

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



Afghanistan Sub-Regional Report

February 2009

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AFGHANISTAN
SUB-REGIONAL REPORT
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1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Overview:

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2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

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3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

(U) Our vital national interest in Afghanistan is to deny terrorists a renewed safe-haven from which to plan and launch attacks against the United States and our allies.

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¹ Conservative Pashtun defined as religious, political, social and business conservatives

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4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ This report assumes the following:

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5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ STRATEGIC GOALS


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6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

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
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7A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LINES OF OPERATION



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7B. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ IMMEDIATE ACTIONS FOR CENTCOM




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9. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Current Resources (Personnel, Facilities, Assistance, etc.)

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~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Constraints and Action

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~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Additional Authorities and Resources Required

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
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(U) Information and intelligence activities also require greater resources. Streamlined and improved coordination mechanisms between civilian and military agencies must be implemented to fully capitalize on the introduction of these additional civilian resources.


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10. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) **RISK AND MITIGATION**

(U) Annexes for each line of operation address relevant risks and propose mitigation measures. The following are overarching risks that require additional consideration.



Afghanistan. Be realistic about the enduring commitment of resources necessary to achieve outcomes necessary to protect vital US interests. Explain the importance of the effort to European audiences.



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11. (U) ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(U) The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan has the overall lead for setting U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The U.S. Ambassador and COMUSFOR-A have joint responsibility for implementation of U.S. policy in Afghanistan.

(U) Political [LOO1]: State has lead responsibility for the political line of operation as outlined in this plan with the NSC, DOD, USAID, and CENTCOM in support. State will coordinate closely with

UNAMA and ISAF on all political matters, and will also engage the GIRoA on political matters to seek input and to communicate decisions, as relevant and appropriate.

(U) Diplomatic [LOO2]: The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and State have lead responsibility for the diplomatic line of operation, with the NSC, DOD, USAID, and CENTCOM in support. All efforts will be coordinated, as needed, with UNAMA and ISAF.

(U) Governance [LOO3]: State has lead responsibility for the governance line of operation, with USAID, DOD, DOJ, DEA, FBI, and DHS in support. State will coordinate closely with UNAMA and ISAF on governance matters. State will coordinate all governance efforts with the GIRoA. A Rule of Law coordinator with ambassadorial rank will be established in Kabul to coordinate all USG efforts.

(U) Security [LOO4]: DOD has lead responsibility for the security line of operation, with DOS, the NSC, and USAID in support. DOD will closely coordinate security matters with OGA. DOD will coordinate all security matters with ISAF and NATO. DOD will closely integrate security efforts with the GIRoA efforts. Elevate the border management coordinator in rank and responsibility to coordinate all USG efforts.

(U) Development [LOO5]: USAID has lead responsibility for the development line of operation, with State and DOD in support. USAID will closely coordinate development matters with UNAMA and ISAF. USAID will closely integrate development efforts with GIRoA priorities, plans, and programs.

(U) Unity of Effort [LOO6]: The NSC and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with DOD and State in close support, have lead responsibility for ensuring unity of effort. The NSC will coordinate with DNI on intelligence matters.

(U) Strategic Communications [LOO7]: State and DOD have lead responsibility on the information cross cutting line of operation, with USAID in support. DOD will closely coordinate with the DNI on intelligence matters. State will closely coordinate information efforts with the GIRoA, UNAMA, and ISAF.

(U) Counternarcotics [LOO8]: State has lead responsibility for counter-narcotics, with USAID, DEA, DHS, and DoJ, and DOD in support. State coordinates counter-narcotics matters with the GIRoA, UNAMA, and ISAF. A “Drug Czar” at Embassy Kabul, with Ambassadorial rank and responsibility, will be established and coordinate all USG efforts.

12. REFERENCE LIST

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Millennium Development, 2004
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Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), June, 2008
ISAF Strategic Vision and Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan (CSPMP)
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FY 2010 Mission Strategic Plan, US Mission to Pakistan, March 27, 2008

Defense Department Statement on Pakistan Partnership #190-06, March 4, 2006
US Policy Options in Post-election Pakistan, John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 2008
U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Partnership Joint Statement, Washington DC, September 29, 2008
“S-3263 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2008,” Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Biden-Lugar Bill), June 2008
National Security Strategy of the United States, 2006
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), 2008
UNODC Afghanistan Opium Winter Assessment, 2009
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CJTF-101 OEF 7-09 Campaign Plan, December 2007
CJTF-101 and Regional Command East OPORD 08-16, OP TOLO HAMKARY, August 2008
SACEUR OPLAN 10302 Revise 1, 4 May 006
COMJFCBS OPLAN 30302 Revise 3, 7 January 2008
COMISAF 38302 Revise 2, 8 October 2008
COMISAF OPORD 04-2008 Operation TOLO, September, 2008

13. **ANNEXES**

ANNEX A: Situational Assessment
ANNEX B: Political Line of Operation
ANNEX C: Diplomatic Line of Operation
ANNEX D: Governance Line of Operation
ANNEX E: Security Line of Operation
ANNEX F: Development Line of Operation
ANNEX G: Unity of Efforts Cross Cutting Line of Operation
ANNEX H: Counter Narcotics Cross Cutting Line of Operation

ANNEX A: SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

(U) Purpose

(U) The Afghanistan-Pakistan Team of the CENTCOM Assessment Team (CAT) conducted a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to assist in the development of a new Commander's assessment and develop options to improve a comprehensive approach to the sub-region with our inter-agency and coalition partners.

(U) Scope

(U) This document is not an in-depth intelligence assessment or country study of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the surrounding region. Extremely detailed products of this nature exist and were used to inform and shape this document. This document represents the research, personal observations and deductions of the Afghanistan-Pakistan team.

(U) Methodology

(U) The Afghanistan-Pakistan team used research, plenary sessions, interviews and field study to develop this product. A detailed list of this activity is located at the end of this document. The team utilized members from U.S. military, interagency and select coalition nations to focus its assessment on the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts in time, space, and purpose to achieve stated goals and objectives. The assessment design was structured to outline the strategic context; assess the current policies and activities; identify advantages and disadvantages of shifting course; and identifying constraints.

1. Strategic Context

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(U) Recent Developments and Historical Context

Afghanistan and Pakistan are at the heart of Western interests in Asia. They share closely interrelated histories and a disputed 2,340 kilometer contiguous border. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are strained due to several factors; most notably, the Afghans have always disputed the border created by the British along the Durand Line. Because the Durand Line cuts through Pashtun tribes,

Afghan leaders have periodically made irredentist claims on Pashtun areas in Pakistan. The on-going failure by either national government to adequately control the territory along the border magnifies the weakness of governance and insecurity in both states.

(U) Afghanistan is a historical trade route and the path of invasions from ancient times to the present. It has never been a strong centralized state. Ethnic division among the country's Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras has been a constant feature of Afghanistan's history. Local communities and tribal structures have traditionally been the major sources of authority, outside of state control. Warlike tribes, difficult terrain, and a tendency of different groups to unite against outsiders have always made control of Afghanistan a difficult proposition. After a series of inconclusive campaigns, the British found the best means to manage Afghanistan was to secure clients in the country, rather than trying to control territory with their own military forces.

(U) Pakistan has a stronger tradition of centralized governance than Afghanistan, but has weak civilian institutions and a history of military intervention in politics. The Pakistani army has overthrown the civilian government three times and is the strongest political actor in Pakistan. Acrimonious partition with India in 1947 has prompted perpetual hostility between the neighbors and oriented Pakistan's foreign policy primarily towards the continued threat from India.

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(U) Two events brought Pakistan and Afghanistan again to the center of Western interest. The first was Pakistan's detonation of a nuclear weapon in May 1998 in response to India's successful nuclear test. The second was al Qaeda's attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. Following the September 11 attacks, the West intervened directly in Afghanistan and demanded support from Pakistan. The Taliban were rapidly defeated but, along with al Qaeda, were able to flee to Pakistan. The Pakistan military deployed to the FATA but soon after redeployed most of its forces to the Indian border as the result of tensions brought about by the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. As a result, the Taliban and al Qaeda were given the time and space necessary to rearm and reorganize.

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(U) The insurgents enjoy the freedom to base, train, and regroup in Pakistan. The insurgents are pursuing strategies similar to those of the mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation. Basing among the rural population, they seek to isolate the urban centers, while building their influence among the people and eroding the resolve of foreign forces. Their relationships with state and non-state actors in Pakistan vary by group, but there is a prior history of and enduring motivation for Pakistan institutional support. There remains at least Government of Pakistan acquiescence to Afghanistan insurgents in Pakistan. Although the current situation differs significantly from the Soviet occupation, particularly in the purpose and legitimacy of the international effort and the popular attitude towards it, there are cautionary lessons to be drawn from the Soviet experience - both to avoid repeating their mistakes, and to understand where comparisons may resonate with Afghans.

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- (U) Culture of violence. Lastly, a deep-seated culture of violence exists in Afghanistan. A Pashtun cultural code (Pashtunwali) of retribution and revenge for past grievances often results in familial and tribal feuding that lingers for generations and is largely beyond the state's ability to contain or control. It also means that a similar blood feud is started each time that coalition causes civilian casualties. Ultimately, the preponderance of polling and anecdotal data strongly suggests that the majority of Afghans continue to yearn for security and is exhausted by decades of violent struggle.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ *Governance*

(U) Afghanistan's government remains in its infancy and faces an uphill struggle to become effective. There is a critical lack of human capital at all levels of government, and a host of programs still struggling to extend governance to the local level. Warlords, powerbrokers, the narcotics industry, weak police, and a culture imbued with insecurity, violence, and the rejection of distant political power combine to offer resistance to Afghan government efforts to reach to the local level. The main driver affecting governance is a crisis of Afghan government legitimacy. The GIRoA's crisis of legitimacy is exacerbated by pervasive corruption as well as the lack of capacity to deliver basic services and justice. Alternative power structures, and traditional domestic political and center-periphery tensions also complicate matters.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Factors contributing to the crisis of government legitimacy include:

- (U) Lack of human capital. Aside from a handful of ministries led by exceptional individuals, the GIRoA lacks the bureaucratic and human capacities to cope with daily governance, let alone the challenges of nation-building in the midst of escalating conflict. Education programs, mentoring and capacity development will be critical through the mid and long terms.
- (U) Competing political interests. Overall, the political system comprises an awkward mix of western-style democracy, ethnic interest, traditional patronage and corruption. Absent issues-based parties, President Karzai's power is constrained mainly by the need to balance policy among ethnic interests and the interests of his own Popalzai tribe. This shapes resource and development priorities between North and South, and places limits on any reconciliation programs. However, the power of the presidency and incumbency provide Karzai with important levers to advance a personal agenda that many see as not serving the larger national interest. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) is often cited as an example of an effort to serve Karzai's political ends even as it delivers notable progress on governance.
- (U) Sub-national governance. There is currently a lack of agreement within the Afghan government and the international community regarding the appropriate or desired nature of sub-national governance, i.e. expanded and improved reach of the central government into the rest of the country versus increased and expanded authorities at the sub-national level. This goes to the core of the type of government Afghanistan will ultimately have, and the nature of the relationship between the center and the sub-national level. In the immediate term, focus needs to be on service delivery, regardless of the final outcome of such discussions.
- (U) Lack of elected representation. The ad-hoc application of governance at the local level often serves to reinforce warlordism or conflicts with traditional structures. Governors are appointed by the President and often are seen as corrupt and having little connection to the people they supposedly represent. Elected officials at the provincial level, such as the Provincial Council,

have little power and the first district elections will not be held until 2010. Tribal structures (where they still exist) and allegiances continue to command greater loyalty and play a more tangible role in people's lives than the central Government.

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- (U) Government financial dependency. The international community currently provides more than 70% of the Afghan budget. Limited economic opportunities and severe underdevelopment will leave Afghanistan deeply dependent on the international community to fund its substantial COIN, nation-building, and operating budgets beyond the mid-term. Extensive economic development, particularly in trade and mining will be required in the long term. In the meantime, new incentives and regulatory regimes for the private sector, and improvements to the taxation and other revenue systems would be foundational steps to invigorate the economy. Corruption plays a key role in this area, as it leads to potential revenues.
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Endemic Corruption. Moreover, the Afghan government's frequent inability to pay salaries to the ANP and other civil servants sets conditions for "functional corruption" as these individuals seek to earn living wages for themselves and their families. The relative impunity of civil servants who derive bribes and other forms of illicit payment from the Afghan populace has a severely deleterious effect on the people's confidence in the honesty and accountability of government. Popular disaffection resulting from corruption bolters popular support for insurgent groups, particularly the Taliban, who historically did not excessively extort finances from the population in comparison to what is currently being experienced.

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Development*

(U) Current situation. Nearly 25 years of war and violence have devastated Afghanistan's polity, economy and society. Afghanistan is the fifth poorest country in the world, with some of the worst social and economic rankings, including infant mortality rate, life expectancy at birth, per capita income and illiteracy rate. Less than 15% of Afghans currently have access to electricity. One out of every five Afghan children dies before the age of five. Afghanistan is one of only four countries in the world where polio remains endemic.

(U) With an average yearly income of \$300 per person, 40% unemployment rate, and over 50% of the population living below poverty line, Afghanistan remains highly dependent on foreign aid—accounting for at least 70% of its recurrent costs, and the preponderance of development costs—as well as trade with neighboring countries. The population continues to suffer from food insecurity, housing shortages especially in Kabul, clean water, and economic opportunity. Economic development is hampered by the lack of physical security and governance, as well as the difficult physical terrain.

(U) Economic development is inextricably tied to security and vice versa. Improved security conditions not only provide the necessary environment allowing for economic programs, but they also provide the necessary confidence for the relevant actors to invest in Afghanistan. On the other side, economic development increases the incentives for improved security through creating the conditions for more jobs and improved job security.

(U) Progress to Date. In line with development assistance for the past seven years, the international community, during the June 2008 Paris Conference, pledged over \$20 billion to Afghanistan, in addition to previously pledged \$10 billion during the 2006 London Conference.

Since 2001, Afghanistan has improved many of its social and economic indicators. Through the assistance of the international community, real GDP growth exceeded 7% in 2007. Customs is the main source of revenue for the Afghan Government, generating almost \$429 million in revenues from March 2005 to March 2006, which resulted from the building and equipping of customs houses and training. State-owned enterprises are being restructured, liquidated, or privatized, generating additional revenue for the government. Creating access to capital activity, through the provision of farm credits, micro-finance loans, and small and medium enterprise loans are further stimulating the economy. Agriculture programs are not only providing seeds and fertilizer, rehabilitating irrigation canals, and providing extension, but are also focusing on creating value chains in order to bring more of the work to Afghanistan and to develop more lucrative value-added businesses, providing for more employment opportunities within the country.

(U) The number of children attending school has increased from less than one million in 2001 to over 6 million today, with one-third of those being girls. Access to health care has increased from 8% during Taliban times to over 80% today. As a result of improvements in health care, infant mortality rate has dropped by 22%, an impressive accomplishment. Through international assistance since 2002, over 90% of children under five have been vaccinated against polio. An important factor for the impressive accomplishments in the health and education sectors has been the strength in the leadership of the ministries themselves, which have led the donor community in implementing their vision of reforms in those sectors.

(U) Physical infrastructure has greatly improved, with the ring road mostly completed from Kabul to Herat, and the remainder planned or under construction. Many secondary and tertiary roads are connecting towns to cities to provinces, products to markets, and people to people. Approximately 60% of Afghans now live within 50 kilometers of the Ring Road.

(U) The North-East Power System, a multi-donor initiative that will expand access to reliable, low-cost electricity to over 20% of the population by mid-2009, is under development, and power purchase agreements are being negotiated with some of the Central Asian countries. In the southern part of the country, at Kajaki Dam, one of the turbines is operating, and a second, through impressive international effort was recently delivered and is being installed. When all 3 turbines are installed and operating, the dam will provide power to a significant proportion of the population in the area. This physical infrastructure will enable further economic development.

(U) Finally, through international assistance, the GIROA recently completed a bidding process for the development and extraction of the Aynak copper mine, which is expected to create approximately 10,000 jobs and generate approximately \$400 million revenue in royalties per year to the Afghan Government, once the mine is fully functional (approximately 5 years). Although there are pending issues with the Aynak process, this is one example of the great potential for the development, extraction, and capitalization on the country's great amounts of natural resources.

(U) Obstacles. Despite major accomplishments to date in the social and economic development sector, much remains to be done to elevate social and economic indicators in Afghanistan and to improve the lives of ordinary Afghans, given the very low baseline from which we started. Additionally, very high expectations set by the international community and GIROA from the very beginning, as illustrated in many of the documents such as the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS, are leaving many parts of the Afghan population disappointed.

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~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ *Cross-cutting Issues*

Additional drivers that cut across all other sectors are:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Regional Dynamics.

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(U) Demographics. The complexities of Afghanistan's demographic composition exert a profound influence on political, social and economic life, and must be factored into all of our strategic considerations.

- (U) Afghan Diversity. The Afghan population is a mix of ethnicities including Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, a plurality of 40% Pashtuns (but a perception by Pashtuns they are over 50%) and smaller minorities such as the Aimaks, Turkmen, Baluchis and Kuchis (nomads). Pashtuns dominate in the south and east; Hazaras (the only Shia grouping) in the center and most of the others in the north. It is a highly rural and tribal society. Afghan identity is very localized, shaped and networked by a variety of ethnic, tribal, religious and other social factors (e.g., xenophobia and radical ideology) which is neither homogenous nor predictable due to regional differences and breakdown of many traditional structures over time. At the same time, in many communities, there exists a core of local elders and religious leaders, whose influences could potentially be mobilized.
- (U) Rural population vulnerable. Afghanistan's ethnic and tribal mosaic is overlaid on a mainly rural pattern of settlement. More than 75% live in rural districts or villages, often in medieval conditions. These rural populations are isolated, and tend to be poorer and more conservative than their urban counterparts. This makes them highly susceptible to Taliban coercion and recruitment through financial and religious inducements. This isolation also makes the provision of development assistance more difficult, especially in the less secure areas. In recent years, wealthier landowners in insurgency-prone districts have tended to re-locate to urban centers,

increasing the connection of the urban to the rural, but creating a vacuum of elites among the rural population, and further opportunity for Taliban influence.

- (U) Urban populations. Urban populations, though a smaller proportion, present significant pockets of generally cosmopolitan and less conservative Afghans. Their concentration and positive orientation toward development make urban areas easier for under-resourced GIRoA and ISAF forces to influence, secure, and support. Although less conservative, urban populations often retain strong linkages with their home districts, with influence flowing in both directions along those lines. The insurgency can therefore safely stage through rural districts, while exploiting tribal connections to urban populations to act in the cities. Overlaying these characteristics of the Afghan city dwellers, is the different symbolic value of the cities themselves in the historical memory of the people, and as prizes to the Taliban, GIRoA, and the international community. The political capital, Kabul, is critical in the minds of the international community and population as the seat of the GIRoA. Kandahar, however, has a much older history as the capital of former empires, as well as the center of resistance to foreign empires: Persian and the early caliphates, and more recently the Soviets. Through the rise and rule of the Taliban and to the present day, Kandahar has been the homeland of TB, Mullah Omar and his Shura. Herat has a rich history as a centre of culture and learning, and remains closely tied to both Shiism and Iran. Mazar-i-Sharif is the most important northern Afghan city, with a large population of Uzbeks, Hazaras as well as Turkmens and Tajiks.

2. Assessment of Current Policies and Activities

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Current US Policies and Activities

(U) In May 2005, Presidents Bush and Karzai signed the *Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership*, in which the US articulated its policy to work with Afghanistan on the following areas:

(U) Democracy and Governance:

- Support democratic good governance and the development of civil society based on the rule of law and human rights and encourage broad-based political participation in Afghanistan.
- Help build strong, lasting Afghan Government and civic institutions and support political traditions that are efficient and responsive to the needs of the Afghan people.
- Encourage the advancement of freedom and democracy in the wider region.
- Support Afghanistan's initiative to restore the country's historic role as a land bridge connecting Central and South Asia and to shift the pattern of regional relations from rivalry to economic and political cooperation.
- Foster cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors and deter meddling in its internal affairs.
- Support people-to-people exchanges and partnerships to strengthen ties between American and Afghan society, thereby fostering common outlooks and collaboration on the challenges and opportunities before us.

(U) Prosperity

- Facilitate and support Afghanistan's integration into regional and world economies and appropriate international organizations.

- Help develop a legal and institutional framework for a thriving private sector and an environment favorable to international investment in Afghanistan.
- Encourage and facilitate involvement of US businesses in ventures that accelerate the development of Afghan firms and the private sector.
- Continue the reconstruction of Afghanistan and investments in the people of Afghanistan and encourage other nations to do so.

(U) Security

- Help organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan security forces as Afghanistan develops the capacity to undertake this responsibility.
- Consult with respect to taking appropriate measures in the event that Afghanistan perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk.
- Assist the Afghan Government in security sector reform.
- Continue to conduct counter-terrorism operations in cooperation with Afghan forces.
- Support Coalition assistance to the Afghan Government's counter-narcotics programs.
- Continue intelligence sharing.
- Strengthen Afghanistan's ties with NATO.
- Support border security initiatives.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (U) The Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Agreement was signed on December 5, 2001, by the representatives of the various Afghan factions (excluding the Taliban) at the conclusion of the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. The agreement set out a timetable for the reestablishment of permanent government institutions in Afghanistan, and served as a roadmap for the creation of provisional arrangements until permanent ones could be put in place. The agreement laid out several processes, including the Emergency Loya Jirga and the Constitutional Loya Jirga, through which power would be exercised and then transferred to a fully representative government through elections. The Bonn Agreement was largely adhered to. The Afghan government and the UN successfully established most of the provisional arrangements called for. The last milestones of the agreement were the presidential and parliamentary elections that took place in October 2004 and September 2005, respectively.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. Advantages/Disadvantages in Shifting Course and Constraints

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Advantages and Disadvantages in Shifting Course

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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ANNEX B: POLITICAL LINE OF OPERATION

1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) INTRODUCTION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Tasks:

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION (5-10 years)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Objective 1.1: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Tasks



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ TENSIONS AND TRADEOFFS



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Elections

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

8. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ ORGANIZATIONAL AND RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX C: DIPLOMATIC LINE OF OPERATION

1. (U) INTRODUCTION

(U) The United States must engage in robust regional diplomacy to achieve its political objectives in Afghanistan. Achieving a consensus with European partners on core security objectives and clarifying missions where they might best contribute will be necessary to enhance NATO's contribution in Afghanistan. More broadly, the United States must enlist international partners to hold the Afghan government accountable for key political decisions (e.g., addressing corruption, devolving authorities to the local level) necessary to achieve sustainable security.

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) ASSESSMENT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) OVERALL CONCEPT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) GOALS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) TENSIONS AND TRADEOFFS

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The United States will need to determine major regional priorities and consider the consequences of certain tradeoffs. Among issues that will need to be considered:

- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ ORGANIZATIONAL AND RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX D: GOVERNANCE LINE OF OPERATION

1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) INTRODUCTION

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) ASSESSMENT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OVERALL CONCEPT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ GOALS

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Near-Term (18 months):

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) TENSIONS AND TRADEOFFS

- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Doing vs. Mentoring.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

8. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) ORGANIZATIONAL AND RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX E: SECURITY LINE OF OPERATION

1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ INTRODUCTION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OVERALL CONCEPT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ GOALS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) TENSIONS AND TRADE-OFFS

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) ORGANIZATIONAL AND RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX F: DEVELOPMENT LINE OF OPERATION

1. INTRODUCTION

The USG must prioritize development as an important tool to combat insurgent elements and the increasing illegitimacy of the Afghan Government. While recognizing that development efforts should not abandon longer-term aspirational goals of nation-building, these efforts should be subordinated to the more urgent task of defeating the insurgency. Planning for development must be fundamentally integrated into overall COIN planning, adequately resourced and be accorded with the authorities needed to decentralize rapid decision making to the PRT level. For development efforts to contribute to increasing the legitimacy of the Afghan government, these efforts must focus on government capacity building to enable efforts to be Afghan-led. Development efforts should also be used to increase economic integration to advance regional cooperation.

2. ASSESSMENT

Most development efforts in Afghanistan are currently focused on aspirational goals of nation-building and dramatically improving all aspects of the lives of the population. While important, longer-term nation-building efforts are often slow to show results and thus do not necessarily contribute to the more urgent task of defeating the insurgency. Furthermore, these nation-building efforts are usually centrally planned and implemented, which can result in a lack of responsiveness to local needs and a lack of strategic focus in areas of USG interest.

Although there have been some efforts to build Afghan government capacity, most USG development programs are designed and implemented by foreign contractors with the mandate to achieve development objectives. While this may be a faster way to get things done initially, it does not build the capacity of Afghans to assume responsibility for these projects in the future. More problematic in achieving short-term counterinsurgency objectives, foreigners implementing programs without Afghan partnership or leadership reinforces the fact that the Afghan government can not deliver basic services and infrastructure for its people and further decreases its legitimacy.

Due to inadequate resources and the lack of prioritization of those resources, the USG is thinly spreading its funds across almost all sectors and geographic locations. Furthermore, development efforts have been hampered by inadequate civilian staff, both in numbers, experience and skills. Civilian staff currently in country is hampered by extensive security requirements that often limit their travel. The flexibility of development funding is hampered by a risk-averse system with a high level of scrutiny (IG, GAO, SIGAR) and low tolerance for potential loss/misuse of funds, which prevents creative programming such as direct assistance to the Afghan government or to local and regional entities. In part due to this risk aversion, decision-making is overly centralized with field officers having little ability to quickly influence funding direction. Furthermore, an annual budget process hinders predictability in funding and effective planning.

3. OVERALL CONCEPT

The overall concept is to use development resources as a means to defeat the insurgency rather than solely as an end in itself. This effort will require a shift toward achieving near-term counterinsurgency gains, while still pursuing important but subordinate nation-building objectives.

Within this overall concept, development must be strategically targeted to support a negotiation strategy (detailed in the Political LOO) designed to identify leaders and population groups that could likely be driven away from insurgent sympathies with a carefully designed package of carrots and sticks. Development assistance will be a majority of the carrots offered, and thus must be quickly and flexibly targeted both in geographic location and type of activity to support this strategy.

Development assistance must also be focused in border areas with high levels of insurgents crossing back and forth from safe havens in Pakistan. The right development projects with local buy-in through a locally recruited labor force and community contribution to projects they value can help to incentivize local communities along the border to deny support to insurgents transiting back and forth. These projects should be made conditional on current or intended denial of support to transient insurgents.

More broadly, development should be used as a tool to increase the Afghan government legitimacy through delivering economic opportunity and assistance. The most important sector of Afghanistan's economy is agriculture and thus programs should focus on promoting licit market-led value chain development (e.g. agricultural products, marble) as an alternative to poppy. These programs must facilitate the private sector through training, assistance in obtaining business permits and licenses, and the provision of credit, supplies, and badly needed infrastructure. Several agribusiness development programs (including several undertaken by DOD's Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT) have been designed to fail because they do not secure private investment at the beginning of the project, and turn over business management to Afghan government entities. Even with significantly increased capacity, state-owned enterprises rarely succeed, and significant USG resources (through USAID) are being devoted to privatizing large state-owned enterprises in Afghanistan. A better way to stimulate private sector growth and ensure that needed businesses (e.g. slaughterhouses, cold storage facilities) continue to function would be to form an association of farmers to invest in and manage the facility.

Longer-term infrastructure and economic growth programs should be supported in the immediate term by a quick disbursement of a 'development dividend' to a large portion of the population through existing or new mechanisms (e.g. Afghan Construction Corps). Also to increase Afghan government legitimacy, development projects should have an Afghan face where possible. This effort toward "Afghanization" requires not only a shift in how we do development, but also requires a civilian surge to fill immediate Afghan government capacity gaps, but also a longer-term effort to build Afghan government capacity to increasingly be able to truly lead these efforts.

Economic integration can also be used as a tool to improve regional relationships. Economic interests often align more easily than other more contentious issues such as security. Through this effort, informal agreements and relationships that already exist can be strengthened as used as an important stepping stone to improve political and security relationships. Successful economic integration in the region can once again place Afghanistan as the land bridge of the region, bringing in substantial revenue through customs and trade.

The political line of effort provides recommendations on the negotiation strategy which will be supported by both the security and development lines of effort. Security efforts detailed in the security line of effort will be critical to the ability of development assistance to achieve its objectives, particularly in more dangerous areas of the country. Capacity efforts will support the Governance line of effort.

4. GOALS

Near-Term (18 months): Increasing number of Afghan people see the Afghan Government delivering economic and social improvements building on security gains in targeted areas.

Mid-Term (5 years): Increasing number of Afghan people see the Afghan Government delivering economic and social improvements building on security gains.

Long-Term (20 years): Afghanistan is a society with conditions for licit economic opportunity and self-reliance, with all groups feeling part of the broader Afghan project.

5. OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR TERM CONDITIONS

Objective 5.1: Population increasingly believe that economic progress is being made

Tasks:

- Deliver an immediate ‘development dividend’ at the local level to a large portion of the population, through existing NSP, CERP, NERAP and NGO programs. Identify new opportunities as needed (e.g. stand up a construction corps program).
 - Lead: USAID, DOD
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Number of people receiving direct assistance through wages or village projects
- Form an Afghan Builders Association to certify the skills and dependability of local contractors, thereby emphasizing local contracting and on-the-job vocational training for development and Coalition projects [DOD, USAID]
 - Ensure wages for Coalition/national projects match and exceed local insurgent pricing [DOD, USAID].
 - Lead: DOD, USAID
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Number of local contractors belonging to Association
- Resource World Food Program and fund cash for work programs enabling people to purchase food in markets.
 - Lead: USAID
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Percentage of food insecure population receiving assistance
- Provide security to enable food delivery in advance of the peak hunger season (March-May). Provide air transport to deliver food to food insecure areas cut off by snow.
 - Lead: DOD
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Percentage of food needs met in insecure and snowbound areas

- Stand up a “civilian CSTC-A” to provide mentors for selected sector ministries at the national, provincial and district levels, using the successful example of the Ministries of Health and MRRD (detailed in objective 3.3).
 - Lead: USAID with support from USDA
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Number of mentors assisting key sector ministry efforts.

Objective 5.2: Population is sufficiently incentivized to decisively turn in favor of the Afghan government in targeted areas in support of a politically-led negotiation strategy.

Tasks:

- Target development projects to strategically important areas and villages in order to incentivize populations to shift support to the Afghan Government. Design quick impact and in some cases longer-term projects to meet identified needs.
 - Lead: USAID, State, DOD
 - Time: In synch with the political-military negotiation strategy (see Political LOO)
 - MOE: Number of projects in strategically important areas
- Increase funding for civilian agency quick impact projects at the PRT level, and coordinate its use with DOD CERP funds. PRT officers should have the maximum possible level of discretion over the use of civilian quick-impact funding.
 - Lead: USAID with DOD
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Percent of funds controlled by PRT civilian officers
- Provide security to enable quick impact projects to proceed
 - Lead: DOD
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Number of projects completed in strategically important areas.

Objective 5.3: Population in border area sufficiently incentivized to withdraw support from insurgents transiting across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border

Tasks:

- Target quick impact and infrastructure projects to border areas with high levels of insurgent transiting. Target assistance to those communities denying or promising to deny support to insurgents attempting to transit through their community.
 - Lead: USAID, State, DOD
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Number of projects in border areas with high levels of insurgent transiting.
- Provide security to enable quick impact projects to proceed
 - Lead: DOD
 - Time: Immediately
 - MOE: Number of projects completed in strategically important areas.

6. OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERMEDIATE CONDITIONS

Objective 5.4: licit economic alternatives increased

Tasks:

- Provide vocational and business skills training focused on adding value to and marketing agricultural products. Explore possibility of sending people abroad for training, and developing an indigenous technical assistance capability.
 - Lead: USAID, DOD
 - Time: On-going
 - MOE: Number of entrepreneurs trained

- Assist in the development of a national program for selected sector ministries (e.g. Agriculture and Mines) using the successful example of the Ministry of Health (e.g. all donors participate, ministry sets policy and procedures, capacities not existing in the ministry are contracted out).
 - Lead: USAID
 - Time: After arrival of “civilian CSTC-A” mentors
 - MOE: Number of national programs developed that have received donor funding

- Secure Congressional approval to move more funds through the Afghan government budget and the ARTF.
 - Lead: USAID
 - Time: 2011 budget cycle
 - MOE: Percent of USAID funds disbursed through Afghan budget systems

Objective 5.5: Regional economic integration increased

The following three tasks relate both to objectives 5.4 and 5.5

Tasks:

- Develop sufficient energy sources necessary to promote economic growth using regional energy linkages, large-scale projects in Afghanistan (e.g. Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistan-India pipeline) and small micro-hydro projects.
 - Lead: USAID, DOD
 - Time: On-going
 - MOE: Percent of population with access to electricity

- Fund increased transportation infrastructure (consider including rail links), that link farmers with markets in Afghanistan and trading partners in the region (especially India) and position Afghanistan as the land bridge in the region.
 - Lead: USAID, DOD
 - Time: On-going
 - MOE: Decrease in transportation cost along key trade routes

- Target barriers to trade that increase the cost of doing business (both regionally and domestically) through trade negotiations.

- Lead: USAID
- Time: On-going
- MOE: Number of identified trade barriers minimized

- Promote a South-Asia Free-Trade Agreement (see Diplomatic LOO).
 - Lead: Special Representative, State
 - Time: On-going
 - MOE: Agreement signed

- Facilitation of public-private partnerships to ensure long range financing, including through seeking Chinese and Saudi/Gulf financing for economic investments.
 - Lead: USAID
 - Time: On-going
 - MOE: Dollar amount of public-private partnerships secured for Afghanistan

7. TENSIONS AND TRADEOFFS

- Increasing development efforts in insecure areas.
 - Advantages:* Development projects more effectively employed to support counterinsurgency objectives.
 - Disadvantages:* Insurgents can disrupt key development efforts and ineffective project monitoring due to security concerns can result in poor quality or corruption.
 - Recommendation:* Increase local buy-in by recruiting labor from target communities and requiring community resource contribution to projects. Plan for adequate force protection at prioritized development locations through an integrated civil-mil planning effort before development projects begin. DOD should assist in civilian project monitoring where security conditions do not permit adequate monitoring by USG civilian personnel.

- Putting the Afghan government in the lead.
 - Advantages:* Development projects increase Afghan government legitimacy and increase their connection to targeted populations.
 - Disadvantages:* Insufficient capacity even when bolstered by external support can be slower to achieve results and can result in inferior quality work.
 - Recommendation:* Effective partnering with the Afghan government allows for an Afghan face to be put on all projects, with coalition efforts leading strongly from behind.

8. ORGANIZATIONAL AND RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

Development efforts will support an integrated politically led counterinsurgency effort and will be led by USAID in close collaboration with State and DOD and will be focused primarily at the tactical (BCT and PRT levels) but also at the provincial and national levels. The following efforts should be emphasized:

- Fully resource Embassy Kabul's request for additional civilian personnel (especially USAID) at the PRT and BCT level. Increase incentives to attract higher-quality officers. Place two USAID officers at most PRTs to ensure continual coverage even during rest breaks and business trips to Kabul.

- Provide additional security and transportation assets for increased civilian presence in the field. This effort will require additional funds for transportation (including armored cars and drivers and air transport) and for protective detail contracting. Additional RSO personnel may be required at the regional and battalion levels to oversee civilian security. DOD security assets may also be required to assist civilian personnel to accomplish their mission in insecure areas.
- Provide USAID and other civilian PRT staff with decentralized authority over quick impact funds to ensure flexibility and quick responsiveness to rapidly changing conditions in the battle space.
- Measure development efforts employed as a means to achieve counterinsurgency objectives in terms of counterinsurgency goals. For example, the success of a road built through an area where many local leaders are contemplating Taliban support should be measured by 'number of villages supporting the Afghan government' rather than the traditional development metric of 'reduction in travel time and cost to the market center.'
- Focus DOD Agribusiness Development Teams on facilitating the growth of the private sector by providing training targeted at value chain development and badly needed infrastructure including irrigation, roads and electricity. The regulations of CERP prohibit funding projects that benefit private business entities or business cooperatives. Thus, either the regulations of CERP need to be changed in order to allow for private sector and association development and support, or as currently restricted; ADTs should avoid setting up or supporting state owned enterprises.

ANNEX G: UNITY OF EFFORT CROSS CUTTING LINE OF OPERATION

1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ INTRODUCTION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) RECOMMENDATIONS

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Overall U.S. Approach:



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX H: COUTNERNARCOTICS CROSS CUTTING LINE OF OPERATION



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OVERALL CONCEPT

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) ORGANIZATIONAL AND RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)