

Tribal Dynamics in Afghanistan



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PREFACE

Afghanistan is arguably the most complex and diverse society on earth. Long labeled the “Crossroads of Asia,” history seems to illustrate serial waves of both migrations and invasions in which each successive wave of humans resulted in some of their number remaining behind. Some stayed in Afghanistan as colonists while others were left behind to secure lines of communications for armies continuing onward, but regardless of the original purpose that led these people to Afghanistan, there is now a great cultural mixture of ethnic groups and tribes separated from the unity required to form a nation-state by race, religion, and tribal animosities that go far into unrecorded history.

In this study, efforts were made to accumulate both tribal and human factors to establish a baseline that may be built upon as additional tribal knowledge and insights are accumulated through interaction with the people of Afghanistan. Naturally, this study’s essential focus is upon southern Afghanistan and Helmand Province, in particular. Each section that follows has parallel information in the classified holdings of several governments and the study has reference material derived from open sources at the end of each study. Citations to referenced material are also included for the use of interested analysts planning to take this basic research further.

A large section related to cultural terminology within Pashtunwali is included in the study’s appendix. This material was derived from the work of an unknown author who kindly posted this material on the internet. Obviously, this researcher’s language was other than English and is difficult to read, in some cases, in spite of efforts to edit the material.

Additionally, insurgencies generally end in some form of reconciliation and several general case studies related to attempted reconciliation are also included in the study. The current Afghan civil war will also end in some form of reconciliation and these case studies contain “single points of failure” that may assist in avoiding pitfalls as similar efforts are considered.

Finally, this is only a starting point in the study of southern Afghanistan’s tribes. The process will be greatly enhanced if future field reporting included the following information on each village and key indigenous personality included: name, tribe, sub-tribe, and location. For example, “Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (Alizai, Pirzai),” tells analysts a great deal of information that will gradually allow a better picture to be assembled on Afghanistan.

This is a product of Courage Services, Inc. Comments and feedback are encouraged and may be directed to Bill Pratt (bill_pratt@courageservices.com), Tom Flint (tom_flint@courageservices.com), or Dave Phillips (dave_phillips@courageservices.com).



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Given the fact that Afghanistan is probably the most complicated society on earth, efforts have been made in this study to provide examples of both key tribal and human factors that may have been observed in other tribally-based cultures but have great significance in stability operations in Afghanistan. Special efforts were made to focus the study on conditions found in Helmand Province or those factors observed elsewhere that may be applied by British forces engaged in operations in southern Afghanistan. Some of the illustrated factors are seen only in Pashtun areas.

The case study on the Arbakai, for example, illustrates the use of traditional Pashtun culture that provides a form of armed “neighborhood watch” under the control of tribal elders. Normally, the Arbakai serve as a “tripwire” and attacks against them can result in the elders calling for the creation of a Lashkar, or tribal militia, that reacts against the threat to the Arbakai. The development of this form of self-defense at the village level may effectively deny access to food and safe haven in many Pashtun villages without causing political concerns over the potential emergence of “warlords.”

Historically, larger and wealthier tribes were more powerful and managed to occupy the best land as their smaller, weaker cousins were forced into less productive territory where their existence is marginal. This condition is seen in nearly all the world’s tribal areas and smaller tribes seldom gain adequate redressing of their grievances as central governments form in newly emerging nation-states. As a result, smaller tribes often support insurgents against the national governments where they lack representation. This is the case of some of the smaller Durrani and Ghilzai tribes of Afghanistan and a case study related to the development and creation of key leaders in the Durrani Ishaqzai tribe is provided as an example of what is possible in a tribal stabilization effort.

History also provides advice for managing current problems with Pashtun tribes. They live in a society in which their history and extended genealogies are memorized and recited by tribal story-tellers – as well as a culture in which their views of their tribal victories and losses may result in history repeating itself. Key indigenous leaders were recently closely connected to one another as they fought the Soviet army and Afghanistan’s communists. A study of leaders separated by tribal differences who could find common ground because they both fought together in Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-i Islami is included. While this material concerns an Alizai and a Popalzai leader, the study may be applied to any of the “traditional” political parties, or those seeking to return Afghanistan to the form of government experienced prior to 1973.

Each of the Pashtun tribes has a “tribal character” that is not unlike the “national character” observed in modern nation-states. Individual tribes are motivated by different factors and even groups of tribes, called *confederations* in the literature, react differently under unique circumstances. Animosity between the Durrani and Ghilzai confederations has been the source of much of Afghanistan’s violence



over the past several centuries and a study on the Kakar tribe is included to illustrate how ancient animosities and jealousy can be used by unscrupulous leaders to rally large numbers of supporters toward a common goal, such as regaining lost glory when the Kakar tribe dominated Afghanistan.

The Durrani Confederation's long-term competition with their Ghilzai cousins began with the creation of the Afghan state when Ahmad Shah Durrani, a Popalzai tribesman, replaced the Ghilzai Hotak leading family. Afghanistan's history appears to be repeating itself as Popalzai Hamid Karzai is opposed by Hotak Mullah Mohammad Omar. A study is included that illustrates this animosity that has resulted in Ghilzai leaders deposing Mohammad Daoud, the last Durrani, and leading Afghanistan into a civil war that has lasted 30 years as Ghilzai leaders Taraki, Amin, Karmal, and Najibullah adopted communism as a political ideology in an effort to dominate the Durrani. Ghilzai fundamentalists such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Mullah Mohammad Omar replaced the communists while having the same goal.

Underlying tribal animosities are combined with equally powerful religious differences that are deeply imbedded within Afghanistan's culture. Many Afghans quickly adopted Sufism taught to them by Sufi missionaries who explained a religious belief that closely resembled the mysticism of their previous Shamanism. Many Afghans are Hanafi Muslims, but there is a subtle Sufi influence that is commonly found in them. There are fundamentalist Salafist/Wahabbi Muslims in northeastern Afghanistan's population that were converted to Islam in the early 20th Century and this dual approach to Islam had a more permanent impact in the development of political parties that fought the anti-Soviet Jihad. "Traditionalist" parties seeking to return to a "pre-1973" form of governance were generally outmaneuvered by the "Revolutionary" parties that planned to establish an entirely new form of government under Sharia law and this led to civil war following the Soviet withdrawal and the defeat of Najibullah's communists.

Tribal unity is a powerful tool in Afghanistan's seemingly endless conflicts and the Taliban recognize this factor. Increasingly, there seems to be an effort underway by the insurgents to split their primary opponent, the Durrani Confederation. There is a study that shows how the Durrani's two divisions, the Zirak and Panjpai groups, are composed of large, powerful tribes in the Zirak group while the Panjpai are composed of smaller, weaker tribes that have been restricted, historically, to poorer land. The study shows that the Panjpai tribes, particularly the Ishaqzai, Noorzai, and Alizai, may be better represented in the Taliban Movement than they are within the current government of Afghanistan.

The Taliban Movement is far from being unified and it appears that the insurgents are divided into three separate groups, North, Central, and South. Control of the North and Central groups appears to come from Peshawar while the dominant group is located in the South and is managed from Quetta. There are substantial differences within the groups, especially their connections to al-Qa'ida's Arabs and Egyptian militants. Recognizing the existence of separate Taliban elements is important as plans are made to combat this extremist movement.

In addition to key tribal factors, there are significant human factors that are important to understand as efforts are made to stabilize Afghanistan, particularly its rural areas. Individual case studies on



difference subjects were prepared to illustrate the different ways Pashtuns respond to significant local leaders, especially during troublesome periods. Basically a feudal society, rural Pashtuns respond to their leaders much as medieval vassals responded to their barons. The “Strategic Center of Gravity” for the Taliban is the rural population of Afghanistan. Ironically, this is also the strategic center of gravity for the Coalition. Understanding the population is vital if this critical element is to be drawn away from their traditional support for the insurgent.

Included in this final section is a large series of case studies involving attempts to develop reconciliation programs during the last seven years. Mistake after mistake has been made as opportunities were lost and basic levels of trust failed to develop that could lead to a general reconciliation of insurgents that will be necessary to end the fighting. The existence of “black lists” – rumored or fact – has created an environment in which few Taliban leaders would risk a reconciliation attempt that could lead to arrest and trial. The case studies were drawn from open source material and are referenced for additional research by analysts working on this critical phase of ending the Taliban insurgency.

Finally, appendices are included that are intended to help analysts understand this extremely complex society.



KEY TRIBAL FACTORS



Implementing an Arbakai System in Pashtun Areas

Background

Traditional Pashtun security systems are frequently misunderstood by westerners and in the case of the Arbakai, this lack of knowledge is becoming very apparent. Described as “militia” and feared as something that could return Afghanistan to “warlordism,” Arbakai are neither. These are generally better viewed as “an armed neighborhood watch” under the control of village elders rather than a tribal chief. Arbakai are probably more common in eastern Afghanistan than in Pashtun areas in the south, but all Pashtuns are aware of the Arbakai system.

Naturally, Arbakai are tribal-based and will operate only in their tribal areas. Crossing Arbakai from one tribe into the territory of another could lead to violence. The Arbakai function best in rural areas and in homogenous villages. Larger towns are generally populated by several different tribes and Arbakai systems instituted in semi-urban areas would not be effective. They are, however, needed in the rural areas where the Taliban have freedom of movement and safe havens.

Criticism that the creation of an Arbakai system will undercut the United Nations’ DDR program is unfounded. The DDR efforts disarmed militias supporting provincial and national governments in rural areas while the anti-coalition militias retained all of their weapons. Second, the suggestion that only professionally trained police officers should be used is also less than reasonable as a criticism. This is the seventh year of stability operations in Afghanistan and the United Nations, United States, and Coalition forces have failed in historic proportions to recruit, train, and deploy substantial numbers of trained, honest police officers.

The suggestion that Arbakai will fall under the control of warlords is also unlikely to occur. Warlords are generally tribal leaders with their own supporters – well-armed militias – who are generally dominated by coalition forces present to ensure that “warlordism” does not return as a stability factor. Their power will decrease naturally as local security increases.

Arbakai can be utilized as a stopgap measure to fill the security void within rural areas until sufficient numbers of police can be deployed. Coalition advisory groups can be created to provide direct payment of salaries, an excellent control factor, and to coordinate the activities of adjacent Arbakai elements. The Arbakai of one village could serve as a reaction force for another village under attack, for example. Air and artillery support could also be managed by the advisory groups.

Finally, the criticism in the press regarding militia suggests that the Hmong tribes of Laos were less than successful as a “militia.” The Hmong units were actually light infantry guerrillas deployed against regular North Vietnamese army units, not insurgents such as the Taliban. The comparison is unreasonable and incorrect.



Analysis

- The DDR program disarmed large numbers of pro-government militias in southern Afghanistan and replaced them with inadequate numbers of Afghan National Army companies and trained police units. Vocational training and jobs programs were not successful or were not implemented. Disarmed militia troops were not reintegrated successfully into civil society.
- Warlords are a reality in failed states where they provide basic levels of security for their “vassals”. This is as natural in tribal areas of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq as it was under similar circumstances in Europe during the unstable Dark Ages following the collapse of security provided by Rome. As security improves, warlords will return naturally to their more ceremonial tribal chief roles.
- The Afghan National Auxiliary Police Force failed, probably because of the consistent effort by coalition politicians to “homogenize” military and security units. Generally, ethnically mixed units are not effective, lead to corruption, and lack any tribal controls that would be found within Arbakai. *The American “Indian Police” that served on reservations within their own tribes is a far better model to use as an example.* Arbakai raised by tribal elders through traditional jirgas and operating within their own tribes is far better than any “centralized” national police force designed to function under national government control within tribal territory.
- Arbakai are backed by the tribal “lashkar,” an organization that IS a tribal militia. If the Arbakai are challenged by a force outnumbering them, the elders can call for an emergency force, generally mobilizing one armed man from each family. This can be a substantial force led by their own tribal leaders and it is unlikely that the Taliban would risk creating a tribal lashkar by challenging Arbakai.
- American criticism that Britain’s decision to create tribal Arbakai elements shows that the British don’t understand counterinsurgency is incorrect. Just the opposite is true. American military forces, excluding U.S. Special Forces, have entered into a seventh year of failure to comprehend insurgency as they have consistently used conventional military forces in essentially a police role. Arbakai are a good first step toward the creation of traditional tribal forces that can help stabilize rural Pashtun areas, enforce jirga decisions regarding the denial of safe havens for insurgents, and expand or contract according to local security requirements until professional security forces become available.
- The presence of professional military advisors with larger Arbakai units could result in air support, artillery, and powerful military responses whenever an Arbakai element is in contact with Taliban forces.

Opportunity

The creation of an Arbakai system – by any name – that is locally controlled by village elders may be an effective counter to Taliban incursions into contested territory. In order to be effective, Arbakai elements need to be composed of members of the same tribe, ideally the same sub-tribe that is responsible for defending the village while maintaining internal order. Arbakai village elements could be linked into a mutually supporting system in which Arbakai of one village come to the assistance of an adjacent village being threatened by the Taliban.



Parallel to the creation of Arbakai as “village defense forces,” a district-level Arbakai could be created as a “district reaction force” that could come to the aid of any village under threat or attack. District Arbakai could be alerted for two weeks duty – on call – in an English “fortnight” arrangement before being replaced by another on call group. Ideally, any group on duty at one time would be from the same sub-tribe, the “tier” within the tribal structure where cohesion and loyalty is strongest.

District Arbakai could be used as a large reaction force to come to the aid of an adjacent district under threat or attacked. This is the level at which Coalition advisory teams or American Special Forces teams could be assigned. Their role would be quasi-advisory but in “on-the-ground” reality, they would control the Arbakai unit through their “counter-parts”, the Arbakai officers they are advising. These teams would be positioned to call for air and artillery support, react personally against significant targets, and request large coalition reaction forces when large Taliban elements are engaged and their positions are fixed.

Coalition teams could retain control of the Arbakai by personally paying each Arbakai member, ensuring that each man actually receives his pay, while establishing “dominance” over the entire indigenous organization.

Warnings

First, there will be significant pressure brought to place these irregular groups under direct control of the national government. This must be resisted. Local commanders would be replaced by individuals supported by Afghan politicians who are generally always resented by local tribal authorities due to the graft and corruption that accompanies these “political appointees.” In order for any Arbakai village defense force to work, they must be viewed as being loyal to their tribe and as soon as this “bond” is broken, the Arbakai system will fall apart. Second, national-level senior military officers, generally officers with no irregular warfare experience, will object strongly to any forces they do not personally control. There will be a constant effort on the part of these senior officers to undercut the irregular formations as they are organized and deployed. Third, their complaint will center on the lack of training within the Arbakai, but Arbakai serve their purpose simply by being positioned in a village. Much like the “bait on the rat trap” scenario experienced by small Special Forces teams in Vietnam, the Arbakai may initiate contact with Taliban forces and be destroyed as a result, but, in reality, the loss of an Arbakai may result in local elders calling for a lashkar to engage the Taliban. Additionally, any Arbakai in contact with a Taliban element fixes the insurgents in a position where they may be attacked by air, artillery, or a conventional Coalition unit.

History has consistently revealed two instructive factors: first, it is nearly impossible for a conventionally trained and experienced officer to understand basic tenets of irregular warfare. Second, “where you sit determines where you stand” is a basic principle of bureaucratic politics. If these factors are considered, it is highly unlikely that Kabul-based general officers will ever support provincial and district level irregular, paramilitary programs. These two key factors are the reason six years have passed without real progress in providing security for rural populations in Afghanistan.



Historical Background

The men responsible for the enforcement and implementation of the Jirga decisions are known as Arbakai. In ancient Aryan tribes, the Arbakai led groups of warriors in wartime and maintained law and order in peacetime. Today, they take orders from a commander. They are given considerable immunity in their communities and cannot be harmed or disobeyed. Those who flout these rules are subject to the punishments set by the Arbakai organization.

[Source: www.theilf.org/ILF_cust_law_afgh_10-15.doc.]

At times of danger, beating the drum brings hundreds of armed local men running from their homes - an instant army to protect the area. It is the basis for a traditional system of village militias, known as the "arbakai," that operates in only a few provinces of the east. Speaking to the British parliament on 12 December, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said that Britain advocated a shift in strategy that would favour "hard-headed realism" and work "with the grain of Afghan tradition".

"One way forward is to increase our support for community defence initiatives, where local volunteers are recruited to defend homes and families modelled on traditional Afghan 'arbakai'," he said.

Harnessing informal militias is not a new idea in counter-insurgency. But it has a mixed history of success, not least in Afghanistan. Alongside some successful examples - such as the British use of the Firqa irregulars in Oman in the 1970s or the US forces' use of Hmong tribal militias in Vietnam - are less encouraging precedents.

At sunset in a village in Ahmadaba district of Paktia, in the shadow of snow-capped mountains, a group of local men stand with Kalashnikovs and a wary eye for their surroundings. They are the local arbakai from the Ahmadzai tribe, just 10 strong but with the power to raise a force of 250 in less than 20 minutes.

The arbakai are the police, tribal elders are the local rulers; the system as a whole is part of the ancient Afghan code of behaviour known as "Pashtunwali". "Each sub-tribe takes its turn to be arbakai and they serve 10 days at a time," said Shaista Khan Mangal, a tribal elder in the provincial capital, Gardez. "The arbakai only works in the area of its own tribe. The tribe will discipline them if they do anything wrong to the people. "They recognise the local people. That is why they are better than the national police or the army."

[Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7155500.stm]



U.S. officials fear that arbakai fighters would fall under the command of warlords disloyal to the Afghan government. Their reluctance to endorse the plan follows a disastrous international initiative to build an "auxiliary" police force, which was scrapped last year.

Auxiliary officers were given assault rifles and uniforms after just a few days of rudimentary training, on the understanding that they would be required only to police the area they came from. "The auxiliary police was an attempt to take short-cuts," said Cone, warning that there were similarities between the doomed auxiliaries and Mr Brown's arbakai plan. "It is very important to understand why the Afghan National Auxiliary Police Force did not work, as we look at any informal programme that doesn't promote professional policing," he added.

Analysts also fear the introduction of arbakai would undo years of effort by the United Nations to disarm illegal militias.

[Source: <http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,160060,00.html>.]

But analysts say the squabble is symptomatic of uncertainty over how to deal with Afghanistan, which is emerging as a more complex and nuanced battleground than Iraq, and a desire to show who is in the lead under the NATO umbrella.

The dispute has focused on Britain's proposal to use untrained neighbourhood defence teams -- known as 'arbakai' -- to help improve security in the volatile south were it operates.

In unusually frank and public criticism, U.S. officials and military commanders have said the idea will not work, could fuel fighting and that Britain doesn't understand counter-insurgency.

[Source: <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L16771258.htm>]

Here we are dealing with decades of failure and corruption. Progress has been slow. By March 2008, there will be more than 800 international police trainers, including 65 police from Britain. This must be matched with a wider effort across civil society, which we will continue to support, on judges, courts and prisons—working with the grain of Afghan traditions but within international norms. One way forward is to increase our support for community defence initiatives, where local volunteers are recruited to defend homes and families modeled on traditional Afghan arbakai."To ensure that longer term political and economic objectives are the guiding force behind the security campaign, we have brought the British civilian and military personnel together into a co-located headquarters. We will continue to strengthen their integration and at the same time we will recruit and deploy more specialists who speak the local languages and understand the tribal dynamics. "But again the Afghans themselves must be persuaded to take the lead in improving local and national government.

[Source: <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007-12-12a.233.2&s=speaker%3A13129>]



Deepening divisions within NATO over its military operations in Afghanistan emerged yesterday after Robert Gates, the US defense secretary, said America's allies did not know how to fight insurgencies.

In arguments often used by British defense officials against American military tactics, Gates told the Los Angeles Times: "I'm worried we're deploying [military advisers] that are not properly trained and I'm worried we have some military forces that don't know how to do counterinsurgency operations."

[Source: <http://www.buzzle.com/articles/172549.html>]

Much like the DDR process in Gardez, sizeable tribal militias such as the *arbakai* (tribal self-defence forces in parts of the southeast) are unlikely to be prioritised for the disarmament phase although they are the largest armed groups in the region. Their exclusion from the process would be a disincentive for others to give up their weapons and probably have serious implications for a process that essentially relies on mutual disarmament.

[Source: www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000241.doc]

The ambassador came up with the idea of tribal militias - *arbakai* - as a way to defeat the Taliban. In Afghanistan's past, when invading armies approached a town, drums were beaten to call people to oppose the enemy. The idea was that towns and villages would form their own militias to respond to such drum-beating. The idea met immediate opposition from the NATO commander, who happened to be an American.

"He [Coles] thought that the people would fight against the Taliban, but the Taliban happen to be the sons of the soil," a Western strategic analyst based in Kabul told ATol on the condition of anonymity. "The idea of arming tribal militias in Helmand is silly and will fall flat. Helmand is in the hands of anti-coalition insurgents, and we expect arrangements like *arbakai* to be a success?"

A spokesperson for the British Embassy in Kabul countered, "I think the Afghan government is completely in favor of *arbakai* and this has been successfully implemented in a few Afghan provinces."

[Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA19Df05.html]



The Alizai as a Key Tribe in South-Central Afghanistan

Background

Much of Helmand Province's instability may be the result of a complex combination of local power relationships, combined with personal animosities, than a unified opposition force having a single political or religious ideology. Ancient hatreds and jealousies exist within the Alizai tribe and between the other tribes of the Panjpai sub-confederation, the Noorzai, Ishaqzai, and Alizai tribes. Little love is lost with the other Durrani Confederation tribes in the region, but much of the conflict that occurs is within the Panjpai group of tribes.

This complexity is easily misunderstood and a part of the confusion is related to the common misidentification of "Akhundzada," an honorific used by families with a religious heritage, not a tribe, and the large numbers of subtribes that exist. This problem is especially acute with the Alizai tribe.

The significance of the subtribes is also often underestimated. In many cases, a tribal identity appears to be only an entry into internal feuds with subtribes. Cohesion and loyalty seem to form first at the subtribe level and where western observers would expect to see common efforts against external threats. Pashtun subtribes are often in conflict with one another. Adding to this confusion, the subtribes also tend to form alliances with other tribes or political groups based on where opposing subtribes develop their alliances and coalitions.

The problem seems to be more acute with the large Alizai tribe where a three-way conflict seems to be occurring over an extended period. The Pirzai, represented by Mullah Salaam, recently tilted away from the Taliban to align itself with the national government and President Karzai and joins the Hassanzai of Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, a long-term ally of President Karzai, and the Khalozai, led by a recent reconciled Taliban, Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani. But while these three Alizai subtribe leaders now have moved into common cause with the national government, this does not mean that they are no longer personal enemies leading opposing subtribes.

Analysis

- Abdul Ghafar, the pre-Taliban governor of Helmand and the uncle of the new governor, was killed in Quetta, Pakistan, four years ago, presumably by Taliban assassins. A member of the Akhundzada "mafia," Abdul Ghafar's nephew, Sher Mohammad, and the Hassanzai have little love lost for the Taliban, including their fellow Alizai tribesmen who recently rallied to the national government.
- The majority of the people in Musa Qala, Kajaki and Baghran, the districts which contain (23.5%) of Helmand's population are from the Alizai tribe.
- "Mullah Abdul Salaam treated his own people very badly," said Din Mohammad, a resident of Kajaki. "He especially abused the Hassanzai." The Hassanzai will be slow to respond to Mullah Salaam, Musa Qala's new district chief.



- Three Alizai subtribes are now allied with the national government, the Hassanzai, Pirzai, and Khalozai. Three Alizai tribes remain uncommitted, the Habibzai, Shekzai, and Adozai, or their status is not well known.
- Sher Mohammad had a long running feud with Rais al-Baghrani and apparently his Hassanzai had problems with Mullah Salaam's Pirzai. His family, now identified as "Akhundzada," seems to be the central point in this intra-Alizai feuding.
- Sher Mohammad may eventually be designated Helmand's governor again. With the apparent animosity between Sher Mohammad's Hassanzai and the other two Alizai subtribes, the Pirzai and the Khalozai, such a move by the national government could be destabilizing. There is a chance that by having Sher Mohammad as governor, Mullah Salaam as Musa Qala district chief, and Rais al-Baghrani as Baghran district's chief they would be closely monitored by the Karzai administration and controlled with threats of removal from their position.
- The Jihad background of these three leaders seems to indicate that Sher Mohammad and Mullah Salaam have more in common than either have with al-Baghrani. Sher Mohammad's family was allied with Mohammad Nabi's Harakat and many of the Harakat went into the Taliban, as did Mullah Salaam. The murder of Sher Mohammad's uncle in Quetta, however, was blamed on the Taliban and this may be a divisive factor.

Opportunities

Three of the six Alizai subtribes are now generally tilted toward the Karzai administration and are probably targeted for assassination by the Taliban, making any potential return to extremism an unlikely course of action for them. They are antagonistic toward one another and their three-way feud will present problems with efforts to stabilize Helmand province.

The creation of a "Unity Shura" among the Alizai subtribes may be a useful forum for the identification of points of contention and ways to defuse continuing antagonisms. Incentives, such as public works projects and creation of vocational training programs in areas identified by the members of this shura may be one method of getting these three subtribes to work together.

As the Pirzai, Hassanzai, and Khalozai begin to develop more positive relationships, the remaining Alizai subtribes can be invited to enter the shura or jirga. Pulling the Alizai tribe into a more cohesive group will bring increasing levels of security to Helmand province while countering any attempt by the Taliban to split them into feuding factions from which they hope to recruit fighters.

[Source: Adamec, vol. 5, pg. 144]



Historical Background -Subtribes of the Alizai: Khalozai, Habizai, Hasanzai, Shekzai, Pirzai, Adozai.

“...the Taliban leadership has learned from the public discontent that seriously weakened its rule in the late 1990s. The movement was initially welcomed in much of the country for the security it brought to previously anarchic areas. The Taliban know they need an element of public consent - as NATO and the Afghan government do - to be able to rule. And they know that the people of Musa Qala, like most Afghans, want to be ruled neither by a corrupt and inefficient government, nor by them, but to be left to themselves.”

With this in mind, claims that the Taliban run more than 50% of Afghanistan should be treated with scepticism. Between 1998 and 2001, the Taliban repeatedly claimed to control 80% of the country. Yet to anyone who travelled extensively around the country in that period, it was clear much of that dominance was nominal, depending on the fickle allegiance of local powerbrokers, village chiefs and warlords.

A final reason for their relative flexibility in Musa Qala is that the Taliban are, largely, local men, part of the infinitely complex network of local power relations that makes Afghan society tick rather than being a network superimposed upon it.

And it is in this factor that many of the actual roots of the violence lie. The battle for Musa Qala is to a significant degree an inter-tribal conflict in which religion, varying degrees of ethnic and nationalist sentiment and external support have all been pressed into service to continue centuries-old struggles for scarce resources.

When the Taliban fell, the president, Hamid Karzai, appointed loyalists within the Akhunzada sub-tribe to key positions of power locally. For three years, the other sub-tribes, the Pirzai, Ibrahimzai, and Khalozai, tried to secure a fairer redistribution of lucrative administrative posts through more or less peaceful means, largely to no avail.

[Source: <http://afghan.cc/blogs/afghan/archive/2007/12/11/2305.aspx>]

“You must help Musa Qala as soon as possible,” said Hajji Zaher, representing the council of the Alizai tribe, a major Pashtun group in the area. “If you do what you did before and ignore this district, then you will lose the people’s trust.”

New Man in Charge Has a Mixed Record

No sooner had the dust settled than the government announced the appointment of a new district governor, Mullah Abdul Salaam. Abdul Salaam is a controversial and contradictory figure, not least because he used to be a high-ranking Taleban commander who was believed to be quite close to the movement’s leader Mullah Mohammad Omar.



His most recent defection to the government side, accompanied by some 200 of his men, took place some time before the December assault on Musa Qala and was hailed as a great victory for the counterinsurgent effort.

But Abdul Salaam's allegiance has shifted many times over the past half decade say observers, and it is owed more to a complicated web of tribal feuds and personal grievances than to any conversion to democratic values. Under the Taleban, Abdul Salaam served as governor of Uruzgan province, then moved to Helmand, where he was district governor of Kajaki. He had a reputation for being a harsh leader, but people who remember his time in Kajaki recall that Mullah Omar would not hear a word said against him.

"Mullah Abdul Salaam treated his own people very badly," said Din Mohammad, a resident of Kajaki. "He especially abused the Hassanzai."

The Hassanzai are one of the three major branches of the Alizai tribe, which largely controls northern Helmand. Abdul Salaam is from the Pirzai sub-tribe; the other major branch of the tribe being the Khalozai. The sub-tribes have historical disputes going back decades, and according to residents, Abdul Salaam used his position to attack his Hassanzai enemies. One of the Hassanzai, however, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, became governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taleban regime in late 2001. During Sher Mohammad's tenure, Abdul Salaam was briefly imprisoned and badly beaten. Despite this, he left the Taleban and eventually joined the government. He even served as head of Sher Mohammad's security detail. However, his fellow-tribesmen never forgot the past affront. "They said, 'this day will pass, our turn will come'," said Din Mohammad.

According to local sources, when the Taleban re-emerged as a major force in the northern districts of Helmand, Abdul Salaam rejoined them, only to leave again several months later. In September last year, the Taleban became convinced that Abdul Salaam was spying for the government and decided to eliminate him. Warned of the danger in advance, he managed to escape with the support of tribal elders and his own private militia. At that point, he found it prudent to join forces with the provincial authorities again.

"When he was with the Taleban, Abdul Salaam was a good man," said local Taleban spokesman Qari Yusuf. "But we decided to punish him because he was a spy. He was playing a double game."

The Taleban have made no secret of their distaste for those who cooperate with the government. They have assassinated several provincial and district governors, and attempted to kill many more. Qari Yusuf made it clear that Abdul Salaam is firmly in their sights, "Now he is completely out of the Taleban, and we will treat him just like any other governor."

Abdul Salaam's new constituents seem less than impressed by their leader.



“I don’t think Mullah Abdul Salaam is going to last long as governor,” said a Musa Qala resident who did not want to be named. He just wants revenge for what happened to him under Sher Mohammad. He will begin to carry out his acts of cruelty again.”

[Source: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=342021&apc_state=henh]

According to the Telegraph report, a majority of the Taliban operating in Musa Qala are the Pirzai Alizai, one of three sub-tribes of the Alizai, nearly all of whom are loyal to Mullah Abdul Salaam.

The political outcome is so serious and potentially devastating to the Taliban movement that senior Taliban officials outside of Helmand dispatched assassins to kill Mullah Addul Salaam this week but failed. Other provincial officials have confirmed that ‘secret’ peace talks have transpired and support any such developments. Unlike Helmand’s other marginalized Taliban aligned tribes, like the Noorzai and the Itzakzai, the Alizai have been included in legitimate government positions and the illicit drug trade.

[Source: <http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/4729>]

Later that evening, we receive an unexpected visitor, a member of the Kakar tribe, a rival to the Alizais.

[Source: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1220/p7s2-wosc.html>]

1793 – 1800: Zaman Shah began to remove prominent Muhammadzai leaders from positions of power and replacing them with men of his own lineage, the Sadozai. This upset the delicate balance of Durrani tribal politics that Ahmad Shah had established and may have prompted Painda Khan and other Durrani chiefs to plot against the shah. Painda Khan and *the chiefs of the Nurzai and the Alizai Durrani clans were executed*, as was the chief of the Qizilbash clan. Painda Khan's son fled to Iran and pledged the substantial support of his Muhammadzai followers to a rival claimant to the throne, Zeman's older brother, Mahmood Shah. The clan who’s chiefs Zeman had executed joined forces with the rebels, and they took Kandahar without bloodshed.

[Source: <http://www.afghanistans.com/Information/History/Default.htm>]

Aktur Khan Alizai. Leader of a rebellion of Durrani tribesmen against Shah Shuja 1840-42.

[Source: http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/siege_of_herat13_appendix.php]



...officials in the governor's office here said that Mullah Omar was never in Baghran. They said that Mullah Omar, a member of the Hotak clan of the Pashtun ethnic group, was hated in northern Helmand by the Alizai clan there. Abdul Ghafar, the pre-Taliban governor of Helmand and the uncle of the new governor, was killed in Quetta, Pakistan, four years ago, presumably by Taliban assassins, the officials said.

The situation in northern Helmand centered on a dispute between the governor and the local Taliban leader in Baghran, Abdul Waheed, known as Rais Baghran, or chief of Baghran. Both are members of the Alizai clan, the officials said.

[Source: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9402E3D71639F935A35752C0A9649C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>]

The largest tribe in Helmand belongs is the Alizai tribe, then after them the Noorzai, Barakzai and Ishaqzai tribes. The majority of the people in Musa Qala, Kajaki and Baghran, the districts which contain (23.5%) of Helmand's population are from the Alizai tribe; the majority of the people in Naw Zad, which contains (5.6%) of Helmand's population, are from the Noorzai and Ishaqzai tribes. The majority of Washir which contains (1.7%) of Helmand's population are from the Noorzai tribe; the majority of Sangin which contains (6.6%) of Helmand's population are from the Alikozai and Ishaqzai tribes.

[Source: http://salem-news.com/articles/june262007/helmand_article_62507.php]

In Helmand, there is a tense standoff between Governor Sher Mahmad, an Alizai, and the Security Chief, Abdur Rahman Jan, who is Nurzai. Sher Mahmad is close to President Karzai, while Abdur Rahman Jan is said to have longstanding relations with the Panjshiris in the cabinet.

[Source: <http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/afghanistanpashtunalienation.pdf>]



The Awami National Party – A Pashtun Independence Party

Background

The “Pashtunistan” issue within Pakistani politics has been present since 1947 when Pakistan gained its independence from Great Britain. One of the key families has been involved since the turn of the century, beginning with the Haji of Turangzai. His son-in-law, Ghaffar Khan, was the leader of a large Pashtun peace movement affiliated with India’s Ghandi and often known as the “Frontier Ghandi.” He was followed by his son, Wali Khan who died in Peshawar in January, 2006. The political party that has evolved onto today’s Awami National Party (ANP) and is currently led by Asfandiyar Wali Khan, the great grandson of the Haji of Turangi.

The leadership of the ANP (and it’s predecessor parties) has maintained good relationships with Afghanistan’s leaders, communist and non-communist, due to their goals of unifying the Pashtuns.

The ANP is expected to win many new seats in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)

Current Information

- Around 31 activists of Awami National Party (ANP) were killed in Shabqadar area of Charsadda on February 9, 2008 while another ten ANP activists including one North Waziristan Agency (NWA) party head were killed in a suicide attack in Waziristan just after four days.
- This was a new series of attacks on the liberal and democratic leadership of NWFP with expanded targets.
- It was for first time that unknown militants directly targeted the ANP, a Pakhtun nationalist party. No doubt it was the second serious attempt of militants against another liberal political force after the killing of PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto. Both parties have been opposing terrorism and Talibanization in the region as a basic party policy from the very beginning.
- ANP is one of the oldest parties of Pakistan following a basic philosophy of non- violence, introduced by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan who was an important political ally of Indian National Congress during freedom struggle. ANP has also history of good relationship with different Afghan rulers like Amanullah Khan, King Zahir Shah, Babrak Karmal, Najibullah and now Hamid Karzai.
- ANP leader [late] Khan Abdul Wali Khan was an open critic of pro-Pakistani Mujahideen.
- After American attack on Afghanistan Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) highlighted the issue as a major slogan in 2002 elections against ANP and the party faced a situation of political isolation among the public and MMA won the election because of its pro-Taliban stance.
- After the presidential elections in Afghanistan a fresh and close relationship was established between ANP and Hamid Karzai-led Afghan leadership. ANP’s three top leaders Asfandiyar



Wali Khan, Afzal Khan and Afrasiab Khattak visited Kabul several times and got fully state protocol in the Afghan Capital.

- Asfandiyar Wali and Afrasiab Khattak left for Kabul along with Hamid Karzai where they stayed for one week and held meetings with several American and European officials. In Kabul they enjoyed a protocol of state guests.
- His party has been advocating friendly relationship with all neighbouring countries since its very inception. In the meanwhile it has strongly opposed Talibanization and ongoing extremism in Pakistan as well as in the whole region.

Conclusion

The expected win of ANP in NWFP and FATA in 2008 elections can become a real threat for those elements that are supporting Talibanization and extremism in this sensitive belt. Such elements will never afford a party like ANP to come in power their involvement in the attacks on ANP leadership can not be ruled out.

[Source: Pakistani Think Tank Says ANP Victory in NWFP Likely, Poses Threat to Militants; SAP20080215447005 Lahore Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies in English 16 Feb 08]

After his defeat in the 1990 elections at the hands of opposition candidate Maulana Hasan Jan (a close confidante of the Afghan Pashtun leader Gulbadin Hekmatyar), Wali Khan opted to retire from electoral politics and turned down a senate ticket from his party and the offer from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of contesting Lahore. When asked his reason for retirement, he said that he had no place in politics “when the mullahs and ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) decide our destiny and politics”.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khan_Wali_Khan]

Analysis

If the ANP wins the upcoming parliamentary elections in Pakistan’s NWFP at the expense of the MMA political party coalition, there may be a stronger response to the militants in the region. While Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan are no longer alive, their views of Pashtun extremism are held by their followers who number in the hundreds of thousands. In an election win, the ANP will view the voter’s support as a mandate against extremism that has recently resulted in attacks on their leaders and rank and file membership.

Wali Khan’s funeral in Peshawar in January 2006 was attended by notable Afghan politicians – as well as the remaining “Red Shirts” of his father’s political movement. He opposed “mullahs and ISI” in Pakistan’s politics and retired from public life following his defeat in an election by one of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s supporters. The members of the ANP will probably oppose radical Islamists in the NWFP.



Given the changes in polls in Pakistan that show both Usama Bin Ladin and the Taliban losing support, the ANP and their political allies, the PPP of Benazir Bhutto, may make considerable advances in the control of the NWFP at the expense of the fundamentalist parties comprising the MMA.



The Ishaqzai Stabilization through a Key Leader

Background

While there are multiple tribes located in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, the members of the Panjpai group of the Durrani Confederation appear to be the “keepers of the balance of tribal power” in southern Afghanistan. One of the smaller tribes, the Ishaqzai may be the subject of Taliban efforts to split the Durrani Confederation and the Iranians may be attempting to influence the attitude of the Ishaqzai tribe toward the Afghan government.

According to UN reporting from the refugee camps in the vicinity of Quetta, there has been a history of animosity between the Ishaqzai and the general Taliban. With the death of Akhtar Mohammad Osmani and accusations by the Ishaqzai that the some members of the Taliban were responsible for his betrayal, rallying some of the Taliban’s Ishaqzai to the Afghan national government may be possible.

This trend may be countered by locating a key Ishaqzai leader to focus regional development projects through him to enhance his prestige within the Ishaqzai tribe. Unfortunately, the Ishaqzai are geographically divided across southern Afghanistan and no single leadership personality appears to have emerged.

One person emerged from background searches. Mohammad Anwar, not to be confused with Haji Mohammad Anwar (a former governor of Helmand province), is an Ishaqzai tribesman and appears to be a supporter of both the Government of Afghanistan and the British forces in the Helmand region.

Analysis

- Mohammad Anwar reportedly made the following statement: “Many years have passed since the Afghans and British fought,” he said. “The British are here to help, not for revenge.”
- He represented Helmand Province in the Constitutional Loya Jirga. Anwar seems to have moderate views and supports negotiations. He was reported to say, I would like to suggest to all my fellow countrymen to solve all the problems by negotiation.”
- He openly supports President Karzai and said in an interview, "What Mr Karzai did in relation to Rafiqollah's release was a fair step.... It also proves that Afghanistan is an Islamic country where youths are encouraged to pursue education not to kill or commit violent activities."
- The other Ishaqzai members of the government and in political parties did not seem to have the positive potential possessed by Mohammad Anwar Ishaqzai.



Opportunity

Once Mohammad Anwar Ishaqzai's background is carefully reviewed, it may be possible to approach him in Kabul as assess his potential as a "rallying point" possibly capable of drawing the general membership of the Ishaqzai tribe toward the national government. This might result in some of the Ishaqzai members of the Taliban entering into negotiations to return to their home villages and reconcile with the Afghan government. Anwar's statement that "...Afghanistan is an Islamic country where youths are encouraged to pursue education not to kill or commit violent activities" puts him on the record as being in favor of reconciliation.

It may be possible to get the other prominent Ishaqzai in the government to join with Anwar to form an informal "development jirga" for the Ishaqzai tribes through which assistance could be funneled. As aid projects are implemented and credited to Anwar's ability to lobby for his tribe, his status within the entire Ishaqzai tribe will rise along with his credibility. Once this foundation of trust is in place and development projects become obvious, visible signs of progress, Mohammad Anwar may be able to use his status and the trust developed within the tribe to gradually wean portions of the tribe away from opium cultivation with development projects and local vocational training replacing their dependence on the opium economy.

The development of a powerful personality within the Ishaqzai tribe may be a very positive factor in stabilizing this smaller Durrani tribe that appears to be "courted" by both the Taliban and the Iranians.

Historical Background

Northern Helmand lies to the north of the paved main road and consists of Sangin, Washir, Naw Zad, Musa Qala, Kajaki and Baghran. The largest tribe in Helmand is the Alizai tribe, then after them the Noorzai, Barakzai and Ishaqzai tribes. The majority of the people in Musa Qala, Kajaki and Baghran, the districts which contain (23.5%) of Helmand's population are from the Alizai tribe; the majority of the people in Naw Zad, which contains (5.6%) of Helmand's population, are from the Noorzai and Ishaqzai tribes. The majority of Washir which contains (1.7%) of Helmand's population are from the Noorzai tribe; the majority of Sangin which contains (6.6%) of Helmand's population are from the Alikozai and Ishaqzai tribes.

[Source: http://www.frontline-news.com/articles/june262007/helmand_fl_article_62507.php]

In Kandahar, another politician said he believes that Iran supports the Ishaqzai tribal faction within the Taliban. The Afghan politician said he recently met with an Iranian official and challenged him about the rumours, which produced only a shrug from the Iranian.

[Source: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070212.wiranafghanistan0212/BNStory/Front>]



Tribal tensions can have devastating consequences for Afghan refugees [in Quetta], affecting their settlement options in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. For example, in Saranan Camp Block III most residents are Pashtuns from the Ishaqzai tribe (90 percent); the remaining are Kakars, Tookhis, Khiljis, Arabs (all Pashtun tribes) and some Pashto-speaking Baloch from Kunduz. When the Taliban took over Afghanistan they fought with the Ishaqzai tribe in Kandahar, which had formerly been mujahedin. Taliban sympathisers (in Camp II) were attacked by the Ishaqzai refugees from Camp III in retaliation. Camps I and II were inhabited by Uzbeks and Pashtuns. Uzbeks from Kandahar had allied with the Taliban in the attacks on the Ishaqzais, and were the targets of retaliation. The local landowner supported the Ishaqzais in pushing the residents out of Camps I and II. The Pashtuns from those camps returned to Kandahar, while the Uzbeks remain at the border: tribal conflicts mean they still have no safe place to go in Afghanistan.

[Source: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/txis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&page=SUBSITES&id=43e75cf02>]

The Afghan Millat Party was the most active political party in Kandahar Province during the election campaign and its campaign illustrates some of the challenges parties currently face in electoral politics. For starters, the party became a victim of the personality-based politics and resulting factionalism that characterises Afghan party politics. The party has two shuras (councils) in Kandahar – a provincial shura that was headed by Azizullah Ishaqzai and a city shura headed by Dr. Abdul Rahman Jameel. Factional infighting, however, led to a split in the party at the provincial level.

[Source: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN022885.pdf>]

Afghan Army General Ghulam Mustafa Ishaqzai, who commands troops patrolling near the Pakistan border, told AP that he has noted an Arab influx over the last year.

[Source: <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/06/6-SWA/swa-250607.asp>]

Mohammad Alam Ishaqzai, the governor of Baghlan province....

[Source: <http://ins.onlinedemocracy.ca/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=10426>]

The head of Helmand's provincial council, Mohammad Anwar, also rejects the senators' accusations. "Many years have passed since the Afghans and British fought," he said. "The British are here to help, not for revenge."

[Source: <http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allArticles/7AFDCF9C3F37D46A8725738F002AD4E9?OpenDocument>].



LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE AFGHAN CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA JIRGAMohammad Anwar Eshaqzai:
Helmand....

[Source: http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Constitutions/LIST_OF_MEMBERS_OF_THE_AFGHAN_CONSTITUTIONAL_LOYA_JIRGA.htm]

Helmand MP Mohammad Anwar: "The enemies are not all the same. Some of them are foreign terrorists and some others are directly influenced by the Pakistani ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence]. Another group of them are local people who are dissatisfied with the government for certain reasons. I would like to suggest to all my fellow countrymen to solve all the problems by negotiation."

[Source: http://tolo.tv/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=98&Itemid=42]

An MP from Helmand Province, Mohammad Anwar, says "What Mr Karzai did in relation to Rafiqollah's release was a fair step. Rafiqollah was deceived and the president officially forgave him. The measure carries a good message for those who want to carry out suicide attacks in Afghanistan. It also proves that Afghanistan is an Islamic country where youths are encouraged to pursue education not to kill or commit violent activities."

[Source: *Kabul Arman-e Melli (National Aspiration) in Dari 0000 GMT 21 Jul 07*]

Haji Mohammad Anwar Khan, a newly-elected member of the Wolasi Jerga from Helmand, urged the international community and non-governmental organizations (NGO) to extend maximum support to farmers in return for halting poppy cultivation. He said scarcity of irrigation water and fertilizers usually compel farmers to grow poppy on their fields. [A different Mohammad Anwar]

[Source: *Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News (Internet Version-WWW) in English 1500 GMT 27 Nov 05*]



Alliances Based on Membership in Jamiat-i Islami

Background

There are two key personalities located in southern Afghanistan from different Durrani Pashtun tribes, one Zirak and the other Panjpai, who are also from adjacent provinces, but these men have a common history of serving in the same Jihadi party in the fighting against the Soviets and their Afghan communist allies. Oruzgan Province's Jan Mohammad Khan, a Zirak Popalzai tribesman, and Helmand Province's Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani, a Panjpai Alizai tribesman, might be connected in a loose alliance based on the common threat they face from the Taliban and other extremists operating in their adjacent tribal areas.

Analysis

- Jan Mohammad Khan and Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani were both members of Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami during the fighting against the Soviets and the Afghan communists. The reasons these tribal leaders chose to fight under Jamiat are unknown, but may have some connection to Rabbani's connections to Sufism, a popular trend of Islam in southern Afghanistan.
- While Jan Mohammad was jailed by the Taliban, he was reportedly visited by Abdul Wahid who tried to improve the prisoner's conditions.
- Jan Mohammad immediately came to the support of Hamid Karzai as soon as he was released from confinement; Abdul Wahid has rallied to the Government of Afghanistan following a public break with the Taliban.
- Both men are Durrani Pashtuns.
- Many of the complaints lodged against Jan Mohammad may have originated with the Hazara population of Oruzgan Province while he was governor. There has been historic animosity between the Hazara and Pashtuns that may now be less open with the creation of Daikundi Province, the portion of Oruzgan Province generally inhabited by the Hazara.

Potential Opportunity

Given the large number of factors in common with these two rural Pashtuns and their common Durrani heritage, it may be possible to link them together in an anti-Taliban coalition with loyal fighters to deny Taliban combatants either transit through their territory or safe haven. Jan Mohammad was imprisoned for three years by the Taliban and probably despises them. Given his loyal response to Hamid Karzai as soon as he was released, Jan Mohammad will probably respond to nearly any request made by the president.

Abdul Wahid provided men for the Taliban military forces and once saved them from defeat, but he was never provided any formal government position by Mullah Omar. Additionally, Abdul Wahid was sent to




negotiate the surrender of Kandahar with Hamid Karzai as the Taliban retreated to the safety of Pakistan. Following his formal reconciliation and subsequent denunciation of Mullah Omar, Abdul Wahid may both fear and despise the Taliban.

Patient efforts should be attempted to connect these two men in a defensive alliance. Their combined efforts would help stabilize a large section of southern Afghanistan.

Historical Background

Jan Mohammad Khan (*pictured*) is a typical rural Pashtun tribal leader from Afghanistan's Oruzgan Province. He is a Popalzai (Durrani Zirak) and is very loyal to President Hamid Karzai. During the anti-Soviet jihad, Jan Mohammad was a member of the Jamiat-i Islami, a party led by Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani. While biographical material is lacking, there are a few known facts about his background.



He is a wheat farmer by profession, basically illiterate, and probably was affiliated with the Taliban during its earlier days (as were many Pashtuns, including Hamid Karzai), but he was later imprisoned by the Taliban for three years and held in a cell too small to stretch out his legs. During this period, he was reportedly visited by Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghmani, another member of the Jamiat-i Islami who tried to make Jan Mohammad's imprisonment more comfortable.

In late 2001, Jan Mohammad was released from confinement by Hamid Karzai's force that was passing through Shahwali Kot as they were moving to attack and capture Kandahar. While Jan Mohammad had not seen his family in three years, he told Karzai that he would return the night of his release with his loyal fighters and late that night he arrived with approximately 300 fighters.

[Source: Interview with a U.S. Special Forces soldier present during this period]

Kandahar City

Five people were killed in an ethnic riot in the southern troubled province of Uruzgan, Governor Jan Mohammad Khan said the other day. Apparently, the governor added, the slaying of five Pashtuns in Gujran district of the province came in retaliation for the killing of 11 Hazara tribesmen, allegedly by Taliban adherents. As Taliban remained tight-lipped on the incident, Jan Mohammad said: "The five Pashtuns were gunned down in an overnight raid by armed Hazara men on their houses in Marwa village."

[Source: <http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?113410>]



On March 28, 2004, the new Daykundi was carved out of an area in the north leaving Oruzgan with a majority Pashtun population and Daykundi with a majority of Hazaras.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oruzgan_Province]

In their modern history, Hazaras have faced several wars and forced displacements. Since the beginnings of modern Afghanistan in the mid 18th century, Hazaras have faced persecution from the Pashtuns and have been forced to flee from many parts of today's Afghanistan to Hazarajat.^[9] In the mid 18th century they were forced out of Helmand and the Arghandab basin of Kandahar.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hazara_people]

Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani



Abdul Wahid is also a typical rural Pashtun tribal leader from Afghanistan's Helmand Province. His tribal territory is located in Baghran District and he is an Alizai (Durrani Panjpai) who reconciled with the Government of Afghanistan. During the anti-Soviet Jihad, Abdul Wahid was a member of the Jamiat-i Islami, a party led by Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani. Like many southern Pashtuns, he supported the Taliban Movement but never was assigned a formal position in the government.

Abdul Waheed Baghrani, 51, a diminutive, soft-spoken man, has more the air of a religious leader than a wanted terrorist.

Yet he is the highest level Taliban commander to accept the government's recent amnesty offer, coming down from the mountains after three and a half years on the run from United States forces.

"My message to those still fighting is they should take this golden chance and come back and build the country," he said in an interview here in late May. "We have an Islamic country and Shariah law, and we should accept the rule of the government."

The United States military and the Afghan government have greeted his decision as a sign of the success of the amnesty in undermining the Taliban insurgency. In response, American forces have organized aid shipments to his region and offered to undertake new reconstruction projects....

Although he is a close associate of Mullah Omar, Mr. Baghrani is a renowned tribal chieftain and resistance leader in his own right. He goes by the name Rais-da-Baghran, or Chief of Baghran, the 100-mile-long mountainous valley of northern Helmand where he lives. He fought the Soviet occupation for



10 years and joined the Taliban in the early days of the movement, he said, in the interest of national unity.

"Afghans were fighting each other, and Afghanistan faced breaking up into several parts," he said. "As a national leader, I had to join them."

But, he said, he grew disillusioned with Al Qaeda's growing influence over the Taliban leadership. "In the beginning they stood for peace and stability," he said. "But then later there was a lot of foreign interference and we tried a lot to persuade them to come over to the right way."

Mr. Baghrani never held an official post in the Taliban government but supported its push to gain control of the whole country, sending his commanders and fighters to fight in northern Afghanistan. His high standing in the government became clear when he was asked by Mullah Omar in December 2001 to carry a message of the Taliban surrender to Hamid Karzai, who was then in the mountains north of Kandahar with American Special Forces.

[Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/international/asia/02amnesty.html?pagewanted=print>]

Netherlands Foreign Ministry Insists Munib Has To Stay on as Uruzgan Governor

Jan Mohammad Khan, the former governor of the Afghan province of Uruzgan who was dismissed at the request of the Netherlands, attributes the recent surge of the Taliban in Uruzgan to the flawed policies of his successor, Abdul Hakim Munib. Khan says he is doing nothing against the Taliban.

In an interview with NRC Handelsblad, Khan says that his successor has no idea how to fight the Taliban. "How can the people have confidence in him when he has allowed things to come to this in such a short space of time," the former governor, who was called back last January at the request of The Hague, said. He has been living in the Afghan capital of Kabul since he left Uruzgan.

[Source: Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad 2006-07-25].



The Kakar Tribe - Seeking Elevated Status and Power

Background

The Pashtun Kakar tribe has traditionally been viewed as a low status group with their primary lands located in Baluchistan's Zhub region. Part of the current insurgency in Afghanistan involves an opportunistic Kakar attempt to regain its social and political standing among the other Pashtun tribes of the region. Commanders such as Dadullah-Lang and his brother, Bakht Mohammad, are Kakars with little actual status of their own until the civil war among the Mujahedin parties resulted from the power vacuum following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The Kakar probably view themselves as having greater status and tribal glory than is allocated to them in Pashtun society today. Their line of descent from Qais, the progenitor of the Pashtuns, is both direct and short, and they were once the rulers of Afghanistan. Many Kakar insurgent leaders may be motivated by a desire to "spread the glory of their family name," as stated by the member of the Kakar tribe who prepared the Wikipedia article on their tribe.

In their possible desire to regain their lost "glory," the Kakar members within the Taliban may be competing with the Hotak (Ghilzai), a tribe that also once ruled Afghanistan and Persia before being defeated by Persia's Nadir Shah. The Hotak were once "royals" and the possible tension existing between the opportunist commanders of Kakar and Hotak factions, Mullah Mohammad Omar, Hotak, and Mansoor Dadullah, Kakar, may have been a major reason for Mullah Omar's recent dismissal of Dadullah Mansoor from the Taliban leadership. This would also explain the tension that apparently existed between Mansoor's brother, Dadullah-Lang, and Omar. Both tribes view themselves as having a right to rule Afghanistan while recovering their rightful tribal "glory."

Analysis

- Pashtuns have long tribal memories.
- Those tribes that once ruled the country retain ambitions to regain control. In the case of the Durrani royal tribes, the Barakzai and Popalzai, they tend to remain supporters of "traditionalist" approaches while the Ghilzai Hotak and the Gurghusht Kakar tribes appear to have adopted more "revolutionary" tactics and seek supporters by advocating a Sharia-ruled Islamic state.
- The competition between the Durrani royal tribes appears settled, with the Barakzai subtribe, the Mohammadzai, holding this status. The death of Zahir Shah, however, and lack of a suitable heir may allow the Popalzai subtribe, the Saddozai, to move into contention for "royal primacy." The desire to rule has not been a settled issue between the Kakar and Hotak tribes.
- Signs of tension between the two tribes exist. Mullah Mohammad Rabbani (Kakar), a co-founder of the Taliban, was sent to Kabul rather than work within the Taliban leadership in Kandahar. The Taliban's foreign minister, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil (Kakar) reconciled to the



Government of Afghanistan in early 2002, the first Taliban leader to do so. Tension existed between Dadullah-Lang (Kakar) and Mullah Omar, Mullah Obdaidullah, and Mullah Osmani. Similar pressure has apparently resulted in Mullah Omar dismissing Dadullah Mansoor, Dadullah-Lang's brother, from the Taliban leadership.

Opportunities

Given the probable tension within the Taliban leadership personalities, such as Hotak Mullah Omar and Kakar Dadullah Mansoor, it may be possible to exacerbate this by offering one side opportunities for reconciliation while ignoring the other. This may increase the tension and lead to open breaks between the tribal groups. Hotak are Ghilzai and will probably be allied with other Ghilza tribes while the Kakar are Gurghust and are not always viewed as true Pashtuns by the other tribes. Working with one side while ignoring the other may pay dividends.

There are Kakars within the Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party located in Pakistan. There are Kakars in leadership positions and contact with them could probably be arranged through Mehmood Khan Achakzai, a key leader in this party who resides in Quetta and is a member of the national parliament. Contact could probably be arranged through regular contacts with Mehmood Khan through the British High Commission in Islamabad. Pakistani Kakars could be utilized as "contacts" to locate Taliban Kakars seeking reconciliation opportunities.

There are probably Kakars serving in the Karzai Administration. They may also be capable of making contacts with Taliban Kakars. Both approaches could be used to "steer" these individuals into a "Pashtun Peace Movement," or something similar.

Pointing out that the Kakars have a more complete Pashtun genealogy than the Hotaks since they claim direct descent from Qais, the grandfather of Dane, their ancestor, may have an impact. Suggesting that the Hotaks, and the entire Ghilzai Confederation, lacks such a solid ancestry may have an interesting effect since the Durrani suggest that the Ghilzai arose from an illegitimate child.

Another interesting theme could focus on the lack of Kakars in the Taliban administration in their capital city, Kandahar. The few senior Kakars in the Taliban government were assigned to posts in Kabul and were trusted to work in Kandahar. Mullah Rabbani and Mutawakil were essentially restricted to Kabul. This may also increase the fissures within the Taliban rank and file, especially if the reports of Dadullah Mansoor's dismissal are correct.

Historical Background

The Kakar tribes, strictly so called, consisting of twenty main divisions and innumerable sub-divisions, and numbering probably five lakhs in all (though the number has been computed at 9, 12, and even 18 lakhs), derives its descent from Kakar, the eldest of the four sons of Dane son of Ghorghasht, and holds possession of a spacious tract, some 100 miles square, bounded on the north, first by the southern limit of the Ghalzai, and further towards the west by the Arghasan, and also by that part of Toba in the



occupation of the part of Toba in the occupation of the Achakzai Durrani, and on the west and south by Balochistan, a part of the Spin Tarin country, and a ridge of the Suleiman mountain....

The Kakar are a genial, joyous people, fond of amusement and easily amused. It is their custom in summer, after the evening meal, to sit outside the village, the women being a little apart from the men, and pass an hour or two in playing and singing their simple national airs. Another and more grotesque amusement said to have been introduced by the followers of Pir Taric, and known amongst the Tarin under the name of Tisri, is called by the Kakar "loba," a word that properly means a game or sport. This game, played in the summer evenings, consisted in the young men and women collecting outside the village and crying out, "The Pir is not dead but alive" (Fir mar na dai, zhwandai dai,) accompanying the cry with a drunken pantomime of staggering to and fro, and the like ribald buffooneries. This is said to have been the occasion of much impropriety between the sexes, and has now almost fallen into desuetude. In religion, the Kakar are Sunni Musalmans, but they do not burthen themselves with too nice an observance of the injunctions of their faith, of which indeed their knowledge is of the vaguest ; few, indeed, having the faintest tincture of literary acquirement. Except the old men few attend prayers, and, (which by no means follows) they have not the least tendency to fanaticism. Their mullas they regard with a degree of reverence proportioned to the crassness of their own ignorance, and every strolling impostor and vagabond charm writer is to the simple Kakar a holy and learned man....

[Source: *Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants*, pp. 85-87]

Taliban Dismisses Senior Afghan Commander - December 29, 2007



As 2007 comes to a close, the Taliban has dismissed its senior military commander in southern Afghanistan. Mullah Mansoor Dadullah (*pictured*), a senior military commander, was relieved of his command by Mullah Omar, according to a statement. Dadullah was accused of insubordination.

"Mullah Mansoor Dadullah has been dismissed as the Taliban commander because he disobeyed the orders of the Islamic Emirate," Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed told *AFP*. "Therefore it was decided not to appoint any post in the emirate to him," Mujahed concluded.

Mansoor was the military commander of Taliban forces in the strategic southern provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul provinces. He took command of Taliban forces in May of this year after his brother Mullah Dadullah Ahkund, a popular but brutal and effective commander, was killed by British Special Forces in Helmand province.

[Source: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/taliban_dismisses_se-print.php]



Mansoor Dadullah, the half-brother of Mullah Dadullah, comes from the Arghandab district of Kandahar province and belongs to the Kakar tribe—a tribe from which many Taliban commanders and soldiers originated. He is approximately 30 years-old and has spent considerable time in prison. In the mid-1990s, when the Taliban were engaged in a battle with the Northern Alliance in north Kabul and later in northern Afghanistan, Mansoor was a soldier for Dadullah and acted as his assistant (al-Jazeera, June 7). According to those that know him personally, he is not as ruthless as his brother Mullah Dadullah. His prominence comes not from his military activities, but due to his connection with the notorious neo-Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah.

[Source: <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373567>]

After he was accused for a bloody genocide in the central Bamyan province, Dadullah [-Lang] was disarmed according to Mullah Omar's order in 2000. He was later re-armed since the Taliban needed his aggressive command against Northern Alliance troops. He is able to evade capture because of his friendship with mujahideen commanders and due to the support he receives from his Kakar tribe in the southern provinces of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

[Source: <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369933>]

Kakar is the name of a large Pashtun tribe, with members living in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. According to the history of Afghanistan, the Kakar tribe established an empire in Afghanistan and spread the glory of their family name. The originator of the Kakar tribe is Dani, who was son of Ghourghusht and grandson of Qais Abdur Rashid. Some Afghan clans related to the Kakar family include:

- Sanzarkhel
- Taraghzai
- Barakzai of Kakar
- Parizon
- Mirdadzai
- Jogizai
- Abubakarzai
- Abusyedzai

Sanzarkhel, Taraghzai or Taragharai and Santia (sub tribe of Abubakarzai Kakar) are the biggest sub-tribes of the Kakar in Balochistan. Historians such as Abdul Hai Habibi and Bahdur Shah Zafar Kakakhel are confident that the Jadoon are also part of the Kakar tribe.



The Kakar also make the largest tribe of Pashtons. Kakar have descendants in western provinces of Pakistan but are mostly in Afghanistan and eastern Iran. [Note: This article was researched by a Kakar and reflects Kakar views of themselves].

[Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kakar>]

The Kakars, a Pathan tribe on the Zhob valley frontier of Baluchistan, inhabit the back of the Suliman mountains between Quetta and the Gomal river; they are a very ancient race, and it is probable that they were in possession of these slopes long before the advent of Afghan or Arab. They are divided into many distinct tribes who have no connexion beyond the common name of Kakar. Not only is there no chief of the Kakars, or general *jirgah* (or council) of the whole tribe, but in most cases there are no recognized heads of the different clans. In 1901 they numbered 105,444. During the second Afghan War the Kakars caused some annoyance on the British line of communications; and the Kakars inhabiting the Zhob valley were punished by the Zhob valley expedition of 1884.

[Source: <http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Kakar>]

The roots of the Taliban are found in the mujahedin efforts against the Soviets. From the hundreds of resistance groups that sprang up, the ISID recognized seven and established offices for them through which to channel covert support. Although most had a strong religious ethos, the groups were organized primarily along ethnic and tribal lines. Significantly, three of the seven were led by Ghilzais and none by their rivals, the Durranis, who were deliberately marginalized by the ISID.

[Source: <http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pubs/Understanding%20the%20Taliban%20and%20In%20urgency%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf>, pg. 75]

Kakar Afghan was one of the grandsons of Qais Abdur Rashid. Kakar's father's name was Dani son of Ghourghusht, who was son of Qais in the Afghan appendix of tribes. According to Afghan and Muslim historians, Ghourghusht was alive in 388 hijri (by the Islamic calendar). Kakar is also called in some parts of Afghanistan Kakar-khel.

[Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kakar>]

Qais Abdur Rashid is a legendary progenitor of the Pashtun people, thought, among Pashtuns, to be the first Pashtun who traveled to Mecca and Madina during the early days of Islam.



Qais Abdur Rashid was born **Pehtan Qais** in Southern Afghanistan. Upon hearing about the advent of Islam, he was sent by his tribe to Arabia. He met Mohammad and embraced Islam, and was named *Abdur Rashid* by him.

It is also said that the famous warrior companion, Khalid bin Walid, who was a Quarashi Arab from Bani Makhzoom, cousins of Mohammed who was from bani Hashim, and Qais Abdur Rashid was introduced by him to Muhammad. It is commonly believed by Pashtuns that Khalid bin Walid and Qais Abdur Rashid were their fathers, who brought Islam to them, well before the invasion of Afghanistan by the Arab Muslim forces during the caliphate of Omar bin Khattab, the second caliph.

Qais Abdur Rashid died leaving three sons: Sarban, Baitan and Ghourghusht. From these three sons, as well as Karlan, we get the majority of Pashtun tribes known today.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qais_Abdur_Rashid]

The **Hotaki dynasty** (1709-1738) was founded in 1709 by Mirwais Khan Hotak, an ethnic Pashtun (*Afghan*) from the Ghilzai clan of Kandahar province in modern-day Afghanistan. Mirwais and his followers rose against the Persian Safavid rule starting in the city of Kandahar in 1709. He began his rule by killing Gurgin Khan, the Georgian-born governor of Kandahar, who was representing the Persian kings. Next, Mirwais ordered the deaths of the remaining Persian government officials in the region. The Ghilzai Afghans then defeated the Persian army that was dispatched from Isfahan (capital of the Safavid Empire).

Mirwais Khan Hotak died peacefully in 1715 from natural cause and was succeeded by his son Mir Mahmud Hotaki, who later led his army to invade Persia. In 1722, Mir Mahmud sacked the city of Isfahan and declared himself Shah of Persia (meaning *King of Persia*). However, the great majority still rejected the Ghilzai regime as usurping. . For the next 7 years the Hotaki became the de facto rulers of eastern Persia and the Peshawar Valley.

The Hotaki dynasty was a troubled and violent one as internecine conflict made it difficult to establish permanent control. The dynasty lived under great turmoil due to bloody succession feuds that made their hold on power tenuous, and after the massacre of thousands of civilians in Isfahan – including more than three thousand religious scholars, nobles, and members of the Safavid family – the Hotaki dynasty was eventually removed from power in Persia. In October 1729, they were defeated by Nader Shah, head of the Afsharids, in the Battle of Damghan and pushed back to what is now Afghanistan.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotaki_dynasty]



Origins of Ghilzai and Durrani Animosity

Background

Much of the modern conflict inside Afghanistan generally can be attributed to animosities between tribes and tribal groups that go back for centuries. One of the longest series of feuds involves the anger and jealousy of the Pashtun Ghilzai Confederation over the status of the Durrani Confederation, a status that once belonged to the Ghilzai. The Ghilzai, particularly the Hotaks, were once the rulers of an empire that included half of Persia and their “vassals,” the Abdalis that became the Durrani, rose to prominence by serving as cavalry shock troops for the Persian leader, Nadir Shah, who rewarded their service with Ghilzai lands. This historic animosity may be repeating itself today, with Mullah Mohammad Omar, a Hotak, trying to gain control of Afghanistan from Hamid Karzai, an Abdali/Durrani.

Analysis

- Ghilzai Hotaks once ruled Afghanistan and half of Persia until displaced by the Durrani. Many of their tribal lands were given to the Durrani by Persian Nadir Shah.
- The Durrani’s new leader’s first conquests were additional Ghilzai lands in Ghazni. Fighting was repeated between the Ghilzai and Durrani and a Ghilzai tribal chieftain and his sons were shot from a Durrani cannon. Subsequently, Durrani attacked and killed Ghilzai women and children in the vicinity of Kandahar.
- An indigenous historian wrote in 1881 that the Ghilzai were vindictive and not much has changed in their “tribal character.” Animosity toward the Durrani has often been a common factor in Afghan history. Ghilzai communists overthrew the last Durrani ruler, President Daoud, and were closely allied with the Soviets during their ten year occupation. Ghilzai leaders appear to dominate the Taliban movement that is seeking to defeat Durrani Hamid Karzai.
- Feuds are commonplace within the Ghilzai and the Hotaks feud with the Tokhi. With the Kharoti Pashtuns claiming – and probably believing – that they are a subgroup of the Tokhi, the old animosity between Hotak and Tokhi may help explain one reason for the distance between the Taliban’s Mullah Mohammad Omar, a Hotak, and HIG’s Hekmatyar, a Kharoti.

Opportunity

Given the historical background of the Ghilzai attraction to gaining power under any political ideology, communism and “Talibanism,” this known tendency may be used effectively to weaken the Taliban leadership. Themes such as “The Ghilzai, especially the Hotaks, go to great lengths to shut out other tribes from leadership positions within the Taliban. Evidence is available to support this.



Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, Dadullah-Lang, Bakht Mohammad are all Kakars. Rabbani and Mutawakil were never trusted by the Taliban leadership and were restricted to Kabul instead of working in Kandahar with the remainder of the Taliban government.

Pointing out that the Ghilzai leadership of the Taliban discriminates against any non-Ghilzai tribe whose senior men attempt to gain leadership positions. Omar's Hotaks are working to limit the access to leadership roles for non-Ghilzai tribes as it follows a strategy to split the Durrani along their Zirk and Panjpai lines. Mullah Omar works hard to limit the power of the Kakars, for example, while making serious efforts to bring the Ishaqzai and Noorzai into Taliban leadership positions as was done with parts of the Alizai as he tries to completely split the Panjpai Durrani tribes away from the alliance that supports Hamid Karzai.

This approach may create a fissure between the non-Ghilzai members within the Taliban and create additional problems with the Kakar following the death of Dadullah-Lang and the sacking of Bakht Mohammad.

Historical Background

Mir Wais Khan Hōtak (1673-1715) was a Pashtun tribal chief of the Ghilzai clan from Kandahar, who founded the Hotaki dynasty that ruled Persia from 1722 to 1729.

A former state hostage of the Shi'ite Safavids, Mir Wais Khan was the son of Muhammad Bakir, from whom he inherited leadership of one of the Ghilzai clans. He had visited the Persian court and understood their military weaknesses. The Pashtun tribes rankled under the ruling Safavids because of their continued attempts to convert the Pashtun from Sunni to Shia Islam. In 1709, Mir Wais organized militia forces against Gurgin Khan, the Georgian governor of the city who ruled in the name of the Persian Safavid Shah. Gurgin Khan was killed, and the Hotakis took control of the city. Then, Mir Wais successfully defeated a large Persian army, sent to regain control over the area. Mir Wais remained in power until his death in 1715 and was succeeded by his son Mir Mahmud Hotaki, who took advantage of the political weakness of the Persian Shahs and conquered the eastern Persian Empire, while the Ottomans took the west.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mir_Wais_Hotak]

The distinguished services rendered by the Abdali tribe to Nadir Shah were now to meet with fitting acknowledgment. The lands lying west of Herat, and still held by the Durrani, were made over to them by royal grant. Besides this, the Ghilzai lands were also apportioned among them, the valley of Arghandab falling to Ghani Khan and his clan the Alkozai, and the region of Dawar to Nur Muhammad and the Alizai, while the allotment of the Barakzai was of inferior land.

[Source: Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants, pg. 33]



Ahmad Khan (later *Ahmad Shah*), from the Sadozai section of the Popalzai clan of the Abdali tribe of the Pashtuns, was born in Multan, Punjab. He was the second son of Mohammed Zaman Khan, chief of the Abdalis. In his youth, Ahmad Shah and his elder brother, Zulfikar Khan, were imprisoned inside a fortress by Hussein Khan, the Ghilzai governor of Kandahar. Hussein Khan commanded a powerful tribe of Afghans, having conquered the eastern part of Persia a few years previously and trodden the throne of the Safavids.

In around 1731, Nader Shah Afshar, the new ruler of Persia, began enlisting the Abdalis in his army. After conquering Kandahar in 1737, Ahmad Khan and his brother were freed by the new Persian ruler. The Ghilzai were expelled from Kandahar and the Abdalis were allowed to settle there instead.... Nader Shah's rule abruptly ended in June 1747, when he was assassinated.... On their way back to Kandahar, the Abdalis had decided that Ahmad Khan would be their new leader, and already began calling him as *Ahmad Shah*.

Ahmad Shah began his military conquest by capturing Ghazni from the Ghilzai Pashtuns and then wresting Kabul from the local ruler, and thus strengthened his hold over eastern Khorasan which is most of present-day Afghanistan. Leadership of the various Afghan tribes rested mainly on the ability to provide booty for the clan, and Ahmad Shah proved remarkably successful in providing both booty and occupation for his followers. Apart from invading the Punjab three times between the years 1747-1753, he captured Herāt in 1750 and both Nishapur (Neyshābūr) and Mashhad in 1751.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Shah_Abdali]

...until the greater struggle between the Durrani and Ghilzai tribes put an end to all lesser ones. When the brothers Shah Zaman and Shah Mahmud quarrelled, and owing to the treachery of Ahmad Khan (Nurzai), Zaman Shah was defeated, the occasion seemed to the Ghilzai a favorable one for the assertion of their independence.... The new wazir was then appointed to guard the passes, while 'Abd-ur Rahim went towards Kabul to raise the Suleiman Khel whom the Turin and Ibrahim Ghilzai were prepared to join. The insurgents were however defeated with heavy loss by the Ibrahim Ghilzai, amounting to 5000 to 6000 men, by a Durrani army from Kabul. 'Abd-ur Khan returned to Kalat-i Ghilzai. A second engagement took place on the Koh-i Surkh, called Surghar in Pashtu, where the Ghilzai gave battle on ground of their own choosing. Here too they were defeated, the Tokhi losing about 600 men, while the Hotaks, who were mostly horsemen, escaped with much less loss. Nothing further was done in the winter, but in the spring (1802 A.D.), that battle took place after which the year is still known as the "year of the Ghilzai slaughter."

[Source: *Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants*, pg. 99]



Shah Mahmud attempted to discourage further Ghilzai unrest by having Abd al-Rahim and two of his sons blown away from a cannon. Moreover, he followed Nadir Shah's example in constructing a minaret from Ghilzai skulls. The effects of the great "Ghilzai War" continued to be felt for years afterward.

[Source: Noelle, Christina, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, pg. 211]

Ahmad Shah returned to Kandahar and raising a Durrani army equipped with artillery and armaments, set forth to chastise the Tokhi. He was unable to affect his purpose, and the Tokhi ... retired to the mountains about Kalat, where they successfully defied the attempts of the Durrani. These, unable to make any impression, suddenly turned to Arghandab, and falling upon the women and children of the Ghilzai, put to death many of these helpless and innocent ones. This was the closing phase in the struggle between the Durrani and Ghilzai.

[Source: Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants, pg. 171]

The Kharoti tribe claims to be an offshoot of the Tokhi Ghilzai....

[Source: Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants, pg. 179]

The Ghilzai are vindictive, and are therefore prone to family-feuds and clan-feuds ... the relations between the Hotaki and Tokhi ... the old hatred still exists between them, and does await an opportunity to declare itself with fresh intensity.

[Source: Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants, pg. 175]



Afghan Sufism vs. Wahabbism

Background

Southern Afghanistan is heavily influenced by Qadiri Sufism and a large number of local Pashtun leaders generally follow the religious guidance of Pir Gailani. His National Islamic Front for Afghanistan (NIFA) played a larger role than has been previously accepted as fact due to Pakistan's ISI underreporting during the anti-Soviet jihad while they attempted to press Hekmatyar to the front ranks of their "Seven Party Alliance." In addition to having loyal local pirs in the south, NIFA had good relations with Mojdeddi's ANLF and Nabi's Harakat, but Sufi-based traditionalist parties.

Arab Wahabbis and the revolutionary Islamist parties supported by Hekmatyar and Sayyaf were far less welcome in southern Afghanistan. Much of this was due to the Arab Wahabbi tendency to view the Pashtuns as "imperfect Muslims" and their desecration of local graves and shrines that were decorated following Sufi tradition.

This factor may be use successfully to reinforce the Sufi tendencies in the south while splitting the Arabs and foreign Pashtun Islamists having similar views from the local Pashtuns.

Analysis

- Most Hanafi Afghans follow Sufi traditions in some way. Some are openly Sufis and attend sessions with pirs, but most are simply heavily influenced by Sufism and will not openly state their religious tendencies.
- The Arabs and many foreign Pashtun fighters entering Afghanistan are Salafists, either the strict Wahabbis whose religion developed in Saudi Arabia or the Deobandis with faith originating in South Asia.
- Sufism and Salafism are generally incompatible with one another. In general, Salafists openly preach that Afghan traditional grave decoration and construction of shrines constitutes a form of worship for the dead person and is a form of forbidden "polythesism." It is widely known inside Afghanistan that the Wahabbis have desecrated and destroyed Afghan graves and shrines in the past, acts that are greatly resented by the Afghans.
- Afghans recall the wars fought against the British who sought to make them into a colony and are probably susceptible to themes related to plans of the Arab Salafists to re-colonize Afghanistan as a part of an Arab-ruled Ummah, or Muslim world.

Opportunity

The Pashtuns of southern Afghanistan, particularly those current groups whose leaders were once affiliated with the Sufi-based parties, such as Harakat, NIFA, and ANLF, may accept general suggestions that the current fighting is the result of the Arab Salafists and their "foreign Pashtun mercenaries" efforts to capture and rule the Pashtuns as the Arabs did long ago. The Arabs, such as Usama Bin Ladin



and others believe that all of the lands once ruled by Arabs must be reclaimed as a part of their heritage. Their geographic goals extend from Spain in the west to the southern Philippines in the east, a broad region that also includes Afghanistan.

In order to accomplish their goals, the Salafist Arabs know that the Afghan's basic religion has to be eliminated and replaced with a new belief based on Salafism and its violent offshoot, Wahabbism. The southern Pashtuns may not know that al-Qa'ida's Arabs are attacking the primary shrines associated with Sufism as they work steadily to erase this "deviation," as they call Sufism.

The same southern Pashtuns may not know that the mosque, shrine, and tomb of the founder of the Qadiri Sufi order was severely damaged in a suicide bombing attack in Baghdad. Once known, they may decide to expel any Arabs in the region that they can locate. The Salafist attacks on Sufism and their intent to reclaim Afghanistan as a part of an Arab-ruled Ummah may have considerable resonance among southern Afghanistan's Pashtuns.

Historical Background

Wahhabism is one of the fiercest Salafi sects in its opposition to icons of all kinds. The building of shrines to commemorate dead religious figures is seen as akin to idolatry by the Wahhabi faith. Many of the homes and graves of the Muslim prophet and his companions were carelessly torn down in Mecca and Medina to make way for the building of highrises, since such historical buildings are considered to have no religious significance, and their preservation for their perceived religious value is sternly frowned upon. The departing kings of Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia are traditionally buried unceremoniously in unmarked graves....

It should be noted that not only Shi'a shrines fell victim to al-Qa'ida's bombs, several Sunni and Sufi temples were also targeted by the extremist group. The destruction of al-Qadiriya shrine last month was a major calamity for millions of Sufis around the world, who witnessed the grave of the revered Sheikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani turned into rubble.

[Source: <http://sufijourneys.blogspot.com/2007/06/shrine-politics.html>]

Al-Qadiriya Shrine in Baghdad, still in Baghdad, the city of history, literature and culture, there is another prestigious Islamic site. It is AL-Qadiriya shrine which is situated in AL- Rusafa, at a quarter known as Bab AL-Sheikh Abdul Qadir AL-Gailani, the Sheikh of Islam and the head of the Islamic scholars. History tells that AL-Qadiriya Shrine was originally a religious school. It was built by the Hanbali scholar Sheikh AL-Mubarak bin Ali bin AL- Hussein Abu Sa'eed (died 1119 A.D., 513 A.H.). He was a scholar and a pious man of religion. The mausoleum and the Mosque of Sheikh Abdul Qadir AL-Gailani saw various construction phases. The most important of which took place in 1534 A.D. (941 A.H.) when a huge and wonderful dome was constructed over the indoor praying section of the mosque. It is the biggest ever dome in Iraq to be built of bricks and gypsum....



[Source: <http://www.aljanobtour.com/islamic.php>]

The mosque is famed as the burial place of Sufi Sheikh Abdul Qadir al-Gailani, and a dome built by Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent still stands in the mosque complex. But outside, the minaret bears the scars of Baghdad's recent turmoil. Scaffolding covers its top and broken concrete and rubble surround the base, still not repaired after a May [2007] truck bombing outside the mosque which killed 24 people.

[Source: <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL17423456>]

Iraqi Qadiris could also inspire brethren in Pakistan, India, Indonesia, the Caucasus and the Balkans and western and northern Africa to join in the struggle, which many Arabs and Muslims see as a civilisational war against the West.

The well-organised Qadiris led 19th-century liberation wars against the French in Algeria and the Russians in Chechnya and Daghestan. An Iraqi Qadiri tribal leader, Dhari Khamis al-Dhari, was the hero of the Shia-led 1920 revolt against the British.

The Qadiri, or Qadiriyya, are one of the oldest Sufi tariqas (organisations). Their founder, Iranian-born Abdel Qadir al-Gailani (1077-1166), became the head of a school of Islamic law in Baghdad and a revered preacher. His tomb, located in the splendid Gailani mosque in central Baghdad, was until the recent civil strife a place of pilgrimage for both Sunnis and Shias. The Gailani family played an influential role in Iraqi politics during the 20th century.

[Source: <http://blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/Week-of-Mon-20060828/044628.html>]

Militants from the main Sunni nationalist insurgent group, the Islamic Army in Iraq, and the al Qaeda jihadist alliance known as the Islamic State of Iraq fought fierce battles May 31 for control of the southwestern Baghdad district Al Amiriyah provoked by jihadists' efforts to assert themselves in the area. On the same day, a jihadist suicide bomber struck a police recruitment center in the Sunni-majority town of Al Fallujah, killing 30 people and wounding scores. And on May 28,[2007] a truck bomb partially destroyed a mosque that houses the shrine of a major 12th century Sunni religious figure, Abdul Qadir al-Gailani.

[Source: <http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/06/iraq-nationalists-vs-jihadists-and.html>]



Violence continued to tear through Iraq. The deadliest attack of the day was the bombing of the Abdul-Qadir al-Gailani Mosque in central Baghdad, one of the world's most important shrines in Sufism. The blast destroyed several cars, shattered glass in buildings within a radius of 200 yards and scattered victims' body parts. "It was like an earthquake," said Mowaffak Abdulla, 55, who witnessed the explosion. "Smoke, dust, and were fire everywhere. Cars were burning."

As he spoke, Mr. Abdulla burst into tears. "Why would they target our Sheik Abdul-Qadir?" he wailed. "What is the government doing to stop this? I don't think they can protect us because they cannot protect themselves."

In the past two years, Sufis have found themselves the targets of attacks by fundamentalist Sunnis who view them as apostates.

[Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/middleeast/29iraq.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/M/Maliki,%20Nuri%20Kamal%20al-&pagewanted=all>]

After the Soviet withdrawal the Afghan government evacuated its garrisons in Kunar. The unorganized and fragmented mujahedin committed a number of atrocities against the civilian population of the government-controlled areas they took over and then engaged in numerous battles with each other. Jamil al-Rahman's Jam'at al-Da'wa and the seven parties of the Peshawar alliance created rival shuras in the provincial capital of Asadabad. Jamil al-Rahman received large Arab donations and many Arab volunteers joined him. He engaged in a campaign to remove flags and raze monuments erected over tombs, icons that he claimed were un-Islamic, as had that archetypal tribal puritan Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab before him. (It is a long-standing Afghan tradition to raise a flag over the tomb of a martyr fallen in jihad and to build a monument [mazar] over the tomb of a scholar or pir.

Hekmatyar's forces emerged as Jamil al-Rahman's main military rival in Kunar. The two leaders took opposing sides in the 1990-91 Gulf War; Jamil al-Rahman supporting his Saudi and Kuwaiti patrons and Hekmatyar the Muslim Brotherhood in its anti-American, anti-monarchy position. This, together with numerous other disputes, led to repeated clashes in the summer of 1991 that ended in August when an Egyptian gunman assassinated Jamil al-Rahman.

[Source: Rubin, Barnett, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pg. 261]

Ibn Jawziyyah said: "The mausoleums that are built on graves must be demolished. It is not permitted to keep them for one day if there is the power to demolish them." Seven centuries had passed after the advent of Islam with none of the scholars raising the issue. Muhammad ibn 'Abd al Wahab, who came four centuries after Ibn Jawziyyah, went further in his extremism and adopted doctrines that label



people with differing views as unbelievers and polytheists. Those falling into these categories, according to him, were worthy of nothing but extermination. Their lives deserved no sanctity, their wealth could be plundered and their families could be enslaved or killed. The legacy of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al Wahab has not only survived for two centuries, but has also acquired new international dimensions. Extremists are now distributed over the five continents and are threatening not only non-Muslims but also the very fabric of the Muslim Ummah, which is being destroyed in the rising sectarian discord promoted by followers of the neo-Salafis.

[Source: http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_501_550/destruction_of_islamic_architect.htm]

Many Afghans resented Wahhabi proselytizing. It was carried out with particular aggressiveness in Kunar. For two years a community of Arabs and Afghan converts dominated the province under the leadership of Jamil-ur-Rahman, a Pushtun native. Other Wahhabi cells were established, including a community at Paghman, which served as the base for Rasul Sayyaf, the mujahidin party leader most closely identified with Saudi Arabia....

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was the last party leader to be recognized by Pakistan. His arrival in Peshawar was delayed until 1980 by imprisonment since the mid-1970s under the Daud and Taraki-Amin regimes. He was born at Paghman, a town immediately west of Kabul. A member of the Kharruti tribe, as were Hafizullah Amin and Hekmatyar, he was released in 1979. He studied in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and was an active member of the Ikwan-i-Musalamin. Sayyaf arrived in Pakistan when foreign supporters were pressuring the parties to unite. He was elected to head a front of all the parties, the Ittehad-i-Islami B'rai Azadi-i-Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan). The front quickly broke up and Sayyaf retained the name for his own party. With excellent Arab connections, Sayyaf has been generously funded, but has had no substantial base of support inside Afghanistan. His avowal of Wahhabism limited recruitment. Wahhabism clashes with the law and practice of the Hanafi system accepted by most Afghan Sunnis. More than any of the other party leaders, Sayyaf recruited mujahidin through weapons and funds.

[Source: <http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/afghanistan/afghanistan.html>]

Wahhabi proselytizers continued to desecrate Afghan graves, provoking violent retaliation.

[Source: Coll, Steven, Ghost Wars, pg. 201]



One of the reasons they were so hated in Afghanistan was their habit of tearing down flags and decorations on Afghan graves.

[Source: Wicker, Brian, Witnesses to Faith: Martyrdom in Christianity And Islam - Page 99]



PIR SAYED AHMED GAILANI - Afghan religious leader. Once a key member of the Islamic resistance movement against the Soviets, Gailani still wields power as a leader of Afghanistan's Sufis, an Islamic denomination known for its tolerance and mystic traditions. Gailani has spoken against Islamic fundamentalism, and supports US-backed efforts to hold a loya jirga.

[Source: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0610/p01s03c-wosc.html>]

In Qandahar party and tribal allegiances were as fragmented as in the East, but relations among the fronts were on the whole good. Support of NIFA in this area ... reflected not only adherence to some local Qadiri pirs, but a general loyalty to the old regime. In the DCAR report on Qandahar, of forty-one "people of influence" whose party affiliations were given, fifteen are said to be affiliated with NIFA or working to spread the influence of Pir Gailani.

[Source: Rubin, Barnett, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pg. 244.



Are the Taliban Dividing the Durrani Confederation?

Background

There has been a history of Pakistan's successive governments working to exacerbate the split between the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtun confederations. Pakistan's motivation was relatively clear: Durrani royal governments consistently maintained claims to Pashtun regions inside Pakistan's national borders and provided strong support for generally secession-minded "Pashtunistan" advocates. The strategy of dividing the Pashtuns in an effort to counter the efforts to create "Pashtunistan" – a survival issue for Pakistan -- has been successful and may now be expanded into an effort to divide the Durrani Confederation in an effort to weaken the Karzai Administration, as was done with the previous royal Afghan governments.

Unlike the Durrani Zirk group that is well-represented in the national and provincial governments, the principal Durrani Panjpai tribes, the Alizai, Noorzai, and Ishaqzai are under-represented in the Afghan government and have grievances that are real and essentially not addressed. With the presence of the now-deceased Osmani and the presence of Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor in the senior levels of the Taliban leadership, the average rural Panjpai tribesman may feel he is better represented in the Taliban Movement than within the Afghan national government.

Finally, with the close cooperation between "marginalized" Pashtun tribes generally at odds with the Durrani Pashtun leadership in Kabul and Pakistani government organizations, a Taliban strategy of working to separate the two Durrani groups into hostile and opposing groups is highly probable. This requires efforts to counter this trend.

Analysis

- Louis Dupree once accurately described all Afghan politics as a system of "fission and fusion" that is continuing within the current instability. The large Zirk tribes, Barakzai, Popalzai, Alkozai, and even the Achakzai are generally cooperating with one another, obviously with some exceptions. The Durrani Panjpai remain "up for grabs" between the Afghan national government and the Taliban Movement.
- Mullah Omar's reliance upon senior Panjpai tribesmen, such as the Ishaqzai Osmani and Mansoor, while removing the senior Kakar leader, Bakht Mohammad, from the Taliban leadership. A key unanswered question: was this an effort on the part of the Taliban leadership to forge a Ghilzai: Panjpai alliance that could oppose the Zirk Durrani and their allies more successfully.
- If this is correct, Mullah Omar may be attempting to gather as much tribal support – at the expense of the Zirk Durrani national leadership – possibly before entering into some form of negotiations.
- Negotiation periods are generally more violent in insurgencies as the weaker guerrillas tend to press for tactical advantages they result in stronger bargaining positions.



Opportunity

Efforts should be considered to stabilize the Panjpai tribes while pointing out to them that the current fighting and resulting casualties are caused by foreign Pashtuns whose goal involves capturing the lucrative opium and hashish trade in Helmand province. Simultaneous work might be considered with senior Ishaqzai elders to enter into tribal discussions intended to draw Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor into reconciliation discussions with the Karzai administration.

Stability projects, ostensibly provided by the national government or Zirak “humanitarian groups,” intended to support the poorest of the Panjpai villages in Helmand province may partially counter the probable efforts by the Taliban to split the Durrani.

The creation of specialty jirgas in region, composed of Panjpai tribes feeling disenfranchised, with direct and meaningful access to the provincial government and provincial reconstruction team may result in a perception that they are gaining formal representation that they currently lack. This approach may work especially well with the smaller Ishaqzai and Noorzai tribes as the Alizai are larger and had representation when Sher Mohammad Akhundzada was governor (and may be again). The recent reconciliation of Rais al-Baghri and Mullah Salaam with the national government may have provided the Alizai with the perception of recognition they desire.

As unseemly as it is, some work with the less desirable members of the Ishaqzai and Noorzai tribes may be necessary to shift their positions from close to the Taliban to a more neutral point, a net loss for the Taliban, while working to counter the efforts to create wedge issues between the Zirak and Panjpai Durrani.

Historical Background

“During the Soviet occupation, Pashtun rivalries continued unabated and were actually exacerbated by outside actors. For instance, successive Afghan governments had refused to recognize the borders drawn by the British when they established an independent Pakistan following World War II. Because this line of Afghan kings had maintained territorial claims to Pashtun areas of Pakistan, leaders in Islamabad had worked to undermine the Afghan monarchy and had offered support to the Ghilzai clans. This support was most crucial in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion when Pakistan’s military dictator General Zia Ul Haq “effectively prevented the ex-king or his representatives from playing any role in the resistance.” Zia sought to ensure that the Durrani did not play any role in any post-Soviet Afghan government. One result of this was the rise of the Ghilzai-based Taliban. Meanwhile, there remained a split within the Afghan Communist Party that reflected the tribal divide between the Durrani and the Ghilzai. Both factions of the Party distrusted each other and worked to undermine the power and influence of the other tribe.”

[Source: Lansford, Tom, A Bitter Harvest: US Foreign Policy and Afghanistan (pg. 17). This provides an excellent explanation of the animosity between the two antagonistic South Asian neighbors].



The Alizai and Noorzai tribes were part of the Abdali (Durrani) tribes that were forced into Nadir Shah's service in 1728 and before the Abdalis were granted Ghilzai lands in the vicinity of Kandahar.

[Source: Muhamad Hayat Khan's Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants]

"...because Mr. Haji Bashar Noorzai is one of the most known Taliban supporters and drug traffickers in Afghanistan," Schmidt said. "So, definitely, having this person arrested is a major step in the counternarcotics efforts. We know that Mr. Noorzai is part of the Noorzai tribe from Kandahar Province. He is a quite wealthy person. And Mr. Noorzai was supporting the Taliban during the Taliban regime in providing required equipment."

[Source: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/04/mil-050426-rferl01.htm>]

Within the Afghan tribal system, the Noorzai tribe is the most pro-Taliban, while the Achakzai tribal people partially support the Taliban. Between them, they dominate trade in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their region spans the southwestern parts of Pakistan and the southern areas of Afghanistan. On the Pakistani side, they control the Chaman markets and on the Afghan side the Spin Boldek markets.... All of these traders are either from the Noorzai tribe (100% pro-Taliban) or from the Achakzai tribe (partially pro-Taliban). These tribesmen wield immense financial clout in Kandahar and most newly constructed hotels belong to them.

[Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IA10Df02.html]

While Taliban leader Mullah Omar's tribal background is not known, he was always reliably supported by the Noorzai tribe.

[Source: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1587252-3,00.html>]

Now, in the Taliban's traditional stronghold in the south--where Noorzai's tribe lives--the radical Islamic group is actively encouraging poppy cultivation on a grand scale, a dramatic shift from its days in power when its puritanical tenets forbade drugs and drug trafficking. Why the change? As a Western diplomat in Kabul puts it, "It takes money to fund an insurgency." Of the \$3 billion earned last year by Afghan narcotraffickers, roughly \$800 million trickles down to the Afghan farmers who grow the crop. According to a senior Western official in Kabul, a small portion of that sum is "more than enough to finance" the insurgency--and the Taliban gets more than a small portion. "The more money the traffickers make, the more they can give to the Taliban, the more weapons the insurgents can buy and the more dangerous the insurgency becomes," says Kamal Sadaat, head of Afghanistan's antinarcotics police force.



[Source: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1587252-8,00.html>]

The largest Pashtun tribe in Helmand, the Alizai (23.5%), are in secret talks with the government regarding a possible defection from the Taliban insurgency. The tribe's leader, Mullah Abdul Salaam, is a powerful Soviet-jihad mujahidin commander and former Taliban Corps commander.

[Source: <http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/4729>]

The Alizai tribe holds sway across most of northern Helmand, including Musa Qala, Baghran, and Kajaki districts. The Alizai are known to be Taliban sympathizers, arms smugglers, and heavily involved in the illicit drug trade. The former governor of Helmand province, an unsavory Alizai tribesman named Sher Muhammad Akhundzada, was found with over 9 tons of opium at his provincial headquarters by US officials. Karzai subsequently fired Sher Muhammad upon the insistence of UK forces who were preparing to deploy throughout Helmand province in 2006.

[Source: <http://www.wideawakes.net/arena/viewtopic.php?p=22949&sid=fed0dbe5900c212b18fb32ce401b8014>]

"The Itzakzai tribe, in particular, have been key Taliban supporters, principally because they have felt excluded from both provincial power and the province's lucrative drugs trade since 2001...."

[Source: <http://iraqupdate.wordpress.com/category/taliban/>]

NATO officials and western diplomats consider Mullah Obaidullah as one of those closest lieutenants of Mullah Omar. The other two were Mullah Akhtar Osmani and Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor. [Both Osmani and Mansoor were/are Ishaqzais.]

[Source: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/02/top1.htm>]



Panjpai Relationship with the Durrani

Background

Recently a question came up regarding the relationship within the Durrani Confederation. Specifically, there were reports that the Panjpai tribes (Alizai, Ishakzai, and Noorzai) were actually Ghilzai tribes that were incorporated (or incorporated themselves) into the larger, stronger Durrani tribes in approximately 1728 when Persia's Nadir Shah provided the Durrani tribes large tracts of previously Ghilzai lands by royal grant. The land grants were provided in appreciation for the Durrani service in the capture of Daghestan after these tribes were forced into Persian service following their rebellious actions when they attacked Mashed.

The question was thought provoking and outlined a pattern of tribal behavior in which weaker tribes allow themselves to be incorporated into one that was large in return for gained prestige and increased protection.

Analysis

- According to Muhamad Hayat Khan's *Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants*, the Alizai and Noorzai tribes were part of the Abdali (Durrani) tribes that were forced into Nadir Shah's service in 1728 and before the Abdalis were granted Ghilzai lands in the vicinity of Kandahar. He failed to mention the Ishaqzai in his history. The Alizai leader, Nur Mohammad Khan, was clearly mentioned as being a leader of the Abdalis in Nadir Shah's force that captured Daghestan and was rewarded with Ghilzai lands for their feat of arms.
- Ferrier included all five of the current Panjpai tribes in his second division of the the Abdalis in his book, *History of the Afghans*, that was apparently written in 1845 and translated into English in 1858.
- There may have been previous animosity between the Abdali tribes and the Ghilzai that predated the Nadir Shah's royal grant. The Saddozai (Popalzai) spokesman for the Abdali tribes, Allahyar Khan, asked that the Ghilzai lands "be made over to the Abdali" during the meeting with Nadir Shah. Based on this statement, it remains possible that the Panjpai tribes may have allied themselves with the Abdalis long before their period of service with Nadir Shah and the doubt cannot entirely be ruled out. In Pashtun culture, there is generally reason for a separation within a tribe or group of tribes and this may explain the separation of the Zirak and the Panjwai.
- The confusion over the origins of the Panjpai may have been created by the Adamec section "...it appears from the genealogical table given overleaf that no such division as the Panjpai ever existed..." and Adamec seems to have relied upon a single source for this information.
- While it is difficult to determine with any precision the actual origin of the Panjpai group of tribes, they were part of Nadir Shah's Abdali force that captured Daghestan. This occurred prior to the grant of Ghilzai lands and the five Panjpai tribes seem to be a part of the all important genealogical record of the Durrani Confederation.



- Conclusion: Panjpai tribes have been a part of the Durrani Confederation since before 1728 and probably before. There is a small chance that these five tribes may have been Ghilzai at one time, however, but before the royal grant of the Ghilzai lands to the Durrani by Nadir Shah.

Historical Background

About the end of 1728, Nadir Shah (Irani) taught the Abdali [Durrani] an unwonted lesson of subjection, notwithstanding which they soon after, under the leadership of Zulfikar Khan, older brother of Ahmad Khan, rebelled against their new conqueror, marched upon Mashed, and after defeating an army commanded by Nadir Shah's brother, laid siege to the city. When, however, the famous general, Nadir Shah, himself appeared in force, they raised the siege and fell back to their own country, closely pursued by Nadir Shah who soon appeared before the gates of Harat. With desperate energy the Abdali, thus pursued to their last stronghold, defended the beleaguered city, and when, after ten long months it surrendered, the enraged conqueror determined to signalize his success that should put an end to Abdali turbulence. He sent 6000 families into exile in various districts of Persia, scattered others to Multan and elsewhere, and forced great numbers to enter his army....

Nadir Shah had been eleven months engaged in the siege of Daghistan, when he was one evening eating in his tent, a ball struck the ground near and caused some dirt to fly into the dish before him. Siezed with a fit of ungovernable fury (the Naderi temper is still a byeword) the despot sent for the Abdali chiefs who were with his force and swore that unless the city was taken within 20 hours they should all pay the forfeit of their lives. Upon this Ghani Khan (Alikozai), Nur Mohammad Khan (Alizai), Haji Jamal Khan (Mohammadzai Barakzai), Khanu and Manu Khan (Nurzai) and the other leading Abdali gathered their fellows together, and at their head made a determined assault upon the city which, after an obstinate resistance, fell into their hands within the time specified. Nadir Shah, well pleased with their gallantry, promised to grant them any request they might make, and the assembled chiefs, putting forward Allahyar Khan (Saddozai) [Popalzai] as their spokesman (that same that afterwards met his death at Sabzawar), then asked that the ancient possessions of the tribe might be restored to them, that those sent into exile to Persia might be recalled, and that the lands then held by the Ghilzai might be made over to the Abdali. This boon was granted.

[Source: Khan, Muhamad Hayat, Afghanistan and its Inhabitants, (1874), translated by Joseph Priestly, 1981, pp. 62- 63]

Indeed, it appears from the genealogical table given overleaf that no such division as the Panjpai ever existed. The Zirak division is again subdivided into Barakzais, Popalzais (or Fufalzais) and Alikozais, whilst the so-called Panjpai division is said to be subdivided into Nurzais, Alizais, Ishakzais, Khugianis, and Makus. Each clan contains several branches.

[Source: Adamec, Vol. 5, pg. 142]



Abdel, the son of Tsera-Bend, the founder of this tribe, had only one son, named Teryn, who had two sons, Zirek and Pindja: from the first originated three tribes and from the second five.

The tribes that descended from Zirek are:

- (1) Koofdzye, more generally known as Popolzye
- (2) Barukyze
- (3) Alikiouzye

The tribes descended from Pindjpa are:

- (1) Isakzye
- (2) Alizye
- (3) Noorzya
- (4) Khaouganee
- (5) Makohee

[Source: Ferrier, Joseph P., History the Afghans, (translated in 1858), pp. 8-9]

The distinguished service rendered by the abdali tribe to Nadir Shah was now met with fitting acknowledgement. The lands lying west of Heart, and still held by the Durrani, were made over to them by royal grant. Besides this, the Ghilxai lands were also apportioned among them, the valley of the Arghendab falling to Ghani Knah and his clan of the Alikozai, and the region of Dawar to Nur Mohammad and the Alizai, while allotment of the Barakzai was of inferior land.

[Source: Khan, Muhamad Hayat, Afghanistan and its Inhabitants, (1874), translated by Joseph Priestly, 1981, Pg. 63]



Quetta vs. Peshawar as Taliban "Power Center"

There seem to be three separate "power centers" related to the Pashtun insurgency that are geographically distinct from one another with potential hostile leadership personalities, and potentially opposed to one another. These are easily viewed as "North", "Central", and "South." The differences in these geographic groups were probably noticed by the insurgent's foreign "sponsors" who have real and continuing needs to keep them separated to prevent the insurgents from coalescing into a single force that could present a very significant threat to their "sponsor." Keeping the insurgents divided must be a national priority to their "sponsor."

"North" is fairly unique in the Afghanistan and Pakistan border region. The inhabitants are generally Wahabbi and are relatively recent converts to Islam, making them more religiously zealous than many other Afghan-Pakistan populations. They were the first to openly revolt against communist rule and Wahabbis like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are strong in that region. The indigenous Wahabbi "Panjpir Movement" was in conflict with Hekmatyar's Wahabbis over disagreements over a response to the 1991 Gulf War and the leader of the Panjpir Movement was assassinated to leave Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami the dominant force in the region. They are a revolutionary movement that seeks to impose Sharia on the Afghan population. This region seems to end between Asadabad and Jalalabad.

"Central" covers the area immediately to the north of Jalalabad and extends southward to the southern boundary of Waziristan. The primary political parties are the remnants of Yunis Khalis' Hezb-i Islami (HIK) and Jalaluddin Haqqani's mujahedin group. Khalis was once allied closely with Hekmatyar, but the groups split and some animosity probably still exists. Haqqani was an early mujahedin leader who opposed Mohammad Daoud following the coup that removed Zahir Shah from the Afghan throne. Some limited cooperation exists between Hekmatyar, Khalis's son and heir, and Haqqani, but their political and personal differences will assist the insurgency's "sponsors" in keeping North and Central groups from uniting. The appearance of Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan has upset a long-standing balance of power and is probably a significant factor in the recent re-appearance of Jalaluddin Haqqani to offset Baitullah Mahsud's charisma and political-military power in the central region. Mullah Kabir is a key regional commander. He is Taliban and is probably in a balancing act of trying to maintain some semblance of control over HIK and Haqqani's operations in some form of coalition. Peshawar is the location of the coordination group for both "North" and "Central."

"South" extends from the southern boundary of South Waziristan to the the southern end of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and Quetta is the location of the coordination group that tries to hold the loose coalition of forces together that is the Taliban. This is the location of the real power of the Taliban Movement, a force that seems to have risen out of resentment for Pakistan refusing to allow them a role in their "Seven Party Alliance" that fought the anti-Soviet Jihad and planned to govern Afghanistan afterwards. Southerners, like Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi's Harakat, were in the Seven Party Alliance, but -- and very significantly -- there were no Durrani Pashtuns in key command positions in the



Pakistan-backed Seven Party Alliance.

Pakistan's motivation was simple. Southern Pashtuns were primarily Durrani, the tribal confederation from which the nation's ruling tribes, the Popalzai and Barakzai, had their tribal territory. Both of these tribal groups were strong advocates of the concept of "Pashtunistan," a Pashtun homeland that extended to the Indus River in Pakistan. The Afghan king, Zahir Shah, a Barakzai from the Mohammadzai subtribe, was also a Pashtun advocate and the two countries had nearly entered into open conflict over the issue. Pakistan closed its borders to Afghan trade on two occasions in the 1960's, forcing trade to be opened to the north with the Soviet Union -- changing Afghanistan's political orientation.

The second major factor in Pakistan's decision to exclude Durrani and southern Pashtuns, in general, from the political apparatus being formed to govern the post-Soviet Afghanistan involved religion reasons. Pakistan's ruler, General Zia-ul Haq, relied increasingly upon Pakistan's religious political parties, generally Deobandi, to offset his political opposition. Southern Afghanistan's Pashtuns, both Durrani and Ghilzai, were generally influenced by Sufism, a form of Islam that was very opposed to the more strict Deobandism. The exclusion the Sufi-based mujahedin parties, such as Nabi's Harakat and Mullah Naqib's Alikozai tribe that was allied with Professor Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami, was intended to hold Zia's religious allies to the Pakistani military.

These southern Pashtuns fought the Soviets and Najibullah's Afghan communists to a standstill and were even able to fight their way into Kandahar where they forced the communist governor, a Barakzai named Ulumi, to enter into negotiations to end the fighting. Soon undercut by Pakistan's ISI and Hekmatyar, resentment probably grew among these Durrani and Ghilzai.

When the Taliban first formed, they were Pakistani Pashtuns from madrassas under the control of two Pakistani Pashtuns, Fazl-ur Rehman and Sami-ul Haq, who formed volunteer units that crossed the Afghan border at Chaman and soon captured Afghanistan's Spin Boldak. Soon afterwards, the southern Pashtuns -- the very fighters denied the victory they had won against Ulumi and Najibullah a very few years earlier -- took control of the new Taliban and were soon on the march. It is no accident of fate that many of the Taliban's commanders, and Mullah Mohammad, were members of Mohammad Nabi's Harakat. They were not going to be denied again.

These are the current leaders of today's Taliban, southern Pashtuns -- probably nationalists who despise Arabs as much as they despise Americans and Britons -- who were denied a hard fought victory against Najibullah's forces in Kandahar. Angry, resentful, distrustful, frightened, and having no real options other than to continue fighting, these very non-pragmatic Pashtun leaders are located in the vicinity of Quetta. Their desired end state involves the recapture of Kandahar, possibly negotiation from a position of strength afterwards, and Helmand province's opium profits that allows them to remain a potent combat force.



Their "North" and "Central" regions that are generally coordinated out of Peshawar's refugee camps are far less significant to the Taliban Movement than is Quetta.



KEY HUMAN FACTORS



Helmand Province - Background Related to the Role of Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (and development of factions within the Alizai tribe)

There are multiple key events in the development of current alliances and animosities within much of Helmand Province:

First, the entire “Akhundzada” group was composed of three brothers and the son of one, Sher Mohammad, were essentially a religious family that gained considerable secular power at the expense of the traditional land-owning khans of Helmand Province. This shift in the tribal balance of power left the senior brother, Mullah Nasim Akhundzada, at odds with the remaining traditional tribal leaders in northern Helmand province, Abdul Rahman Khan and Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghriani.

Second, these groups allied themselves with different Jihadi parties as Mullah Nasim entered Mohammad Nabi’s Harakat, Abdul Rahman Khan joined Hezb-e Islami (Gulbuddin), and Abdul Wahid allied his forces with those of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-i Islami. Abdul Rahman and Abdul Wahid joined forces against Mullah Nasim’s Harakat as Helmand Province entered into a civil war among the dominant Alizai tribe. Mullah Nasim and his brothers represented the Pirzai sub-tribe while Abdul Wahid led the Hassanzai sub-tribe. [Abdul Rahman’s subtribe has not been located at this time and is a pending piece of important information.]

The third factor is related to the assassination of Mullah Nasim Akhundzada and the subsequent murder of his brother, Ghaffar, in Pakistan along with several of their sub-commanders. These leaders were all members of the Harakat and were in frequent conflict with tribal rival Abdul Rahim Khan, who was allied with HIG. The reaction to Nasim’s assassination was demonstrated clearly when the two surviving brothers attacked the man blamed for Nasim’s assassination. Within a month, their forces attacked and defeated Abdul Rahman Khan’s HIG forces located at Girishk.

With the death of the three brothers, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada moved into leadership of the Harakat party fighters in Helmand.

Analysis

- Harakat appears to have been the dominant Jihadi political party in Helmand Province during the anti-Soviet jihad. Mullah Nasim’s selection of Harakat should not be surprising. According to Robert Kaplan (Soldiers of God), Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Forces) was led by a cleric, Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi, was less a moderate party than a neither-nor group of urban intellectuals and village clerics under the same roof.
- Many of the Taliban’s leadership personalities, including Mullah Mohammad Omar, were members of Harakat. Having this background in common – along with personal common



enemies – Helmand’s former Harakat will have opportunities to communicate readily with contacts within the Taliban who were also affiliated with Harakat.

- Those individuals opposing Sher Mohammad’s family, especially those in HIG with suspected responsibility in the assassination of Mullah Nasim Akhundzada, will not be openly received in Helmand Province. Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani’s alliance with HIG’s Abdul Rahman Khan will keep him unwelcome in areas of Helmand Province dominated by former members of Harakat regardless of his membership in Jamiat-i Islami. Abdul Rahman Khan returned temporarily to Gireshk but relocated to France where he was living in 2005.
- The choice of Jihadi party may have been based on the selection of an intra-tribal antagonist rather than being a selection resulting from ideological choice. Abdul Rahman Khan may have selected HIG because Mullah Nasim was allied with Harakat, for example.
- The animosity generated between the Pirzai (Sher Mohammad) and Hassanzai (Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani) probably developed during the period when Mullah Nasim initially sought to capitalize upon the local unrest to gain secular power at the expense of Helmand’s traditional elites. Casualty lists on both sides of this intra-tribal civil war ensure that their animosity will continue into the future, regardless of the political positions assumed within the Afghan national government by either of these sub-tribe leaders.
- Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani, previously affiliated with Jamiat-i Islami, came to the support of the Taliban at Gireshk during a major offensive by Ismail Khan and Ahmad Shah Masood’s Tajiks, also previously associated with Jamiat. Al-Baghrani’s reinforcements allowed the Taliban to defeat the Tajiks and soon they lost both Shindand and Herat. Al-Baghrani has enemies among the Alizai’s Pirzai sub-tribe and the Tajiks who are now in the national government. Since reconciling in April 2005, al-Baghrani has Taliban enemies, as well.
- The impact of tribal animosity seems to have a decreased effect in southern Helmand Province, possibly due to the influence of many tribal groups migrating into the region once the land reclamation projects associated with the Helmand Valley Authority were completed.
- Opportunists, primarily communists, from the southern region exist and will be the subject of a separate study.

Potential Opportunities

There were generally three “moderate” Jihadi parties, Harakat, Nifa, and the Jabha-i-Nijat-Milli of Sibghatullah Mojeddeddi that might be coalesced into one large party. Their common denominator has been a strong Sufi influence in all of them. Encouraging the creation of a provincial Ulema Council composed of the province’s senior religious scholars through the use of financial incentives, possibly encouraging the development of a provincial madrassa may pull the Sufi scholars together. If this is considered, it should remain outside of the provincial government or Taliban propaganda will “label” it as a part of the government and attack it. Generally Sufis are very opposed to Salafists/Wahabbis and encouraging the development of a religious system that bolsters Sufism may have a positive impact on the extremism.



Sufis will never openly state their religious choices, but nearly any religious leader claiming affiliation with any of the three “moderate” parties will have Sufi tendencies. They may also be attracted to any offers of assistance for the creation of a “peace conference” or development of a madrassa. The development of a madrassa in Helmand Province will attract students to it rather than push new students into the free madrassa system in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan where they are frequently radicalized.

Within Islam, there are frequent suggestions that “unity” is critical to maintaining peace within the Muslim community. Equal warnings about the undesired consequences of “disunity” are also found. Given the large percentage of Pashtuns in Helmand Province, the provision of quiet support to create a “Pashtun Unity Movement” may also result in additional stability. The fact that there was a long-running civil war occurring between Sher Mohammad Akhundzada’s Pirzai sub-tribe and the Hassanzai sub-tribe affiliated with Rais al-Baghrani provides a recent example of the impact of disunity. It may be wise to focus efforts on a general “Pashtun Unity” movement rather than try to unify a single tribe, such as the Alizai. A limited unity program could be viewed as a threat by the smaller tribes in Helmand Province, such as the Ishaqzai and Noorzai tribes and the minority of the huge Barakzai tribe that lives in Helmand Province. Efforts at unifying all Pashtun tribes are probably the safest approach.

In meetings with Pashtun leaders and elders in Helmand Province, interlocutors may want to guide discussions to the fact that the fighting is “Pashtun against Pashtun” and point out that if “Muslim on Muslim” violence is forbidden in their holy writings, Pashtuns killing Pashtuns must be especially forbidden. Once any discussion such as this is entered into, the conversation may be led into the fact that the Pashtun “civil war” and its associated violence is holding back reconstruction and development work inside the Pashtun areas while the non-Pashtun regions are being repaired and developed. Examples should be given (Herat’s paved streets and a new highway in the Panjshir, a new province) and the fact that the Pashtun regions soon will be so far behind the other regions that they will never be able to catch up. The key question can be inserted at the end of this line of reasoning: “Who is benefiting from this Pashtun fighting?” Many Pashtuns have never considered this line of reasoning and positive results may occur.

While the Helmand Province’s Harakat members have a great deal in common with the Taliban leaders who were in the same Jihadi party, opportunities exist to rally some of the Taliban’s membership to the peaceful Harakat. The key to potential success involves “deliverables” of some sort being provided to cooperating Harakat groups through civic action programs and direct grants for projects that can be verified. As “peaceful” Harakat groups begin to thrive, emissaries may be sent to discuss “peaceful tribal progress” with members of the same tribe who remained with the Taliban’s Harakat. Contacts such as this and the examples of progress that can be presented in regional media may result in a gradual reduction in Taliban recruitment and retention capability.



Historical background

Harakat-e-Inqilab-e Islami had less of a regional concentration than the other Jihadi parties, but gradually took on a more Pashtun focus. One area of Harakat concentration was in Helmand Province where their commander, Maulavi Nasim Akhundzada, became a powerful warlord based on opium growing. Nasim's power was so extensive that he was the only Sunni traditionalist singled out by Afghan president Najibullah in his appeal to seven major commanders in April 1988.

[Source: Rubin, Barnett R., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pg. 213]

On March 25, 1990, Mullah Nasim Akhundzada, a leading commander of Harakat-e-Inqilab-e Islami, was assassinated along with five other commanders (his bodyguards), in Cherat, 25 kilometers east of Peshawar. One suspect, Allah Noor of Helmand, was caught and sent to Harakat-e-Inqilab-e Islami officials in Quetta where he was reportedly executed; another suspect was imprisoned. Akhundzada was a major heroin producer, with some 10,000-15,000 men under his control. Over the previous three or four years, he reportedly sold heroin to Hezb-e Islami forces for processing; before his assassination he had struck an agreement with U.S. officials to cut production in exchange for U.S. A.I.D. funds. Since that agreement, his men had been locked in a bitter feud with Hezb-e Islami forces. In revenge for Akhundzada's murder, Abdul Haq of Hezb-e Islami was reportedly imprisoned and tried by Harakat-e-Inqilab Islami forces. According to one source, he was reportedly executed in early June 1990. Other sources claim that his fate remains unknown.

[Source: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/afghanistan/5AFGHAN.htm>]

Nasim Akhundzada met with Ambassador Robert Oakley in Islamabad and offered to stop opium cultivation in return for \$2 million a week to support his "private army" of 7,000 men. Nasim was 34 years old.

[Source: New York Times, February 4, 1990]

Nasim Akhundzada was succeeded by his brother, Ghulam Rasul. [Probably incorrect name]

[Source: Rubin, pg. 213]



The Helmand base of HIG commander, Haji Abdul Rahman, was attacked by Nasim's mujahedin forces in April 1990. "All of the tanks in the base were transferred to Musa Qala by the mujahedin of the late commander."

[Source: Afghan Information Centre]

The Akhundzadas -- tribal warlords of Helmand: Confirmation of the tribally based warlords' potential for resilience comes from an example of a family who fought on the jihadi side during the 1978-1992 war. The Akhundzadas played an important role from the very beginning of the conflict in the southwest. Belonging to main tribe of Helmand, the Alizais, they hailed from Musa Qala district in northern Helmand. While in the new districts of Nad Ali and Nawa, where farmers tended to be immigrants from mixed tribal backgrounds and tribal rhetoric had little impact, in the other districts tribal networks remained much more solid, especially in the north. It was first Mullah Mohammad Nasim Akhundzada who became a prominent commander in the Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, the leading jihadi party in Helmand. The information available on Nasim is contradictory. He appears to have been a relatively charismatic military leader, who could count on a large number of devoted fighters. He is still seen as having led many successful battles against the Russians and Afghan government forces, although the extent of his actual success has probably been exaggerated, particularly as far as the Soviet Army is concerned. He had also been involved in fierce fighting against other jihadi parties, particularly the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.

Nasim was not a tribal leader at the start of jihad. He was a taleb at that time and like other mullahs, his status within Pashtun society was quite modest. His rise to prominence was a byproduct of the war, as he overtook the traditional khans and accumulated a much greater power than they themselves could muster. In 1978, when the Khalqis started antagonising the landlords, many of these khans fled. Following a successful anti-government uprising in Sangin district, a group of insurgents from Sangin attacked Musa Qala and took it from the government. As they returned to Sangin, they left in control only a small group of insurgents.

This small group inherited weapons left behind by the Sangin insurgents. When the government retook the district center, they moved to the mountains from where they continued their activities and rapidly became one of the main insurgent groups in the province. As the government started losing control over the countryside, the khans came back and tried to reassert themselves against the new generation of military leaders who were consolidating their hold. However, the khans suffered badly in the fighting and were wiped out in most of the province.

Despite his clerical background, Nasim appears to have moved to a position of tribal leadership, rather than using the jihad movement as an opportunity to build bridges across the tribes. Over the following years, three families from among the Alizais of northern Helmand led the jihad. Apart from the Akhundzadas, the two other families were that of Abdul Rahman Khan and of Abdul Wahid [Rais al-Baghmani], with the one important survivor among the khans being Abdul Rahman, whose family of well



established traditional khans was locked in a conflict with the Akhundzadas leading Abdul Wahid and Abdul Rahman Khan to join forces against the rising star of the Akhundzadas.

The two sides fought a bloody war, which peaked in autumn 1987 when Nasim Akhundzada brought the war deep into Abdul Rahman's territory in Kajaki district. The fighting was so violent that the locals welcomed Soviet troops as peacemakers when they deployed in the area. Abdul Rahman Khan was under so much pressure from Mullah Nasim that he had joined Hizb-e Islami, a party not normally known for being friendly to khans. In northern Helmand, as in much of Afghanistan, Hizb-e Islami was considered somewhat heretic and dubbed as an Ikhwani group. Much of the fighting between Harakat-e Enqelab and Hizb-I Islami was in fact a fight between two families - Nasim's and Abdul Rahman's. Other commanders of Hizb-i Islami, for example Moalim Ubaidullah and Moalim Mir Wali, were from the "detrified" south and were educated and therefore relied more on ideological arguments for recruitment. After the 1987 fighting Abdul Rahman Khan withdrew back to Girishk, which he held until 1990, when following Nasim Akhundzada's assassination his brothers unleashed a major offensive against Hizb-i Islami's last stronghold and wiped it out.

The Akhundzadas seem therefore to have been charismatic military leaders, but Nasim also showed a considerable organisational capability and a flair for business. Starting from the time of jihad, and accelerating after the Soviet withdrawal, Nasim appears to have worked actively for the expansion of the narcotics business in Helmand. The poppies were a traditional crop in northern Helmand, but Nasim favoured their expansion towards southern Helmand, a territory which he conquered once he had gained an edge over his rivals thanks to the poppy revenue. His exact role is a matter of controversy. Rubin reports that he established a system called Salam (peace), which allowed him to buy the harvest at the time of sowing, at low prices. According to this interpretation of how Nasim's system operated, he also forced all farmers in the area to cultivate poppies. Those who refused were punished with torture and execution. There seems to have been a clear difference between northern Helmand, the Akhundzadas' home territory where they relied on the respect of their fellow tribesmen to rule, and southern Helmand where Nasim's rule was imposed by force. Rubin speaks of a "personalistic dictatorship" over the peasantry of the south. Like some of his fellow warlords of northern and western Afghanistan, he did invest some of his resources in the provision of services to the population, such as hospitals, clinics and madrasas, or at least so he claimed.

Other sources, however, could not find any trace of forced cultivation of opium poppies among the farmers. They attribute the spread of poppies mainly to market factors, although Nasim likely encouraged the process. An example of this can be found with his 1981 fatwa legitimising poppy cultivation. Farmers from the northern districts migrated to the government lands of the south and took the poppy crop with them. In other words, the role of Nasim and other Akhundzadas might always have been closer to that of a patronage dispensing tribal leader than that of an authoritarian leader. What is certain is that he benefited from their role as protectors of the narcotics trade and their control over the trading routes. In part, the expansion of the territory under his control was also the result of the need to control the transport routes of the poppies. In 1989 Nasim fought a bloody battle for the control of a bridge with commander Yahya of rival jihadi party Ittehad-i Islami. Yahya tried to levy a tax on poppies in



summer 1989, only to have Nasim attack his area and conquer it. His businessman-like pragmatism allowed him to send the harvest to the refineries of Hizb-I Islami, from where the final product was then smuggled into Iran and Pakistan.

[Source: <http://www.afghansolidarity.com/forum/index.php?s=281078d510d51b787ddaab5a53f67c85&showtopic=1588>]

Nasim Akhundzada's brothers were Mullah Mohammad Rasool and Mullah Abdul Ghaffar.

[Source: <http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp7.2.pdf>]

While Rasul died of natural causes his brother Mullah Ghafar was, like Nasim, assassinated in Pakistan, this time allegedly by the Taleban. In a further display of extreme resilience, after the death of the three brothers Mullah Sher Mohammad, son of Mohammad Rasul, replaced them at the head of the family and became governor of the province in 2001. He would serve to be the second longest lasting provincial governor of post-Taleban Afghanistan. He was removed from his job only in December 2005, at the insistence of the British.

[Source: <http://www.afghansolidarity.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=1588>]

Nasim Akhundzada, Ata Mohammad, and Rais Noorzai attacked Girishk in April 1989.

[Source: Afghanistan Information Centre, No. 97. April 1989, pg. 20]

Commander Bahlol (NIFA) and Dad Mohammad Khan (Jamiat) combined forces to attack Haji Faizullah Khan (HIG) and forced Faizullah from their area. Haji Abdullah Khan (NIFA) expressed his support for the HIG commander, Faizullah Khan.

[Source: Afghanistan Information Centre, April-May 1991, pg. 31]

Nasim Akhundzada's supporters (Harakat) fought Maulavi Ata Mohamamd (Jamiat) in 25 June 1991 in the area of Naw Zad. Ata Mohammad was forced from his headquarters in Sangin.

[Source: Afghanistan Information Centre, July-August 1991, pp. 53-54]



Key Helmand Political Leaders in 2003

Individual	Jihadi Party	District
Haji Mullah Amir	Harakat	Musa Qala
Haji Mullah Abdul Rahim Akhund	Jamiat	Baghran
Anamullah	Jamiat	Dishu
Abdullah Jan	Harakat	Garmser
Haji Mullah Sharafuddin	----	Kajaki
Haji Tawaz	Harakat	Khaneshin
Mullah Sher Mohammad (Kajaki)	Harakat	Lashkar Gah
Meera Jan	----	Nad Ali
Mullah Quddos	Harakat	Nahri Saraj
Mohammad Rahim Khan	NIFA	Naw Zad
Mohammad Nabi Khan	----	Naw-e Barakzai
Gul Mohammad	Jamiat	Sangin

[Source: UNHCR District Profile]



Animosity Between Harakat and HIG in Helmand Province

Background

There were long-term tribal animosities occurring among the Alizai sub-tribes and clans that were carried over into the anti-Soviet Jihad. While the factors that led to Jihadi party selection by individual tribal leaders may never be fully understood, the party selected by a tribal antagonist may have been a major reason for party selection by an opposing leader. Availability of funds and arms that could be used against a tribal enemy may have been another factor. At a least common denominator level, the conflict in Helmand province during the civil wars between the communists and mujahedin and subsequently among the mujahedin, themselves, appears to be a continuation of ancient intertribal animosity.

The factors that created the tension between the subtribes and the tribes are probably still viable factors that need to be considered as stability efforts are undertaken in Helmand province. The Alizai tribe is dominant in the Helmand region and stabilization efforts among them will be useful in stabilizing the entire province. This approach may also have some impact on the overall cohesiveness of the Taliban insurgency by setting Harakat and its former members who became Taliban against Hekmatyar and HIG, further isolating them.

The large profits from the opium fields attracted Hekmatyar during the late 1980's and a minor war was fought between what was essentially Harakat and HIG for control of the drug trade. Casualties were heavy on both sides, but Hekmatyar was an outsider while Mullah Nasim and his brothers, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada's family, were from Helmand province and were probably viewed by many locals as defenders. The animosities that grew from the casualties taken are probably still present.

Analysis

- Tension has existed between Helmand province's Harakat and HIG contingents since the the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980's. The tension culminated with the assassination of Mullah Nasim Akhundzada and the subsequent murder of his brother, Ghaffar, in Pakistan along with several of Harakat sub-commanders.
- These leaders were all members of the Harakat and were in frequent conflict with tribal rival Abdul Rahim Khan, who was allied with HIG.
- The Harakat reaction to Nasim's assassination was demonstrated clearly when the two surviving brothers attacked and defeated Abdul Rahman Khan's HIG forces located at Girishk.
- Since HIG had a base at Girishk, that town must have current HIG sympathizers living there now.
- Harakat and its probable allies (all tribal factors being equal) are NIFA and ANLF, a total of 16 mujahedin era commanders in Helmand Province when compared to the 8 HIG commanders. Harakat, alone, had 12 commanders operating against the Soviets and communists during the 1980's and is probably still the strongest party in Helmand province.



Opportunity

Considerable animosity between the Harakat and HIG must still exist. The two Harakat leaders killed with their subcommanders near Peshawar were Sher Mohammad Akhundzada's uncles and the Harakat reprisal attack on the HIG base at Girishk indicates that Helmand's Harakat leaders believed HIG was responsible for the murders.

HIG tried unsuccessfully to capture the opium industry in Helmand province, engaging in combat with Harakat commanders, such as Mullah Nasim. Casualties were taken on both sides and greater anger and resentment may be retained in Harakat's followers.

HIG lacks tribal cohesiveness and seems to form generally where tribal structures have broken down. The situation in Helmand from the early jihad drove the traditional maliks and khans from their positions of local power and HIG took advantage of the social breakdown. Efforts to unify the tribes, beginning with the Alizai and continuing with the Panjpai group, may have the side effect of restricting HIG's ability to recruit and raise funds in Helmand province.

Working to unify the Alizai tribe may effectively reduce the effectiveness of HIG in Helmand. Harakat's followers include many of the members of the Taliban leadership and any efforts to reduce HIG's presence in Helmand may also encourage Harakat veterans in the Taliban to work against HIG. There is tension between the two insurgent groups that may be magnified by any HIG reversals in Helmand province.

Historical Background

The third factor is related to the assassination of Mullah Nasim Akhundzada and the subsequent murder of his brother, Ghaffar, in Pakistan along with several of their sub-commanders. These leaders were all members of the Harakat and were in frequent conflict with tribal rival Abdul Rahim Khan, who was allied with HIG. The reaction to Nasim's assassination was demonstrated clearly when the two surviving brothers attacked the man blamed for Nasim's assassination. Within a month, their forces attacked and defeated Abdul Rahman Khan's HIG forces located at Girishk.

One of Hekmatyar's chief rivals in the mujahedin, Mullah Nassim, controlled the poppy fields in the Helmand Valley.... In 1989, Hekmatyar launched an assault against Nassim, attempting to take control of the Helmand Valley. Nassim fought him off, but a few months later Hekmatyar successfully engineered Nassim's assassination....

[Source: Cockburn, Alexander, Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press, pg. 264]

While Mullah Nasim ruled the opium fields of Helmand, Hekmatyar held the heroin complex at Koh-i-Soltan at the southern end of Helmand, just across the border inside Pakistan. Beginning in 1988, Hekmatyar's local commander challenged Mullah Nasim's rule over the Helmand opium harvest. Once the snows melted in the spring of 1989, the war was revived, now focused on a bridge that linked



Helmand to Pakistan’s heroin refineries.... Though Mullah Nasim won that opium war and inflicted heavy losses on Hekmatyar’s forces, within a year, he, too, was dead, probably from a drug assassin’s bullet.

[Source: Eisendrath, Craig R., US Intelligence After the Cold War, pg. 132]

The establishment of Hekmatyar groups is a phenomenon which transcends tribal alliance, but it occurs most frequently in Pashtun areas and amongst young intellectual groups. It is to be found most frequently in pockets where tribal structures have broken down or which have a mixture of groups originating from different tribes.

[Source: Roy, Oliver, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, pg. 112]

Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami Afghanistan was established on the same day under the leadership of Mohammadi. Ulemas, religious personalities, civil and military officers, scholars and youth joined Harakat-e-inqilab-e-islami Afghanistan. Very soon Jihad was started in all of Afghanistan, in every province and district. After nearly four months for a number of reasons, engineer Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Ustaz Rabbsni got separated from Harakat e Inqilab e Islami and founded their own parties by the name of Hizb-e-islami and jamiat-e-islami. Molvi Mohammad Nabi carried the leadership of Harakat and managed Jihad in Afghanistan better than before. Harakat e inqilabi islami was one of the seven parties that were officially recognized by the Pakistani government and was funded by the US and Arab countries through the Pakistani government.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Nabi_Mohammadi]

Helmand Mujahedin Commanders

Name	Tribe	Jihadi Party	Operational Area
Maulavi Nassim Ahkuhdzada	Alizai	HAR	Helmand Valley
Baz Mohammad Akhund		HAR	Helmand; Nad Ali
Abdul Rauf		HAR	Helmand, Shirin Tagao
Mirza Ahmad		HAR	Helmand
Maulavi Mohammad Rasol	Alizai	HAR	Helmand Valley
Abdul Rahman		HAR	Helmand
Ubaidullah	Pashtun	HAR	Helmand, Kajaki district



Haji Abdul Raouf	Pashtun	HAR	Helmand, Kajaki district
Ghulam Haidar	Pashtun	HAR	Helmand, Kajaki District
Bismallah	Pashtun	HAR	Helmand, Kajaki district
Malim Lal Mohammad	Pashtun	HAR	Helmand, Kajaki district
Malauvi Ata Mohammad	Pashtun	HAR	Helmand, Sangin district
Amanullah		HIG	Helmand
Haji Abdur Rashid		HIG	Helmand, Girishk district
Mohammed Mussa Alukat		HIG	Helmand Valley
Abdurrahman Khan	Alizai	HIG	Helmand, Musa Qala district
Hafizullah	Barakzai	HIG	Helmand, Lashkargah
Yahya Khan		HIG	Helmand, Nawa district
Shah Mohammad		HIG	Helmand
Maulavi Zia Ul Haq		HIG	Helmand, Washer district
Abdul Waheed Akhundzada	Alizai	JIA	Helmand, Ainak area
Daoud Mohammad Khan	Alizai	JIA	Helmand, Sangin district
Ajab Gul	Ludi	JIA	Helmand, Nad Ali district
Ghulam Reza Rahimi		NASR	Helmand
Ahmad Akbar		NIFA	Helmand Valley

[Source: Orkand Study, 1989]



Kandahar Province – Durrani Tribal Competition with the Peshawar Jihadi Parties; Origin of the Taliban

Background

Unlike Helmand Province where instability produced a situation in which the khans, the landed elites, lost their dominant political status to opportunists, many of whom were the leaders of new religious parties, Kandahar remained relatively stable and essentially unchanged. The resistance to the communists and their Soviet allies generally consisted of the more “traditional” Jihadi parties that sought to return Afghanistan to its pre-1973 stability by reinstalling the king, Zahir Shah. These Pashtun moderates were opposed by the more “revolutionary” parties that planned to create an Islamic state as an entirely new form of government.

The moderate parties were the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) under Sufi Pir Gailani and Harakat-i-Islami under Sufi Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi. They were supported by Sufi Sibghatulla Mojdeddi’s Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF), an organization that didn’t play a major role in southern Afghanistan. In southern Afghanistan, these moderate parties – with their general orientation toward Sufism – were generally composed of Durrani tribes that had traditionally provided Afghanistan’s kings, the Barakzai and Popalzai. Generally allied with the Barakzai were the Achakzai, once a part of the larger Barakzai tribe whose sub-tribe, the Mohammadzai, provided the country with Zahir Shah. Given this historical background, the Durrani were generally “royalist” in orientation.

The more “revolutionary” parties, those of Hekmatyar, Khalis, Sayyaf, and Rabbani, Hezb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) or HIG, Hezb-i Islami (Khalis) or HIK, Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and Jamiat-i Islami, respectively, had little Sufi influence and maintained headquarters in Peshawar. Their lack of a Sufi influence was not their only difference; they all received a great deal of western and Saudi aid that was funneled to them through Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI), an organization that clearly favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, the Durrani mujahedin – who had been denied any significant role in the Peshawar-based parties by Pakistan’s ISI – fought their way into the Durrani capital city, Kandahar, and appeared on the verge of winning a major victory. They entered into negotiations with the communist governor, a fellow Durrani named Ulumi who was from the Barakzai tribe, as it became increasingly obvious that they might win a major victory, possibly creating a cascading series of disasters for the Kabul government. This situation was not lost on Najibullah, the communist president, and the “royalists” entered into negotiations to end the war by forming a coalition government with the communists.

This end state, however, was not one that was desired by Pakistan. They had a series of major incidents with Zahir Shah’s government over the concept of “Pashtunistan,” the creation of a Pashtun nation that would absorb a great deal of Pakistan’s territory. As the negotiations became possible, Pakistan moved



its proxy, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, into the southern region to undercut the possible victory of the Durrani that would lead to a return of the king.

During this period, assassinations of key Durrani and Sufi leaders began and Hekmatyar appeared to remove the Durrani leadership. The Barakzai tribe lost Haji Abdul Latif, the “Lion of Kandahar,” and the Popalzai’s senior leader, Abdul Ahad Karzai was assassinated. Professor Majrooh, the Sufi poet with a PhD who operated the Afghanistan Information Centre in Peshawar was also murdered soon after his monthly bulletins began to speak about the desire of a majority of Afghans to see Zahir Shah returned to Kabul.

Denied an earned victory as well as any participation in the “Seven Party Alliance” that attempted to govern Afghanistan following the disintegration of the Najibullah government, the Durrani “royalists” – primarily those leaders within Mohammad Nabi’s Harakat, fumed quietly. It was no accident of history that the new Taliban’s leaders were primarily from Harakat. Angry at being unable to negotiate an end to the war and the creation of a coalition government with the communists that essentially would have returned Afghanistan to its pre-1973 form of government, these “traditionalist” Pashtuns of both the Ghilzai and Durrani Confederations found common cause. While the Taliban may have originated in Pakistan and supported by volunteers from Fazl-ur Rahman’s political party, the new “student” movement quickly became an indigenous Afghan movement with many of its leaders tested veterans of the anti-Soviet Jihad and the civil war against the Najibullah’s communists – and, as often as not, they were affiliated with Mohammad Nabi’s Harakat.

Analysis

- Kandahar’s Jihadist parties were less “revolutionary” than the Peshawar-based parties that were receiving the bulk of support from foreign sources.
- Pakistan – the conduit of much of the foreign assistance to the mujahedin – generally supported the revolutionary parties. Based on their history of antagonism with Zahir Shah over the Pashtunistan issue, the Pakistanis minimized the role of the more moderate traditional parties rather than risk the return of Zahir Shah and the dangerous issue of Pashtunistan he supported.
- When the southern parties were positioned within Kandahar city and had entered into surrender negotiations with the city’s communist governor, they were undercut by Pakistan’s ISI that favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a violent revolutionary Islamist whose primary role seemed to be the attacking of other Jihadist parties.
- Assassinations of key southern and royalist leaders began as the traditionalists were sidelined in favor of the more revolutionary parties that took control of Afghanistan following the communist defeat. They quickly turned on one another.
- The Taliban generally emerged from the more religion-based Jihadi party, Harakat.



Potential Opportunities

Efforts could be initiated to attempt to unify the tribes and leaders that were associated with the southern traditionalists, the Popalzai, Barakzai, and parts of the Achakzai. The Achakzai were once a part of the Barakzai tribe and Barakzai elders could be asked to help with making Achakzai contacts. Caution should be exercised with the Durrani Alikozai tribe as many of their leaders were affiliated with Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami party that was basically dominated by Tajiks. Individual jihad era commanders formerly associated with Harakat, NIFA, and Anlf could be encouraged to enter the unity process, regardless of tribe.

Since many of the current Taliban leaders were once members of the Harakat, key Harakat leaders working within the Afghan government could be utilized to make contacts with their former colleagues remaining in the Taliban to encourage them to also rally to the national government or a unity movement.

The creation of a Pashtun peace movement that condemns Muslim-on-Muslim violence could be encouraged. The development of a Pashtun Peace Institute could be encouraged. The "Red Shirt" movement of Badshah Khan could be used as a general model.

Economic development of the southern region would be helpful in reducing the unemployment and lack of economic hope within the young Pashtun tribesmen. The construction of a railroad from Chaman to Quetta would serve to open markets for the fruits and produce of southern Afghanistan, encourage local investment in the creation of new agricultural areas, and stimulate expatriate Afghan investments in the region. Create vocational schools to provide skilled labor for railroad construction and other job opportunities that will emerge once the railroad is functional. [One venture capitalist estimates the cost of the 70 miles of railroad would cost approximately \$50 million.]

Efforts should be made to empty refugee camps by relocating feeding and support programs to deliver commodities directly to villages rather than to the camps. Refugee camps now contain a second generation of young Pashtun men who lack any future hope of economic opportunities, lack strong role models of working, warrior fathers, and are subject to the influence of religious role models that generally lead them toward violence. Focusing resettlement efforts toward villages will serve to reduce the migration toward urban areas where returning refugees will quickly overwhelm social services.

Design and implement "development shuras" within the individual tribes. Once the shura decides on what project has the highest priority, they should agree to responsibilities for the security for the actual development site. The division of labor should have the shura managing security while contractors perform the actual work. Contractors should hire and train local labor whenever possible. A high priority should be given to projects developed to support the Alikozai tribe and its new chief who replaced Mullah Naqib. They occupy key terrain, and in many ways, the Alikozai are the keepers of the tribal balance of power in the Kandahar region.

Additional efforts should be made to create development shuras for the Noorzai and Ishaqzai tribes, smaller tribes that have little, if any, actual governmental representation. They are smaller, poorer, and



are heavily involved in narcotics and provide support for the Taliban insurgency. Stabilizing these tribes will have a positive impact on the insurgency.

Historical Background

Kandahar Province is dominated by the Durrani Pashtuns, especially the Achakzai, Barakzai, Popalzai, Mohammadzai [sub-tribe of the Barakzai], and Noorzai tribes. As the ancestral home of the tribal lineage (Mohammadzai) that has ruled Afghanistan for more than a century, Kandahar's tribal leaders remain adherents to the more moderate of Afghanistan's resistance parties, particularly that of Pir Gailani (NIFA) and Harakat-i Islami (Mohammedi). However, the so-called fundamentalist resistance parties, especially those of Sayyaf (Itihad Islami) and Khalis (Hezbe-i Islami) are reportedly gaining ground in the province. Nevertheless, the traditional power structure of the province based on the influence of large landowning khans and their families remains largely intact [as opposed to what occurred with the khans in nearby Helmand Province]. Simply put, the main political division in the province is between the royalists and the supporters of the Interim Government of the mujahedin parties, with the former having the majority of the popular support both within the province and in the refugee camps.

[Source: UNHCR, "Kandahar Province", prepared by the Data Collection for the Afghan Repatriation Project, 1 September 1989]

In April 1987, the Afghan Information Centre (AIC) – the only independent Afghan source of news about the fighting inside Afghanistan – broke its general rule of avoiding news and commentaries on the political situation in Pakistan to note the groundswell of support for Zahir Shah among refugees and mujahedin. This news accompanied indications that the Soviets might at last be ready to leave the country. According to the AIC, support for the king – while most evident among Afghans from the southern provinces – was widespread throughout the refugee and mujahedin communities and came even from some Hezb-i Islami commanders whose endorsement directly contravened their party's official position.... This report went on to describe a meeting outside Quetta of some six thousand refugees and mujahedin from the four western provinces (Qandahar, Helmand, Zabul, and Uruzgan) at which the leaders "deplored the persistent disunity among the political leaders and criticized their inability to unite, and at the end of all shouted: "We want King Zahir Shah!"

[Source: Edwards, David B., Before Taliban, pg. 279]

On August 7, 1989, the 76-year-old Barakzai commander of Kandahar, Haji Abdul Latif, known as the Lion of Kandahar, was poisoned to death, allegedly by Hekmatyar's men. Haji Latif was then fighting against a rump shura of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf commanders in the province. A month ago, Hekmatyar had himself visited Kandahar, together with a large group of his militia, mostly Ghilzais recognizable from their northern Pashto dialect.



[Source: Ahmad, Isthiaq, Hekmatyar, pg. 24]

Pakistan's concerns about the Pashtunistan issue therefore contribute to Islamabad's resistance to a broad-based Afghan settlement process as well as Pakistani favouritism for the Afghan radical Muslim factions. An inter-ethnic political consensus among Afghan groups would inevitably sideline the Taliban in favour of traditional tribal and clan leaders. Pakistani strategists and the joint venture have so far effectively blocked emergence of a religiously moderate Pashtun tribal alternative to the Pashtun Muslim radicals through weapons transfers, financial means and assassinations, such as the 1999 assassination of prominent Popalzai tribal leader, Abdul Ahad Karzai, in Quetta.

[Source: http://www.omaidd.com/english_section/in_the_press/geoPolitics_pTomsen_Feb01.htm]

One factor that has kept the "Zahir Shah option" alive over the years is the king's popularity among refugees, especially political moderates and the exiled elite. A survey conducted in 1987 by Afghan scholar Sayed Bahuddin Majrooh's Afghan Information Center, based in Peshawar, Pakistan, found that 70 percent of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan favored the king's return. Majrooh was assassinated in 1988, allegedly by an Islamist faction led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar, who strongly opposed a role for Zahir Shah.

[Source: <http://www.qwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB59/>]

Solidarite Afghanistan is working with Sayyid Hamid Agha, who holds great respect among the local population. He is reportedly closely with Pir Gailani in trying to enhance the power and influence of NIFA in the region. [Haji Agha was murdered while serving as Kandahar Provinces Director of Refugee Affairs in 2004.]

[Source: UNHCR/Kandahar Background Report, 1 September 1989, pg. 16]

The hatred of the fundamentalist parties like Khalis's for the nonfundamentalist parties like NIFA was therefore easy to comprehend, since it had to do not only with politics but with class divisions, as well. But the NIFA guerillas hatred of the Soviets took a different form: it was fired by tradition, not religion. The difference between NIFA and Khalis's Hezb-i-Islami was that Khalis's men were revolutionaries, while the NIFA mujahedin were simple patriots. They wanted a restoration of the days prior to 1973, when nDaoud's coup against the king set the country on the ignoble path toward communism. Khalis, on the other hand, wanted a new Afghanistan entirely: an Islamic republic, free of both king and Communists.



[Source: Kaplan, Robert D., Soldiers of God, pg. 19]

Because NIFA was willing to settle for less, and was also doing less of the fighting, it was more willing to talk to the enemy. As the Kremlin began to realize that the ideology of communism had no future in Afghanistan and the best it could hope for was a return to the status quo ante, NIFA and the other nonfundamentalist parties became even more inclined to make a deal. By late 1987, NIFA and Moscow were each willing to settle for a return to mid-1973 conditions.

[Source: Kaplan, Robert D., Soldiers of God, pg. 191]

ISI had developed a pattern of exaggerating the successes of the mujahedin who were deep inside. The reason was to justify Zia's strategy of arming his Peshawar pet, Hekmatyar, to the detriment of the other six resistance groups. ISI's motive was particularly strong. When it began to look as if Kandahar might fall to the guerillas, ISI got nervous. Kandahar's conquest would strengthen the hand of royalist forces such as NIFA's, because it was in Kandahar that King Zahir Shah enjoyed his strongest support. ISI, intent on creating a fundamentalist Afghanistan in Zia's image, wanted Kandahar to fall only if the credit and spoils would go to commanders like Hekmatyar and Rasul Sayyaf.... ISI had sponsored Hekmatyar on a tour through the region, providing him with an army escort right up to the Afghan border.... In order to get the Americans to turn a blind eye to this policy, ISI had to show results in the field, such as claiming the Kandahar airport was under control.

[Source: Kaplan, Robert D., Soldiers of God, pp. 215-216]

The city elders I interviewed desperately wanted a negotiated settlement with the Communist governor of Kandahar, a disaffected Parchami named Nur-ul Haq Ulumi. That, of course, was what NIFA wanted too, so that the only Afghan with a strong royalist base would fall first and serve as a springboard for King Zahir Shah's return. But since the fundamentalist parties, the Pakistanis, and the Americans did not back a settlement, Kandahar's inhabitants were doomed to go on suffering. (Had the Pakistanis and Americans supported NIFA's course of action, it is possible that Kandahar would have fallen to the mujahedin before the end of 1988, leading to mass army desertions in Kabul and the subsequent collapse of the Najib regime – making unnecessary the badly organized, bloody siege of Jalalabad that began in March 1989, in which large numbers of civilians were killed.)

[Source: Kaplan, Robert D., Soldiers of God, pg. 222]



Kandahar - the Betrayed City

The organizations of Peshawar treated this brave city with unjust and disappointed it during the most critical times. Its declared crime is it is the hometown of Zahir Shah, the last king and the mortal enemy of the Pakistani government.... Thus brave men took control of their city, at least twice, during the Jihad period. It was about to return to them one more time when the Soviet withdrawal was in its third.... It is not a secret that the people of Kandahar shared a mutual feeling of distrust and hidden hatred with the organizations of Peshawar.... They told me point blank; we don't like Peshawar's organizations and we don't want them, we want King Zahir Shah.

What many don't know is that Kandahar's Mujahedin rarely have left their town; they remained until the end in control of certain sectors. For instance, they used to capture one side of its main road and shield in its old clay buildings; while the government soldiers shield on the other side, and both sides exchanged shots from heavy guns and RPG rockets or recoilless guns.

Thus, when most of the Soviets have left; the best thing is to seize Kandahar, it is even better for the Mujahedin if the Soviets revoke their withdrawal under these conditions that guarantee safe withdrawal for the Soviets with this intensification and escalation of the war in Afghanistan.

The main role was for leader "Hekmatyar"; who moved his men and they opened the road for the military rescue heading from Herat to Kandahar. They were destroyed many times along the road until the rescue has arrived from the fundamentalist leader; who claimed that he rescued his homeland from a conspiracy to bring Zahir Shah back.

It was certainly not the case; rather it was a back stab, coming from Peshawar to the hearts of Kandahar's Mujahedin. What goes around comes around. The Mujahedin of Kandahar gave it back many times to the Peshawar Parties on the hands of the Taliban Movement; who rushed like a storm from Kandahar towards Kabul and other regional capitals. In essence, this movement was a people's revolution against the deviation of the organization and the corruption; by which the common life, specifically in the country, was destroyed after assuming government in Kabul.

[Source: Hamid, Mustafa, Chats Number Eleven, pp. 45-46. Note: Hamid was an Arab fighter and al-Qa'ida's military leader, Sayf al-Adl's, father-in-law.]



Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi's Harakat as a Stabilizing Factor

Background

During Afghanistan's social unrest following the Daoud coup and the communist coup that replaced him, the "traditionalists" that included land-owning Khans, tribal Maliks, and the senior clergy began to rally rural populations to oppose the new governments. Over time, the Khans and Maliks, normally large landowners, were displaced by either the communists or the "revolutionary" opportunistic clergy who forced them to immigrate to safer areas or were killed. This seems to be genesis of the power vacuum into which the clergy moved and remain as powerful factors in Afghanistan.

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi's Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami formed a political party that was generally centered on Afghan religious scholars, but this group was essentially "traditional" rather than "revolutionary" and seeking to impose a fundamentalist Islamic government on the Afghan people like those parties of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf. Nabi also seems to have bridged the gap between his group and the traditionalists under Pir Gailani and Hazrat Mojdeddi's political organizations as well as maintaining good relations with Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami.

The essential difference between the "traditional" parties of Nabi, Gailani, Mojdeddi, and even that of Rabbani with the "revolutionary" parties of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf was the traditionalist's connection to Sufism. Gailani is the leader of the Qadiria Sufis in the region and Mojdeddi leads the Naqshabandi Sufis. There is no available information that indicates that Rabbani was a practicing Sufi, but his Jamiat attracted many Sufis from the north and it is highly likely that the Pashtun leaders from the south who entered the Jamiat were attracted to Rabbani because of his connections to the region's Sufis. Rabbani's key commander, Ahmad Shah Masood, was discussing mysticism and Sufi poetry with his friend, Masood Khalili, during the night before his assassination.

Hekmatyar and Sayyaf were heavily influenced by Salafism and its derivatives, Deobandism and Wahabbism, respectively. Additionally, these "revolutionary" political parties were supported and heavily financed by foreign interests. In the case of Hekmatyar, he was supported by Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) that funneled the largest portion of American assistance to his Hezb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) (HIG) and Saudi Arabia provide the funding that kept Sayyaf's forces in the field against the Soviets.

Yunus Khalis was also a revolutionary cleric leader who formed a powerful political party, but he seemed to lack the drive for personal power that seemed to be driving Hekmatyar and Sayyaf.

Analysis

- There were two separate, basic political groupings that opposed the Soviet invasion and the Afghan communists allied with them. One was the Sufi-based or Sufi-influenced parties of Nabi, Gailani, and Mojdeddi that were generally allied with Rabbani's Tajiks. The second group was composed of political parties seeking to impose Islamic rule over Afghanistan in a



revolutionary approach to the establishing of a new form of government. These leaders were Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, and Khalis. (While there were several political parties with combat elements supported by the Iranians, none of them were sufficiently powerful to challenge the role of any single Sunni revolutionary party.)

- The single factor that seemed to allow the revolutionary parties to gain more regional strength than the traditionalists was the allocation of foreign support. While Pakistan recognized Rabbani, Nabi, Gailani, and Mojdeddi, the overwhelming bulk of foreign financial assistance was passed to Hekmatyar by the Pakistanis. In the case of Sayyaf, Saudi Arabia provided large amounts of direct funding at levels generally matching that sent by the United States.
- Nabi was one of the first of the Afghan leaders to oppose communism in Afghanistan and he appears to have served as a catalyst figure serving to rally other leaders into the opposition. Selected as the leader of the opposition to communism, he was quickly undercut by others who entered his coalition.
- Nabi's apparent plan to instigate and support an officer's uprising in Kandahar failed for probably multiple reasons, but this potential revolt demonstrates Nabi's influence in southern Afghanistan. Later in the war, around 1987, these same traditionalists were denied a second opportunity for victory through negotiations and the creation of a royalist: communist coalition that would have denied the revolutionary parties a victory.
- Nabi apparently believed that Hekmatyar and Sayyaf had been working against him behind his back.
- Undercut by the revolutionaries, denied support and adequate funding to dominate the Afghan Jihad, the traditionalists watched as Pakistan's ISI maneuvered Hekmatyar's HIG into the southern region while the Americans received disinformation regarding the role the traditionalists might play.
- The death of Pakistan's Zia ul-Haq shifted the political scene as Benazir Bhutto tilted Pakistan's support away from the extremists and more toward the traditionalists. Out of their resentment over being denied any opportunity to win a victory or form a coalition with the weakened communists that would have returned Afghanistan to the pre-1973 form of government, in a typical Afghan consensus agreement, many of the traditionalists from southern Afghanistan entered the new Taliban. Many, if not most, of the Taliban's leadership came from Nabi's Harakat.
- Given Nabi's Sufism and the fact that Mullah Lawang, the man for whom Nabi's madrassa was named, has a shrine in Paktia Province, Nabi was a Sufi. Additionally, Nabi was connected to both the Qaderia and Naqshgbandi Sufi orders, and through them to Pir Gailani and Mojdeddi. Nabi's Harakat was once the connection between the other traditionalist parties. The creation of the Taliban has served to split the traditionalist parties into generally opposing groups with southern Pashtuns on either side of the current Afghan conflict. Harakat, in particular, is divided and many Taliban commanders, to include Mullah Mohammad Omar, were once in Harakat and attended Nabi's madrassa.



Opportunity

For the most part, Salafism – Deobandism and Wahabbism – are anomalies on the Afghan religious-political scene where traditional Hanafi Muslims and Sufis, generally Qaderia in the south, were the most prevalent form of Islam. Any efforts to stimulate a Sufi resurgence will have a stabilizing impact on the region.

Nabi's old Harakat organization probably presents the best opportunity to reinforce Sufi traditions in southern Afghanistan, but care must be taken not to strengthen the role and status of the opportunistic clergy, such as Sher Mohammad Akhundzada's family and similar religious families that have gradually displaced the traditional maliks and khans. If former more secular members of Harakat are not located, individuals with a religious background who have rallied to the Government of Afghanistan, such as Maulavi Qalamuddin (details in the historical background below) might be approached and developed gradually into a stabilizing influence responsible for locating former Harakat members and rallying them to the national government or a "Pashtun Peace Movement."

If Harakat members can be located and encouraged to work together in either a "peace movement" or a "unity institute," they may also be encouraged to send delegations to the remnants of the other traditional political parties and to the Pashtun members of the Jamiat-i Islami living in the south in an effort to draw them into a larger organization.

This approach may be effective in dividing the Taliban rank and file membership into two groups, those seeking reconciliation and the fighters planning to remain active. This potential fissure may be further enhanced if the senior membership of the new organization has the authority to guarantee safe conduct transit for reconciling Taliban while being able to ensure potential reconciles that they are not on any "coalition black list."

Afghans cannot keep a secret and those Harakat members contacted by the "peace movement" membership, a form of grass roots reconciliation program, can be expected to discuss their "options" with Taliban colleagues, ensuring leaks. These nearly guaranteed leaks of potential "defections" will probably result in the Taliban leaders making threats and assigning security responsibilities to trusted members to prevent members from reconciling. As their leadership's increased efforts to prevent reconciliation develops, anger, fear, and frustration may be created that may result in even increased desire to reconcile and creating additional "fault lines" to exploit.

Historical Background

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi was an Andar Ghilzay Pashtun from the Sherkhel village of the province of Logar. Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi is the leader of the centrist traditionalist Islamic resistance organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Movement. Mohammadi studied in the Mulla Lawang madrasa in Ghazni and after graduation served as a mulla in various villages, including villages in northern Afghanistan. Mullas and mawlawis (religious scholars), among them Mawlawi Mughalkhel, formed the widest circle of his acquaintances. He also served as a representative (khalifa) of the Mojaddidi family. Mainly because of the support of the family, he won a seat in the National Assembly in



the constitutional period. There he once physically beat Babrak Karmal for making pro-Soviet remarks. Mullas and mawlawis mainly from the Logar, Ghazni, and Helmand provinces, as distinct from the educated Islamists, form the bulk of support for Mohammadi's organization, which is one of the major resistance organizations. Its original rapid progress was curbed by the Islamist organizations of Islamic Association and the Islamic Party of Hekmatyar (Z.G. Alam, personal communication, San Diego, 1993).

[Source: http://www.afghanan.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=49&Itemid=69]

In 1946 when he was 26, he finished all Islamic education and began to teach. In 1947 he was a part of Qadiria Methodism due to the insistence of Ulema in the region. In the same year he also joined Naqshbandia Methodism in order to obtain self-confidence....

In 1958, while some of the other scholars were already carrying out anti-communist activities and a newspaper styled "Khalq" was published, Molvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi began preaching against communism to people who would listen, traveling far and wide to many of the provinces in Afghanistan.

In 1969 while Babrak Karmel, Hafizullah Amin, Noor Ahad and Anahita Ratibzada had become candidates for the membership of the Afghan General Assembly, Movi Mohammad Nabi also made himself a candidate of the Logar Province with the aim of removing the communists in the General Assembly, and he was eventually selected to be a member of parliament. His political war against communism began in earnest shortly after he was selected and there was ample opportunity as a fierce struggle between the two competing ideologies of communism and Islamic government had been raging for some time.

Despite the government being quite despotic he managed to succeed in convincing the Muslim members of parliament to side with him and many communists lost their provinces as a result. However, it is rumored that he physically assaulted another member of parliament and used other bully tactics in order to accomplish his aims. He is also known for a comprehensive speech in a parliament session that was played globally on radio stations around the world; the speech itself alarmed the communist states and provoked further action.

At the end of the period of the parliament by a coup in 1973, Daud Khan came to power. The Russians and their supporters in Afghanistan knew fully that Daud Khan was unable to stop the activities of the Ulemas against the communists and that the communists would soon be fully vanished from Afghanistan. So by a coup in 1978 (sour 1357 hijree shamsi), a Russian puppet, Noor Mohammad Tarki, came to power. Mohammad Nabi Mohamadmi was under the secret surveillance of the communists. Soon after, Mohammadi was compelled to leave Afghanistan and immigrated to Pakistan.

From the west part of Afghanistan, he arrived in Quetta, a city in Balochistan province in Pakistan, and there he proceeded to gather a large number of religious scholars and to make qualified activities inside Afghanistan in almost all provinces. He sent messages to all Ulemas inside Afghanistan and encouraged



them for the Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan. At this time in Peshawar Hizbe islami and jamiat e islami Afghanistan intended to make a unity under a single leadership. Molvi Mohammadi was thought to be the best to lead the Jihad and Mujahedin of Afghanistan in such a dangerous and delicate mission. So he was asked for the leadership from Quetta. Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami Afghanistan was established on the same day under the leadership of Mohammadi. Ulemas, religious personalities, civil and military officers, scholars and youth joined Harakat-e-inqilab-e-islami Afghanistan. Very soon Jihad was started in all of Afghanistan, in every province and district. After nearly four months for a number of reasons, engineer Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Ustaz Rabbani got separated from Harakat e Inqilab e Islami and founded their own parties by the name of Hizb-e-islami and jamiat-e-islami. Molvi Mohammad Nabi carried the leadership of Harakat and managed Jihad in Afghanistan better than before. Harakat e inqilabi islami was one of the seven parties that were officially recognized by the Pakistani government and was funded by the US and Arab countries through the Pakistani government....

In 1992 the pro-Moscow government in Kabul collapsed and the Mujahideen took power. Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi became the Vice President in the Mujahideen government. But when the Mujahideen leaders opened their weapons at each other and the civil war in Afghanistan started, he resigned from his post and forbade the troops loyal to him from taking part in the war. He remained in Pakistan and tried his best to stop the war between Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdur Rab Rasool Sayyaf. In 1996, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. Most of the Taliban leaders were the students of Molvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Mohammadi, however, maintained a good relationship with the Taliban, recognizing that they brought peace in Afghanistan. He at times advised them to soften their policy regarding individual rights, female education, etc.

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi died in Pakistan on 21 April 2002, at the age of 81.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Nabi_Mohammadi]

Provincial committees were also established to coordinate resistance activities in each of the twenty-six provinces of Afghanistan. A number of experienced military officers began to develop coordinated plans for the resistance. Symbolic of his new status, Nabi was taken to Bela Hissar fort in Peshawar by Rabbani and Hekmatyar. There he was introduced to Pakistan authorities in charge of Afghan refugee affairs as the elected leader of the Afghan resistance, who was henceforth in charge of relations with the Pakistani authorities and responsible for all assistance directed to the mujahedin.

Shortly after the establishment of Harakat, however, efforts began in earnest to undermine the alliance. Rumors began to spread that Nabi was incapable of organizing the party, that he hadn't done a day's work since the alliance was announced, and that his family members were draining the party coffers. During this period, a secret plan was also approved for an uprising by military officers in Qandahar, but the timing of the uprising was botched, information was leaked, and the government succeeded in capturing the officers involved in the plan. While the causes of this failure have never been adequately explained, many assume that the mix up was brought about either by miscommunications or outright sabotage by disaffected members of the party who wanted to see the alliance destroyed. Nabi himself



was blamed by many involved in the failed Qandahar uprising. They had been told that Harakat had weapons and would support the operation, but support never appeared, and those involved were decimated. Nabi subsequently claimed that he had no involvement in the order to begin the uprising in Qandahar, and he accused Hekmatyar and Sayyaf of working behind his back.

[Source: Edwards, David E., Before Taliban, pg. 246]

Three traditional political parties had also appeared as separate entities by 1980. Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, imprisoned under Daoud, used his family and traditional Naqshbandiyya Sufi linkages to create the Jebha-i-Melli Nejat (National Liberation Front) by the end of 1978. Militarily the weakest of all the parties, Mojaddidi had the support of pockets of Pashtuns, including key Popalzai Durrani Pashtuns in Kandahar. Similarly, Maulavi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi thurned the Harakat-i Inqulab-i Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution) coalition into his own party, which by all accounts was the strongest front early in the war. Mohammedi is a Ghilzai Ahmadzai from Lowgar who had been a member of parliament in the 1960's. His party was based strongly on "the inward looking, traditional ulema" and, unsurprisingly, was the organization most affiliated with the rise of the Taliban in 1994. The final party to form before the invasion was Pir Sayed Gailani's Mahaz-i-Milli Islami-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan or NIFA) in late 1978-early 1979, based on family tribal ties and his Qadiriyya Sufi followers. Gailani not only had a religious title but also was married to a granddaughter of Amir Habibullah; he was thus the strongest proponent throughout the war of the return of the king to Afghanistan.

[Source: Goodson, Larry P., Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, Pg. 62. Note - Goodson's assertion that Nabi was an Ahmadzai is probably an error.]

The Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF)--Jebh-e-Nejat-i-Melli Afghanistan was a moderate party founded by Sebqhatullah Mojadeddi. Primarily secular, it drew from the tribes, the old social order and the Sufi orders of the South. Its strength was in Kunar and Paktia provinces. It has Deobandi links.

The Islamic Party (HIG)--Hezb-e-Islamie-i-Gulbuddin founded in 1974 to fight the Daoud government. It later split as cofounders Rabanni and Khalis founded their own factions. Its leader, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is a fundamentalist internationalist Pashtun. His radical Islamist party recruited heavily from among the government secular school and Kabul religious school graduates. Hikmatyar's party received more outside aid from Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia than any other party. Its strength was in Nuristan, Nangrahar and around Kabul.

Islamic Party (HIK)--Hezb-e-Islami-Khalis was founded by Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis who left Afghanistan for Pakistan in 1973 after the Daoud coup. Khalis is from Nangrahar Province and is very



anti-Shia. His most famous commanders included Abdul Haq in Kabul, Haji Abdul Qadir in Nangrahar and Jalladuddin Hagani of Paktia Province. The party is fundamentalist moderate. Its recruits came from graduates of government schools, religious schools of the Gilhzai, Khugiangi and Jadran tribes as well as the Kabul and Kandahar regions. It also drew a lot of army deserters. Its strength was in Nangrahar, Kabul, Kunar, Lowgar and Wardak provinces.

Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA)--Harakat-e-Inqilab-i-Islami was founded by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. The party is moderate (traditional Islamist) and primarily Pashtun. It drew recruits from the private seminaries, liberal intellectuals, and the Andar, Gilhzai, Mahmud, Hotak, and Durrani tribes. Its strength was in Lowgar Province and the Helmand valley. General Yahyah Nawroz was one of its most famous commanders.

Islamic Society (JIA)—Jamiat-i-Islami was founded by a Tajik, Burhanud-din Rabbani, who fled to Pakistan in 1974. His most famous commanders were Ahmed Shah Masood in the Panjshir valley and Ismail Khan in Herat Province. The party is primarily moderate fundamentalist and dominated by ethnic Tajiks, but has Uzbeks and Pashtun in its ranks. Its recruits came from the religious and secular government schools and northern Sunni religious schools and northern Sufi brotherhoods. Its strength was in northern Afghanistan. It had members throughout Afghanistan but was particularly strong in Lowgar, Samangan, Faryab, Farah and Nimroz provinces.

[Source: <http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/miredinmount.htm>]

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi: Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami (Islamic Revoultionary Movement), Born 1921, Logar Province

In the 1950's, he was one of the first members of the religious establishment who agitated against leftist movement in the country. H was elected to the parliament in 1964 as a representative of Logar. In 1978, after "Saour Revolution", he fled to Pakistan and utilized a network of mawlawis to organize armed resistance against Kabul regime. In early 1980, his group was one of the largest Mojahedin group; but his group has less influence in the current political situation in the country. After the take over of Taliban power of Kabul, Nabi Mohammadi has become less active in the political and military elite of Afghanistan.

[Source: <http://www.ariaye.com/english/history.html>]





Maulawi Qalamuddin

Among the wide range of people standing for parliament in Afghanistan, there is one man whose past record makes him a remarkable choice of candidate by any standards.

Maulawi Qalamuddin was deputy head of the Taleban's ministry for the prevention of vice and promotion of virtue, whose religious police struck fear into the population.

Arrested by the United States and Afghan forces after the 2001 ousting of the Taleban, Qalamuddin spent some time in jail. Now he has now joined the race to democracy, running for a seat in the southern province of Logar.

When he was in power, Qalamuddin's Islamic police beat women for not being properly covered or for going out without a close male relative accompanying them. They enforced the closure of schools for girls and also targeted men, wielding scissors on hair perceived to be too long and checking beard length. How will such a man cope in a parliament where many men will be clean-shaven and women will not be in the all-enveloping burqa? "It was the role of the government of the day," he told IWPR in a phone interview he kept brief, explaining he needed to get back to campaigning. "In the upcoming parliament, I will be not against women and not against the government. We will work together."

Now aged 60, the former deputy minister has lost nothing of his brusque manner. IWPR did not find him at home in his mud-brick house in Shaikhan, a village in the fertile Baraki Barak district, where his guest room is furnished only with five mattresses and a faded red carpet. Instead, he spoke to IWPR by mobile phone from somewhere in the mountainous district of Kharwar, saying, "You should know better! These are the days I have to work - let me get on with my campaign."

Qalamuddin had a religious education, progressing from the school at his village mosque to the Mohammadia Society College in Logar province – the honorific title Maulawi indicates higher Islamic learning. In the 1980s, Qalamuddin was involved in the holy war against Soviet forces, holding the position of special legal adviser and security guard commander with Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, a mainly Pashtun mujahedin faction led by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. As the Taleban gathered strength in 1995, many members of sHarakat-e-Inqilab went over to the new movement. Qalamuddin did especially well, as deputy head of the Taleban's ideological enforcers. After the Taleban regime disintegrated, Qalamuddin says he went back to the land, looking after his farm.

Now he is standing as an independent, and says he has broken all connections with the Taleban – whose guerrillas are still active in southern Afghanistan. He has four sons, and the eldest is helping him campaign, in which his religious focus remains dominant. As a prospective member of parliament,



Qalamuddin sets out his key policy aims as building more religious schools, eradicating drugs and alcohol, creating security and national solidarity, and claiming war reparations from Moscow for the ten years of occupation. "I will always propose things that are for the good of the people and religion," he said.

Qalamuddin said he wants to see "the freedom of Afghanistan", but he did not make it clear whether this meant getting rid of United States forces or his old colleagues. He predicts the parliament that emerges from the September 18 election will be stormy because of its diverse membership and because of "foreign interference". "The atmosphere will be rife with problems," he warned.

[Source: http://iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state+hensabrina%20saqeb&s=o&o=afghan_elect_2005_profiles.html]

In the following months, both Hekmatyar and Rabbani reportedly tried to convince Nabi to join their parties, but, with the encouragement of the loyal ulema, who refused to break their oaths of allegiance, Nabi decided to keep Harakat ... alive as a separate party to represent the madrassa-educated ulama. This party received strong backing and financial support from influential Pakistani clerics.

[Source: Edwards, David E., Before Taliban, pp. 248-247]



“Mizh der beitabora khalq yi.”¹

Pashtun Reconciliation Programs

Any reconciliation program developed with a goal of impacting on a rural insurgency will be very complex and fraught with both surprises and unintended consequences. While the Pashtu quote above was derived from the Mehsud tribe, it fits all Pashtuns as they *are* very untrustworthy people and any agreement entered into must be both verifiable and enforceable or it *will* be violated.

In addition to being chronically untrustworthy, Louis Dupree noted in 1979 that an essentially Shi’a custom of “dissimulation,” or protective lying, was also present in Afghanistan. The custom, *al-Taqiyya*, allowed dissimulation to save life and protect property against discriminatory taxation, to obtain and hold government jobs that were normally denied to the Shi’a, or to prevent unpleasant situations from arising. *Al-Taqiyya* was practiced freely between Sunni and Shi’a, but it is very probable that all Afghans can lie freely to foreigners, especially those who are Christians.² Given the violence that this society has experienced during the past thirty years, the safety of a clever protective lie must be especially widespread.

Reconciliation is the natural avenue to the end of any insurgency and must be pursued, but there are real problems with the Afghanistan insurgency. First, many of the combatants are Pashtuns living in Pakistan – making this nearly a foreign invasion. It is relatively simple to divide the Taliban into two groups, depending on their country of origin. Given this reality, it is much easier to reconcile Taliban who originated from within Afghanistan’s borders than it would be to reconcile the “invading” Pakistani Pashtuns.

Taliban may also be divided into two groups, based on their views of nationalism. Many are Pashtun nationalists who view the hostilities as a way to regain control of Afghanistan for the Pashtun majority that has traditionally ruled the country. The second group contains – or consists of – men who are essentially opportunists, criminals making a good living under the cover of being insurgents. Reconciling nationalists is straightforward while it may be impossible to make any “arrangements” that would result in the opportunists giving up the fight.

Another split within the Pashtuns who form the Taliban involves their particular desired end state, the real reason they are fighting. A large number of them are “traditionalists” whose goal has generally involved moving Afghanistan’s political system back to the period prior to 1973 when the king, Zahir Shah, was overthrown by modernists seeking to create a modern nation from Afghanistan. The second, opposing groups are basically “revolutionaries” seeking to impose a new form of governance upon

¹ Howell, Evelyn, *Mizh: A Monograph on Government’s Relations with the Mehsud Tribe*, Simla, 1931, pg. 63. The translation is important to anyone considering a reconciliation program among the Pashtuns, “We are very untrustworthy people.”

² Dupree, Louis, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Oct-Dec. 1979, pp. 680-682. Dupree commented on *al-Taqiyya* practiced by Shi’a groups such as the Qizlbash, but many experienced individuals comment on the Afghan proclivity to tell falsehoods, especially to save themselves embarrassment or to escape a risky or hazardous situation.



Afghanistan, *Sharia*. Traditionally, these parties have been supported and funded by outside interests, chiefly from Pakistan's madrassa system and from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These opposing "coalitions" entered into a civil war following the Soviet Union's withdrawal and the defeat of President Najibullah's communist government. This civil war is continuing with the Taliban and their Muslim extremist allies representing the "revolutionary interests" against the "traditionalists" supporting Hamid Karzai and the current government of Afghanistan. Those members of the revolutionary coalitions had experienced foreign influence, control, and financial support that allowed many of them to enrich themselves far beyond the aspirations they had as self-ordained country mullahs. Reconciliation may not be an option they would welcome.

Another important factor related to reconciliation involves *Pashtunwali* and its requirement for revenge for wrongs suffered at the hands of others. During the Taliban period, many people were punished for little reason, executed cruelly after being tortured, and jailed for minor transgressions. Taliban considering reconciliation must consider the possibility that their previous victims and their relatives will exact revenge if they return to Afghanistan. Pashtuns are uncommonly patient about the timing for the revenge they plan and one folk saying is relevant here: "If I get my revenge before a hundred years have passed, I am not a Pashtun." Reconciliation in the face of this potential threat makes the process even more difficult.

Revenge may come from the Taliban who are being "deserted" by those deciding to reconcile. Mullah Khaksar, the Taliban's Deputy-Minister of Interior, was the first defector from the senior levels of that government. He was later murdered on the streets of Kandahar. Potential reconciling Taliban must also consider the possibility that the Taliban might actually win their war. If this happened, those considering leaving the Taliban know they would face harsh punishment.

Afghan police, security, and military corruption are factors that those Taliban considering reconciliation must consider. Much like the Mafia, the Afghan security services can be expected to demand "protection money" to ensure that former Taliban members would not be harassed. Arrests and forced bribes to gain release are real factors of Afghan life and the members of the Taliban know this as well as the common Afghans.

There are other Afghan ethnic groups to be considered when Taliban reconciliation is considered. Many of them, particularly the Hazara, have been the victims of Pashtun aggression in the recent past and currently occupy their own regions as well as positions in national and provincial governments because of the "shield" provided by American, NATO, and ISAF military force. The Tajiks, in particular, have managed to become a significant political force now that the Pashtuns are split between Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar. Any Taliban reconciliation success would be viewed as "Pashtun reunification" by the other ethnic groups and they will work behind the scenes to ensure this effort is not successful. The Tajiks, for example, would lose half of their political power if the Pashtuns were united in a single political force that opposed them.

Finally, there is a widespread belief – that is not altogether inaccurate – that the United States and its allies have prepared lists – "black lists" – of Taliban commanders who will not be allowed to reconcile.



This group of “irreconcilables” is frequently referred to, but no one has ever seen the alleged list. Taliban leaders and commanders considering reconciliation have no way of knowing if they are on this “black list” and fear that reconciliation could lead to a prison cell, or worse.

Based on the above, any reconciliation effort in Afghanistan is very difficult to create and manage. But it can and should be attempted.

First, Taliban leaders are like any other Pashtun group and they will call their trusted subcommanders into a shura, a religious gathering, where they will discuss the potential reconciliation. Given the fact that Pashtuns cannot keep a secret, the potential reconciliation will soon be the subject of widespread gossip. Hard line Taliban leaders will soon hear the rumors and the individual considering reconciliation – a process that the Taliban will view as “defection” – will no longer be trusted by his colleagues. Increased security surveillance is possible, discoverable, and the suspicion that will automatically develop makes reconciliation more likely. This is a winning scenario even without the actual reconciliation.

Second, any key Taliban commander suspected of harboring plans for reconciliation with the government of Afghanistan will quickly be viewed as a security risk by those individuals and organizations affiliated with Pakistan’s security services. Their natural course of action involves surveillance and arrest as soon as the potential reconciliation is corroborated by another source or two. Given the Pashtun proclivity of denigrating one another at every opportunity, it wouldn’t be long before the arrest is made. As in the first case, this is also a winning scenario as it removes a Taliban leader from the organization while creating suspicion within the Taliban leadership that expects additional colleagues to also consider the reconciliation option.

Finally, the actual reconciliation of a Taliban leader from any of the identified “tiers” can have a cascading effect on the remaining insurgent leaders. This is especially true if the reconciled leader is able to live a relatively normal life and is NOT forced to make public statements repudiating his former colleagues. Any Taliban leader returning to Afghanistan should fear only the Taliban and should be allowed to live as normal a life as possible. The impact on others considering reconciliation could be dramatic. Naim Kuchi, a former Taliban and the leader of the Ghilzai Ahmadzai tribe was arrested and incarcerated at Guantanamo, but when released and allowed to return quietly to his tribal position, he began to help with the peace process.³ This model should be repeated widely.

³ The Guardian, February 16, 2008. Naim Kuchi met with Michael Semple, the diplomat expelled from Afghanistan for meeting with “irreconcilables.”



CASE STUDY: Good Intentions Gone Wrong

Amateurs should avoid Afghanistan's internal politics. An excellent example was provided with the involvement of the "Ritchie Brothers" and their freelance affiliation with Mujahedin heroic figure, Abdul Haq, who tragically lost his life following a 2001 expedition into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Convinced that they knew better than US planners, they presided over a well-documented disaster that left Abdul Haq's tortured body hanging at Ariana Circle in Kabul as a grisly warning to others who might consider opposing the Taliban Movement.

A second essentially freelance attempt to "resolve" the Afghan fighting was attempted by two European diplomats, James Semple and Mervyn Patterson. According to open source reporting, Semple had been interested in methods utilized in Northern Ireland that resulted in the Ulster Volunteer Force ending its military operations and serving as a secret link between the "Loyalists" and the Irish government. Semple was an experienced Afghanistan veteran with experience with non-governmental organizations and he was a rarity among Europeans and Americans in that he spoke Pashtu.

Semple was reported to believe that the "Taliban thing is very localized" and that people often follow a local chieftain who happens to be Taliban and the Taliban was not a homogenous group. Later, Semple and Patterson were accused by the Afghan government of talking with one of the "irreconcilables" and were soon ordered to leave the country. Their defense involved accusations aimed at local officials, but it is obvious that they were repeating the error of the Ritchie Brothers, getting involved with tribal dynamics they knew little about.

In this case, Semple had drawn generally correct conclusions regarding the Taliban. They were not a homogenous group and local people frequently followed a local chieftain who happened to be Taliban, but he made a great miscalculation by assuming that the factors he identified were actually constants in Pashtun society. His greatest error involved his belief that Mansur Dadullah (AKA Bakht Mohammad) was one of the local chieftains in Helmand province who was followed by local people and his attempt to persuade Mansur Dadullah into reconciliation was a masterpiece of miscalculation – if the open source accounts are generally correct.

Far from being from Helmand province and a member of a tribe that local people might rally to and follow, Mansur Dadullah was a Kakar tribesman and a member of a tribe that was not well-represented in Helmand province. Kakar territory is generally within Pakistan's Baluchistan province and while this large Pashtun tribe is widespread within the region, few Kakars are found in Helmand province. Knowing this basic tribal reality may have saved Semple and Patterson from a large mistake. These Kakars were from the Gurgusht group and were not allied closely with either the Durrani or the Ghilzai Confederations that dominated Helmand province – particularly the Durrani tribes.

Semple was reported to have drawn a comparison between what he and Patterson were seeking to achieve in Helmand and what the US had done in al-Anbar province in Iraq. He also believed that there



were many people who served with the Taliban regime who were well-placed inside the Karzai regime or else were pillars of Afghan society.⁴

Like with the Ritchie Brothers, Semple and Patterson were observing exceptions, not the general rule with the Taliban. Naïve and wishful thinking managed to dominate their reconciliation efforts as they apparently continued their efforts to gain access to Mansur Dadullah, the brother of one of the bloodiest Taliban commanders who was killed in Helmand province by British forces in 2007, instead of a local chieftain who also happened to be in the Taliban. The evidence is circumstantial, but fairly damning. Semple and Patterson were expelled from Afghanistan on December 25; Mansur Dadullah was sacked from his Taliban position by Mullah Mohammad Omar on December 29.⁵ This was the primary error made by Semple and Patterson as they attempted to replicate the US success in al-Anbar province. The second error was made with their decision to leave the local government officials out of their operational plan. Governor Wafa was accused of playing local politics as Semple and Patterson were summarily expelled from Afghanistan, but Wafa and Hamid Karzai, left out of the planning and the actual operation, were left with suspicion as their only option when the reconciliation efforts leaked – as all things do in Afghanistan. Like Mullah Omar, they suspected treachery and reacted predictably by removing the objects of their discontent.

CASE STUDY: US Failure with Mutawakil

Following the retreat of the Taliban from Kandahar in late 2001, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, the Taliban's last Foreign Minister who had been assigned to Kabul, also went to Quetta seeking safety in Pakistan's Pashtun region. From Quetta, Mutawakil carefully planned his personal reconciliation and discrete travel back to Kandahar.⁶

Arriving in Kandahar in early February 2002, Mutawakil was soon taken into custody by the US military where the fact that he was the highest-ranking prisoner from the Taliban soon doomed him to incarceration at Baghram rather than the personal reconciliation he had carefully planned and probably negotiated with the Afghan officials affiliated with the Afghan interim president, Hamid Karzai.⁷ His actual move to Kandahar was facilitated by drug lord, Haji Basher Noorzai, who was subsequently lured to New York where he was also arrested by zealous Drug Enforcement Agency officers.⁸

After voluntarily returning to Afghanistan in what should be best described as a "defection" from the Taliban leadership, Mutawakil spent three years in US and Afghan custody before being allowed to speak freely – and even run for a position in the new Afghan Parliament. Soon, the Taliban sent him a

⁴ The Guardian, February 16, 2008

⁵ Asia Times, February 5, 2008.

⁶ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1810717.stm

⁷ <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2002/02/09/taliban020209.html>

⁸ <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?pagewanted=all>



highly unveiled warning by killing his brother in Quetta.⁹ They had previously disowned their own Foreign Minister and stated that Mutawakil “does not represent our will.”¹⁰

Mutawakil represents a tremendous lost opportunity, the likes of which are seldom available in an insurgency. Since Mutawakil voluntarily sought reconciliation with the newly formed Afghan Interim Government and had belonged to the more pragmatic Taliban faction that was affiliated with the movement’s co-founder, Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, little effort would have been required to maneuver Mutawakil into a public stance from which he could disown his more radical colleagues who worked from Kandahar and were antagonistic toward Mullah Rabbani and his pragmatic faction. The decision to use Mutawakil as a “trophy,” after all he was the highest-ranking prisoner from the Taliban Movement, prevented his use by the Afghan government as a spokesman for reconciliation.

Second, and most important, the arrest and imprisonment of Mutawakil served as a warning to all other Taliban leadership personalities who might consider defecting into a reconciliation program. They knew that Mutawakil, the son of a famous Pashtun poet, was harmless and was essentially the Movement’s spokesman and if he was arrested and held in solitary confinement, they could guess about the treatment they would receive if they chose defection.

Third, the Taliban reaction that led to the disowning of Mutawakil and the murder of his brother in Quetta served also as a warning to anyone in a significant leadership position of the Taliban’s response to any defection from their movement. Later, the Taliban demonstrated both their reach and patience by killing Mullah Khaksar, the Taliban’s former Deputy-Minister of Interior and a close colleague of Mutawakil.¹¹

From the very first, the US gave up an opportunity to take the initiative in the propaganda war against the Taliban. After ceding the initiative to the insurgents, the Taliban used their well-honed propaganda apparatus and deadly violence to show that potential defectors faced a fate far more devastating than just the three years of US custody experienced by Mutawakil. The US error and the Taliban reaction effectively halted any realistic leadership reconciliation efforts.

CASE STUDY: Afghan Government Reached Midpoint with Rais al-Baghrani

The case of Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani illustrates how much closer the Afghan government can come to managing a successful reconciliation of a respected Taliban commander. Abdul Wahid came to the attention of the Afghan government in mid-2004 when they learned that he had ordered that his Alizai subtribe, the Khalozai, register and participate in the presidential elections scheduled for later in 2004. He was an unusual Pashtun leader who seemed to be more of a Pashtun nationalist than a Taliban and he had never served officially within the Taliban leadership. He had been a member of the Jamiat-i

⁹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4649827.stm

¹⁰ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3209584.stm

¹¹ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/14/AR2006011400983.html>



Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani during the anti-Soviet jihad and his willingness to find common cause with a Tajik – Rabbani – demonstrated his pragmatism.

Following Mutawakil, Abdul Wahid was the senior-most leader affiliated with the Taliban. He went further than Mutawakil from the first, agreeing to media interviews in May 2005. He said:

“My message to those still fighting is they should take this golden chance and come back and build the country,” he said in an interview here in late May. “We have an Islamic country and Shariah law, and we should accept the rule of the government.”¹²

With Abdul Wahid, the Afghan government managed a successful reconciliation of their own, but it made little difference because nothing else was done to capitalize upon their work. Returning to the relative safety of his Baghran District, Abdul Wahid brought nothing back from Kabul to demonstrate that his reconciliation was a positive step to his elders. Additionally, he was now an openly declared target for the Taliban. Abdul Wahid probably found himself in a situation not unlike that of a “tightrope walker” whose slightest error could be fatal. His own powerful elders and clergy must have been looking at him with crossed eyes when he returned from Kabul where he placed all of them on the Taliban’s sights – and he returned with no aid or assistance they were probably expecting after declaring themselves for the Karzai administration.

Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani didn’t make the decision to rally his Khalozai sub-tribe of the Alizai tribe by himself. He would have sat in numerous jirgas and shuras with his tribal leaders and his religious advisors prior to making the reconciliation decision. Additionally, his reconciliation meant that a majority of the Khalozai were in full agreement with his decision. Since early 2005, few – if any – deliverables such as schools, clinics, wells, and food aid have arrived in Helmand’s Baghran District. Instead, his Khalozai found themselves in a new battlefield that had previously been relatively calm. Democratically oriented Pashtuns, such as the Khalozai, have leaders serving at the pleasure of the governed and through his reconciliation without any positive results for the sub-tribe, Abdul Wahid’s position as leader is probably jeopardized.

He is probably surprised at the results of his efforts at reconciliation and the public endorsements of reconciliation that he made. He is now walking that tightrope between capture and arrest by Coalition forces, murder by the Taliban, and removal from his position within the Khalozai for his failure to bring development aid along with his reconciliation. When he is not worrying over these three potential fates, he must also be concerned over efforts by drug enforcement officials to find and arrest him for the opium trade that occurs in his region.

And hanging in the background is the nagging suspicion that Abdul Wahid sheltered Mullah Omar in the period after Kandahar was captured. His explanation makes perfect tribal sense, but the reports that he helped Omar escape might as well have been carved in stone:

¹² <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/international/asia/02amnesty.html>



“The American military once suspected Mr. Baghrani of harboring the Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, in Baghran, his home region, in northern Helmand Province. He denied that, adding that Mullah Omar was from a different tribe and would never have trusted his life to a tribe other than his own.”¹³

Worse, potential Taliban leaders considering reconciliation are aware of the plight of Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani that resulted from his decision to reconcile.

CASE STUDY: DOD Manages to Construct a Policy Failure in 2001

The general “instincts” of the Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan have generally proven to be superior to that of the western leaders when negotiations were considered. They know the natural flow of negotiations from their historical relationships while the leaders in the West must rely upon their personal backgrounds that are poorly suited to function in tribal situations.

Perhaps the best example involves the surrender of Kandahar and the possibility of ending the fighting completely in late 2001. Hamid Karzai had been able to rally reinforcements inside Afghanistan and move toward Kandahar from the north as Gul Agha Shirzai’s Barakzai force was moving toward Kandahar from the east. Finding their position untenable – and US air strikes daunting and unstoppable – the Taliban entered into negotiations by sending Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani to meet in person with Hamid Karzai, the new leader of the Afghan Interim Government. During the negotiations with Abdul Wahid, Hamid Karzai took the normal Pashtun approach toward an enemy and offered terms that allowed the Taliban to return to their homes with dignity rather than to continue the fighting.

CNN reported:

“The negotiations have been between the Taliban ... and the head of Afghanistan's new interim government, Hamid Karzai. Now, Karzai has been heading a tribal military force that has been one of the forces circling the city of Kandahar over the last week or so. (Mullah Muhammad Omar is the leader of the Taliban, who is to turn over control of the city.) All the details of the surrender -- the negotiation terms and what this means for the Taliban and what they expect in return -- were announced by the Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan. There are some key things to look at in the terms of that surrender. Number one -- the implications that the Taliban leaders can go free, can go home.”¹⁴

¹³ <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/international/asia/02amnesty.html>

¹⁴ <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/06/ret.robertson.otsc/index.html>



Hamid Karzai had also been communicating with a key leader in the Kandahar region. Mullah Naqib, of the powerful Alikozai tribe, was a fellow Durrani Pashtun and had a large militia. Mullah Naqib was also close to the Taliban Defense Minister, Mullah Obaidullah, a fellow Alikozai, and the two felt that Karzai's offer of amnesty for all Taliban leaders was something they could accept. Time Magazine reported:

"Kandahar sources say that the Taliban defense minister Mullah Obadullah has sent out feelers to Karzai, offering to hand over the city to him and to Mullah Naqib, a respected former Soviet war commander residing in Kandahar with a large tribal following."¹⁵

Around this time, the Taliban withdrew from Kandahar and retreated to nearby Pakistan as Mullah Naqib combined his militia with forces belonging to a senior Noorzai leader, Haji Basher Noorzai, and they maintained order in Kandahar until the city could be turned over to Hamid Karzai's approaching force. The Taliban leaders, especially Mullah Obaidullah and Abdul Wahid, individuals most closely involved in the surrender negotiations with the approaching leaders, expected to be able to return to their homes peacefully – as Hamid Karzai offered.

Unfortunately, US policy toward the Taliban was soon set in Washington, D.C., by someone who knew nothing about *Pashtunwali*. The US Defense Secretary soon reversed Hamid Karzai and left the simultaneous disastrous impression that the new head of the Afghanistan Interim Government was an American "puppet."

"Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said the US would not stand for any deal that allowed Omar to remain free and "live in dignity" in the region."¹⁶

This was the moment that reconciliation efforts were made far more difficult than ever anticipated. Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani returned to his home in Helmand's Baghran District to be searched for by US Special Operations teams as Mullah Obaidullah withdrew to Quetta, Pakistan, where he continued to manage aggressive Taliban operations. While it is only possible to speculate, if Hamid Karzai had been able to keep his word that was given during negotiations with Abdul Wahid, the war with the Taliban may have been over in late December 2001. The US Defense Secretary ensured that the Taliban would become an implacable foe rather than quietly return to their home villages.

Reconciliation Planning: Something that may actually work.

Given the complexity of any well-intentioned reconciliation program among the Pashtuns and the animosity from other ethnic groups a serious reconciliation effort would generate, caution is needed as these operations are planned and implemented. Communication is necessary between all parties

¹⁵ <http://www.time.com/time/columnist/mcgirk/article/0,9565,186578,00.html>

¹⁶ <http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1207/p1s2-wosc.html>



involved, as well, to prevent suspicion as leaks occur. Both Mullah Omar and Hamid Karzai obviously came to suspect betrayal by Bakht Mohammad as Semple and Patterson initiated contact with the Taliban faction leader. Instead of generating suspicion, the first stage of any reconciliation program should involve a broad effort to publicize previous successful Taliban reconciliation activities. Semple highlighted the experience of Naim Kuchi in The Guardian interview, but his efforts would have been better served if Naim Kuchi had appeared on Tolo and Khyber television systems and on BBC Pashtu language broadcasts to show that he lived a life not unlike what he experienced before the Taliban period. As in any military operation efforts should have been made to prepare the propaganda battlefield. Semple and Patterson missed this point.

Second, the Taliban Movement is a “coalition” of like-minded combatant groups, many of them more criminal than nationalist. They need incentives to reconcile and the best tool available to encourage this response involves kinetic operations. Both groups are more likely to view reconciliation opportunities through a positive lens if there are increasing chances that they will become fatalities. The “trick” involves maneuvering the Taliban leaders and sub-commanders into situations in which no matter what actions they take; they lose. Getting them into negotiations through couriers is a good initial step. As pointed out previously, this will soon leak and create or increase the degree of distrust between the leader targeted for reconciliation negotiations and his Taliban colleagues.

Selection of a susceptible target personality is also a necessity. The Taliban leadership was far from being cohesive and while Ghilzai leaders tend to occupy many senior positions, there are numerous members of the Durrani Confederation within the leadership. The presence of the two groups forms a natural schism that may be taken advantage of through carefully orchestrated reconciliation efforts. Additionally, there were even two Taliban “factions” that didn’t work well together from the first. As a result, Mullah Omar managed to restrict his political enemies to Kabul while he maintained the Taliban seat of government in Kandahar. The group that was posted in Kabul was composed of Mullah Rabbani, Mutawakil (the first of the leadership to surrender), Mullah Zaeef, Mullah Razzak, Mullah Kakar (the first defector), and others who were not fully trusted by Mullah Omar. These individuals and the Taliban officials assigned to Kabul instead of Kandahar, and those affiliated with them, would be excellent reconciliation targets.

Selecting an influential individual to conduct the negotiations is also a crucial variable. A highly trusted religious leader, for example, may be an excellent choice to start the long distance talks. If trusted by both sides, this individual would go far to develop the degree of trust needed to move the discussions forward. Most of the reconciliation targets important enough to go after in reconciliation efforts live in Pakistan’s safe havens and will have to be convinced to cross into Afghanistan. This will require the development of a high degree of trust. The more the two parties to the negotiations have in common, the more likely success will result. Common tribe, madrassa, jihadi party when fighting the Soviets, and similar things help ensure success.

Offering asylum in a foreign country is a very useful approach. The Taliban leaders know that their former colleagues will always be alert for any opportunity to attack them out of revenge and any offer of safe haven or being moved to a witness protection program will go far toward convincing a key



individual to defect from the Taliban leadership. This should be reserved for individuals who might be expected to cooperate in luring others into a reconciliation program or to participate in specific psychological operations intended to inflict severe damage to the Taliban, but an offer of safety abroad would be a very powerful inducement toward cooperation and reconciliation.

The overarching psychological goal of any reconciliation program involves concentrated efforts intended to split the enemy into two groups. This has been partially accomplished by their own organizational problems with members of Durrani and Ghilzai confederations involved in the leadership. Durrani are the traditional leaders of the Pashtuns, and Afghanistan, for that matter, and most Durrani Pashtuns must resent the presence of Ghilzai “upstarts” within the leadership. For their part, the Ghilzai view themselves as the founders of the Afghan nation that was overthrown by Durrani usurpers, particularly the Popalzai tribe whose leader Ahmad Shah Durrani replaced the Ghilzai leaders long ago. In general, the Ghilzai appear to be more nationalistic and xenophobic than the Durrani and this is one split that may be exploited by a clever reconciliation campaign that focuses only on Taliban Durrani while leaving out the Ghilzai – to exacerbate the historical fault line between the two Pashtun groups.

Local Helmand province animosities between Alizai subtribes, between the Ishaqzai and Kakar tribes, and between Ishaqzai and Baluch tribes over the control of the narcotics trade are other schisms that might provide opportunities to exploit through reconciliation offers. Offers to one group, while leaving out a tribal competitor, is nearly certain to worsen relations between the two target tribes.

The most difficult aspect of ending an insurgency involves a final demobilization of hostile forces. The American military has not managed to accomplish this very desirable end state since the War Department became the Defense Department in 1947. Britain had great success in Malaya, but against insurgents who were actually a very small minority of the total population that was composed of an ethnic group that was essentially hostile to the insurgents. Often taken as a case study in the successful prosecution of a counterinsurgency, interesting results might be obtained from a case study that included a close examination of the population’s actual demographics as an analytical factor.

As military and police pressure is applied against insurgents and they begin to lose their ability to maneuver, recruit, and gain access to funds they are forced to move away from tactics normally found in guerrilla warfare, such as raids and ambushes, in favor of terrorist tactics. These new tactics always adopted by insurgents losing their ability to control events includes bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and these tactics harm the very population they are seeking to gain their support. Civilian and non-combatant casualties begin to outnumber the casualties the insurgent is able to inflict on the security forces opposing them. As they become increasingly nihilistic, non-combatants suffer even more. Increasingly, operations conducted by insurgents come to resemble common criminal acts. It is at this point in any insurgency that the insurgent is most vulnerable as their attacks on the civilian population, especially the Muslim-on-Muslim violence that is forbidden in their sacred religious texts. Rallying the population against the criminal violence and attacks on innocent Muslims becomes increasingly easy to accomplish.



In the case of the Taliban, there are two easily discernable groups in operation, the Pashtun religious nationalists and those “opportunists” seeking to enrich themselves. This provides a situation in which the two groups may be split while potentially developing an impact on their ability to recruit reinforcements, acquire operational intelligence and safe haven from villagers, and reduce their ability to raise funds needed to continue operations.

This approach involves efforts to “criminalize” the criminal behavior of *individual* insurgents. Efforts have been made in past insurgencies, such as Northern Ireland, to criminalize entire insurgent groups, but this has been counterproductive and often leads to insurgent propaganda which results in increased support for the insurgency from their target audience. This factor can be eliminated by focusing only on the criminal behavior of individual insurgents. Formal indictments in criminal courts in the *United Kingdom* for those Taliban captured after wounding or killing a British service member is a good course of action to consider. Taliban members know that if they are captured and placed in custody of an Afghan security service, they will normally be able to bribe their way to freedom within three days. The assurance of a long prison sentence in a United Kingdom prison will be a significant deterrent to the less committed Taliban fighters and may aid in efforts to split the Taliban into nationalist and criminal groups. Being labeled “criminal” may also serve to drive a broader wedge between tribal elders and their villagers against the Taliban. Few people will willingly support individuals widely recognized as criminals.

The application of customary Laws of Land Warfare and the requirement of wearing a uniform or distinctive badge while bearing arms openly may also be a useful approach to demobilizing a failing insurgency. The threat of a “Drumhead Court Martial” and transfer to a European prison as an illegal combatant should also have a significant impact on insurgent morale. Even those seeking martyrdom and the customary 72 virgins should have second thoughts if faced with the assurance of extended prison sentences from which they would be unable to bribe their way to freedom. If this is applied only to Taliban field commanders and the penalty to be imposed is published widely, it should have a dampening effect on Taliban morale and their ability to recruit additional fighters.

Since the Taliban leaders believe that a list of “irreconcilables” exists but no one knows who is actually on it, this effectively stops any serious efforts to develop a reconciliation program. Ideally, no Taliban leader should be excluded from reconciliation talks. Even the worst of the Taliban should be able to reconcile, but with appropriate sanctions for past wrongdoings. Extended periods of house arrest, possibly in a third country as was done with Uganda’s Idim Amin, and even lifetime house arrest should be considered to get key Taliban leaders to abandon the fighting.

Reconciliation programs should focus only on leadership personalities. Rural Afghanistan, the origin of most of these leaders, is essentially a feudal society and vassals can be expected to follow the example of their feudal leaders. Serious efforts should be made to attract key leaders into reconciliation negotiations, but the average rank and file fighter should be reconciled through the established mechanism of the PTS program.



Reconciliation programs are possible to design and implement, but this approach has been made increasingly difficult by the poor policy decision that reversed Hamid Karzai's amnesty offer to the Taliban in December 2001 that made many of the Pashtuns into enemy fighters. The arrest and incarceration of the first defector from the Taliban leadership, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, made additional defections – as the Taliban view the reconciliation process – increasingly difficult to obtain.

Careful publication of the stories regarding successful reconciled Taliban leaders would be very useful. Assuring that reconciliation can occur with no preconditions is also important. Long studies of the history of insurgencies will reveal no reconciling leader who is willing to denounce or help harm his former colleagues and any preconditions will generally doom a reconciliation effort. Offers of relocation to overseas locations and witness protection safety may be needed to attract important leadership personalities into a reconciliation program but depending on the targeted leader; this may be a real bargain. The Taliban have no real depth when it comes to leaders and the removal of a "keystone" personality from the Taliban "leadership arch" may result in its sudden collapse.



Taqiyya

While the concept of Taqiyya is well documented among the Shi'ia, the Sunnis also rely upon dissimulation. This is especially prevalent in Afghanistan where the Persian culture has had such a wide impact and conflict for in excess of thirty years has created so many casualties, destruction, and continuing animosity. It would be incredible for the average Afghan not to adopt some form of Taqiyya in order to protect family and to ensure personal survival. There are portions of their holy writings that excuse the use of falsehoods for personal protection.

Afghans are better at dissimulation than other Muslims; they deny that they rely upon Taqiyya in their interrelationships, particularly those with the infidels – like us.

Opportunities

- Caution must be used when negotiating with Afghans. Enter into only the agreements in which you have the capability to enforce the results of negotiations. Rely upon Afghan goodwill and compliance of the Afghan side of any agreement at your peril.
- Afghans, particularly Pashtuns, view concessions as a sign of weakness, not fairness. Be aware that they often interpret kindness as timidity and weakness. It is wise to demonstrate resolve and force them to make concessions rather than become the conciliatory party. The dictum, “Peace through Strength,” is axiomatic when dealing with Pashtuns and the other Afghans.
- Design any agreements as a series of “tests” to be successfully achieved to ensure gradual compliance with larger agreements. Afghans should complete the initial phases of a trust-building agreement before moving forward to any second stage. Never provide money until the product is received unless start-up funding is required to initiate a program of project. Divide all projects into phases and fund each subsequent portion once the initial stages are satisfactorily finished.
- Be very cautious with Hazara interpreters and translators, especially when dealing with matters related to Pashtuns. The more powerful Pashtun tribes, especially the Ghilzai, have been preying upon the Hazaras for centuries and they have good reasons to “dissimulate” when translating or advising coalition forces to put their hereditary enemies in the worst possible light. Having a second language-capable officer present to monitor in this type of situation may be very useful. The Hazara are generally Shi'ia and have very good reasons to dissemble when they have an opportunity to create problems for their Sunni enemies, primarily the Pashtuns. There are many other Shi'ia tribes in the region, especially in Pakistan's Kurram Agency, and the “Kabuli” population has many Shi'ia. The Qizlbash tribe and those individuals identified as “Farsiwans” may be Shi'ia, but their use of taqiyya prevents any accurate census from being made.
- Afghans were described in a 1933 British Army Handbook: “Cupidity, instability, a suspicious nature, intense jealousy, bitter vindictiveness, excitability, impatience, want of self-control



and a complete disregard for truth form the chief characteristics of the Afghan nature." Caution is indicated in all dealings with Afghans.

Background

Al-taqiyya, dissimulation or plain, right-out lying is often stated to be a Shiite Muslim concept. An example is the Iranian revolution of 1979 where Ayatollah Khomeini presented his struggle as one against the Shah and invited all Iranians to participate. However, his primary agenda was the introduction of a theocratic Islamic state based on vicious Sharia, Islamic law. Within a year or so his former "allies", democrats, Marxists, communists, and Baha'i were being executed. But taqiyya is not just a Shia tradition. The Sunni Moriscos rode out the Spanish Inquisition by hiding their true views. They would conform by going along to mass and then wash off the "holy water" when they got home.

The Qur'an explains this:

"Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers ...except by way of precaution (taqiyya), that ye may guard yourselves from them. But Allah cautions you to remember Himself; for the final goal is to Allah." (3:28)

"In the cause of Allah" is the qualifying concept. Muslims must not dissemble if this is not the case: for example for personal reasons or where the aims of Islam should be made clear.

Muslim apologists will blithely tell you that jihad means "striving for Allah" e.g. in one's personal life or perhaps war to defend Islam knowing full well that it can be offensive war to spread Islam. They will tell you that Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance when there are dozens of examples of belligerence and intolerance in the Qur'an, for example (9:5), (98:6), (9:29), (9:14), (8:39), (9:123), (48:29),(60:4), (5:72-73).

Their main reply when these verses are quoted to them is that "they are quoted out of context" or applied to certain conditions pertaining at that time. But this is pure dissimulation: fundamentalists will say that the verses do apply today and have never been abrogated.

Muhammad permitted lying if it was in the interests of Islam

Sahih Bukhari 5:369:

Allah's Apostle said, "Who is willing to kill Ka'b bin Al-Ashraf [a poet] who has hurt Allah and His Apostle?" Thereupon Muhammad bin Maslama got up saying, "O Allah's Apostle! Would you like that I kill him?" The Prophet said, "Yes," Muhammad bin Maslama said, "Then allow me to say a (false) thing (i.e. to deceive Kab)." The Prophet said, "You may say it."

Islam's #1 theologian allowed lying in the interests of Islam.



Imam Abu Hammid Ghazali said: "Speaking is a means to achieve objectives. If a praiseworthy aim is attainable through both telling the truth and lying, it is unlawful to accomplish through lying because there is no need for it. When it is possible to achieve such an aim by lying but not by telling the truth, it is permissible to lie if attaining the goal is permissible." (Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, "The Reliance of the Traveller")

"On the battlefield" (dealing with non-Muslims) outwittings are necessary.

Hadrat Ali said that in the battlefield one could not observe the highest standard of truth as a muslim has been exhorted to do in matters of religion. For example in the battlefield one has to hide facts and outwit the enemy." (Hadith Sahih Muslim, Vol. 2, ft. #1446)

[Source: <http://www.danielpipes.org/comments/12309>]

A definition of Taqiyya, as it applies to Afghanistan, might be "protective dissimulation." Rather than precautionary dissimulation.... Afghan Shi'ites use Taqiyya in a number of situations and may continue to do so for more than a generation. Taqiyya is practiced to save life and protect one's property against discriminatory taxation, to obtain and hold government jobs, or simply to prevent unpleasant situations from arising.... It may be prudent to define taqiyya in two distinct ways: the way local religious leaders interpret it, and the way it functions in the day-to-day lives of the people involved.

[Source: Dupree, Louis, "Further Notes of Taqiyya: Afghansitan," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 99. No.4, Oct., 1979, pg. 681]

Taqiyya is obligatory in the realm of taqiyya, and there is no sin for a man who embraces it in order to ward off injustice from himself.

[Source: McEoin, Denis, "Aspects of Militancy and Quietism in Imami Shi'ism," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 11. No. 1, 1984, pg. 20]

The Afghan character is a strange blend of virtue and vice. Hardy, brave, proud, simple in their mode of living, frank, prepared to die in accordance with their code of honor yet faithless and treacherous; generous to a degree yet devoured by greed for money; capable of great endurance and of feats of great energy but constitutionally lazy; merry, cheerful, humorous and fond of music yet inclined to be austere. Cupidity, instability, a suspicious nature, intense jealousy, bitter vindictiveness, excitability, impatience, want of self-control and a complete disregard for truth form the chief characteristics of the Afghan nature. They are capable of strong personal attachments but never forget a wrong. Grossly credulous, superstitious, fanatical and bigoted yet knowing little of their religion. Tribal feuds as seldom allowed to be forgotten but on the threat of a common danger widespread fanaticism kindled by



“mullahs” and other leaders would have the immediate effect of uniting all the tribes to meet the emergency. Severity and harsh justice are understood and are not resented but nagging merely acts as an irritant. They appreciate justice, an open hand, firmness, patience, good humor and the English disposition to punish and be friends again. They are great travelers and keen observers, shrewd men of business, good traders indefatigable in pursuit of gain, intellectually wide awake, of mental ability and avaricious to a degree. The race is in short a mass of contradictions, which are accentuated by the strong individuality of the people. Though brave almost to recklessness, they are easily discouraged by defeat or failure. Hospitality is part of their creed. A host will defend a guest at the risk of his own life. On the other hand, a host has no scruples against revealing his guest’s future movements to others, who may have the avowed intention of waylaying and murdering him. Their honor, if such a word can be used at all in relation to them, seldom extends beyond the vindication of their own rights and has little in it of an altruistic or national character. Plausible and specious in their arguments, they often succeed in imposing upon Europeans with their protestations of good faith and honorable intentions, but experience of a very positive nature impresses on us the fact that no Military Commander should ever rely on their good faith alone for the fulfillment of any promises they may make. It is in short useless to make any terms with them unless the observance of such terms can be enforced. The treachery and guile of the Afghans in their dealings with foreigners and enemies are but a phase of Afghan patriotism, of an unscrupulous character, doubtless, according to our own standards, but nevertheless practical in its methods, and not wholly unsuccessful in its results, as we know it to our cost. Afghan races show as much aptitude as the Indian for continuous and conscientious application to their duties, provided that respect for their superiors is maintained.

[Source: HANDBOOK OF KANDAHAR PROVINCE 1933]



Attempted Assassination of Zahir Shah and the Assassination of Ahmad Shah Masood – Common Factors

Background

As two clearly opposite political groupings began to emerge in Afghanistan's rough and tumble politics and as the country fell into a violent civil war, indigenous "Traditionalists" who preferred a return to the pre-1973 conditions were opposed by the "Revolutionists," or those political parties seeking to change Afghanistan dramatically through the creation of an Islamic state ruled under Sharia, or Islamic law. The Revolutionists had most of the foreign assistance as American aid was funneled through Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) that clearly favored the radical Islamist, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Saudi Arabia's assistance generally went to Abdur Rasul Sayyaf, an Afghan professor who received two King Faisal Awards for his role in Afghanistan.

The more traditional parties had two popular trends that assisted them in rallying support as they opposed the Soviet occupiers and their communist allies, the population's attachment to Sufism and their lingering belief in their former king, Zahir Shah. In order to oppose these popular symbols of national unity, the revolutionary Islamists worked – and are working to supplant Sufism with their more radical beliefs, Wahabbism and Deobandism. But at the same time, they planned a wave of key assassinations designed to remove key "royalists" from the scene. The Barakzai's Haji Abdul Latif was soon dead of poisoning and the Popalzai's Abdul Ahad Karzai – and many others -- fell to assassin's bullets. Al-Qa'ida entered the effort to create a drastic social change in Afghanistan's political environment in 1991 as they conducted their initial international terrorist attack. They tried to assassinate the key symbol of Afghanistan's national unity, Zahir Shah. This key attack would have undercut the general goals of at least three of the Jihadi parties, Harakat, NIFA, and ANLF while greatly strengthening Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, the primary parties receiving the majority of the external assistance. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's policies also benefited from this wave of attacks on the traditionalists and their moderate supporters.

Additionally, al-Qa'ida's successful elimination of Zahir Shah would have accomplished one of Pakistan's major foreign policy goals, the elimination of a major advocate of Pashtunistan, a new proposed national entity that would absorb approximately one-third of Pakistan's national territory.

The removal of those two popular symbols that were major underpinning factors of the Afghan traditionalist parties would have assured eventual victory for the revolutionaries.

Analysis

- The attempted assassination of Zahir Shah in 1991 was a potent foreshadowing of the 2001 assassination of Ahmad Shah Masood. In both cases, the assassins used a Muslim journalist persona as a cover to allow them to approach their target. In each case the revolutionary Islamist parties were the beneficiaries of the attacks. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar appeared to be



the driving force behind the decision al-Qa'ida made to assassinate Zahir Shah and Abdur Rasul Sayyaf was a key individual in allowing Ahmad Shah Masood's assassins to approach him.

- In both assassination operations a foreign power was directly involved in supporting the revolutionary Islamist party that encouraged or facilitated the attacks. In the case of the attempted assassination of Zahir Shah, Pakistan's ISI was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's patron. Sayyaf was directly supported by Saudi Arabia's ruling elites.
- Hekmatyar, widely believed to be an ISI Agent of Influence, was the catalyst behind the attempt to kill Zahir Shah. This decapitation operation was intended to remove the unifying symbol of the traditionalist parties of Afghanistan, a goal shared by Hekmatyar and his Pakistani patrons/sponsors and Sayyaf with his Saudi Arabian patrons/sponsors. In this early case, al-Qa'ida appears to be acting as a surrogate for both Pakistani and Saudi interests that were working to reduce or eliminate the power of the traditional parties that viewed Zahir Shah as a powerful symbol of national unity.
- Zahir Shah's powerful influence was apparently viewed as a threat sufficient to the potential success of the revolutionary parties that his contact with the traditionalists had to be broken. Zahir Shah was located as a critical hub with "spokes" extending outward to Harakat, NIFA, ANLF, heavily Sufi influenced parties. Added to this large group was Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami, generally viewed as a revolutionary party but it contained sufficient contacts and influence with southern Sufis that Jamiat was often essentially allied with the traditionalists in southern Afghansitan. Powerful Pashtun leaders, such as Mullah Naqib of the Alikozai tribe, Jan Mohammad Khan of the Popalzai tribe, and Abdul Wahid Rais al-Baghrani of the Alizai tribe were powerful Jamiat leaders who were likely attracted to Jamiat by Rabbani's loose connection to Sufism.
- The antagonism between the traditionalists and revolutionary parties, with Jamiat in a position opposing the revolutionaries, was clearly demonstrated by the fighting that occurred in Qandahar Province between Jamiat's Mullah Naqib and Hekmatyar's local commander, Zabit Jalil.
- Rabbani's Sufism and that of Ahmad Shah Masood were probably strong reasons for the animosity that the leading revolutionary leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, bore for each of these Tajik leaders. Lacking any religious credentials of his own, Hekmatyar built his base of support with young men, many university students, with a comprehension of Islam generally as weak as his own. Threatened by Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masood, and Jamiat's connection to the southern traditionalists, Hekmatyar and his ISI allies/controllers began to assassinate their enemies who were Zahir Shah's supporters.
- Ahmad Shah Masood's connection to Sufism is demonstrated by his connection to both mysticism and his favorite Sufi poet. Masood Khalili, the Northern Alliance's ambassador to India, explained the night before Masood was killed when they were reading discussing mystics and poetry. Masood's revolutionary enemies, such as Hekmatyar, were extremely anti-Sufi.



- In order for the revolutionary Islamists to succeed, Zahir Shah’s influence had to be reduced or eliminated and Sufism among the generally Hanafi Muslims of Afghanistan had to be undercut. The identification of these two strategic goals in analysis increases understanding of key events, victims, and beneficiaries of violent actions that occurred in Afghanistan and western Pakistan during the past 30 years.
- The final decision to assassinate Ahmad Shah Masood appears to have been made when Masood sent his emissary, Yunus Qanuni, to meet with Zahir Shah in 2001. Having spent ten years in breaking up the traditionalists and their potential contact with the king, a natural unifying symbol, the revolutionary Islamists and their foreign allies were taking no chances that Masood, the King, the traditionalists would be able to merge as a powerful force to oppose them. As with the attempted assassination of Zahir Shah, al-Qa’ida took the lead in the murder of Masood, earning additional favor from the revolutionary parties for the assassination.

Opportunities

Zahir Shah died of natural causes in 2007 and left no politically active and credible heir who could be come a new symbol of national unity. Lacking a natural rallying point for the traditionalist parties, Harakat, NIFA, ANLF, and parts of Jamiat, these people are now separated – and the Revolutionaries and their foreign allies now have accomplished their original goal. Pakistan has few residual worries over a realistic “Pashtunistan” movement and Saudi Arabia’s missionary efforts to spread Salafism is no longer blocked by a robust Hanafi Islam with a deep influence from Sufism, an Islamic interpretation that is nearly the direct opposite of Salafism.

The fact that the revolutionary parties spent so much effort in the splitting the traditionalists to ensure that any coalition that might be formed by a combination of the traditionalists, royalists, and former communists wouldn’t leave the revolutionaries in a weakened, minority situation – losing – is a clue to what should be done to stabilize Afghanistan.

With the revolutionary goals of weakening the traditionalists and with the royal family no longer playing a role, efforts could be made to unify the traditionalists into a single political alliance with a peace platform for future political campaigns. Mojdeddi’s ANLF and Gailani’s NIFA membership should have a natural affinity toward one another, in spite of being from two different Sufi Brotherhoods. Many of the Pashtuns from Rabbani’s Jamiat may have a natural attraction to this type of political group, given the revolutionaries’ success in disrupting the moderate’s efforts during the anti-Soviet Jihad and the civil war against Najibullah’s communists. It was probably due to resentment, circumstance, and external support related to their loss that led many of Mohammad Nabi’s Harakat and traditionalists to form the Taliban Movement. Many former members of moderate parties have no alternative other than to remain with the Taliban and the creation of another option for them to consider may result in a gradual drain of key commanders from the Taliban.



Harakat members affiliated with the Government of Afghanistan could be located and encouraged to start quiet personal negotiations with their former colleagues in the Taliban to encourage them to rally to the “new” political alliance. Tribal affiliation, tribal membership, and attraction to Sufism are factors, that when identified, can be useful in determining who within the Taliban may be worthwhile targets of quiet, individual diplomacy to encourage personal reconciliation.

Pir Gailani and his immediate family members remain highly respected leaders of the Qaderia Sufi community. He is often thought to be a Tajik, but he is actually descended from Iraqi Arabs who immigrated to Afghanistan. Pir Gailani and his sons have been politically active and have broad contacts among the Qaderia Sufis and those influenced by them throughout southern Afghanistan. Gailani’s senior Sufis could be contacted and utilized to locate influential individuals within the Taliban who are also Sufis, possibly even former students of Pir Gailani. Intermediaries are crucial to this approach since most Sufis do not openly identify themselves as involved with Sufism. Qaderia Sufism, however, is widespread throughout southern Afghanistan and even Mullah Mohammad Omar has been associated with Sufism, but from the Nashgabandi group more often associated with Mojdeddi.

The stabilizing influence of Sufism in Afghanistan should not be underestimated. This mystical approach to the practice of Islam is viewed as sinful by the Salafists, the Wahabbi and Deobandi extremists that are gradually penetrating Pashtun society. Any quiet efforts to sustain and rebuild Sufism at the expense of Salafism will have positive, stabilizing results. In considering any program with Sufis, caution must be used to avoid direct support for Sufi clerics and projects they suggest – other than provincial madrassas. There are many regional and tribal leaders with strong Sufi backgrounds who could be located and quietly supported with stabilizing projects created within his tribal area. For example, Abdul Salam Rocketi, the key Suleiman Khel leader and member of Parliament, has strong Sufi connections. Support could be channeled through Abdul Salam to the Suleiman Khel tribe in an effort to support that key Ghilzai tribe while helping spread the stabilizing influence of Sufism. He is only a single example of tribal leaders influenced by Sufism. Efforts should be made to strengthen those maliks and khans having strong Sufi affiliations. Similar efforts should be made to avoid strengthening the authority of the Afghan clergy, even those with Sufi backgrounds.

Caution must be exercised in dealing with the Sufis, however. Westerners tend to view Sufism in its most common aspects, its mysticism and “whirling” while under the influence of drugs, but Sufism is a very complex human activity that has political dimensions as well. Violence is not far beneath the surface of Sufism, as the Russians discovered in the long wars in the Caucasus region and the British learned in Sudan. The current Chechnya rebellion against the Russians is Sufi-based. Any support for Afghanistan’s Sufi leaders should be calibrated in order to avoid strengthening them to the point that they become yet another problem.

Historical Background

An assailant posing as a Portuguese journalist stabs Zahir Shah, the former king of Afghanistan, in his home in exile in Rome. Shah survives. The New York Times will later report that US investigators concluded the assailant had ties to al-Qaeda.



[Source: United Press International, 11/6/1991; New York Times, 10/14/2001]

The assailant, a Portuguese convert to Islam named Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, will later claim he was one of the first members of al-Qaeda. He claims that he discusses the plan to kill Zahir Shah in detail with bin Laden, as there is civil war in Afghanistan at the time and there is a possibility that Shah could return there and lead a secular government hostile to bin Laden's interests. But he will say he didn't get specific permission from bin Laden for the attack. "[T]here wasn't a well-defined hierarchy, we were rather disorganized; you could give a try to whatever entered into your head." He also says that bin Laden "was the guy who gave money to keep the organization going... but he didn't give many orders." Santos is immediately caught and serves eight years in an Italian prison for the attack.

[Source: Bergen, 2006, pp. 116-119]

In November 1991 Santos was dispatched by al Qaeda to Italy to assassinate Zahir Shah, the seventy-year old king of Afghanistan, who had lived in exile in Rome for decades. The assassination attempt against the king appears to be the first time that al-Qaeda had emerged in an act of international terrorism.... Posing as a journalist....

[Santos statement]: "I took an oath of loyalty to [al Qaeda]. Our final aim was to establish the Caliphate and Islamic government and combat oppression.... There were several mujahedin groups that were fighting. Some felt that the king [of Afghanistan] was better than nothing, that at least during his time the country had enjoyed some stability. Other groups, the more hardline Muslims, said that this king had never been a good Muslim. One of the groups was Hish-e Islami [sic], led by [Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar, who said, "If the king comes back, we will fight him and will wage war against those who want to establish a monarchy."

"So I made a proposal to eliminate the king."

[Source: Bergen, pp. 116-119]

After the June 23, 2001 meeting Commander Masood sent one of his political advisors, Yunus Qanuni, to meet the former Afghan monarch Zahir Shah in Rome to decide on arrangements for the Loya Jorga process. Mr. Qanuni visited Rome twice before Masood's tragic assassination by Arab Muslim extremists.

[Source: Future of Afghanistan: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House, published 2001]



Then, around midnight, Masood talked to Khalili. Not about war, but about poetry and Sufi mysticism.

[Source: <http://www.dawn.com/2002/09/08/int8.htm> "Aide recalls last hours of Ahmed Shah Masood"]

I myself learnt of Bedil outside India. During the US bombing of Afghanistan, many journalists, including yours truly, travelled to the areas under the control of the Northern alliance (which was helping the West in ousting the Taleban) via Tajikistan, where Ahmad Shah Masood, the great Afghan patriot, found frequent sanctuary. In Dushanbe I located people who told me about Masood's love for Bedil's poetry.

[Source: http://dumbfoundry.blogspot.com/2007_03_01_archive.html]

Abul Ma'āni Mirzā Abdul-Qāder Bedil [or Mawlānā Abul Ma'āni Abdul Qader Bedil also Bidel Dehlavi] (1642–1720) was a famous Persian poet and Sufi born in Azimabad (present day Patna, India); his family was from Badakhshan (present day Afghanistan). According to some other sources, he was born in Khwaja Rawash, an area of Kabul province in today's Afghanistan.

[Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul-Qader_Bedil]

Two previous presidents of Afghanistan, *Sebghatullah Mojaddedi* and *Burhanuddin Rabbani*, are of the Naqshbandi order. The founder and the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omar, is allegedly a *Naqshbandi* as well.

[Source: <http://www.info-islam.org/SufiMujahideen.pdf>]

It should be noted that not all Sufi Brotherhood members remained within the traditional Islamic parties; a number of them joined the Islamists as well, especially the Jamiat-i Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani.

[Source: *Magnus, Ralph H. and Naby, Eden, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, pg. 95*]

Rabbani was part of three major networks of the resistance; he was a leader of the Islamists at the university, he was respected as an alim, and he had some links to Nashgabandi figures in the north, although he does not seem to practice Sufism himself.

[Source: *Rubin, Barnett R., The Fragmentation of Afghansitan, pg. 218*]



A deep knowledge of the faith comes not simply from reading the Holy Scriptures but also through the teachings of “a trustworthy alim.” Superficial understanding of the texts can lead to ignorance of Islam and to extremism.

[Source: Hanzah, A. Nizar, and Dekmejian, R. Hrair, “A Sufi Response to Political Islam: Al-Ahbash of Lebanon,” Intl. Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 28, no. 28, pg. 223]

The Ulama believe government is necessary, but they do not believe that it is a part of an alim’s duty to wield governmental authority directly. The proper function of the Alim is to advise the government, and set it right when it goes on the wrong path.

[Source: Binder, Leonard, “Islamic Tradition and Politics: The Kijaji and the Alim,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, pg. 253]



APPENDICES



Appendix I: The Barakzai (Baraksay) – Dominance and Conflict

1826 -1839	Amir Dost Mohammed Khan Baraksay (son of Fhat Khan Barakzay) (First time): Takes Kabul and proclaims himself Amir. Tries to retake Peshawar but the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh defeat the attempt. Captures Kandahar in 1834 from the local government and soon after consolidates his control over Afghanistan.
1837	Seige of Herat: Mohammad Shah of Persia lays seige to Herat. The British fearing Russian intrigue in the seige again enter into alliances with the leaders of Kandahar and Herat. Seige is broken by the Alliance. Their envoy Captain Alexander Burnes tries to enter into an alliance with Barakzay in Kabul, but because they refuse to assure British support to Dost Mohammad to regain Peshawar, he refuses to enter into the alliance.
25 July 1838	Tripartide Alliance: The British feeling a great threat by the Russians and Persians, and being unable to firm an alliance with Kabul, form a tripartide alliance between Shah Shoja and his Afghan forces, Ranjit Singh and his Sikh forces and the British East Orient Company.
1838-1842	First Anglo-Afghan War: The British lead the Alliance on an attack of Afghanistan with the object of restoring Shah Shoja to power under British influence. Kandahar taken in April 1839, Ghazna in July 1839 and Kabul in August 1839. Dost Mohammad captured and sent in exile to India.
1839-1840	Amir Dost Mohammed Khan Baraksay: Escapes to Balkh and then to Bukhara where he is arrested. Escapes in 1840 and leads a group against the British. Surrenders to the British at the Battle of Parwan in November 1840. British deport him to India.
Aug 1839-Jan 1842	Shah Shoja and De Facto British Rule (2nd time): Reinstated by the British in Kabul after the capture of the city. Violent outbreaks occur across the country in response to the British rule and their puppet monarch. The British finding their position untenable open talks about withdrawal with Akbar Khan (Dost Mohammad's son), but the British envoy Sir William Hay Macnaghten was killed in 1841.. On Jan. 6, 1842, the British and their Indian support troops withdraw



	from Kabul. Many were massacred outside the city by Afghans waiting in ambush led by Kan Akbar (Dost Mohammed's son). Shah Shoja is killed after British withdrawal. The country splits once again into local khanates with no central authority.
Sep -Oct 1842	Seizure of Kabul: British under Lord Ellenborough and General Pollack lead a punitive force and retake Kabul but quickly evacuate it after exacting harsh penalties.
1843- June 1863	Amir Dost Mohammed Khan Baraksay (2nd time): Returns to Kabul. Began to reconsolidate his rule. Takes Kandahar in 1855, and Balkh and the Northern Khanates in 1859 and Herat in 1863. Dies June 1863.
1845	Seizure of Herat: Ghürid princes revolt and seize Herat. Recaptured by
30 March 1855	Treaty of Peshawar: Dost Mohammed and the British agree to form an alliance against the Persians who are laying siege at Herat.
1855-1857	Second Siege of Herat and British-Persian War: Persians lay siege on Herat upon the death of the local Ghürid Prince. Eventually they seize Herat. British declare war and attack the Persians regaining the city. After British Afghan forces control Herat.
1857	Treaty of Paris: British successes impel the Persians into the Treaty of Paris which renounces all claims on Herat and recognizes Afghan independence.
1862-1863	Revolt of Herat: The Sultan of Herat leads a revolt against Afghan rule but it is repressed by Dost Mohammed one year later..
June 1863-1866	Shir Ali Khan (3rd son, 1st time): Draws nation closer to Russia at the expense of the British. Deposed by elder brothers who have British support.
1863-1869	Civil War: Between Shir Ali and his brothers



May 1866-Sep 1868	Afzal Khan (elder brother) and Azam Khan (elder brother): Overthrow their younger brother.
September 1868	Shir Ali Khan (2nd time): Regains throne after defeating his brothers in civil war.
1878-1880	Second Anglo-Afghan War: Shir Al Khan continuing his pro-Russian stance receives a Russian Mission but refuses to receive a British one. British attack from India. Leaving his son Yaqub as regent, he travels to Russia to gain help. The Russians advise peace. Shir Ali dies suddenly in Mazar-e Sharif in 21 Feb. 1879.
21 Feb - Nov 1879	Yaqub Khan (son) opted for peace with the British who occupy much of the nation and signs the Treaty of Gandamak.
26 May 1879	Treaty of Gandamak: The treaty calls for a permanent British Mission and that Afghanistan conduct foreign affairs with "the wishes and advice" of the British government" and provides for British control of the Khyber Pass.
3 Sep - 31 Oct 1879	Assassination of the British Envoy to Kabul, Sir Luis Cavagnari, and the reoccupation of Kabul by British forces.
Nov 1879	Yaqub Khan: Forced into exile in India by the British where he dies in 1923
24 Dec 1879	Musa Khan (son) interim
Mar 1880	Ayub Khan (Uncle) interim
Oct 1880-3 Oct 1901	Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan: (cousin, son of Afzal Khan) Returns from exile in Central Asia and proclaims himself Amir of Kabul. The British accept his government and withdraw in 1881. Oversees the drawing of modern Afghan borders. Put down a myriad of rebellions and consolidated his control and that of the Afghan Central Government. Considered the founder of modern Afghanistan. Dies 3 Oct 1901.



April 1881	British Withdrawal.
1885	Panjeh Incident and Border Dispute: Border dispute between Russia and Afghanistan flares with violent clashes between forces in 1885. British and Russians negotiate a truce in 1886. The British and Russians begin to negotiate the boundaries of modern day Afghanistan. In affect Afghanistan was set to serve as a buffer between Tsarist Russia and British India.
1893	Durand Line Agreement: Afghan and British negotiators set the border between Afghanistan and British-controlled India. The area between the Durand Line and the actual border of India is referred to as 'Free Tribal Territory' under British sovereignty. This inbetween area would be the subject of much quarrel between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1950's and 1960's.
11 Mar 1895	Pamir Frontier Agreement: British, Afghan and Russian negotiators set the modern border between Russia and Afghanistan.
3 Oct 1901-20 Feb 1919	Amir Habibullah I Khan (son): Designated by his father.. His friendship with the British keeps Afghanistan neutral during the World War I despite intense pressure from the Ottomans. Assassinated by anti-British forces at the end of the War.
21 Mar 1905	Friendship Agreement: Afghanistan enters into a new Friendship Agreement with the British.
1907	British-Russian Entente: Russians and British hold a series of meetings to increase and further regional understanding.
REIGN OF KING AMIR AMANULLAH KHAN I (HOUSE OF BARAKSAY): LAST ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR	
Feb 1919 - 14 Jan 1929	Amir Amanullah Khan (son, 1rst time): Seizes power after a short struggle with his brother Nasrullah after his father's death. Changed title to "padshah (king)" in 1923. Abdicates in favour of his brother.



May 1919	Third and last Anglo-Afghan War: Resentful of British control of Foreign Relations, Amanullah launches a Holy War against the British calling for all British Muslims in India to arise against British control. However, his early successes are soon halted and a stalemate ensues. The war weary and stalemated British sue for peace.
1919	Treaty of Friendship with Bolshevik Russia: Before signing the Treaty of Rawalpindi, the Afghan government enters into a friendship treaty and becomes the first nation to recognize Bolshevik Russia.
8 August 1919	Treaty of Rawalpindi: Afghans get complete Independence from England, and formally gain the right to conduct their own foreign relations. British foreign subsidies are ended. Treaty amended in 1921.
28 Feb 1921	Treaty of Friendship with Bolshevik Russia:
1 Mar 1921	Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Turkey:
22 June 1921	Frontier Treaty and Treaty of Non-Agression with Soviet Russia: The young government of Bolshevik Russia seeking to appease tensions on its southern flank and gain cooperation offers border concessions to Afghanistan. The treaty cedes the Kushka District and areas along the Amu-Darya and Panja Rivers to Afghanistan.
1923	New Constitution: King Amanullah enacts a progressive constitution. Modelled on that of Ataturk's Turkey, it retains strong power in the monarch as head of state while creating a new legislative assembly (1/2 appointed, 1/2 elected). Many progressive reforms follow including women's rights, education reforms and progressive taxation.
10 June 1926	Treaty of Non-Agression and Neutrality with Soviet Russia:
27 Nov 1927	Treaty of Friendship and Security with Persia:



1928	Foreign Relations: Amanullah takes a prolonged foreign trip establishing relations with European powers, Egypt and India.
28 May 1928	New Treaty of Friendship with Turkey:
CIVIL UNREST AND INSTABILITY OVERTHROW OF KING AMANULLAH AND THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF BARAKSAY	
Nov 1928	Civil War and Abdication of King Amanullah: Tribal jealousies and religious conservatism against the liberal constitution lead to a series of revolts throughout the country. A Tajik folk hero Bacha Saqqao (aka Bachai-I-Sakao, Bacceh Saqow) sacks and captures Kabul, and establishes a rival government. Under increasing pressure, Amanullah abdicates on 14 Jan 1928 in favour of his brother.
14 -28 Jan 1929	<u>Amir Inayatullah Khan</u> and the Fall of the House of Baraksay (brother): Inayatullah is given the throne by his brother Amanullah who abdicates in his favour. He only lasts a few days before being forced to abdicate to Bacha Saqqao, the Tajik usurper.
17 Jan-10 Oct 1929	<u>Amir Habibullah II Ghazi</u> (Bacha Saqqao, usurper): The Tajik folk-hero overthrows the House of Baraksay and usurps the throne. However, his hold on much of the country is tenuous at best.
1929	Civil War: After the fall of the House of Baraksay, the country is rife with civil unrest and a variety of pretenders emerge in different regions. A large resistance loyal to the Baraksay Monarchy and led by Prince Nadir Shah wages a major offensive against the Habibullah.
28 Jan - 15 Jul 1929	Ali Ahmad Khan (another pretender):
28 Jan - 23 May 1929	Amir Amanullah Khan (2nd time): When his brother fails to retain the throne, he makes a last attempt to save it. However, he fails to retrieve the throne and goes into exile in Italy. Dies in 1960 in Zurich.



3 Nov 1929	Assassination of Habibullah: The loyalist forces defeat Habibullah's Tajik forces after several months of bitter fighting. Habibullah flees the palace on the approach of Nadir Shah's forces on Oct 10 1929 in Kabul. He is caught and executed November 3 1929 in Kabul.
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HOUSE OF BARAKSAY: REIGN OF KING NADIR SHAH	
16 Oct 1929 - 8 Nov 1933	<u>Mohammad Nadir Shah Ghazi</u> and the Reestablishment of the House of Baraksay (great-nephew of Dost Mohammad): When the Baraksays are overthrown in January 1929, Prince Nadir Shah returns to Afghanistan from Paris where he is serving as a minister of state. He sets up a loyalist resistance and drives Habibullah II (the Tajik usurper Bacha Saqqao) from the throne. He tries to restore Amanullah to the throne, but public opinion presses for his own ascension. He accepts and immediately backtracks on many of Amanullah's liberal reforms. This placates many conservative tribes. He follows a foreign policy of neutrality and retains good relations with both the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia.
14 Nov 1929 - May 1946	Mohammad Hashim Khan: Appointed Prime Minister by the new King
1932	First Afghan Parliament and New Constitution:
1932	Rebellion of the Charkhi Clan: The Charkhi Clan, still loyal to King Amanullah, plots to overthrow Nadir Shah. The King crushes the plot and kills or imprisons much of the family.
1933	Rebellions in the Northwest and South: Several significant local uprisings are put down by the King.
2 June 1933	Non-Agression Treaty with Soviet Russia: Russia signs and on July 3 1933 ratifies a Non-Agression Treaty with Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania and Turkey in an attempt to calm the fears of its neighbors.



Nov 8 1933	Assassination of King Nadir Shah: The king is assassinated in Kabul amid unclear circumstances.
THE REIGN OF KING MOHAMMAD ZAHIR SHAH	
8 Nov 1933 - 18 Jul 1973	Mohammad Zahir Shah (son): Succeeds to the throne after the assassination of his father.
27 Sep 1934	Admission to the League of Nations: Afghanistan becomes the 48th member of the League.
1936	Relations with Japan: In a surprising move, the King calls for closer relations and exchange with Tokyo as opposed to Europe, citing the need to promote Oriental ties over Occidental ones.
20-24 June 1938	Revolt of Shami Pir: Major Religious uprising in Waziristan in the NE. Quickly put down by government.
1937-1938	Military Development: Afghanistan receives military support and training from the UK, Italy and Russia to increase its air power and fighting capability.
8 July 1938	Treaty of Saadabad, Oriental Entente: A non-aggression and support pact is signed in Tehran's Saadabad Castle between Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran and Iraq to increase regional cooperation. This is in line with the Afghan King's call for greater Oriental-Middle Eastern Cooperation.
16 Sep 1938	Recognition of the Italian Empire: Afghanistan recognises Italy's control over Abyssinia.
1939	Industrial Development: The king unveils plans to develop the agricultural and mineral wealth of Afghanistan. He puts particular emphasis on cotton production and metals mining.



WORLD WAR II	
Jan 1940	Preparations: Alarmed by the increasing global tensions, the King implements a mandatory draft and announces plans to put Afghanistan on a heightened footing in case of attack.
May 1940	Economic Development: The King announces the formation of a joint stock company to oversee the processing and manufacture of cotton goods. He also announces a major investment into sugar beets.
29 July 1940	Russian Trade Alliance: Afghanistan and Russia sign a major trade deal promoting increased cooperation.
17 Aug 1940	Neutrality: The King proclaims Afghanistan's neutrality at the opening of the Parliament. He announces plans for increased preparation against attack.
May 1941	Economic Development: The king announces further developments in cotton textile manufacturing and sugar beet production.
22 June 1941	Soviet Russia Attacked by Germany: The German invasion of Soviet Russia brings the war ever nearer to Afghanistan. On July 28, 1941, the King reaffirms Afghanistan's neutrality in the conflict.
19 Oct 1941	Expulsion of the Axis Diplomatic Representatives: Under strong pressure from both the UK and Russia, the King expels the diplomatic representatives of Germany and Italy. He also reaffirms Afghanistan's neutrality.
Nov 1941	Neutrality again Reiterated:
28 Dec 1942	Renewal of the Saadabad Treaty: Despite the unusual situations caused by the war, the signatories agree to continue the treaty and seek regional cooperation.
5 June 1943	Appointment of Ambassador to USA: Afghanistan appoints its first ambassador



	to the USA, Abdul Hussein Aziz.
5 Mar 1944	Friendship Treaty with China: Afghanistan signs a friendship treaty with the Chinese government in Chungking.
1945	Aftermath of the War: Although not directly impacted by fighting during WWII, the economy of Afghanistan is severely disrupted by lack of trade and financial help from wealthier nations.
POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS: PATHANISTAN CONFRONTATION, RISE OF MOHAMMAD DAUD KHAN	
May 1946 - 6 Sep 1953	Shah Mamud Khan: President appoints him Prime Minister. He sanctions free elections, and the resultant democratic "Liberal Parliament" functions from 1949-1952
13 June 1946	Frontier treaty with the USSR: The much more powerful post-WWII Russia seeks to reclaim lost territory and further buffers its borders. Therefore, after Soviet pressure, a new frontier treaty is signed in Moscow redemarcating the Soviet-Afghan border back to its pre-1921 limits (limits agreed with Tsarist Russia). The treaty recedes the Kushka District back to the USSR. Bolshevik Russia had ceded it to Afghanistan in 1921 to gain favour and cooperation during its formative stages.
9 Nov 1946	Admission to the UN: Afghanistan is unanimously admitted to the United Nations as the 54th member. Afghanistan had requested admittance on July 5, 1946.
June-July 1947	Outbreak of the Pathanistan Affair—Conflict with Pakistan and India: In what is to become a long running dispute, Afghanistan on July 3, opens the first salvo in what will become known as the Pathanistan Affair. Afghanistan, witnessing the independence developments in British India/Pakistan, sends a letter to British and Indian officials. The letter points out the desire of many hill tribes in the Northwest Frontier and in Baluchistan to break away from India. It calls upon the British to allow these groups to freely decide to associate themselves with India or Afghanistan or seek independence. The Durand Line of 1893 demarcating the border had placed the Northwest Frontier area known as Pathanistan on the



	Indian side in the status of a 'Free Tribal Territory'. Both India and Pakistan call upon Afghanistan not to interfere in internal affairs.
June-July 1947	NW Frontier Referendum: In the lead up to the referendum, there are calls by a prominent tribal elder and leader of the 'Red Shirts', Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, for a referendum on complete independence for 'Pathanistan'. Authorities in Pakistan and India reject this idea. Khan then calls for a boycott of the referendum. Pakistan sends 15,000 troops to the area to secure the peace. The heavily Islamic NW Frontier province votes overwhelmingly for union with Pakistan over India. However, due to the boycott, the turnout is only 50%. The question of independence or union with Afghanistan is not put on the ballot angering the Afghan government. The 'Red Shirts' with support from Afghanistan seek to rebel.
15 Aug 1947	Formal Independence of Pakistan and India: With the independence of Pakistan and India from the UK, the door is now wide opened for lengthy border disputes especially in the Northwest Frontier Area.
Dec 1947	Withdrawal of Pakistani Troops from NW Frontier Province: In an effort to reduce tensions between the Pakistan government and resident tribes, Pakistan announces the withdrawal of military forces from the NW Frontier Province (called Pathanistan by Afghans and Waziristan by Pakistanis). Over 15,000 troops had been sent there to maintain order during the 1947 referendum. Many troops remain however.
March 1948	Gaffar Khan seeks NW Frontier Province Autonomy: Former pro-Afghan Red Shirt leader and current national MP for the Northwest Frontier Province, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, backtracks on his formerly strong independence views and creates the new 'Pakistan Peoples Party'. He now calls for the NW Frontier Province to be an autonomous region within the dominion of Pakistan.
29 Mar 1948	Upgrading in Relations with the UK: Afghanistan and the UK upgrade relations formally exchanging Ambassadors.
15 June 1948	Arrest of Gaffar Khan: Provincial government agents arrest Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and accuse him of conspiring with the Waziri tribal leader, the Fakir of Ipi,



	to create mass disturbance in the province. He is sentenced to three years. Many others are arrested.
8 July 1948	State of Emergency in the NW Frontier Province: The provincial government implements emergency powers to govern the frontier and prevent insurgency and unrest. A major military offensive is launched against suspected rebels. Many arrests are carried out. Dr Khan Saheb, Gaffar Khan's brother and former premier of the Northwest Frontier Province, is also arrested.
19 Aug 1948	Trade Treaty with the USSR: Afghanistan and the USSR sign a major trading deal. Afghanistan exchanges wool for a wide variety of Soviet goods including oil and gas.
16 Sep 1948	Banning of the Red Shirts: The pro-Afghan Red Shirt party is banned by the Northwest Frontier Government.
Mar-Apr 1949	Escalation of the Pathanistan Affair: With increased repression against the Red Shirts and reports of atrocities against the Afghan 'Pathan' population of NW Pakistan, the Afghan government launches a major war of invective against Pakistan. The Afghan government calls for the right of self-determination for all groups in the NW Frontier Province and Tribal Territories between the Durand line and the Indus River. Afghanistan moves several armed divisions to the Pakistani border in late March. On April 27, Afghan Prime Minister Mahmud Khan threatens Pakistan with strong action if the atrocities against the Pathans are not ceased.
12 June 1949	Pakistan Bombs Afghan Village: The Afghan village of Moghalai was bombed by Pakistani planes killing 23 people and injuring 24. The Pakistanis claim it was a mistake and agree to compensation. Pakistan maintains that the planes were fired on first.
June 1949	Pakistani and Afghan Allegations: Afghanistan accuses the Pakistani government of supporting Agha Amin Jan (half-brother of the former Afghan King Amanullah) in an attempt to seize the Afghan throne. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of supporting the subversive activities of the Fakir of Ipi. Both countries deny the charges, but the rhetoric is growing increasingly hostile.



July 1949	United Kingdom backs Pakistan: The British government increasingly alarmed over the growing unrest in the area supports Pakistan's interpretation of the 1893 Durand Line.
20 Sep 1953 - 10 Mar 1963	Lt. Gen. Mohammad Daud Khan, (1rst time): Seizes the government and the post of prime minister, and imposes conservative, religious rule. Closes the border with Pakistan several times due to border diputes over Pashtunistan. Increasingly allies Afghanistan closely with the USSR although he also acquires US assistance.
August 1961	Pashtunistan Affair: Pakistan closes the border over the Pashtunistan affair (border dispute) forcing Afghanistan to ally even closer to the USSR.
10 Mar 1963	Dismissal of Prime Minister Daud Khan: Is dismissed by the King after hardship caused by prolonged closure of the Pakistani Border over the Pashtun Affair, and due to his convictions on social and democratic reform which were opposed by the King.
10 Mar 1963	Mohammad Yusof: Appointed Prime Minister
March 1963	Pakistani Border Reopened
1964	New Constitution: A new Constitution sets up an elected Parliament
1965	Parliamentary Elections:
24-29 Oct 1965	Mohammad Yusof (2): Appointed Prime Minister
2 Nov 1965-11 Oct 1967	Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwai: Appointed Prime Minister
May 1967	Natural Gas Agreement with USSR: The Soviets agree to import natural gas from Northern Afghanistan via a large pipeline connecting the two countries.



	This deal helps cement Soviet-Afghani ties.
1 Nov 1967 - May 1971	Mohammad Nur Ahmad Etemadi
1969	Elections
1970-1973	Drought and Famine: Central and Northern Afghanistan experience a devastating drought and resulting famine that claims the lives of approximately 100,000 people. Worst hit is the central province of Ghor.
8 June 1971 - 6 Dec 1972	Dr Sharifi Abdul Zahir: Appointed Prime Minister. He loses a vote of no-confidence in the Lower house after failing to adequately deal with the worsening drought and resultant famine.
7-10 Dec 1971	King and Prime Minister visit UK: The visit helps to further ease relations between Afghanistan and its colonial ruler.
March 14 1972	Prime Minister visits USSR: In meetings with Prime Minister Kosygin, Afghan-Soviet friendship and cooperation is stressed with particular attention on the successful natural gas pipeline venture.
12 Dec 1972 - 17 Jul 1973	Dr Mohammad Musa Shafiq: Dr Musa Shafiq, the foreign Minister since 1971, is elevated to the post of Prime Minister.



Appendix II: Cultural Terminology

The following are some of the words that find common usage in Tribal society, explaining at the same time a Pathan's way of life, his custom, his culture and his thinking and approach towards his fellow beings:

AEL

Ael means tame, obedient and submissive, it is opposite being yaghi (rebellious). When two tribes fight and the stronger defeats the weaker, the defeated tribe must comply with the terms of the victor and is said to be made ael. The word ael has another meaning too. When a member of tribe acts against the interest of the tribe, then it is said that such a man should be made ael. There is a saying, " pa ael osa aw po ghra ke yaghi" which means "be tame in the city and rebellious in the mountains".

AHMADZAI POR

Among Pashtun tribes, Ahmadzai tribe of Suleman Khel is very serious in observance of their custom and usage. The procession of their marakas shows the developed stage of customs and usage. When injury or harm is done to someone of this tribe, he will necessary take the por. The rules for dispute settlement though marakas of this tribe are very precise and the decisions reached thereby are irrevocable. The por of this tribe is also very heavy. It is said in every day usage that the Ahmadzai por will necessarily be taken. But all the rules and regulations of narkh will be strictly adhered as well.

ARBAKAY

Tribal policemen are called Arbakay. In Paktia Province, arbakay supervises the implementation of tribal decision with the authority or punish those who do not obey the tribal decisions. The usual punishment is to burn down the house of the guilty man. Arbakay obeys the orders of the 'MIR'. Arbakay has peculiar immunity amongst the tribe. Nobody can inflict any harm on him and if any one does so, he will be severely punished. Until recent times, the Arbakay also had special tasks to perform.

ARTINA OR MANDINA

Artina or mandina, meaning a woman or wife, are interchangeable words and both of them have one and the same meanings. This word is usually used for the weak, inferior and subjected people, as one will say; you are not even my artina. Though artina and mandina are interchangeable but in western tribes, it is usually used to insult someone. In eastern tribes it is commonly used on behalf of mandina denoting insult to someone. It is an adjective for the inferior as wife is inferior amongst Pashtuns according to their penal custom and usage. Artina is not an equal partner of the husband of a woman in the matter of rights.



ASHAR

To do collectively and tribal public work is ashar. Some people think that this word has come from the Arabic asher, but it is an Aryan word. All working men of the village participate in ashar. Those unable to participate will send their drought animals to the ashar. The refusal to participate in ashar has a determined nagha and anyone who refuses will be criticized. Public works such as canal construction, cleaning up of karez, underground wells, drain construction, grain threshing, etc., are done by ashar. Ashar was the collective activity of the ancient tribes. When all production activities were collectively performed in earlier times, land was sown by ashar and the produce was apportioned collectively. In the beginning of social stratification, the work of the elders of the tribe was done by ashar and the elder was to serve some food to ashargains (or asharbani) participating in ashar.

ASHARGANI (or ASHARBANI)

Persons chosen or demanded for ashar. The animals sent to ashar are also asharbani. The asharbani of the ashar called for the public work of the village will have their own food to eat and their own work-tools to use; but the asharganis called for the work if the khan may not have their own food and tools. The Khan may supply both.

ATTAN

It is a square type of dance performed by Pathan youths in one square. Only in tribal combats the young men go to fight in Attan. When Chigha is called for, everyone has a duty to enter the square to Attan and go to the tribal combat.

Attan is an element of Pashtun's culture and has no instance in the culture of other nations, for in the rest of the world. Square dancing is done only for enjoyment but in Pashtun tribes Attan is done on the battle ground too. However the dancing done for enjoyment is called gada or nasa. In the western part of Afghanistan, Attan is done for both battles and festivities. In the Kakar and Shirani tribes and in the places of Suleman Koh (Suleman Mountains) there exists a kind of Attan called gadamay in which both men and women take part.

BABERRAI

Access over a decision of the Jirga is called baberry. This term is usually used in the cases of Walver (price fixed for the bride).

For example, if an amount is fixed by two parties as walvar but afterwards the family of the girl demands more than what was decided, it would be called Baberry. The word Baberry is also used for the reversal of a disease. In tribal customary law and usage, Baberry can also mean to increase the amount of Nagha previously decided upon.

BADANA

Badana is another word for the 'robe of honor.' When the decision of maraka is accepted by both sides



of a dispute, then a badana is given to the members of maraka. It is a kind of bribe and is used when the members of maraka side up with the powerful party to the dispute and try to enforce their decision upon the other party by force. The word bade is also used for badana.

BADI

Badi means enmity. The man having enmity with someone is called badi dar. Badi is used individually as well as collectively, i.e., two tribes may have badi between themselves. Badi is very close to trabgany, but trabgany is more exclusive concept.

BADRAGA

Badragas are the escorts that accompany a traveler through tribal territory. If a stranger, say a resident of the Kohat District, has an occasion to visit Maidan, he must pass through Orakzai limits. To protect himself from injury to person or property, he takes with him an escort from the tribe through whose limits he travels, and is then safe from any harm, as the violation of a badraga gives rise to a feud. A badraga often consist of a single man who is generally armed. The escort is paid by the man requiring it, according to the distance traveled. An escort will take a traveler safely through the limits of his own, as well as of other tribe, with which their section is on good terms. When a person is under the badraga of a tribe not concerned in the matter, then his enemy will not harm him. If tawan is done to him, then the badraga considers it a tawan to them. In every tribal agency, the political agent provides such badragas to guests entering into his jurisdiction.

In the eight Afridi tribes of Tirah, badraga carries great consequences. It is a custom of these tribes that if a material arm is done to the one under badraga, then the badraga pursues the culprit and gets tawan from him. The man under badraga may pay some cash amount to badraga but this is not a strict requirement.

BALANDRA

'Balandra' means collective work. It is synonymous to ashar. Its most usual meaning is 'joint attack'. In the Kharoti and Mangal tribes of Kurram Agency and that of the Orgun region (Afghanistan) , balandra is the collective decision of a group to kill all the members of a certain family. Balandra is used in forest-covered regions. The collective work to clean up a piece of land from forest is also called balandra.

BARAMPHTA

Baramphta means a pledge which both parties to a dispute will give to the maraka to enable it to implement a decision. If one or both of the parties to a dispute will not accept the settlement decision, the baramphta of the non-accepting party is forfeited. Usually rifles are given in baramphta. The baramphta which is forfeited is either given to the accepting party or kept by the marakachyan (members of the council) Baramphta is a kind of guarantee which is given to the maraka in all tribes. The kidnapping of a person for a certain purpose other than ransom is also called baramphta.



BARKHA

Barkha literally means part or share. In Pashtun custom it means 'rights.' A person living in a tribe has barkha there. Such a barkha (share) in the tribe has its own economic and judicial implications. In Sheikh Mili's book, the law of tribal land distribution is based on the principle of barkha. The word is synonym to nikat commonly used in Wazirs, Mehsuds, Mohamands and Afridis. Barkha is also the share for which one takes part in the public work. Allusively barkha means Eima (faith, belief). When a pious man dies then it is said, he left with a great barkha, i.e., he died with faith.

BAKHAL

Bakhal means 'paradon'. Every member of a tribe had the right to Bakhal. Every individual or group of a tribe can grant it to the encroachers upon his rights. Usually bakhana is given in the cases of murder. However no cases of Bakhana in the case of assault on a woman can be found in Pakhtun society. If someone were to grant bakhana in such a case, he would lose face in his tribe. In the Mohmand tribe, bakhana in case of murder is one of the four rights the murderer should have. The others are nikal, kashanday, and swara.

BATYARAY

Batyaray is a professional cook engaged mostly for cooking rice in big copper mugs during marriage ceremonies. In tribal status batyaray is inferior. A proverb says, when the mother is a batyaray, her son will not become fateh khan (Fateh Khan is a famous hero of Pathan folk-lore). In the social stratification batyaray like jola (weaver) and eingar (blacksmith) belong to the lower stratum and they are not equal to asil. In tribal society an Asil man can marry a batyaray woman but not vice versa.

BAWAR

Bawar means trust. In tribal marakas and council, both sides of the dispute are required to give bawar to someone as a surety. Bawar is given orally. Until bawar is no given, maraka will not sit. A tribal man is sincere in giving Bawar. When bawar is broken, the bawar-breaker has to pay sharam. The misuse of bawar is an unlawful act according to tribal norm.

BAIRAGH

Bairagh is a tribal flag. Every tribe has a flag of its own and the tribe, clans or khels are counted with Bairagh. For example, it is said that the Afridi tribe has eight bairaghs. Bairagh is kept in a well-secured place by the clans entrusted with. A tribe will take out its bairagh and hold it high only in bigger fights. When Afridis have grand Jirga they will bring black flags to it. The decision reached under the black flags is especially important and irrevocable. It is said that Amir Amanullah Khan gave the black flags to the Afridis.



The bairagh of Umara Khan of Jandool is yellowish with a black stripe which he flew in 1895 during his was with the British against the siege of Chitral. This bairagh is lying in the Mess of Chitral Scouts.

BELGA

Anything from among the stolen things found in someone's house. The one whose house it is found in is considered either the thief or his accomplice. To store goods stolen by someone else bears tawan and the plea of the man hiding stolen goods is not accepted.

BONGA

The term is used for the amount taken by the culprits to recover a kidnapped person or to restore stolen articles to the actual owner.

BRID

Brid means attack. In a tribe 'tak' of every member is known and the encroachment on some one's 'tak' is brid. 'Tak' means land, plot or share. Brid is an offence. If anyone alone or through the connivance of his tribe commits 'brid' he is to be punished according to "narkh". The case goes until the decision as to punishment of the offender of brid is reached. Brid also means a boundary between two individuals or tribes.

CHAGHA

This is also a body of qaumi lashkar raised spontaneously on the occasion of dacoity [robbery], robbery, lifting away of cattle, and other offences of the sort. A man announces by drum-beat or otherwise, to inform the people around, who come out of their houses, fully armed and chase the offenders.

CHALWESHTHAI

This is a force raised by the tribe on a voluntary basis to deal with any eventuality regarding a concerted action. Its aim and purpose is to help government implement its policies and implement works on self-help basis whenever occasion demands. During war, jihad, etc., the chalweshthai call the fighting youths from each house to join the team. A certain number from each family volunteer to form a tribal force which then proceeds to act in conformity with the jirga decisions and orders issued by a qaumi jarnail (tribal gernal). The sanctity of action by a member of chalweshthai is respected and no retaliation allowed or penalty imposed on any member of the tribe. It is not uncommon for chalweshthai to have been engaged for constructive purpose like the digging of a channel, construction of a flood protection band (dam) and prevention of crimes on a small scale.

There have been several instances where chalweshthai have burnt houses, inflicted severe injuries and even death on members of the same tribe, but their action has not led to community of individual feuds. Some chalweshthais are employed to prevent murders and other heinous offences on main roads and in tehsil [sub-district] headquarters. Chalweshthai worked for peace and order in some of the turbulent



areas of Federally Administred Tribal Areas (FATA). But of late it has attracted much criticism owing to its misuse of powers. Majority of the tribes have even called them great rascals. That is why it has now been stopped from operating in some of the Tribal Agencies.

CHANREY

Chanrey is an assistant of the " Mullah" and a servant who works in the mosque. He collects bread from the village families for the Mullah that is called "Tuk" by the western Pashtuns. When someone dies in the village the chanrey acts as a messenger to inform the dead one's relatives of the event. A chanrey may become talib and a mullah by gaining religious knowledge and become Pesh-Imam in a mosque. Chanrey may remain as such the rest of his life. As they say, chanrey cleans up Jumat in this world and in the other world, is servant in the heavens.

During maraka or jirga, charey stands at the door of the mosque and gets what the village has donated to assist the marakachyan.

DA CHEGHI

Literally the drum for calling. In tribal life the job of a doolchi is a serious one. He shall use the drum that the people from the very sound recognize whether it is a call to warn them of any serious event. In some tribes, doolchi has many dooles but the chegi dool is the biggest.

DA KAT KHAPA NIWAL

Da kat khapa niwal is an act of begging pardon by holding the leg of the charpai (kot) upon which the body of the killed one is carried to the graveyard. This custom is similar to that of pa qabar ke samlastal and is resorted to by one who has killed someone inadvertently. After such an act, the killer is pardoned. The one begging pardon must be very careful to get the charpai, for there is no tawan if he is killed on the way before reaching the charpai.

DA KHABAR TIE

Means the time and the notice for tiega. When such a tiega is made, zamingarey (sureties) are appointed from each side. Each side may inform the zamingarey that the tiega has been broken and is not in force any more. Also zamingarey may serve a notice on both sides saying that they are no more zamins (sureties) and thus the tiega is broken. This custom is common in the Afridi tribe.

DA LASHKAR CHIGHA

To call the tribal army for launching a lashkar. It is done only when there is a big danger of a plan to attack. The dolchi stands on a high place beating his drum rushes up to the place where the dolchi is standing. Da lashkar chegha is done for chpaw too. In the lashkar chegha, great losses are incurred including killing of humans and house burning.



DAM

Dam means an instrumentalist or a singer. None of the tribal nobility will become a Dam, which has low social status. Their tribal relations are mostly unknown. Dam play and sing in parties, weddings and other festive occasions. Dams have their own customs and traditions. The grooms shall pay some amount to the Dam on the wedding day. If a tribal man harms a Dam, Nanawati is not done nor maraka called to investigate and hear the case; only a second or third rank mashar may settle the case.

DAMA

Dama is the woman who acts as dancer and sings songs at the marriage functions. Dama belongs to the non-Pashtun race, or so to say, lower strata of society. Pashtuns are extremely fond of engaging pretty damas in their marriage functions; that is why professional female dancers existed till recent past and to some extent even now in Swat, Mardan and Peshawar. Dama has a low social position. Dama is the property of the mashar of the tribe. He has rights to give her away in marriage or get her divorced. Her living expenses are paid by the mashar. In tribes whose women are veiled, a Dama can go around unveiled.

DA MARAKCHI DA SPAKAWI TAWAN

This means tawan for disrespecting a marakachi. The prestige of a spin giery of maraka is strictly safeguarded. If someone disrespects a spin giery of maraka, he shall pay 1800 Afghanis as tawan (now perhaps more) according to the Esa Narkh.

DA MAROKHEY BADLA

The revenge for kidnapping a married woman. The taking away of a married woman is a very serious crime and has serious por. The offender cannot be pardoned and shall be killed. The por is "owwa sara," meaning that if the first offender dies, his natural death and someone else marries the woman, the second husband is to be killed and this goes on up to the 7th husband to be killed.

DA MIRAS DA PARA QATAL

To kill as to receive inheritance. The one doing this ignominious act is deprived of the inheritance and is liable to por and his house to be set on fire.

DA MUSA NARKH

Musa is the brother of Esa, the son of Ahmad. The Musa Narkh is named after him which till recent was in force, but now it is replaced by the Esa narkh. In musa narkh much attention is paid to revenge especially in the murder case. For example to pardon a murderer, the whole plarina shall grant it instead of only the heirs of the murdered.



DA NAMZADI PA ZOR BEWAL

Means taking away by force of one's betroth from her father's house to his own. When the father-in-law is stubborn to arrange for the wedding, the fiancée has the right to take away his betroth from her father's to his own house; but when it is done he shall send nanawati to his father-in-law. The father-in-law is forced by the custom to respect such nanawati. This is an ancient custom mentioned in the story of Adam Khan Durkhanai, a famous Pashto folk-story of love and romance.

DA SPIN GIERI GHALA

Da spin gier ghala (i.e., theft by an old man). When an old man is caught stealing, his beard, mustaches and eyebrows are shaved and then he is released. Such punishment is considered the worst tribal life and one will rather be killed than so punished. This insult is a peshor to his successors.

DA SPI TAWAN

Means tawan of a dog. The dog watches the house and the properties of a tribal. Hence nobody shall kill it. If one kills some one's dog inadvertently he shall give the owner of the dog, one psa (i.e. lamb) and some amount of money being da spi tawan. If the killing is premeditated, the killer bears a por of a full khun upon himself and his killing by the dog owner as such has no tawan.

DA TORO BAIRAGHUNO JIRGA

Da toro bairaghuno jirga means the jirga convened under the black flags under the awe of imminent danger of foreign chpaw. Such Jirgas are convened by the Afridi tribe. Those not obeying the verdict of such Jirgas are very heavily punished.

DA WACH KHALI AKHISTAL

It means to take a dried wood chip. It is a kind of oath-taking in every day common problems. The malammat (guilty) will take a small dried wood chip in his hand and take the oath. Taking oath by wach khali is considered a bad omen and it is believed that the one who does so, dries out like the wood-chip.

DA WARMAIG DA WIENI SHARIK WAL

It means the common neck blood, i.e. blood relationships. All those belonging to the same plarina are considered blood relatives. If someone of a plarina commits murder, all plarina are considered enemies by the murdered side. Any one of da warmaig da wieni sharik wal may be killed by the victim's party.

DODAI (or MARAI)

Dodai means bread. It is also means melmasthia (entertainment of guests). The expenses of Jirga are also called dodai. Oath may be taken on the name of dodai. A person who frequently entertains guests is referred to as a dodimar. When one offers dodai to someone, he should take it or at least a portion of it otherwise it is considered disrespectful. Tribal men respect dodai and Dastarkhwan (tablecloth, the



cloth on which food is served). When one takes out dodai in his hand to be pardoned, the other side must kiss it and grant pardon. If he is not willing to grant pardon, he puts some money on the bread because of sharam to dodai.

DOL

Dol is a double-headed drum. In tribal life it is a means of communication. When some trouble looms over a village, the dols are drummed up. The village people hearing dol will hurry to the place where dolchi (the drummer) stands. All along the march to and the battlefield, a dol is drummed. In tribal customs dol is respected. The dol is kept in the house of a mashar (Elder).

DOLCHI

Dolchi or Dolzen is the dol-drummer. In some tribes Dolchi called Ghazi (the killer of a non-Muslim enemy and the winner of the battle). This title of respect might have been given to Dolchi in the 19th century when Pashtuns were fighting the British imperialism. A dolchi has some immunity in tribal disputes. Pegor is the lot of the killer of the dolchi on the battlefield. A dolchi goes to battlefield under the flag of the tribe. An experienced dolchi keeps the front line in order through the act of drumming. Tribal men are familiar to the commands issued through the drumming sounds by an experienced dolchi.

DA DOL DANGAW

Literally means to drum up the dol. In tribal customs it is the announcement of some imminent danger. When chapaw looms over the village or any need arises to call in all the village people, the the dol is drummed up. Any tribal man hearing it knows that something has happened and hurries to the place where dolchi stands.

DOKHMAN (or DOSHMAN)

It means enemy. Dokhman is called ghaleem (enemy) and to try to defeat him on every front is a tribal duty. To continue enmity with his enemy is a sign of manliness for a Pashtun. The doshman of one person is the doshman of all the members of his plarina. It is a saying, dokhman, even if small and fire even if a spark, is always harmful.

DRIMAN

The word means the third ones, or a third party trusted by both sides of a dispute for settling the matter. Driman gather information about the case from both sides and on the basis of his findings determine the malamat (guilty). Driman do not have the prestige of maraka for their decision is not accepted, it has no nagha.



ELCHI

Elchi is the middleman between two quarreling tribes. He brings about some understanding between them. Elchi has the privilege to enjoy security as it said there is no prison or detection for elchi. To insult an Elchi is an offence and the offender must pay sharam, otherwise the elchi has the right to file suit before jirga. It has occurred in tribal history of Afghanistan that an elchi once went to some hostel to his own, and was insulted there. Upon his return he filed suit for attempted murder and the jirga settled the case in his favor.

GHACH

Ghach means revenge. Ghach prikhodal means not to take revenge is considered cowardly and unmanly. In tribal life every man and every tribe has a very strong sense of ghach. A tribal man may be very patient in ghach akhistaal (revenge taking), but eventually he takes it. The proverb, (PAKHTUN SAL KAL WROSTA GHACH WAKHIST WAILY-OS-ME HUM TALWAR OKRA) means a Pashtun took revenge hundred years later, but said even then had been in hurry, explains the patience and strength of the Pashtun in taking revenge.

GHADAI

It is a sort of joint movement of people who come out for commission of some crime like robbery, dacoity, etc. in settled or tribal area. The difference between ghadai and chaga is that the former is designed to commit a crime while the latter, to avert it.

GHAIRAT

Ghairat means zeal. To keep on one's own and his tribe's prestige, one has to be zealous, courageous and somewhat heedless. The one who is not zealous and courageous may come under the chapaw of others. Ghairat is a part of namus and it is said that if one has no ghairat he cannot keep his namus. Calling one beghairat (unzealous) is insult equal to calling names. Nobody has the right to call other one as beghairat. Ghairat does not only concern men; women also must have ghairat. Ghairat is often tinged with fanaticism yet it helps to preserve the tribal system and is an integral component of Pakhtunwali.

GHOLAY

Gholay means the courtyard of a house. In tribal terms it is the track a tor (accused) person adopts for himself through which he can walk with immunity to someone's house. The tor will walk along a certain path to the house of a certain man and kill a sheep there. This brings him under the protection of the said man. Then he walks to another's house and kill a sheep there and so on. He is then protected by all the people whom he crosses in such a manner. The path along which the tor thus walks is called gholay. He has immunity while on this path, but he has to be very careful not to walk off this path or else, he may be attacked.



GIERA

The word means beard. It is the symbol of manliness and is sacred despite the fact majority of the young shave beard in today's time. To harm someone's beard brings the liability of por. The pulling out of a beard in fight has a certain tawan, if done deliberately.

HAD

The word literally means bone. But in custom it means a member of plarina. All those having a common plarina are each other's had. When one of plarina is killed, it is a Hadmat for the whole plarina and all the members will act as one to revenge the death. (Hadmat means one whose bone is broken). The father and brother of the killed one are called hadmati. In every day conversation the plarina of the killed one is called hadmati for their had (bone) is broken, meaning that a member of their plarina is killed.

HAD PO HAD KE

When maraka decides that the killer side shall give a woman to the heir of the killed and a compromise is effected in this way, such a decree and rogha is called Had po Had ke that is, bone for bone. To accept the principle of had pa had ke does not depend only on the members of the family of the killed, but it is mutually discussed by all the members of the plarina and decision as to the acceptance made. It is not necessary to give only one woman in had po had ke. Instances have been noticed in which seven women were given in had po had ke.

HAMSAYA

Hamsaya literally means sharing shadow. The one who is taken under shadow (or protection) by his naik (Master) is called hamsaya. To allow a fellow being to share his shadow under his roof, is again reflective of a Pathan's generosity, and is a testimony of his Pakhtunwali large.

An individual, tappa or tribe of weaker influence is obliged to place themselves under the protection of a powerful patron to secure immunity from injury to life of dishonor. A person seeking such protection slaughters lambs (one or two) in front of the house of the person whose protection is sought. After preliminary negotiations, the naik accepts him as hamsaya even if he is a murderer, or guilty of other heinous offences but not charged with the label of Tor (illegal sexual relations with a woman) for tor persons are not considered worth negotiation with the aggrieved parties or even as arbitrators. All other offenses, if any, are invariably negotiated by the naik and with the aggrieved parties on his hamsaya's behalf to reach an amicable settlement. In no case will the naik return or handover the hamsaya to his enemy until a peaceful settlement is reached, for it is considered against his 'pashto'. If during his hamsayagi his enemy causes him injury, insult or tries to kill him, it will invariably be considered as if the injury has been caused to his naik who is bound to pick up arms against him. In some tribes the custom prevalent is that, to affect compromise, por is paid to the master in case of murder of his hamsaya by his enemy.



Hamsaya is usually of two kinds; one is hamsaya of the land, the other, hamsaya of lamb. In both of the cases the right of protection is sacred, traditional and everlasting. Malik in tribal areas are most often heard saying that such and such person or tribe had shed the lamb's blood in front of their fore-fathers in time of yore, hence our hamsaya. Likewise a hamsaya is given lands by his master for cultivation on the settled terms. He is called 'land hamsaya' and his protection is equally sacrosanct upon his master.

A hamsaya, in return for protection, is bound to support his patron and assist him as necessary, even in his family feuds. In pre-partition times, quite a good number of Hindu families were hamsayas of Muslims naiks in tribal areas. They never joined in the actual hostilities but they were bound to supply meals and other articles to their patrons on the eve of siege, war, etc. Foreign hamsayas, such as members of another clan are rarely dragged into feuds of this kind. According to the usual custom, hamsayas of masters at feud are not subjected to reprisal unless they engage in actual fighting.

A hamsaya is barred from purchasing lands but if he does, he still remains as hamsaya of a particular malik/clan. During his refuge with, the said hamsaya shall remain peaceful and if required by the political administration, his naik may even provide them a bond of good conduct, but he shall not be handed over to the government for arrest or otherwise. The following Pashto verse is most often heard from the mouth of Turis (CHE NAIK DE ZORAWAR WEE HAMSAYA DE GHACHAWI PARDI KATOONA) which means" a hamsaya who has a powerful naik, has a free access to the charpais of others".

HIRED ASSASSINS

A body of hired assassins exists in every Agency but a Pathan's ego is satisfied only when he himself presses the trigger over his enemy.

HUJRA

A Hujra is a place for guests and for gatherings and parties of the male population of the village. A Pashtun must have either hujra, big or small, or a baitak. In the hujra of Khan festive gatherings are held. A hujra is a safe place for any offender entering its premises and is protected there up to the time he gets out. Even the murderer of the hujra owner's brother or son, when he gets into the hujra, can stay there in security and the hujra owner will not do any harm to him.

Hujra has special norms and etiquettes. The elder, will sit in the elders place and the youngster in the place for young ones, but the hujra owners always sits near the door. The institution of hujra amongst the Pathans is now unluckily dwindling fast.

INAM KHWARA

The Mughals and later the British tried to abolish the land distribution system brought about by Sheikh Milli in Momands and Yusafzais, but their tribes did not comply and still distribute lands according to the old wesh [land apportioned by clerics] system. However, the government has distributed some lands to some people, who are called inaam khawara, on a permanent settlement basis. The act of the government was to destroy the wesh system but the tribes reached badly and hated all those acquired



land from the government and called them by the insulting name of *inaam khara* which taking *inaam* (gratuity) for carrying out a shameful act.

JAT

Jat belongs to the low stratum in the tribal society. The jat makes double drums, sieves, and they work as tanners. The Pashtuns consider them as strangers and they are not equal. Their color is dark in general. They seem to be the *sudra* (*shuder*) cast of the Aryans that had low social position in that time too. The term *jat* in this sense is commonly used in western parts of Afghanistan. The Pashtuns of the Helmand Province treat *jats* and *toryan* as being low. *Dams* and *barbers* are also thought equally low. No *jirga* is concerned to look into the complaints of *jats*, only one elder is enough to investigate the case. *Jats* living within a tribe are given separated dwellings. No Pashtun will marry a *jat* woman.

JABA (OR ZHABA)

Jaba, like *khwla*, means a promise, undertaking, or an agreement. Not complying with *jaba*, bears *nagha*. A tribal man is very faithful in fulfilling *jaba* no matter how much loss he may incur. Pathans say *jaba* is sacred because one reads the Quran with it.

JHAGH

A peculiar custom prevailing amongst Pathans is *Jhagh*, which means a unilateral declaration of claim over a girl. A man wishing a particular girl for his wife may declare unilaterally by means of fired shots that he has *jhagh* or claim on her, thereby announcing that anyone else having claim on her will have to settle his accounts with him first. A youth making such proclamation obviously takes the risk of his life for there is every possibility of disapproval of the girl's father or guardians, which may lead to utter animosity between the two parties. If however, there is place for the girl amongst her relatives, the *Jhagh*-making youth is cooled down, otherwise the girl has to be betrothed to him or else he has to be appeased by cash money. If the girl's father is comparatively more powerful, then the *jhagh*-making youth is bound to pay him *sharmana* (the amount received as a result of his insult). Among the Wazirs, this amount is Rupees 1200/- cash plus one or two lambs. In other territories of FATA the scores are settled with the *jhagh*-making youth according to circumstances and *Rewaj*. In some of the tribes the youth throws the head of slaughtered lamb into the girl's house as a token of his claim over the girl intended to be betrothed to him. Among the Sherani and Usthrana tribes of D. I. Khan, a custom prevails that a person having money dispute or broadly speaking, any claim other than sex matters, declares by proclamation that nobody shall marry the sister or daughter of a particular person till his claim is settled. Sheranis call this *Arra*. In fact this is an embargo placed on the girl's parents till the claim of the *jhagh*-making youth is satisfied, but instead of the *jhagh*-making youth fails to prove his claim, then he is liable to pay *por* to the party against whom *jhagh* has announced. There are instances that on account of failure to reach an amicable settlement between the parties, the girls get old in their parent's houses. A party in dispute in Sherani tribe may proclaim before his rival, "your daughter is *Arra* to me" (i.e. you cannot marry your daughter till you first settle my claim). The opposite party may promptly retort "your daughter is also *Arra* to me". The enmity thus takes a start. In such a case, the *Jirga* consisting of elders,



notables or Syeds, etc., intervene and their first and foremost duty is to release the innocent ladies from the clutches of Arra on both sides. In order words the embargo of Arra is lifted but the jirga continues its deliberations till it reaches some adjudication. In case a person is held par'h' (guilty' by the jirga), then he is directed to make Nanawati on the opposite party. In such a case both por and sharam as fixed by the jirga, may be paid to the party aggrieved. Cultivable lands are also attached unilaterally in this manner.

A jhagh is spontaneously proclaimed that such and such land has turned Dakia to him. In this case, no one can have the liberty to cultivate tha Dakia land except, of course, the real owner, until accounts are settled with him. Similarly a running tractor may turn Dakia, in which case it shall remain barred from sale or being put to hire. A running grocery shop, flour mill, sawmill, etc., may likewise become Dakia in which case no one shall purchase articles from the shop, bring grain to the mill for grinding or bring wooden logs to the saw mill for sawing, cutting, etc.,

The term speena is also used for land put under Dakia which means that the very land shall remain Banjar (arid) till settlement of the dispute. This, in other words, is a stay order in favor of the claimant.

KHAN

Khan is mashar (elder) of the tribe. He is a defacto member of maraka. He may issue his own orders, too. Khan has hujra and must serve the guests that come to his hujra. In places where old customs have remained in force, the Mir is the ruling power and where these customs have weakened; the Khan is the ruling power. In western tribes, khan means Mashar of the tribe. Khanate is a powerful tribal institution at the head of which sits the khan. At times when private properties did not exist, the khan was elected by jirga. Later the khan was elected for his life and finally khani became inheritable. Khan has absolute authority over the men of whom he is the khan. The khan keeps people as his kinsmen to strengthen and maintain his ruling power.

Khan is a Mongolian word. During the time of Mongol rule, the word came to be used in China, Khurasan, India and Khwarazm. When Pakhtun tribes were nomadic, they cultivated the land where they lived under the leadership of their mashar. The mashar must have been courageous, ambitious and an adventurer. Adventures were admired by Pashtuns that paved the way for the institution of Khanate. The adventurism of the Pakhtuns is well pictured in such stories as Adam Khan-Durkhanai, which relates the juridical relationship of the time as well as tribal rivalries. In places where Khan's economic power permits he must pay the expenses of maraka and jirga. Khan has an influence over maraka and jirga which plays a great role in the limitation of the authority of the jirga.

KHAIRAT

Literally khairat means sacrifice and devotion. It is a custom to slaughter a sheep, goat, cow or buffalo in sacrifice to celebrate certain religious and other traditional festivals. The slaughtering of sheep or cow in maraka and jirga in prayer for the successful conclusion is also called khairat. To avert calamities such as drought the Mullahs will often advice people to do khairat.



KHEL

Khel is an ethnographic unit forming the central point around which tribe moves. Khel is a unit of tabar and a cluster of khpas (pshas), and khpa is composed of kuls and koranai, i.e. families. The khel is a unit based on kinship. In the southern tribes the term khel and in the western tribes, the term Zai are suffixed to the name indicating the basic ethnographic unit. It is the authority of the khel to admit someone into the tribe or refuse him. The decision on such matters will be taken in Jirgas in which the representative of each khel casts a predetermined number of votes. The number of votes a khel can cast in the jirga, determines its tribal position in the tribal hierarchy.

KHWLA KAGAWAL

A bewasah (helpless) engaged in enmity unable to carry it to the end, will call on his khel for help and he is necessarily to be helped. Such an act is called Khwla Kagawal. The act of Khwla kagawal is to diminish the tribal honor and may be rarely seen.

KOG NARKH

The verdict in favor of one side contrary to the rules of narkh is called kog-Narkh. If the opponent does not have to accept the verdict he has the right to appeal to another maraka. If a wrong (KAGA) is proved at the hands of marakcheyan, they have to pay nagha, otherwise the opponent has to obey the verdict and pay nagha.

KUDALA

Kudala is a hut built from woods and stones to shelter both men and animals. The burning of kudala comes under the same judiciary rules as the burning of a house.

KUL

Kul means family. It is usually used to indicate an enlarged family. Koranai and tabar are used for a smaller family. Sometimes Kul is used for a group of families closely related to each other. In this case, Kul may refer to Khel as the Pateh Kul and Omar Khan Kul in Mangal tribe.

KULAL

A potter; the person who makes mud potteries. He belongs to the lower string of the social stratas. Akulalan are considered strangers and not the members of the tribe. Tribal nobility hinders the creative work, for the tradesmen are considered servants and hence are treated by the tribal nobles as their servants.

LAMAN

Literally, laman means shirt. In custom, it means excuse, forgiving and granting refuge. "Pa laman de vor lwedal" plunging into laman means asking for refuge. "Flankey loya laman lari means "Mr. so and so has a wide laman," i.e. he has a great sense of forgiving and pardoning. In jirga and maraka when pardon is



begged from someone then it is said 'staa laman loya da.' pa kpula laman ke qabul kra.,"meaning you have a vast laman; accept him in your laman. A Pashtun takes pride in hearing that he has a vast laman.

LANGAR

The pirs and sayeds perpetuate this institution in tribal setup since long by collecting charity from the well-to-do people. The word connotes the food as well as the place where food is served for visitors. A langar that serves cooked vegetables with bread and meat is called chwarr langar, that is, fat langar. People in need for prayer and tawiz live in langar until they get the desire tawiz from the a pir concerned. In regions where piran and sayeds are influential, rogha jorra are done in langar. It is not customary to have maraka or jirga convened in langar. Only the limited maraka and jirgas will be called in langar and only when rogha jorra are certain to come about.

LASHKAR

This is a body of tribesmen raised or collected at the response of a drum beat to combat a large scale offensive. Its purpose is invariably to deal with a particular incident. The term is applied to dozen of men going to a nearby village for family feud and also to the fifty thousand who poured into Kashmir in 1947-48. Since the Pathans are a warrior race, the lashkar is an inseparable part of thier life. The best English equivalent of the Pashto Lashkar is probably war party as was found among the Red Indians of America. The Pashtun outlook of life being what it is the word is one of the most common in thier language. Lashkar, as used in the tribal sense, can be employed as a crusade or a holy war or can even be out against a particular policy of the government. The tribal lashkar in the latter case continues until the political authorities see it appropriate to sit with them across the table and carve out an amicable settlement. In Mohmand Agency particularly Safis, the lashkar is known by the name Amr-Bil-Maaruf Party. As in the case of jirga, size is irrelevant.

LOKHAY

Lokhay is the psa (sheep) given in nanawati. When someone tries to come under the protection of a tribe, he puts Lokhay with it. Anyone asking for the protection will slaughter a psa in the tribe, and the tribe grants him membership. From then on, the tribe will keep him in safety from any harm intended by any one.

LOKHAI SHARIKAWAL

Lokhai sharikawal is another good practice followed in the tribal areas. A weaker tribe or individual slaughters a lamb in front of the house of an influential malik or in his hujra and expresses his desire for acceptance of his pot by the naik. Once he accepts the pot, his housemates, as per tradition, become the family members of his naik and vice versa. No ill will is nourished between the two afterwards. In pre-partition times, Hindus and Sikhs used to beg the Muslim naiks to accept their pot in which the former offered them silver coins in the pot. It may be explained that lokhai means a 'jar' in Pashto, and it is said that originally when a Hindu wished to become any one's hamsaya, he sent him a jar of ghee [clarified



butter] as a declaration of such intention and its acceptance was the token of his consent. Lokhai denotes the means by which the relationship of patron and client is established.

LOOTAWAL

Lootawal means 'to plunder.' The act of lootawal is at times committed by plundering the house of the enemy or their caravan and plunder away whatever they can get. If plunder is committed in normal peace times, the maraka and jirga will levy the tawan (damage loss) on the plunderer, and the plunderer has to take a psa to maraka or jirga in payment of Sharam over the tawan. To loot a caravan involves the tawan for disturbing the safety of path over and above the tawan for loot. Looting entails heavier punishment if committed at day than if done at night.

MACHALGA

Machalga is the surety given to the marakachyan by both sides of the case in dispute, ensuring unconditional compliance of the maraka's decision. Usually topaks, kalashnikovs, cash or ornaments may be given in machalga. Machalga is forfeited against the side not accepting the maraka sentence. Unless machalga is given the maraka will not be convened. When convened, the maraka will ask both sides to pledge orally that the side not accepting the decision will not request return of its machalga.

MAKHRUNAY

Makhrunay is the guiltless person. In this sense of the term it is a synonym to spin. "Every man is born innocent and remains so unless proved otherwise", that is everyone is makhrunay unless he commits an offense, is a command of the Afghan customary law. An accused proved innocent is called makhrunay, and in such a case, he may demand Nagha under sharam from his accusers.

MAKHTORAY

An offender of criminal acts but in particular, an adulterer. The irreligious ones and agnostics are also called makhtoray. Makhtoray kedal, to become an adulterer, is an unpardonable crime. Every tor may become spin (guiltless), but makhtoray cannot become spin. This proverb is in accord with the codes of narkh concerning adultery. Nanawate of makhtoray cannot be accepted, that is, he cannot be pardoned, and has to be killed. His killing carries no por, if killed by his opponents.

MALAK

Malak is the elder of his tribe. He follows tribal events and sometimes informs others of them. The term malak is current in tribes of both plains and hills where the central government is in authority. Malak is the mediator between his tribe and the political Agent in an Agency. The institution has unluckily dwindled with the passage of time.



MALAMAT

Malamat means 'par'h. Anyone proved wrong in his suit is called malamat and is duty bound to pay nagha. Par'h is used in the eastern and southern tribes while malamat is use in the western rtibes. Once declared, malamat has to accept the verdict otherwise the nagha is increased.

MARAKA

Maraka means a tribal customary law court. The marakacheyan issues their sentence in accordance with the codes of narkh. The difference between maraka and jirga is that the former investigates and hears small cases while the later, the big ones. 'Wak' is given to maraka and also jirga members and whatever the verdict, both sides have to accept it. Mostly weapons, cash, jewelry, etc., are given to maraka/jirga members as guarantee, which may be confiscated from the side not accepting the verdict. There are two kinds of maraka. One is the zhabay sa khwarido maraka in which both sides to the case present their cases to prove the case in their favor and the Maraka hears them. The other is da wak maraka in which wak is given to maraka and whatever the sentence, both sides have to accept it.

MARAKACHI

Marakachi or Marakzan is a member of maraka. The elder member of maraka is called spin gierai. Usually a marakachi is an influential man, spin gieri connotes mashar (elder), but the marakachi does not necessarily have to be elderly. A young marakachi is also called Spin Gierai. A marakachi has security in maraka. Experienced marakacheyan do not issue any sentence unless advised by narkhyan that the sentence accords with the codes of nark.

MARG

Marg, mrrina and khun are synonymous, each meaning murder. In common usage, premeditated murder is marg which carries a great tawan. The por for marg is not easily forgiven and if someone does forgive, he is called be nagha (disgraced, coward). The por for marg is marg if nanawate is accepted, pardon is granted. The nanawate, in the case of Marg however not easily accepted. But if he gets hold of the leg of the bedstead or lies down in the grave dug for the murdered, then this is a parda to the relatives of the murdered and nanawate is accepted.

MASHAR

Mashar is a respected title given to one by his tribe. A mashar is the jury member of maraka and jirga. Generally speaking, mashar connotes spin gierai. A mashar is not necessarily old; he may be young and still deemed as mashar. In common usage, every old man is a Mashar, but as a tribal title, mashar is to ensure him of his influence and command. A young man being mashar has all the privilege of an old spin gierai.



MAINA

Maina means home, homeland, and country. Often it means a temporary camp of nomads (kuchi). The encroacher on maina is punished according to narkh. Kuchis have two kinds of maina; one is da owrrey Mena (i.e. the summer camp) and the other is da jami Maina (i.e. the winter camp). 'Da nikano maina' means the camp of grandfathers. The kochis leaves their surplus belongings when they migrate in nikano maina. Nobody will steal anything from the Nikano maina. It is a belief that if anyone steals anything from the nikano maina, it will be exchanged for the head of one of his family male members. Such nikano naina are usually located along the road side where Kuchis go by.

MAIRRANA

The word means bravery, militancy, and courage to revenge against an enemy. Ghairat and mairrana are synonyms. The one not possessing mairrana cannot protect his right in the tribe. Mairrana is the main element of Pashtunwali and the one known for mairrana is greatly respected.

MATEEZA

Any girl who leaves her father's house to search for a husband is called Mateeza. In particular sense, Mateeza is a girl who elopes with her fiancé before marriage. Mateeza is considered a bad woman, a vagrant. One will say that '*Flankai sail di kawa, mateeza lare,*' meaning 'oh miss so and so, you were around everyone and ran away as Mateeza.'

MIRAS

Miras is the property of the dead one left to be distributed among legal heirs. A wife is not entitled to Miras, but is herself a part of it. She must be married to her brother-in-law or to her husband's tarboor. Such a woman is called kunda (widow). There is proverb 'kunda de qam da' means the widow belongs to the tribe, i.e. if there are no close heirs then the miras goes to the tribe's mashar. The eldest son is the first miras-khor heir and then any younger son. If the elder and the younger sons dispute over inheritance, it can be a source of tribal enmity, continuing for a long time. Tribals give equal shares to son and nothing to widows and female heirs out of their inherited property. In some tribes, the eldest son gets comparatively more share than his brothers. This is called mashri. In case the deceased is not survived by male issues, then his brothers or closest male collaterals inherit his property, including the burden and cars of the widow and unmarried daughters, if any. In case the deceased is survived by a minor son or sons, the widow becomes dependent on her brothers-in-law who may even take her in marriage in which case the minor son, on attaining age, is paid the marriage money. The nephews of the deceased will not be entitled to a share if their father had died prior to his brother (the present deceased). This is known as pera by Mehsuds. Women are not entitled to inheritance. In Kurrum Agency the land properties are recorded in daughters' names in the revenue record, but not practically handed over.



MIRATHA

Meratha is an extreme form of enmity where all of the male members of a family including minors are killed, but women are left unhurt. As a common rule, though not frequently, even women are saved, Pathans being brutal in vindicating their enemies. The difference between miratha and pagra is that in the former, women are not killed, but in the later, all including women are killed. In Waziers miratha is called khay and satah. The tawan for miratha is great. It is one hundred thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand Afghanis plus 30 psoona to be killed and the house set on fire. In some places it may include expulsion of the offender from the tribe.

MOR

Mor means mother. Mother is respected and is second only to the father in the family hierarchy. In common usage an elder woman having children is called mor by all. An insult to any elder woman is considered as insult to one's mother. A mother's complaint against her son to the tribal elders is accepted as truthful and proved without any further investigation, for it is supposed that the love of mother does not allow her to complain against her son without reason. Mother as a witness is not accepted in any event.

MORA

This term is used in Khost, Afghanistan. It means any married woman who is in love with someone other than her husband, having love affairs secretly and spending her husband's money on her lover. The killing of Morezana is allowed in Narkh. The one killing his wife for this reason will not be interrogated openly; only the spin giereis will interrogate him in secret. If the cause of the act is proved to be the above mentioned reason, the criminal act of the lover is automatically proved and he is immediately killed. His nanawate is not acceptable.

MRRINA

Mrrina is murder and bloodshed. Premeditated killing is Mrrina. In Narkh, Mrrina is a serious criminal act which brings por upon the porawarey (the criminal) and a Tawan is to be paid. The word is synonymous to marg, which comes under the same code. Mrrina is paid for by Badal, but the relatives of the murdered one may grant pardon in case nanawate is done.

MULLAH

A religious leader is called a Mullah. He leads prayers five times a day and also namaz-i-Janaza, including a sermon at such occasions. Mullah accompanies nanawate as a spin patkay. When there is a hot quarrel between tribes, mulayan put Quran on their heads and run to the field of fight to bring about a truce. Sometimes mullayan take part in Maraka and Jirga not as member, but as one praying for success. In loya jirga (enlarged jirgas) the Mullahs sit nearby. When verdict is announced, the maraka will call for the Mullahs to pray for the successful enforcement of it. Mullah also superintends the khairats (charity) offered at the conclusion of marakas.



MONKAR

Monkar is the one denying an act of offense. If one confesses that he has committed the offense, the Tawan may be less than the Tawan for an offense denied and latter proved. The more persistent the denial, the greater the tawan levied. Witnesses in the case will be first examined in maraka for jirga; in case of insufficient witnesses the accused must take an oath. In this case the accused is called not guilty.

MLATARR

Mlatarr means the one who cooperates. In common usage it means a body guard, any male member of the family who can use topak; a guard, a comrade-in-arms. An armed man under the command of an elder is also called mlatarr. Lashkar is raised on the basis of mlatarr.

MZAKA

Mzaka means land in general, but in particular it means the agricultural plot of one man. In nomadic tribes (the kochis) zmaka is warsho (the grazing port). Symbolically, zmaka represents one's ancestors. If someone sells his zmaka, then the others will say that 'Da plar nikah haduki-ye- khars,' meaning he sold his father and grandfather's bones which is pegor in Pashto. Witnesses are not accepted in disputes over zmaka; oaths are rather taken. Mzaka comes under namus; therefore, the encroachment on someone's mzaka means encroachment on his Namus. Tribals symbolize with mor (mother) because zmaka is sacred to them.

NAGHA

Nagha is a fine levied on an offender. The limits of the fine are determined in narkh. But if the offense is grave, then narkhyan have the authority to determine how heavy the ngha shall be. For example, the amount of nagha is known for cutting down forest trees and for thefts. The nagha for miratha (killing all the male members of a family) is heavier. Not to pay nagha makes one liable for member's nagha. The nagha for murder or miratha can be abated through begging pardon, but the tribal man will not do this for it is considered a disgrace for the whole tribe.

NAMUS

Literally, namus means chastity, but in common usage it means 'woman'. Guarding the chastity of women is guarding namus. Wife, mother, sister and daughter form the sequence in the order of namus. Even a new-born girl, still in the cradle, is included in the namus. Disrespect for someone's namus is a grave crime and cannot be pardoned. The oral insult to someone's namus brings charges of nagha and sharam. In the western tribes the agricultural land is also considered namus. In this case namus implies great patriotism. All women of a Khel khana (plarina) are common namus; a central point of tribal grade. Pashtuns say '*maal de sara zar au sar da namusa,*' meaning 'sacrifice wealth to save the head, sacrifice head to save namus'.



NANAWATE

Nanawate is the ceremony of pardon begging, which occupies an important place in the Pashtun's tribal customs. In every case, the par'h (blamed accused) sends nanawate to his opponent. Nanawate in the case of murder is very heavy. When one is killed, the killer shall send nanawate to the relatives of the killed and the latter will honor nanawate as the narkh commands. No nanawate is acceptable in the case of an assault on namus, i.e. woman.

For petty offenses nanawate will be Spin Patkey (mulla) taking as psa (sheep) to the plaintiff's house. For serious offenses nanawate consists of sending spin patkeyan (mullahs), spin geries and notables who carry psoona to the opponent's house. Tor saray (woman) also go to the opponent's house with the Holy Quran on their heads and implore his mercy through nanawate, which is never rejected. In a case of murder, the killer is taken along with nanawate and put at the disposal of the relatives of the murdered whether to kill or pardon him. In such cases, the killer is usually pardoned.

NAARINA

Narina refers to any male person or group of males. Naarina is the one possessing all the good qualities of Pakhtunwali; the one who is generous, courageous, militant, hospitable, and so on. When recalling the ancestry, one will say '*pukhwani khalq tole naarina wo,*' meaning that all the people of the past were naarina. This explains the meaning underlying the word Naarina. When one of both sides to a dispute express dissatisfaction with 'Maraka' or a Jirga decree--or take light its proceedings--one of the maraka or jirga member replies '*Da Naarna-o-Jirga da,*' i.e. it is jirga of naarina that must be enforced.

NARKH

In simple terms, it means common customary law of Pashtuns, covering penalties and punishment for all kinds of offenses against the native customs, norms and traditions. It may simply be called as Rewaj, covering all norms of Pashtuns society. Nobody in Pathan society is supposed to violate the rules of Narkh and contrarily, everybody's rights are fully protected. Some tribes have narkh of their own, but the main standards of all narkhs are similar. All known narkh is that of the Ahmadzais which consists of Esa narkh and Musa narkh of which the Esa narkh is very strict and precise. Narkh is a tribal law and is binding on all members. Those refusing to obey narkh are refused tribal membership and rights.

The Pashtuns say '*Da watana wooza kho de narkha ma wooza,*' meaning 'you may leave your homeland, but you cannot leave the homeland narkh.' This proverb explains the fact that Pashtuns give utmost importance to the narkh. Tribal narkh is a simple judicial system and serves the spiritual and material needs of the tribes. With the development of the tribes, narkh changes and an individual of influence may use narkh in his own favor through 'maraka' and 'jirga.' This difference indicates the process of the weathering away of the tribal life, nevertheless the two main narkhs prevail. The Ahmadzai Narkh and Razmak narkh do not only govern the judicial life of these people, but other tribes refer to them for the settlement of their disputes too. The area of the 'Ahmadzais Narkh' extends from Ghazni to Ningrahar including Laugar and some regions of Paktia province, and the 'Razmak Narkh' is in force in Waziristan and its surrounding areas.



NAYEE

Nayee is the village barber. Nayee has low status in the tribal hierarchy. The village nobility pays him predetermined wage for the services he renders, called Gand. Nayee has no equal rights compared to the members of the tribe. Nayan (plural of Nayee) are considered strangers. Their ancestry is unknown. In the Wesh system of Yousafzais, Nayan were also given a plot of land. This land was not subject to the Wesh system and was the permanent property of Nayan. Maraka or Jirga cannot be called in to hear the grievance of Nayan. Any village elder, even of no much repute, can hear such grievances.

NIKA

Nika means grandfather. The ancestors of grandfather are called Nikan or Nikagan. Nika is sacred and respected in tribal life. The psha of a tribe is named after its Nika. Every tribe has legends about its Nikagan. Taking pride in the name of Nika is a common character of the tribal man. The sacred soul of Nika is prayed for to help in times of trouble. Marakas and Jirgas are held in the graveyard of the common Nika. A tribal man feels that his life is inseparable from that of his sacred Nika and therefore when acting on some important matter will pray and call for help from the name of his Nika. Every family, psha, khel or tribe, respects Nika as a hero in a metaphysical way.

NIKAT

The word is derived from Nika, which literally means grandfather, and is thus translated to mean hereditary rights and genealogical connections. It involves a set of laws or an organized system based on heredity which established the rights of each section down to the last sub-division and is rigidly adhered to by the tribesmen. It regulates the shares in benefits, awards, inams, services, etc., as received from the government or derived as booty from a raid. It is in fact the foundation on which the edifice of the rights of tribals is erected. As a result, no dispute or ill will exists among them as everyone's share is fixed on the basis of Nikat. The reason why a tribe or a tappa has possessed comparatively more share in profits has its genesis in the manpower, weaponry, land, etc. which they contributed comparatively more than other tribes/khels during tribal wars, Qaumi Lashkars, and on the occasion of Jihad, etc. against the infidels, in ancient times.

MARRAI

Nmarrai means meal. In particular, a meal served for marakacheyan is called nmarrai. This Marrai khuwaral does not mean the eating of a full meal but eating whatever is served. Nmarrai, like malga (salt), is sacred and Pashtuns swear by it. Spora nmarrai means dry meal and ghwara nmarrai is a fat meal. It is the character of a Pashtun to be thankful for a nmarrai served by another one, and he considers himself bound to reciprocate.

OATH

A bulk of disputes are adjudicated upon the Holy Quran in the tribal areas. In case of doubt or suspicion over a person involved in an offense, the accused is liable to be administered an oath upon the Holy



book to prove his innocence. In some cases, the accused, beside himself, is bound to produce a specific number of witnesses to swear under oath to absolve him of the charge leveled against him. Tribals have a blind faith in the Holy Quran because they know that the person showing readiness to swear does not do so at the risk of his Eeman' (faith) and religion. It is interesting to note that the Mali Khel section of Turis in Kurrum Agency if asked to swear on the Holy book, would, instead, make up the loss claimed but would avoid swearing on oath even if not guilty.

OWWA SARA PREKAWAL

One who denies the allegation of murder or usurpation of another's rights has to take seven oaths. This act of taking seven oaths is called owwa sara prekawal. Only those who are blood relations of the accused are to take the oath. In a dispute over the land, the maraka will demand the accused to go through owwa sara prekawal, in which seven of his cousins or blood relatives will take part. Women do not take part in owwa sara prekawal.

PACHA

It means casting lots. In the Trakano , Momands and Yousafzai tribes, where land is redistributed according to the wesh system, pieces of land are demarcated and everyone's piece is determined by pacha achawal. In a place where sheep are owned in common, the wool sheared from sheep is allotted by the pacha achawal. When one is drafted into military service, it is said, '*pacha-i-rakhatali da,*' which means 'his lot has come out.' In rural areas the mullas (Muslim priests) cast lots on the meat they may have. In Yousafzai and Ranizai tribes of the Malakand Division, the landed property owned by an individual or tribe, is in terms of pacha which here means 'share'.

PANAH

To take someone in personal protection is called panah. Even if a notorious criminal or an outlaw asks for panah, he will definitely be granted asylum and duly protected. It has happened many a times that a murderer after committing murder asked for panah from the family of the victim and they gave him panah. During panah he enjoys equal rights and status, but when he leaves their house, he can be killed in revenge and his family cannot claim for any penalty of reward under the custom of badal (revenge). Different tribes have different customs for giving panah. According to the custom of some tribes, panah seeker knots the edge of palao, i.e. Parronai of a woman and only in this way, panah is granted to him. Asylum is not granted to the one accused of adultery, i.e. having sexual intercourse with a girl or woman. Such a man is called makhtori (literally meaning black faced). If the one under asylum is killed by his enemy, the grantor of the asylum has to take por just as in the case of a member of his family.

PARRAY PA GHARA ACHAWAL

This phrase literally means putting rope around the neck. When a person of a tribe commits a grave offense against another and fears revenge that may be taken by one to whom he owes por, then he begs bakhana (pardon) by putting a rope around the neck, and presents himself in the form of nanawte.



Parray pa gharra achawal symbolizes the fact that the man is in the sole possession of the one whose pardon is begged. At times this act is complemented by taking fodder in the mouth, which symbolizes that he is a beast and can be slaughtered at once. Whenever someone gets that low, he is necessarily granted 'bakhana.' But very rarely a tribal person can be found to act so low. This is why the custom has now receded almost totally.

PA QABAR KE SAMLASTAL

It means lying down in the grave. If a killer, taking advantage of the people's unawareness, jumps into the grave dug for the killed and lies down there, the heirs and the relatives of the killed must grant bakhana to the killer. This act is called pa qabar ke samlastal and connotes the same meaning as the act of da kat pkha newal, i.e. holding the leg of the bedstead. Even in the case of intentional murder the killer tries to lie down in the grave to beg for bakhana. The heirs and relatives of the murdered pay great attention not to let the murdered avail opportunity to lie down in the grave.

PARRONAI

Palao, parronai, and Tekray have one and the same meaning. All of these terms mean a shawl, which covers woman's head and face. In common usage, it connotes the pardon begged by a woman. When a man begs pardon then it is said '*palao menz ke raghai,*' meaning 'palao intervened' and pardon is granted.

In Pashtu custom usage of parronai is considered sacred and everybody is duty bound to respect it under the narkh. When a woman puts palao over someone pursued by his enemy, the pursuers will not shoot him. They will say '*palao-e-pe-woghrarawa,*' meaning she put palao over him. If the opponent shoots the man under palao he is liable to give nagha for disrespecting the palao. In ancient times, even the dacoits honoring parronai used to avoid looting a caravan if there was any woman travelling with men. Even during a battle, if a woman protected someone, he was supposed to be forgiven. A woman begging pardon for someone will say '*for the sake of my parronai pardon him*' or '*pardon him for my parronai.*'

Palao or 'Tekray' is also a symbol of dignity. The parrunai of a wrandar (brother's wife) is a unique term which means that protecting the dignity and honor of one's brother's wife is the responsibility of every brother. If during an informal meeting or during a formal jirga, a woman asks to forgive someone, he is supposed to be forgiven or else it would be considered as dishonoring parronai and the offender will pay a fine fixed for this offense in some tribes. In the same way, if a woman guards someone under the parronai, though a most sinful or notorious criminal he may be, nobody will have the right to offend or kill him. If he is killed, the offender would have to pay to parrunai (i.e. woman) or qaum, a fine fixed for this purpose.

PEGHOR

Peghor means sarcasm. It implies shame too. In tribal language to accept peghor is to negate manliness. Peghor is the lot of all those who breach the tribal customs and usages. Also it is the lot of par'h (guilty). When someone comes under peghor, he may migrate to some other place. If he remains where he is



under peghor, he may get into a big fight should someone remind him of peghor. Peghor goes down through inheritance from generation to generation, in some cases down to the tenth generation. Peghor engendering from cowardice brings great shame to the guilty.

PLARINA

The unit of the tribe that has common ancestral father (khpa). Those of common plarina have duties to guard the honor of each other. In tribal relations the basis of the closeness of relations starts from palrina up to the khel and tabar. In plarina the transfer of inheritance has particular importance which is regulated by the rules of narkh. When one having no son, brother or cousin dies, the inheritance left is distributed among the members of his plarina. The plarina of the one killed takes revenge and likewise may pardon a murderer.

POR

Its literal meaning is "debt" in customary and usages. It closely expresses tawan. Whoever commits an offense is liable to and must pay the corresponding por. It is a saying '*por de bado barkha da,*' meaning por is the lot of the wrong doers which very well explains that whoever does a wrong is liable to pay por. The proverb '*por pa warkrra khlasigi*' means 'debt is paid by giving it.' Por has determined limits in tribal customary law and usage.

POZA PREKAWAL

Poza prekawal means cutting nose. Poza prekawal is categorized as spin parrar. The offender is liable to pay tawan for it. In Ahmadzai's narkh, the tawan for this crime is half that for murder. But the tawan for poza prekawal preceded by murder is equal to the tawan for murder. Poza prekawal is synonymous to buchay and munjay.

PREKRRRA

Prekrra means settlement. When a maraka and jirga reaches a decision to the satisfaction of both the parties to a dispute, the settlement decree is called prekrra. Any breach of the prekrra has tawan which most often is to put his house on fire. The prekrra of greater importance is announced in the public for the information of all the members of the tribe. In offenses of little consequence, the tawan for the non-acceptance of the prekrra is not to return the barampta.

PSA

Psa means sheep. In the Pashtun custom and usage psa warkawal i. e. giving a sheep and psa warwarral, i. e., to take a sheep to someone, means to admit himself guilty before him and therefore to beg for pardon. It is the necessary stipulation of 'nanawate' (pardon for the convict) to take psa along with them. Sheep are necessarily killed in maraka, jirga and immolation. When nanawate or Jirga is mentioned, psa is invariably implied.



PESHEMAN (or khpeman)

The word means penitent and sorry for. The one penitent for the offence he has committed, is called khpeman or psheman. Khpeman for the offence is granted bakhana or alternatively meted out with a light penalty.

PURA PA PURA

'Pura pa pura' means equality or balance. When in a dispute or enmity the rival parties lay equal claims against each other; the jirga charges them with equal penalties. For example, when equal number of the men are killed on both sides of the warring parties, the jirga will decide that both parties will give equal number of girls in badal (i.e. exchange) to each other or the matter would be compromised on equal basis, that is, on the principle of pura pa pura. No penalty in other words is imposed on any of the two parties. When both sides are killed in duel it is pura pa pura. When both man and woman are killed in a duel it is pura pa pura.

QALANG

No Qalang, i.e., the system of forced tax, that exists in tribes -- particularly in Wazirs and Masuds, as everybody is fierce, aggressive and powerful here.

QURAN LWASTAL

Quran lwastal is to recite the verses of Quran. In some tribes it is a custom to open the Quran and read some verses from it while taking the oath. That is why Quran **lostal** means taking of oath. The reading of Quran over the head of dying person is also called Quran lostal. When it is said 'Quran pre walwala' it means read Quran over his head so as to give up life with ease'..

Most pashtuns will recite SURA-I-YASIN over the head of the dying person to give up life with ease. During jihad or lashkar, the Quran is held high and people pass under it so as to succeed in fight and return home unharmed.

RAPE AND ATTEMPT TO RAPE

In case where jhagh is made by the husband or a relative of the girl, the accused shall be liable to pay the por, which varies according to the circumstances of the case. In case no jhagh is made then the girl need not suffer death or be handed over but instead, only sharam is paid to the party aggrieved. Even to rape is considered serious onslaught upon a Pathan's honor and is most often repaid in the form of death to the accused. Amongst the Turis tribe of Kurram Agency, the custom is that an amount of Rs. 85,000 is paid as blood-money in addition to Rs. 85/- and one or two lambs. In earlier times in the case of Tora, the woman's nose and the paramour's leg was to be cut off. This custom no longer exists. Today, only death is the panacea.



SALAWATA

In a tribal dispute when no one is left in a family except a cowardly, and unmanly heir, then the family is termed as salawata. The tribals say '*mirata kha da kho salawata bada da,*' meaning 'mirata is better than salawata' for in mirata every man, young or old, is killed and no one is left to keep the honor and prestige of the family. In salawata, an heir is left who brings disgrace to the past prestige of the family.

SAMEL

There are eight khels in the Afridi tribe which are divided into two gunds. One of them is called samel. Samel is also pronounced as semel. Amongst the eight khels of the Afridis, Malak din Khel, Zakha khel, Sepai, Aka khel, and Kamar khel are members of samel.

SARKHEL

Sarkhel is the mashar. Every kalay, plarina, khel, and tribe has a sarkhel. Sarkhel is very close to mir in meaning. A sarkhel has the authority to call a maraka or jirga. Sarkhel is a Kochi (nomad) word while mashar and mir are words used among the settled Pathans.

SATA

Sata, like miratha, is an attack in which all male members of the family or khel under attack are killed and houses are put on fire. Sata is done in times of enmity and all kinds of weapons are used in it. Sometimes the women of the family or khel under the attack of sata are taken away.

SERAI-KHWARA

In the Momand and Yuosafzai tribes, serai-khwara are those people who have a permanent piece of land which are excluded from the wesh system. Sayeds, Mians, Mullahs, Akhunzadas, ahingars and nayan are serai-khwara. During the Mughal rule, nayan, trakanrs and ahingars were also included in the group.

SPAY

Spay means dog. A dog is to watch his owner's house and belongings. That is why a dog has rights in narkh. No one shall kill any other's spay. If one does so, he is liable to por. The beating of a spay has tawan, if not done in self-defense. The stealing of a shepherd's dog has heavy tawan for such stealing implies harming the herd, too.

SPIN GUND

Spin gund is the opponent of tor gund. The terms have become popular in keeping with color of the flag which the warring tribes used to fly during battles. The terms tor and spin are commonly used in Marwats as each khel of this tribe has a separate social entity and each one takes pride of belonging to spin or tor gund.



SPIN PATKEY

Spin patkey is a title for the mullah (the Muslim priest). A sayed or influential spin gierey is also called spin patkey. Spin patkeyan and psa are important components of nanawte. Spin patkeyan serve in disputes, too. When a dispute gets too hot and is at peak, then spin patkeyan will take the Quran over their heads and rush into the battlefield to have it stopped and bring truce. In some places they will take katwai (cooking pots) over their heads instead of Quran. The latter custom seems to be very ancient.

SPIN SARUNA

When reasons for a certain accusation are obscure, then nonaligned people are called to take an oath and reveal the truth. Such people are called spin saruna. The spin saruna shall truthfully reveal whatever they know about the case. Anyone concealing the truth or refusing to take oath to reveal the truth is considered assistant of the accused and is sentenced as such. Women can act as spin saruna.

STAANA

Staana means the God-favored and holy. Sayeds and shahibzaadas are stana. All dead are stana. Sometimes a whole khel may be stana. Staana participate in nanawate and beg pardon for the guilty.

SHAMLA

Shamla is the upper end of the turban that stands erect over a Pathan's head. Shamla connotes ghairat and mirrana. *'Flankei the qaam shamla da,'* meaning 'Mr. so & so is the honor of the Qaam.' *' Flankai da Qaam shamla khkatta krra,'* means that 'Mr. so and so lowered down the shamla of his Qaam.' Shamla here means namus (honor).

Insulting Shamla is calling names to someone and the offender is liable to pay sharam. Da shamley khawand metaphorically means a noted, or a respectable person. The quality of respectability, ghairat and mairrana for a Pashtun is also reflected from the following verse of Pashtu poet, Khushal khan khattak, but he has used the word Dastar (turban) for shamla,

DE DASTAR SARAI BE SHMAR DE

DE DASTAR SARAI PO SHMAR DE

Meaning, "countless are the persons who keep turban on the heads, but few are the persons who are worth of keeping turbans on their heads."

SHARAM

Sharam literally means shame. In tribal customs and usages it is a payment made by par'h (i. e. guilty) to his opponent. Mostly sharam is given for moral offenses, such as insulting a woman, disgracing a maraka member or rejecting nanawate or not honoring parrunai (women who beg pardon), etc. Money or psa is



given in sharam. Sharam has no common standard in narkh; two or three spin giereys may determine it. One who refuses to pay sharam may be forced to pay nagha as well as sharam.

SHAMANA

This is a particular jirga convened, usually by the offender or his representatives, to seek a negotiated settlement of a quarrel or feud arising out of sharam relating to a woman. Compensation is agreed upon, sheep may be given, a daughter may be offered in marriage, and so on. The daughter in this sense is termed as swara. When a jirga recovers compensation of this sort from the person delared as guilty, it is said they have recoverd sharmana.

SHKANZA (or kanzal)

Shkanza is name calling and abusing. The Zaziz call it ziarre. Shkanza is an offense and the offender of such an offense must pay sharam, which differs as to the age and social position of the offended. Skanza to an unacquainted woman is the worst of such an offense. Shkanza to a woman and old man has a heavy sharam. In such cases the maraka pays great attention to the age and social position of the one so abused.

SHUKA

In Afridi tribes, shuka means to rob a traveler of his belongings by force without wounding him. Shuka is an offense and punishable according to narkh. Shuka is considered a petty offense and that is why in customs and usages Nagunah tawan is levied on the offender plus Da laarey sharam, for in such a case, the safety of the laar (way , path , road) is disturbed. When a part of shuka is found in someone else's house, he is considered an accomplice and is punished under the customary law.

SUR-LASSAI

Sur-lassai means a murderer. Every sur-lassai is liable to pay a por. The por can be sealed through nanawate. If sur-lassai escapes, every member of his family is porawarray and the heir of the murdered one may avenge any one of them. The validity time of granting refuge to a sur-lassai is for two years after which he shall leave; otherwise, the granter of the refuge is considered an enemy by the opponents.

SYAL

Syal means rival and syali is rivalry. To have equal prestige with a syal is very important in tribal life and is an indication of zeal and pride. Tarbroona (tarbooran) are the syalan of each other. In syali every syal tries not to remain behind his syal, both socially and economically. Neighbors are syals in hospitality. Syali means a feeling to be superior over his fellow beings.



TABAR

Tabar is a social formation of a group of khels into one unit. Tabar has come into being through the process of the development of a tribe under specific social conditions. Tabar has the authority to call for the jirga of relevant khels. Abdalis, marwat, etc. are the large tabars of the Pashtun tribe. A tribal formation developed into the khel gives birth to tabar.

TAK

Tak means tribal territorial boundaries of each khel. Anyone encroaching on the tak is liable to pay tawan. Everyone is duty bound to respect the tak. And whenever brid is done on tak, every member of the khel is duty bound to defend it by means of arms. In common usage encroachment of tak connotes encroachment upon rights. Tak is most commonly used in connection with warsho (grazing land of a khel). The warsho of every khel is well demarcated. The demarcation line is called karkha, i.e. line. Encroachment on tak has tawan and the encroacher is called parr.

TAP

Tap means injury and is of two types, tor tap (black injury) is the injury done to the covered parts of the body such as chest, belly, shoulders etc, and spin tap (white injury) is the injury done to the uncovered parts of the body such as ears, nose, eyes, etc. The tawan for tap depends on the part of the body injured and the material or the weapons by means of which injury is inflicted. Tawan is determined in narkh (i. e. customary law). The tawan for spin tap is greater than for the tor tap. The standard tawans are well defined in the Ahmadzai Narkh, particularly Wazirs and Mehsuds.

TARBOOR

One having share in a common inheritance is called tarboor. Its plural is tarbooran. Relatives of the same khpa are called tarbooran. The cousin is also a tarboor. Rivalry with tarboor is a common character of the tribal Pathans, but each one will help the other when in enmity with someone from another plarina. The proverb goes '*badd tarboor pa bada wraaz pakaregi,*' meaning that Tarboor even if enemy, helps in need.

TARLA

Tarla is the daughter of uncle. In a tribe society, every woman is the tarla of every man of the same tribe. A man's manliness can be proved when his tarla accepts him. This term is very common in the Kakar tribe and has important and mythical place amongst them. Tarla have special songs to keep the morale of the tarboor, which are called kakarai ghare.

TAWAN

Literally, tawan means loss, harm, or damage. In tribal customary law it is a payment for por. Whoever commits an offense is liable to por for which he has to pay the tawan stipulated in the relative narkh.



Por is a conviction and tawan is its compensation. Nagha and sharam are two types of tawan, each one of which is meted out for a certain por according to narkh. In cases where tawan for a por is not stipulated in narkh, the Jirga has the authority to specify it. This stipulation of tawan is also called narkh. If it is not accepted by a party to a dispute, he is called kog (bent to one side'not obedient).

THEFT

If the thief is caught red-handed or guilt proved upon him by way of enquiry, evidence, etc., then the thief becomes liable to return the stolen articles (or equivalent to their price). Besides cash, penalty as fixed by the elder is to be paid separately. The punishment for robbery, burglary, arson, cutting crops and damaging trees in a garden, is payment of compensation amounting to the value of the loss or damage, which is determined by a tribal jirga sworn to on oath by the person injured, in addition to fine which the jirga may consider proper under the circumstance.

TEEGA

This is a sort of truce which is enforced upon the combating parties for a specified period in order to dissociate them from fighting, holding in abeyance their mutual jealousies and to avoid a bigger combat between them. 'Teega' literally means a stone which is fixed at a certain place across which both the combating parties make pledges to have no concern with life or property of the opposite party till the time a permanent settlement is carved out. Teega, in other words, is a temporary truce in a feud arranged by a tribal jirga or the jirga arranged by the government which is symbolized by the setting out of a teega.

TEEGA MATAWUKAY

Teega matawunkay means 'the stone breaker' but in tribal custom it means the one who breaches the provisions of Teega. Anyone not obeying the teega decided upon by jirga among the warring tribes will be punished heavily. The starting punishment is to set his house on fire. Sometimes teega matawunkay may be punished by expulsion from the tribe. No party to a teega, even if temporary, can breach it except upon a notice from the other side. Such teega becomes ineffective upon the expiry of its validity times. The tribes that do not obey the provision of teega are called tige matawunki, which is a bad repute.

TEKRAY AKHISTAL

Tekray akhistanal means the taking away of shawl of a woman. Whoever takes away the shawl of a woman or an unmarried girl, takes the risk of enmity of her relatives and must pay tawan as sharam or do nanawate. The taking away of the Tekray of a married woman is considered a great crime followed by enmity and even death.

TOIGH

Toigh or togh means the expenses of maraka. It also means the act of contributing toward the living



expenses of another one by the members of khel or plarina, etc. The amount contributed is also called toigh. All members of the plarina will share in the toigh. If only one person pays the expenses it is called Khairat. Both terms are most common amongst the Zadran tribe. In some cases the Jirga will take months to settle a certain dispute. During this time toigh may result in great and unbearable expenses to both sides. The Marakacheyan who do not settle a dispute for a long time are called Toigh khwara (toigh eaters), which is bad name. The Marakacheyan therefore try to settle the dispute as quickly as they can.

TOL

Tol means weight and to weigh but in the tribal judicial systems it means law. Tol and Narkh are synonyms, both meaning a custom, rewaj of customary law. Only the Narkhyan well acquainted with the tribal Narkh can sit in jirga. When the term Tol is used for necessarily have to belong to the nobility, but must know the Narkh and Tol.

TOPAK

Topak means rifle. In tribal custom, a topak is sacred because they swear by topak. Topak is usually given for baramptha. An insult to topak means one liable to pay nagha. The first thing the father of a new-born male child does is to bang a topak over his bed. This topak will be the revered one for the family. When a man engaged to a girl is away from home for a long time, the girl will be wedded to his topak and taken to the husband's family where she will live until her husband returns. Such wedlock to a topak of a Pashtun women shows her extreme faithfulness to her husband during his absence.

TOR GUND

Tor gund and spin gund are opposing social groups of Pashtun tribes. Mangal, Zazi, Mandozi, Chamkani and Maqbal of the karlani tribes, Tota khel, kharoti, Andar, Baozi and Sahak of the Ghaljai tribe, and Esak khel and Ghuzni khel of Marwat tribes are tor gundis.

Tor gund has limited and enlarge maraka in which the relationships with spin gund is reviewed and unity among the gund is strengthened.

TORRA AND TORA

Torra is one of the marriage custom of Pathans. It is also a specific amount given to a tribal elder by non-tribals residing with him as hamsaya. It is payable at the time of Rukhsati (actual departure of the bride from the parent's house). It is also the amount payable to the bridegroom's father by his friends and colleagues after arrival of the dooly, in order to enable him meet his partial marriage expenses. A proper register is maintained to keep such accounts.

The word 'Tora' means any woman charged of illegal sexual intercourse. While pronouncing Tora stress is laid on 'T' while in Torra, stress is on the "R." It is the only pronunciation that elucidates the difference.



TOR GHALL

The word literally means 'black thief.' If a person is proved guilty by way of inquiry or direct evidence, even after administering of oath on the Holy Quran, he becomes known by the name of Tor Ghal. Such a culprit, if he apologizes and turns penitent, is liable to pay por as well as sharam to the person aggrieved.

TOR SARE

Tor sare literally means 'black headed' and refers to woman. In some tribes when tor sare is sent on nanawate, the accused is granted pardon necessarily, according to Narkh. Figuratively, every woman can be called tor sare. When a woman's hair turns gray, she is called spin sare. No matter how great the offence, pardon is granted through nanawate of a woman, but sending a woman on nanawate is humiliatig to the tribal pride.

TRA

Tra means uncle and wrara means nephew. They are not friendly, for often tra encroaches upon the rights of wrara, particularly when it comes to dividing an inheritance. At times tra will be at daggers drawn with his nephew for no cause of reason. The proverb '*Khodai khabar dai, tra wal-e kafar dai,*' meaning 'God knows why uncle has become my enemy,' explains the relationships of tra and wrara. Figuratively, every elder of the tribe is called tra. After the death of the father, tra is the executor of his estate, independently of the dead one's will. Tra also has authority over the dead brother's widows and has some rights in the properties of his dead brother.

TRABGANEY

Trabganey is the cut-throat rivalry and enmity among members of the same plarina. Sometimes the area of trabganey is enlarged to involve two or more in trabganey. In some cases the causes of trabganey between two tribes are not known as the trabganey may have come down through generations by inheritance. In some cases the causes of trabganey are even mythological.

TURA

The word means sword. Figuratively, it means courage; turzan is courageous. Possessing tura means being courageous and warrior. Tura is sacred and disrespect for it makes one liable to pay nagha. One swears by tura. If someone is engaged to a girl and is away from home his family can get the girl married to a tura as with topak. After the ceremony of such marriage the family of her husband takes the girl along. She lives there until her husband returns. When a courageous act for guarding the grace of the tribe is done, it is said that Tura-i- wakrra, i.e. he did tura. The cover of tura is called teki. The meaning of a common Pashto proverb is "Don't take tura of its teki, but once you do, it must be reddened."



WADHA

'Wadha' means marriage. Each and every male and female member of the society has the rights to marry only under the rules set up by the tribe. A man can marry any adult girl, but if she is already engaged to someone else, the question of engagement does not arise as it is considered a serious assault against namus. If this is done without the prior knowledge about the girl's engagement then the man has to divorce the girl and give another girl to the tarboor (cousins and distant cousins) of the man engaged to the said girl. Forced marriage with the widow of a family member, mostly to younger brother is legitimate under narkh. If a man is outside his tribe and no one knows about his whereabouts, his parents or relatives have the right to bring the girl by force to their home. However, the majority of the tribes resist this attempt even to the risk of stark animosity, as she is considered to be their property with no interference from without. A custom also prevails that an engaged girl whose expected husband is far away or his whereabouts unknown, may be wedded to his topak or tora and may be taken to the house of her husband's relatives.

WAR FLAGS

Every tribe has its own flags, having their own colors demonstrated collectively by lashkar. In the past these flags were flown at the time of any peril against a common enemy or during a holy war (jihad). One such war flag flown by Umara khan of Jandul during siege of Chitral in 1895, is lying in the mess of Chitral Scouts. They were common in British period. Now war flags have almost vanished.

WAAK

Waak is the opinion given by rival parties to maraka or jirga to settle a dispute. When someone gives his Waak to a maraka or jirga, it is called *da waak maraka* or *da wak jirga*. The sentence of the waak maraka or waak jirga is irrevocable and all parties have to obey it. Waak is given by both sides of the case under hearing. When someone is persuaded against his will, it is said (wak-ye-pradai dai), i.e. his will belongs to someone else.

WAKHA PA KHWLA KE NEWAL

The maxim means putting fodder in one's mouth, i.e. to beg forgiveness. This is a customary ceremony that a defeated one will perform in presenting himself to the victor. When a tribe is defeated in a fight, its elders take fodder in their mouth and present themselves to the elders of the victor tribe. To really carry out such a ceremony is very humiliating, hence seldom seen. In the early stages of tribal life a weaker tribe used to perform such a ceremony to save themselves from the attack of the stronger tribe. History has recorded many cases of the rebellious being presented to the king with fodder in his mouth. The peghor of such a ceremony hoes down to the generations of a tribe whose forefathers performed the humiliating act of taking fodder in their mouth.

WALJA

Walja means booty. It is not contrary to the custom to take booty from the enemy. However, taking



booty from one's enemy in the same tribe is contrary to the regional narkh. If one steals the belongings of a passer-by, it is not walja. Taking undue walja has tawan in narkh.

WESH

Wesh means distribution. The Momand and Yousafzai tribes, in the land distribution law of Shiekh Mili, use the term in a specific way. According to this law, land is redistributed among the tribe members once in every ten years. This ten years cyclic distribution of land is called wesh. Wesh is very old custom, coming into existence when nomadic life gave way to settled agricultural life. We know from history that the ancient nomads fostered the wesh system from the very beginning upto the dawn of state institute. In the 15th century AD Shiekh Mili brought the wesh system into a new code of law which he called Daftar code. From then on, the ten year cyclic wesh system came into being.

Shiekh Mili was a Yousafzai of the Khashi tribe who came to Kabul from Qandahar and thence went on to Peshawar. Sheikh Mili had great influence over this tribe that enabled him to bring into being his ten year cyclic wesh system. Many struggled against Shiekh Mili's 'daftar' accusing him of interference in God's working.

When objective conditions were favorable to the development and consolidation of private property developed, the wesh system vanished by and by. Mr. Khushal Khan Khattak, the famous Pashto poet says:

"There are two things in Swat
That exist either secretly or openly.
One is the Treasure of Akhun Darwiza
And the other, the Daftar of Shiekh Mili".

The wesh system is inherited from ancient Aryan tribes, for it was in force over a vast area during the time of Alexander the Great.

WISA

Wisa means trust. Those who participate in marakas and jirgas are given wisa on behalf of their tribes who would then be trusted accordingly. This term is used frequently in the waak maraka. For example, both sides of the case will be asked whether they have wisa of their own and whether they have wisa in maraka. When they answer to both in the affirmative, then maraka is convened. The one who loses wisa may have hard time to live among his tribe. In the Aryan cast system, wisa is the class carrying a third class status in the hierarchy after Brahman and Kishtury.

WRAKA

Wraka means things stolen or lost. All the village people assist one in finding his wraka. With the permission of the village elders, the wraka may be looked for in the house of anyone suspected for stealing. However, if wraka is not found there, the one looking out for his wraka, must pay sharam to the house owner. If the wraka is found in the complainant's own house, then he has to pay sharam to



jirga along with the tawan to the person unduly suspected. If the suspicion was deliberate to shame someone, then the tawan is very heavy and a nanawate has also to be sent to jirga apart from paying sharmana.

YARGHAL

Yarghal means attack by swarming up the opponents. Yarghal is usually an attack without a prior notice. Families or tribes engaged in enmity will assign guards to call for chigha to push back the yarghal intended. Those doing yarghal are called yarghalgar. The captured yarghalgars are either killed or after putting a nanawate on them, are released alive. Yarghal is mostly done at night, but during the fights, it is made at daytime.

YARGHAMAAL

The word means to mortgage a person; to give someone in lieu of. According to professor Rasheed of Afghanistan, yarghamaal is a Turkish word and means 'someone in trust'.

When prekrra is arrived at the end of the fight between the two tribes resulting in nagha, there will be some provisional stipulations to be complied with by both sides. To trust each other in this provisional period, each side will give the other some persons in trust-guarantee called yarghamaal. The British used to obtain one or two persons, mostly maliks as yarghamaal from a particular tribe in lieu of fulfilling certain obligations through the Maliks concerning law and order or matters of national importance or ensuring truce, etc.

ZAIRAY

Zairay means good news or bringing good news. The one seeing the moon on the first night of the month of Eid will call upon the village people and give zairay to them. In return, every one of the village people shall give him small cash or sweets. The word, as such, also denotes some innaam given in lieu of bringing good news that may be in cash or kind. In tribal life, the zairay of a new-born baby or his mother and sisters, etc., with words as, zairay me darbande, i.e., I have brought a good news to you. And the one receiving such news is bound to give him innaam.

ZAKHMANA

This is the amount received by the jirga from the offender as a result of bodily hurt caused to the complainant and paid to him as compensation. In Waziristan, loss of one hand or one leg is considered to be 1/4th of murder. The zakhmana for murder being Rs. one lakh. However, this can be increased or decreased according to the nature and circumstances of the case. The loss of one tooth attracts zakhmana of Rs. 300/-. The case may generally be compounded and compensation made keeping in view the nature of the offense, intention involved and the circumstances under which offence was committed.



ZAMINGARI

When provisional teega is affected, one or more families from each side give each other a pledge-bond. Those giving the pledge -bond are called zamingary who then superintend and implement the Teega (truce). Anyone harming zamingary is liable to pay tawan. Any side accusing the zamingary of prejudice has to prove it.

ZENA

Zena means adultery, i.e. having sexual intercourse with woman without being married to her. In the case of zena, both man and woman are to be killed. An eye-witness husband of zena has the right to kill both his wife and the man. In such a case he does not become porawarrey either to his wife's or the man's relatives. Maraka or jirga cannot be called in for zani and his nanawate is not accepted. He has only one punishment and that is, to be killed. If a zani woman runs away from her husband house to his father's or brother's, the father or brother, whatever the case may be, shall kil her; otherwise he shall hand her over to her husband to kill.

ZERE

Zere is spy-money, which is paid by a person to trace stolen property or get a clue to the offender. The name of the receiver of zere is generally kept secret to avoid his getting into trouble. The amount varies according to the value of the property stolen. Zere rarely offered in petty cases of theft.

ZIARRE

Ziarre, shkanza and kanzal are different dialects of the same word that means insulting a man by calling him names. Nobody shall insult another person in obscene words like ziarre. If one does so, he shall pay sharam. Ziarre to a woman implies to disgrace and disrespect to her family. The one accused for this shall send a nanawate to the man aggrieved. Ziarre to spin gierey and maraka or jirga members, makes one liable to pay for sharam and nanawate.

ZIARAT

Ziarat is the graveyard of a tribe's ancestors. Also it is a holy grave that has the miracle power to enable one achieve what he wishes in case he appeals to the grave spirit. Ziarat is a holy place and hence the jirgas and marakas are convened there. Par'hs (guilty) are pardoned for the sake of ziarat. Each tribe has a ziarat of their nikahgan (ancestors).

The Musa Darwesh Ziarat in Wazir is well-known where great tribal Jirgas are convened. Flags of different colors are usually put high over the tomb of a ziarat.

[Source: <http://www.afghanan.net/pashto/pashtunwali/terms.htm>]



Appendix III: The Eight Member Shia Mujahedin

Historical Background

The main eight influential Shi'a groups supporting Iran:

1. Harakat Islami Afghanistan: This group was based in the Iranian city of Qom, with offices in Tehran, Mashad, Zahedan, Tabiyad, Sheraz, and Turbat-e Jam. Harakat maintained offices in Peshawar, Miran Shah, Chaman, and Quetta. Armed groups of this group were active in Kandahar, Helmand, Heart, Ghazni, Bamian, and other regions of "Hazaristan." The publication of the organization was "Esteqamat." The organization's leader was Ayatollah Mohammad Asef Mohsini, a Kandahari, and a professor of theology. The core and cadre fighters totaled approximately 2,000 and the organization were about 15,000. *Source: Urban, M. War in Afghanistan, 1988, pp. 243-244.*
2. Shura-e Inqelab Itehad-e Islami (Shura): This group is led by Seyyed Beheshti and consists of 4000 fighters and 8000 supporters. The organization attempted to control the Afghan community in Iran and a large number were sent as volunteers in the war between Iraq and Iran.
3. Hizbullah: The party leader is Qari "Yakdast," its military leader is Wali Mohammad, and it was headquartered in Tehran. This party was created in 1980 by the religious and political leaders in Iran. They trained in the military camp of the Sepah Pasdaran-e Inqelab-e Islami in Qom and in the "Topkhana" military camp in Tehran and Shiraz. The group consisted of individuals from Herat and Farah. Afghan Hizbullah numbered about 1,500 and had approximately 3,000 followers. The main area of their activities were in Bamiyan, Ghor, Farah, Herat, and Oruzgan. This organization had close relations and contacts with Hizbullah parties in a number of Middle Eastern Countries.
4. Nasr: This is a pro-Iranian organization with a five-person leadership. Its command center is in Qom and its leader was Qazi Amin. It had 1500 fighters and 4000 followers. This was reported to be the staunchest pro-Iranian group and it maintained committees in Qom, Esfahan, Mashad, Zahedan, Zabul, and Kerman. Radio Zabul provided broadcast time for broadcasts into Afghanistan. Its publications were "Payam-e Mustazefan" and "Mujazefan" and these were printed in Tehran. Nasr's armed groups were active in Uruzgan, Parwan, Behsud, and Mazar-e Sharif.
5. Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Jihad-e Islami: This pro-Iran group is under the control of Iran's Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Inqelab Islami, is military in nature, and is intended to be the nucleus of the "Liberation Army of Afghanistan." There were reports of Maoists in this organization and Chinese trainers present. Sepah coordinates with Nasr and operates in areas around Ghor and Bamiyan. It has 3000 members with headquarters in Qom.
6. Jabha-e Mutahed-e Inqelab Islami Afghanistan: This appears to be an umbrella group of smaller Shi'a groups loosely united by the Iranian leaders. They were:
 - Islam Maktab-e Tawheed: This organization played a central military and political role with its leadership in Tehran. Their training center provides three months of religious



and military training (partisan operations) provided by experts from Sepah-e Pasdaran. Once their training was completed, they were sent to the Iran-Iraq frontlines for practical training for an additional three months before returning to their Afghan organizations.

- Rohanyat wa Jawanan (“Reja,” “Omaid”): This organization was formed from Shi’as from Kandahar, Farah, and Helmand provinces. While they have a headquarters in Tehran, they maintain committees in Qom, Mashad, Zahedan, and Zabul. They conducted operations in Kandahar, Farah, and Helmand provinces.
 - Junbeshe Islami Mustazefan-e Afghanistan (“Jama”): This group was created in 1978, but is divided and lacked support from Iranian leaders.
 - Fidaye’an-e Ummat-e Musulman-e Afghanistan: This group was active in Balkh Province, especially in the city of Mazar-e Sharif. The leader was a famous poet and preacher, Seyyed Ismael Balki. Its headquarters was in Qom with committees in Teheran and Mashad.
7. “Raad”: This organization was founded in 1976 by a religious figure from Mazar-e Sharif named Khazayee, a follower of the late Seyyed Ismael Balkhi. The armed groups were active in Herat and Balkh. They were led by Ayatollah Mohsini.
 8. Sazeman-e Niro Islami: This organization was founded with the help of Sadeq Khalkhali. They were active in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and in Behsud district. The members of this organization conducted traditional terrorist operations.

This group of Shi’a parties and their armed groups were united in 1989 into the “Jihadi Shura” that did not recognize the “transitional government” composed of the members of the Seven Party Alliance as a representative of the people of Afghanistan.

[Source: War In Afghanistan: Military History Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union, pp. 66-71]



Appendix IV: Afghan Jihad Political Parties

Fundamentalists

Hizb-i-Islami (Party of Islam). A radical, anti-western group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former Kabul University engineering student. Despite his extremist politics and lack of grassroots support, Hekmatyar was favored by Pakistani and American intelligence services, who provided him with more arms than any of the other parties.

Hizb-i-Islami (Party of Islam). A more moderate group than Hekmatyar's. led by Yunus Khalis, an Afghan cleric and former schoolteacher. Because of its tribal support among Pathans in the regions of Kabul, Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Kandahar, Khalis' group was among the most significant militarily, boasting respected commanders like Abdul Haq, Haq's brother Abdul Qadir, and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Because of his age and lack of interest in details, Khalis allowed the day-to-day operation of his party to be controlled by another of Haq's brothers, Din Mohammad.

Jaliat-i-Islami (Islamic Society). A militarily powerful party dominated by ethnic Tajiks and led by Burhuddinn Rabbani, and academic and theologian. Jamiat's power was concentrated on the northern half of Afghanistan, inhabited by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other minorities. Two of the most famous resistance commanders fought for Jamiat: Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Panjshir Valley and Ismael Khan in Herat.

Itihad-i-Islami (Islamic Unity). Led by a former university professor, Rasul Sayyaf, this party, like Hekmatyar's, derived its strength from outside aid. In Sayyaf's case, the aid came mainly from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states.

Moderates

Mahaz-i-Milli Islami (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, or NIFA). Led by Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani, a hereditary Sufi saint, NIFA was a royalist party supporting the return of deposed King Zahir Shah. The party's stringest base of support was in the southern region of Kandahar. Its commander there was Haji Abdel Latif.

Jabha-i-Nijat-Milli (Afghan National Liberation Front). Like NIFA, a royalist party with a base of support in Kandahar. Despite the brave personal record of the party's leader, Sibghatullah Mojadidi, it had few troops in the field and consequently got the least aid from the Pakistanis and the Americans. Mojadidi was a compromise figure selected to lead the mujahedin government-in-exile in March 1989.

Hakarat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Forces). Led by a cleric, Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi, Harakat was less a moderate party than a neither-nor group of urban intellectuals and village clerics under the same roof. Because it was loosely organized and had an opaque political personality, Harakat got little attention among Peshawar-based journalists, but nevertheless boasted a large number of fighters in Afghanistan.



(NOTE: There are over a dozen lesser political parties, including eight that were based in Iran. More information needs to be compiled on all of them.)

[Source: Kaplan, "Soldiers of God," pp. 233-234]



Appendix V: Mujahedin Control of Provinces in 1994

Background

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the mujahedin parties entered a period of chaos and civil war. The primary antagonists were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbe Islami and Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami with each having shifting sets of allies. The following is a list of provinces under the command of individual commanders.

Analysis

This data illustrates the regions in which individual political leaders and insurgent commanders derived their support. The alliances and coalitions formed during the civil war period generally remain in effect as the areas population and fighters still support that particular political party.

Historical Background

[This data is derived from an article that appeared in The Herald (Pakistan) during February 1994. It was reprinted in Afghan Forum, Vol. XXII, No. 3. (May, 1994). The title was "Who Controls What."]

- **Kabul** - Rabbani's Tajik-dominated Jamiat-i Islami; Ahmad Shah Masood.
- **Herat** – Jamiat's most powerful commander, Ismail Khan, controls the province and has influence in a number of adjoining provinces.
- **Farah** – Controlled by Jamiat-led forces.
- **Baghdis** - Controlled by Jamiat-led forces.
- **Nimroz** - Controlled by Jamiat-led forces.
- **Oruzgan** – Harakat-dominated shura.
- **Ghazni** – Controlled by Harakat's Qari Baba.
- **Helmand** – Harakat's Mullah Rasoul Akhundzada.
- **Kandahar** – Shura dominated by Jamiat's Mullah Naqib and Hizbe Islami's Haji Sarkatib.
- **Parwan** – Controlled by Ahmad Shah Masood.
- **Badakshan** – Controlled by Ahmad Shah Masood and allies.
- **Takhar** – Controlled by Ahmad Shah Masood and allies.
- **Konduz** – Dominated by Jamiat's Arif Khan and allies but Hezb Islami has influence.
- **Balkh** – General Dostum and allies.
- **Samangan** - General Dostum and allies.
- **Jowzjan** - General Dostum and allies.



- **Faryab** - General Dostum and allies.
- **Baghlan** - General Dostum and allies.
- **Sar-e Pol** - General Dostum and allies.
- **Nangahar** – Combined shura representing most groups.
- **Laghman** – Controlled by Hezb Islami.
- **Logar** – Controlled by Hezb Islami.
- **Konar** – Controlled by a shura dominated by a Wahabbi party.
- **Paktia** – Harakat dominated shura without representation by Hezb Islami.
- **Paktikia** – Controlled by a shura representing most groups.
- **Zabul** – Harekat dominated areas.
- **Wardak** – Conflict between factions belonging to Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, and others.
- **Kapisia** – Conflict between Hezb Islami and Jamiat.
- **Bamiyan** – Controlled by shura composed of eight Shi'a parties.
- **Ghor** – Controlled by a Jamiat-dominated shura.



Appendix VI: Paktia Political Factors – 1989

Background

Paktia was one of the key locations where the “Afghan Civil War” was continued with a vengeance. Located on the border with Pakistan, being the origin of key leaders of both the communist and mujahedin sides, and located on key infiltration and supply routes the fighting was severe in Paktia. The differences between the “urban elites” that formed a nearly new tribal identity, the “Kabulis,” and the opposing “rural cleric war leaders” are easily seen in this region.

The Kabulis, regardless of tribal origins, were educated in universities and in the Soviet Union where they attended military training while their tribal connections were gradually muted into the background. The rural clerics opposing them remained closely identified with their tribal origins and eventually defeated their opponents by rallying support from the unsophisticated rural population.

Analysis

- The great difference between the communists and the mujahedin resistance are best illustrated in a Paktia Province case study. The communists assembled jirgas comprised of tribal elders while the mujahedin held shuras, or religious councils.

Key Urban Leaders From Paktia

- Several of the most senior communist leaders were native to Paktia Province.
- President Mohammad Najibullah was born in August 1947 to the Ahmadzai sub-tribe of the Ghilzai Pashtun tribe. Though born in Kabul, his ancestral village was located between the towns of Said Karam and Gardez in Paktia Province. He was educated at Habibia High School and Kabul University, where he graduated with a doctor degree in medicine in 1975. [Note: Najibullah probably identified more with the “Kabulis” than with his Ahmadzai tribal origins.
- Mohammad Aslam Watanjar was an Afghan General and Politician. He played a significant role in the coup in 1978 that killed the Afghan president Mohammad Daud and started the “Saur Revolution”. He later became a member of the politburo in the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, playing prominent roles in the communist coup as well as the coup that overthrew the constitutional monarchy. An Andar Ghilzay Pashtun from Zurmula in Paktia. However, he was trained as a tank officer in the Soviet Union after he had graduated from the Military Academy in Kabul.
- Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoy, the leader of the Khalqi faction of the Afghan Communist Party was exiled as Ambassador to Moscow as part of the political preparation of the Soviet pullout, in September 1988.
- Lieut. Gen Shahnawaz Tanai is a former communist general. He was chief of Afghanistan's army under the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. His military positions



included Commander of Artillery, Chief of the Army Staff, Chief of the KHAD Intelligence Network and then Minister of Defense during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. A pillar of the Communist Regime, Tanai later attempted a coup against his former friend and President Mohammad Najibullah, seeking refuge in a hostile Pakistan and working with fundamentalists such as Engineer Gulbadin Hekmatyar. He was a member of the Khalq faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and leader of at least the majority of the Khalqi faction since its former leader Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoy was exiled as Ambassador to Moscow as part of the political preparation of the Soviet pullout, in September 1988. Born in 1950 in the village of Dargai in the southern province of Khost. Tanai followed a classic military career, attending first the military academy and then university, specialising in infantry tactics. He later traveled to the Soviet Union to study leadership.

Key Rural Leaders

- Jalaluddin Haqqani (Pashto:) (c. 1950-) is a Pashtun military leader known for his involvement in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, specially during Operation Magistral, as well as for being invited by President Hamid Karzai to become Prime Minister of Afghanistan. Originally a member of the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Haqqani was admired by certain eastern Pashtuns during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and ensuing civil war. In 1991 he was the first resistance leader to capture a city, Khost, from the Najibullah government. After the fall of Kabul to the Mujahideen in 1992, he once had strong ties with the CIA and the Pakistani ISI. He reputedly attracted generous was appointed justice minister in the first Mujahideen government. Operating against the Soviets and the Afghan government from a safe haven in North Waziristan, Haqqani is reputed to have support from prosperous Arab countries compared to other resistance leaders.
- The other rural commanders were relatively obscure and could not be documented. Interestingly, most of the resistance parties were present and conducted operations against the communist forces.

Historical Background

-Political Situation in 1989

“Many of the leaders of the communist government in Kabul are native to Paktia, including President Najibullah, Interior Minister Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, former Interior Minister Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi, and Defense Minister Shahnagaz Tania, among others. The government is working hard to win the support of the tribes in the eastern part of the province by holding jirgas with tribal elders and offering certain concession in exchange for local cooperation. At the end of 1988 for example, the governor of the province held jirgas with Mangal elders at Gardez, and with elders of the Ahmadzai tribes, representatives of various nomadic groups, and Sikhs from Gardez and Chamkani. The



government has been claiming success with this policy and points to Paktia as one of the areas to which refugees have been encouraged to return....

“The major mujahedin commanders participate in a provincial military shura. Among the most well known of its participants are: Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani (HIK), Engineer Faiz Mohammad (HIG), Maulavi Pir Mohammad (SYF), Gul Abbas Khan (NIFA), Sayed Noor Mohammad Shah (ANLF), Capt. Amanullah (JIA), and Malik Khan (HIIA). Jalaluddin Haqqani, a member of the Zadran tribe, is one of the few commanders in eastern Afghanistan to have extended his influence beyond his tribe and he has received considerable foreign support for his activities. The Zadrans are generally loyal to Maulavi Khalis. Another influential commander, Maulavi Nasrullah Haqqani of the Zormat tribe, lost his foreign backing after splitting with HIIA. He has since been seeking support from Iran. The Jaji, Mangal, Tanai, and Waziri tribes have given their support to Pir Gailani or have remained indifferent to political influences. Sections of each tribe have remained loyal to the government.”

[Source: Paktia Province, UNHCR Report, 1989, pg. 2]

