CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

L8

05June2007

Baghdad (MND-B) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Baghdad

(BC0003) Airport Police Local Police Station: The Team was notified of a firearm assault on a KBR employee at the BIAP on the morning of June 4th. Global Security officials and Iraqi Police are conducting an investigation into the matter and no further details were available.

(BC0009) Al Alawiyah Local Police Station: The Team met Colonel [redacted] (Station Commander) who advised IPs are conducting an investigation into the reported kidnapping of a female. Preliminary information indicated the complaint was invalid. Colonel [redacted] has been briefed on the MOI Training Initiative and he is awaiting further directions from MOI concerning CF-LPS-07-00023. The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol with IPs and no incidents were experienced. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(BC0017) Al Hurrya Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 17 IPs covering Tactical Handcuffing Procedures. Students participated in practical exercises to demonstrate proficiency in the techniques.

(BC0018) Al Jazaaer Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 5 IPs and 1 Officer covering Handcuffing Procedures. Students were attentive to the material presented and participated in practical exercises to demonstrate proficiency in the techniques. The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol with IPs and visited Checkpoints with no incidents experienced. The Team visited the Station on June 4th and conducted Training for 5 IPs and 1 Officer covering Firearms Safety with special emphasis was placed on officer safety during the class. The Team conducted 2 Joint Patrols with 8 IPs and no incidents were experienced.

(BC0025) Al Karada Patrol Police Station: The Team met Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] (Station Commander) who advised he rescinded his earlier resignation (Due to a disagreement with General [redacted]) and the matter had been resolved. He advised an IP was shot in the neck by a sniper on 31 May 2007. Details revealed the IP remains hospitalized in stable condition and expected to recover. The Team observed Lieutenant [redacted] (STO) conducting training for 74 new IP recruits covering Officer Safety. Lieutenant [redacted] is a capable instructor and followed the MOI Training Plan during the class. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(BC0031) Al Kark Motorcycle Traffic Station: The Team met Staff Sergeant [redacted] (Administrative Sergeant) who advised the Station would be out of fuel soon. Information revealed Kadhamya Traffic Station is the local Fuel Point and is out of fuel. A VBIED explosion was recently experienced in Shula District and local citizens are threatening retaliation against CF for allowing the explosion to happen. Intelligence revealed extra precautions should be taken while traveling Route North Cubs due to the JAM threat.

(BC0038) Al Khansa Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 4 IPs and 1 Officer covering Community Policing. Students were attentive to the material presented and participated in classroom discussions. A VBIED detonated near the Station and all available officers were dispatched to the scene for security. The Team met Major [redacted] (Station Commander) who advised the AOR had been quiet since May 31st. Information revealed Major Mahar may be relieved of Command by a Colonel from the Traffic Department and no

further details were available. A list of FTO candidates to receive training is near completion.

(BC0045) Al Nasir Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 10 IPs and 1 Officer covering Fire and Movement Drills (associated with being ambushed). The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol with IPs and no incidents were experienced. The Team met Captain [redacted] (Station Commander) and discussed MOI Training Initiative.

(BC0046) Al Quanat Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 5 IPs and 1 Officer covering Prisoner Management and Officer Safety. The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol and Foot Patrol with IPs. IPs set-up a Hasty Checkpoint and were observed using good vehicle search techniques with no incidents experienced. The Team inspected the Detention Facility and found 43 detainees incarcerated. The Military counterpart conducted interviews with detainees and allowed them time for exercise. Prisoners complained about not having air-conditioning in the jail.

(BC0052) Al Rashidia Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 9 IPs covering Situational Awareness. Students had difficulty understanding that it was their responsibility to be vigilant when placed in dangerous situations. Sergeant [redacted] attended the class and assisted with conveying the concept of individual responsibility to students. Most students were found to be under the impression it was the responsibility of supervising Officers to take care of them in dangerous situations. The Team conducted 2 Joint Patrols and no incidents were experienced. The Team met Colonel [redacted] (Station Commander) who advised there was no additional information available concerning a murder which occurred 2 days ago. The Team is assisting the Station in preparing a Force Protection Plan which includes responsibilities for Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.

(BC0069) Al Thawra Local Police Station: The Team met 1st Lieutenant [redacted] (Shift Commander) who advised IPs recovered the bodies of 2 murder victims on June 3rd. The Station was attacked with 3 mortar rounds during the visit and no injuries were reported. The Team conducted a Joint Patrol with IPs in an attempt to ascertain where the mortars were launched from. Members of the public were contacted and refused to provide any information concerning the attack.

(BC0078) Al Zohour Patrol Police Station: The Team observed Training for 42 new IP recruits and 1 Officer covering Officer Safety and Survival presented by Lieutenant [redacted] (STO). The Station Commander appointed 3 STOs for conducting training at the Station. The Team provided STOs with hard-copy lesson plans covering Patrol Principles/Objectives for future reference. The Stations Training Record Book was inspected and found to be in order.

(BC0090) Boob Al Sham Local Police Station: The Team conducted Training for 7 Officers covering Situational Awareness. Colonel [redacted] advised MOI has not provided any information concerning STO classes. The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol and 2 Foot Patrols with IPs and no incidents were experienced.

(BC0092) Baghdad IHP HQ: The Team met Major [redacted] who advised the Iraqi Army visited the Station and announced orders to move NP off the Station Compound. Major [redacted] advised there were no NP at the Station and directed them to the NP Compound on Route Cedars. No Training was conducted due to the Training Division being moved to another building on the IHP Compound. Captain [redacted] (STO Headquarters) requested additional training for IPs covering vehicle and person searches. The Team found 1 IP incarcerated for disciplinary reasons. The Station has been without power for the past 8

(b)(2), (b)(8), (b)(6)

days due to generator problems. Major [redacted] is attempting to correct the issue with the assistance of COP Battle Group. (b)(6), (b)(7)

(BC0101) Mahmoudiya District Police HQ: The Team conducted Training for 40 new IP recruits covering Democratic Policing, Use of Force and Handcuffing Techniques. The recruits were recently hired and have not received any training. Information revealed they will attend Baghdad Police Academy at a later date.

(BC0111) New Baghdad District Police HQ: The Military Force Protection Unit assigned to the Station refused to admit 26 IPs onto FOB Rustamiyah for today's training class. Diligent efforts are being attempted to resolve the matter.

(BC0119) Rusafa Patrol Traffic Station: The Team observed Lieutenant [redacted] (STO) conduct Training for 60 new recruits covering Drill and Ceremony. The Team is assisting by providing training tips (Train the Trainer) during the classes. (b)(7)c

(BC0120) Rusafa Directorate Police HQ: The Team observed Lieutenant [redacted] (ERU Training Officer) conduct Training for 140 new IP recruits covering ERU Weapons, Radio/Basic Equipment and Vehicle Familiarization CF-LPS-07-00023. Information revealed recruits will be scheduled to attend Baghdad Training Academy at a later date. The Team met Colonel [redacted] and Colonel [redacted] concerning a list of supplies and equipment needed for the computer section. Brigadier [redacted] (OIC Inspections) advised he has 3 Officers and 2 Commissioners assigned to conduct Station inspections within Rusafa AOR. Brigadier General [redacted] (Headquarters Station Commander) has been briefed in reference to MOI Training Initiative. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(BC0628) Rusafa Directorate Patrol Station: The Team conducted Training for 8 IPs covering Weapons Handling/Maintenance, Officer Safety and Team Building. A computer disc covering the MOI Training Plan was provided for future reference. The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol and Foot Patrol with IPs. IPs recovered a vehicle involved in an earlier shooting which occurred near the Station. Details revealed 2 victims were shot inside the vehicle by assailants and the matter remains under investigation. The Team inspected the Detention Facility and found 9 detainees incarcerated. Running water is not available in this area of Baghdad.

Babylon (MND-CS/S)

Al Qadisiyah

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(BQ0602) Balda District Police HQ: As the team pulled into the station, General [redacted] was observed driving away from the station. The team met with Major [redacted] (transferred from Jamhuri). The visit was short; however, the team was able to get reports concerning a recent disturbance. The Major said, from the disturbance/clash several persons were injured and one killed by gun fire. There was an IP from Jamhuri who was reportedly wounded in the stomach. This was all the information he could provide at this time. He mentioned some other incidents where injuries and deaths had occurred in the area. The Major will obtain further information as he can for the team. The team will follow up on this. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(BQ0603) Diwaniyah Local Police Station: The team visited this station and was able to speak to Colonel [redacted]. The Colonel was asked about training and he said that it is currently being held twice a week. The team met with IP [redacted] who said that he will hold sessions at least four to five times per week. Presently, he is instructing vehicle searches (b)(6), (b)(7)c

and will go into fire arm safety the next week. Again, the team pledged support and look forward to working with him.

(BQ0060) Emergency Services Unit 1: The team met with 1st Lieutenant [redacted] who was the acting station commander as Colonel [redacted] was attending a conference at the PQH. Upon arrival at the station, the team noticed a small number of IPs conducting force protection and other duties. During the visit with the Lieutenant he said the majority of his IPs were out on joint patrol missions with the IA and other Coalition Forces throughout the city. He said the IPs were currently at Stone Circle, the Government Center and PHQ. A patrol was presently on the way to check out a report of a sniper on a roof near the Government Center. He said there were numerous reports of shots fired throughout the city. The IPs were very busy trying to respond to different parts of the city. He went on to state that civilians were arming themselves and firing shots at the IPs and the IA; however, he did not know of any casualties. The Lieutenant relayed that the ESU-1 IPs had been conducting joint missions with ESU-2; but with the increased number of incidents with the Militia, the joint missions had to be stopped. There were ten officers and approximately 200 IPs on duty.

(b)(2), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(BQ0060) Emergency Services Unit 3: The team met with Colonel [redacted] who was recently given the command of ESU-3 and approximately 489 IPs. Upon arrival, the team noticed several concrete structures on the compound. The structures appeared to be uninhabitable, as there were no doors or windows. There were a total of five buildings on the compound and all of them were in the same condition. There was approximately 25 to 35 IPs on the compound. They were walking the compound conducting force protection.

During the visit with the Colonel, he said his station was not operational. He was told by the PQH the station would be ready by June 9th. He said most of his 489 IPs were given time off by PHQ. The few he had working, were his security team and force protection for the station. The Colonel further stated he did not know how ESU-3's patrols would function and he was not sure as to how many IPs he would have on each shift. He told PTT that PQH would make that determination in the next few days. A cleaning crew was to be there the next morning to clean up the station in an attempt to get it operational.

(BQ0024) Diwaniyah Training Academy: The team traveled to the Diwaniyah Training Academy for a PTT Mission. Once on scene, the team was ordered to immediately respond to the Hay Rafat Local Police Station to assist a PTT team that was under attack from small arms fire and RPGs. No PTT business was able to be conducted.

Wasit Province [redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(NoFFID#) Wasit 4th SRT: The team from Fob Delta met with Colonel [redacted], Commander of the station, who stated that he has had no IPs injured or killed since the team's last visit. The Colonel said he was appreciative of the training offered on the Fob by the IPLOs. He said that his men, who had attended the training, had returned and conducted similar training for other IPs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

The team patrolled with SRT through Al Kut neighborhoods checking businesses and practicing community policing standards. The IP Officers selected an area to set up a hasty checkpoint. The IP Lieutenants gave a command and within five minutes the IPs had a three way checkpoint set up and functioning. The team was very impressed. Just six months ago the same IPs did not know how to set up a checkpoint and they would wait for the team to tell them what to do. While at the checkpoint, IPs were questioned and critiqued on their stop and search techniques.

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

Babil Province

(b)(8), (b)(6)

(BB0032) Babil Provincial Police HQ: The team from Fob Reo met with Colonel [redacted] who stated that he had 272 males and 22 female prisoners (along with three children). The Colonel's main concern was getting the new prison open, as it would help with the current overcrowding problem. He related that the prison had run into the problem of tuberculosis. They have attempted to keep prisoners that had health problems away from the rest; however, sometimes a prisoner would get to the facility that didn't realize they had TB or any other health issues. Doctors come to the jail once every week and check the prisoners. If they find that one prisoner has active TB, medicine is given to all the prisoners. A human rights group comes to the jail twice a week and checks the prisoner's welfare. Prisoners get regular visits with their families, except on Fridays. Finally, he said the jail is sprayed for bugs whenever it needs it.

Twenty-one IPs were trained on Defensive tactics, Prisoner transportation, and Detention facility operations at FOB Kalsu.

Dhi Qar / Al Muthanna (PIC)

(b)(8), (b)(6)

PTT members attended the daily operational briefing in Camp Terendak and the daily MTT/CPATT meeting in MAJ [redacted] office. PTT members arranged for senior IPS officers to attend a one day orientation course for the budget training to be conducted on June 9th to June 13th. This orientation course is intended to show senior IPS officers how to best utilize their budget officers once they have been trained.

PTT members worked on modifying the July – August IPS academy schedule. This plan will be presented to the SSR OIC.

Tikrit (MND-CW)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Diyala

Internet service is inoperable at this time.

Salah Al Din

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Camp Speicher PTT Salah Ad Din: On June 4th, thirty of the generator spotlight systems came in to logistics. PTT stressed to CF that the process of issuing this equipment must go through LTC. [redacted], Provincial Logistics. The PTT can only suggest where they go, but CF is trying to issue them to the districts and provide the LTC with a copy of the receipt after the fact. PTT stressed to CF that LTC. [redacted] must be involved in this process for accountability.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(TA0079) Salah Al Din Check Point HQ: Check Point Headquarters Operations are functioning well and there is good communication between Check Point Headquarters and the respective check points. A new checkpoint has been placed near the bridge that crosses ASR Clemson, which now gives coverage on both the east and west bound lanes of traffic. The northern checkpoint has recently received lights for nighttime operations.

The check points now have log books to put information in that they receive from Check Point HQ. They also log any unusual activity for tactical and intelligence purposes. Check

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Point Headquarters has a good administration system and the supply commander has all the equipment accounted for as well as weapons and ammo.

(TA0084) Samarra District Police HQ: IPLO talked to GEN [redacted] who stated that they have currently fired 250 IP from Samarra that did not return to work. He also stated that he has received notice from Tikrit PHQ that 150 newly hired IP will be coming to Samarra.

PTT had a meeting with CF, GEN [redacted] BG [redacted] Mayor [redacted] and Assistant Chief [redacted] During the meeting, BG [redacted] advised that the IP would be ready to perform all the missions that were being requested by the CF tomorrow. IPLOs keep hearing rumors of another IP walk out, due to insurgent threats. AIF is reportedly telling the IP to quit and if each IP brings 2 AK-47's and 1 handgun to the insurgents, then the insurgents will let the IP leave the city. The Team has told the IP repeatedly that this is not true. The PTT have implored the IP to stand up against the insurgents, but they say their families are at risk and they will quit. PTT has been keeping a close watch on the IP and the weapons.

(TA0005) Ad Dawr District Police HQ: Roll call was conducted as the IP arrived for duty; there were 52 IP and 24 Officers. Training was conducted by MAJ [redacted] with the topic of Females in Policing and was attended by six IPs. The Major did an excellent job in conveying the subject matter and reserving his personal thoughts while explaining the need for females in various positions of law enforcement.

Mosul (MND-N)

Ninewah

(MN0056) Ninewah Provincial Police HQ: *The PTT met with BG [redacted] TOC OIC and discussed the significant recent events occurring in Ninewah Province. BG [redacted] advised that on July 2nd at 1910, an IP was wounded in an AIF attack in the Al Senaa district. At 1950 an injured IP was taken into Al Jamouri Hospital and later died of his wounds. He was an IP at the Trans Jail, but no other information was available. At 2000 four civilians were killed by AIF in the Al Bakr district and dumped in the roadway. The bodies appeared to be wired to an IED so CF was requested. At 0130 on June 3rd, a body was found that was identified to be an insurgent. It was determined that he had been killed by another insurgent group. At approximately 1600 a VBIED detonated in the Al Tahrier district as IP were approaching to inspect it. Six IP were wounded including LTC [redacted] the 4th ERB Commander. There were also several IEDs directed at IP patrols throughout the region resulting in a number of IP being wounded; and also an unusual number of civilian deaths, especially in Mosul.*

The PTT discussed with BG [redacted] the progress that was being made in the community policing concept in Mosul and how the General and his department could help that move forward. BG [redacted] described it as moving forward slowly, but suggested the problem is not totally with the IP failing to push the program, but rather with the civilian population being too afraid to be seen working with the IP. The civilians are threatened and made afraid to be seen talking to IP for fear of retribution from AIF. BG [redacted] spoke of an example of business owners who asked the IP not to frequent their businesses for fear it would be construed as them providing information to the IP. BG [redacted] did advise that the IP began putting the telephone number of the police station on police cars and making the public aware of where to call if they need IP assistance or want to report a crime. The use of cell phones is an important part of community policing. He advised this has been a positive counter to the 'fear factor'. The PTT cautioned that the IP should not get impatient because this is a program that takes time to become rooted into the community, and the IP should

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

continue to build relationships of trust with the citizens of the community and their efforts will eventually pay off.

The PTT discussed with BG [redacted] the old issue of the lack of fuel and how that continues to impact the effectiveness of patrols in the city. This has a direct negative impact on every proactive program the IP can muster against the AIF and BG [redacted] pleaded for assistance from CF to convince MOI to allocate more fuel to the region.

The PTT met with LT [redacted] the Detention Center OIC, and talked about the prospect of a centralized jail. It is clear that the detainee population at NPHQ is not diminishing and the conditions there are less than ideal. A centralized facility would improve the manner in which the detainees are moved through the system, improve the living conditions, ease the overcrowding, and raise the level of safety and security. LT [redacted] felt there are some obstacles to overcome, including financial, but otherwise the idea is good. The PTT will survey others in the detention center command staff to assess the feasibility of such a project. LT [redacted] advised the daily count was 418 total detainees, with twenty two IP, four IA, and twenty two juveniles.

PTT spoke with BG [redacted], Logistics officer, regarding the current ammunition and weapons inventory at NPHQ. He explained that there are sufficient firearms in the NPHQ inventory to handle replacement requests from the DHQ and LPS served by NPHQ. He advised the NPHQ has sufficient AK and 9MM ammunition on hand, but that it is critically short in BKC ammunition with only enough to provide a two day replacement should police units become heavily engaged with AIF units. PTT was advised that several requests for replacement ammunition have been sent to MOI in Baghdad, but nothing has been forthcoming from the requests. PTT discussed transferring ammunition from DHQ and LPS to others needing that ammunition, but most were at or just below the standard requirement level. PTT then discussed borrowing several thousand rounds of BKC ammunition from the Iraqi Army and BG [redacted] agreed that this would be a good source for a temporary replacement of BKC ammunition. PTT agreed to speak with the PDOP and then suggested that he contact the CG of the local IA Division to negotiate the temporary transfer.

BG [redacted] then spoke of a complaint lodged with MOI in Baghdad by BG [redacted] Commanding officer, Tall Afar DHQ. He advised that BG [redacted] alleged that NPHQ wasn't providing him with sufficient information to support his DHQ and the LPS in the Tall Afar area. PTT reviewed recorded issues of ammunition to that area and noted that between January 14th and May 30th, NPHQ issued 60,000 rounds of AK ammunition, 26,760 rounds of BKC ammunition and two BKC machineguns. PTT discussed the turn-around time for the Logistics armorer to examine dysfunctional firearms turned in for repair or replacement to NPHQ. BG Khalaf assured the team of a 24 hour time-frame for repair or replacement.

(MN0099) Mosul (Ninewah) Major Crimes Unit (CID): PTT met with COL [redacted] MTU, and discussed the method that he should use to review cases before they are submitted to the Investigative Judge. COL [redacted] stated that this was in practice but he will begin looking for more information to be included in the cases beyond just the paperwork that is required. PTT learned that COL [redacted] also reviews the cases after they return from review by the Investigative Judge. COL [redacted] advised that two detainees brought to him on June 2nd were found to be members of the Iraqi Army. He related this particular case has been before the Investigative Judge and will proceed to trial at an unknown date. COL [redacted] advised IP from the Al Nasir DHQ brought 24 detainees to the unit on this date. Three were originally detained in relation to a kidnapping but after the initial investigation was conducted 21 more were detained in relation to this incident.

The PTT met with COL [redacted] of MCU and spoke to him about the current cases assigned to MCU. COL [redacted] informed the PTT that each investigative officer currently is working 15 cases or so. COL [redacted] was asked if he reviewed all of the cases before the cases are submitted to the investigative judge. COL [redacted] informed the PTT he reviews each and every case with the investigative officer, so he can make recommendation and approve each case. COL [redacted] was advised about the upcoming crime scene training exercise and the PTT explained to COL [redacted] that it is imperative that CPT [redacted] participate in this exercise. COL [redacted] advised that CPT [redacted] will be present.

The PTT asked COL [redacted] about the status of the evidence room. COL [redacted] informed the PTT that he does not have any evidence in his possession at this time. COL [redacted] went on to explain that almost every case is given to MTU and then reassigned to MCU once it is determined the crime is not terrorist related. COL [redacted] informed the PTT that most cases received by MCU are without evidence. COL [redacted] explained this occurs, since the IP are not properly educated on the collection and preservation of evidence. COL [redacted] continued to state that much of the evidence turned in by the IP has been tampered with and no longer valid for use in a trial. COL [redacted] informed the PTT he believes this problem will never be fixed.

PTT met with COL [redacted] NPHQ Intelligence, who advised that it was "business as usual" within his unit. PTT mentored and advised COL [redacted] on different ways to pass intelligence information in a confidential manner to other end users without it becoming compromised, and without the source of the information becoming known to unauthorized recipients.

(MN0201) Ninewah SWAT Team: PTT met with SF command and discussed was a joint entry/clearing mission with Ninewah S.W.A.T. The Ninewah S.W.A.T. tactical commander was briefed. PTT mentored S.W.A.T. on stack, clearing procedures, and from the imagery, an overview of the area. A timeline and rehearsal location was set.

(NO FFID) 1st Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(NO FFID) 2nd Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(NO FFID) 3rd Emergency Response Battalion: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(NO FFID) 4th Emergency Response Battalion: On the evening of June 3rd, PTT was informed that COL [redacted] had been killed when a VBIED detonated. On June 4th, PTT traveled to the 4th ERB and met with LTC [redacted] who advised PTT that he was the Acting Commander of the 4th ERB. LTC [redacted] informed PTT that COL [redacted] had not actually been killed but was seriously injured and was currently at the IA hospital located near the 3rd ERB. PTT contacted CF on FOB Marez in an attempt to see if COL [redacted] could be taken to FOB Diamondback for further treatment. CF began coordinating the effort to determine COL [redacted] medical condition and arrange for a CF surgeon to go to the hospital to evaluate COL [redacted]

PTT met with LTC [redacted] and discussed the training program the Team had been conducting at the 4th ERB. LTC [redacted] was fully briefed by PTT regarding what training had been conducted and what training still remains to be conducted with the IP at the 4th ERB. PTT also spoke with LTC [redacted] regarding the purchase of uniforms for the IP at the 4th ERB. PTT discussed

with LTC [redacted] the procedures for filling out a request with NPHQ for Ammunition as he advised PTT he was low on PKC and AK-47 ammo.

PTT then met with BG [redacted] at Blickenstaff and discussed the training program PTT is conducting with the 4th EPB. BG [redacted] stated that he would support this training and requested that a couple of his Officers attend the training also. BG [redacted] also stated that he would provide PTT with a projector for Power Point presentations and Dry Erase boards if they were needed.

PTT traveled to the IA hospital with a combat surgeon to evaluate COL [redacted] and determine if he needed to be brought to the CSH. After the combat surgeon evaluated COL [redacted] it was determined that he did need to be transported to the CSH for further medical treatment. PTT transported COL [redacted] to the CSH where he underwent a surgical procedure to treat his life threatening injuries. PTT discussed with LTC [redacted] the procedures for filling out a request with NPHQ for ammunition as he advised PTT he was low on PKC and AK-47 ammo.

(NoFFID#) Emergency Response Unit: This station was not visited today due to military re-tasking.

(MN0008) Al Gizlani Local Police Station: This station was not visited today due to the military part of the PTT being assigned to another PTT to visit Al Kazrag LPS and Al Dawasa LPS.

(MN0214) Al Waqaas Local Police Station: This station was not visited today due to the military part of the PTT being assigned to another PTT to visit Al Kazrag LPS and Al Dawasa LPS.

(MN0045) Al Kazrag Local Police Station: PTT was informed by the station commander that a joint patrol was conducted yesterday with DHQ IP in the Sin Adima neighborhood. The station had two TCPs running with two vehicles and eight IP each. The IP were paid recently and also received only 150,000 dinar as opposed to the 210,000. The IP stated they were also taxed 60,000 dinar for food and did not receive the 100,000 incentive pay. PTT was informed that the station received 1200 rounds of AK ammo on May 29th. PTT informed the station commander that another request for an exchange of two broken PKCs needs to be sent up the chain of command. PTT further informed the station commander that the station's force protection issues are going to be addressed. A pedestrian check manual was given to the station commander and training was conducted on how to more effectively stop and search subjects while exercising safety and caution.

(MN0036) Al Dawasa Local Police Station: PTT was informed that the IP went on joint patrol with the DHQ IP yesterday with no insurgent activity. There was two TCPs running each with two vehicles and 10 IP. LT [redacted] informed PTT that the last QRF drill was conducted five days ago. PTT discussed the importance of running QRF drills several times a week to be ready for insurgent attacks. The IP were recently paid and received only 150,000 dinar for food instead of the 210,000 that was put in a memo. According to the IP, they were taxed 60,000 dinar which is the difference in the original amount they were supposed to have received. There was also some food given to the station as well which was not part of the arrangement.

PTT informed LT [redacted] that a printer will be given to them soon along with an ink cartridge for the copy machine. Currently, the station has six trucks working and five that are in need of repair. PTT mentored the IP on sending in requests for items such as gun oil and

(b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

ammunition. PTT gave CPT [redacted] a pedestrian check manual and trained him and several other IP on how to more effectively stop and search subjects while using safety and caution.

(MN0022) Al Rabaein District Police HQ: An hour class was held with the facilities laptop on Report Writing using Microsoft Word. Other computer training classes are planned for the near future. Two IP from Al Rabeain DHQ and one from Al Sheak Fahti attended the hands on training.

(MN0924) Al Jamouri Hospital Local Police Station: PTT met with COL [redacted] who reported that he was unsuccessful in finding a contractor to work on the HESCO barriers. COL [redacted] said that all of the contractors he spoke with were scared to do any work for the IP. PTT will check with NPHQ to see if they can find someone to fill the HESCO barriers. PTT was still unable to complete the arms room inventory, due to the IP SGT over the arms rooms was not at the station. PTT inspected the station computer, copier and digital camera and found them in good working order.

(MN0215) Mosul Al Gadeda Local Police Station: PTT arrived on station, and spoke with COL [redacted] who stated his IP did a joint patrol with the IP from NPHQ today. The COL advised they killed two terrorist, and captured several others. COL [redacted] also advised the PTT that the person with information on terrorists was in fact being held at NPHQ for questioning on other matters. COL [redacted] stated he needed gasoline for his generator. PTT advised COL [redacted] that getting him gas would not be a problem. PTT also advised the COL that the blankets and mattresses have been ordered.

(MN0220) Al Karama District Police HQ: PTT did not visit stations this date due to military issued maintenance.

(MN0221) Al Kadra Local Police Station: PTT did not visit stations this date due to military issued maintenance.

(MN0030) Bab Shamas Local Police Station: PTT did not visit stations this date due to military issued maintenance.

(MN0076) Tall Afar District Police HQ: PTT made contact with LTC [redacted] of the Tall Afar station and explained to him that it is important that the IP are in complete uniform and especially to wear the station patch that is assigned to the station. PTT also stressed that when any items or equipment is needed within the stations, a written requisition form should be completed and forwarded to the DHQ. It will also be stressed to DHQ that the stations are not to be supplied items without a written request. PTT spoke to the LTC concerning his reserve supply of ammunition. The LTC stated that his IP are held accountable for the ammunition they are issued and that he keeps very strict control of his ammunition and does not allow the IP to waste ammunition. Because of this, DHQ refuses to issue him extra ammo so that he can maintain what he feels is an adequate reserve supply. LTC [redacted] said the stations that waste their ammunition, need only request more from DHQ but are never questioned as to why they are using so much ammunition. LTC said DHQ knows he takes care of his armory, and he feels, that he is being punished for his diligence. PTT advised that this matter will be taken up with the DHQ command staff.

(MN0225) Al Mumi Local Police Station: PTT went to Al Mumi LPS and met with CPT [redacted]. MAJ [redacted] was off-duty and not available to report in. PTT inquired about attendance, personnel, complaints against IP, written policies, logistics, inventory, and the records for each. PTT looked at the armory and the armory's records. PTT conducted an inspection of

the force protection already in place. PTT addressed the following deficiencies with CPT [redacted] attendance records, written disciplinary policies, insufficient space for the armory, insufficient force protection and insufficient fuel supply. PTT will schedule an Ethics class for Al Mumi to ensure the lack of policy does not cause an immediate problem. CPT [redacted] was told of the force protection issue. Specifically, he was told to request, in writing, additional resources from Rabiyah DHQ. He should request eight foot HESCO barriers and a steel drop-arm gate. CPT [redacted] proposed tearing down a block wall and building additional rooms. PTT has mentioned this previously as a priority. PTT saw Al Mumi LPS records of previous requests to Rabiyah DHQ. PTT emphasized they must use this system and keep records even when they feel the system is not working. PTT informed CPT [redacted] to request a gate and eight foot HESCO barriers as well as permission to build the additional rooms.

(MN0020) Hassanqoi Local Police Station: PTT traveled from FOB Sykes to Hassenqoi LPS to meet with LTC [redacted] for introduction of the new IPLO who would be taking over course instruction after the station realignment. LTC [redacted] stated that there had been no significant problems in the Hassenqoi area lately and that it had been quiet. PTT checked the jail which has three inmates. The LT in charge of the jail was advised that he needed to separate the inmates according to the law because of their age, and he stated he would. All three were being held on suspicion of terrorism.

(MN0131) Al Bugha Local Police Station: On arrival at LPS PTT met with IP CPT [redacted] and LT [redacted] and obtained PSMR information and other station assessments. PTT made a request to Hamadi to maintain a training log which would include the type of training, number of hours, and names of the IP who received the training. The station is still in need of vehicles to cover the vast AO and conduct community policing. The completed station lacks furnishings but has received a computer for station operations.

(MN0140) Checkpoint Company Local Police Station: The PTT went to the Checkpoint Company's AO for the purpose of collecting information for the PSMR. Contact was made with the officer in charge who answered several questions related to the station's logistics, administration and operations. The information gathered will be used to complete the PSMR.

At Tamim [redacted]

(TT0005) Kirkuk Provincial HQ: PTT convoyed to HQ to meet with COL [redacted] to discuss equipment issues. COL [redacted] will be ordering a complete inventory of weapons from all stations in the providence. Ammunition will be distributed according to this final number, once it arrives. Proper requesting procedures were coved with the logistic officers from Meghdad and Adallah stations as both failed to follow the request process. PTT was informed that IP would be paid today.

(TT0034) Kirkuk Training Center: PTT traveled to the Kirkuk training academy to train five Sergeants from Aruba, Azadi, Highway Patrol, Qoria and Rahemawah police stations; one sergeant from each station. PTT explained to the SGT that this was a class to enhance their ability to return to their perspective stations and train their subordinates' on covered topics. The material covered included detainee handling procedures as well as Basic marksmanship skills and First Aid.

(TT0910) Aydallah Patrol Police Station: PTT convoyed to Aydallah Police Station and met with 1SG. [redacted] who was the day shift supervisor with patrol officers assigned to different schools within the AO to monitor the registration. There were no incidents reported.

PTT visited the holding cell and all 20 inmates were in good conditions with no medical issues and all have seen the Judge.

(NoFFID#) Multaka Local Police Station: PTT traveled to the Multaka station and met with COL [redacted] who advised that he had received 35 new IP from the recent graduating recruit class. PTT continued with questioning the COL about numbers at the station. It was learned that 25 IP are assigned to security and patrol that did not include the Mayor's bodyguards. The station had three prisoners, all of which were brought in by the Mayor and incarcerated. The COL advised that the Anti Corruption Unit has issued an order to capture the Mayor. COL [redacted] stated that he had seen the order while at headquarters

(TT0030) Saragaran Patrol Police Station: PTT traveled to Sagaran IP station and observed training and shift change. Training consisted of room clearing techniques, searches of persons and patrol techniques. Standard drill and ceremony practice followed the training. The station received sixteen new IP who began their station training. PTT met with COL [redacted] and discussed the force protection plan. Improvements were suggested and received well.

(TT0032) Taza Karhmatu Patrol Police Station: PTT convoyed to Taza Karhmatu Patrol Police Station. The team observed the guard mount then spoke with the Station Commander.

Irbil [redacted]

(MI0275) Irbil Provincial JCC: The PTT developed a SOP and Mission Statement to include Objectives and Personnel required for the PJCC. This four page document will be refined and then presented to the KMOI for approval. If the approval is granted, PTT will move forward with the planning and development of a more useful PJCC for the region.

(MI0051) Mergasor District Police HQ: PTT met with LT. [redacted] and discussed the Training the Trainer course progress and IP involvement. PTT discussed an issue of a fingerprint kit that Mergasor DHQ expected to receive several months ago, but never received. PTT learned that LT [redacted] has not requested the fingerprint kits outside the PTT. PTT informed LT [redacted] that PTT is no longer responsible for the delivery or issuing of equipment and urged him to submit a request for the needed equipment. LT [redacted] advised PTT that the coats and boots issued were only enough for about 10% of the IP and that they needed more before winter as it becomes very cold in the Mergasor area. PTT discussed the training that LT [redacted] had requested for firearms and the lack of ammunition for training. PTT informed LT [redacted] that PTT is still trying to obtain training ammunition. Eleven students were instructed in day two of the Train the Trainer Course. The students received the instruction well and demonstrated what they have learned in this first day of class. Student IP appear to be enjoying the course.

(NoFFID#) Mergasor Traffic Police Station: PTT met with LT [redacted] at Mergasor Traffic Police Station and discussed the many issues facing the small station. Mergasor Traffic Police Station operates from a rented house with no electricity, no generator and has no computer, generator, or digital cameras for working traffic collisions and only has one Nissan Pickup. LT [redacted] informed PTT that the station would like to be part of some kind of Train the Trainer Course like the regular IP have received and are receiving in Mergasor. PTT stated that the request would be noted, but informed LT [redacted] of the limited personnel resources of PTT. LT [redacted] also advised PTT he was interested in Check Point training for his IP and thought other local traffic IP could benefit from the training as well. PTT obtained the phone number and name of contact for this station and the DHQ in

Soran. PTT stated that training would be subject to approval and available personnel, but PTT would look into it to see if it would be possible. Traffic IP were very receptive to PTT visits and invited PTT to spend a week visiting and training all stations in the area.

Sulaymaniyah [redacted] (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(NoFFID#) Sulaymaniyah Assaish HQ: PTT met with the Assaish check point officers at the Kirkuk check point which is a continuing training program for these officers. Officers and PTT performed vehicle checks and pat downs for weapons on in coming traffic from Kirkuk.

(TS0008) Sulaymaniyah Traffic Police HQ: PTT traveled to the office of COL [redacted] to discuss the upcoming motorcycle course. COL [redacted] advised he will be able to send ten students and three training officers for the week long class that will start on June 4th. PTT also gave COL [redacted] a copy of the motorcycle obstacle course that all students will be required to navigate by using the proper technique. PTT traveled to the Border Control parking lot to reestablish the cycle course with proper measurements on all exercise locations. PTT rode the course numerous times preparing for the upcoming class. (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(TS0065) Piermagruen Local Police Station: The PTT conducted Police Ethics training with fifteen IP from Piermagruen LPS who were extremely receptive to the training. The PTT was unable to train the IP on the concept of Community Policing due to time restraints caused by another task that had been given to them by the station commander. The station commander apologized for the interruption to the training. The PTT advised the station commander that when the PTT returns on June 6th to distribute the certificates, the Community Policing portion of the training would be administered first. The PTT advised the fifteen IP to be prepared to complete their training before their certificates will be presented.

(TS0004) Sulaymaniyah Provincial Police HQ: PTT met with traffic investigators at the Sulay PHQ which was the second day of a 30 day advanced accident investigation course at the Sulaymaniyah Police Academy. This course is being conducted at the request of MG [redacted] to insure his police investigators have an understanding of accident investigation, as they have the duty under Iraqi Law to present the case to the Investigative Judges in fatality cases. (b)(2), (b)(7)c

The course curriculum is being adjusted at this stage to address the majority of the student's lower education and lack of basic knowledge in the field of accident investigations. The course will continue to be directed in order to insure the investigators have a good working knowledge in the field, and are able to adequately interpret the physical evidence present at accident scenes.

(TS0008) Sulaymaniyah Traffic Police HQ: The Force Protection Course started today at the Main Traffic HQ. The first course of training was Police Mind Set, Force Continuum and Officer Presence. Students were instructed on what the mind set should be when on duty. The topics discussed were Officer Presence and Verbalization to include display of authority as a peace officer and such non-verbal means of communication as body language, demeanor, and manner of approaching. Verbalization involves the direction, and commands given to the subject as well as proper way to communicate with a non-violent, but noncompliant subject

(TS0024) Cham Chamal District Police HQ: The PTT arrived at Cham Chamal DHQ and continued the lesson on Crime Scene Evidence Collection. The topics were covered and all students participated in the class. The lesson consisted of suicide topics and recognition along with weapons collection at the crime scene. The class is going well and all students

are expanding their knowledge as advanced investigators.

Dahuk [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(NoFFID#) Camp Zawita: Training continued for 24 of the Governor of Dahuk's body guards on mind set and surveillance detection. IPLOs then moved the class to the range for training with the Glock 9mm. The students were only able to shoot one magazine each due to the corrections needed.

(MD0635) Shekhan District Police HQ: PTT met with LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and his ERB [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c at Shekhan Police HQ for firearms training with the AK rifle to sixteen IPs. LT advised that his men have not shot since they were in Jordan, about six months ago. Due to the fact the IP have not shot their weapons in quite awhile PTT concentrated on basic firearms safety and shooting drills. The first group of four IP fired three 30 round magazines. The next three groups of four IP only shot one thirty round magazine due to time and equipment constraints.

PTT went over the three firearm safety rules and explained them in detail. PTT also covered the rules they needed to follow while on the shooting line and the importance of following the range master's commands.

(MD0646) Zahko District Police HQ: PTT traveled to the Zahko DHQ to present the second day of five in Crime Scene Investigation. The PTT was informed after arriving that a VIP was scheduled to arrive at the DHQ and the training for today would need to be cancelled because the IP were needed for a security detail. The training is scheduled to resume tomorrow.

(MD0621) Akre District Police HQ: Since the last station visit, the DHQ has greatly increased their perimeter security. One entrance has been blocked off and the other can only be reached by a convoluted path. Personal vehicles are no longer allowed in the station parking lot and now must be parked across the street in a designated area. The district commander advised this was done due to the recent problems in Irbil and the threats to Kurdistan in general. The district continues to grow with many people from the area or with relatives in the area moving in from other areas of Iraq for the better security. Due to this increase in population, the commander would like to add another 100 men to his force. He would like to create an Anti-Crime Unit and expand the patrol force with the additional men. He is pleased with the communication system and reports receiving 62 hand-held radios to issue throughout the district. As the administrative office for the district they are having problems with sufficient reliable power and equipment that PHQ seems unable to help them with. The PTT will follow up on this with PHQ.

The district has begun receiving a fuel allotment of 600 liters per station in addition to their normal station budgets. The commander advises this has been a great help and for the time being is sufficient. No other financial problems were noted or brought to the attention of the PTT.

The DHQ has a good printer/copier but they are having problems finding the toner to keep it operational. The PTT will discuss this with PHQ and see what can be done to resolve the problem. The station has a problem with electricity, estimating they only have about four hours of reliable electricity per day and no generator of their own. Since the building is shared with the Mayor they can tap into the Mayor's generator when he is using it but otherwise they have no power other than the unreliable city power. The power situation has already ruined one of their radio charging units.

The PTT discussed a train the trainer program with the district commander who was very interested and agreed to participate in the program to the extent his manpower demands would allow. He is interested in many types of training and SWAT type training, in particular.

(MD0622) Akre Local Police Station: Since the PTT last visited in April, this station has yet again been moved to a rented house. This is a large and busy station with an authorized strength of 100 but a current strength of only 70. The commander advised he needs another 30 men as he has to cover many static guard locations and would like to beef up his patrol as well as having a reaction force of ten or fifteen men available at the station. The station has only one vehicle assigned to it and needs more due to the large number of men and responsibilities this station has. The station is located in a densely populated area that allows them to effectively use a great deal of foot patrol.

This station has begun receiving a fuel allotment of 600 liters per station in addition to their normal station budgets. The commander advises this has been a great help and for the time being is sufficient. The station budget is insufficient to allow them to purchase needed desks and chairs.

This is a large and busy station that has not been able to obtain a copier. For this reason the PTT provided them with a copier purchased with TTIF funds. A receipt was obtained and a copy will be forwarded to PHQ. This station moves frequently and not being collocated with any other government office has no generator of their own. The PTT provided them with one purchased with TTIF funds and obtained a receipt. A copy will be forwarded to PHQ. This station needs more desks and other office furniture which they have been unable to obtain from PHQ so far. The team will follow up on this shortage to see what may be done to correct it.

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(MD0625) Bijeel Local Police Station: PTT traveled to the Bijeel LPS and met with LT [redacted] who reported that the station continues to provide patrols and answer calls for service in their area. They are trying to maximize their personnel by conducting mobile vehicle checkpoints along the main highway in addition to their patrols. They are setting these checkpoints during the day and night and moving them so that people don't start just finding ways to avoid them. Foot patrols are not much of an option due to their AO consisting of small villages scattered over a large area. They now estimate they have good radio coverage over about 70-75 percent of their area. Given the steep terrain and canyons of this AO, the PTT feels that is a good average. If they could obtain and program a vehicle radio it might increase their communication abilities in those more difficult areas.

The station budget is inadequate to provide fuel for effective mobile patrol. The station has started receiving a monthly fuel allotment which helps with covering their needs. No other financial issues were noted or brought to the team's attention.

The station has been unable to obtain a printer/copier for their computer through their chain of command. The PTT delivered them one purchased with TTIF funds. A receipt was obtained and will be maintained in the PTT files with a copy forwarded to PHQ. The station needs a vehicle radio now that their communications system is operable and the commander was informed that PHQ does have some. He advised he will request one. Prior to the next winter this station very seriously needs winter clothing issued as they have never been provided any and the station is in one of the coldest regions in the country with the temperature often reaching well below freezing.

Drill and PT are the only self initiated training being conducted at this time. The Station Commander stated that he would like additional training for his police.

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(RA0010) Tamim Local Police Station: No station visit was conducted. Military members of the Police Transition Team attended training not related to the PTT mission.

(RA0020) Ramadi East Local Police Station: The Police Transition Team conducted Iraqi Police training on patrol briefs, radio communications, and patrol techniques for 8 IP. The radio communications class taught officers basic radio operation and functions. The briefing class gave its students a better understanding of why briefs are needed and what they should contain. The class participated in a mock brief and debrief with scenarios. The patrol class gave IP the fundamentals of mounted and dismounted patrols. The IP actively participated in all classes. The station has 79 IP on shift and no detainees.

IPs are in need of proper footwear, handcuffs, radios, radio batteries, and canteens. The station was connected and is being supplied water by the city service.

Ma'laab (East Ramadi sub station): The Police Transition Team conducted training for Ma'laab, a Sub-Station of East Ramadi. The PTT met at Combat out Post Camp Corrigedor. The IP were transported to Camp Tiger for dry and live fire stress drills. The PTT met and discussed the following day training schedule. The training for the Ma'laab Station was conducted off site due to limited space at the Ma'laab Station. There were 25 Iraqi Police present for the day's training.

(RA0025) Al Huria Local Police Station: Police Transition Team did not make a station visit due to military counter parts conducting vehicle maintenance.

(RA0029) Jazeera Patrol Police Station: The Police Transition Team checked on detainees and found 27; 15 of which have been brought there from other IP Stations. The longest time of detention is about two and a half months. There were no detainees with signs of abuse that had not already been documented and reported. The detainees receive adequate food, water and regular medical checks. They also receive bathroom breaks and showers as needed.

The PTT conducted training on Pre-Patrol Operations and Roll-Call Formations. The Al Jazeera IP Station just received electrical power from the local grid, but it has not been connected for use. When the power is connected, the station will be able to rely on it and use the generators for back up.

Al Jazeera Station is holding detainees from other IP Stations and it is causing an over crowded situation at their facility. If Al Jazeera Station is to continue to be used by other IP Stations for detainees, then it will need a larger detention area. In addition, some of the detainees are being dropped off without arrest/investigation reports causing them to be released when seen by a judge. The Detention Captain is going to start refusing to accept detainees if they do not have the necessary reports when dropped off. In addition, with the increased number of detainees, the station will need more supplies such as filing cabinets to secure reports and detainee's property.

(RA0030) Ramadi South Local Police Station: The Police Training Team conducted two classes for 12 Iraqi Police. The first class was based on room entry and foot patrol operations. The second class covered first aid to include the proper application of a

tourniquet and the proper way to apply a splint. There were 44 detainees accounted for during formation.

(RA0046) Qatana Local Police Station: No station visit was conducted. Military members of the Police Transition Team attended training not related to the PTT mission.

(RA0048) Ramadi District Police HQ: The Police Transition Team convoyed to the Joint Coordination Center (JCC) to conduct a meeting with Deputy Chiefs of the Iraqi Police stations. The purpose of the meeting was to cover the core classes to be taught at the Officer Basic and Advanced Courses being held at the Regional Training Center (RTC) in the near future. Ten Deputy Chiefs attended the meeting. The course curriculum (not lesson plans) were turned over to the acting Team Leader for review and further input.

(RA0060) Saqlawiyah Patrol Police Station: Delayed Reporting From an Extended Visit
June 3rd: PTT arrived at the station late in the evening due to vehicle maintenance issues. PTT is attempting to secure promotions for three of the top-performing Iraq Police to the rank of warrant officer who would become department heads of Administration, Logistics and Operations sections of the station. The promotion orders have been prepared and forwarded to the next higher headquarters for processing. PTT is tracking these promotion requests through the Iraqi command system. PTT met to discuss plans and assignments for the week, which include one-on-one training with the three warrant officer candidates. PTT discussed plans to include the IP routinely in force protection duties.

Since the last station visit, the station has received 15 new IP from the recently graduated academy class. The addition of these new IP will boost the work force of the station tremendously. One IP, who was injured recently during a shooting, is awaiting further medical care, and will probably not be returning to work. The station is still waiting for damage that occurred during a VBIED attack several months ago to be repaired. The station's Internet service is up and working but it is intermittent at best. One functional computer is being used by the IP for email communications with Fallujah Joint Communications Center (JCC).

June 4th: PTT spent the majority of the day in small meetings with the Station Chief and the three warrant officer candidates to discuss their pending promotions. PTT explained the different functions of the three departments, sections of the station and their individual responsibilities as supervisors. PTT assigned the warrant officer candidates' basic task to be completed this week. PTT will continue to work closely with the warrant candidates as advisors and mentors. PTT inspected the station's detention cell with no incidents to report. The capacity of this cell is approximately twenty-five and is primarily used for overflow holding area. Detainees are transported to Fallujah District Headquarters for processing as soon as possible.

(RA0080) Al Qaim District Police HQ: The PTT consulted the Station Chief on the importance of establishing a budget for MOI to approve funds for future operations and supplies. He was instructed that the DHQ was also responsible to oversee the budget process for each station in the district. The Chief understood the concept and agreed to meet with PTT members to receive further instruction and guidance in implementing a district wide budget plan.

PTT members and the Station Chief also discussed the need for DHQ oversight in the District's training program. The DHQ Training Officer has a current training binder with personnel training records available for review. He was further advised in his responsibility

(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)

to oversee the training records of each station in the district. The PTT Leader is currently seeking information on official Iraqi Police training conducted through MOI.

(RA0095) Baghdadi District HQ (Al Asad MHC): The Police Transition Team convoyed to Jubah (a Baghdadi Sub-Station) to inspect the station and the Hesco barriers that were delivered yesterday. Some changes were made to the pattern on the Entry Control Point (ECP). The PTT met with the Station Chief and discussed some problems in the department.

PTT convoyed to the DHQ and inspected 43 reported non-functional IP weapons. PTT inspected the detention facilities and observed that the prisoners were being treated satisfactorily. All paperwork concerning the detainees appeared in good order. The PTT then returned to the FOB and inspected the weapons to determine their status. Out of the 43, only 12 were found to be actually non functioning. The others were repaired and parts replaced from the non functioning AK-47 rifles.

(RA0083) Hadithah District Police HQ: PTT issued remaining uniforms and equipment. Logistical issues and IP tracking system problems were addressed and resolved for upcoming recruit drive.

(RA0088) Haqlaniyah (K3) Local Police Station: There is not an established station in this area or Police Transition Team assigned. The Iraqi Police are rotated out of the Haditha District Station on a regular basis for training. All training is conducted at the District Station.

(RA0089) Barwanah Local Police Station: PTT conducted foot patrols with the Iraqi Police resulting in seven suspected insurgents being detained.