L26

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

25 June 2007

Baghdad (MND-B) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Baghdad [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(BC0003) Airport Police Local Police Station: The team learned today that an IP from the BIAP station was kidnapped and killed on his way home from work. The incident took place on 22 June somewhere in Baghdad. There was no further information available.

The normal daily training was conducted at the BIAP station only. The range Team conducted a meeting at the Muthana Iraqi Army facility. This meeting was to attempt to arrange use of their firing range. The Team was told we must wait on a decision by the base commander. The Team also conducted an inspection of both detention facilities. There were no irregularities discovered in either inspection.

(BC0009) Al Alawiyah Local Police Station: The Team met with the station commander, COL [redacted]. [redacted] again requested more men be assigned to his station. He has again refused to review the MOI training plan despite repeated requests by the Team. The Team conducted training for 3 ranking IPs concerning Disciplinary Procedures. (b)(6), (b)(6c), (b)(6), (b)(6c)

(BC0010) Al Bayaa Local Police Station: The Team was requested to support a mobile patrol into a neighborhood in order to investigate a report of a citizen being murdered. During the patrol, team members mentored IPs and 2 Officers concerning a ops brief and patrol ops in a high risk environment. The patrol then traveled to the reported area to investigate. The team provided oversight. Nothing relevant was found.

(BC0018) Al Jazaaer Local Police Station: The Team conducted training for 6 IPs covering the Justifying of Detentions, Searches, and Arrests. Photographs of 80 IPs were taken.

(BC0022) Al Kadhimaya Patrol Police Station: Due to a bomb threat at a gas station adjacent to the patrol station and the lack of concern by the Station Commander, the Team took the opportunity to mentor the Station Commander about proactive law enforcement. Also during the station visit, the Team noticed the gaps in the outer defenses were still unaddressed by the IPs. A class on Force Protection was conducted. The practical training was conducted by having the Force Protection supervisor implement a plan of action. It took 1 IP and a use of an existing tower to cover both openings in the outer wall.

On a 2nd visit, the Team processed and updated the command chart that exists at the station. Each officer's name and rank was recorded, along with their photograph. The Team spoke with Major [redacted] regarding 1 of the station's I.P.'s who was arrested on Friday, 6-22-07, for being a suspected insurgent. Apparently, on the aforementioned date, CF conducted a raid on a residence in the Kadhamiya District and apprehended a high ranking member of JAM ([redacted] - reportedly #2 in the organization), along with 3 I.P.'s from the Kadhamiya District. 1 of the IP's arrested in the raid was a Kadhimaya Traffic Police Officer ([redacted]). Major [redacted] stated that the only reason the station hired him was because they had received a direct order from the Kadhamiya HQ to do so. (b)(6), (b)(6c), (b)(6), (b)(6c), (b)(6), (b)(6c), (b)(6), (b)(6c)

(BC0033) Al Karkh Patrol Police Station: The Team met with the Station Commander. He stated the current allocation of fuel from MOI is not enough. The station currently has 800 liters at the station. With an average daily fuel consumption of 60 liters per vehicle, for an

average daily deployment of 23 vehicles, it will be necessary to find an adequate fuel source in the near future.

(BC0037) Al Kahdra Local Police Station: The Team spoke with the Station Commander, Colonel [redacted], about the storage of numerous vehicles inside the station compound. It was suggested having a scrap dealer purchase the vehicles without owners and use the money for station improvements. The station has two 5000 gallon fuel storage tanks out back not being used. The Captain wants to move it to Monsour District HQ for their planned fuel point.

(BC0041) Al Mesbah Local Police Station: The Team conducted training for 5 IPs covering Field Interview Techniques and Handcuffing.

(BC0045) Al Nasir Local Police Station: The Team conducted training for 1 Officer and 12 IPs covering Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, and Detention.

(BC0046) Al Quanat Local Police Station: The Team conducted training for 3 Officers and 5 IPs covering Laws of Arrests. The arms room and the detention cell was inspected. One joint patrol was conducted without incident.

(BC0065) Al Taji Patrol Police Station: The station's new IP recruits have finished with their training, but are not permitted to go out and conduct patrols because they have yet to receive any formal firearms training. One of the station's training officers (Sgt. [redacted]) requested all of the new I.P. recruits be taken out to FOB Justice to receive said firearms training. The Team advised him he needed to make the training request to M.O.I. first. The Team would also inquire as to whether or not this was a possibility.

The station has an additional 72 AWOL's who have not reported for duty for the past few months and is awaiting the termination paperwork from M.O.I. to formally discharge them and remove them from the station's employee roster.

(BC0073) Al Yarmouk Patrol Police Station: The Team spoke with the Station Commander who reported that on 06-21-07, Capt. [redacted] responded to a dead body call with 3 other IPs. Upon arrival, his truck was disabled from an IED blast. All personnel were injured. Another patrol vehicle responded to assist the injured crew. As Capt. [redacted] attempted to enter the second vehicle, he was shot and killed by a sniper. The other three IPs survived their wounds. During the incident one vehicle was destroyed by an IED attack and a second truck was rendered useless after it was struck by an IED.

(BC0075) Al Zaafaranyah Local Police Station: The Team conducted training for 4 IPs covering Room Clearing and it was concluded with a practical exercise. The Team spoke with the station commander, COL [redacted], regarding recent attacks on the 240th MP Company and the fact that the last two attacks occurred within 300 meters of an IA/IP checkpoint. COL [redacted] advised he had relocated the checkpoint in closer to the IED strike areas in an attempt to curtail them.

(BC0081) Bab Al Sheikh Local Police Station: The Team took part in a 3 hour joint patrol during which a suspect was arrested for being armed with a handgun.

(BC0085) Baghdad Provincial Patrol Police HQ: The Team met with Col. [redacted] to discuss a management/leadership class and the personnel that would be involved. The team met with the training department and discussed issues regarding lack of ammunition and improvements for the range.

(BC0086) Baghdad Main Provincial Police HQ: Team discovered General [redacted] wrote a memo to MOI regarding problems with the water, sewer, and electric power generators at the station with no response. Col. [redacted] also advised they have 24 working radio towers in the greater Baghdad area. Logistics meeting information revealed the manager at CMF was not releasing equipment until he received a signature from Major [redacted]. This problem has now been resolved.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

MOI announced no training ammunition is being issued right now. New IPs shoot their weapons at training only. All left over ammunition is sent to their station for duty ammo. The HQ is now receiving electric power from the city grid between the hours of 2000 to 0600 hours. The Team observed the BHQ Force Protection IPs. It was determined they needed assistance to improve their Force Protection. This will be addressed on the next visit.

(BC0090) Boob Al Sham Local Police Station: The Team conducted training for 2 IPs covering the subject of Hate Crimes. The Team was traveling Northbound on MSR Dover, returning to Camp Cooke, when the third vehicle in the convoy was struck by an IED. The IED was detonated from the east shoulder of the roadway striking the passenger side of the vehicle, damaging both doors, cracking the windshield, and flattening both right side tires of the vehicle. There were no injuries reported and the Team returned to the Camp without further incident.

(BC0119 Al Rusafa Patrol Station: The Team conducted training for 52 IPs covering Checkpoint Procedures. 12 checkpoints were visited without incident.

(BC0125) Yousifiya Local Police Station: The Team assisted with the police recruitment drive with more than 200 new recruits being processed.

Babylon (MND-CS/S) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Al Qadisiyah [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB Echo: There were no missions on this date due to a CC mandated stand down as a result of threat level. The team continued to work on the development of the VISTA IPS training center and program.

Babil [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(BB0032) Babil Provincial Police HQ: The PTT team from FOB REO attended the weekly Babil Province Chiefs-of-Police meeting. There are still serious security issues at Iskandariyah. The IP's in this district need to be on their toes for any suspicious activity. Pay attention at checkpoints in that area and do your job correctly. There was a VBIED that was detonated in a park in the Balda District next to the old Al Hillah jail close to the main market. The concern here is that the owner of the park is supposed to inspect all vehicles coming into the park before admitting them. The authorities hold the park owner responsible for the VBIED explosion. Checkpoints are not doing their jobs. There was a man in the trunk of a car, and went through 10 checkpoints and was never discovered by the checkpoints. The chiefs demanded, their IP's search every vehicle thoroughly every time at these checkpoints, even IP vehicles.

Some chiefs are complaining, some of the checkpoints in their district do not have enough PKC's or magazines and ammo. Some station chiefs complained that the checkpoints in there are are substandard. They have no shade for the IP's. The shelter is poor. Some

station chiefs complained the fuel to run their IP vehicles is very dirty. The in-tank fuel filters are clogging up and are running poorly or in worse case scenario they are not running at all.

The Intelligence section was asked to get better Intel about VBIEDS and other explosive devices. By the time the VBIED gets to the checkpoint it is too late. The checkpoint is probably their target and they detonate. They need the info in advance.

Some areas need to be fortified with T-walls, such as the Main Market Place in Al Huriyah LPS. The 127th MP Co. has sent in packets requesting certain areas be fortified with T-walls but have not received approval on them yet. The military advised that the budget for T-walls and etc. is shrinking.

The Internal Affairs Commander Gen. [redacted] spoke to the chiefs at this meeting to explain his job. He plans to have training classes for all IP's in Babil Province to understand what his office does and why. The Internal Affairs Commander Gen. [redacted] also requests that when he enters an IP station and shows his I.D he wants admittance immediately, instead of waiting for the IP security to radio someone for approval. That request was approved.

Gen. [redacted] also told his chiefs, he does not want the IP's talking on their cells phones except for an emergency. The use of cell phones, are distracting and when they are playing with their phones they are not paying attention to their job. The phones are a distraction.

Wasit [redacted]

There were no missions conducted due to a shortage of military personnel.

Dhi Qar / Al Muthanna (PIC) [redacted]

PIC members attended the daily operational briefing in Camp Terendak and attended the daily SSR/MiTT/CPATT meeting with Major [redacted]. PIC members met with members of MiTT team to coordinate planning and training efforts for both provinces. PIC members attended the Sync Matrix meeting to share effects of the past weeks meetings and events.

PIC members met with Dhi Qar Anti-terrorism unit Commander (Col. [redacted]). The Col. Has recently taken over the position of unit commander. This meeting was coordinated by the OBG S2 (Intelligence) unit. Col. [redacted] may prove to be a valuable asset. PIC members are planning follow up meetings with Lt. Col. [redacted] and evaluate the renovations that have been done on the Al Muthanna PCJJ as well as check the status of his continued work on the Provincial Security Plan. This may take place during the Al Muthanna Academy training. PIC and MITT members are meeting on an ongoing basis to coordinate training in conjunction with OBG-3 schedules as they continue the process of acclimating to the mission.

Tikrit (MND-CW) [redacted]

Diyala [redacted]

Scorpion Academy: Twenty-eight IP received classroom training in Human Rights.

No PTT Missions were scheduled for FOB Warhorse, FOB Caldwell or FOB Normandy.

Compiled by [redacted]

(TA0100) Tikrit Emergency Patrol: At the beginning of the visit, CPT [redacted], of Tikrit Main and 2LT [redacted] of Tikrit ERU, arrived to tell us that they could not provide any IP for training. They advised that they had been tasked to guard the schools and hospitals. However, 1LT [redacted] of Tikrit 911, arrived later in the meeting with 14 IP for training. 1LT [redacted] taught Police Survival to the IP. 1LT [redacted] was an effective instructor, but lacked true police experience. IPLO and two CF counterparts added to the instruction by sharing their police experience.

(TA0084) Samarra District HQ: PTT met with GEN [redacted] at the JCC. The topic of discussion was the upcoming payroll. GEN [redacted] advised there are 242 dead or injured IP that need to be paid, in addition to 400 more IP to be paid for actual work. PTT was able to provide evidence to him, there was no way possible that there had been that many IP here in Samarra this past time period to warrant that many personnel to be paid. PTT worked with GEN [redacted] to get the number of IP to be paid down to 300. This means that total IP pay we will need for Samarra will not be more than 542 to be paid. There should still be money sent back to Tikrit once the pay is distributed to the IP. GEN [redacted], once again, promised us a list of the 242 that were hurt. In the past, GEN [redacted] has not provided this list when PTT has requested it. GEN [redacted] further stated that there were 66 Samarra IP working in Tikrit. IPLO told him to tell those IP working in Tikrit to get their pay at the Tikrit PHQ. If PTT has not seen them working in Samarra they will not be paid in Samarra.

PTT then discussed how pay is going to be distributed. The plan is that GEN [redacted] must notify the IPLO before anyone travels to Tikrit to pick up the payroll. Once he gets the pay he will notify PTT. PTT will then be present for all pay distribution. IPLO told GEN [redacted] to put the word out that all IP will be paid and they must bring their weapons when they come to get their pay. If the IP are on the "to be fired list" PTT will get their weapon and tell them they are fired. This way we can get some of the weapons back. Nobody will be paid that says they lost their weapon. IPLO are hearing many stories that the IP have sold their Glock pistols for 1000 US dollars. Everybody will be searched before they are let into the headquarters to be paid. PTT also informed GEN [redacted] that the pay would have to be picked up by the IP being paid. There will no longer be IP picking up pay for the actual IP that worked. The same will hold true for the injured and dead IP. A family member will have to pick up their pay unless headquarters is notified to the contrary.

It is imperative, that the SAD PTTP informs the Tikrit PHQ, not to send anymore than 542 payouts for Samarra. At the least, this will minimize the damage if the payroll is compromised again. GEN [redacted] was informed that if he starts paying IP without first letting PTT know he shall be arrested.

PTT also met with GEN [redacted] to see about getting the keys for LT [redacted] and leaving them at the motor pool. GEN [redacted] advised that this would be agreeable, and that he had talked to LT [redacted] in reference to this in advance. He also advised that LT [redacted] is going to get him a request for the items that he needs so that they can get them purchased. We then spoke with LT [redacted], and handed over the keys too him. He also is going to set aside approximately 5 trucks for the Emergency Battalion in case they need vehicles for a mission. These vehicles would be ready to go at all times. LT [redacted] would also know if the vehicles are missing any equipment when they are returned. This would solve one of his problems that the IP are stealing equipment off of the vehicles and not taking proper care of them.

(TA0050) As Sanyiah Police Station: Upon PTT's arrival at the station, 10 IP were on duty and a total of 18 trainees showed up at the station for academy training. CF had a special mission going on in the Sanyiah area that they were involved in, so IPLO conducted all of

the academy training during our shift. IPLO was assisted by some of the IP at times during the class. The classes were in weapons safety, maintenance, and cleaning. Also covered during the instruction, was how to hold and aim their primary weapons. IPLO also conducted a review of how to stop and search suspects that IP are going to arrest.

Camp Speicher PTTP Salah Ad Din: Both, Provincial and District teams were on stand down, due to the death of an AF member that was on a PTT mission on the previous day. PTT was advised that the teams may remain down for a few days while the AF deals with this situation.

Camp Anaconda: PTT traveled to FOB Paliwoda and prepared the firearms course curriculum for an upcoming IP training course at this location.

Mosul (MND-N)

Ninewah

(MN0056) Ninewah Provincial Headquarters: PTT spoke with BG [redacted], OIC TOC, and received a briefing on the significant events that occurred within the past 24 hours in Ninewah Province. He related that IP from the Al Nasir DHQ discovered an IED constructed of mortar rounds in the Ninewah neighborhood and EOD subsequently reduced the IED. 1st ERB reported the impact of a single mortar round which detonated near the Tall Afar garage. Al Somer LPS was the victim of indirect fire by AIF using mortars and RPGs. An IP patrol in the Bauaj District was attacked by AIF resulting in one KIA and one WIA. Civilians were killed by AIF in the Al Mothana neighborhood, Al Entessar neighborhood, Senaa Wady Okab neighborhood, and Al Nowr neighborhood. An off duty IP assigned to 4th ERB was killed and his wife injured by AIF in the Al Zahra neighborhood. CF discovered and reduced IEDs in the Bab Shames neighborhood, Al Methak neighborhood and the Al Karam neighborhood.

PTT met with LT [redacted], NPHQ jail and noted the jail population to be comprised of 406 adults, 21 IP and four IA. There were no signs of prisoner abuse. The facility now has air conditioners, freezers to keep detainees water cool, and the staff has begun to escort the detainees to the BATS unit on a timely basis. The gates to the cell block and reception area are properly manned.

PTT spoke with BG [redacted], Logistics Officer, and discussed recent information received by PTT that a contractor has spoke with BG [redacted] (Chief, Tall Afar DHQ) and presented him with a written estimate for a vehicle repair center in Tall Afar for the IP vehicles. BG [redacted] related that this had not been discussed with MG [redacted] for his authorization of such a facility. BG [redacted] related he had set aside 100 Glock pistols to be issued to Tall Afar and at least 100 sets of Kevlar vests to replace those in the Hassenqoi LPS. PTT arranged for BG [redacted] to receive an additional 7,019 BKC rounds to bring the total of hand at NPHQ to 8,019. BG [redacted] advised there were 2,328,000 rounds of AK ammunition and 1,120,000 rounds of 9mm ammunition. BG [redacted] added there were 231 AK47 rifles, 1,849 Glock pistols, six BKC machineguns, five RBC machineguns and ten RPG7s in the NPHQ inventory for issue. BG [redacted] also discussed the need for additional fuel for the IP vehicles and explained that the previous fuel issue had already been consumed. PTT notified the appropriate authorities within CF of the IP request for additional fuel.

PTT spoke with COL [redacted], Chief of Communications, and provided him with a disc containing software from Motorola. The software should allow his technicians to reprogram the 250 Motorola GP360 UHF radios which are not mission capable and display "Code plug error" on the LED screen. The micro-processors had been effected by the warlocks in CF

vehicles over the past few months rendering the UHF radios inoperable. PTT discussed this month's payroll distribution and noted that the date has been set but will be officially announced in a few days. This delayed announcement is due to terrorist activity within Ninewah Province. PTT also spoke to BG [redacted], Training officer, and the majority of the meeting covered the movement of officers to FOB Endurance (Q-West) where they would be attending the Police Station Training Officer Course. BG [redacted] also discussed his views in reference to tomorrows meeting with the training officers from the districts and stations within the Province.

(MN0099) Major Crimes Unit/Major Terrorist Unit: PTT met with LTC [redacted] of MTU who related that, approximately three days ago, a memorandum was sent to all DHQ and LPS in Mosul. He remarked the memorandum explained no detainee will be accepted by MTU unless the IP responsible for the arrest comes to MTU with the detainee. This is desirous as the Investigative Judge wants the arresting IP to make a sworn statement to substantiate the facts of the arrest. LTC [redacted] also advised PTT that the fifteen juveniles were still in custody at MTU. He related the Investigative Judge has requested the names of all the juveniles, as well as, the Investigative Officer's name, who is investigating the case in Tall Afar. LTC [redacted] stated that if it is found that there are no cases prepared against these juveniles there will be some sort of legal action taken against the Investigator. LTC [redacted] did not know what kind of action would be taken, but he did say that the Investigative Judge was going to take action. PTT was also advised by LTC [redacted] that he has meetings three times a day with the Investigators assigned to the MTU. These meeting are for the Investigators to get their assignments as well as have any questions answered. LTC [redacted] stated that COL [redacted], Commander MTU/MCU does not always attend these meetings. PTT discussed some investigative techniques that he could discuss with his Investigators during these meetings to assist them in their investigations.

(MN0928) Abi Tamaam DHQ: PTT traveled to the Badoush prison. Three IP were trained as trainers for the Badoush station on various topics. Eighteen IP were trained. The names of the three IP for trainers were provided for the station commander COL [redacted]. The IP were very excited to train. The participation was outstanding and additional training will be conducted during the next visit to Badoush

(MN0918) Al Fasalia LPS: No station visit was conducted due to PTT being re-tasked to escort provincial team to NPHQ

(MN0018) Al Nasir DHQ: No station visit was conducted due to PTT being re-tasked to escort provincial team to NPHQ

(MN0068) Al Somer LPS: The PTT visited Al Somer and was advised by MAJ [redacted] who is second in charge that the station was struck by a mortar. MAJ [redacted] then advised that they received Intel one day ago that a VBIED was going to hit their station. MAJ [redacted] also advised that he received Intel about a possible kidnapping of IP from Al Somer Station. No jointed patrol was performed due to four IP being injured during a VBIED two days ago. MAJ [redacted] stated that he would like to have tactical training in fighting positions defending the station and that he would like to facilitate cordon training.

(MN0030) Bab Shamas LPS: PTT is assigned to the Badoush Prison detail

(MN0201) Ninewah SWAT: PTT accompanied Ninewah Provincial Headquarters PTT this date on personnel issues. Later PTT was contacted by Ninewah SWAT Commander regarding information he had received from a source. PTT mentored SWAT with regards to setting up a source driven target package. PTT advised SWAT to utilize Special Forces, CF, and IA personnel for this mission. Being that the target was time sensitive, notifications were

made to all assets and a brief time of 2200 hours set. All met as agreed, it was at this time that CPT [redacted] gave the mission brief. An order of movement was set and all responded to four locations where simultaneous breaches were conducted. PTT assisted and mentored throughout the entire process. Six members of an IED cell were taken into custody.

(MN0232) 1st Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(MN0233) 2nd Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(NO FFID) 3rd Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(NO FFID) 4th Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(NO FFID) Emergency Response Unit: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(MN0009) Al Hadba DHQ: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0008) Al Gizlani LPS: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0214) Al Waqaas LPS: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0045) Al Kazrag LPS: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0036) Al Dawasa LPS: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0022) Al Rabaein DHQ: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0024) Al Sheak Fathi: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0923) Al Yarmook: PTT met with LT [redacted] who stated CPT [redacted] was in charge, but responded to the Mosul hospital after one of his IP was shot in the leg. Ten of the IP were waiting for more IP from AL-Rabeain DHQ to arrive to do a residence raid. While the ten IP were standing by, a group of five fired one RPG and two BKC from around a corner. LT Mohammad stated they took cover, returned fire and the group ran away.

PTT had two soldiers from the Psychological Operation Unit (PSYOP) and they asked questions and issued wanted posters for the IP to post in their community. LT [redacted] advised them that a reward program would be very beneficial. The PSYOP soldier stated there is a reward program and they would bring posters promoting that program soon.

LT [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated he received a tip that four Al-Qaeda members were killed by a group of nine AIF members; however, no bodies have been found.

The water main in front of the facility has not been repaired yet. LT [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) stated they are now down to about 300 BKC rounds. He was advised to send in ammunition requests everyday (Al-Rabeain DHQ keeps advising them the there is a shortage of BKC ammunition.)

(MN0924) Al Jamouri Hospital LPS: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0215) Mosul Al Gadeda LPS: This station was not visited due to new military squad assignments.

(MN0076) Tall Afar DHQ: PTT spent the morning with BG [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) on the FOB, covering upcoming future missions pertaining to the intelligence and operational sides. CF was also present conducting future planning, with the current intelligence available. PTT also discussed with the BG allowing his subordinates to take control of the raids, rather than a General. The BG was very accepting of this. PTT arranged with BG during the trips to Mosul, if there are any prisoners that need to be transported, this would be a good time to complete the transport. It was also explained to [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c), the only trucks that would be used for the transporting of the prisoners, would be IP or IA vehicles. The CF would be used for security operations only. CF advised BG, there are 100 pistols in Mosul that are ready to be picked up. PTT requested BG to obtain further information on the prisoner that is being detained in Al Kisik, whether the prisoner is to be released or if he in fact needs to be transported to Mosul. BG said he would look into this. There will be an undisclosed amount of money given as martyr payment, to the IP.

(MN0222) Rabiyah DHQ: PTT is on an overnight mission. No information is available for reports at this time.

(MN0209) Avgani: PTT is on an overnight mission in the city of Tall Afar. No information is available for reports at this time.

(MN0204) Al Tahadi: PTT is tasked to assist conducting an assessment of the Bi'aj district IP. No internet is available and communications is limited. No report information is available at this time.

(MN0134) Abu Maria: PTT traveled from FOB Sykes to Abu Maria LPS without incident. The purpose of the travel was to speak with the MAJ [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) about terrorist activity in the area, check to see what supplies are needed, and identify five areas of training that the IP at Abu Maria need. The PTT spoke with MAJ [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) in reference to the well being of the station. MAJ [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) advised that everything was going well at the station. MAJ [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) also advised that two men had moved into the area about one month ago. The two men are suspected terrorist that target civilians. MAJ [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) advised that his IP were looking for the two men, but they have been unable to locate them so far. MAJ [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) also advised that BG [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) from Tall Afar DHQ had taken 29 of his men and one of his trucks and had not returned them. Abu Maria is now in need of 29 replacement IP and another vehicle. MAJ [redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) identified five areas of training his IP needed. PTT is in the process of planning these classes and will be prepared to begin teaching them next time they visit Abu Maria LPS.

At Tamim [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(TT0099) Criminal Investigations Unit: The PTT spoke with COL [redacted] and LTC [redacted] and passed on the information about the Baghdad training. PTT will assist with the preparation for the training. It appears that only three investigators will be going to the training. COL [redacted] stated that BG [redacted] has the signed agreement to start on the remodel of the new MCU. COL [redacted] will meet with COL [redacted] to discuss the financial requirements for the remodel. PTT observed the building was clean and organized and upon inspecting the upstairs investigator's room PTT found a PDK bodyguard who was there to guard MAJ [redacted]. PTT discussed the need for a bodyguard with MAJ [redacted] and will investigate why a political party is guarding the police.

(TT0006) Criminal Evidence Unit: PTT spoke with COL [redacted] and informed him of the travel arrangements for the investigators going to Baghdad. PTT talked with COL [redacted] and MAJ [redacted] about numerous issues with the Criminal Evidence Unit (CEU). PTT found that the CEU currently has no evidence processing equipment set up at the building due to lack of space. PTT spoke with MAJ [redacted] in detail about the fingerprint and criminal records sections of the CEU. PTT discovered that the current process of checking a criminal history on arrested suspects takes ten days to one month because they must submit the paperwork and fingerprints to Baghdad for processing. PTT found the CEU has a very good fingerprint card with good information gathered on the card. PTT spoke with MAJ [redacted] about having all arrested suspects fingerprinted and information cards filled out so that they can start a local database in Kirkuk to identify criminals. CEU was very interested in starting this process. PTT will assist them in setting up a computerized database. CEU personnel were already familiar with the computer system and believe they can start the database without much difficulty.

(TT0003) Arafa Patrol Police Station: PTT did weapons and ammunition checks on IP in formation. Fourteen IP were found to be short a considerable amount of 9mm ammunition. LTC [redacted] is investigating the shortage. PTT instructed 32 IP in safe weapons handling, including loading and clearing of weapons. PTT then checked the armory and discussed future plans to improve the armory.

(TT0004) Aruba Patrol Police Station: The PTT observed guard mount and the training class on vehicle check points and vehicle searches up on by the Iraqi trainer. IP were instructed on the scenarios of building clearing and planning.

Daquq JCC: PTT met with LT [redacted] and MAJ [redacted]. PTT discussed some of the needed repairs of the building and what future assistance could be offered. MAJ [redacted] advised he has three IP attending the Academy for the supervision class.

(TT0018) Highway Patrol Tamin: PTT convoyed to Highway Patrol LPS and met with LTC [redacted]. PTT discussed personnel issues and equipment supply issues concerning DHQ. LTC [redacted] reported that the XO is still neglectful of duties, and had not shown for work as of 9:45 today. DHQ will not take action against the XO, and it causes morale problems with the other IP.

(TT0024) Qarah Anir Patrol Police Station: The PTT observed guard mount and the training class on vehicle check points and vehicle searches put on by IPLOs.

(TT0031) Shwan Local Police Station: PTT observed the work in progress for the improvement of the electricity and lighting in the station. No deficiencies were noted. BG [redacted] requested from PTT that he receive more Hesco barriers for the front of the station and the jersey barriers will be moved to the checkpoints. This would be in line with the force protection plan. PTT reviewed the practical exercise with the investigations section. It was noted to them how between the three scenarios, they improved their performance each time.

However, PTT reviewed case files with the investigations unit and it was abundantly clear that they were not performing to the same standards during actual cases. Apparently the investigations officers are intimidated by friends and family involved in cases. On one case, inadequate photos were taken because the family did not allow it. In another case, false leads were followed because the investigators took statements at face value and did not analyze them for validity. The situation was discussed with BG [redacted] and additional training will be sought for the investigators involved. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(TT0032) Taza Karhmatu Patrol Police Station: PTT observed the shift change and reviewed detention procedures with the shift supervisor. The team spoke with COL [redacted] about the need to revamp the investigative unit and to bring it up to the level of other station divisions. The unit is down to one investigator who wants a transfer and an officer that has been filling in. The issue will be addressed with COL [redacted] and his staff at the next visit. PTT transported two detainees to Daquq for a court hearing on terrorism charges and later transported them back to FOB Warrior for continued detention by CF. The case was reviewed by the investigative judge and will be forwarded to MCU. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Irbil

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Irbil Training Center: PTT met with command staff from Mosul and Baghdad regarding progress in the Kurdish Regions. Meetings are being scheduled to have command staff meet PDOP and MOI.

Sulaymaniyah

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(No FFID#) Sulaymaniyah Asaish HQ: PTT trained two blocks of IP both for two hours.The class today consisted of officer survival and first aid. PTT then met with Assaish check point at the Dukon check point. There are only eight officers working the check point. The Assaish officers work four hour shifts. The car and truck count through this check point is approximately 300 per hour. The officers have no cameras or surveillance equipment.

(TS0010) Sulaymaniyah Traffic HQ: PTT traveled to the Border Patrol Academy were the first day of Motorcycle training for the fifth consecutive class began. This class has riders that either have never been on a motorcycle or have ridden very little. As a result, the first half of the day was very difficult for some. After one on one mentoring, the students started grasping the specific instructions and by the end of the day all class members had greatly improved.

(TS0034) Dukan DHQ: PTT arrived at Piermagruan LPS and spoke to CPT [redacted]. The new Investigation Training Class was to be held at his station. While meeting whit the CPT he informed PTT it would be better for all the surrounding areas that had Investigators who wanted to attend the class to meet in Dukan. The PTT spoke to COL [redacted] by phone and he informed PTT he was not busy and would like for us to come see him concerning the class. PTT then went to Dukan DHQ and had a meeting with the COL [redacted]. He spoke highly of the PTT and all the training provided to Dukan so far. He also wanted to allow the different stations in the area to send one or more Investigators to this new training course. The date set to begin the class was (withheld). The class will be held in Dukan DHQ. It is unknown exactly how many students will attend but PTT was assured that the classroom is very large and there will be plenty of room. It was also explained that the class will last for one month and it contains a large amount of information for the Advanced Investigator. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(TS0005) Emergency Police HQ: PTT met with COL [redacted] at the Emergency Police HQ to make sure he was aware of the training to start on 26Jun07. He advised he (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

was aware and has the class room ready. PTT asked about the communication and issues the emergency police have had with the Judges of Sulaymaniyah in the past. The COL. advised he has had some issues of his police getting punished for just doing there job. PTT advised this is a Sulaymaniyah wide problem and plan on forming a Police Rights Board. PTT will start by meeting with the Judges and the MOI discuss an outline and to set up the board. From this point, if they agree, a board will be formed to meet monthly to get all law enforcement on the same page. This board will have representatives from the MOI, MOJ, and all sections of police. The COL advised that this would be a great and is badly needed. All sections of Police, MG [redacted], BG [redacted] and COL [redacted] have all stated there willingness to participate in this program. From here with the assistance of PTT Deputy Chief, meetings will be set with MOI and MOJ to start this Board.

(TS0275) Sulaymaniyah PJCC: PTT met with MAJ [redacted] and discussed PJCC operation. [redacted] stated that there were no major disturbances over the weekend [redacted] advised PTT that the PJCC had taken bids on the antenna and other equipment that is needed at the New Halabja JCC to make it operational. They received bids from three separate vendors for brand and model specific equipment. The bids are now waiting for BG [redacted] to authorize payment. [redacted] is on vacation and will not return to work until 01Jul07.

(TS0004) Sulaymaniyah PHQ: PTT met with IP from the Sulaymaniyah PHQ. The team began the forth week of the 30-day advanced accident investigations course today at the Sulaymaniyah Police Academy. This course is being conducted at the request of Gen [redacted], to insure his police investigators have an understanding of accident investigation, as they have the duty under Iraqi Law to present the case to the Investigative Judges in fatality cases. Overall the class continues to progress, and is developing a good understanding of the dynamics of vehicles involved in collisions. However, again due to the varying levels of education the students have, today's objective proved difficult for some members of the class. Therefore is will continue to be necessary to adjust the daily curriculum, in order to insure the students have the appropriate skills, knowledge and understanding in this field prior to completion of the course.

Dahuk

(MD0002) Dahuk PHQ: The BG was asked his assessment of security and the effectiveness of the police in the area and he stated that he thought it was improved over the past year. He stated that he thought the security situation was better because the people in the community work with the police and that the police had improved in part to the training and support provided by the PTT. BG [redacted] also addressed the issue of refugees moving into the province in large numbers and advised the PTT that all people are thoroughly screened and must have family in the area before they are allowed to relocate. He also said that they are sometimes even watched after moving in to see if they might be a problem. According to the BG, the only problems associated with the influx of refugees have been an increase in minor crimes such as theft and fighting.

The BG informed the PTT that the low pay and high cost of living in the Dahuk area are negatively affecting the recruitment and retention of personnel in the province. However, he also stated that there were about 1000 applicants for 440 openings created by the formation of a new district. He also said that the hiring process had been frozen because the KMOI had only approved pay for 40 of the 440 IP needed.

A Basic Crime Scene class was started today for the Dahuk Major Crimes Unit which is located at PHQ. This will be a week long class and is designed to familiarize investigators with basic crime scene techniques.

Dahuk PJCC: There has been no real change since the PTT last visited the PJCC. They lack any sort of radio communications that would enable real time communication not dependant on cell phones. The BG reports that the Turkish military has again fired artillery into Kurdistan. This time three rounds were fired near the village of Shuranish in the Zahko District. No injuries were reported and the only damage was to crops that were set on fire due to the shelling. The PJCC reports that there have been no reports of legitimate targets (PKK) in that area. No other significant activity has been reported lately. The PTT discussed the lack of progress in obtaining any operational budget assistance from Baghdad and BG [redacted] advises he suspects that is because the Kurdish Government filters or must approve information forwarded. (b)(6), (b)(3)

The JCC is staffed full time by personnel from the Governor's office and the Ministry of Defense. The staff salaries are paid through the Dahuk Governor's Office and the Ministry of Defense. The salaries for the engineers who work in the unit are paid by the Governor's office. Personnel working an extended shift are only paid for the days they are actually on duty and are not provided a regular salary. The center is provided no operating budget. The PTT has contacted the NJCC in Baghdad regarding the possibility of monetary or logistical support and has been told that is the responsibility of the Kurdish Government for the PJCCs located in Kurdistan.

The JCC is well equipped with computers, telephones and internet capabilities. The facility is a part of the Governor's Administrative Building and consists of two rooms. If radio communications for each involved agency were added they would need more general office equipment and more space if a suitable secure location could be found. The radios and the personnel to operate and monitor them are the only immediate requirements to have the center fully functional although their current facility would be very crowded. Some personnel travel long distances and work for as much as fifteen days straight. These personnel have to pay their own travel and cover their own food expenses even though they are remaining present and available for duty for the entire days they are on shift. The station needs its own backup generator so that it can remain operational when the power is out. They are currently allowed to operate off the Governor's generator system when the power is off but during holidays when the Governor's office is shut down they are not allowed to utilize this system and are forced to shut down operations until the power comes back on. The personnel on site claim if they had a generator capable of supplying at least 25KV they should be able to run their systems without depending strictly on the Governor's back up system.

The personnel currently working in the center seem capable and the only concerns would be the addition of trained radio operators and establishing the procedures for them to follow. The unit commander advises he is willing to send men to any training that will help their effectiveness and anticipates that if and when radio communications capabilities are added they will need to send men for training in this area. No training is being conducted although the PJCC is very agreeable to doing practical exercises.

Ramadi (MND-W) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Al Anbar [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(RA0013) Fallujah District Police HQ: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0252) Fallujah JCC: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0807) Fallujah Local Police: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0061) Shuhada Station: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0059) Tawaheed Station: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0005) Amariyah Patrol Police: No station visits due to limited living space at the station, visits will resume next week.

(RA0016) Ferris Station: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0022) IHP-7: The station clean up is still in progress due to the Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive attack.

(RA0032) Karmah Station: No station visit conducted, due to refit.

(RA0060) Saqlawiyah Station: IPLO's returned back to FOB Fallujah Police Transition Team (PTT) and met with the detention facility staff and discussed a juvenile detainee being detained in the cell due to assault on his parents. The PTT advised that the Station Chief would conduct an investigation. The Iraqi Police (IP) in charge of the detention log failed to enter the juvenile into the detention log. The PTT provided guidance on the proper detention record keeping. The juvenile was released to his parents. The PTT advised the operations sergeant on the proper usage of a filing system to track patrols. The operations section has requested a computer.

(RA0501) South West Station: Station is under construction.

(RA0080) Al Qaim (Husaybah) District HQ: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA107) Old Al Ubaydi Local Police Station: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0093) Rumana Local Police Station: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0103) Sa'dah Local Police Station: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0007) Al Qaim Local Police Station: The Police Transition Team (PTT) conducted an assessment of the location of the new Iraqi Police (IP) station located at Battle Position Hue City.

(RA0115) SW Husaybah Local Police Station: The Police Transition Team (PTT) conducted a detailed inspection of the stations armory records and facilities, and found them to be in good order. The PTT conducted the payroll process for the Iraq Police (IP).

(RA0092) Karabilah Police Station: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0110) Rawah District Police HQ: Extended visit in progress, due to communication issues a comprehensive Daily Station Report (DSR) will be filed as soon as possible.

(RA0086) Anah District Police HQ: Extended visit in progress, due to communication issues a comprehensive Daily Station Report (DSR) will be filed as soon as possible.

(RA0072) Rutbah District Police HQ: Extended visit in progress, due to communication issues a comprehensive Daily Station Report (DSR) will be filed as soon as possible.

(RA0018) Walid Local Police Station: Extended visit in progress, due to communication issues a comprehensive Daily Station Report (DSR) will be filed as soon as possible.

(RA0116) Akashat Local Police Station: Extended visit in progress, due to communication issues a comprehensive Daily Station Report (DSR) will be filed as soon as possible.

(RA0010) Ta'meem: The Police Transition Team (PTT) conducted BAT's and issued identification badges. While Iraq Police (IP) was receiving identifications badges they were required to demonstrate general knowledge of their Glock 19. The PTT conducted a cell search with the Iraq Police (IP). The IP were instructed to conduct a pat-down search of all detainees before they were returned to their cells. The Police Transition Team (PTT) conducted training in foot patrol techniques and patrol element security.

(RA0025) Al-Huria: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0029) Jazeera: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0030) South Station: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0046) Qatana Station: The Police Transition Team (PTT) traveled back to the station. The PTT spent time conducting administrative and logistical duties and preparing lesson plans for tomorrows training sessions.

(RA0048) West Ramadi District Headquarters - (Youth Center): No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0048) West Ramadi Station: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0927) Abu Faraj: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0933) Albu Aetha: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0915) Ma'laab: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0930) Al Samood: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0089) Barwanah: Delayed reporting due to extended station visit,

06192007: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.
06202007: The Police Transition Team (PTT) met with the Station Chief and discussed training. The PTT conducted a foot patrol with the Iraq Police (IP) in the town of Sinjun. The emphasis is put on interacting with the community to build a strong relationship while maintaining a police presence.
06212007: The Police Transition Team (PTT) met with the Station Chief and discussed operation plans. The PTT traveled to the sub-station in Sinjak to do a site survey.
06222007: The Police Transition Team (PTT) met with the Station Chief and discussed the pay issues.
06232007: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.
06242007: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0095) Baghdadi DHQ: The Police Transition Team (PTT) distributed fuel to the Iraq Police (IP) vehicles. The PTT conducted training at FOB Lueken. The PTT trained 17 Iraq Police (IP). The training was on democratic policing, crime scene, crime categories and criminal attempt, criminal liability, assaults, property crime, apprehensions, witness statement, use of force, and crime scene practical.

(RA0084) Baghdadi Local Police Station: There was no station visit conducted. The Police Transition Team conducted training on the Camp Lueken. The PTT engaged in pay operations and fuel operations.

(RA0095) Dulab Local Police Station: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0083) Hadithah District HQ: The Police Transition Team (PTT) conducted training on handcuffing. The PTT checked the holding cell and found 1 detainee. The detainee showed no signs of abuse.

(RA0081) Hit Dist HQ: No station visit at this time due to the Police Transition Team (PTT) assigned to non-PTT duties.

(RA0094) Hit South Police Station: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0104) Al Furat (Zawaya) Local Police Station: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0097) Kubaisa Local Police Station: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0098) Muhammadi Local Police Station: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0106) Tal Aswad Local Police Station: No station visit conducted due to other station duties.

(RA0002) Provincial Headquarters: The Administrative section and their Provincial Police Transition Team (PTT) counterpart are still in Baghdad. A report on their activities will be completed upon their return. The PTT issued uniforms for the Iraq Police (IP) in the jail section. The PTT met with the Provincial Chief and discussed the training section, to include naming a section chief and staff.

(RA0052) Highway Patrol: The Police Transition Team (PTT) took the Iraqi Police (IP) vehicles to Camp Ramadi and fueled. . The PTT then went to the academy in Habbaniyah where the PTT were engaged in meetings with Iraqi, coalition and US police advisors concerning new programs and training.