

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

USCENTCOM ASSESSMENT TEAM (CAT)



Iran Sub-Regional Report

February 2009

Classified by: Maj Gen Robert R. Allardice,
Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, USCENTCOM

Reason: ~~1.4.a.c.d.e~~

~~Declassify on: 15 February 2034~~

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IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	3
2. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY.....	7
3. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT.....	9
4. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS.....	16
5. STRATEGIC GOALS.....	17
6. OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION.....	18
7. LINES OF EFFORT.....	24
8. GRAPHIC: PLAN OVERVIEW.....	28
9. RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION.....	NA
10. RISK AND MITIGATION.....	45
11. ORG ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES & COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.....	48
12. CONCLUSIONS.....	49
13. REFERENCE LIST.....	51
14. ANNEXES.....	56
ANNEX A: IRAN SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT.....	57
APPENDIX 1: IRAN MILITARY ANNEX.....	77
APPENDIX 2: IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ.....	79
APPENDIX 3: LEGAL, BUDGETARY, AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.....	81
ANNEX B: IRANIAN COURSES OF ACTION (ICOAs) ANALYSIS.....	83
ANNEX .C: RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION.....	85
ANNEX .D: OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN.....	90
ANNEX .E: RISKS OF AN ISRAELI STRIKE.....	93
ANNEX .F: LIST OF ACTIVITIES BY APPROACH.....	96
ANNEX .G: METRICS.....	112
ANNEX .H: COUNTERING MALIGN IRANIAN INFLUENCE (CMII).....	116
ANNEX .I: U.S.-IRAN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS.....	128
ANNEX .J: ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC TOOLSET.....	135
ANNEX .K: ANALYSIS OF THE IRANIAN STRATEGIC TOOLSET.....	146
ANNEX .L: KEY RESOURCES AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.....	150

**IRAN
SUB-REGIONAL REPORT**

1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1. SITUATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.2. CURRENT U.S. EFFORTS

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Current efforts have fallen short of achieving the United States' intermediate policy objectives of:

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.3. CORE REGIONAL INITIATIVES

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.4. POSSIBLE APPROACHES

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.5. RISKS AND CONCLUSIONS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT -
SECTION ONE

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS - SECTION THREE



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ STRATEGIC GOALS FOR IRAN

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


5.4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Intermediate Objectives (5 years)

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5.5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Near-Term Objectives (18 months)

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LINES OF EFFORT



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


8. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ GRAPHIC: PLAN OVERVIEW

8.0. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Figure 1: Possible Approaches Overview Graphic



8.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ APPROACH #1: BALANCED REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT


8.1.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Figure 2: Approach #1: Balanced Regional Engagement Graphic



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

8.2. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) APPROACH #2: MEASURED ISOLATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Figure 3: Approach #2: Measured Isolation Graphic



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

8.3. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) APPROACH # 3: ISOLATE AND COERCE

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Figure 4: Approach #3: Isolate and Coerce Graphic



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

9. (U) RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

10. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) RISK AND MITIGATION

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

11. (U) ORGANIZATION ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS (THIS SECTION NOT USED)

12. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) CONCLUSIONS – SECTION FIVE

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

13. (U) REFERENCE LIST

(U) LIST OF AGENCIES/INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

The Team consulted a wide range of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in order to gain broader insights and varying opinions. The following individuals were consulted:

- AMB Thomas Pickering – Hills & Co.
- Dr. Vali Nasr – Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School Tufts University
- Mr. Karim Sadjadpour – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Dr. Michael Rubin – American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
- Dr. Frederick Kagan – American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
- Dr. Kimberly Kagan – Institute for the Study of War
- Mr. Mehdi Khalaji – Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Dr. David Asher – Heritage Foundation
- Ret. Marine Col. T.X. Hammes – Center for American Progress
- AMB John Limbert – U.S. Naval Academy
- Dr. Ken Pollack – The Brookings Institution
- AMB Laura Kennedy – U.S. National War College
- Mr. Terry Moran – SAIC
- Ret. Army COL W. Patrick Lang

In addition to the meetings with the academic community, the Iran Team received briefings from:

- U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff, as well as additional country/region experts
- U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Terrorism Finance
- Representatives from the U.S. Intelligence Community

Additional feedback was provided by representatives from the Chairman's Action Group (CAG), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), USEUCOM, USCENTCOM/J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Defense University, and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

In Qatar, the Team conducted a SVTC with the British Ambassador in Tehran (Sir Geoffrey Adams), and held a roundtable with British Embassy staff in Doha.

Disclaimer: This document solely represents the Team's efforts and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of any individuals or the organizations/departments consulted.

(U) LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

The CAT Iran Team consulted a wide range of USG Documents including the following:

- National Defense Strategy dated Jun 08
- CJCS Guidance 2008-9
- USCENTCOM Theatre Plan dated 11 Jun 08
- USCENTCOM Theatre Campaign Plan dated Oct 08
- Department of State Strategic Plan 2007-12

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14. (U) LIST OF ANNEXES & APPENDICES

<u>ANNEX A:</u>	IRAN SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT.....	PG. 57
<u>APPENDIX 1:</u>	IRAN MILITARY ANNEX.....	PG. 77
<u>APPENDIX 2:</u>	IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ.....	PG. 79
<u>APPENDIX 3:</u>	LEGAL, BUDGETARY, AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.....	PG. 81
<u>ANNEX B:</u>	IRANIAN COURSES OF ACTION (ICOAS) ANALYSIS.....	PG. 83

<u>ANNEX C:</u>	RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION.....	PG. 85
<u>ANNEX D:</u>	OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN.....	PG. 90
<u>ANNEX E:</u>	RISKS OF AN ISRAELI STRIKE.....	PG. 93
<u>ANNEX F:</u>	LIST OF ACTIVITIES BY APPROACH.....	PG. 96
<u>ANNEX G:</u>	METRICS.....	PG.112
<u>ANNEX H:</u>	COUNTERING MALIGN IRANIAN INFLUENCE (CMII).....	PG.116
<u>ANNEX I:</u>	U.S.-IRAN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS.....	PG.128
<u>ANNEX J:</u>	ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC TOOLSET.....	PG.135
<u>ANNEX K:</u>	ANALYSIS OF THE IRANIAN STRATEGIC TOOLSET.....	PG.146
<u>ANNEX L:</u>	KEY RESOURCES AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.....	PG.150

ANNEX A TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

IRAN SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

The Troubled U.S.-Iran Relationship

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Iran's Broad Objectives

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

² Harold Lee Wise, *Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp. 188-218.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

³ U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Country Analysis Briefs," October 2007
(<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/background.html>).

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

⁵ Petroleum Minister Gholam Hussein Nozari, "Update 1 – Iran budget to be based on oil price of \$37.50," Reuters, 4 January 2009.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

⁶ Arang Keshavarzian, *Bazaar and State in Iran*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

⁷ Najmeh Bozorgmehr, "Move to the Euro Haunts Ahmadi-Nejad," *Financial Times*, 29 December 2008.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A – IRAN SITUATION ASSESSMENT:

OVERVIEW OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY

(U) The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the final word on Iran’s domestic, foreign, and security policies. He determines and supervises the implementation of policies in consultation with the Council for the Discernment of Expediency. As the final decision maker on policy, he can settle differences and coordinate relations between the various branches of the government. The Supreme Leader appoints officials to key positions, approves the holding of referenda, and as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the armed forces, he can declare war.

(U) The Supreme Council of National Security (SCNS) determines and coordinates defense and security policy initiatives to counter domestic and foreign threats. The SCNS is chaired by President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad. Said Jalili is the Supreme Leaders representative, but the Supreme Leader must approve its decisions.

(U) The primary role of the military in Iran’s overall foreign and national security strategy is not to project power, though it can do so to a limited extent. Rather the military is primarily defensive and exists to guard against repercussions of Iran’s efforts elsewhere. Iran’s defense is built around three “pillars” of deterrence, its ballistic missile force, its ability to interdict strategic

waterways off its coasts, and sponsorship of terrorism. Ultimately, Iran deters through its large ground forces and militia; Iran believes the high potential for casualties that any aggressor would incur fighting its ground forces serve as a deterrent.

(U) The regular armed forces are responsible primarily for protecting the territorial integrity of the country and the IRGC is charged with safeguarding the Islamic Revolution. The IRGC and regular armed forces use a mix of older U.S. and Soviet-era equipment and newer Russian, Chinese, or North Korean ground, naval, air, air defense, and ballistic missile systems, as well as indigenously produced equipment such as small arms, artillery, and equipment built under license or assembled in Iran, such as armored vehicles and cruise missiles.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Supreme Leader Khamenei gave Interior Minister Sadeq Mahsuli control of the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in December 2008. The LEF is estimated to have as many as 200,000 officers. The LEF performs national police functions, such as border control, coast guard and counternarcotics duties, and serves as the first response to riot control. The Supreme Leader appoints the Commander and many units include officers who previously served in the IRGC. The IRGC typically supports the LEF as needed.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A – IRAN SITUATION ASSESSMENT:

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A – IRAN SITUATION ASSESSMENT:

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) LEGAL, BUDGETARY, AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


ANNEX B TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX C TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION**



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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX D TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Engagement	Deterrence and Presence	Building International Consensus
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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX E TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX F TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LIST OF ACTIVITIES BY APPROACH

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5.



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES FOR APPROACH #2: MEASURED ISOLATION

1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Engagement

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES FOR APPROACH #3: ISOLATE AND COERCE

1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Engagement

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX G TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ METRICS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Near-Term Objectives (18 months)

Objective

Metric

Proposed Lead

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Intermediate Objectives (5 years)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX H TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Campaign Objectives

5-Year:


- -
 -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

18-Month:

- -
 -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Concept of the Operation

Figure 6: CMII Concept of Operation Graphic



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Key Sub-Tasks:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **LOE 8. Targeted Development**

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX I TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX J TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC TOOLSET

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX K TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX L TO IRAN SUB-REGIONAL REPORT:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Global Ambitions

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

