

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



Central Asia States Sub-Regional Report

February 2009

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Reason: ~~1.4a,c,d,e~~

~~Declassify on: 15 February 2034~~

Central Asian States Sub-Regional Report
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1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (U) PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **PURPOSE:** This report was completed by the U.S. Central Command's Assessment Team (CAT) over a 100 day period from November 2008 to February 2009. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, a review of existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations and suggested actions for U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in the context of an illustrative report for the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of coalition partners in time, space and purpose to achieve policy goals.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ **METHODOLOGY:** This report was developed in the format of a draft illustrative plan in order to impose sufficient rigor in analysis and recommendations. By providing a comprehensive, civilian-military context for USCENTCOM, this report is intended to mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short term solutions to long term problems.

(U) Disclaimer: This document does not represent the official position of U.S. Central Command, the Department of Defense or any other agency of the United States Government.

3. (U) SUMMARY OF SITUATION ASSESSMENT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Key Trends.



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Risks.

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Opportunities.

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. (U) STRATEGIC GOALS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Long-Term Strategic Goal (10 years).

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Intermediate Strategic Goal (5 years). A region that is able to provide better

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Intermediate Subordinate Goals (5 Years)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Near-term Strategic Goal (18 months).

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Near-term Subordinate Goals (18 Months)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. (U) OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. (U) LINES OF EFFORT

(U) INTERMEDIATE TERM (5 Years)

- NDN that supports U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan and as an economic and developmental benefit to the CAS

- U.S., Russian and Chinese bilateral cooperative relations established based on mutual cross-cutting interests in Afghanistan and the CAS including:
 - Expansion of the NDN outside of the CAS.
 - Intelligence/Information sharing
 - Humanitarian Assistance and disaster preparedness
 - Crisis/Consequence Management
 - VEOs, Counter Terrorism and Counter Narcotics
 - Long-term presence by USCENTCOM in the region
- Regional governments and local populations that are supportive or at a minimum better informed on U.S. and international partners policy and goals for individual CAS and the region.
- Bilateral security cooperation programs focused on building the capabilities and capacities of regional security forces to counter VEOs, insurgencies and narco-traffickers

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LINES OF EFFORT

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ KEY TASKS

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TASK IMPLEMENTATION

- Diplomatic. DoD, DoS, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM and USPACOM senior leaders and POLADs.

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ NEAR TERM (18 Months)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ LINES OF EFFORT

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ KEY TASKS

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TASK IMPLEMENTATION

- Diplomatic. DoD, DoS, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM and USPACOM senior leaders and POLADs.

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED (Common to both Intermediate and Near Term)

- Diplomatic.

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

8. (U) GRAPHIC: PLAN OVERVIEW (This Section Not Included)

9. (U) RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Current Resources

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Constraints and Actions Required

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

10. (U) RISK AND MITIGATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

11. (U) ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

12. (U) CONCLUSIONS

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ The following are the major conclusions of this analysis:

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

13. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS (This Section Not Used).

14. (U) REFERENCE LIST

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

15. ANNEXES

- ANNEX A: SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT
- ANNEX B: DEFENSE AND SECURITY COOPERATION
- ANNEX C: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

ANNEX A: SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

1. (U) STRATEGIC CONTEXT

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.1 (U) U.S. and Allied Interests and Values Relating to Central Asia

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) U.S. Interests¹

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

¹ Derived from U.S. policy statements and briefings.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.2 (U) Recent Events and Historical Context

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Significant Recent Events

Four particularly significant events affecting the geopolitical situation of the region in the past few decades have been:

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.3 (U) The Nature of the Environment

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Summarizing the Nature of the Environment

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1 (U) CURRENT USG POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES²

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ U.S. Policy Interests

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

² Derived from CAT Interview of NSC staff, U.S. State Department Briefings, U.S. State Department Mission Strategic Plans, U.S. Central Command Planning Document.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ U.S. Strategic Goals

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
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2.2 (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Identify Current International Policies and Activities

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

³ Derived from organizations' official websites.

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3 (U) Identify Current Host Nations' Policies and Activities

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4 (U) Assessment of USG, International and Host Nations' Policies and Activities

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.5 (U) Major Risks and Opportunities

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Risks - Short Term (18 Months)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Mid-Term (18 Months – 5 Years)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Risks – Long Term (5-25 Years)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Opportunities

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.6 (U) Critical Gaps in Knowledge and Intelligence

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.7 (U) Preliminary Recommendations

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Key Observations

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Recommendations

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
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.1 (U) Advantages and Disadvantages in Shifting Course

(U) Engagement of Regional Governments and Neighboring Powers Directly and/or through Regional Cooperation Fora


(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Increasing Humanitarian Assistance to Countries at Risk



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Cooperation on intelligence sharing



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Disconnects between Policy/Planning/Assumptions

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) How Are Other Actors to Respond to Shifts in U.S. Strategy?

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.2 (U) Legal, Budgetary, Political and Resource Constraints

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX B: DEFENSE AND SECURITY COOPERATION

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.0 (U) KAZAKHSTAN

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) KYRGYZSTAN

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.2 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RECOMMENDATIONS.

- Near Term (18 months)


(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. (U) TAJIKISTAN



4.2 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RECOMMENDATIONS

- Near Term (18 months)



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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- Intermediate Term (5 Years)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. (U) TURKMENISTAN

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5.2 (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) RECOMMENDATION.

- Near Term (18 months)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

• Intermediate Term (5 Years)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. (U) UZBEKISTAN

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6.2 (U) RECOMMENDATIONS

- Near Term (18 months)
 - Uzbek component of the NDN is fully operational

- DoD senior leader engagement with Uzbek Ministry of Defense, Border Service and possibly Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Security Service (SNB) on mutual Counter Terrorism, Counter Insurgency and Counter Narcotics interests
 - At a minimum, re-constitute the ARCENT NCO Academy and English Language programs, LANG partnership and Special Operations training programs
 - Humanitarian Civic Action assessment conducted and short duration/high impact projects identified and executed. The intent is to focus on the Fergana Valley region, the tri-border area IVO Termez or Bukhara.
 - Visits by senior level Uzbek officers and non-commissioned officers to U.S. training and operational military bases and professional development programs
 - Strategic Communications assessment conducted and initial plan developed to employ Uzbek media forums that reinforce positive Uzbek/U.S. relationship with an additional emphasis on the positive economic impact provided by the NDN
- Intermediate Term (5 Years)
 - Consistent MIL-MIL and POL-MIL engagements between key U.S. DoD, DoS and other U.S. governmental departments or agencies conducted
 - Coordinated and synchronized DoD Humanitarian Civic Action and DoS (AMEMB) USAID program for small, medium and large impact programs in remote areas of Uzbekistan.

ANNEX C: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

1. (U) BACKGROUND

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (U) STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS GOALS

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Central Asian elites and general public have a positive view of the United States and benefits of cooperation with it.

2.1 Lines of Effort

- **Coordination**

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- Messaging

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- Engagement

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)