

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

U.S. Central Command Assessment Team



Arabian Peninsula Sub-Regional Report

February 2009

Classified by: Maj Gen Robert R. Allardice,
Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, USCENTCOM
Reason: ~~1.4.a.d.e~~
Declassify on: 15 February 2034

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

**ARABIAN PENINSULA SUB-REGIONAL REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
2. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY	5
3. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT	6
4. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS	9
5. STRATEGIC GOALS	9
6. OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION	11
7. LINES OF EFFORT	14
8. GRAPHIC: PLAN OVERVIEW	16
9. RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION.....	21
10. RISKS AND MITIGATION.....	23
11. ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.....	24
12. REFERENCE LIST	26
13. ANNEXES.....	28
ANNEX A: SITUATION ASSESSMENT.....	29
ANNEX B: DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL LINE OF EFFORT.....	61
ANNEX C1: SOCIO-ECONOMIC LINE OF EFFORT – THE GULF.....	68
ANNEX C2: SOCIO-ECONOMIC LINE OF EFFORT – YEMEN.....	74
ANNEX D: SECURITY LINE OF EFFORT	83
ANNEX E: MILITARY LINE OF EFFORT	91
ANNEX F: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION LINE OF EFFORT	98

ARABIAN PENINSULA SUB-REGIONAL REPORT

1. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The Arabian Peninsula (AP) comprises seven states, including six Gulf states plus Yemen. The AP, excepting Yemen, is the sole area of relative economic prosperity and political stability in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility (USCENTCOM AOR). The sub-region has substantial potential to affect positively U.S. and allied interests. Conversely, it could also become an area of economic crisis, extremist infection, and political turmoil. This report will address three critical challenges facing the United States:

- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

(U) This report was completed by the U.S. Central Command's Assessment Team over a 100 day period from November 2008 to February 2009. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the USCENTCOM area of interest, a review of existing strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and suggested actions for U.S. Central Command in the context of an illustrative plan for the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of coalition partners to achieve policy goals.

(U) The Team consisted of members or retirees from across civilian and military agencies/departments of the U.S. Government (i.e., USCENTCOM, DoS, Treasury, and CIA). It also included a member from academia and from the UK MOD. It drew on intelligence analysis,

existing U.S. and Coalition plans and policy guidance, relevant reports and studies (see paragraph 12 for a full list of reference and source materials), the expertise of its members, the broader U.S. Government community, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and academic institutions, and consultations throughout the region, including with Country Teams, bilateral partners, local actors, and international and nongovernmental organizations (see Section 12 for a full list of consultations).

(U) This report was developed in the format of a draft illustrative plan in order to impose sufficient rigor in analysis and recommendations. By providing a comprehensive, civilian-military context for U.S. Central Command, this report is intended to mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short-term solutions to long-term problems.

(U) Disclaimer: This document does not represent the official position of U.S. Central Command, the Department of Defense or any other agency of the United States Government.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION ASSESSMENT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ This report assumes the following:

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ The global economy will remain in serious recession for a least a year and possibly longer.
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

5. STRATEGIC GOALS

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Enduring Interests and Values. (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Overall Long-term Strategic Goal (10 years). (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Intermediate Strategic Goal (5 years). (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Near-term Strategic Goal (18 month). (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

6. OVERALL CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

7. LINES OF EFFORT

LONG TERM (10 years)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) To underpin this overall strategic goal, the following subordinate line of effort goals have been identified:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Diplomatic and Political: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-economic: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-economic: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Security: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Military: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

INTERMEDIATE (5 years)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Diplomatic and Political: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-economic: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-economic: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Security: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Military: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Strat Com (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Near-Term (18 months)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Diplomatic and Political: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-economic: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-economic: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Security: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Military: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Strat Com: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

8. GRAPHIC: PLAN OVERVIEW


Diplomatic-Political



Pages 17 through 20 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Strategic Communication



9. RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Additional Resources Required

Activity

Lead Agency

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)	
------------------------------------	--

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Additional Authorities Required:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

10. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ RISKS AND MITIGATION

Risk	Likelihood	Consequence	Mitigation
------	------------	-------------	------------

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



11. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

U.S. Central Command

Tasks – USCENTCOM	Deadline	USCENTCOM Entity with Action
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)		

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

Agency/Department/Actor

Recommended Tasks – Other USG	Deadline	Suggested USG Agency/Department
<p>(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)</p>		

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

12. REFERENCE LIST

- Al Ismaily, Salem Ben Nqsser, Karabegovic, Amela, and McMahon, Fred. Economic Freedom of the Arab World: 2008 Annual Report. The Fraser Institute, 2008
- Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations. United Nations Development Program, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, <http://arabstates/undp.org/>, accessed 27 January 2009
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Fact Sheet: U.S. Actors Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, <http://www.CarnegieEndowment.org>, accessed 26 January 2009

Page 28 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

13. ANNEXES

- ANNEX A: Situation Assessment**
- ANNEX B: Diplomatic and Political Line of Effort**
- ANNEX C1: Socio-economic Line of Effort – The Gulf**
- ANNEX C2: Socio-economic Line of Effort – Yemen**
- ANNEX D: Security Line of Effort**
- ANNEX E: Military Line of Effort**
- ANNEX F: Strategic Communication Line of Effort**

ANNEX A: SITUATION ASSESSMENT

1. (U) Strategic Context

1.1. (U) *The United States and Allied Interests and Values Relating to the Country and Region*

1.1.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

[(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]
- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]
- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]
- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]
- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]
- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]
- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]
- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]
- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

1.1.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

1.2. (U) *Recent Developments and Historical Context*

1.2.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

[(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.2.2. (U) For most of the 20th century, the UK had special political relationships with Kuwait, the Trucial States (later the UAE), Bahrain, Oman and Aden. Many of those relationships loosened after the UK announced its withdrawal from east of Suez in 1967. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman also have had long-standing close relations with the United States dating back more than 50 years. Iran has for centuries incited Arab, Sunni Gulf states' suspicion and fear of Persian, Shia intentions to dominate the region.

1.2.3. (U) Yemen, in contrast to the Gulf states, is a nation characterized by intense poverty and severe structural limits to sustainable economic growth. It is a fragile state in which the central government exercises limited control over territory, particularly in the northern tribal regions. Yemen's modern history is rife with internal conflict. In North Yemen, the republican revolution of 1962 overthrew the Zaydi Imamate, ending centuries of Islamic rule. In the South, Soviet influence embedded itself in the newly created People's Democratic Republic of Yemen upon British withdrawal from Aden in 1967. The two Yemens, North and South, were united in the 1990, initiating a period of democratic opening. Immediately following unification, the new republic was crippled by the return of nearly one million Yemeni expatriate laborers. These workers were expelled from the Gulf following Yemen's decision to support Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. In 1994, the brief period of power sharing and democratization ended abruptly. The former northern and southern regimes fought a brief civil war, in which the north, led by Ali Abdullah Saleh, defeated the south. Today the country continues to suffer from internal strife, decentralized political legitimacy, underdevelopment and corruption. A tribal rebellion in the north near the Saudi border percolates along as a vestige of the historic Imamate. In the south, latent tensions connected to unity and the civil war fester as southerners protest political and economic marginalization. Adding to domestic instability, AQ is increasingly a threat. In 2000, AQ operatives attacked the USS Cole and since then the organization has launched attacks against both domestic and foreign targets in Yemen. Relations with Saudi improved in 2000 as a result of a border demarcation treaty; however, the treaty served to irritate northern tribes.

1.2.4. (U) Significant events in 1979 marked the beginning of the growth of today's threats from violent extremists throughout the region and the world, including the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, which shook the Saudi ruling establishment; the Iranian revolution, launching its campaign to spread the power and influence of Shiism and of Iran itself; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which encouraged the rise of various Sunni mujahideen groups. Iran's

revolution gave rise to an increasingly aggressive drive for regional and global recognition of Iran as the vanguard of Shiism. The Saudis responded with an equally fervent export of their own puritanical Salafist creed, popularly known as “Wahhabism.” This ideology is deeply embedded in the fabric of Saudi society, and derives from the 18th century “contract” between the al-Saud tribe of central Arabia and the Ibn ‘abd al-Wahhab religious leadership in that region. In that pact, each acknowledged the other’s dominance in their respective political and religious domains in Arabia which continue to this day.

1.2.5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.2.6. (U) Key events on the Peninsula include:

- 1938 Discovery of huge reserves of oil in Saudi Arabia
- 1967 UK announces withdrawal from east of the Suez Canal
- 1979 Iranian Revolution and seizure of Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia
- 1980 Beginning of Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)
- 1980s The rise of AQ as a mujahideen force against the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its focus changed in 1990 to a force opposing the ruling al-Saud family and U.S. military presence
- 1990-1 DESERT SHIELD/STORM
- 1991-2003 US and allied military operations in support of Operations Northern and Southern Watch
- 1990 Unification of Yemen and subsequent 1994 Civil War
- 1991 Expulsion of Yemeni workers from Gulf countries and closure of USAID Mission in Sana’a as a result of Yemen’s support of Iraq in Gulf War
- 1995-96 Terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Dammam, and Al Khobar against U.S. and Saudi personnel and interests
- 2000 Terrorist Attack on USS Cole in Yemeni port of Aden
- 2003 Invasion of Iraq by U.S. and Coalition forces
- 2003 Terrorist Attacks on Riyadh housing compounds
- 2007-08 Increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea

1.3. (U) *The Nature of the Environment*

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.3.2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.3.3. (U) The Gulf countries are monarchies; policy decisions on all major issues are made by the rulers themselves and a small number of immediate advisors, usually family members. The strength of our relations with these nations, our credibility in their eyes, and their willingness to attend to our requests rests in the hands of these few players alone. Some Gulf states have developed legislatures or consultative bodies, but the monarchs can overrule their recommendations and activities. Each state is taking steps to reduce corruption, provide more transparency and increase the peoples' voice in their own governance, but the effort varies widely from country to country.

1.3.4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.3.5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

1.3.6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (U) Assessment of Current Policies and Activities

2.1. (U) Identify Current USG Policies and Activities

2.1.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Promote regional security and stability*

2.1.2.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.2.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.3.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.3.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.4.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Advance a positive economic and commercial climate*

2.1.5.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Support good governance, political reform and an enhanced mutual understanding*

2.1.6.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.7. (U) *USG policies and activities in Yemen*

2.1.7.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.7.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.7.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.1.7.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2 (U) *Identify Current International Policies and Activities*

2.2.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-
-
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
-
-

2.2.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-
-
-
-
-
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
-
-
-
-

2.2.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.7. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.8. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.9. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.10. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.11. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.2.12. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3. (U) *Current HN Policies and Activities*

2.3.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

[(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.6.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.6.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.6.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.6.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.7. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.7.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.7.2. (U) Though Bahrain was the first country on the Arabian Peninsula to discover oil, its reserves are the smallest. Consequently, Bahrain was the first GCC country to begin to diversify its economy. It built an aluminum smelter in the 1970s, Alba, which was recently expanded to become the largest in the world, and has developed several downstream industries, such as the manufacture of cans and venetian blinds. Bahrain also became the major financial center for the Middle East, as many of the banks and other financial institutions fled the Lebanese civil war and set up in Bahrain in the 1980s and 90s. Though it has been surpassed recently by Dubai, and even Qatar, Bahrain remains a major center for Islamic banking. It has a strong tourism industry, especially in conference tourism, which employs close to 20% of the labor force and contributes roughly 15% to GDP. In the late 1990s, Bahrain began to open its economy and now has the most liberal economic regulatory infrastructure in the USCENTCOM AOR. It negotiated an FTA with the United States that went into effect in 2006 to attract more outside investment.

Nevertheless, Bahrain's economy remains predominantly hydrocarbon based, petroleum production and refining still account for 60% of Bahrain's export revenues and 70% of government revenues, and unemployment (estimated at 15% in 2005) continues to be a long-term challenge.

2.3.8. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.8.1 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~_____~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.8.3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.8.4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.8.5. (U) A Note on Succession in Yemen:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Critical Risk:

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.8.6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5) :

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.9. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.9.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.9.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.9.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.9.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.9.5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.9.6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.10. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.10.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.10.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.10.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.10.4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.11. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.11.1. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.11.2. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.11.3. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.12. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.12.1. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.12.3. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

[(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.12.4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.3.12.5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4. (U) *Assessment of USG, International, and HN Policies and Activities*

2.4.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
-
-
-
-

2.4.2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
-
-
-
-

2.4.3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.4 (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.6.1 (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.7. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Promote regional security and stability.*

2.4.7.1 (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Strengths.*

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
-

2.4.7.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Weaknesses.*

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
-
-
-
-
-
-

2.4.8. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Maintain strategic access to the region and its natural resources.*

2.4.8.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Strengths.*

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.8.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Weaknesses.*

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
-

2.4.9. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Counter- terrorism and counter-proliferation of WMD.*

2.4.9.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Strengths.*

- -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.9.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Weaknesses.*

- -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.10. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Advance a positive economic and commercial climate.*

2.4.10.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Strengths.*

- -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.10.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Weaknesses.*

- -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.4.11. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Support good governance, political reform and an enhanced mutual understanding.*

2.4.11.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Strengths.*

- -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.5.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The following *opportunities* have been identified:

- -
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Critical Intelligence Requirements*

2.6.1 (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The following areas have been identified as critical gaps:

-
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2.6.2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Advantages/Disadvantages in Shifting Course and Constraints on Policy

3.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Advantages and Disadvantages to Shifting Course

3.1.1. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Value in shifting U.S. strategy within the Arabian Peninsula

[Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.1.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Political will to support increased resource commitment in the Arabian Peninsula*

3.1.2.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Domestic support to expand relationships in the Arabian Peninsula*

- -
 -
 -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.1.2.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *International support to resource commitments in the Arabian Peninsula*

- -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.1.3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Key disconnects in policy/planning/assumptions that need to be overcome to shift strategy.*

- -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Legal, Budgetary, Political, and Resource Constraints*

3.2.1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Domestic and international constraints on U.S. freedom of*

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.2.2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) *Legislative restrictions on U.S. or other external actors' actions in the Arabian Peninsula*

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3.2.3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ *Support from U.S. Congress, IGO and regional organizations, and domestic and international public support*

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX B: DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL LINE OF EFFORT

1. (U) DEFINITION

(U) The Diplomatic and Political line of effort comprises those activities involving diplomacy among and between states and international organizations, as well as the political actions of governments regarding their policies and behaviors.

2. (U) ASSESSMENT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) CONCEPT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Diplomatic and Political Overall Strategic Goal (2030).

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Diplomatic and Political Intermediate Strategic Goal (2014).

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Diplomatic and Political Near-term Strategic Goal (2011).

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. (U) IMPLEMENTATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Diplomatic and Political LOE Intermediate Strategic Goal (2014):

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

○
○

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

• (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Diplomatic and Political LOE Near-term Strategic Goal (2011):

[Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
- [Redacted]

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

○ [Redacted]

○ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL T~~

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

○ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX C1: SOCIO-ECONOMIC LINE OF EFFORT – THE GULF

1. (U) DEFINITION

(U) The socio-economic line of effort comprises activities involving or targeting macro- and micro-economic factors, as well as societal paradigms and institutions (e.g., employment, education, and social alienation).

2. (U) ASSESSMENT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) CONCEPT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. (U) IMPLEMENTATION:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-economic LOE Intermediate Term (2014) Goal:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

[Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

[Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-economic LOE Near Term (2011) Goal:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)



ANNEX C2: SOCIO-ECONOMIC LINE OF EFFORT – YEMEN

1. (U) ASSESSMENT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Problem Statement: (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (U) CONCEPT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ The socio-economic line of effort aims to bolster the long-term

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) IMPLEMENTATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

•

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-
-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Socio-Economic LoE Near Term Strategic Goal (2011) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

¹² See Counterterrorism Appendix pg. 14

○

○

○

○

○

○

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) Dependencies on other lines of effort:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX D: SECURITY LINE OF EFFORT

1. (U) DEFINITION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

2. (U) ASSESSMENT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) CONCEPT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Overall Strategic Goal (2030). (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Intermediate Strategic Goal (2014). (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Near-Term Strategic Goal (2011). (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. (U) IMPLEMENTATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Security LOE Intermediate Strategic Goal (2014). (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- -
 -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Security LOE Near-Term Strategic Goal (2011).

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- -
 -
- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

ANNEX E: MILITARY LINE OF EFFORT

1. (U) DEFINITION

(U) The military line of effort comprises all aspects of military-to-military engagement including education, training, security assistance, exercises, and real-world operational and tactical coordination.

2. (U) ASSESSMENT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Endemic Constraints:

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-
-
-
-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

-
-
-
-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ U.S. Domestic Obstacles:

-

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) CONCEPT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(U) To underpin the achievement of our strategic goals, military line of effort goals have been identified for each time frame. The goals are:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

¹⁸ (CCJ5 briefing, dated 04 Feb 09).

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Intermediate Strategic Goal (2014)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Near-term Strategic Goal (2011)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. (U) IMPLEMENTATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Military LOE Intermediate Strategic Goal (2014)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Military LOE Near-term Strategic Goal (2011)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- [Redacted]

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

○

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

ANNEX F: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION LINE OF EFFORT

1. (U) DEFINITION

(U) Joint definition from JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning – 26 Dec 2006: Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

2. (U) ASSESSMENT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

3. (U) CONCEPT

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

4. (U) IMPLEMENTATION

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Strategic Communications LOE Overall strategic goal (2030)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Strategic Communications LOE Intermediate goal (2014)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

- (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)
-
-

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Measures of Effectiveness:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)


~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

•



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Measures of Effectiveness:



(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d), (b)(5)