) Establish Unity of Effort via a virtual Inter-Agency Task Force

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Shine a Light / Name and Shame State and Sub-State Actors That Enable IRGC-QF Covert Activities.**

4.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Roll-Back & Supplant IRGC-QF Regional Footprint**

6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LOE 6. Regional Security Initiative / CMII Working Group

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D: DETAILED PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN CT SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

(U) Regional Dynamics

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Pakistan/Afghanistan Mosaic





Figure 6. (U) PAK/AFG Mosaic

(U) The Threat Mosaic



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Threat Perceptions

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)




Figure 7. (U) Conflicting Perceptions

(U) CT and COIN Assessments

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



Figure 8. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) CT and COIN Capabilities

(U) **Additional Pakistan Challenges**



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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
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(U) **Terrorist Financing**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Improving the Situation**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX D: INTEGRATING COUNTERTERRORISM INTO STABILITY OPERATIONS**

(U) **Abstract**

(U) In the recent past, counterterrorism (CT) missions have tended to be narrowly focused, planned, and executed through a lethal prism. While this has led to tactical success, it can be argued the effectiveness of some missions has been detrimental to the fulfillment of wider operational and strategic goals, e.g. stabilizing an area. While the problem of failing to integrate all elements of U.S. national power into a comprehensive national security strategy is not unique to the counter-terrorist community, the impact of CT missions is often more significant than other missions (development, political engagements, etc.). This paper argues that to improve U.S. national security at all levels, CT and other elements of national power must be integrated throughout the various levels of command. This can be accomplished by making “stability” the prism through which all lethal and non-lethal missions are filtered; employment of the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) to identify the population’s perceptions of the local sources of instability; integration of these perceptions into an interagency CT decision-making process which is focused on overall stability; and the “packaging” of other activities with CT missions to increase the effectiveness of all USG activities in support of overall national security goals.

(U) **Introduction**

(U) From the end of World War II until the breaching of the Berlin Wall, the main foreign policy threat to the United States and its allies was aggressive or expansionist countries attempting to change global and/or regional balances of power. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy focused on maintaining the status quo by supporting regimes which fostered the status quo, regardless of their political disposition.

(U) The break up of the Soviet Union and the inward focus of China after the Cultural Revolution led to a significant change in U.S. foreign policy. Instead of trying to maintain the balance of power, with the exception of Operation DESERT STORM and a few minor forays (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo), the 1990s saw a return to a more traditional isolationist foreign policy.

(U) The attacks on the World Trade Center and other U.S. and Allied facilities led to a reappraisal of threats facing the United States. This led to the elaboration of a new National Security Strategy in 2002. Acknowledging the new reality that contemporary threats to U.S. security come as much from fragile states as strong aggressive states, it noted: “The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states...poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”

(U) This foreign policy change was encapsulated in numerous documents. They include the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) and National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 (2005). The former states the United States' strategy for combating terrorism “focuses on taking the

fight to the terrorists themselves.”²³ This will be accomplished by “using all elements of our national power and international influence to attack terror networks; reduce their ability to communicate and coordinate their plans; isolate them from potential allies and from each other; and identify and disrupt their plots before they attack.”

(U) NSPD 44 integrates National Strategy for Combating Terrorism with other national security strategies by noting “the United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies...The United States should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe-haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.” This description suggests stabilizing countries and helping them control their territory are key components of a successful counter-terrorism strategy.

(U) These documents, as well as other strategies and directives, elaborated America’s national security goals for the 21st century. They also provided the broad direction necessary to conduct missions in support of these goals. What they didn’t do is provide a mechanism or framework to prioritize sometimes contradictory goals (e.g. counter-terrorism activities may undermine stability operations), surmount stove piping, develop relevant national security metrics, include relevant government entities in the decision-making process, or take into account how the activities of one entity effect others and overall national security goals. This situation has limited success both in strengthening U.S. national security and diminishing threats to it. The complex, dynamic, milieu of the 21st century and the challenges to U.S. national security require a new national security policy-making process at the operational and tactical level.

(U) **Stability Operations**

(U) Recognizing the need for a new approach, many USG entities developed new doctrine or policy guidelines. While these efforts are a step forward, a notable gap has been the lack of overarching guidelines and methods which fosters an integrated, whole-of-government approach at the operational level. This gap began to be filled with the 2008 publication of Army Field Manual 3-07, “Stability Operations.” This unique manual was the first to be written by an Inter-agency team. The goal of FM 3-07 is to “develop a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian partners, and the private sector.”

²³ United States White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003).

(U) Stabilization is “the process by which the underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development.”

(U) However, in terms of activities to support these objectives, there is often inherent tension between the missions of the various actors in an AOR. For example, while USAID’s mission is to foster long-term sustainable development, the mission of a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) is to neutralize high value targets (HVT). While both missions can foster stability, determining the appropriate combination and sequencing of both lethal and nonlethal actions has proved difficult.

(U) **Afghanistan Example: Stability and CT Operations**

(U) As noted above, there is often tension between the missions of the actors involved in stability operations. This is the result of numerous factors which include different mission sets, metrics for success, time horizons, a continually evolving operational environment, and differing views of second and third order consequences. To illustrate these factors, this section examines the genesis and execution of a typical counter-terrorist mission in Afghanistan²⁴ and how it could impact overall stability objectives.

(U) A mission often begins with a target identified by a local national; a member of the local or international security forces; a member of a USG entity; someone on the high value target (HVT) list of the military unit which owns the battle space; etc. In other words, the “targeting process” works from both the “bottom up” and the “top down.” Once a target is identified, the “target” is vetted. This includes accessing all relevant intelligence and military sources to establish the person’s identity, activities, affiliations, etc. This process also includes a “cost-benefit” analysis which determines the benefit of removing a target versus the cost of losing a known entity which could lead to higher level individuals. If the target has been cleared for prosecution, the battle space owner has to grant approval for the mission. In case of disagreement, adjudication occurs at the next highest command level. Once approval is granted, the target is prosecuted at the first opportunity.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

²⁴ Afghanistan was selected because it is a priority USCENTCOM concern. It is important to note it is also unique as U.S. forces “own the battle space” and thus issues such as sovereignty and political restrictions are minimal. Conditions in other areas within the USCENTCOM AOR will add another layer of complexity.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) **Tactical CT Decision-Making**

(U) Because of the nature of the threat, in contrast to other USG activities, counter-terrorism missions have distinctive features. Two of the most important are time sensitive decision-making and operational security.

(U) Time sensitive decision-making making is the result of an environment which presents fleeting opportunities that must be quickly acted upon or lost. While understanding the need to take advantage of opportunities, there are also potential, serious, negative ramifications of doing so in isolation. For example, a rapid decision-making process is not conducive to incorporating potentially relevant information from non-intelligence/military actors working in the Area of Operations (AO) and/or conducting a thorough review of potential second and third order consequences for the overall stability of the area. This situation is compounded by the fact that most of the time all the actors in the AO are not located in a single headquarters and/or have different levels of connectivity.

(U) In terms of operational security, the sensitive nature of CT missions operations and the intelligence required to prosecute CT targets makes tight operational security a necessity. The principle of 'need to know' usually preclude the necessary engagement of all USG actors in an AO. Often, only the battle space owner is notified of the strike so he can carry out a basic de-confliction of friendly forces.

(U) In summary, there is no operational planning and decision-making construct which integrates all lethal and non-lethal USG entities involved in a stability operation. If all foreign policy tools are not coordinated, linked, and synched, and more importantly, prioritized in terms of their effect on overall stability, the effectiveness of each will be diminished. In the worst case, uncoordinated individual activities of one actor can even foster instability! In other words, we are winning the battles but losing the war.

(U) **Integrating CT into Stability Operations**

(U) Although counterterrorism missions are a key component of national security and have unique attributes, they are only one instrument of national power. Noteworthy, and in contrast to other foreign policy tools, the ramifications of CT missions can have a detrimental effect on other foreign policy tools. As an illustration, if USAID constructs a school without ensuring it is staffed and funded, the ramifications are minimal. In contrast, even a CT mission that is "successful" but causes collateral

²⁵ This mindset can be ameliorated by including Stability Operations education and training throughout the military curriculum.

damage or injures innocent bystanders can work against overall USG national security goals by radicalizing more people and lessening support for the host country government.

(U) To help foster the effective integration of all U.S. foreign policy tools and ensure they are mutually supporting at the tactical level, the following recommendations should be considered.

1. (U) Use “Stability” as a prism through which lethal and non-lethal missions are filtered.
 - a. The lack of a framework to foster an integrated, whole-of-government approach at the operational level has been a major impediment to successful stability operations. To help “operationalize” the broad goals outlined in the National Security Strategy and supporting documents as well as overcome narrow bureaucratic stovepipes, “Stability” should be adopted as the unifying principle from the strategic to tactical level. Similar language is used by the Department of State (NSPD-44) and USAID (Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy). Use of this definition will help integrate CT with other foreign policy tools, improving their ability to fulfill U.S. national security goals.
2. (U) Tactical Instability Assessment
 - a. A significant obstacle to integrating civilian and military activities is the lack of a common, tactical, view of the causes of instability in the AO. Currently, each USG entity looks at an operating environment through their bureaucratic prism. For example, USAID looks at the environment through a development lens, Treasury from a financial lens, DoD through a security lens, etc. Since instability can stem from many sources, e.g. insecurity, ideology, religion, politics, economics, demography, etc., to stabilize an area it is imperative all USG entities in the AO share a common operational picture. Perhaps the most important component of a common operational picture is gathering--and integrating into planning, activities and evaluation, the views of the population.
 - b. A July 2008 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report noted that although understanding “Afghan and Pakistani perceptions are critical at national, regional, district, and local level...popular perceptions at the province, district, and local level are critical and usually ignored in official reporting.” The report goes on to note that success in the area must be based on “Afghan terms and values” and that the focal point for all activity must be the “impact on Afghan perceptions and attitudes.”²⁶
 - c. To gather local perceptions and foster their incorporation into both the civilian and military planning process, USAID developed the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF). The TCAPF is a standardized diagnostic tool designed for use by both military and civilian personnel to gather information from local inhabitants to identify local causes of instability. This information helps identify, prioritize, evaluate, and adjust civil-military programming to diminish the causes of instability--which are often exploited by the enemy. Since it “maximizes the use of assets in the field and gauges the effectiveness of activities in time and space, it is an important tool for conducting successful stability operations.”²⁷

²⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, The Afghanistan-Pakistan War: Measuring Success (or Failure) (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008).

²⁷ United States Army Headquarters, Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 2008).

- d. TCAPF helps integrate CT as well as other military and civilian missions into a local Stability Plan. It helps surmount “stove pipes” by providing a common, prioritized view of the sources of instability in an AO and fosters more effective programming because the population identifies the activities they think will lessen instability. Since the population provides this information, TCAPF also helps identify IO themes which resonate with the local population. Throughout the USCENTCOM AO, U.S. personnel are “at best viewed as outsiders, at worst crusaders. Therefore, ideological battles must be won locally.”²⁸ Without local understanding, our operations will not be successful.
3. (U) Integrated, Interagency Decision-making at the Operational/Tactical Level
 - a. Currently, CT missions are conceived, planned, and executed mostly within the narrow confines of specialized intelligence and military communities. Although there are well established tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) which ensure the consequences of each mission are considered, they are examined primarily through an intel/military prism. Because insurgents often carry out terrorist acts in order to entice the counterinsurgent to overreact, or at least to react in a way which can be exploited; it is imperative that a careful assessment of the effects of a mission on higher level operational and strategic goals be conducted.
 - b. To facilitate this assessment and examine second and third order consequences from a different perspective, representatives from actors working in the AO--and if possible, the host country--should be included in the CT pre-prosecution decision-making process. This could be accomplished through liaison officers (LNOs) or communications to allow cleared, non-DoD actors to take part in the process. A possible model is the JIACG (Joint Interagency Coordinating Group) structure, expanded to include representatives from host country security forces. Noteworthy, this group would be significantly different than the current JIACG which simply “informs” members of decisions that have already been made. To ensure accountability, the battle space owner should be held responsible for failing to implement this construct. Overall, a more informed decision-making process which provides different and broader perspectives should negate the impact of slightly changing the CT decision-making process or operational security considerations.
 4. (U) ”Packaging and Linking CT Missions”
 - a. In order for a CT mission to be completely effective, a process know as F3EA (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze) must occur. If it doesn’t, then the full benefits of a CT mission are not realized. These benefits are also not realized if a mission destabilizes an area. To help ensure CT missions are both effective and support overarching policy goals, CT missions should be “packaged” and linked to an overall stabilization plan for an area. At a minimum, a CT mission should include a prepared information operation (IO) and follow on stability activities.
 - b. Just as Nixon’s Chief-of-Staff H.R. Haldeman would not allow the President to appear in public until his staff gave him “the headline from tomorrow’s New York Times;” an IO must be developed before the mission. While “first with the truth” should be a guiding principle, a prepared IO would be much more robust. It would include a baseline assessment which includes the perceptions of the targeted audience-- rather than a subjective staff assessment, IO

²⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, USCENTCOM and the Future: Establishing the Right Strategic Priorities (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2008).

messages, and an evaluation plan to measure the effectiveness of the mission. The IO could be conducted in two phases. Phase One would immediately follow the operation and Phase Two would take place within 24 hours and include ‘gun tapes’ and/or selected elements from Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE).

- c. The lack of a prepared IO leads to bland Press statements that are neither credible nor effective in preventing terrorists from filling the vacuum with their own narrative. Ceding the IO space contravenes the “Countering Violent Extremism” requirement of the National Counterterrorism Strategy. Since our operations are heavily scrutinized and falsehoods quickly identified, it is imperative that we release our version of events quickly and completely. As General Chiarelli noted: “commanders must be involved in ensuring the information aspects of military operations are considered in every action we undertake.”²⁹
- d. The second component is a prepared package of supporting activities. If a CT operation develops over time, stability activities should be initiated in the area before the operation. If the operation is on a short time fuse, stability activities should be started immediately afterwards. In either case, a tactical conflict analysis (Recommendation #2) MUST be completed prior to the initiation of activities. Without a detailed analysis which includes operational and cultural characteristics as well as local perceptions, the effectiveness of both lethal and non-lethal activities will be diminished. A CSIS report which examined the effectiveness of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan noted: “Tactical victories become meaningless without political, ideological, information, and media dominance.”³⁰ Gone is the day when killing an enemy is an effect. Today, killing an enemy must be a means to achieve an effect.

(U) **Recommended Way Ahead**

- Create a comprehensive Stability plan which links and synchronizes all USG and other relevant actors for a country in USCENTCOM’s AOR. Suggestion: Afghanistan.

(U) **What’s New?**

- Integration of CT into Stability Operations.
- TTPs to foster coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and non-military entities to ensure CT missions foster stability rather than undermine it.
- The use of a TCAPF to identify local causes of instability to help ensure CT missions support broader Stability Operation goals.

(U) **Conclusions**

(U) It is important to note that even if these recommendations are enacted, decision-making in a rapidly changing environment will always entail a degree of “art,” not science. There will always be some situations commanders will have to make decisions based upon incomplete information. This

²⁹ United States Army, Division Commander’s Guide to Information Operations in OIF and OEF: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December, 2007) pg. 7.

³⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, The Afghanistan-Pakistan War: Measuring Success (or Failure) (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008).

important caveat notwithstanding, “operations focused on influencing the will of the local population and the world community are more than enablers in Stability Operations and the Global War on Terrorism; they are the decisive actions.”³¹ A bullet that hits its target but causes other, unintended consequences is as detrimental to the effort as a scandal or a tactical defeat. To ensure operational and tactical missions fulfill broader strategic imperatives, we must more effectively integrate all elements of national power into Stability Operations.

³¹ United States Army, Division Commander’s Guide to Information Operations in OIF and OEF: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December, 2007) pg. 7.

(U) APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX D: ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES

(U) Additional challenges to the CT effort include: mitigating the seams between Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), countering cyber safe-havens, and addressing the challenges of terrorist acquisition and use of WMDs and MANPADs.

(U) **Mitigating Seams between GCCs**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Countering Cyber Safe-havens

(U) According to the DoS's Country Reports on Terrorism, safe-havens are defined as, ...ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S. national security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will or both.³²

(U) While denying terrorist groups physical and financial safe-havens has been the primary focus of USG efforts to date, the need to prevent groups from utilizing cyberspace for recruiting, propaganda and internal communications is also necessary. Further, countering terrorist use of cyberspace to attack U.S. and allied interests is increasingly important; threats include denial of service attacks, theft of data, manipulation of data, and attacks upon the computer systems that control critical infrastructure. The possibility of a "lone wolf" or unaffiliated individual to carry out the aforementioned attacks cannot be dismissed. Such an unaffiliated actor would have a less visible signature and would be more difficult to identify and counter prior to an incident.

(U) Terrorist Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

³² United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: 2008).

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Combating MANPADS

(U) Man Portable Air Defense Systems, or MANPADS, are designed for use against helicopters and low-medium altitude aircraft. Terrorists groups such as Hizballah, Al Qaeda, Taliban, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Hizbul Mujahideen are reportedly known to possess them and have shown both the will and the ability to employ them. With the increase in tactical collaboration among various terrorist groups in the USCENTCOM AOR, one may expect the transfer of both the MANPADS and the training associated with it.

(U) Terrorists, insurgent groups, and other actors (both state and non-state) have used MANPADs against fixed and rotary wing aircraft around the globe. While accurate numbers are difficult to achieve, “one source estimates that of 35 recorded attacks against civilian aircraft, 24 planes were shot

down killing over 500 people.”³³ Countering the proliferation of MANPADS should remain a top national security priority of the U.S. MANPADS, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, in the hands of criminals, terrorists, and various non-state actors poses a serious threat to passenger air travel and Western commercial and military aviation sector.

³³ James Chow, et. al. Protecting Commercial Airliners Against the Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).

(U) **APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX D: TRAVEL AND CONSULTATIONS**

(U) Members of the CT Functional Team consulted various officials and subject matter experts external to the USCENTCOM Assessment Team members and advisors during the course of this project. Those consulted include:

- Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
 - CDR JSOC VADM McRaven
- CIA/CTC (names withheld)
 - Chief of Operations
 - Deputy Director
 - Subordinate regional chiefs
- NCTC (names withheld)
 - Senior Group Chief for Strategic Assessments and NIP Development
 - Deputy Group Chief for Strategic Assessments
- United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office
 - Dr Rhydian Phillips, Counter Terrorism Department
- United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
 - Director of Counter-Terrorism & United Kingdom Operations Michael House
- Department of State/Office of Counterterrorism (Dos/CT)
 - Principal Deputy Coordinator Schlicher
 - Deputy Coordinator Abercrombie-Winstanley
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
 - Special Agent William R. Genter
- Department of Justice/Counterterrorism Section
 - Pierre R. St. Hilaire, Esq., Trial Attorney National Security Division
- Department of the Treasury
 - Director of Strategic Policy for Terrorist Finance Chip Poncey
 - Assistant Director of Strategic Policy for Terrorist Finance Emery Kobor
 - Strategic Policy Advisor Michael Rosen
- Kuwait
 - Ambassador Jones and members of Country Team
 - Central Bank of Kuwait Financial Intelligence Unit Deputy Talal Ali Al-Sayegh
 - Representatives of the Kuwaiti business community, including International Financial Advisors CEO Saleh Al Selmi; Center for Economic Consultancy General Manger Naser Alnafisi, Al Joman; and American-Kuwaiti Alliance Director Fahad M. Al-Ajmi
- Egypt
 - Ambassador Scobey and members of Country Team
- Lebanon
 - Ambassador Sisson and members of Country Team
- Yemen (via VTC)
 - Ambassador Seche and members of Country Team (via VTC)
- Pakistan (via VTC)
 - Deputy Chief of Mission and members of Country Team
- Iran (via VTC)
 - British Ambassador to Iran Adams

- Tajikistan
 - Ambassador Jacobson and members of the County Team
 - World Bank officials in Tajikistan