

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team (U)



Annex A Intelligence Functional Report (U)

February 2009

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1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The purpose of the Intelligence Annex is to provide a regional overview and to identify key cross-cutting issues, threats and challenges. Where relevant, it includes references to countries and areas outside the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), including Israel, the Palestinian-controlled territories, India, Russia, and China. Appendix 1 to the Intelligence Annex provides a detailed situation assessment of the AOR, while Appendix 2 examines intelligence process, procedures and architecture to address key U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), and USCENTCOM challenges.

(U) The region is host to a complex mix of evolving threats and challenges with many extending beyond the AOR. From Egypt to Pakistan, it comprises an arc of instability that, in broad terms, is rich in hydrocarbons, whose population is primarily Islamic, and is subject to “great game” competition between competing power centers both within the region (e.g., Iran versus Arab states) and beyond (e.g., Russian and Chinese influence particularly in the establishment of military and energy infrastructures). Many regional governments exhibit weak and ineffective governance while maintaining strong internal controls. Radicalization is fueled by the impact of globalization, poverty, increasing fundamentalism, a sense of victimization, injustice, and growing frustration among local populations. At times, irrational exceptionalism and a zero-sum mentality color attitudes towards the West among many policy elites and their wider respective populations in the region. Populations of the region are susceptible to conspiracy theories and propaganda because of a lack of education, the scarcity of credible information, and cultural tendencies. In recent years, antipathy to the United States and the West has increased precipitously.

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2. (U) PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

(U) This report was completed by the USCENTCOM Assessment Team over a 100-day period from November 2008 to February 2009. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the USCENTCOM AOR of existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and suggested actions for USCENTCOM in the context of an illustrative plan for the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of Coalition Partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve policy goals.

(U) The Intelligence Team consisted of members from USCENTCOM, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Air Force, and National Security Agency, as well as Coalition Partners from the United Kingdom Defence Intelligence Service, New Zealand Defence Staff, and Canadian National Defence organizations. It drew on intelligence analysis, existing U.S. and Coalition plans and policy guidance, relevant reports and studies, the expertise of its members, the broader U.S. Government (USG) community, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and academic institutions, and consultations throughout the region, including country teams, bilateral partners, and local actors.

(U) This report was developed in the format of a draft illustrative plan in order to impose sufficient rigor in analysis and recommendations. By providing a comprehensive, civilian-military context for USCENTCOM, this report's intent is to mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short-term solutions to long-term problems.

(U) Disclaimer: This document does not represent the official position of USCENTCOM, the Department of Defense (DoD) or any other USG agency.

3. (U) SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

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4. (U) SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ARCHITECTURE

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. (U) APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: SITUATION ASSESSMENT

APPENDIX 2: INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ARCHITECTURE

APPENDIX 3: REFERENCES

**APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE):
SITUATION ASSESSMENT (U)**

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1. (U) MAJOR DRIVERS AND TRENDS

(U) The countries and issues across the USCENTCOM AOR can not be easily aggregated due to a wide range of unique sub-regional and local dynamics. Nonetheless, there are several notable cross-cutting issues and drivers. Transnational issues that affect U.S. and key ally security interests to varying degrees across the region include:

- The prospect of nuclear proliferation and confrontation; the security of nuclear devices and material.
- Poor governance and ungoverned or alternatively governed spaces
- Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian rivalries
- Immature economies and competition for limited resources, including water
- Demographic trends, population growth, regional “youth bulge,” and migration
- Poor, inaccurate, and distorted perceptions of U.S. and Western intentions
- Extremist ideologies—primarily Islamic—and violent offshoots
- Poverty and inequality, which generate local grievances and set conditions for criminal activity and terrorist recruiting
- Globalization, interdependence, and current global financial instability
- Disputed borders, which support interstate conflict, transnational terrorist, and criminal organizations
- Weapons trafficking and WMD proliferation
- Narcotics, corruption, and criminality

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2. (U) REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES

(U) Many people in the region feel a highly corrosive and profound sense of injustice, which they attribute largely to the United States and the West. This sentiment undermines moderates, empowers extremists, and feeds into efforts to control and amplify a narrative of “Arab resistance.” This sense of injustice degrades U.S. initiatives and undermines strategic communications.

(U) Anti-Americanism—including a negative attitude about American policies, perceived arrogance, and the view that U.S. principles and actions are offensive to local values and culture—is a significant characteristic across most of the region, frequently extended to Coalition Partners and the West more generally. It is more often a phenomenon among the general population or of the “street” than of national leaders. Only in Iran is the leadership clearly more antagonistic. For many opposition and militant leaders, anti-Americanism provides a source of legitimacy and is a key asset in recruiting and mobilizing militant followers. According to a University of Maryland April 2008 poll, Hizballah leader

Hassan Nasrallah and Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad are the two most popular leaders in the region.

(U) Understanding these attitudes and the broader cultural and religious environment is a prerequisite for dealing effectively with the region and for analyzing policy opportunities.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ These are complex issues, but some examples of cause or effect are commonplace and straightforward:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. (U) RISKS TO STABILITY

(U) Weak governments, fragile legitimacy, and incompetent or corrupt state authorities contribute to instability in a number of states. Unresolved territorial disputes (e.g., United Arab Emirates (UAE)-Iran island dispute, Golan Heights, Kashmir, Fergana Valley) continue to fester. The region is a focus for international terrorism, weapons proliferation (including WMD), and narcotics. These problems combined with underlying conditions create a potentially volatile environment that could worsen with little warning. Political or military instability might, for example, follow the death of a leader, a major terrorist attack or an otherwise routine border skirmish.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ In the short- to medium-term, the risk of instability is of most concern in the following areas:

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. (U) SUB-REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL ISSUES

(U) The following is a description of issues and challenges by country and function. Each is reviewed for its potential to create significant effects across the region or complicate U.S. policy.

(U) Afghanistan and Pakistan. Among the poorest countries in the world, Afghanistan and Pakistan suffer from inadequate and/or unstable governments. This has precluded adopting significant industrial, political, societal, and scientific advances of the period. Both countries have become more conservative Islamic states, rejecting measures to educate all their citizens and to use technology to their advantage. Factionalized and weak governments have led to competing and, at times, self-defeating policies, giving the appearance of a schizophrenic and unreliable partner.

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Iraq. Iraq's geographic location in relation to other U.S. allies and adversaries, its educated population, hydrocarbon resources, growing economic capacity, and potential status as a regional military power all make Iraq an important actor with which the United States must maintain influence.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) The Levant and Egypt. The Levant/Egypt is a complicated sub-region (including Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, the Gulf of Suez, and the Gulf of Aqaba) consisting of nation states, external proxies, and indigenous malign actors that sit astride a strategic transportation and commercial hub connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa. Currently, relative stability exists in the region, although the recent Gaza crisis highlights how forces—both at the state level and regional levels—have the potential to inflame the sub-region and other areas of the AOR.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) The Arabian Peninsula (including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Yemen, northern Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and western Arabian Sea). The Arabian Peninsula is a hydrocarbon-rich region with relative political and economic stability. The Gulf region in general, and the Arabian Peninsula in particular, will remain the primary source of the world's energy supplies for the foreseeable future.

(U) The Peninsula is predominantly Arab and Muslim. The region is not, however, homogeneous. Schisms exist between Sunni and Shia and various interpretations within these two major sects. Tribal and family rivalries and identities also exist and in some cases extend across national borders. Distrust, personal rivalries, and historical legacies inhibit regional cooperation.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) The Peninsula's governments are pressured by demographic changes, socio-economic considerations, and food and water scarcity. The Peninsula governments' ability to address population pressures and demands for political participation also varies widely. This provides a potential fertile recruiting ground for VEOs.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) The region has significant oil, gas, and mineral wealth, but suffers from widespread poverty, underdevelopment, inadequate governance, and inequality. Russia maintains robust relationships with the former Soviet Republics, exercises significant political influence within factions of various governments, and views the region as within its sphere of historical influence. The spillover of narcotics and insurgency into Central Asia from Afghanistan are short-term drivers of potential instability. In the long-term, parts of Central Asia are susceptible to many of the problems currently seen in Afghanistan, such as radicalization and the reliance of local economies on the production and trafficking of narcotics.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. (U) IRREGULAR THREATS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(b), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. (U) OUTLOOK

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

**APPENDIX TWO TO ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE):
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ARCHITECTURE (U)**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(U) To improve the intelligence process and architecture, USCENCOM will need to overcome a range of interrelated challenges including institutional biases; inertia and resistance related to trust and confidence; and the ownership, control, apportionment, and allocation of intelligence personnel and resources.

1. (U) OBSERVATIONS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(U) National-level analysts remain overwhelmingly tied to sensitive compartmented information (SCI)-based Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) in their day-to-day operations and production, which further inhibits tailoring production to a broader range of customers and disseminating the material at the collateral level.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(U) National Intelligence Estimate Coordination. The ODNI-led National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) coordination process does not provide enough opportunities for input from the USCENTCOM Commander as a combatant commander or from the 4-star Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. The normal peacetime NIE coordination process when DIA represents and articulates USCENTCOM Commands' analysis and judgment is inadequate. These commands—the most knowledgeable about

the intelligence and operational environments—are involved in complex civil and military operations. Commands engaged in combat in AF-PAK and Iraq should have direct access and input to the NIE.

2. (U) DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Recommendations



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

2.2 (U) Reapportion limited IC resources.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

2.3 (U) Develop human capital.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c


(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Recommendations

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.5 (U) Increase intelligence sharing.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c



2.6 (U) Push all-source, fused, analytic support into U.S. Embassy Country Teams.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4c

**APPENDIX THREE TO ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE):
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