CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

29

06June2007

Baghdad (MND-B) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Baghdad [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(BC0003) Airport Police Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 6 IPs covering the basic Glock Pistol. Special emphasis was placed on firearms safety. NCO [redacted] (STO) attended the class and received training material for future reference concerning FTO duties. The Team met Colonel [redacted] (Station Commander) to discuss Station operations and training needs. The Team met US Military officials and discussed training supplies needed for the French Village Sub-Station. The Team discussed lesson plans for the upcoming firearms training schedule. The Team met the Global Security Project Manager and discussed plans concerning the arrival of new IPAs. Arrangements were made to have passports stamped by Immigration Officials. The Team continues to monitor the IPs daily performance at the Terminal and French Village Sub-Station. The early morning shooting incident referenced in an earlier report remains under investigation with no additional details available. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(BC0007) Al Adhamiya Patrol Police Station: The Team observed Commissioner [redacted] (FTO) conduct Training for 64 IP recruits and 1 Officer covering High Risk Vehicle Approach Procedures. The Team monitored the class and provided training tips to enhance instructor effectiveness. The Team met Colonel [redacted] (Station Commander) who advised MOI suspended fuel delivery due to 'accounting problems'. Further information revealed MOI has not satisfied the fuel debt for a 6 month period. The Team visited the Station on May 29th and conducted Training for 10 IPs covering Vehicle Search Techniques. Students participated in practical exercises and demonstrated their proficiency in techniques covered. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(BC0008) Al Adhamiya Traffic Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 10 IPs and 1 Officer covering ASP Baton Techniques. Captain [redacted] (STO) participated in the class and received special instructions (training tips) for future reference. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The Team met General [redacted] (Station Commander) who advised 1 IP was shot recently during a kidnapping attempt by insurgents. Details revealed assailants approached the officer and identified themselves as MOI investigators conducting an investigation. Assailants handcuffed and blindfolded the victim driving him to an unknown location. The victim was removed from the vehicle and shot 3 times with 1 round striking his lower abdomen. Details revealed a citizen witnessed the shooting and began firing at the assailants with an AK-47 causing them to flee. No further information was available and the crime remains under investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The Team visited the Station on May 31st and conducted Training for Captain [redacted] (STO) covering the MOI Training Initiative. He was provided Arabic lesson plans for future reference. The Team visited the Station on May 29th and conducted Training for 12 IPs covering Use of Force. The Team met Captain [redacted] and discussed the Training Plan and need for the appointment of an STO. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(BC0009) Al Alawiyah Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 5 IPs covering Professional Appearance and Uniform Equipment. Students understood the importance of professional appearance and were not in favor of the suggestion for them to purchase police equipment not supplied by MOI. Students felt the Americans or MOI should furnish all required equipment. The Team met Colonel [redacted] (Station Commander) to discuss Station operations and the MOI Training Initiative. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

(BC0042) Meshahadah Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 10 IPs covering Basic Marksmanship. Students were attentive to material presented and participated in classroom discussions pertaining to the subject. The Team met with the Military and discussed the possibility of future Range Training for IPs. The Station is out of fuel and the Military stopped supplying fuel for Station operations.

(BC0081) Bab Al Sheikh Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 20 IPs and 2 Officers covering Officer Safety and Team Building. The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol and 3 Joint Foot Patrols with IPs and no incidents were experienced. The Team inspected the Detention Facility and found 37 detainees incarcerated. Prisoners are unable to shower due to no running water being available in this area of Baghdad.

(BC0085) Baghdad Provincial Patrol Police HQ: The Team met Colonel [redacted] (Provincial Headquarters Personnel Section) who advised personnel statistics were updated on the 15th and 30th of each month. Current information revealed 69 AWOLs (within the AOR) have been reported to MOI for disposition. The Team met Colonel [redacted] who advised the new 'Tiger Team' class remains on schedule.

(BC0100) Mada'in Patrol Police Station: The Team monitored Training for 65 new IP recruits covering Officer Survival and Drill/Ceremony. The class was presented by Lieutenant [redacted] (STO) and 2 Station Commissioners. The Team met Captain [redacted] who advised current training for new recruits should continue for another 3 weeks. The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol and Foot Patrol with IPs to investigate a report of an underground structure possibly being used as a prison. The report was unfounded and IPs set-up 2 Hasty Checkpoints with no incidents experienced.

(BC0101) Mahmoudiya District Police HQ: The Team conducted Training for 40 IP recruits covering Democratic Policing, Use of Force and Handcuffing Techniques. Students participated in practical exercises to demonstrate proficiency in the techniques covered.

(BC0103) Criminal Investigation Directorate HQ: The Team met with the Headquarters Training OIC and discussed MOI Training Initiative. He advised no information has been passed through the Chain of Command in reference to the Training Plan. He was provided with a CD version of the Field Training Manual and was requested to make copies of the Manual for each of the CID Units. Information revealed the Station received 263 new recruits which have not attended the Baghdad Police Academy.

(BC0105) Criminal Investigation Directorate Unit 2: The Team conducted Training for 6 IPs covering Glock Pistol Safety. Information revealed students were members of General [redacted] security detail. The Team inspected the Detention Facility and found 248 detainees incarcerated in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. Raw sewage is backing up in the jail and General [redacted] reported an outbreak of disease among the prisoners. He requested assistance to correct the issue to avoid the potential spread of disease to IPs and the public.

Colonel [redacted] (Station Commander) and Lieutenant [redacted] (FTO) have been provided a copy of the MOI Field Training Manual. The Team visited the Station on June 2nd and conducted Training for 8 IPs and 1 Officer covering Weapons Retention. Special emphasis was placed on officer safety. The Team inspected the Detention Facility and found 244 detainees incarcerated in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions previously reported.

(BC0107) Medical City Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 7 IPs covering Police Survival Skills. Classroom instruction consisted of mind-set training and

evaluation of non-verbal body language. The Team visited the Station on June 2nd and conducted Training for 10 IPs and 1 Officer covering Fire/Maneuver and Cover/Concealment Procedures. The Team conducted 3 Joint Foot Patrols with IPs at the Medical City Hospital complex and no incidents were experienced.

The Team met Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] (Station Commander) and provided a copy of the MOI Field Training Manual. The Team visited the Station on June 1st and conducted Training for 9 IPs and 1 Officer covering Force Protection. Students were encouraged to remain vigilant and wear their issued protective equipment at all times on post. General [redacted] investigated the report of the Iraqi Army firing several rounds during the assault of an IP at a Checkpoint near the Station. Information revealed an Iraqi Army Patrol was passing through the area and required to stop at the Checkpoint. Further details indicated members of the Iraqi Army exited their vehicles and began beating the IP. Station IPs witnessed the incident and began moving towards the scene to assist the IP when members of the Military Patrol fired several rounds in their direction striking a building next to the Police Station. The assaulted IP was not seriously injured and bullet holes were evidenced on the building supporting the claim. The incident remains under investigation by General [redacted] and a US Military representative from the JSS.

The Team visited the Station on May 31st and conducted Training for 8 IPs covering Domestic Violence. Students were trained on proper procedures for handling a domestic violence complaint.

(BC0111) New Baghdad District Police HQ: The Teams' attempt to conduct Training at FOB Rustamiyah failed again on June 4th due to CF Force Protection preventing IPs entry to the Compound (no 'proper identification credentials'). 5 IPs showed-up for class out of 30 scheduled and CF advised the number was insufficient to justify utilization of a Military squad. Training was cancelled and the Team continues their efforts to resolve the matter.

(BC0120) Rusafa Directorate Police HQ: The Teams Military counterpart advised the Biometric portion of IP badge processing has been delayed per MOI orders. Colonel [redacted] was notified of a tentative date for the Badge Team arrival. The Team met Colonel [redacted] (ERF) and Brigadier General [redacted] (Station Commander) and provided notification reference the change for processing badge applications. Brigadier General [redacted] previously refused to allow IPs participation in the process and efforts continue to gain his cooperation. Brigadier General [redacted] has been furnished with a copy of the MOI Field Training Manual.

Babylon (MND-CS/S) [redacted]

Al Qadisiyah [redacted]

(BQ0107) Qadisiyah Checkpoint Police HQ: The PTT team from Fob Echo met with 2nd Lieutenant [redacted] who advised that there had been no serious incidents at the station since the team's last visit. The IPs were busy manning checkpoints and providing force protection, so no training was conducted. The Lieutenant advised he had five officers (including him) and 30 IPs working. He also said he had nine vehicles assigned to the station and all were in working order. The team observed the IPs manning a checkpoint. The IP's searched various vehicles and persons and appeared to be doing so in the proper manner.

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

Wasit Province (b)(3), (b)(6)

(NoFFID#) Wassit 1st SRT: The team from Fob Delta met with Major [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c. During the meeting, current events pertaining to insurgent activities, night/day patrol assignments and patrol activities were discussed. A joint patrol with 20 IPs and two Officers (3 IP Patrol Vehicles), was conducted in the 1st SRT AOR neighborhoods that are of concern, with no problems. The team observed excellent patrol functions. The patrol concentrated on areas where SRT believes that rocket attacks on Camp Delta originated. The IPs advised that they would prefer to have armored vehicles for patrol missions. Prior too and after Joint Patrol Operation, IPs/Officers were mentored on proper patrol procedures and then debriefed after the operation.

Academy style training on First Aid, Patrol formations and Tactical movements was conducted on the Fob with the Ukrainian military assisting. 35 IPs from the Wasit Province attended the training.

Babil Province (b)(3), (b)(6)

(BB0500) Babil Police Academy (Al Hillah): The team from Fob Reo went to the academy to photograph and diagram an abandoned structure which has been identified as an acceptable building for the temporary housing of the Babil Crime Lab. The buildings' structure is sound but will require a complete refurbishing of the inside, along with modifications necessary to support sensitive lab equipment. The team has identified a possible source for funding. The information gathered along with technical data will be compiled in a Scope of Work and submitted a US State Department official for approval.

The team and range instructor, Major [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c, discussed problems the Academy was having with placements of paper targets. The framework necessary to properly secure the paper targets is non existent. The "string" system they now have does not allow the target to remain in place long enough to complete a single exercise. The team suggested they use metal stands to secure the targets. The team will follow up and assist with the proper request for funding of these needed items.

(BB0032) Babil Provincial Police HQ: The team met with Colonel [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Administration Commander) to discuss the status of all of emergency generators at the IP stations under the Provincial HQ's command. The team was recently advised by CPATT Logistics Support that there is a contract in place with a local vendor to provide on-site generator repairs throughout Iraq. This maintenance/repair contract is limited, but so far it is the best available. The Colonel contacted his maintenance superintendent to ask him about the generator maintenance program. In total, the Province has 53 emergency generators with only one broken (waiting on a repair part). In speaking with the Colonel, he advises that they have an excellent generator maintenance program and it is well funded. At this time he does not require any assistance in that area.

The team met with Major [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c to discuss the need for additional computers in the Provincial Stations. CPATT Logistics Support has advised that there are a limited number of computers and possibly printers that can be issued to IP stations that qualify; mainly HQ stations that have dependable electrical power and have a true need. The Major will meet with General [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and develop a list of stations that they feel meet the qualifications for additional computers. When that list is developed, it will be forwarded to CPATT Logistics Support for consideration.

Fob Kalsu advised there were no missions conducted. Training was conducted on the Fob to 21 IPs on Checkpoint Operations, Vehicle Stops and Searches and Interviews and Interrogations.

Dhi Qar / Al Muthanna (PIC) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

PTT members attended the daily operational briefing in Camp Terendak and the daily MTT/CPATT meeting in MAJ [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c office.

PTT members met with the outgoing SSR OIC and incoming SSR OIC Majors [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c. PTT members met with the OBG(W) 3 MTT team officers to arrange upcoming meetings and training assignments.

Tikrit (MND-CW) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Diyala [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Internet service is inoperable at this time.

Salah Al Din [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(NoFFID#) Tikrit PJCC: PTT met with BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and his staff. The following tasks were discussed and/or implemented: New force protection plans were revealed to GEN [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c which include seven and four foot Hesco barriers plus the dirt, twelve foot T-walls, razor wire, Jersey barriers, a new guard tower, and aircraft wire. The aforementioned new force protection plans have been submitted to the appropriate military authorities for final approval. These new plans also include exterior and interior walls, a re-designed guard tower, and a new serpentine front entrance with Jersey barriers. Once all measures have been implemented, safety at the PJCC will be greatly improved.

(TA0037) Al Owja Local Police Station: The PTT team met with LTC [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c who is the newly appointed Police Chief and has been on the job 2 days. PTT discussed community policing and getting out in the neighborhoods where the people will see them. PTT will coordinate more joint patrols in the near future.

(TA0049) Ar Rubaydhah Patrol Police Station: LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he trained his officers prior to the PTTs visit. He informed the Team that he presented instruction regarding force protection and conducting a crime scene. He advised that he makes all of his officers perform some sort of physical training prior to beginning the class. PTT reviewed the lesson plans and the files he uses to keep track of all training conducted at the station. The training paperwork appears to be in order, but PTT still needs to observe Lt. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c teaching some of the lessons to make sure he is performing his duties as the training instructor.

(TA0038) Al Qadassia Local Police Station: This station appears to function properly, but does not react to attacks on the station with appropriate measures. During this visit, the station came under sniper attack and no IP responded to locate the sniper; therefore, CF had to order the IP to patrol the area.

(TA0084) Samarra District Police HQ: PTT met with GEN [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c from the Emergency Battalion and inquired if the IP were ready to do patrols in the city. Once again,

LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that they could not do missions because they had no vehicles and most vehicles are too big for the IP to drive them through the city streets.

PTT is still waiting for MAJ [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c to return from his vacation to find out exactly how many IP were paid this month. The Team should have that information tomorrow.

(TA0050) As Saniyah Local Police Station: CF and IPLOs met with the new shift commander, [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c who stated that he had 10 IP report for duty. He stated that Bayji HQ issued an order to send a patrol out and arrest the IP that have not been coming to work in the last 5 days. The IP were then ordered to bring the arrested IP to the Bayji Jail and put them in detention. 5 IP were picked up and brought to the station. All 5 IPs talked to CFs and told them that the old shift commander told them not to come back to the station due to threats to them and that they still wanted their jobs. CF subsequently put them back to work.

PTT had 11 IP attend training on vehicle check points and community policing. At the end of the day, there was a total of 15 IP on duty.

FOB Bernstein: PTT along with IPTs conducted a live fire range with 19 IPs and were instructed in the proper way to fire a 9mm pistol and AK-47.

The IPTs conducted themselves in a safe and professional manner, while running the range. It is apparent that several of the IP have never fired a pistol before. The IPTs took extra time with the IPs to instruct them how to acquire the target and maintain the sight picture.

(TA0056) Balad District Police HQ: IPLOs had a brief with PTT and discussed the BATS system and how the team could speed up the process of identifying the IP in each station. No progress was made in reference to the BATS system as it is a standard and technical piece of equipment which takes time to individually ID each IP.

Mosul (MND-N) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Ninewah [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(MN0056) Ninewah Provincial Police HQ: PTT spoke with MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c, PDOP, and discussed the contingent of 150 IP from Tall Afar who will report for training to MPSA on June 8th. PTT discussed the fact that complete background checks haven't been conducted on the IP. PTT suggested that each IP be further screened via use of the BATS system and MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c readily agreed. PTT discussed the need for an increase in the budget for the Training Division at NPHQ. MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed to take this suggestion into consideration. PTT recommended that he contact MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c 2nd Iraqi Army Division, to arrange for the transfer of some BKC ammunition to the NPHQ until an additional supply is received from MOI in Baghdad. MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c related that he would contact MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and that he would probably be loaned between 20,000 and 30,000 rounds of BKC to be repaid upon receipt of ammunition from MOI. MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c requested that CF further assist him with a supply of BKC ammunition as he only has enough on hand to re-supply his DHQ and LPS for a two day engagement with the AIF.

The PTT asked BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c to describe the planning and organization of the cordon and search operations that are carried out quite frequently in Mosul, many times in concert with the IA. He explained that the location and purpose of these operations are determined by the Intelligence Section and then the operation is planned by PDOP, Intelligence and Operations. Finally, the coordination of the operation is primarily under the control of the

Operations Section. The PTT felt this was an excellent example of teamwork and careful planning, and added that an after action report with all entities involved should be the final phase of the operation. BG [redacted] agreed and advised that this is done. The PTT secured a copy of the phone numbers for the General Staff at NPHQ.

The PTT met with LT [redacted] Detention Center OIC, and then conducted an inspection of the jail. As has been previously noted, it is extremely overcrowded. There are no facilities for washing except for hoses from water outlets. The juveniles are not sufficiently secluded from the general population. The detainees complain about needing new blankets and pads, as well as medical attention for special cases. There are medical personnel who visit the jail three times per week, but are not actually doctors and unable to treat special cases. The facility was fairly clean and the detainees receive food three times each day. The PTT has examined the kitchen facilities on other occasions and found them to be crude but acceptable. The daily detainee count was 420 total detainees, with twenty two IP, four IA, and fifteen juveniles.

PTT spoke with BG [redacted] Logistics officer and discussed several written requisitions for property submitted by the Badoush Battalion LPS, the Al Rabaein DHQ, and the Al Yarmook LPS. PTT explained that it was simply conducting a follow-up for the DHQ and LPS PTT to verify that the proper written procedures are being followed. BG [redacted] noted that the Al Yarmook commanding officer had requested spare vehicle parts so that he could affect repairs to several police vehicles which were no longer fully mission capable. BG [redacted] related that he would forward that request to BG [redacted], who is in charge of the Mosul Police garage and charged with vehicle repairs and maintaining spare parts for all police vehicles. BG [redacted] examined the Al Rabaein request and noted that his records reflected that he had issued 200 ballistic vests to the DHQ on May 6th. BG [redacted] examined the Badoush Battalion LPS request and related that he would not issue the additional vehicles requested as there were sufficient vehicles assigned to the LPS to allow them to carry out their assignments. He then discussed requested ammunition, AK-47 rifles, BKC machineguns, body armor, binoculars and several other items which he had recently issued to that LPS. PTT examined the records maintained by the Logistics office in regards to the aforementioned requests. It was noted that the NPHQ Logistics office had been able to satisfy the request for most of the items sought by the DHQ and LPS. PTT noted this as a definite improvement in the IP logistics system compared to what would have been expected just a few months earlier. PTT discussed the need for two air conditioners to be issued to the NPHQ Training Department for use in the classrooms. BG [redacted] related that they would be issued on June 6th. BG [redacted] provided PTT with the complete Logistics officer training syllabus which would be used in preparation of the Logistics SOP.

(MN0099) Mosul (Ninewah) Major Crimes Unit (CID): The PTT spoke with COL [redacted] of MCU about case preparation and case presentation. COL [redacted] explained the process in which cases are received and filed with the court. The PTT made several suggestions and used proven examples, which are used by MTU for COL [redacted] to have a better understanding of the process. COL [redacted] informed the PTT he is well aware of the procedure to file cases with the courts, especially since, he use to be the commander of MTU.

The PTT inquired about the status of the Badoush Prison case. COL [redacted] informed the PTT that fifteen Iraqi Correction Officers are being charged with Assisting with the Escape of the prisoners. COL [redacted] informed the PTT the case is currently with the court and awaiting judgment

The PTT met with MAJ [redacted] of Intelligence and discussed current events. MAJ [redacted] informed the PTT that Intelligence conducted patrol this morning with no new activity to

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)

report. MAJ [redacted] did inform the PTT that IP from the Al Nasir DHQ had arrested twenty four suspected insurgents. The IP, while on patrol, observed several males transferring weapons from one vehicle to another. The IP responded to the area and were able to detain the suspects. MAJ [redacted] advised the majority of the insurgents are of the teenager age.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

The PTT conducted training on case preparation and case presentation. The topics included page indexing, lab reports, witness, and suspect statements. The Investigative Officers were required to answer many questions on how they prepare cases for court and to provide examples to those cases.

(NO FFID) 1st Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(NO FFID) 2nd Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(NO FFID) 3rd Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(NO FFID) 4th Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(NO FFID) Emergency Response Unit: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(MN0009) Al Hadba DHQ: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(MN0008) Al Gizlani LPS: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(MN0214) Al Waqaas LPS: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(MN0045) Al Kazrag LPS: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(MN0036) Al Dawasa LPS: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(MN0022) Al Rabaein DHQ: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.
(MN0024) Al Sheak Fathi: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(MN0923) Al Yarmook: PTT met with COL [redacted] who stated that at 1000 hours this date, the station came under attack from the southeast part of Al-Yarmook neighborhood. Several AK-47 and BKC rounds started hitting the building and three mortars came close to striking the entry gate. The IP on the roof and entry gate returned fire. No IP were killed or injured and it is unknown if any AIF were injured. A joint patrol with one IP vehicle attempted to find an alternate route to the Badoush prison.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(MN0924) Al Jamouri Hospital LPS: PTT went to NPHQ and met with BG [redacted] concerning finding a contractor to work on the HESCO barriers. BG [redacted] said he could get a contractor to do the work. PTT and COL [redacted] will try to install the HESCO barriers later on this week. PTT was able to inventory the second arms room today. PTT accounted for fifteen AK-47s, one Glock, four RPKs, 2,050 PKC rounds and 2,250 AK-47 rounds.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Additionally, PTT put on another defensive tactics class for the IP. In this class PTT demonstrated arm bar and wrist lock techniques. PTT also discussed the use of pressure points. After the instruction and demonstration, a practical exercise was conducted.

(MN0220) Al Karama District Police HQ: PTT met with COL [redacted] who reported that four small arms attacks occurred on his mounted patrols in as many days. The attacks were all repelled by IP with no casualties sustained. A fifth attack occurred in front of DHQ on May 31st. In that incident an RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) exploded in the street in front of an IP truck, slightly injuring one IP. Two males from a nearby shop that were believed to have been involved in the attack were arrested and turned over to NPHQ. Their names were not available.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)

In the aforementioned attacks, 1850 rounds of AK-47 ammunition and 1650 rounds of PKC ammunition were expended. Written reports documenting the depletions were submitted and the ammunition was replaced by NPHQ.

PTT was advised that 79 new IP will be added to the ranks who will be assigned to DHQ and LPS. Nine are presently at MPSA. Six mechanics have been assigned to DHQ and have been making some much needed repairs to the vehicle fleet.

5000 rounds of AK-47 and 5000 rounds of PKC ammunition was received from NPHQ which will be distributed among DHQ and LPS.

(MN0381) Al Zuhoor Local Police Station: PTT was re tasked due to a non PTT mission conducted by the military.

(MN0961) Al Shur Local Police Station: PTT met with LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c the LPS XO, who reported that his IP had been attacked by small arms fire on four occasions, 27, 28, 30May07 and 1Jun07. IP returned fire and thwarted the attacks. There were no injuries to the IP and it is believed that no AIF were killed or injured. An IED (Improvised Explosive Device) was detonated on 3JUN07 at what is referred to as the Gates of Ninewah. One IP sustained minor injuries and an IP truck was moderately damaged, but was able to drive from the area.

LPS continues to experience chronic shortages of ammunition. Later this date, the situation was addressed with DHQ and all LPS are to be issued more ammunition. This will subsequently be tracked.

(MN0076) Tall Afar District Police HQ: PTT met with MAJ [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c at Abu Maria IP Station and approximately twenty IP. PTT discussed with the MAJ concerns about AIF activity in the AO of Abu Maria. The MAJ stressed he has at least sixty of his IP working or on standby at all times. MAJ stated his IP are on a 24 hour vehicle or foot patrol in Abu Maria AO. PTT spoke with the MAJ concerning the IP not being in full uniform. The biggest problem is the IP not meeting the station regulation regarding the station badges. The MAJ stated he has been working on trying to get the badges for quite some time. BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised he would help out in obtaining the correct items required.

PTT also spoke to the MAJ regarding written requisition forms. PTT advised it is crucial, for the future of any requested items that will be needed from DHQ, will need to be on the provided requisition form, or no items or supplies will be provided to the stations. BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c spoke with the MAJ concerning the relationship of the IP of the station and the Abu Maria community. BG sated it is important that the IP to interact with the community to allow them to feel more safe. The commander requested for more man power and to add two more check points on the main CF route through the town. The MAJ stated he fears the AIF are too strong in his AO and would like to have more help from the IA. BG informed the MAJ he has a sufficient amount of IP to do the job required in his AO, but the BG would speak to the IA to request assistance. PTT spoke with BG concerning 150 IP to attend the Regional Academy in Mosul. The BG agreed to send the IP, but requested the IA supply trucks to transport them. The General agreed this would happen in the very near future. PTT spoke with the BG about the order from CF concerning, hiring 1200 more IP for the SRT. BG requested to hire 1000 Shia, and 200 Sunni. CF advised these numbers would not work; it is imperative to have equal numbers of each group.

(MN0224) Tal Uwaynat Local Police Station: PTT attended the ISF meeting and the ISF Intelligence meeting. COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not attend nor send an officer in which PTT will inquire

about. ISF discussed ways to solve the gasoline shortage in the Rabiyah area and are working on interagency cooperation to transport fuel. LT [redacted] provided each attendee a list of 50 wanted persons. The CF representative thanked him and asked all other participants to provide a similar list, but to narrow it to their 'Ten Most Wanted.' All ISF were asked to keep all sheepherders away from certain roads in the city as they have the ability to plant IEDs.

PTT attempted to travel to Tal Uwaynat to assess force protection, inventory the station and interview the commander; however, due to a vehicle breakdown, PTT only made it half way to the station. PTT is attempting to borrow a vehicle, while repairs are being made.

(MN0209) Al Avgani Local Police Station: Avgani LPS lost three IP to resignations during the month of May. All three IP were academy trained.

At Tamim [redacted]

(TT0005) Tamim Provincial Police HQ: PTT convoyed to the Kirkuk PHQ and met with MG Jamal. PTT received the Battle Rhythm Schedule, and requested information on the Provincial Organization Chart regarding District Commands. The Battle Rhythm Schedule involves four meetings to start out with; Provincial Staff Management, Inner District Commanders, Outer District Commanders, and Inner LPS station commanders. All the meetings are twice a month. There has been an on-going problem with the Organizational Structure of the District Stations in this Province. The JCCs are commonly referred to as district stations, but in actuality don't operate as district stations. On paper, the Province carries four district stations, Laylan, Dibbis, Hawijah, and the Provincial JCC. For the 37 main stations covered in this Province, there are only two district commanders, BG [redacted], and BG [redacted]. The intent will be to eventually sell the idea of DHQs for every 4-6 stations depending on the locations, thus helping command and control within the Province. PTT also met briefly with COL [redacted], Maintenance Facilities Director who stated that one of his big problems is not being able to get repair parts for the 603 vehicles he has in this Province. He wants a committee authorized to buy vehicle repair parts from a contractor outside of Kirkuk Province. PTT supports the idea of getting the parts from outside contractors if they cannot be purchased through contractors in this Province or obtained through MOI. This issue will be discussed with MG [redacted] in the near future.

(TT0099) Kirkuk (Tamim) Major Crimes Unit (CID): The PTT met with COL [redacted] and LTC [redacted] at the Major Crimes Unit. COL [redacted] advised that he had received twenty new IP from the graduating class at the TIPS. The IP were at the station receiving what equipment was available. It appears that the officers are in need of hand guns and AK-47 rifles. COL [redacted] will be putting together a memo for HQ to request the weapons and additional equipment for the new recruits. COL [redacted] has been in recent contact with BG [redacted] concerning the proposed new MCU location. BG [redacted] has turned the matter over to the engineers to see what the cost will be to refurbish the building to meet the MCU's needs. The last topic discussed with COL [redacted] today was the reorganization of the MCU so that it will better address the needs of the Major Crimes Court and the people of Kirkuk. The unit will be divided into four areas: Terrorism, Kidnapping, Economic Crimes, and Money Laundering.

(TT0002) Alton Kupri Patrol Police Station: PTT traveled to Altun Kupri IP Station and checked on the improvements being made to the force protection plan. The IRD workers set up the HESCO Barriers along the inside perimeter of the Police Compound wall and they appeared ready to be filled when equipment is available.

(TT0004) Aruba Patrol Police Station: PTT convoyed to the Aruba IP Station and made contact with the shift commander, CPT [redacted]. The team discussed with CPT [redacted], the arrival of the 40 IP recruits from the last TIPS academy.

(NoFFID#) Daquq JCC: PTT convoyed to Daquq JCC and met with LT [redacted] who was in-charge and discussed equipment and supply issues. The PTT checked all the JCC computers for virus and informed the communication room personnel regarding virus and how to prevent them.

(TT0018) Tamim IHP Station: PTT arrived at the station and observed the shift change and role call. Marching and PT were conducted after role call. PTT spoke with the training NCO that attended the training at tips yesterday. The training NCO showed PTT the training outline and schedule for providing the training to the station. PTT spoke with the station commander about projects the IRD workers would start on.

(TT0021) Laylan Patrol Police Station: PTT convoyed to Laylan Police Station to meet with COL [redacted] to inspect the final placement of Hesco's surrounding the station and to pay the contractor for the gate at the main ECP. The monthly PSMR was also completed and detention procedures were reviewed with the shift supervisor. It was found that individual booking information is kept with the case file and could not be tracked. A new booking form was implemented and the information will also be entered in the computer by name. The team spoke with the fleet maintenance officer and found that fuel is obtained from Meghdad maintenance in bulk once a week and is kept at the station. Drivers then obtain fuel at shift change and the maintenance officer documents the amount and the mileage. The team was assured that only three officers have access to the fuel and system works. There has been no problem with theft and there is usually a surplus of fuel at the end of the week.

(TT0024) Qarah Anir Patrol Police Station: PTT convoyed to the Qara Hinjeer IP Station and met with the station commander, COL [redacted]. The team coordinated with COL [redacted] the hiring of the IRD workers. The team also conducted an assessment of the station force protection, which appears to be more than adequate.

(TT0025) Qoria Patrol Police Station: PTT arrived at Qoria station and checked on the construction project. Major reconstruction has started and the station was very busy with workers.

(TT0026) Rahemawa Patrol Police Station: PTT convoyed to Rahemawah police station and were met by Station Commander, COL [redacted]. COL [redacted] advised that he has not heard any word back from HQ in reference to his request to revamp the water and sewer systems at the station. PTT trained nine new IPs on the proper mind set to be in while on patrol. PTT also discussed the differences between cover and concealment. PTT spoke with the administration IP reference collecting vital information on all detainees and starting a file on each person booked into the station. PTT explained what information would be needed in each file and why it was needed.

Irbil [redacted]

(NoFFID#) Irbil Ministry of the Interior: PTT met with MOI [redacted] at his request for updates on PTT activities on various matters. First and foremost, the MOI wanted to know the status of the checkpoint assessments and recommendations. PTT gave information on observed procedures at the checkpoints and told him a formal assessment would be available soon. He requested it as soon as possible. PTT agreed to make it a priority.

PTT updated the MOI on the airport assessment, the PJCC assessment and conditions at the Asayish range. PTT agreed to provide a copy of the airport assessment soon. The PJCC assessment was also discussed and the MOI agreed it needs an upgrade. PTT recommended the PJCC be relocated with the new PDOP HQ when it is built. PTT advised of the Irbil Governor's reluctance to move the PJCC. MOI advised it did not matter what the Governor thinks. PTT informed MOI of the deteriorating condition of the Asayish firing range since the Asayish is no longer in charge of it. The MOI said he would check on it and contact PTT. PTT asked about the possibility of providing heavy equipment for renovating the range. MOI agreed to contact the Minister of Agriculture to inquire about the equipment. PTT also informed MOI of the presence of UXO at the firing range in an unsecured area. He was unaware of the matter but said he would inquire.

PTT discussed the need for portable radios for the guard towers at the airport. MOI said he has furnished many radios for them already. PTT will confirm the report. MOI said they are; however, in need of chargers for the radio batteries. PTT agreed to check on chargers. PTT informed the MOI of the recent purchase of eighteen generators for the IP with TIFF funds. He expressed his approval and said they are much needed.

(MI0051) Mergasor District Police HQ: PTT visited Mergasor DHQ and conducted the Training the Trainer course, day three, to twelve students. The students received the instruction well and demonstrated what they have learned in this first day of class.

(NoFFID#) Soran Traffic Police Directorate: PTT met with BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and discussed the traffic police concerns for Soran, Choman, and Mergasor areas. BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c was concerned about the safety of PTT and offered security for PTT visits anytime PTT is in the area. BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c called BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c to discuss working with PTT and received the okay to work with PTT and conduct training.

BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c informed PTT that the Traffic Police under the Soran Directorate have a shortage of pistols, equipment for searching, vehicles, digital cameras, and have no handcuffs or batons. PTT discussed the differences between working checkpoints in Mosul and working checkpoints in Mergasor. PTT also discussed with BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c the difference between checkpoints in Soran and in the Mergasor (less populated) area. PTT scheduled checkpoint training for Soran Traffic Police Directorate for June 6th and for Mergasor Traffic Police Station on June 7th. PTT discussed possible training in the future when security in this area is better as the traffic police reported there was a VBIED recently in Soran. BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c introduced PTT to a LT from Rawanduz Traffic Police Station and MAJ [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c from Assayish from Sedeacan (northern border town). MAJ [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c invited PTT to visit his station in Sedeacan and offered to provide security for PTT during visit. PTT explained that PTT usually works the Koyasinjar area, but would try to visit MAJ [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c in Sedeacan next time PTT is spending time visiting stations in the Soran area. BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c offered assistance to PTT any time PTT visits and arranged for eight IP to attend the checkpoint class tomorrow.

(MI0100) Soran Directorate Police HQ: PTT met with LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c at Soran Directorate Police HQ and delivered certificates of completion of Train the Trainer Course for two IP. LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c reported that things are going well and stated that he would make sure the certificates were delivered. LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that the training had gone well and they were very happy with it. PTT discussed prior visits of PTT and the future visits that Soran Directorate Police HQ would like.

Sulaymaniyah

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(TS0008) Sulaymaniyah Traffic HQ: PTT conducted day two of the Basic Motor Cycle Training Class. The class has a total of eleven students and three student instructors. Students conducted exercises through the U-Turn course and figure eight and clover leaf for several hours. Students have shown vast improvement in all exercise from day one, which includes an assortment of technical skills.

PTT met with traffic officers from the Sulaymaniyah PHQ. Today was the third day of a 30-day advanced accident investigations course at the Sulaymaniyah Police Academy. This course is being conducted at the request of MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c to insure his police investigators have an understanding of accident investigation, as they have the duty under Iraqi Law to present the case to the Investigative Judges in fatality cases.

The course curriculum is continuing to be adjusted in order to insure the investigators have a good understanding and working knowledge in the field, and are able to adequately interpret the physical evidence present at accident scenes.

(TS0024) Chamchamal District Police HQ: The PTT arrived at Chamchamal DHQ and continued the lesson on Crime Scene Evidence Collection. The topic of the class was deceased body check list. The class was covered in depth and the information was discussed so the students were knowledgeable of the material.

(TS0069) Qaradakh Local Police Station: The PTT traveled to Qaradakh LPS and met with LTC [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c, the station commander, and checked on the overall moral of the station. At the conclusion of the meeting, the PTT and the station commander presented training completion certificates to twenty-four IP assigned to this station. After the certificates had been presented, the PTT met briefly with the newly assigned Community Policing instructors for Qaradakh LPS.

Dahuk

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Camp Zawita: Today, training continued with the Governor of Dahuk's body guards with twenty four guards present. Training started at 0800 with foot formations and forming the box or diamond formation after exiting the vehicles. The students were taken outside where they performed the formations several times until they were comfortable with it. The PTT took questions from the class after the blocks of instruction. The PTT then moved the class to the range for training with the AK-47. The students shot from the standing position.

(MD0646) Zahko District Police HQ: PTT traveled to the Zahko DHQ to present the second day of five in Crime Scene Investigation. The first topic covered today was protecting and searching the Crime Scene which included proper marking of evidence, evidence information, and concluding the search. The second was an Introduction to Documenting the Crime Scene that included note taking, crime scene sketches, photographing the scene, and standards of credibility. The last topic covered was an Overview of Fingerprint Evidence which consisted of types of prints, main patterns, conditions affecting latent prints, and locating latent prints.

(NoFFID#) Dahuk Security Police: PTT visited BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the Dahuk Security Police who stated that the Security Police have primary responsibility for major crimes, counter terrorist investigation and checkpoint operations. The PTT discussed communications issues with BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c during this visit. The Security Police are a part of the Provincial JCC

and the BG realizes the importance of having a coordination center for all the local security forces.

As a result of only receiving support from the Kurdish MOI, this department is not nearly as well equipped to conduct their law enforcement duties as their counterparts are. Now that the police have their radio communications system in place, it would be very helpful if the Security Police had radios and their own frequency that could tie in with the police system. As yet, they do not have this in the province.

The primary purpose of the visit was to discuss upcoming 'train the trainer' courses the PTT are preparing to give. The BG has always been very supportive of ongoing training and fully realizes the importance of having his own men trained as capable trainers so they can more fully operate a self sustaining program without the help from outside instructors. The BG is fully behind the program and is willing to commit men to it.

Ramadi (MND-W) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Al Anbar [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(RA0025) AlHuria Local Police Station: The Police Transition Team met with the Station Chief and discussed Iraqi Police (IP) attendance and supplies. IP attendance for this shift was good. The IP continue to patrol on a regular basis. No training class was given due to time restraints and being tasked with detainee questioning. The PTT was advised there was a detainee that wanted to commit suicide and was a known Insurgent. In speaking with the detainee, he admitted he wanted to commit suicide, but had changed his mind. The detainee requested he be removed from the Al Huryia and taken to Camp Ramadi Detention Facility. The detainee stated he would cooperate with the military in reference to insurgent information. This information was given to the military chain of command.

(RA0029) Jazeera Local Police Station: The Police Transition Team checked on 27 detainees with issues concerning health, food and water or hygiene. The PTT conducted training on Pre-Patrol Operations and Roll-Call Formations again with a sergeant and five IP.

The detention Officer in Charge conducts detainee interviews in an area that does not provide any privacy. The OIC needs to enclose his area so that he can conduct his interviews without unnecessary interruptions. The overcrowded detention area is also unsafe. Detainees overflow into an open, unsecured area that and allows them too much freedom of movement.

(RA0048) Ramadi District Police HQ: The Police Transition Team convoyed to the Joint Coordination Center (JCC) to conduct a meeting with Deputy Chiefs of the Iraqi Police stations. The purpose of the meeting was to cover the core classes to be taught at the Officer Basic and Advanced courses being held at the Regional Training Center (RTC) in the near future. Ten Deputy Chiefs attended the meeting. The course curriculum (not lesson plans) was turned over to the acting Team Leader for review and further input.

(RA0093) Rumana Local Police Station: The PTT trained 2 officers and 2 IP, including the Training Officer, on how to properly receive, store, maintain and re-issue detainees' personal property. In addition, a log was established in order to document this information.

The PTT also discussed the development of a Field Training Program. The Training Officer assigns new IP to work with more experienced IP but the station has no specific field training

program in place. There is no current system to track the new IP advancement in the training process. Training curriculum will be prepared and presented to the training officer.

(RA0095) Baghdadi District Police HQ: PTT traveled to Baghdadi DHQ / MHC for supervision of detainee release. No administrative personnel were at the station to obtain accurate and up to date numbers of personnel and equipment assigned to that station. The District Chief was told by the Provincial Chief that he is no longer an officer. There is no further information as to who will be the new District Chief or what is going to happen with the former Chief.

(RA0083) Hadithah District Police HQ: PTT and Haditha District Police personnel screened approximately 180 IP candidates for the June Basic Recruit Class with 142 candidates meeting the requirements. Iraqi Officers assumed the majority of the screening responsibilities and took the lead role throughout the entire process. Their performance was professional and fair to all of the tribes involved. Iraqi officers also established a force protection plan consisting of mounted vehicle patrols, static vehicle/pedestrian checkpoints, entry control procedures/crowd control and a dedicated QRF.

(RA0088) Haqlaniyah (K3) Local Police Station: There is not an established station in this area or Police Transition Team assigned. The Iraqi Police are rotated out of the Haditha District Station on a regular basis for training. All training is conducted at the District Station.

(RA0089) Barwanah Local Police Station: PTT conducted a class on detainee handling and detainee rights.

(RA0106) Tal Aswad Local Police Station: PTT met with the Station Chief to discuss recent raids in the area by Coalition Forces. The PTT also discussed an incident where 2 detainees suspected of kidnapping, escaped through a window in the holding area. It was recommended to use concertina wire to cover windows until more bars could be welded on. Weapons were issued to 40 IP recently returned from the academy.

(RA0032) Karmah Patrol Police Station: Delayed Reporting From an Extended Visit
June 3rd: The station currently has eight vehicles; four full operational, three in need of repair and one beyond repair. This station continues to be dependant on Camp Fallujah for their fuel needs. PTT provided training on roll call procedures and operations.

June 4th: Iraqi Police conducted recon missions to Sahabee while the Police Support Unit conducted mission to Camp Fallujah to pick up Identification cards.

June 5th: Iraqi Police and Police Support Units conducted patrols of the area and returned from missions with five people suspected of involvement in the manufacturing of IEDs. No IPLOs were present on the raids. PTT provided training on Vehicle maintenance.

(RA0060) Saqlawiyah Patrol Police Station: PTT continues to track the warrant officer promotion packets. PTT collected the warrant officer promotion packets and hand delivered them to Fallujah District Headquarters for the appropriate signatures. PTT then delivered the promotion packets to Provincial Headquarters to obtain the required signatures on the packets. The promotion packets were submitted to Ministry of the Interior for their approval.