CPATT IPLO DAILY SITREP

N9

July 16, 2006

Baghdad (MND-B) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(BC0011) Al Dorah Local Police Station: Five bodies were brought to the station on July 13th. Four prisoners that were detained for kidnapping were mistreated after being taken into custody. The prisoners were given medical attention and interviewed. Interviews were also conducted with the IP supervisors, investigators, and IPs. Written statements were obtained from the prisoners.

(BC0042) Al Mishahida Local Police Station: Lieutenant [redacted] reported that IP [redacted] was killed on July 13th. Warrant Officer [redacted] was also wounded in the attack. Both men were returning home after their shift. They had just boarded a bus in the market area when it was sprayed with gunfire from a passing vehicle. The incident was reported to District HQ by LTC [redacted] who has been confirmed by MOI as the new Station Commander. Colonel [redacted] dismissal may have to do with former Ba'ath party connections. Lieut. [redacted] reports that nearly half of his shift is absent putting the station critically understaffed. JCC is not operational. Forty Glock pistols were delivered to the station and they were signed for and secured in the armory.

(BC0047) Al Quds Local Police Station: Major [redacted] was with a Brigadier General from Rusafa HQ and were out inspecting the patrols in the Quds area. The Team observed several IPs cleaning their AK-47s. Three tower guards wore immaculate uniforms, and polished shoes. The inside grounds of the station is well kept and clean. A directive on the station wall next to the Commander's office ordered no cell phone usage in the building as of July 11th. It was written in response to a memorandum from Adhamiyah HQ. All cell phones must be left with the guard at the front gate. There are 25 inmates housed in cells in which are clean, neat and free of offensive odors.

(BC0052) Al Rashidia Local Police Station: Colonel [redacted] expressed concerns of a pending attack by the Mahdi Militia sometime during the night. The intelligence he had was that the attack was to take place on July 13th with 50 vehicles involved; the intent of the Mahdi Militia is to take control of this area.

The Team delivered two police vehicles; a Nissan truck and a Chevrolet Lumina sedan which is for the Colonel's use. Two vehicles were tagged for repair at Camp Taji. Fuel (160 liters) was also delivered to the station for the patrol vehicles. Colonel [redacted] said the two men arrested for possession of the AK47's at an illegal checkpoint were hired by the city council. The local judge has not rendered a verdict or opinion yet. The Team explained checkpoints can only be manned by IP or IA; the Colonel tried to explain that it is only the local people trying to keep the insurgent forces out.

(BC0059) Al Sha'ab Local Police Station: Major [redacted] was with a Brigadier General from Rusafa HQ and were out inspecting the patrols and checkpoints in the Sha'ab area. There are 18 prisoners housed in the cell. One of the inmates being held was an IP arrested for murdering an Iraqi citizen. He is identified as [redacted] a Lieutenant with the Baghdad Highway Patrol. The major crimes unit arrested him on a warrant outside of Sha'ab jurisdiction and he was transferred here. He will be transferred to Ganat station after the investigation is complete.

Compiled by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2) 6/16/2008

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(BC0064) Al Taji Local Police Station: The Team delivered 20 Glock pistols which were inventoried and logged into the armory. Uniforms, gun belts and accessories were also brought. A computer was installed, a printer connected, and a demonstration on their functioning was given. Training on establishing a perimeter and conducting interviews was given to fifteen IPs.

(BC0057) Al Salaam Local Police Station: The Team met with LTC [redacted] who reported no major incidents since the last visit. On the joint patrol done on July 13th, two males had been arrested when they fired on IP vehicles as they passed. LTC [redacted] said the suspects were taken to court and the judge released them on one million dinar fines. The rifles used are still in IP custody. 463rd Company Commander's team arrived on station and a joint patrol was organized with his team, the PTT and a number of IPs. Patrol focused on the market area and a large section of the city. PTT accompanied the movement to Al Zohour, Shiekh Saad and Boob Al Sham LPS to gather information on their disabled patrol vehicles to be included in a plan to have them repaired at Camp Taji.

(BC0081) Bab Al Shiekh HQ: LTC [redacted] reports the station received 11 new IPs and 2 new trucks over the past few days. The team will check with KBR to get training for station personnel.

(BC0086) Baghdad Main Provincial Police HQ: The Team took the ERF Commander from Al Shoula, Major [redacted] to each of the area checkpoints. They assessed the staffing, tactics and safety of each checkpoint and mentored the ERF personnel on proper checkpoint procedures.

(BC0089) Belat Al Shuhadaa Local Police Station: The shift commander was out on patrol with other IPs. It is becoming increasingly difficult to have the command staff of this station cooperate with the Team in disciplining IPs and containing the IPs for training. The stations' Colonel shows very little interest in cooperating with the Team and taking charge of his station. IPs are becoming disinterested and somewhat uncooperative as they understand the Team has no authority to discipline.

(BC0100) Mada'in Patrol Police Station: The PTT Team was advised of an IED exploding by IPs just west of the station approximately five minutes before PTT's arrival. Two IPs were killed, one of which was a Major from this station and twelve wounded.

Colonel [redacted] increased manpower in around all Mosques in their area after receiving threats. Air conditioning units, desks, mattresses and computers was dropped off by CFs. The station appears to be functioning very efficiently.

(BC0103) Criminal Investigation Division: The Team assisted the military in a raid of a house in Baghdad suspected of housing hostages. CID investigators were mentored and trained in crime scene techniques, interview and photographic skills were honed.

(BC0121) Saba Al Boor Local Police Station: The Team met with Colonel [redacted] and Colonel [redacted] who advised that MOI has them on red alert for a one week period that started July 13th and both would be working 24/7. MOI received information that the insurgents are going to attack government buildings in the next few days. The Team delivered 40 Glocks, a large number of tools, medical kits, air conditioners, and other supplies. Colonel [redacted] advised the Team that the 3 murder suspects who had escaped, were recaptured; however, they were released when taken in front of a judge in Baghdad. The Team advised the commanders of the requirement to man the JCC room on a 24/7

basis and who should be manning it. The detainees are still being fed by their families as the food contractor is not coming in Saba Al Boor. Currently there are six prisoners.

(BC0401) Baghdad Taji IHP Station: The Team brought 20 Glock pistols which were inventoried and logged into the armory. Uniforms, gun belts, and accessories were all brought and were distributed. Training was conducted on establishing a perimeter and conducting interviews to eight IPs.

An Najaf (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

Karbala (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

Babil (b)(3), (b)(6)

(BB0500) Al Hillah Regional Police Academy: The Team arrived and prepared the classroom for Riot Control instruction. Sixty IPs were scheduled to attend. When no students showed up, the Team met with Colonel (b)(6), (b)(3)c. Colonel (b)(6), (b)(3)c was under the impression the class was scheduled for next weekend. The Team also met with the language assistants to complete profile documentation and prepare payroll information.

Tikrit (MND-N) (b)(3), (b)(6)

No reports received on this date for Tikrit

Diyala (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

Salah Ad Din (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

At Tamim (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

Mosul (MND-N) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Ninewah (b)(3), (b)(6)

(MN0056) Ninewah Provincial Police Headquarters: There are currently 1224 IPs and 301 officers assigned to PHQ. 25% of them have been to the academy. M and M test did not go on today.

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The PTT advised in the development of a FTO (Field Training Officer) program and a Continuing Training Program. The plan for the FTO program is to marry up a new recruit with a veteran IP as a mentor and trainer until the new recruit goes to the Academy. A check list of items for the new recruit to be trained in will be maintained by the FTO and turned into the station commanders upon completion. The Continuing Training Program is

designed to provide training year round at the station level in things such as Firearms, Check Point security, Searching Procedures, Iraqi Law, Force Protection, Explosive Devices, Human Rights and Police Ethics or any other course Training HQ wishes to install. This program is for all IPs, new or old, Academy trained or not. It is not designed to replace Academy training but rather to compliment and supplement it on a yearly basis.

(MN0928) Abi Tamaam District Police Headquarters: Investigations class scheduled for tomorrow was cancelled by the district station executive officer due to increased insurgent activity and orders from NPHQ to step up patrols and checkpoints in the area. PTT scheduled a joint patrol with the Al Thakkafa and Abi Tamaam IPs tomorrow to assist and observe their operations.

Four IPs and one ex-IP were in jail. Two IPs were jailed in connection with a kidnapping, one IP was arrested for killing another IP, one IP was arrested for killing a civilian and the ex-IP was held in protective custody for killing and insurgency.

Ten traffic cones were requested for use at local checkpoints.

(MN0099) Major Crimes Unit: On July 15th, IPLOs sat in on a second interrogation of subjects. Present at the interrogation was CF Majors [redacted] and [redacted], Captain [redacted] numerous Iraqi Commanders, Investigators and Officers (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Both subjects claimed they worked with the resistant against CF. They claimed they were only low-level helpers that helped [redacted] and [redacted] (possibly from the West side of Mosul). They both claimed they transported explosives from one area to another as well as setting up locations to plant IEDs. Both subjects stated they would continue to attack CF if released, until CF left their country. Both stated they assisted [redacted] and [redacted] in attacking FOB Courage within the past two months. (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c
They also stated they were responsible for planting three or four IEDs against CF approximately every two months. They stated they 'found' the two 155 mm shells on the street near Badush and put them in their vehicle to safeguard them so they could protect any Iraqi civilians in the area just before being picked up by the Al Rabien IP Patrol.

According to Colonel [redacted] he believes both subjects will be released as they stated they only attacked CF and the Judge will release them. Colonel [redacted] stated the Judges place them in detention for 'a few months' until CF forgets about them, then release them. The release of dangerous AIF into population is, and has been a continuing problem for the Iraqi Police, Iraqi citizens and CF. During a discussion between Colonel [redacted] and IPLOs, it was suggested that if these admitted terrorists who admit to attacking Coalition Forces were to be held as POWs or war criminals for an indefinite period of time, this would alleviate the Judges 'catch and release' program they currently use with impunity. The release of admitted terrorists, such as in this case, remains a daily threat to Coalition forces. (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The evidence and Property room are still in need of air conditioning. IPLOs have repeatedly requested the IPs address this issue through their chain of command.

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(MN0076) Tall Afar District Police Headquarters: The PTT Team went to the DHQ and discussed the arrangements for transporting the first 24 detainees from Tall Afar to Mosul. There was one IP Officer and two IPs ambushed and killed on Thursday. General [redacted] returned to work after being off since the attack on him. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(MN0914) Tall Afar Traffic Circle Station: Upon arrival, PTT met with the station leadership and determined that things were running well. Several supply items were received from the castle to include six cots, ten AK47s, 50 blankets, and fifteen vests without armor. All station supply needs were determined and documented.

(MN0962) Al Salaam Local Police Station: An IP was found to be wearing IA uniform pants and top due to having no blue IP uniforms. It was determined that the issuing/purchasing of necessary uniforms is still an issue. Three IPs who were transferred to Hassenqoi Police Station were required to turn in their pistols due to Al Salaam Police Station being in a bad area and needing them. Leadership was informed that that was not proper procedure and that the pistols needed to be returned to the proper IPs whose ID indicated the proper serial numbers pistols as being assigned to them. It was determined that the IPs at the station regularly uses information from CIs and this was pointed out as good police procedure. Station supply needs were determined and documented.

(MN0009) Al Hadba District Police Headquarters: PTT met with the Chief and other IP Officers at Hadba District Police station. Today's visit was to discuss the Hadba District's roster and continuous assistance of the IPs daily activities. The District Chief appeared to be contented during our meeting when he was advised that the district IPs will receive new uniforms and he was requested to submit an estimate of the expense. The chief also expressed his concern over IP training in the police academies located in other provinces and many of the IPs try to avoid being trained in other areas away from Mosul. He advised that they submit false doctor's slips so they can be excused.

(MN0220) Al Karama District Police Headquarters: PTT members visited Al Karama District HQ and conducted a station assessment. Upon their arrival, PTT met with COL [redacted] who stated that no significant acts had occurred in the past 24 hours. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

COL [redacted] discussed the lack of fuel available for both the district and individual stations. He said he could not conduct patrols effectively with only five operational vehicles within the district, and that his patrols were hampered with a severe fuel shortage. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The jail is currently being used as a storage unit for the contractors while the station under goes its renovation.

Several IPs within the district complained that medical supplies are needed and that none had been given to them when an IP is injured or wounded in the field. PTT members distributed several cases of medical supplies over three days to the supply officer at the Al Karama District. After hearing IPs, it is apparent that these supplies have not been distributed to IPs who need this equipment in the field. PTT members will address this issue with COL [redacted] and the supply officer during the next station assessment. (b)(6), (b)(7)c

PTT members provided a block of instruction to a total of 24 IPs in Introduction to Physical Evidence. PTT members instructed IPs on what type of evidence they may encounter and discussed chain of custody.

Compiled by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2) **6/16/2008**

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(MN0045) Al Khazraq Patrol Police Station: The Commander tested his QRF plan while PTT were present. The health inspector took some IPs with him for health inspections and had them arrest and jail three butchers for code violations. The team also delivered a generator to the high school next to the IP station that they purchased with their own funds.

The station currently has four vehicles in the IPA for repairs. PTT went to check on the slow turn around time. PTT learned that the police garage is authorized four chief mechanics and 55 mechanics. They have only one chief mechanic and they want him to go to the police academy. He has only 22 mechanics and none of them are familiar with Chevrolet vehicles and have to go to Irbil every ten days to find parts. Until a qualified instructor is provided or selected mechanics are sent to a school, the turn around time on vehicles is going to be lengthy.

(MN0036) Al Dawasas Patrol Police Station: Team members met with Major [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and staff members. IPs were alert and at there stations checking all vehicles entering police station area. Inspection of the jail faculties was conducted and found it to be clean and in order for Iraqi standards. The weapons room was also inspected and found all weapons stored and files in order. In addition, a joint foot patrol was conducted at the market place. Payroll and personnel records were reviewed and found all flies to be in order. PTT also mentored and advised the Major on the news release procedures.

(MN0381) Al Zuhoor Local Police Station: COL [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c gave PTT a list of 27 names of IPs that have not taken the literacy test. IPLOs and Coalition Forces along with IPs handed out small toys to the children from the neighborhood.

Arbil [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

Sulaymaniyah [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(No FFID#) Sulaymaniyah Criminal Court: The Investigative PTT met with Chief Judge [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c and discussed the caseload he carried as being unreasonably heavy and suggested that he find the means to share the caseload. It is perceived that Chief Judge [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)c prefers to overly control the legal environment in Sulaymaniyah and therefore maintains somewhat of an exclusive possessiveness over the pending case files and their dispositions.

There remains a substantial disconnect within the Sulaymaniyah criminal justice structure. Each component continues to direct blame and put forth excuses for failures to properly attend and process crime scenes and/or gather tangible evidence. Witness statements are the primary source of evidence and basis for convictions. Witness statements are suspect as are the means of obtaining such statements as well as some confessions.

The Legal Investigators typically have no significant interaction with police investigators, except to collect their case files. Once the legal investigators receive the case file, they conduct their investigation from the legal side of the law. The KP policeman is responsible for the collection of physical evidence at the crime scene and transferring the evidence to the legal investigators. The legal investigators transfer the KP investigators report and evidence along with their reports to the legal judge. The legal judge determines the course of action

training this afternoon. The rifles are to be issued to the SWAT team in the morning when they arrive for work.

The members of the team at the station assisted IPLOs/PTT with preparing the weapons for assignment to other team members. Once the weapons were assigned and a 3161 handover form is completed to ensure proper turnover of the weapons, maintenance of the weapons was conducted to rid the AK-47s of the packing grease on the weapons.

Upon completion of the administrative duties and maintenance of the weapons, the IPLOs/PTT and members of the SWAT team went to the Snake Pit range to complete functionality tests on all of the new weapons.

The six members of the SWAT team after completing functionality tests on the new weapons were also given Advanced Combat Pistol training with their issued Glocks. The training was conducted by members of the IPLOs/PTT and the USMC staff at the Snake Pit range.

Babylon (MND-CS) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Qadisiyah (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

Wasit (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

Basrah (MND-SE) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Maysan (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted due to the HIGH risk levels in Al Amarah City and due to other taskings by the military.

Basrah (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.

Al Muthanna (b)(3), (b)(6)

PTT continues to assist Dhi Qar PTT with Op Blast 9.

A meeting was held at the Australian camp regarding re-engagement with the IPS in Al Muthanna Province. Attending was Basrah Operations Chief Goecke and Al Muthanna TL Mott, the British Provost Marshall with his staff and the Australian 2IC Major [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(6)c. The meeting was very productive and the Australians projected a very positive plan to support CPATT in Al Muthanna Province especially in light of the IPA withdrawal from the province. It appears that CPATT is to take the lead in law enforcement issues in the province with the absence of IPA. Major [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(6)c was very positive with the Australian support.

Initial plans call for movements of CPATT and other additional personnel into the desert for as long as a week to gain the maximum contact with IPS in Al Muthanna. They are planning to perform from three to four station visits within that week of movement. Concerns arose as to the suitability of the SUV to travel with their ASLAVs as well as their Bushmasters. There is a strong concern that the SUVs will not be able to maintain contact during movement with

the Australians, particularly when they move onto secondary tracks or even cross-country. The PTT SUV may not be able to sustain a movement of that duration and difficulty over the terrain that will be encountered. It appears that the ASLAVs and the Bushmasters may be the most suitable vehicles for movement in this re-engagement.

Dhi Qar (b)(3), (b)(6)

No station visits were conducted.