L42

CPATT IPA-OPERATIONS DAILY SITREP

22 July 2007

Baghdad (MND-B) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Baghdad [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(BC0003) Airport Police Local Police Station: (TRA Level NA) The Team monitored the morning Guard Mount and observed IPs receiving their daily assignments. The Team met Global Security personnel and IP Command Staff to discuss operations and exchange security information. The Team monitored IPs on post and provided mentoring when needed. Past experience indicates the majority of travel issues occur immediately following 'no travel' days due to weather and other unusual circumstances.

(BC0010) Al Bayaa Local Police Station: (TRA Level 3) The Team met the Station Commander to discuss operations. The Station has not received fuel for the past 10 days and it was determined only a minimal amount of fuel remains on hand. Information revealed the Station Commander as implemented a system for rationing fuel by having personnel sign for amounts drawn. The Team reviewed the Police Blotter with members of the Operations Office. The Team determined the log is being maintained in that significant events are being recorded. Entries included the recovery of 5 dead bodies, recovery of 1 dead female that showed signs of being tortured, 1 IP (Taji Patrol) killed as result of traffic accident and a sniper shooting at an amusement park. Operations Office personnel provided information that a Wahhabi Sect aligned with the Militant Omar Brigade is responsible for a number of brutal crimes in the AOR. The Teams Military counterpart reviewed the details for follow-up intelligence reports.

(BC0012) Al Dorah Patrol Police Station (West): (TRA Level 3) The Team worked with Station Administrative personnel reference maintaining manpower figures, scheduling and assignments.

(BC0022) Al Kadhimaya Patrol Police Station (West): (TRA Level 2) The Team arrived at the Station and found there was no Command Staff present and only minimal Force Protection personnel on duty. The Team traveled to COP Justice and completed necessary administrative duties.

(BC0039) Al Mamum Local Police Station: (TRA Level 2) The Team met the Station Commander and discussed operations. Information revealed the Station is short of 9mm ammunition and the Commander was advised to use the Chain of Command for requesting additional ammunition. The Station Commander advised additional personnel and better equipment are needed at the Station. He advised all IPs working are being paid and those that are AWOL are not being paid. Detainee family members supplied clean linen and clothing for prisoners to combat the scabies issue in the jail. A private contractor has been located to repair the ECP gate and generator at the Station.

Information revealed 3 radios were sent to MOI for repair 3 months ago and has not been returned. The Commander advised all IPs working are being paid, while those AWOL are not being paid. The Team contacted the Maintenance Department OIC and requested he maintain accurate records for vehicles and other associated maintenance issues.

(BC0042) Al Meshahadah Local Police Station: (TRA Level NA) The Team conducted Training for 7 IPs and 1 Officer covering Police Survival Skills. Students were attentive to material presented and actively participated in classroom discussions. The issue of new IPs not being permanently assigned at the Station by MOI was discussed. It was determined the

Station Commander should resolve the issue by communicating with MOI through the Chain of Command. The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol with IPs to pick-up fuel for Station operations and no incidents were experienced.

(BC0073) Al Yarmouk Patrol Police Station (West): (TRA Level 2) The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol with 6 IPs occupying 2 vehicles. IPs were instructed to maintain a steady speed and document locations of anti-coalition graffiti for record. The Team observed IPs turned down dead-end streets on 3 different occasions and it remains unknown if the acts were intentional. IPs exited their vehicles on 2 different occasions for communicating information to the PTT reference clearing a Checkpoint. The Team was unable to meet with IPs after the Joint Patrol due to time constraints.

(BC0081) Bab al Sheikh Local Police Station: (TRA Level 2) The Team conducted 1 Joint Patrol with 3 IPs occupying 1 vehicle and no incidents were experienced. The Team visited Checkpoints and conducted real-time Training covering proper Checkpoint and Vehicle Search Procedures.

(BC0093) Hy Al Amil Local Police Station: (TRA Level 3) The Team arrived at the Station and observed a female citizen requesting assistance from IPs. She requested an escort to her residence to check for damages as a report indicated the house had been burned by members of Al Qaeda. IPs advised there was no vehicle fuel and they did not want to go by themselves. The Team accompanied IPs and the complainant to the location and confirmed the house was burned. The Team returned to the Station without incident.

(BC0105) Major Crimes Unit (East): (TRA Level 3) The Team met the Station Commander and discussed operations. The Team conducted Training for a Station Lieutenant covering Detention Facility operations. The Team inspected the Detention Facility and found 185 prisoners incarcerated. The Team is pleased with observed progress being made at the Station.

(BC0119) Al Rusafa Patrol Station (East): (TRA Level 2) The Station Major reported 31 AWOLs due to a CF blockade which prevented IPs from traveling to work. He also advised 1 of the Stations' IPs was shot by a sniper 2 days ago. He provided additional information that MOI Security Forces would not allow static patrols from the Station in the area approaching the MOI. The Team discussed Training and class scheduling for new IP recruits.

Babylon (MND-CS/S) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Al Qadisiyah (b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB Echo: IPAs met with the military (OIC) and discussed PTT Training on the FOB and the CLS class that is ongoing. It was decided that the training would start as soon as possible, depending on the outcome of the meeting with Gen. Sadek of PHQ, Col. (b)(7)(c), Lt.Col. (b)(7)(c) and Capt. (b)(7)(c) of the Diwaniyah Police Academy. IPAs met with Lt. Col. High and discussed the construction of the V.I.S.T.A. Academy on the FOB and its completion. Lt Col. (b)(7)(c) agrees that training should start right away and that the IPAs would schedule such training. A meeting was arranged with Maj. (name withheld) from the Ukrainian army. The IPAs and the Ukrainians will coordinate a joint effort to train the IP's on FOB Echo.

Babil (b)(3), (b)(6)

Compiled by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(BB0500) Al Hillah Regional Training Center: (TRA Level 2) The Police Transition Team (PTT) accessed reconstruction of the sanitation processing and storage units to relieve an above ground sewage problem that is in the area of the planned site of the new Crime Lab. Progress is moving forward satisfactorily. The Team also met with linguists to have English documents and proposals related to the proposed Crime Lab translated into Arabic for presentation by the DOS Provincial Reconstruction Team at a later meeting at the REO.

FOB Kalsu: The ERU students had a down day to perform maintenance. IPAs provided meals and supervision to students.

Wasit (b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB DELTA: IPAs met with Sgt. (name withheld) of the US Army and finalized logistical support for the Investigations class that will start Monday.

Dhi Qar / Al Muthanna (PIC) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Team members attended a patrol briefing for the upcoming visit to the Al Muthanna Province in the near future. PIC members continued to work on long range training plans for the IPS in the Dhi Qar Province. Training plans were developed for the upcoming trip into the Al Muthanna Province. PIC members continued to work on long range plans for the remainder of the OBG W (3). Team members attended a meeting with (name withheld) and the Australian Military in Camp Terendak. (Name withheld) thanked the Australian Military and coalition partners for their efforts within Iraq.

The Al Muthanna PJCC was contacted in regards to logistical requests that were submitted to the MOI. PIC members are attempting to forward this information up to the CPATT MOI Contacts in Baghdad to determine an outcome of the requests. Reorganization of the security plan for the IPS in both provinces was conducted by team members. This reorganization is for the benefit of the PJCC Commander. Team members prepared for the upcoming security conference meetings being held in the Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar Province.

Tikrit (MND-CW) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Diyala (b)(3), (b)(6)

(NO FFID#) Tahrir Local Police Station: (TRA Level – inactive) PTT-D delivered additional HESCO barriers and retrieved an estimate from a local contractor for the clean up of debris around the compound. The team also spoke with the Chief, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6), about investigators at the station and he advised there were no MCU personnel assigned to the facility. He also stated that they had no station investigators at this time. If investigators are needed, they are sent from Al Sharky IP Station. In reference to TRA Level, this station was previously destroyed and was just recently re-manned. PSMR has yet to be conducted on this station.

(TD0020) Buhriz Local Police Station: (TRA Level – inactive) The PTT-D conducted a station visit at Buhriz IP station and noted there were 22 IP on duty at the check points. There were 33 IP that were waiting for CF to escort them to the Aheded village. The IP were going there to start manning the village. PTT-D was told that the equipment that was given from the Buhriz IP station was 33 vest and helmets, 5 AK-47, 2 PKC, 2 RPK and 900 AK-47 rounds. 650 PKC rounds were also provided. PTT-D also returned a PKC barrel to the IP. No training was conducted. In reference to the TRA Level, this station was previously destroyed and was just recently re-manned. PSMR has yet to be conducted on this station.

(TD0018) Balad Ruz District Police HQ: (TRA Level – 2) The PPT-D team visited the Balad Ruz distinct headquarters and spoke with COL [redacted]. The COL joined the team with 12 IP and performed a joint patrol of the area.

Salah Al Din [redacted]

(TA0034) Al Musafi: (TRA Level 3) The Team observed that very little measures of force protection had been implemented (specific details withheld). PTT met with Musafi IP Station Commander, LTC [redacted]. During this meeting, the LTC was asked about his stations position in reference to Manning, Training, and Equipment Standards. LTC [redacted] stated that he had fifteen (15) IP assigned to his station, but that he felt that he needs at least fifteen (15) more for the station to fulfill its' mission requirements. LTC [redacted] stated that his stations mission includes the sweeping of MSR Tampa, as well as manning the gate/check point to the community. LTC [redacted] said that he has made the request for more personnel to the District Chief in Bayji, but has not received any word on any new IP.

After the discussion with LTC [redacted], PTT attempted to conduct an inventory of all arms assigned to the Musafi IP Station. Only 7 of the 15 assigned Glock pistols were present to be accounted for, and only 4 of the 15 assigned AK-47's were present. LTC [redacted] stated that the missing Glock pistols were either on the IP on duty or were in the possession of the IP that had quit and had not returned the pistols prior to their departure. The missing AK-47's he said were in the possession of the IP on duty at the gate or at their homes. Further inquiry into the missing Glock pistols revealed that LTC [redacted] has addressed this issue with the Provincial Chief who issued an order for the ex-IP to either return the pistols or return to work within the next 7 days. PTT will continue to check this status.

A short period of instruction on Foot Patrols was conducted, followed up by a short foot patrol to the Musafi Market Place Area. All IP observed conducted themselves professionally and with good officer safety techniques. No deficiencies were noted. PTT then proceeded to the gate/check point to observe the IP assigned there. During the observation period, the IP conducted themselves well and professionally, checking ID's and searching vehicles as prescribed in their standing orders. No deficiencies were noted.

(TA0037) Al Owja LPS: (TRA Level 3) On arrival, PTT noted 1 IP on gate duty. The rest of the station seemed abandoned. After walking into the sleeping quarters, PTT located 6 IP. When asked who was in charge, PTT was told the IP in charge was at lunch. After much debate about whereabouts of personnel, PTT was informed there were 15 IP on duty. After discussing a station defense plan, PTT called a React to Station Attack Drill. It was then revealed that only 8 IP were at the station. It took 25 minutes to get the IP to man their positions on the roof and at the gate. PTT addressed several faults in the station defense plan. PTT then conducted a mounted patrol of the Owja area.

(TA0050) As Saniyah: (TRA Level 3) Upon arrival at station, there were 49 IP that reported to duty. There were 39 IP doing station security and dismounted patrols, 13 IP at check points and 0 detainees. 17 IP were trained on checkpoints. PTT will start teaching the IP on building entry and searches.

(TA0099) Tikrit District HQ: (TRA Level 2) PTT traveled to TDHQ. Upon arrival, the Personnel and Logistic Officers were contacted and information was exchanged concerning PSMR operations. PTT then conducted several training drills with the station IP, to include reaction to VBEID and small arms attacks. The IP responded well and enthusiastically. Upon the next visit PTT will follow-up on extending the IP response to such incidents to area's outside of the station.

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Mosul (MND-N) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Ninewah [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(MN0016) Al Kisik: PTT mission was to conduct training and obtain general info about the area. PTT had intended to conduct a class on handcuffing. It was determined that no IP had handcuffs. PTT conducted a class on weapons handling.

(MN0022) Al Rabaein DHQ: PTT met with COL [redacted] (b)(7)(c) who confirmed that Al Yarmook station was moving to Al Gadeda station and will most likely remain there. COL [redacted] (b)(7)(c) stated that on 07JUL07, a foot patrol of twelve IP were performing a raid when two IP were killed while walking past a trash pile. On 14JUL07 a sniper shot an IP in the leg at a TCP and the IP is now in critical condition at AL Jamouri hospital. COL [redacted] (b)(7)(c) asked if the Team could get the IP into the combat support hospital (CSH) to save his life. The CSH was full and was unable to take the IP. However, PTT advised COL [redacted] (b)(7)(c) that we will keep checking for openings daily.

(MN0024) Al Sheak Fathi: PTT met with LTC [redacted] (b)(7)(c) who advised the Team regarding the two attacks that occurred, killing and injuring AL Rabeain DHQ IP. The station records room was inspected and found to be in order. LTC [redacted] (b)(7)(c) stated they have recently been receiving requested items with the exception of PKC ammunition. LTC [redacted] (b)(7)(c) stated they spoke with Mosul Electrical Department who advised him that they could hook up to an electrical grid 800 meters away, but it would not be much better than what they have now. They are looking into tying into a grid servicing a medical facility.

(MN0036) Al Dawasa LPS: (TRA Level 2) The Station Commander informed PTT that on 20JUL07 at 1230 hours, eight IP and one officer with two vehicles had set a TCP in the Tabana neighborhood in an alley. The IP came under attack from AIF with a BKC. One IP was killed and one IP was wounded. The Station Commander advised he is continuing to have patrols in the area due to the continued attacks. The Station Commander also advised that approximately ten days ago, one of the IP vehicles was damaged by an RPG. This attack occurred in the same area. PTT mentored and advised the Station Commander on the importance of continuing to patrol the areas where the IP are being attacked. The Station Commander informed the PTT that they were continuing their foot patrols with four to five IP at a time. The Station Commander advised IP observed a suspect stealing merchandise from a truck. The IP attempted to detain the suspect at which time the suspect attempted to flee. The IP then shot the suspect. The suspect was transported to a hospital for medical treatment.

(MN0045) Al Kazrag LPS: (TRA Level 2) The Station Commander informed PTT he has two TCP and a rotating 24 hour TCP. PTT was advised that no joint patrols have been conducted recently. While at the station, PTT heard a large number of small arms fire coming from all around the station. PTT believed the small arms fire may have been due to the end of the Iraqi soccer game. The joint mounted patrol was conducted without incident. During the patrol PTT did observe several IP conducting foot patrols in the area around the station.

(MN0076) Tall Afar DHQ: PTT spent the day prepared lesson plans for IP trainer training that will take place of FOB Sykes for the next five days.

(MN0137) Al Saad: There is no information available at this time. PTT is on an overnight mission at Tall Afar DHQ.

Compiled by [redacted] (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6)

(MN0201) Ninewah SWAT: PTT met with the Special Forces command and discussed the meeting which addressed the direction of and future ideas involving specialized teams. SF was concerned, as were various elements of CPATT, that the SWAT PTT was not notified about the meeting. The remainder of the meeting concerned target packages and their timelines. SF has requested both Ninewah SWAT and the PTT to assist on a target they have developed which should be ready to action over the next few days. SF has scheduled a meeting with their command staff and the PTT in the near future. PTT has arranged a convoy escort to the SWAT compound to deal with both personnel and command issues.

(MN0225) Al Mumi: PTT visited Al Mumi LPS to deliver force protection materials and a tent.

(MN0928) Abi Tamaam DHQ: Military conducted residential raids this date in the Al Muthena neighborhood. Military advised that this would not be considered a PTT mission.

At Tamim (b)(3), (b)(6)

(NO FFID) ERU: (TRA Level 2) PTT met with station chief and was advised of an accusation of the SGT in charge of the detention cell taking a bribe to release a prisoner. The traffic police detained a person and turned him over to an ERU patrol to take back to ERU detention cell. The traffic police had been informed that the jailer at ERU had taken a 250 dollar bribe and released the detainee. After gathering more information, the situation changed to the detainee claimed that when he was released, money the IP had taken from him and secured as personal property was short 250 dollars. The chief was advised to turn the investigation over to Internal Affairs for investigation. It was also explained to the chief that ERU should not be holding or accepting prisoners. Any person detained should be taken to the station having jurisdiction in that area. At approximately 1130hours, the chief was notified that an ERU patrol was hit by an IED and two officers were injured and taken to the hospital. The chief excused himself so he could respond to the incident. PTT offered assistance if needed. The chief advised everything was under control.

(TT0026) Rahemawa Patrol Police Station: (TRA Level 4) PTT went over personnel records with the administrative section. All personnel files are above average. PTT also spoke with the logistics supervisor about getting water for the detainees. The station was out of water. The lack of water at the station for detainees is a constant problem.

(TT0276) Dibbis District JCC: (TRA Level 3) PTT checked the security of the JCCand found the front gate was closed but unguarded. The PTT went inside the facility to find the senior IP and two others watching TV in the lobby. LTC [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was briefed on the incident. The IP explanation was that he had just returned from picking up paperwork and was taking a break.

All parties discussed future plans and training needs for the JCC. LTC [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) wants to be able to perform some law enforcement functions, but can not because of the lack of a reliable transportation. The JCC is willing and able to perform police intelligence operations, but again need reliable transportation. PTT Also discussed a roadway that runs parallel with the Mosul and Kirkuk Highway on the top of the mountain ridge from Hawijah to Mukmar. It is reported that insurgents are using it to transport material and use for travel. There are no TCP locations on that roadway.

LTC [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has several problem areas that he wants to conduct security operations in. The areas have no clear jurisdictional assignment by Kirkuk HQS and are in the area that is in the Sagaran, Dibbis and Hawijah No Man's Land Triangle. The area is bordered on the South by Hawijah, the East by Sagaran and the West by Dibbis. These areas are the same

areas that the Sagaran IP received mortar fire followed by an IED attack. LTC [redacted] provided grid numbers as well as a hand drawn map to all the places. There are twenty five villages total in that area and the grid numbers are being translated. One village in particular that needs attention is [redacted] the Mayor [redacted] has his own security force dressed in IP uniforms and sets up TCP on the Mosul and Kirkuk Highway. They set up a TCP charge tolls, extort money and kidnap for ransom.

PTT then spoke to the chief regarding the homicide, attempted homicide and kidnapping investigation that has been ongoing for the past week. PTT feels that the subject of investigations needs to be brought up at the provincial level due to this station's lack of cooperation with PTT. PTT found that this investigation received no follow up, no collection of evidence, no adequate questioning of the living victim, no questioning of any potential witnesses and no crime scene processing. The final report consisted of a two and one half page report that only gave a really brief synopsis of the crime. The station chief was the lead investigator on this case, but he is resistant to any PTT advice and/or training.

Irbil [redacted]

(NO FFID) Traffic Police General Directorate: (TRA Level 3) PTT made an observational survey of the traffic checkpoints of the intersections in the northwestern sector of the 100 meter road.

(MI0044) Khabat District Police HQ: (TRA Level 3) The PTT met with IP at the District station and checked on the generator that was recently issued to the station. The personnel there are very happy with the generator, especially the night shift personnel who can now have some electricity while on duty. The PTT also spoke about vehicle and foot patrols. The IP advised that there was never enough fuel to do active vehicle patrols, but that officers were usually doing foot patrols in every village and every District daily, in the mornings and evenings when it is not so hot. The IP asked if there was a way for the Team to assist them with fuel for the vehicles because most of the time, the IP themselves are taking their own vehicles or taxi's to respond to calls. The PTT advised them that there was nothing that could be done for them by the Team and that they needed to make sure fuel requests were being sent through the proper channels. PTT will pass this information on to the PTT Chief to bring up with the PDOP and MOI.

(MI0600) Irbil Directorate Police Headquarters: (TRA Level 2) PTT traveled to Communication Section of the Irbil Directorate Police Headquarters and met with Communication Duty Officer, LT [redacted]. LT [redacted] advised the Communication Center serves as the hub of all IP communication within the Regional Government of Kurdistan. The Provinces of Sulaymaniyah and Dahok, along with all the other Provinces in Iraq are capable of transmitting messages electronically via text and voice on both secure and non-secure networks located in the headquarters. Fifteen other district and stations units within the Kurdistan Regional Government Security Force Network have the capability to transmit and receive the messages. An example of the network capability was provided to the PTT who presented the pictures and physical descriptions and personal information on the recent escapees from Government Prisons who the police are continuing to locate. Suspect and Vehicle Information can also be provided across the network via PDF Documents which can be forwarded on the network and printed for criminal investigation to be on the lookout and locate the wanted persons and vehicle.

In the Irbil Directorate and sub Districts the communication center can summon and dispatch the IP to incidents within their respective assigned zones. These units respond along with local station IP and either conduct further investigation or summon the Major Crime Investigators and the Crime Lab as the incident situation requires. LT [redacted] was questioned

about the response time of these units, investigators and technical support units. He responded that in the past there was a problem with vehicles and fuels but additional vehicles and additional fuel allocation have decreased the response time.

IP patrol Units are now stationed into area and respond via radio and cellular devices available to the IP. Duty rosters for the units that are dispatched and have responsibility to respond to the calls of the communication center are provided to the communication officer on a daily basis and are updated periodically during the shift to keep the communication section advised of who is available to respond. The outlying Directorates within Irbil Province, Soran and Koya along with the Provinces of Dahok and Sulaymaniyah communicate incident related information via the center, which then provide the information to attention of MG [redacted] and Baghdad as directed. Information provided by Baghdad is disseminated as directed to directorates of the other two Provinces in Kurdistan. The facilities of this center are substandard and the Police and Officer are housed during the duty hours in the same room as the equipment and work area.

(b)(7)(c)

LT [redacted] advised that a plan is in progress to construct a new facility in the vicinity or co-located with the Joint Communication Center of Kurdistan and he advised any assistance that CPATT could provide to make this occur as soon as possible would greatly enhance the police being able to provide security to the region and investigative efforts to locate and arrest criminals. He also related that radio systems obtained from several sources are incompatible with each other and sub standard in quality. Nine of the base station units obtained from CF are not mission capable and no one is capable of making assessments on the possible repairs.

None of the portable radios provided by Republic of Korea are compatible or of quality to be upgraded. He further stated that the Motorola Radio System that Kurdistan Regional Government purchased is not fully functional and repair and programming of the equipment has met with many delays because of limited technical support provided with the system. He stated that future proposal and assistance should include the providers to train Kurdish technicians to perform repair, programming and installation, who work for the Security Service and understand the importance of having a functional system to the Safety and Security of those the system serves, and not just drop off the equipment with no further training.

PTT found the section to be totally competent and with a vast understanding of the responsibility and skills required for center. Further computers should be funded and procured to eliminate the multitude of hand written logs and reports that are required of the Center Staff all of which are capable of using the systems if available. Security surrounding the center on duty at the time of the visit was adequate but is considered vulnerable and should be addressed if the center is not re-located on a timely basis.

(MI0905) Airport Security Station: (TRA Level 3) The PTT met with the station commander in reference to a security situation that the PTT observed regarding departing flights from Erbil International Airport (EIA) (specific information withheld). The station commander stated that he agrees with the PTT assessment of this situation and will make the recommendations for corrective action to the airline.

Sulaymaniyah

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PTT met with MAJ [redacted] of the Camp Fumandy Persh Merga force protection unit. The topic of meeting was firing range and vehicle inspection for the last thirty security personnel.

(b)(7)(c)

Dahuk

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(MD0634) Ahemdi LPS: (TRA Level 3) PTT completed its final day of defensive tactics training. The final instruction consisted of escapes, strikes, and weapon retention. After completion of the class, PTT awarded thirteen IP with a certificate for completing the twenty hour course. PTT then met with the station commander and discussed a more detailed train the trainer course. PTT advised him that there were two IP that exceeded standards in the course and PTT would like to use them in the near future as assistant instructors. He advised that he liked the idea and he would get with the district commander on the dates and advise which station needed the most training.

Ramadi (MND-W) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Al Anbar [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(RA0002) IP Headquarters PHQ: (TRA level 3) Provincial Police Transition Team (P-PTT) members distributed 17 new or replacement badges. Senior members of the P-PTT met with the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) and the newly appointed head of the Internal Affairs Section for Al Anbar. There were lengthy discussions surrounding his duties, responsibilities, chain of command and investigations currently underway by those in his section. He also had hiring requests for more individuals to assist in these investigations. This was followed with a shorter meeting with Baghdadi District Chief in which manpower and insurgent activity were discussed. An additional meeting was held with the newly appointed General who was appointed in charge of all the Provincial Security Forces (PSF) in Al Anbar. His responsibilities and required logistical support were the main points of discussion. In the evening the P-PTT attended a social function at the home of a local Sheik. This gathering was attended by the Ramadi District Chief and many Station Chiefs as well as local community leaders and other area Sheiks.

(RA0005) Amariyah Patrol Police: (TRA level 2) An extended station visit is in progress. No daily station report was received due to limited communications. A comprehensive report will be filed upon return to camp.

(RA0009) PSF-3 (Tway): (TRA level 4) The Police Transition Team (PTT) did not visit the Tway PSF 3 station today. The PTT did not have an interpreter available for the visit. The PTT is working to finish the BATS process for Iraqi Police over the next few days.

(RA0010) Tameem: (TRA level 4) The PTT conducted a mounted patrol with the IP Public Affairs Officer. During the patrol, the PTT assisted in distributing food and cooking supplies to needy families. The IP Lieutenant has been keeping a record of needy families in the Tameem area. He has obtained the information during his census and during the community policing patrols. During the station visit, the PTT followed up with the detention staff in reference to the new booking forms. The detention staff is currently using the booking forms correctly. The PTT spoke with the IP Training Lieutenant in reference the training schedule and various training issues. The Training Officer indicated that he wanted to train the IP who were going out on patrols rather than the same group all of the time. The IP Training Officer has requested that the PTT conduct more joint patrols with them.

(RA0013) Fallujah District Police HQ: (TRA level 2) An extended station visit is in progress. No daily station report was received due to limited communications. A comprehensive report will be filed upon return to camp.

(RA0016) Ferris Station: (TRA level 2) An extended station visit is in progress. No daily station report was received due to limited communications. A comprehensive report will be filed upon return to camp.

(RA0020) East Station: (TRA level 4) The PTT arrived and noted seven IP and one IP Lieutenant were involved in a patrol. The area that was patrolled was an abandoned warehouse district. The purpose of the patrol was to check for insurgent activity. The IP maintained a good formation and good weapon / muzzle discipline. The IP Officer was advised of deficiencies noted during the patrol and they will be addressed.

(RA0022) IHP-7: (TRA level 2) Police Transition Team (PTT) on stand-down status due to late night after being stranded in the field due to mechanical failure.

(RA0029) Jazeera: (TRA level 3) The PTT members conducted a jail inspection with no issues or concerns noted. The new prosecution packets were reviewed with the senior investigator who is responsible for preparing the cases for prosecution.

(RA0030) South Station: (TRA level 3) The Police Transition Team (PTT) was assigned to other duties. They are currently securing the site of the new police station. The new station is still under construction. It lacks adequate force protection measures. The land owner and military PTT leader have determined that an International Police Advisor (IPA) presence is not advisable until the new station is operational and the force protection posture is enhanced.

(RA0032) Karmah Station: (TRA level 4) An extended station visit is in progress. No daily station report was received due to limited communications. A comprehensive report will be filed upon return to camp.

(RA0048) West Ramadi District Headquarters: (TRA level 3) The Police Transition Team (PTT) met to discuss the training schedule for the IP assigned to the radio room. Formal training plans and dates were established. The PTT assigned to the JCC will be instructing the report writing classes and various other topics yet to be determined.

(RA0048) West Ramadi Station: (TRA level 3) The PTT was requested to teach a class on sexual harassment. The class was prompted by an incident where 2 IP allegedly harassed a female soldier. Nine IP attended the class. No issues noted during the course of instruction. The station and the detention center were inspected and no problems were found.

(RA0054) Al Taashi: (TRA level 4) The PTT will be attempting to complete the BATS process over the next few days.

(RA0060) Saqlawiyah Station: (TRA level 4) Delayed reporting from an extended visit.
19 July 2007 Police Transition Team (PTT) trained Iraqi Police on Physical Fitness and Self Defense Tactics (Pressure Point Control Tactics & Unarmed Self Defense). The Saqlawiyah Iraqi Police were receptive to the training. The Saqlawiyah Iraqi Police Station remains out of communication with the Joint Communications Center. The Police Transition Team is working to remedy this issue with proper radio communication equipment. The station continues to receive fuel from Coalition Forces. This issue is being addressed by sending requests to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

20 July 2007 The Police Transition Team conducted an inspection of the Detention Facility and observed 1 detainee. The detainee appeared to be in good health and there were no signs of abuse or neglect. The Detainee was being held as a "suspect" pending further

investigation. The inspection found that the Detention Facility was clean, free of debris, and mattresses were provided. The Detention Facility provided adequate restroom facilities.

The PTT trained 5 Iraqi Police on Weapons Handling and Clearing. During the training, the PTT observed that the IP were controlling the muzzle of the AK47s and kept them pointed in a safe direction. The PTT trained One Warrant Officer on mission planning. He was assigned the task of planning a future joint patrol in an area adjacent to the Saqlawiyah Iraqi Police Department's Jurisdiction. The Warrant Officer learned to properly coordinate his personnel and assets with military counterparts. This training will enhance the Warrant Officer's ability to plan and coordinate missions based on the Saqlawiyah community's needs. The Warrant Officer was receptive to the training.

The Police Transition Team again inspected the Detention Facility at 1400 hrs and 7 male detainees were brought in by the IP as a result of a patrol. Two of the prisoners are thirteen years old. The prisoners appeared to be in good health and there were no signs of abuse or neglect. The Detainees were being held as "suspects" pending further investigation. The Saqlawiyah IP continue to have booking procedures in place.

21 July 2007 The Police Transition Team spoke with IP leaders to verify the current number of Iraqi Police on shift and their status. The PTT then conducted an inspection of the Detention Facility at 0930 hours; no detainees were found. The eight prisoners from the day prior were released earlier in the morning.

The PTT provided training in Room Clearing Techniques. The PTT demonstrated proper tactics during room clearing operations. The IP participated well and realized the necessity for future training as they observed their inability to clear rooms efficiently. The PTT conducted a second class on the proper techniques to lift latent fingerprints by demonstration and hands on training.

(RA0070) Civil Camp Police Station (Habbaniyah): (TRA level 4) The PTT responded to the area of the proposed Fallajat Station in order to check on any prisoners detained, no prisoners were at this station. While at the station one of the IP contacted the PTT leader and informed him that they were in possession of an explosive device. The device was found at the cemetery in Fallajat. Locals notified IP and the IP took custody of the device. EOD was notified and responded to dispose of the device. The PTT then responded to the Civil Station to conduct a check of prisoners. The PTT attempted to contact the investigation section on the packets on the prisoners but the investigators had left for the day. No training was conducted.

(RA0072) Rutbah District Police HQ: (TRA level 3) No daily station report is available due to limited communications. A comprehensive report will be submitted upon return.

(RA0083) Hadithah District HQ: (TRA level 4) Police Transition Team members prepared to teach a Crime Scene Administration course. Iraqi Police (IP) went into Haditha City to assist as a security element in the distribution of propane gas. PTT instructed classes today to the 50 PSU trainees. The training covered IED Recognition and First-Aid. A practical exercise in IED training was conducted outside the station.

PTT supply personnel issued uniforms and ID arm band holders to 50 PSU personnel. PTT member spoke with the Station Chief in reference to assigning 2 officers and 2 IP for Evidence Personnel Department Heads and instruction in Crime Scene Investigation for the station. The Station Chief stated he would turn in the list of names to PTT in order to begin the necessary training. The PTT also identified from the PSMR an area of weakness in

Public Affairs. Preparation is being made to locate the PAO to begin training in this area. PTT members and IP participated in two joint foot patrols with Coalition Forces.

(RA0084) Baghdadi Local Police Station: (TRA level 4) The Police Transition Team (PTT) provided range instruction for PSU at Al Asad. However, due to radio problems, they were unable to live fire.

(RA0092) Karabilah Police Station: (TRA level 3) The PTT traveled to AQ for a mandatory intelligence briefing.

(RA0093) Rumana Local Police Station: (TRA level 2) The Police Transition Team (PTT) made a station visit today at Sadah's substation Khe Sahn.

(RA0095)Baghdadi DHQ: (TRA level 2) The Police Transition Team (PTT) provided range instruction for PSU at Al Asad. However, due to radio problems, they were unable to live fire.

(RA0096) Dulab Local Police Station: (TRA level 4) The Police Transition Team (PTT) provided range instruction for PSU at Al Asad. However, due to radio problems, they were unable to live fire.

(RA0097) Kubaisa Local Police Station: (TRA level 4) No station visit was conducted. Military members of the Police Transition Team were assigned to operations not related to the PTT mission.

(RA0098) Muhammadi Local Police Station: (TRA level 4) No station visit was conducted. Military members of the Police Transition Team were assigned to operations not related to the PTT mission.

(RA0103) Sadah Local Police Station: (TRA level 3) The Police Transition Team (PTT) made a visit to Khe Sahn, a substation of Sadah. The PTT issued 3 IP badges. A class was provided on Patrol Readiness and Foot Patrols. Coordination was made for future mounted and foot patrol in the assigned area. Additional training covered Coalition Forces recognition.

(RA0115) SW Husaybah Local Police Station: (TRA level 4) No visit was conducted. The Police Transition Team traveled to AQ for a mandatory intelligence briefing.

(RA0134) Khaladiyah Police Station (Habbaniyah): (TRA level 3) The PTT conducted a station visit to check the detainees and facility. The detention center was found well staffed and clean with no signs of abuse. The PTT spoke with the station investigator about proper case file preparation and evidence collection.

(RA0252) Fallujah JCC: (TRA level 4) An extended station visit is in progress. No daily station report was received due to limited communications. A comprehensive report will be filed upon return to camp.

(RA0910) Zangora: (TRA level 4) The PTT conducted a visit and IP training at the Tway Station.

(RA0920) Tway: (TRA level 4) Twenty IP were taken to the firing range. The IP participated in an AK-47 course of fire. Afterwards, the PTT met the Station Chief at a new check point in the area of operation to discuss manning and equipment issues.

(RA0942) Al Obaid: (TRA level 4) The PTT traveled Junction City for mandatory administrative and logistic duties.

Ramadi Training Center: The Police Transition Team, in conjunction with Coalition Forces, conducted training day 4 of the Officer's Basic. One member of the PTT is visiting other Forward Operating Bases in the Region to present other PTT with the Detectives Class information.

Al Asad Advanced Training Center: International Police Advisers (IPA) instructors discussed the schedule for the Administration and Leadership class. IPA are attempting to obtain the forms used by area IP for their basic policing duties in advance of the training. Coordination with Coalition Forces is being finalized to ensure smooth operation of the course.