

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



Pakistan Sub-Regional Report

February 2009

Classified by: Maj Gen Robert R. Allardice,
Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, USCENTCOM
Reason: ~~1.4.a.c.d.c~~
Declassify on: ~~15 February 2034~~

**PAKISTAN
SUB-REGIONAL REPORT
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1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ *The Challenge*

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) This report was developed in the format of a draft illustrative plan in order to impose sufficient rigor in analysis and recommendations. By providing a comprehensive, civilian-military context for U.S. Central Command, this report is intended to mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short term solutions to long term problems.

(U) Disclaimer: This document does not represent the official position of U.S. Central Command, the Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. government.

3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ SUMMARY OF SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


Proposed US Policy Essentials

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ STRATEGIC GOALS

5.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Enduring Interests and Values related to the Sub-Region

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5.2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Long-Term Strategic Goal: 25 years

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5.3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Intermediate Strategic Goal 5 years

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Near-Term Strategic Goal (Eighteen months)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)




(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) For example, during the fall 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, the US provided substantial humanitarian assistance and airlift to the Pakistani military. US help generated enormous goodwill among the Pakistani public and inside the country's military. It also gave the US military unprecedented access to remote parts of Pakistan.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LINES OF EFFORT

7.1 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LINES OF EFFORT:

(U) The political line of effort sets the conditions and drives all other lines of effort. The political LOE includes efforts to shape Pakistan's security vision and normalize Pakistan-India relations.

(U) The diplomatic LOE supports the political LOE through engagement with our key allies, international organizations, and key regional actors.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LINES OF EFFORT: Political:

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Long-term subordinate goal (25 years):

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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7.1.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LINES OF EFFORT: Diplomatic:

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Near-Term Subordinate Goal (18 months)*: Immediate crises over

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LINES OF EFFORT: Governance:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LINES OF EFFORT: Security:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LINES OF EFFORT: Economics and Development:

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-
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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LINES OF EFFORT: Strategic Communications:

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 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.7. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LINES OF EFFORT: Counter Narcotics:

- -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.8. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LINES OF EFFORT: Intelligence:

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.8. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LINES OF EFFORT: Theater Security Cooperation:


- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

8. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) GRAPHIC: PLAN OVERVIEW



9. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

9.1. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Summary of Required Resources.



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

9.2: ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Current Funding, Personnel, Facilities, and other Resources

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ US Resources

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) The outgoing Bush Administration notionally agreed to an FY 2009 supplemental funding request that will include:

- (U) Support of the Pakistan COIN Capability Fund (DoD);
- (U) Assistance related to displaced persons; and
- (U) \$400 million in direct budget support to Pakistan intended to help with the \$4 billion in donor support that the IMF says Pakistan needs.

(U) The FY 2009 supplemental bridge, enacted in June 2008, included:

- (U) \$60 million towards President Bush's five-year commitment of \$750 million in support for a sustainable development program; and
- (U) \$15 million for police training programs in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).
- (U) \$5 million of FY 2009 supplemental bridge funds are currently being reprogrammed for road and bridge construction in Pakistan's tribal areas and surrounding frontier provinces.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) The United States is also expressing support for the creation of a multi-donor, World Bank-administered Frontier Trust Fund modeled on the Afghan Reconstruction Fund.

9.3: (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Additional Resources and Authorities Required:

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) CENTCOM should ensure that the FY 2009 supplemental includes sufficient funding for:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

10. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) OPPORTUNITIES, OBSTACLES AND RISKS

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

11. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

12. (U) ANNEXES

ANNEX A: USCENTCOM Role

ANNEX B: Strategic Communications

ANNEX C: Proposal for UN Resolution


ANNEX D: Multi Year Development and Assist Plan


ANNEX E: Implementation Plan

ANNEX F: Alternate Approach

ANNEX A: USCENTCOM ROLE


~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Plan Review





~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **USCENTCOM's Role**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Ownership of two lines of influence. Obviously, CENTCOM's



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX B: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

“The people must have a story”

Former Minister of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **The Problem Set:**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Assessment of the Current SC Effort:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Overall

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Recommendations/Way Forward:**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Goals and Objectives for Afghanistan -Pakistan:**

~~USA, FVEY~~ NEAR TERM GOAL (24 Months):

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ NEAR TERM OBJECTIVES

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **SPECIFIC MESSAGING LINES OF OPERATION:**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **OVERALL CAMPAIGN STRUCTURE**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Near Term Effects



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Relationship Building & Engagement

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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- 3)
- 4)
- 5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **COMMON TASKS – CENTCOM**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Improve Strategic Communications Focused Intel Support**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX C: A UN COUNTER TERRORISM RESOLUTION FOCUSED ON PAKISTAN

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

**ANNEX D: COMPREHENSIVE MULTI-YEAR DEVELOPMENT AND ASSIST PLAN FOR
PAKISTAN**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Objectives

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Line of Efforts:**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Line of Efforts:**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


ANNEX E: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Implementing Actions:**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.1.4 (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Security:



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **Lines of Effort and Implementing Actions:**



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7.3.7 (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Informational

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX-F: ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ A Fast, Feasible and Inexpensive Approach to Peace on the Subcontinent

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Enabling Strategic Partnership

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)