CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

N19

July 31, 2006

Baghdad (MND-B) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Baghdad

(BC0003) Airport Police Local Police Station: The Team was able to obtain forty Glock holsters for station IPs. Routine monitoring of airport IPs, which is done on a daily basis, was done.

(BC0007) Al Adhamiya Patrol Police Station (East): PTT heard there had been no attacks on the station and no attacks on station IPs within the past week. The station did send assistance to a neighboring station attacked two days ago (27 July). During the commander's meeting the Team was told that generator fuel has not been a problem for the past week. The station receives approximately 440L every two days. In addition, gas for the patrols has been steady for the preceding week. When PTT announced that two patrols were needed for a joint patrol, COL [redacted] was concerned with starting them back up due to the number of IEDs in the area. (b)(6), (b)(6)

(BC0011) Al Dorah Local Police Station: A joint patrol was done, with the Team mentoring IPs on patrol techniques and officer safety. The 28 July station attacked was the topic of a conversation PTT had with the commander. The commander told the Team he was not concerned about the station being attacked or overrun. Upon hearing this, the Team emphasized to him the need for planning drills and training in the event it did happen. Even after this the commander's main concern seemed to be centered on generator fuel and ammunition.

(BC0024) Al Karada District Police HQ: PTT obtained needed statistics for the PSMR. The Team met with COL [redacted] to discuss developments since 27 July when the area was inundated with explosions. (b)(6), (b)(6)

(BC0025) Al Karada Patrol Police Station (East): The Team met with the training officer and "train the trainer" instruction was given on mobile checkpoint operations. The Team was attacked by hostile forces after leaving the station.

(BC0041) Al Mesbah Local Police Station: PTT learned that eleven detainees have not been seen by an investigative judge or been to court as the judge is on vacation. The detainees are scheduled to be seen 31 July. The Team mentored an IP on the preparation of a daily roster showing detainees that have not seen a judge. PTT was advised of a thirteen year old male (runaway) in custody. The orphanage he ran away from will reportedly pick him up 30 July.

(BC0046) Al Quanat Local Police Station: PTT processed a detainee with a jump kit. A routine manpower check was done by the Team. The only major crime relayed to the Team involved a kidnapping. While the Team was in the administrative office a kidnapping victim was being interviewed in a different office. A description was given by the victim of a house he had been moved to, with an officer stating they would need IA assistance. Because the Team was going to do a joint patrol, that became the subject of the patrol.

(BC0050) Al Rasheed District Police HQ: When PTT arrived everything was in order at the station. A joint patrol was done through a market and residential area with no significant activity. Training on this date by PTT consisted of giving instruction to six personnel on the

administrative staff in the area of crime tracking and analysis. A map utilizing colored pins has been added to the station's inventory.

(BC0064) Al Taji Local Police Station: The Team heard that seven IPs were missing from the day's shift—three of them being AWOL. PTT heard an assessment of patrols, and learned the station has one adult prisoner and one juvenile and they are separated. The Team heard a report about a homicide victim found in the station's AOR. PTT inspected the armory to determine the number of vests on-hand. PTT trained fourteen personnel on the principles and proper procedures for searching a vehicle, dealing with the vehicle occupants, and minimizing the negative impact a search may have for public relations.

(BC0067) Al Tarmiya Local Police Station: (First Shift) PTT made routine checks on manpower. The Team observed shift change formation and corrected some equipment issues. It was observed by the Team that the gasoline tank is leaking again, with IPs collecting the leaking gas with a can to put in vehicles. The Team assisted IPs with security for a city council meeting. The IPs worked traffic in the area and were observed interacting with the public in a professional way. A joint patrol was conducted to the Mishahida station. While at that station a convoy of trucks was ambushed within sight of the station, with a joint then being done for investigation purposes.
(Second Shift) As with the morning shift, the Team observed IPs at the IP/IA checkpoint on the edge of town, with their appearance being neat and alert. At the station the Team found an IP on duty in the JCC with a radio and cell phone. Normal staffing levels were observed by the Team. The station had fielded ten calls so far for the day, including a joint patrol with the IA. No prisoners are incarcerated at the station and no significant activity was reported. A joint patrol was done with six IPs without incident.

(BC0086) Baghdad Main Provincial Police HQ: The Team did not go to the station this date but did attend a meeting at which they were ordered to bring the 1400 UHF Motorola handheld radios and the UHF mobile radios to the 49th and the 4th ID will decide how to distribute them once programming is completed. The Team also learned that the IP fuel shutoff date of 1 August has been rescinded and changed to an unspecified later date.

(BC0096) Karada Miriam Local Police Station: Prisoners in custody asked questions of the Team concerning such things as when they would be seen by a judge or transferred.

(BC0101) Mahmoudya District Police HQ: A joint foot patrol was done with ten IPs and a lieutenant. During the patrol the Team mentored the IPs on foot patrol techniques and community policing tactics. The Team felt the public seemed appreciative that the IPs were out walking around. An after-action brief was held, with the IPs and lieutenant supportive of doing more joint patrols, and most of the IPs being happy to walk around. A Team check of the jail revealed no problems.

(BC0102) Mahmoudya Local Police Station: PTT conducted a foot patrol in the market area. Routine inquires were made by the Team concerning manpower.

(BC0119) Rusafa Patrol Police Station: The Team observed four IPs at the front gate on arrival—none with body armor. PTT heard of an IED attack on a station patrol, causing injuries and vehicle damage. Routine statistics were collected, showing nearly half of the station's seventy-three vehicles out of commission, over half of the seventy handheld radios broken, and ten of thirty-six vehicle radios broken. Weapons and ammunition statistics were also gathered by the Team, along with vest and trauma plate numbers.

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

(BC0121) Saba Al Boor Local Police Station: (First Shift) The Team met with the station commander and discussed general operations of the facility. PTT inspected the station's toilet facilities and observed they had been cleaned up, as there was no standing water and the human feces had been removed. The Team learned the generator was being repaired and should be fixed this date.

(BC0123) South Karkh Traffic Police Station: A new motorcycle has been given to the station and was used for working traffic in the IZ this date.

An Najaf (b)(3), (b)(6)

(RN0023) Najaf Police Academy: The Team assisted the academy staff at Camp Duke with firearms qualification for forty-nine cadets. The Team is doing this until an adequate facility is built at the academy. The qualification was for the Glock handgun, but also involved AK-47 familiarization. Thirty-seven cadets received passing scores, eleven failed to receive passing scores, and one cadet was disqualified for safety reasons.

Karbala (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted on this date.

Babil (b)(3), (b)(6)

BB0042) Eskan Local Police Station: The Team did an early morning inspection of the station's force protection and checkpoints for manning assessment purposes. The Team found that all posts were properly manned and adequately armed. The Team delivered empty sandbags that had been requested.

Tikrit (MND-N) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Diyala (b)(3), (b)(6)

(TD0604) Ba'qubah Center District Police HQ: PTT met with the COL. Station personnel consist of 11 officers, 10 Commissioners and 20 Patrolmen. All IPs at this station have attended an academy class. The station requested more AK-47 rifles and body armor. The condition of the station has improved, currently, renovations are being made to the supply room. Improved force protection has been completed on the observation towers.

(No FFID#) Ba'qubah ERF Facility: PTT met with the CPT, the station is in need of Hesco barriers, sandbags, razor wire and a gate rail for force protection. The station is also in need of a generator. PTT took pictures of the station to document the need for additional force protection measures. This is a new station.

(TD0012) Al Sharky Local Police Station: PTT met with the station commander, personnel consist of 25 officers, 34 commissioners and 94 patrolmen. 75 personnel are assigned to special security details. All IPs at this station have attended either an academy or TIPS training. Each officer at Al Sharky has been issued a hand held radio. 3 additional radios have been distributed to other stations. 120 body armor vests have been damaged and a request for replacements has been made.

(TD0035) Khalis District Police HQ: PTT met with the GEN. The HQ is in need of both vehicle, and generator maintenance. The HQ has 45,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, however, would like additional rounds to bring their inventory higher. PTT issued a fingerprint kit to the Khalis MCU and obtained a hand receipt.

(TD0015) Al Wajihiyah Local Police Station: PTT came under IED attack while traveling to Al Wajihiyah Local Station. This resulted in no injuries or damage. The route was cleared and travel continued to the assigned station. PTT met with the Station Commander, who

said there have been several tribal conflicts, resulting in four civilian deaths. PTT conducted TCP operations on Wajihiyah Main Street.

Salah Al Din

(TA0080) Salah Al Din Provincial HQ: PTT met with MG [redacted]. MG [redacted] states that he would like to have the Egyptian currently in CF custody back in IP custody to stand trial. He believes he has strong case against him and stated that BG [redacted] will testify against him in court.

MG [redacted] stated that he is still investigating the alleged request for $200 bribes from a PHQ officer to allow Samarra recruits to become IP. Samarra IP (including LTC [redacted], CoP) came to pick up 9 vehicles from PHQ. After discussing the unsuitability of the vehicles provided by CF (too large for Samarra streets, fuel economy) LTC [redacted] agreed to accept the trucks that PHQ had selected as replacements. All of the replacement vehicles were inspected by the PTT and found to be in good working order (minus a few dents).

(TA0084) Samarra District Police HQ: PTT met with WO [redacted], main armorer. WO [redacted] stated that he has received a list from the Samarra and Al Mutawakil stations of all their unaccounted ammunition this month. The personnel from those two stations are responsible for working two vehicular checkpoints. Their men are reporting the expenditure of 653 rounds of AK ammunition. It was unclear if the rounds are just unaccounted for or if they were shot in the performance of their duties.

PTT was approached by COL [redacted], MOI Intelligence Officer. COL [redacted] stated that the IP are not searching the vehicles at their checkpoints. PTT then accompanied COL [redacted] as we toured several of the checkpoints and inspected the work being done by the IP. The IP were not searching the vehicles at the Saba Nissan checkpoint or the M1 checkpoint.

PTT returned to the headquarters and sat down with LTC [redacted] Deputy Chief and CPT [redacted], Samarra Chief. PTT explained to them the deficiencies observed at the checkpoints. LTC [redacted] then sent CPT [redacted] to inspect the checkpoints to determine any corrective action he needed to take.

LTC [redacted] visited the Provincial Police today in order to get the 9 new vehicles promised to him. While up in Tikrit, LTC [redacted] telephoned us and asked us what he should do. LTC [redacted] stated that GEN [redacted] was attempting to give him 9 old vehicles. PTT informed LTC [redacted] that GEN [redacted] has given his assurances that the 9 old vehicles he was providing to the Samarra Police Department would all be functional and usable. PTT informed LTC [redacted] to inspect the vehicles and then if he had any issues with them, to address those issues directly with GEN [redacted]

CPT [redacted] stated that he is currently investigating one of the rooftop guard IP in reference to a damaged BKC. CPT [redacted] stated that the IP alleges that a strong gust of wind blew the BKC off the rooftop and onto the ground resulting in damage to the BKC. CPT [redacted] stated that he will keep us informed as to the status of the investigation.

At the request of SGT [redacted], PTT met with LT [redacted] The LT provided a list of 11 IP that would begin a 4-day weapons training course. LT [redacted] was bothered by the number of his trainees that were being used for various missions while in training as well as being bothered that Tikrit was "taking" IP that Samarra sent there for Academy training.

The Samarra PD Personnel Office provided PTT with three more sworn statements from witnesses alleging corruption in the vetting and hiring practices of the Salah Ad Din

Provincial Police. These statements allege that there is a concerted effort to prevent people from Samarra to be hired as IP unless they pay a substantial bribe.

PTT met with the Motor Pool staff in reference to the 9 vehicles received from the Provincial Police today. PTT inspected the vehicles along with the motor pool staff to make sure the vehicles were functional. PTT and the motor pool staff were surprised that all 9 vehicles were lacking police light bars, emergency sirens, and vehicle radios. Several of the vehicles did not even have police markings on the vehicles. PTT is going to thoroughly check all the vehicles tomorrow morning with MAJ [redacted]. (b)(6), (b)(6)c

(TA0021) Al Ishaki DHQ: PTT traveled to The Al Ishaki DHQ station and met with COL [redacted], the XO, who said the Chief, COL [redacted] had gone to Tikrit this morning. COL [redacted] stated that he has no fuel for his vehicles and the Al Ishaki gas station was out of fuel and would not be getting any from Bayji for the next ten days. We finished discussing several items, including the fact that they had not shared any of the new vehicles with their sub-station Farhattia. We confirmed the fact with the station chief, LTC [redacted], who stopped in to check in with headquarters. LTC [redacted] said that the HQ is still trying to push off the broken down 1979 Nissan truck on him and he has refused to take the truck unless they repair it at least. The HQ has received 9 new vehicles from Tikrit in the last month and one was blown up by a pressure switch IED yesterday. COL [redacted] had no response and said he would ask COL [redacted] when he returns about the issue. (b)(6), (b)(6)c

PTT told the IP from Al Ishaki DHQ and Farhattia and the checkpoint to come to the Mahatta gas station to get the fuel for their police vehicles. PTT traveled to the Mahatta gas station and had the owner open the station to get the police vehicles fueled up.

(TA0056) Balad District HQ: PTT traveled to the Balad DHQ and spoke to GEN [redacted]. The MP unit of the PTT arrested one officer at the station. The THT at FOB Paliwoda wanted to question him about his ties to AIF members that have been arrested. All of these men have mentioned his name as giving information to them to be able to plan attacks in Balad. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Al Ishaki checkpoint station: PTT set out with assigned military unit to conduct station visits. PTT and military learned of an IED attack along route Tampa involving the IP. PTT went to the scene to investigate since the IP were from the Ishaki police station. PTT arrived and learned that the IP vehicle had hit a pressure detonated IED set on route Tampa. The blast had killed one IP instantly and wounded the four other IP in the car, three of which were air lifted to a near by hospital. The fourth IP, though badly injured had returned to Ishaki for unknown reasons. This action prompted the military to investigate this IP and obtain his name. This IP was [redacted], he was found to be wanted by the Military for some questioning. [redacted] was then detained by US military and taken back to Paliwoda. While on scene PTT learned that the Ishaki police had lost another IP just days earlier to gunfire. The full details could not be obtained due to the circumstances at hand. PTT noted while on scene that none of the detectives from Ishaki came out to investigate nor did the responding IP ever conduct a perimeter search of the area to see if the person responsible for planting the IED was still in the area. These issues will be addressed to Chief [redacted] at PTT next visit. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Compiled by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2) 6/16/2008

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

At Tamim [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(TT0005) Kirkuk Provincial Police HQ: PTT and CF convoyed to Kirkuk Provincial HQ to meet with GEN [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and GEN [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c (MOI).

GEN [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and GEN [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c explained an altercation at Dibis Station in the following way: SIB is designated to fuel their vehicles at a specific time and IP from Dibis guard the station to eliminate problems. SIB was late arriving at the fuel station and forced their way to the front of the line. IP informed SIB that they would have to wait or return the following day for their fuel allotment and an argument between IP
and SIB ensued resulting in gunfire from both parties. All involved were arrested, SIB were released and the IP involved in the incident remain incarcerated.

(TT0022) Meghdad Police Station: COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that he was pleased with the delivery of 4 new vehicles from CPATT. He now has 8 operational vehicles, placing him at 100% of CPATT's allotment.

PTT met with LT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c, station training officer, and discussed the new public relations course and instructed him regarding training techniques.

(TT0004) Aruba Police Station: IPLO and CF convoyed to Aruba station to meet with COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and to conduct a Train the Trainer class regarding Community Relations. IP were in the field conducting searches and could not be called away from their duties and the class was rescheduled.

COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c spoke with IPLO in reference to the station being connected to city power, and shortages of fuel and ammunition. COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c was advised to make his requests in writing to HQ and supply a copy of his requests in writing to the IPLO for tracking.

(TT0025) Qoria Police Station: COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised IPLO that his station was in need of fuel, ammunition and vehicles in order to perform productive patrols. COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c was advised to submit written requests for each and supply IPLO with a copy for tracking.

COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that a solution for the fuel problem (waiting in long lines for his vehicles to be refueled) should be addressed. This issue was forwarded to the PTT-P team for discussion at Kirkuk Provincial HQ.

Mosul (MND-N) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Ninewah [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(MN0056) Ninewah PHQ: PTT learned that three of the personnel on the Baath party list were either fired or quit. This would bring the number down from forty eight (48) to forty five (45). PTT will try to get the names of those who either quit or were fired during tomorrows visit. Positive confirmation on this subject is still pending until it can be confirmed for sure.

PTT spoke with BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c from finance about the issue of which two districts did not collect pay that was distributed to the Mosul area on 27Jul 06. BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c told PTT that one region picked up their pay shortly after PTT left on 27Jul 06 and the other, Al Shekhan still has not picked up the allotted pay but added he expected that they would be in to receive it on 31Jul 06. PTT will continue to monitor and report accordingly.

Compiled by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2) **6/16/2008**

PTT also checked on the pay for Major [redacted] who is said to be working out of Mosul Hospital and has not been paid in four to five months. PTT found no record of someone by that name, rank, and location on any record either in personnel or finance. PTT was told that if a third name was provided it may provide a more accurate database search.

PTTs today observed the purchase and delivery of bedding supplies for IP stations. These items were ordered by General [redacted] the logistic officer for NPHQ and paid for using TTIF Funds.

(MN0045) Al Khazrag LPS: The IP conducted QRF exercises for the station defense at an acceptable level. The exercises are for the overall force protection for the station.

Today was payday for the police station. There were no observed or reported problems with the payroll.

(MN0070) Al Suweis LPS: PTT met with SGM [redacted] who advised that the IP's had completed two patrols and had responded to assist Al Sumer LPS with the VBIED that was detonated at that station earlier. The PTT discussed developing a training plan for the station and working directly with the SGM (With the Chief's approval) on training issues and joint patrols so the PTT could evaluate the effectiveness of the training.

The PTT checked with some of the IP's at the station and asked how many rounds of ammunition they were issued. It was consistent with what the armorer said they were issued and the PTT will check written records to see that rounds are being accounted for. They are requesting more sandbags for the guard tower in the front of the station. The PTT will deliver those this week.

(No FFID#) Al Ahrar LPS: PTT met with LT [redacted] and discussed the operations of the investigations unit. PTT convinced LT [redacted] to assist in training his investigators and the IP's. The power went off in the office complex again while PTT was there and stayed off until the PTT left. Patrols are still being conducted both day and night and checkpoints done whenever possible. COL [redacted] and a group of IP's were assisting Al Sumer LPS with a VBIED that was detonated near that station.

(No FFID#) Major Crimes Unit: IPLO's attended a meeting at the Major Crimes Unit with two Judges from the Ninewah Provincial Courts. In addition, present at this meeting was Colonel [redacted] (MCU Commander), Iraqi Rule of Law Coordinator, and CFs. This meeting was described to the Judges as a way for the IPs to understand how to better process cases through the Iraqi court system. Several problems observed by IP's, Coalition and IPLO's involving Terrorists cases were discussed with the Judges. Convictions on Fake ID's has been observed involving the suspects only receiving three months sentencing from the Judges when the suspects were suspected of Terrorists activity. In Iraq Law this crime carries a sentence of five years, however none brought up in front of the Judge thus far have been convicted for more than three months. The problem with this as explained to the Judges is that the IP's have expressed that the only persons found to be carrying fake ID's in Iraq have been Terrorists who are being released after only a three month sentence. The Judges were advised that during the IP interrogations with terrorists suspects they have obtained confessions, none of which have been allowed in court. When the suspect gets to court he then changes his statement and tells the Judge he is innocent of the crime he is charged with and at that time the Judge releases him. One Judge stated that all confessions must be in the presence of an Investigative Judge which is why witnesses and proper evidence collection is a very important part of the cases in Iraq at this time.

Concealment of sources identity which is being used as witnesses in multiple high level terrorist's cases was also addressed. One of the judges stated that they have confidential files in which the sources (informants) are given a number and at that time their name is recorded which only that particular Judge has access to. When the case makes it to trial only the number is revealed in court.

Iraqi Rule of Law Coordinator offered his assistance to the Judges in coordinating with the Coalition to have their witnesses available to be brought in front of the court. The coordinator also offered his conference room located on FOB Marez to handle such hearings by the judges. The Judges thanked the coordinator for his offer but advised that this matter would have to be addressed with the Chief Judge for the Ninewah Province.

During this meeting both judges addressed the security issue and advised they would like extra security. At this time they are only escorted from the garage to their office. They requested that they have additional security when traveling to their homes. The Judges inquired about the possibility of having an additional two unmarked civilian vehicles with body guards which would assist in not drawing attention to their vehicles as apposed to traveling with IP vehicles. IPLOs along with their Coalition counterparts believe that the security of the Judges plays a major role in the outcome of terrorist's cases in Mosul. This opinion stems directly from previous cases observed where terrorists have been sentence to minimal time or even released when there was substantial evidence offered. This is also because of references that have been made on more than one occasion about their security and the fact that three Judges have been killed in the Mosul area since 2003.

(MN0928) Abi Tamaam DHQ: Subjects in a white Opal opened fire with small arms at the Al Rashedia checkpoint IP's returned fire. There were no reported injuries or fatalities.

PTT conducted training in basic investigations and crime scene processing. A block of classroom instruction was given which was followed by a practical application. PTT instructor constructed a simulated homicide crime scene and observed IP investigators as they secured the scene, collected evidence, interviewed witnesses and verified the condition of the victim. Mistakes were made as the IP's processed the scene. PTT instructor noted the mistakes and held a discussion after the practical exercise. The IP investigators were very responsive to the training. They were able to comprehend and apply basic skills which were taught in the classroom instruction. The overall result of the training was a success. PTT instructor encouraged those who attended the class to further instruct other IP's on skills learned in today's training in their respective stations. The purpose of today's training was to "Instruct the Instructors". Teaching competent IP's practical skills which they can in turn teach others increases volume training and improves work quality and performance. There were a total of four (4) IP investigators from three local subordinate stations who completed the class.

(MN0022) Al Rabaein DHQ: PTT arrived at the Al Rabaein Police station and met with LTC [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c, who was able to supply the PTT with nine IP's for training. LTC [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated; he met with PTT Commander earlier to discuss the IED's and terrorist's problems in his area and a better way of sharing information between the two units. LTC [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c brought up the issue of the condition of his armory and would like assistance in organizing the room. PTT stated PTT would assist his personnel on the task.

(No FFID#) Al Hamadat LPS: PTT arrived and met with CPT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and advised for the last two (2) days they were without power. He also advised that he was still having trouble obtaining fuel for his IP vehicles. CPT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that he believes the power issue was coming from Kirkuk which supplies the power. CPT [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c was aware that the fuel problem was city wide.

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

(MN0009) Al Hadba DHQ: The Team witnessed the payroll committee paying the IP's assigned to the Headquarters and disbursing funds to the sub-stations.

PTT provided a one hour class concerning phase two of the First Aid package (which consists of six phases).

(MN0076) Tall Afar DHQ: Team members met with BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and BG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Members reported DHQ will be receiving an additional eighteen (18) vehicles. Members discussed literacy testing for newly hired IP's. Talks were held regarding planning for new IP buildings in Avgani, Rabiyah, Zumar, Bi'aj (DHQ), Kisik and Sinjar. A Jail check was conducted with seventy found (74) incarcerated all appearing in good physical condition.

(MN0020) Hassengoi LPS: PTT traveled to Station Kisik to conduct a station evaluation. This evaluation is being conducted incident to the proposed construction of a new IP station. Current station is staffed with one hundred eighty (180) IP's and six (6) officers. There is a Jail with a maximum capacity of fifteen (15) with three (3) currently incarcerated. The three (3) incarcerated were in good physical condition. The station is in need of various equipment and supplies which will be addressed with Zumar DHQ. The IP's are well-trained with high morale. It was reported that the eleven (11) neighborhoods in the area are supportive of the police and active in reporting suspicious activity.

(MN0036) Al Dawasa LPS: The IP's at the TCP and ECP of the station were out of uniform. The station commander and nine (9) IP's were working at the gas station. The IP's at the station stated that MAJ [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c, PHQ economic Affairs, threatened to send them to Tal Afar if they did not let him go to the head of the gas line and fill all his containers.

All personnel had been paid without any problems according to 1SG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(MN0048) Mahkmoor DHQ: PTT met with the Mayor of Mahkmoor, [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and made introductions of a PTT new Team. PTT meeting was video taped by his office. PTT then met COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and made introductions of the new Team. PTT requested and obtained a BIO of the COL In reference to his history. PTT then discussed training issues and he indicated that he currently had four (4) IP's in different schools and that he had fifteen (15) IP's that had not attended any training.

(MN0201) Ninewah SWAT: IPLO's met with PJCC LNO's. Discussed was the transfer from CF presently staffing the communications unit to oncoming unit? Discussed was the condition of the barracks roof and electrical system. The new LNO's indicated they would give this top priority. IPLO's met with PJCC general with regards to proper utilization of new SWAT vehicles. IPLO's and the general both agreed to begin a video/photograph diary of the SWAT team which would be blended into power point class to show the history of the SWAT team and it's many uses. Weapons maintenance was preformed by SWAT operators this date. IPLO's met with NPHQ PTT logistics IPLO. He collected boot sizes for the SWAT team from SWAT IPLO's. He also informed the SWAT IPLO's he was overseeing the sewing of sixty two (62) uniforms expressly for the team.

(MN0205) Karach LPS: PTT met with Major LTC [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and discussed his background and the background of his Command Officers. PTT requested and obtained written statements from the Command Officers that were present at the station. PTT conducted a check of the station jail and armory.

The Commanding Officer's office had an air conditioner but there was no power to run it, they stated that the generator for the complex was reportedly too small for the unit.

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

(MN0103) Al Hamdania DHQ: PTT instructed HQ Chief to send requests to NPHQ and also giving PTT a copy of those requests. There were seven (7) males incarcerated in the local jail, all of which have been before the Judge. One (1) inmate was released from jail while PTT was at the station. Inmates stated to PTT that they had adequate food and water.

(MN0030) Bab Shamas LPS: PTT met with the station commander LTC. A[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c LTC [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that his generator had the starter repaired and had the fuel filters fixed. Now the only problem is there is no fuel to run it. The PTT advised LTC A[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c that there is a fuel shortage throughout the country and that he would have to be patient.

All IP's were paid on 29JUL2006 and no payroll problems were reported.

(MN0220) Al Karama DHQ: PTT met with the station commander COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c. COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c was noticeably upset and disturbed. When asked what the matter was. Colonel [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated the following: The Colonel and his IP's went to a gas station at or near the intersection of Alaska Way and Santa Fe. Upon entering the gas station Colonel [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c was confronted by the PUK. The PUK Commander advised Colonel [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c that he was to take his vehicles and leave the gas station immediately or he would start shooting them. Colonel [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated he and his IP's left the gas station without further incident and responded back to Al Karama and attempted to procure PTT help with his problem with the PUK. However, the route is coded as black and off limits to CF travel.

(MN0010) Al-Hadar DHQ: No deficiencies reported with finance or payroll. The station is authorized a total of 42 IP at present there are only 34 IP.

The station needs an additional computer for the administrative office to track personnel data. The majority of IP at this station only have one uniform at this time. The station does not have a sufficient fuel supply to enable them to conduct basic patrols.

Irbil [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(M10001) Irbil Provincial Police Headquarters: Training was conducted at the Irbil Court, with the class combined of Investigators from MOJ, Investigative Judge Investigators, and MOI, Provincial Police Investigators. Twenty two (22) Investigators were in attendance, one excused, and one (1) unexcused absence.

(MI0606) Crime Lab Station: PTT met with 2Lt [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c at the Irbil Crime Lab. PTT obtained educational backgrounds on all Officer Investigators at the station. This information was collected for CPATT command in Baghdad.

No FFID# Irbil security police firearm Range: PTT traveled to Irbil Range with the 549th MP unit. While at the range the PTT assisted the MP's with the construction of a shoot house. The PTT also offered advise, while at the shoot house, to the MP unit . The PTT and MP unit were at the range for approximmately 3.5 hours. Progress is being made on the shoot house, but will require more time to finish.

Sulaymaniyah [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(TS0008) Sulaymaniyah Provincial Police Headquarters: PTT member delivered another 104 handheld radios to Colonel [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c (Logistics), completed and secured appropriate hand receipts.

Member met with MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and again discussed meeting agenda with KMOI [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

Compiled by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2) 6/16/2008

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

(No FFID#) Sulaymaniyah Ministry of the Interior: PTT member met with KMOI [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and re-introduced CPATT Senior LNO to the KMOI. Member discussed a variety of issues relevant to the Sulaymaniyah Provincial Police.

The KMOI's assistance was requested with respect to supporting MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c in enforcing directives which order SPP personnel to report for TIP/O-TIP training. KMOI [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c was apprised that the established quotas for attendance have not been made to date and that invaluable training opportunities were being lost. KMOI [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that he was not aware of this and was of the same opinion that training was very important for the police. The KMOI offered that Station Commanders may not want to be without their personnel for security reasons. Member advised that each TIP/O-TIP class required approximately 160 personnel, that the SPP had over 26 thousand to draw from, and that half the force was typically idle. KMOI [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed to support MG [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and this initiative.

(No FFID#) Iraqi Army 3rd BDE, 4th Division HQ: PTT member met with Colonel [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and discussed a variety of issues, to include Force Protection at Camp Tow and the constant pilfering through the garbage by IA personnel. Colonel [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c advised that his men would not do such a thing, and was advised that within the past two days, two separate IA soldiers were caught red-handed in the burn pit opening sealed trash bags. The contents are invariably emptied and sorted through. The trash is left to draw flies and to blow everywhere, leaving a large mess, to include a myriad of documents. Tower guards have been encouraged to take action against those violating the posted restrictions against this practice, but instead act as sentinels for their comrades.

(TS0500) Sulaymaniyah Police Training Academy: PTT member met with Lt. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c; In-Processing, and was advised that to date Sulaymaniyah had produced 116 Policemen and 22 Officers of the required 130/30. Irbil/Dahuk had produced 124 Policemen and 10 Officers. There is a current total of 252, of the intended 365. Students were still arriving with more expected.

(No FFID#) Sulaymaniyah Security Center: The Tactical PTT initiated phase three of the Active Countermeasures Program. Safety is the primary consideration by the PTT. A review of all of the safety measures to be taken during this training was reviewed with the fifteen students present.

The subjects of discussion were first aid, pressure sensitive areas, batons, and force continuum. All students listened intently with questions being asked during this portion of the instruction.

Following the lecture, an overview of the last two weeks material and hands-on instruction was reviewed with the students. This week's proposed instruction was also discussed so the students would know what to expect. The necessary training equipment will be provided by the PTT.

(No FFID#) Crimes and Evidence Directorate The Investigative PTT held a test today covering the materials presented to the students over the past few days. The test involved fingerprint comparison and was designed to measure the proficiency level of the students.

Each student was presented a package containing twenty unknown fingerprints to compare to twenty known fingerprints. The second phase of the test concluded with a fingerprint comparison chart to present in court. In the very near future the tests in question will be reviewed and graded by the PTT and a determination will be made as to which students will progress to more advanced training.

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

Dahuk (b)(3), (b)(6)

PTT met with Captain [redacted] today and confirmed the literacy testing date for tomorrow. We should have approximately 70 KPs to be tested. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

PTT met with General [redacted] and discussed how the PTT was doing with JITPC. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

PTT met with Col [redacted] and arranged an escort with his swat team to Bardarash Police station on Wednesday (08-02-06) to can pick up an IPLO arriving from Irbil. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Ramadi (MND-W) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Anbar (b)(3), (b)(6)

(RA0084) Baghdadi Local Police Station: The IPs are continuing construction on the armory and offices within the District Headquarters. The Holding facility is complete. Discussions regarding additional security of the facility was conducted. These conclusions led to preliminary planning to add additional concertina wire and sand bags around the facility.

(RA0080) Husaybah District HQ: The Headquarters element of the PTT transported returning IP' from the FOB airfield to the District Station.

(RA0093) Rumana Local Police Station: The PTTs capability to communicate with the PTT Headquarters element was reported as non existent, but is expected to resume, once repaired (Hand squad radio). The radio facilitates the PTTs daily situation reports to the PTT Headquarters element. There is no change otherwise to the information previously reported.

(RA0092) Karabilah Station: The PTT has embedded at the Police Station location. The PTT communications with the PTT Headquarters element is none existent, due to repair of the squad radio. Communications will resume once this equipment is repaired. This radio is expected to facilitate daily situation reports from the station.

(RA0072)Korean Village Rutbah: Conducted Korean Village Team (Rutbah & Asashat) team meeting to discuss past events, future plans, and any concerns. Met with Rutbah OIC and C.A.G. regarding funding and refurbishing of possible Rutbah Police Station. Presentation by the Rutbah squad assessing the possible police stations. Meeting with operations for travel plans for returning to Rutbah with reconstruction contractors Team to determine exact repairs for immediate needs and long term needs for current and future police stations in Rutbah. Also plan meeting with Rutbah City Council and Sheiks during same mission.

(RA0048) Ramadi District Police HQ: IPLO's Met with Col. [redacted] and requested to have a meeting with him, which he stated that he would be able to meet at 11:00 hrs. IPLO's went back to have their meeting with Col. [redacted] who in turn was conducting pay call. During pay call IPLO's observed Col. [redacted] paying people who were not on the pay roster. After being informed that Col. [redacted] spoke some English IPLO's asked the Col. for another meeting. During their attempted conversation, the Col. stated that he does not speak English so without an interpreter our meeting ended. Junction City Team Leader and PTT counterparts were informed on this matter and the issue with be addressed by the military counterparts. (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(RA0025) Al-Huryia Station: On 27 July 06, Army began relinquishing more of the daily operations, mission planning, equipment inventory and issuing to the IP's. Colonel [redacted] was not present during this reporting period and Capt. [redacted] was only present on for half the day on 27 July 06. The LT's that were left in charge of the station took it upon themselves to (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

plan and execute several patrols over the three day period, averaging at least two patrols a day. The patrols consisted of mounted patrols and establishing limited duration check points. These missions were planned and executed by the IP's with little or no assistance from the Army or IPLO's. On 28 July 06, a mounted patrol resulted in the capture of four detainees. These men were detained for failing to stop at an IP checkpoint, at which one of the detainees ran from the scene. IP's pursued the man and took him into custody. However, upon return to the station, none of the four detainees had been searched. The detainees were all bound with flex cuffs or handcuffs. One detainee flex cuffs were visibly too tight and IPs were advised to immediately cut them off and place new ones on that were properly tightened. IPLOs also observed several IP's striking detainees that were already handcuffed and not resisting; one detainee received a bloody nose, but no other physical injuries noted. IPLO's advised the senior Officer's of the concerns with this behavior and they agreed to address the issue with their subordinates.

(RA0048) West Ramadi Station: IPLOs certified another 10 IP in baton training. All were certified and issued batons and holders along with signing an equipment issue form which is kept on file.

Today Col [redacted] asked for pay for numerous IP he claimed were not paid. Once inside the office a large group of individuals formed outside. IPLOs and PTTs observed the following individuals being paid.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(RA0002) Al Anbar Provincial Police HQ: Approximately 25 IP and officers arrived at the Blue Diamond HQ station today. No Iraqi leadership was there to interact with. Five new Marines have been added, temporarily, to the PTT. They took the opportunity to get acquainted with some of the officers that did show up. There has been no word on the disposition of Gen. [redacted] and his trial last week. The HQ Discipline Section was supposed to arrive today for badging and training. Only a few members did arrive and sat in on the training that was given by the Provincial IPLO team. The class that was given included the Disciplining of Iraqi IP's. The PTT OIC headed into Baghdad today to carry documentation to the MOF.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

Several Glock's and AK's were distributed to HQ personnel today as well as the badges that were required to update those badges with the S/N of those weapons.

Disciplining of Iraqi IP's was the class that was given today at the training facility.

(RA0029) Jazerra: A total of 54 IPs are accounted for on Shift 2, Shift 1 was off duty. These figures include ranking officers as well as policemen, and only include those who have completed the Jordan, or Baghdad academy. The authorized roster for this station has been updated and now allows for 300 IPs

Two IPs are still hospitalized due to wounds sustained from a negligent discharge in the IP living quarters on the Compound.

The majority of the IPs on Shift 2 has now received back pay for the months of April, May, and June. A list of the remaining IPs to be paid has been completed and submitted for approval.

Today we gave the following training class: Muzzle Discipline/ Clearing Drills

Most of the day was taken up with pay issues, resulting in an alteration of the projected training schedule. IPLO's are still confident that the essential training can be completed prior to the scheduled mandatory patrols beginning.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)

CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

IPLO's has also begun training at the command level regarding Areas of Responsibility, and Delegation of Duties/Authority.

Living quarters for the IPs remain inadequate to accommodate the number of personnel, but steps have been taken and additional living quarters are currently being constructed on site.

Force Protection is approaching acceptable levels, but not complete. Due to the size of the compound, sandbags are needed to reinforce the observation towers and sleeping quarters to protect from indirect fire. This project is going slowly due to the hesitant approach of most of the IPs to manual labor.

Babylon (MND-CS) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Qadisiyah (b)(3), (b)(6)

Two days ago the Governor issued an order for SWAT and ESU to go into the Jamhuri section and arrest people with weapons. A fire fight erupted with the militia, a grenade was tossed and 8 IP's were wounded, 2 seriously. No arrests were made and it's unknown if any militia members were injured. The Gen. stated he is going to draw up a security plan for this area.

FFID# BQ 0029 Qadisiyah PHQ: On this date the PTT went to Provincial HQ, while there the Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader met with MG (b)(6), (b)(6), the Provincial Police Chief. We inquired what was being done about the IED that went off a couple of days ago in a traffic circle les than 100 meters from a checkpoint. This explosion and small arms fire hit an El Salvadorian Convoy. The General stated the IPs on duty at the checkpoint had been transferred to another checkpoint and 5 days pay will be taken from them. We encouraged the Gen. to conduct an investigation to determine if the IPs were involved. He stated he would set up a committee to investigate this matter. Beginning today, we were to start teaching an investigations class, that was suppose to commence at 0830. We were told the IPs would not be there until 1000 hrs. We inquired why when the Leadership knew it was to begin at 0830.

Wasit (b)(3), (b)(6)

Wasit Provincial Headquarters (BW0054): PTT team visited Provincial Headquarters to meet with the Provincial Chief. Items discussed were training and possible construction on Checkpoint Headquarters and some work to be done on IP Main.

PTT Deputy Chief attended a security meeting at the Police Academy with IPTs. Academy issues were discussed. Currently the threat level remains high in Waist Province. The El Salvadorian Commander advised that travel should be limited outside the base due to reports that they received on activity in town.

Basrah (MND-SE) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Maysan (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted on this date.

Basrah (b)(3), (b)(6)