~~SECRET~~ U

JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER CENTRAL (JICCENT)

7601 HANGAR LOOP DRIVE
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

JICCENT/OIA

Date: 14 Nov 1998

SUBJECT: Suggested new name for CONPLAN DESERT RESOLVE

U ~~(S/NF)~~ Recommend using the name DESERT CROSSING, vice DESERT RESOLVE, for the new conplan relating to transition of Iraq following destabilization of the regime.

English: DESERT CROSSING
Arabic: Aboor al-Saharat

U ~~(S/NF)~~ "Aboor" (literally: *crossing*) is a favorite propaganda theme of Saddam Husayn's Regime. The concept has been used frequently in speeches and interviews since early 1994 by key leaders, including Saddam himself. Aboor is a metaphor for many things--

- generally speaking, it is invoked to suggest that Iraq is in the process of crossing from a troubled period in its history to better times
- it is also part of the mythology of Saddam, that following his 1959 assassination attempt on General Qassim, Saddam had to flee (according to legend) on foot, and swim across the Tigris-- a symbolic act of rebirth, or purification, or some such. Saddam often compares his own fate to that of the Iraqi nation.
- it was also a sly metaphor used in during the October 1994 buildup of forces along the border with Kuwait to suggest a "crossing" back into Kuwait.

U ~~(S/NF)~~ By co-opting the term, we would deliver a frightening and ominous message to regime supporters and a heartening sign to regime opponents.

U ~~(S/NF)~~ The English meaning, though not quite as rich as the Arabic, is also evocative of the general idea of the plan.

The Iraqi's fear our "left hook" across the desert following DESERT STORM. The name of this operation, the first involving large scale US ground forces movement into Iraq since DESERT STORM, might suggest to them another left hook through the desert areas west of Kuwait and the Tigris-Euphrates river valleys. In fact, the plan's movement is predominantly up the fertile valley plain around Highway 8.

b.1.: 1.4a + c, 1.8

(U) Some examples of Iraqi VIP use of the term are as follows:

"IRAQ HAS CHOSEN THE MEANS OF STARTING *THE CROSSING* AND THE MEANS THAT WILL LEAD US TO THE OTHER BANK..."

Saddam Husayn during an address to officers celebrating the offensive against Irbil

~~SECRET~~ U

"WE HOPE TO HOLD A CELEBRATION AMID OUR PEOPLE'S JUBILATIONS ON THIS GREAT VICTORY AND THE BEGINNING OF *THE CROSSING*. GOD WILLING, A COMPLETE *CROSSING* WILL BE REALIZED SOON."

Amir Rashid, Oil Minister commenting on the beginning of Iraqi oil sales under UNSCR 986
(061422Z DEC 96, FM FBIS AMMAN JO)

IBRAHIM EXPLAINED WHAT THE GIFT REPRESENTS. HE SAID IT IS A MODEL OF THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE AND THE HOUSE IN WHICH THE LEADER PRESIDENT, MAY GOD WATCH OVER HIM, WAS BORN. THE TWO PLACES ARE LINKED BY A BRIDGE SYMBOLIZING *THE CROSSING* TO VICTORY, GOD WILLING, AND AN IRAQI FLAG RAISED OVER A MAST ERECTED AT A CORNER OF THE HOUSE, SYMBOLIZING THE LEADER PRESIDENT'S MARCH OF HEROIC JIHAD FOR THE SAKE OF NOBLE VALUES THROUGHOUT HIS LONG LIFE.

RCC member 'Izzat Ibrahim presenting gift to Saddam on his birthday
(111858Z MAY 97, FBIS AMMAN JO)

"INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS...CANNOT MAKE THE IRAQIS *CROSS* TO THE SAFE SHORE AND VICTORY, BUT WHAT CAN MAKE THEM *CROSS* IS THE RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP..."

Saddam Husayn (262232Z OCT 98; FBIS RESTON VA)

U ~~(S/NF)~~ To recapitulate, the name translates well [ ] I can provide further clarification or details as required.

[ ]
CCJ2
[ ]

→ same as previous page

→ b6

Deny in total
TS/SCI
b1, Section 1.4
a., c, d, g

—Original Message—

b6 From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2005 5:18 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: DC: FW: CINC Wargame Update - 11 May 99

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (u)
CAVEATS:
TERMS [redacted]

b6 [redacted]

—Original Message—

From: [redacted]
b6 Sent: Monday, May 17, 1999 3:40 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: CINC Wargame Update - 11 May 99

b1, 1.4c, b3 Absolutely concur with your reasoning behind by-naming folks. I'll work through the J2 to get these folks invited.
The J2 specifically mentioned [redacted] but I agree that we should get away from single source agencies.
We can talk tomorrow morning at the azimuth check [redacted] scheduled. b6

v/r

b6

LTC, MI
Chief, J2 Plans
968-6279

—Original Message—

From:
b6 Sent: Monday, May 17, 1999 3:18 PM
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: CINC Wargame Update - 11 May 99

b1, 1.4a, c + b3 + b6

1.4a, c, b3 should not play a role in the red cell, we don't want to start inviting in single source producers. they don't bring a balanced view to the table, and we may have to start fending off requests by

there is a reason for these particular names, I can explain if there are any questions.

b5

b6

b6

—Original Message—
From:
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 1999 10:25 AM
To:
Cc:
Subject: CINC Wargame Update - 11 May 99

1. Based upon discussions with the J5 and guidance from the J2, the following intel positions (recommended fills) have been identified as part of the CINC's Wargame, 14-17 JUN 99:

b1: 1.4a, c, d

b3

Same as above

1.4a, d

Request sanity check of the above from addressees.

release

2. We will "by-name" request individuals present for the 29/30 April CENTCOM Intel conference to fill the slots from national level agencies. Who do you want?

3. Do not yet know composition for the rehearsal on 8 June but will let you know as soon as I do.

4. Will meet with J5 and BAH tomorrow morning (time TBD.) I'll attend the CINC brief tomorrow afternoon. Notes will follow.

v/r

b6 [redacted]

LTC, MI
Chief, J2 Plans
[redacted]

DERIVED FROM: multiple
DECLASSIFY ON: 300601

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ U
[redacted]

DERIVED FROM: MS
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ U
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~
TERMS: NONE

***** MESSAGE HEADER *****

Source: USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL A
DTG : 191800Z APR 99
APR 99

Message ID : 24020554
Received Date: 192125Z

***** MESSAGE TEXT *****

RATSZYUW RUCQAAA0558 1092115-SSSS--RUCJACC.
ZNY SSSSS
R 191800Z APR 99
FM USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2//

b2 "low" explicit (exh)

BT
S E C R E T NOFORN
QQQQ
SUBJ: POST-SADDAM IRAQ INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND WARGAME MESSAGE FROM DAWS

1.(S/NF) THIS MESSAGE ANNOUNCES A WORKING-LEVEL CONFERENCE 29-30 APRIL 1999 TO ASSESS POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR A POST-SADDAM IRAQ. THE CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE CENTCOM J2 CONFERENCE ROOM, CENTCOM HEADQUARTERS [ ] AT MACDILL AFB, FL. ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED TO SEND THEIR LEADING ANALYTICAL EXPERTS TO THIS CONFERENCE.

b1 section 1.4 g

2.(S/NF) USCINCCENT, GEN ZINNI, HAS DIRECTED CENTCOM J5 TO ESTABLISH A SENIOR-LEVEL "WARGAME" TO EXAMINE US POLICY OPTIONS AND POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION IN A POST-SADDAM IRAQ. THE WARGAME WILL BE CONDUCTED 14-17 JUNE 1999. GEN ZINNI HAS FURTHER DIRECTED THE "STARTING POINT" FOR THE WARGAME TO BE A "WORST-CASE" SCENARIO.

3.(S/NF) THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE 29-30 APRIL CONFERENCE IS TO DEVELOP THIS "WORST-CASE" SCENARIO. SECONDARY OBJECTIVES INCLUDE ASSESSING OTHER POSSIBLE SCENARIOS; DEVELOPING

"ROADMAPS" OF HOW WE MIGHT GET TO THOSE SCENARIOS; AND, DEVELOPING INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS FOR EACH OF THESE SCENARIOS. WE WILL ALSO EXAMINE LIKELY EVENTS LEADING UP TO SADDAM'S DOWNFALL AND INDICATORS OF THOSE EVENTS.

b5 4. U ~~(S/NF)~~ FOR [ ] REQUEST A PRESENTATION OF YOUR RECENTLY COMPLETED DRAFT [ ] ON POST-SADDAM IRAQ [ ] FROM ITS PRIMARY AUTHOR, [ ] AS THE SCENE-SETTER FOR OUR CONFERENCE.

5. (U) FOR USCENTCOM COMPONENTS: A VTC WILL BE HELD ON 30 APRIL 1999 AT 0700 EDT TO PROVIDE A MID-CONFERENCE UPDATE TO CENTCOM COMPONENTS AND DEPLOYED JTF'S (CONFERENCE NUMBER 3081049.)

6. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE.

A. (U) REQUEST ADDRESSEES NOTIFY BELOW NAMED POC OF INTENT TO SEND REPRESENTATION TO THE CONFERENCE NLT 27 APRIL 1999.

B. (U) ATTENDEES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING THEIR OWN BILLETING AND TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS.

C. U ~~(S/NF)~~ SCI CLEARANCES SHOULD BE PASSED TO SSO CINCCENT //CCJ2-SSO//, PURPOSE IS TO ATTEND POST-SADDAM INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE.

D. (U) CONFERENCE WILL BEGIN DAILY AT 0930 EDT.

7. (U) POC FOR THE CONFERENCE AND THE VTC IS LTC [ ] CCJ2 PLANS, [ ]

b6

BT
#0558
164C

NNNN

From:
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 1999 2:57 PM
To:
Subject: RE: wargame

roger all you have said, check with the J5 guys and ensure BG Johnson is happy and get back to me. Thanks. hln

-----Original Message-----
From:
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 1999 10:14 AM
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: wargame

b6

Yes sir, understand.
At the briefing to Booz-Allen yesterday, we had a J5 guy present ( ) and he seemed to like our scene-setter. He took a copy of it with him, so J5 is aware of where we are headed. In fact, they even participated in the conference last week, so there should be no surprises.
Booz-Allen seemed happy with the information we gave them, and they are taking copies back.
One important decision has been made regarding the game that has made our scene-setter less important to the whole process: both Centcom J5 and the Booz-Allen guys are strongly opposed to gaming the NCA go/no-go decision to execute Desert Crossing. The assumption at the start of the game is that the "go" decision has already been made. That being the case, the scene-setter will be a 15-20 minute brief at the start of play which will not involve any interaction/decisions with the participants. Game play will really start with discussion/decisions of issues beginning in Phase I of the plan.
They have their reasons for doing this-- I don't exactly agree, but the J2 will need to engage at his level if he wants the go/no-go decision gamed.
Bottom line: we've given J2, J5 and Booz Allen what they want. We will come up later today to show both you and J5 the proposed DIDlet for the CinC which is currently scheduled for Mon 10 May.

-----Original Message-----
From:
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 1999 9:22 AM
To:
Cc:
Subject: wargame
Importance: High

b6

b6

Stop by J5 today and discuss coordination of sceen setter/scenario with them. BG Johnson asked DJ2 to ensure we were in full coordination before we briefed the CINC. hln

JTF-SWA/J2 Comments on Desert Crossing Wargame Scenario 5 May 99

1.4a, d

1. Scenario/Wargame should be [ ]

2. Indicators will be very difficult to collect. Must sensitize our seniors that we are likely to get very little warning (if any) of a regime change.

3. Need to emphasize that while an "Exiled Opposition Takeover" is a nonstarter (per NIC memo), instability/revolt in the south/north could be the catalyst for a regime change.

4. Scenarios/Branches/Sequels are based on the NIC memo (coordinated intel community position) so we should be on firm footing.

5. Agree that the branches/sequels should be based on Worst Case for US.

I still have major problems with page 17 in light of the title and implications of a "Desert Crossing". The "bullets" are at best contradictory, when put in context of what it would take to be ultimately successful.

1.4a, d

* Military involvement perceived to be supportive of a particular Iraqi political or opposition would be rejected by regional states.

How do we accomplish the first goal without direct support of some Iraqi political faction?

* Iraq's neighbors probably would acquiesce to US military involvement, if it were seen as a response to a humanitarian crisis.
* None of Iraq's neighbors would accept a prolonged US humanitarian presence, however, would want to see the situation stabilized and a quick exit of US troops.

Doesn't Kosovo give us a historical truth that everything may take longer and more effort (political will) to accomplish than originally planned for? In order for war gaming to be successful and meaningful shouldn't we make firmer assumptions on the Iraqi neighbor's support for "surge of forces" and more details on their support for US actions - necessary on a very "short-fused" basis in order to max the possibilities for success? While optimistic thinking is called for in war gaming - realism is also necessary, in my opinion, in order to truly be meaningful and most productive. "Desert Crossing" seems to be lacking in details about MNF support for US efforts and requirements.

b6

JTF-SWA/J2

U ~~SECRET~~ - declass per JOAQ/

DESERT CROSSING ISSUES and DECISION POINTS

Issues

1. If Iraqi leaders/military uses WMD or creates environmental hazards targeted against Iraqi civilians in a "scorched earth" strategy as they withdrew to central Iraq, what is our response? If this generates a huge humanitarian problem, are we willing and/or able to clean up the mess?

2. Will large numbers of U.S. casualties or the potential for such, undercut NCA commitment and Congressional Support for the Operation?

3. If the Coalition forces must fight Iraqi units on Iraqi territory, there is no place for them to run and therefore a potential for very high casualties among Iraqi units that resist. This is troubling, given the experience in 1991 when the Highway of Death undercut the will and commitment of the NCA. Would the NCA stop or modify the objectives of Desert Crossing following publicity of high Iraqi casualties?

4. Is the NCA willing to make an up front commitment to the entire concept of the plan-- that is, to lead an effort to fight, conquer, and occupy Iraq-- or will the NCA only bite off one piece at a time, seeking to modify the Operation after it begins execution to limit the scope of U.S. involvement and commitment?

Decision Points

1. Desert Crossing Go/No-Go?

2. Assume at the end of Phase 1, coalition cannot co-opt any Iraqi units. Is NCA prepared to initiate Phase II and fight our way into Iraq without any internal cooperation/invitation?

3. Assume that late in Phase 1 or early in Phase 2 a figure or group consolidates power in central Iraq and begins military operations to restore order throughout the country. Does the NCA halt or delay execution of Desert Crossing? Would regional players lose their enthusiasm and withdraw support?
-What if the new regime is *known to be hostile* to U.S. interests-- continue, delay, or halt execution?
-What if the new regime's *policies are unclear* as they relate to U.S. interests-- continue, delay, or halt execution?
-What if the new regime *appears to be friendly* to U.S. interests, but is embarking on a particularly brutal and bloody campaign to consolidate power throughout Iraq-- continue, delay, or halt execution?

4. Assume during phase 2, coalition forces co-opt southern RA units and begin moving north. As coalition forces approach Baghdad, no RG units can be co-opted. Is NCA willing to transition to fighting in order to continue moving north?

DECLASSIFIED BY: NEIL DIAL, BG, USAR, CCJ2
DECLASSIFY ON: 29 NOV 2005
ACTION OFFICER: JAY W. KENT, GG12, USAF

U ~~SECRET~~ 7

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2005 5:19 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Objectives for the J2

b6

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET UNCLAS
CAVEATS:
TERMS:

b6 [redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 1999 7:19 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Objectives for the J2

b6

[redacted]

The primary objective of the 29-30 April conference is to develop the "worst-case" scenario to be used as the start point for the CINC's Wargame. Secondary objectives include assessing other possible scenarios; developing "roadmaps" of how we might get to those scenarios; and, developing indications and warnings for each of these scenarios. We will also examine likely events leading up to Saddam's downfall and indicators of those events.

These are the objectives the J2 gave us in a meeting last week and were listed in the message announcing the conference.

Any questions?

y/r

[redacted]

LTC, MI
Chief, J2 Plans
[redacted]

—Original Message—
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 1999 7:11 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Objectives for the J2

b6

[redacted] J2 would like to see the objectives for Thursday/Friday's event. Email to me is ok. Thanks, [redacted]

DERIVED FROM: multiple
DECLASSIFY ON: 300601

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET U
CAVEATS:
TERMS: I

DERIVED FROM: MS
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET U
CAVEATS: NOFORN
TERMS: NONE

~~SECRET~~ u

DESERT CROSSING
pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference

29-30 April 1999
MacDill AFB, Florida

Purpose and Objectives

DECLASSIFIED BY: NEIL DIAL, BG, USAR, CCJ2
DECLASSIFY ON: 29 NOV 2005
ACTION OFFICER: JAY W. KENT, GG12, USAF

10

u

~~SECRET~~

DESERT CROSSING
Pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference

29-30 April 1999
MacDill AFB, Florida

Stability Indicators

DECLASSIFIED BY: NEIL DIAL, BG, USAR, CCJ2
DECLASSIFY ON: 29 NOV 2005
ACTION OFFICER: JAY W. KENT, GG12, USAF

Timeline


...the conplan timeline
Status quo
Destabilization
DESERT CROSSING
(SO)
Saddam gone
(NCA)
U.S. decision point
...the wargame
Wargame focus
...what we are doing
1. Succession indicators
2. Succession scenarios

Stability Indicators

- Information Requirements-- not Collection requirements.
- Purpose: determine measures of Iraq's internal political and social stability.
- Use: to facilitate CINC through NCA deliberations for the DESERT CROSSING Go/No Go decision.

Stability Indicators:

Instruments of Control

- RA or RGFC commanders attempts to contact the US or regional governments
- Unauthorized "removal" of SRG/SSO political officers at all levels of military field units
- *Unusual* increase in insurgent *urban unrest (north, south, central), decreased government control*
- *Unusual* Increase in government *mount suppression operations (north, south and central)*
- *Unusual* increase in insurgent attacks *(north, south, central), decreased government control*
- *Unusual* Increase in government counterinsurgent attacks *(north, south and central)*
- *Desertion rates/unit desertions (Unit cohesion)*
- *Unusual* movements by RGFC forces
- RGFC units move toward Baghdad
- *WMD use against internal targets*
- *Change in status or content of regime's broadcast media*
- Reports of fighting between Iraqi security or military forces
- Baghdad Security Plan and regional city security plans activated
- SRG heightened activity or deployments
- Increased numbers/reinforcing of checkpoints on roads and bridges
- *Change in C3 patterns*
- Terrorist attacks in Baghdad
- *Casualties from Coalition action*

Stability Indicators:

Leadership Consolidation

- Iraqi Political leaders attempt to contact the US or regional governments
- Announcement of New Leadership
- Continuing purges of high-level military or civilian officials
- *Status of key members of new regime (die, disappear or depart Baghdad)*
- *Status of key members of old regime (die, disappear or depart Baghdad)*
- Rapid VIP movements around the country
- New regime's alternative leadership arrangements publicized (i.e. "Regional Commands")
- New regime's alternative leadership arrangements enacted
- VIP "loyalty" checks/morale visits to units
- Iraq's Foreign Diplomats unable to reach authorities in Iraq
- Reports of fighting between new regime's factions
- Public denouncement of new Regime by a regional authority (Tribal, religious leader, government official, etc)
- Attacks on government facilities; official's residences

Stability Indicators:

Leadership Confidence

- *Announcement of new public programs, etc*
- *Successful execution of military orders*
- *Deployment of military units from Baghdad*
- *Public appearances*
- *International support, recognition*
- *Support of populace*

Stability Indicators:

Military/Regular Army

- RA commanders attempts to contact the US or regional governments
- Unauthorized "removal" of SRG/SSO political officers at all levels of military field units
- *Unusual* Increase in government *MOUT suppression operations (north, south and central)*
- *Unusual* Increase in government counterinsurgent attacks *(north, south and central)*
- *Desertion rates/unit desertions (Unit cohesion)*
- *Unusual* movements by RA forces
- RA units move toward Baghdad
- *WMD use against internal targets*
- *Change in status or content of regime's broadcast media*
- Reports of fighting between Iraqi security or military forces
- Regional city security plans activated
- Increased numbers/reinforcing of checkpoints on roads and bridges
- *Change in C3 patterns*
- *Casualties from Coalition action*

Stability Indicators:

Political/Social

- Iraqi Political leaders attempt to contact the US or regional governments
- Announcement of New Leadership
- Continuing purges of high-level military or civilian officials
- Key member's of new regime death or disappearance
- Key members of new regime depart Baghdad
- Rapid VIP movements around the country
- New regime's alternative leadership arrangements publicized (i.e. "Regional Commands")
- New regime's alternative leadership arrangements enacted
- VIP "loyalty" checks/morale visits to units
- Iraq's Foreign Diplomats unable to reach authorities in Iraq
- Reports of fighting between new regime's factions
- Public denouncement of new Regime by a regional authority (Tribal, religious leader, government official, etc)
- Attacks on government facilities; official's residences
- Shia and/or Kurds seize control of major cities and/or strategic facilities
- Broad civil unrest
- Iraqi media campaign focuses criticism on key leaders, families, tribes, or ethnic groups.
- Increased crime/banditry.

Stability Indicators:

Tribes/Ethnic/Religious

- Public demonstration for/against new Regime by a regional authority (Tribal, religious leader, government official, etc)
- Attacks on government facilities; official residences
- Shia and/or Kurds seize control of major cities and/or strategic facilities
- Broad civil unrest
- Iraqi media campaign focuses criticism on key leaders, families, tribes, or ethnic groups
- Tribal cooperation with new regime
- Status of regime payments to tribes
- Ethnic/sectarian diversity in new regime
- Providing arms to selected tribes
- Regime concessions to tribal/ethnic/sectarian

Stability Indicators:

Economic/Humanitarian

- Iraq seeks the aid of regional countries
- *Major outbreaks of disease*
- Ethnic atrocities
- Status of oil exports
- Large scale internal population displacement
- External refugee flows
- Status of national infrastructure (economic, health, etc)
- Severe distribution problems for humanitarian goods, ration card restrictions/shortfalls
- Breakdown of basic public services in major cities
- Environmental/ecological problems that exacerbate humanitarian shortfalls
- *Legal/Illegal foreign trade disruption/expansion*
- *Changes in exchange rate, prices.*
- *Economic policy changes-- foreign investment, production sharing, etc.*
- *Defense Spending and arms imports status*
- *Spending/repairs to basic infrastructure-- health, power, oil production, C4I, Translog, military and strategic industries.*
- *Increased crime.*

DESERT CROSSING
pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference

29-30 April 1999
MacDill AFB, Florida

"Worst Case" and "Most Likely"

"Worst Case"

Status quo

(SO) Saddam gone

Sudden Departure → Unified Sunnis who would oppose US forces hold in central Iraq but are unable to control other regions while sections break away. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

Military Coup → Coup not recognized by some cmdrs; regional military strongmen emerge. Strongmen may request US assistance

Military-Political Conspiracy → Unified conspirators, who would challenge US force, hold central Iraq but are unable to control other regions. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

Palace Coup → Tikriti coup plot unseats Saddam but cannot replace him; other Sunnis take control (or not). Mass violence: Tikritis vs others, Arabs vs Kurds, Shiite vs Sunni.

"Most Likely"

Status quo

(SO) Saddam gone

Assassination →
- Sunni conflict in central Iraq, no clear leadership emerges; north and/or south break away
- support of military/security services
- produces new leader(s)

Military Coup →
- Triggers regional ethnic uprisings; and fighting between major military units
- emerge

Military-Political Conspiracy →
- Sunni conflict in central Iraq, no clear leadership emerges; north and/or south break away
- support of military/security services

Palace Coup →
- Tikriti coup plot unseats Saddam but cannot replace him; other Sunnis take control (or not). Mass violence: Tikritis vs Sunnis, Sunnis vs Kurds, Shiite vs Kurd.
- down of order; sections of Iraq break away

"Most Likely"


Status quo
(SO) Saddam gone
Assassination
Unified Sunnis hold in central Iraq while sections break away
support of military/security services
ally
produces new leader(s)
Military Coup
Coup not recognized by all RG cmdrs; regional military strongmen emerge
Military-Political Conspiracy
Unified Sunnis hold in central Iraq while sections break away
support of military/security services
Palace Coup
Tikriti coup plot succeeds only after protracted inter-clan fighting, massive break-down of order; sections of Iraq break away

"Most Likely"


Status quo
(SO) Saddam gone
Assassination
Non-Tikriti ascends after limited struggle/palace intrigue, receives support of military/security services
ally
produces new leader(s)
Military Coup
Shia &/or Kurds see coup as opportunity to revolt
Military-Political Conspiracy
Non-Tikriti ascends after limited struggle/palace intrigue, receives support of military/security services
Palace Coup
Tikriti coup plot succeeds only after inter-clan fighting, some break-down of order

"Most Likely"


Status quo
(SO) Saddam gone
Assassination
Tikritis maintain hold and rally around new leader(s)
produces new leader(s)
Military Coup
RG begins repression of ethnic groups after coup
severe crackdowns
Military-Political Conspiracy
Tikritis maintain hold and rally around new leader(s)
produces new leader(s)
Palace Coup
Tikriti coup plot quickly succeeds, new leader(s) get broad support from mil/security

"Most Likely"


Status quo
(SO) Saddam gone
Assassination
Inner circle closes ranks, produces new leader(s)
Military Coup
Coup accepted by all of Iraq; severe crackdowns
Military-Political Conspiracy
Inner circle closes ranks, produces new leader(s)
Palace Coup
Tikriti coup plot quickly succeeds, new leader(s) get broad support from mil/security

Purpose

- To prepare for the 14-17 June wargame of Conplan DESERT CROSSING

- Deliverables:
  1 succession scenarios examined, "worst case" and "most likely" identified
  2 succession indicators for each scenario
  3 stability indicators, post-Saddam

(the goal is community consensus)

SECRET

Scope

...the conplan timeline

Status quo | Destabilization | DESERT CROSSING

(SO) Saddam gone

(NCA) U.S. decision point

...the wargame

Wargame focus

...what we are doing

1. Succession indicators
2. Succession scenarios
3. Stability indicators

SECRET

Scenarios
"A Russian Roulette of Regime Change"

- Assassination
- Military Coup
- Military-Political Conspiracy
- Palace Coup
- Constitutional Succession
- Popular Revolt
- Exiled Opposition Takeover

SECRET

Order of fire, Th 29 Apr 99

0800-0815 Opening remarks (Alexander)

0815-0830 the Wargame (J5 rep)

0830-0845 Purpose/objectives/schedule (Hooker)

0845-0915 DESERT CROSSING J5 rep

0915-0930 break

0930-1030 "Challenges in the Aftermath of Regime Change" (McCormick)

1030-1130 Assassination Scenario discussion (Hooker)

1130-1300 Lunch

1300-1400 Military Coup Scenario discussion (Figueredo)

1400-1500 Military-Political Coup Discussion (Figueredo)

1500-1515 break

1515-1615 Palace Coup Discussion (Hooker)

SECRET

Order of fire, Fr 30 Apr 99

0800-0830 Opening remarks/review yesterday

0830-1030 Stability Indicator Lists (Hooker/Figueredo)

1015-1030 break

1030-1100 Review of "worst case" scenario (Hooker)

1100-1230 Lunch

1230-1430 DESERT CROSSING intelligence issues (Hooker/Figueredo)

1430-1445 break

1445-1600 DESERT CROSSING intelligence issues (Hooker/Figueredo)

Pre-DESERT CROSSING Scenario Discussion: Assassination

29-30 April 1999
MacDill AFB, Florida

Scenarios
"A Russian Roulette of Regime Change"

- ***Sudden Departure***
- Military Coup
- Military-Political Conspiracy
- Palace Coup
- Constitutional Succession
- Popular Revolt
- Exiled Opposition Takeover

SECRET

Definition:

"Saddam's elaborate personal protection measures and pervasive and overlapping security forces have not prevented occasional attempts on his life. Serious attempts on senior regime figures in the last several years--particularly Saddam's son Uday and RCC Vice Chairman Izzat Ibrahim--suggest that a dedicated individual or cell could take advantage of flaws in the security net around Saddam."

- "lone gunman"-- not part of a wider conspiracy
- *sudden departure?*
- *Desert Fox II?*
- *Visibility of the event is key to outcome?*
- *Plotter from inner circle would lead to greater strife in aftermath?*
- is not a conscious effort intended to replace Saddam--more likely an act of revenge/crime of passion
- the act of assassination does not therefore propel the perpetrator to power
- if Saddam were to die suddenly of natural causes, the dynamic would be similar to an assassination

SECRET

Branches

Sudden Departure

#1

Sunni conflict in central Iraq, no clear leadership emerges; regime unable to control north and/or south

Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#2

Unified Sunnis who would oppose US forces hold in central Iraq but are unable to control other regions while sections break away. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#3

Unified Sunnis who would not oppose US forces hold in central Iraq but are unable to control other regions while sections break away. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#4

Non-Tikriti ascends after limited struggle/palace intrigue, receives support of military/security services

#5

Elites maintain hold and rally around new lesser known leader(s)

#6

Inner circle closes ranks, produces new leader(s)

Less stability

More stability

Sudden Departure Scenario Indicators

- Specific information of an Assassination plot
- Increased disunity/upheaval within the inner circle
- *Spike in high level defections*
- Regime retribution/violence against prominent social/ religious/tribal figures
- Increases or dramatic changes in regime VIP security procedures
- Emergency meetings of Baath Party officials/members
- *Unusual media behavior*
- Emergency/unusual VIP movements
- *Baghdad/Provincial Security* plan activated
- *Changes in military/internal security command and control, communications (C3)*
- *Restricted international communications*

Pre-DESERT CROSSING
Scenario Discussion:
Military Coup

29-30 April 1999
MacDill AFB, Florida

SECRET

Scenarios
"A Russian Roulette of Regime Change"

- Assassination
- Military Coup
- Military-Political Conspiracy
- Palace Coup
- Constitutional Succession
- Popular Revolt
- Exiled Opposition Takeover

SECRET

Definition:

- "All known plots against Saddam since the Iran-Iraq war have been spearheaded by active-duty or retired military or security officers. Access to well-armed units, communication and transportation links, and a cadre of like-minded career officers give a military-spawned plot--especially one involving Republican Guard or Special Republican Guard elements--a higher chance of success than most other scenarios. The change could occur suddenly or after a period of disintegration of civil order. "

Background:

- On the morning of 14 July 1958, army units ignored instructions to by-pass Baghdad on their way to Jordan and entered the Iraqi capital. The army seized the radio station and broadcasted a dramatic call to revolution. Soldiers attacked the royal palace, quickly overcame the royal bodyguards, and shot King Feisal dead. BGen Abd al-Karim Qassim emerged as prime minister and commander-in-chief of Iraq.

Branches/Sequels

Military Coup

#1
Triggers regional ethnic uprisings and fighting between major military units; external meddling

#2
Coup not recognized by <u>some</u> cmdrs; regional military strongmen emerge. Strongmen may request US assistance; Ethnic uprisings may occur

#3
Shia see coup as opportunity to revolt

#4
Kurds see coup as opportunity to seize additional territory

#5
Repression of ethnic groups; martial law

#6
Coup accepted by all of Iraq; somewhat smooth transition

Less stability

More stability

Military Coup Scenario Indicators

- Specific information of an Assassination plot
- Increases or dramatic changes in regime VIP security procedures
- Movement of RG forces into Baghdad
- *Insert Sudden Departure Indicators here*
- *Media and opposition group reporting surge*
- *Temporary media silence*
- *Communication pattern changes*
- SRG heightened activity or deployment
- Emergency/unusual VIP movements
- Bagdad security plan activated
- Key regime members depart Baghdad
- Reports of fighting between IZ security forces and military forces

SECRET

SECRET

Pre-DESERT CROSSING Scenario Discussion: Military-Political Conspiracy

29-30 April 1999
MacDill AFB, Florida

SECRET

Scenarios
"A Russian Roulette of Regime Change"

- Assassination
- Military Coup
- Military-Political Conspiracy
- Palace Coup
- Constitutional Succession
- Popular Revolt
- Exiled Opposition Takeover

SECRET

Definition:

- "A coalition of senior officials and officers could remove Saddam in a move similar to the Ba'th Party takeovers of 1963 and 1968. Saddam has fostered a culture of patronage, complicity, and mutual suspicion that inextricably links the fortune and future of Iraq's ruling elite to his survival in power. If, however, Saddam's followers decide that his actions imperil them, they might seek to remove him in hopes of preserving the Party's and military's hold on the country."

SECRET

Background:

- On 17 July 1968, the Ba'athists, with inevitable army support, made their successful coup. Four senior officers had been approached for help: the head of military intelligence, the commander of the RG, the commander of the RG Armored Bde, the commander of the Baghdad Garrison.

SECRET

Branches

Military-Political Conspiracy

#1

Military unit conflict no clear leadership emerges; regime unable to control north and/or south

Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#2

Unified conspirators, who would challenge US force, hold central Iraq but are unable to control other regions. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#3

Unified conspirators, who would not challenge US forces, hold central Iraq but are unable to control other regions. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#4

Conspiracy/coup accepted by all of Iraq; somewhat smooth transition

Less stability

More stability

Military--Political Conspiracy Scenario Indicators

- Specific information of an Assassination plot
- Increases or dramatic changes in regime VIP security procedures
- Movement of RG forces into Baghdad
- *Insert Sudden Departure Indicators here*
- *Media and opposition group reporting surge*
- *Temporary media silence*
- *Communication pattern changes*
- SRG heightened activity or deployment
- Emergency/unusual VIP movements
- Bagdad security plan activated
- Key regime members depart Baghdad
- Reports of fighting between IZ security forces and military forces

SECRET

SECRET

Pre-DESERT CROSSING Scenario Discussion: Palace Coup

29-30 April 1999
MacDill AFB, Florida

SECRET

Scenarios
"A Russian Roulette of Regime Change"

- Assassination
- Military Coup
- Military-Political Conspiracy
- Palace Coup
- Constitutional Succession
- Popular Revolt
- Exiled Opposition Takeover

SECRET

4

Definition:

"Rivalries and rancor within the ruling family--attested in recent years by defections, woundings, and murders-- could erupt without warning in bloody infighting or coup plotting. Similarly, members of Saddam's inner circle or the Tikriti clan who fear that his continued rule endangers them might try to oust him in a way that leaves other elements of Tikriti control intact."

- perpetrators already have access due to position

Branches/Sequels



Palace Coup Scenario Indicators

- Specific information of a Palace Coup plotting
- Increased disunity/upheaval within the inner circle
- Broad threats to the Tikriti status in Iraqi government
- Threat to inner circle financial status/black market access
- Purges of high level military or civilian leadership
- Regime retribution/violence against prominent social/ religious/tribal figures
- Increases or dramatic changes in regime VIP security procedures
- Emergency meetings of Baath Party officials/ members
- Emergency/unusual VIP movements
- Baghdad security plan activated
- Fighting within Tikrit

SECRET

SECRET

"Worst Case"

Status quo

(SO) Saddam gone

Sudden Departure →

Unified Sunnis who would oppose US forces hold in central Iraq but are unable to control other regions while sections break away. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

Military Coup →

Coup not recognized by <u>some</u> cmdrs; regional military strongmen emerge. Strongmen may request US assistance; ethnic uprisings may occur

Military-Political Conspiracy →

Unified conspirators, who would challenge US force, hold central Iraq but are unable to control other regions. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

Palace Coup →

Tikriti coup plot unseats Saddam but cannot replace him; other Sunnis take control (or not). Mass violence: Tikritis vs others, Arabs vs Kurds, Shiite vs Sunni.

~~SECRET~~ U

Desert Crossing Seminar (U)

After Action Report (U)

June 28-30, 1999

~~Classified by: CINC USCENTCOM/Multiple Sources~~
~~Reason: 1.5A~~
~~Declassify on: X4~~

~~SECRET~~ U

Declassified by BGen G. J. Trautman, Jr, USMC, Deputy J5, USCENTCOM
Date: 2 July 2004
Action Officer: Mr Michael D. Fitzgerald, CCJ5P Civilian Contractor

Desert Crossing Seminar (U)
After Action Report (U)

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- Seminar Concept
- Scenario
- Issue papers
- Move 1 Deliverables
- Move 2 Deliverables
- Move 3 Deliverables
- Move 4 Deliverables
- Significant Insights

Declassified by BGen G. J. Trautman, Jr, USMC, Deputy J5, USCENTCOM
Date: 2 July 2004
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Executive Summary (U)

U ~~(S)~~ On June 28-30, 1999, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) sponsored the Desert Crossing Seminar to identify interagency issues and insights on how to manage change in a post-Saddam Iraq. The Seminar structure focused the participants on crucial interagency issues that would bear on the situation, as well as interagency interests and responsibilities. USCENTCOM briefed a draft plan, known as "Desert Crossing," to participants for discussion of the proposed phases and concepts, as well as the risks, threats, opportunities, and challenges that are likely to be present under those conditions. Over 70 participants, including the Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency took part in the seminar.

U ~~(S)~~ Participants were organized into various teams to facilitate the development of insights, but were not asked to "solve" the problems. In fact, there was a consensus that this seminar should be the beginning of much more robust discussions. The observations below summarize participant views and suggest matters for further deliberation. These views do not represent consensus of the individual participants, the various Departments, agencies, or entities, or the U.S. Government.

Deliberate planning needs to become interagency ~~(S)~~ U

- U ~~(S)~~ **Political/Military planning should begin immediately.**

U ~~(S)~~ The dimensions of preparing a post-Saddam policy for Iraq and the region are vast and complex. Early preparation of a political-military plan as called for in Presidential Decision Directive 56 should be a priority. The accompanying policy debate will expose a variety of contentious positions that must be reconciled and managed. Key discussion points include: benefits and risks associated with various strategic options; information requirements; and the likelihood that intervention will be costly in terms of casualties and resources.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Regime crisis may require rapid U.S. action on short notice.**

U ~~(S)~~ When the crisis occurs, policy makers will have to deal with a large number of critical issues nearly simultaneously, including demonstrating U.S. leadership and resolve, managing Iraq's neighbors, and rapid policy formulation. Successfully doing so depends on identifying "Red Lines," the crossing of which is likely to lead to U.S. reaction, in order to facilitate crisis planning. Such Red Lines may include large-scale humanitarian crisis, use (or imminent use) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or imminent Iraqi attack on a neighboring state.

U • ~~(S)~~ **Regime change may not enhance regional stability.**

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U (S) A change in regimes does not guarantee stability. A number of factors including aggressive neighbors, fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines, and chaos created by rival forces bidding for power could adversely affect regional stability. Even when civil order is restored and borders are secured, the replacement regime could be problematic—especially if perceived as weak, a puppet, or out-of-step with prevailing regional governments. These consequences must not be ignored during political-military planning.

- U (S) **WMD issues warrant additional attention.**

U (S) Participants concluded that U.S. policy in reaction to the use of WMD against U.S. personnel or allies was clear. However, U.S. policy on the possibility of Iraqi use of WMD under other circumstances is ill defined and probably does not address the full range of situations. For example, how should the United States respond to an Iraqi faction that employs WMD against a competing faction or a non-coalition or non-ally neighbor? Although the likelihood of WMD use by Iraq was hotly debated, planners and policy makers should review potential WMD situations now to determine the scale, scope, and nature of such use and the likely U.S. response.

Management of Iran is critical to mission success (S) U

- U (S) **Iran's anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq.**

U (S) Iran has substantial interests in developments in Iraq, perhaps its most bitter rival in the region, nor have relations with the United States been any better. The influx of U.S. and other western forces into Iraq would exacerbate worries in Tehran, as would the installation of a pro-western government in Baghdad. More than any other country in the region, the principals were most concerned by how Iran would respond to a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq.

- U (S) **Iran possesses the ability to raise the costs and consequences of intervention.**

U (S) Many participants felt that Washington should attempt to leverage the crisis to improve the present U.S.-Iran relationship. They believe the worst-case scenario is one in which Iran feels pressured and lashes out asymmetrically in moves that range from harassment of U.S. forces to terrorist attacks. Such attacks will likely shake U.S. determination and perhaps undermine public and political will. To preclude this, the United States and its partners should ensure that Iran does not support counterproductive activities in Iraq and should engage Tehran in a productive fashion wherever possible.

- U (S) **Lifting sanctions on Iran may be part of a full Iraq policy.**

U (S) Whether the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran will be required to gain Tehran's cooperation is unclear. Some participants expressed the view that the United States should use the possibility of lifting them as an incentive for Iranian cooperation. Other participants expressed concern as to how to control Iran in the long term if it continues its support for

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terrorism, continues WMD programs, and/or exports its revolutionary principles to other countries in the region once sanctions are lifted.

Ambiguous role of Iraqi opposition clouds U.S. policy development (S) U

- U (S) **Lack of information on internal Iraqi opposition conditions severely hampers contingency planning.**

U (S) The United States lacks sufficient information on individuals and groups within Iraq to plan for, or respond to, Saddam's departure. Information for planning and to facilitate dialog with key internal groups or individuals is currently lacking; the United States does not have a clear understanding of their policies and agendas. The intelligence community should initiate actions to determine potential Iraqi leadership groupings that might "naturally" evolve when Saddam departs and to establish the basic criteria and conditions under which such individuals or groups should be approached.

- U (S) **Iraqi exile opposition weaknesses are significant.**

U (S) The debate on post-Saddam Iraq also reveals the paucity of information about the potential and capabilities of the external Iraqi opposition groups. The lack of intelligence concerning their roles hampers U.S. policy development. Although participants disagreed as to whether exiled opposition leaders could be useful during the regime transition period, there was no dispute that if the United States were to support them, much must be done in order for these groups to be politically credible within Iraq.

- U (S) **The United States should be prepared to initiate, on short notice, a dialog with leaders of key ethnic groups within Iraq.**

U (S) A variety of power struggles might occur during the early stages of a post-Saddam crisis. Because events are likely to occur rapidly, consideration should be given now to individuals and groups and their policies and agendas in order to develop a range of options. To this end, the United States should initiate, or at least prepare to initiate, dialogs with key leaders in the PUK, KDP, and Shia tribes as early possible.

Coalition dialogue should begin immediately (S) U

- U (S) **Active support from coalition partners is critical to mission success.**

U (S) There are many unknowns as to how potential partners think about coalition participation. To facilitate rapid reaction, the United States must begin the process of planning for coalition operations and developing the basis for a coalition now. The risks to U.S. regional interests are too high and events are likely to unfold too rapidly to wait until the crisis begins.

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- U ~~(S)~~ **Differing visions of a unified Iraq complicate end-state articulation.**

U ~~(S)~~ The seminar demonstrated that there are differing visions of what a post-Saddam Iraq should look like to various coalition partners. These differences will complicate developing a common coalition end state, much less reaching consensus on such a state. This will delay coalition formation during the critical early stages of the crisis and may complicate exit strategies.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Arab coalition may undermine accomplishment of U.S. policy objectives.**

U ~~(S)~~ A paradox exposed during the Seminar is that while an Arab coalition will be required for legitimacy in the region, such a coalition may make it more difficult for the United States to attain its objectives. Solutions envisioned by U.S. coalition partners (especially our Arab partners) may be significantly different than those envisioned by U.S. planners. For example, the Iraq Liberation Act specifies a democratic outcome that contrasts starkly with the predilections of some Arab governments. Also, some participants believe that no Arab ~~government will welcome the kind of lengthy U.S. presence that would be required to install~~ and sustain a democratic government.

- U ~~(S)~~ **A long-term, large-scale military intervention may be at odds with many coalition partners.**

U ~~(S)~~ The nature of the region's relationships with the United States and other western nations in the post-intervention era are likely to be vastly different. What participants referred to as the "Japanese Option," (long-term presence and directed change) is not likely to be well received by coalition partners. Changes that could result from intervention at various levels will involve political and military relationships; religious and ethnic conflicts; economic relations; and differing views of social justice. While differences with Arab allies concerning the U.S. presence in the region were managed reasonably well in the past (owing in part to common threats), intervention in Iraq may alter the way these relationships are handled dramatically enough to produce new frictions and conflicts.

<u>Iraq's economic viabilty is key to long term regional stability ~~(S)~~</u> U

- U ~~(S)~~ **Iraqi stabilization requires debt/claims forgiveness.**

U ~~(S)~~ Mounting a large intervention will be costly, as regional partners may not be willing to reimburse the United States to the extent that they have in the past. One possibility, using Iraqi oil revenues to pay for the intervention, would come at the expense of long-term reconstitution and may affect regional and global economic stability if oil prices fluctuate too rapidly. Also, Iraq still faces claims estimated at $300 billion as a result of its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. If these claims are relentlessly pursued, economic recovery, and thus stability, may be delayed. Policymakers in the United States and abroad should investigate debt and claims forgiveness, as a stable Iraq can evolve only if it is economically viable.

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- U ~~(S)~~ **The relaxation of economic sanctions early in the crisis may be a key determinant in the ability of the United States to influence events in Iraq.**

U ~~(S)~~ Some seminar participants believed that one of the most important things the United States could do to improve its image in the eyes of the Iraqi people would be the announcement of immediate lifting of economic sanctions early in the transition crisis. The United States should expect immediate pressure from others, including coalition members, to lift sanctions, even while the outcome of the internal Iraqi situation is unclear. Seizing the "high ground" and immediately lifting the sanctions upon a change in the Iraqi regime—even if its policies and orientation are unknown—might be advantageous for U.S. interests.

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Introduction (U)

u ~~(S)~~ On June 28-30, 1999, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) sponsored the Desert Crossing Seminar. The seminar's purpose was to identify interagency issues and insights on how to manage change in a post-Saddam Iraq.

u ~~(S)~~ Over 70 participants, including the Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, members of the USCENTCOM staff, and component commanders took part. Participants were divided into four teams representing the National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee, the NSC Deputies Committee (Blue Teams), other nations (Green Team), and various Iraqi factions (Red Team).

u ~~(S)~~ This report, which summarizes the seminar results, is divided into several sections. The first section encapsulates significant observations that transcend specific issues. The Second section ~~summarizes participants' discussions and recommendations with respect to 10 specific issues,~~ ranging from intervention considerations to end states and exit strategies. Both of these sections are linked to the third section, which outlines the general scenario used during the seminar to both stimulate and structure discussion. The final section contains information about how the seminar was organized and conducted.

u ~~(S)~~ As noted in the Executive Summary, participants believe that this seminar is merely the beginning of more robust discussions of the challenges the United States is likely to face in the wake of Saddam Hussein. Although the insights drawn from the seminar are significant, most problems remain unsolved and most issues require substantial research and refinement. This report is intended to serve as a catalyst for this work.

u ~~(S)~~ These views do not represent consensus of the individual participants, the various Departments, agencies, or entities, or the U.S. Government.

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Section I. Significant Observations (U)

U ~~(S)~~ The Desert Crossing Seminar focused on 10 key issues. Discussions generally followed issue descriptions (Section II) and were within the bounds of the scenario (Section III). In reviewing the results of these discussions, several themes became clear. The following observations amplify these themes, which include planning requirements, management of Iran, the role of Iraqi opposition elements, the need to begin developing a coalition now, and economic viability as the key to long term stability.

I. Deliberate planning needs to become interagency ~~(S)~~ U

- U ~~(S)~~ **Development of a Political/Military Plan should begin immediately.**

U ~~(S)~~ The nature of the policy debate related to future of U.S. policy on Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein makes clear that there are a wide variety of positions that will have to be reconciled and managed by senior decision makers. These issues are highly contentious and require full debate and assessment to ensure that all aspects are fully addressed. The Desert Crossing Seminar initiated this process, with the understanding of the participants that this effort is the beginning, rather than the end. The dimensions of the problem were fully exposed in the Desert Crossing Seminar and led the participants to suggest that the development of a Political/Military Plan, as envisioned under the Presidential Decision Directive Number 56, should be a priority. This would assist in the expansion of the current Department of Defense deliberate planning process to the entire interagency. Among the first issues to be addressed would be costs, benefits and risks associated with the choice between "Inside-Out" and "Outside-In" strategies. Additionally, questions related to the lack of information on internal Iraqi groups, individuals, and conditions would be addressed, as would the likelihood that the "Desert Crossing" concept is not a zero casualty operation.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Regime crisis may require rapid U.S. action on short notice.**

U ~~(S)~~ A large number of critical issues will require nearly simultaneous attention of senior decision-makers who will undoubtedly be engaged in other matters when the crisis occurs. High priority issues include: ways to demonstrate U.S. leadership and resolve; preempting Iraq's neighbors who might take hostile action; and rapidly formulating clear policy on difficult and contentious issues—all on short notice. The seminar concluded that successfully addressing these and other issues would benefit from early planning and the identification of "Red Lines," the crossing of which is likely to lead to U.S. reaction (to include the possibility of American troops on the ground in Iraq). Seminar discussions indicated that Red Lines may include among other factors: the potential for a large scale humanitarian crisis; the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction or a credible threat that such use was imminent; a credible threat of an Iraqi attack on its neighbors; and a credible threat that neighboring states might take advantage of internal disorder to attack Iraq, especially if such an attack were likely to

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produce regional instability or result in a fragmented Iraq. Investing the time and other resources to consider these issues and develop a range of options for coping with them now will save time and contribute to the most effective and efficient achievement of U.S. goals when the crisis occurs.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Regime change may not enhance regional stability.**

U ~~(S)~~ It often seems that Saddam Hussein is the source of all instability in the Gulf region. However, Iraq in Saddam's wake is likely to be unstable and this instability may spread if not properly managed. For example, Iraq's neighbors may seek to take advantage of this period of uncertainty. Or, the country could fragment along religious and/or ethnic lines. Or, internal forces could create domestic and regional chaos as they bid for power. Each of these will adversely affect regional stability and may require a U.S.-led response. Even when civil order is restored and borders are secured, the shape and type of the post-Saddam regime could be problematic—especially if perceived as weak or out-of-step with the prevailing structure of neighboring governments. The presence of a government that may be more representative (i.e., democratic) in its decision-making functions than any of its neighbors may invite the conduct of subversive activities in Iraq. Neighboring regimes will also be concerned with any catalyzing effect on their own pro-democracy movements. In a sense, a western-style democracy may not engender long term stability without considerable stabilization, preparation, and long-term sustainment. Political-military planners developing courses of action for U.S. response should not ignore these potential outcomes nor should they assume that Saddam's departure will mark a new period of regional stability.

- U ~~(S)~~ **WMD issues warrant additional attention.**

U ~~(S)~~ Seminar discussions, especially those conducted in the Red Team, concluded that U.S. policy and reaction to the use of WMD against U.S. forces, U.S. citizens, or allies and coalition partners was clear. However, the U.S. policy for responding to the possibility of Iraqi use of WMD under other circumstances and against other targets is murky and probably does not address the full range of situations. For example, what would U.S. policy and response be if an Iraqi faction or military leader employed WMD against an ethnic group as part of the power struggle? Or, if an Iraqi faction or military leader employs WMD against a competing faction or organization? Or, if an Iraqi faction or military leader employs WMD against a non-coalition or non-ally neighbor (e.g., Iran or Syria)? Although the likelihood of WMD use by Iraq under this scenario was hotly debated, U.S. planners and policy makers should review various WMD situations and options now. The scale, scope, and nature of such use (and likely retaliation) should be a key consideration in any response.

II. Management of Iran is critical to mission success ~~(S)~~ U

- U ~~(S)~~ **Iran's anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq.**

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U ~~(S)~~ Iran has substantial interests in developments in Iraq, perhaps its most bitter rival in the region. Since the fall of the Shah, Iran-U.S. relations have been extremely poor as each sees the other as a direct threat to its regional interests. The influx of U.S. and other western forces into Iraq would exacerbate worries in Tehran, as would the installation of a pro-western government in Baghdad that would be "anti-Iran." Thus, a crisis of this magnitude would be of great concern to Iran. More than any other country in the region, the principals were most concerned by how Iran would respond to a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Iran possesses the ability to raise the costs and consequences of intervention.**

U ~~(S)~~ Many participants argued that Washington should attempt to leverage the Iraqi crisis to alter the present U.S.-Iran relationship in positive ways. From their perspective, the worst-case scenario is one in which Iran feels pressured by U.S. intervention and lashes out asymmetrically in ways that range from harassment of U.S. forces in the region to outright terrorist attacks. Apart from the tragic loss of life, such attacks would likely shake U.S. determination and perhaps undermine public and political will. Thus, the United States and its coalition partners should take steps to engage Tehran in a productive fashion wherever possible and ensure that at a minimum Iran does not support counterproductive activities in Iraq. These steps include diplomatic overtures and appropriate force protection activities.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Lifting sanctions on Iran may be a part of a full Iraq policy.**

U ~~(S)~~ Whether lifting U.S. sanctions on Iran will be required to gain Tehran's cooperation is unclear. Some participants expressed the view that the United States should use the possibility of lifting sanctions as an incentive for Iranian cooperation should intervention in Iraq be required. Other participants strongly expressed concern as to how to deal with Iran over the long term if, once sanctions are lifted, it continues its support for terrorism, continues its WMD program, and exports its revolutionary principles to other countries in the region. This issue clearly requires additional thought in the interagency forum.

III. Ambiguous role of Iraqi opposition clouds U.S. policy development ~~(S)~~ U

- U ~~(S)~~ **Lack of information on internal Iraqi opposition conditions severely hampers contingency planning.**

U ~~(S)~~ Many participants continuously expressed the view that the United States lacks sufficient information on individuals, groups, and/or elements within Iraq to plan for, or respond to, Saddam's departure. HUMINT and other intelligence on, and direct dialog with, potential key internal groups or individuals is currently lacking. For example, the United States does not have a clear understanding of their policies and agendas. Participants believed the intelligence community should initiate immediate actions to determine potential Iraqi leadership groupings that might "naturally" evolve when Saddam departs, and policy makers should establish the basic criteria and conditions under which the United States should approach them. Also, the intelligence community should identify insofar as possible what

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these groups would likely ask of the United States (or others) under a variety of conditions, including what they might in return for supporting the coalition.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Iraqi exile opposition weaknesses are significant.**

U ~~(S)~~ The nature of the current debate on post-Saddam Iraq reveals a similar lack of understanding concerning the potential and capabilities of the external Iraqi opposition groups. Some participants indicated willingness to provide strong support for the exiled opposition, while acknowledging that they were uncertain of the strength and popularity of these groups inside Iraq. Others disputed the efficacy of depending on the exile groups entirely. The lack of clarity about external opposition groups and agreement concerning their roles hampers U.S. policy development. Although participants argued that exiled opposition leaders could be useful during the regime transition period, there is no dispute that much must be done to ensure their political credibility within Iraq. It may also be possible that external groups may become conduits to leaders inside rather than becoming leaders themselves. Many participants were concerned that actions taken by the United States to increase the credibility of the opposition may have the opposite effect. In addition, some participants highlighted a "disconnect" between the requirements of the Iraqi Liberation Act and policy implementation. These participants stressed the need for clear statements of policy from the opposition groups so that the United States can better determine if the provision of assistance will further U.S. objectives.

- U ~~(S)~~ **The United States should be prepared to initiate, on short notice, a dialog with leaders of key ethnic groups within Iraq.**

U ~~(S)~~ A variety of power struggles will occur during the early stages of a post-Saddam crisis. Contestants will likely come from the Ba'ath Party, Republican Guard, Iraqi army, and members of Saddam's inner circle. Participants generally believed that ethnic groups or leaders of ethnic groups would primarily attempt to improve their position relative to those vying for power rather than attempting large-scale revolts. Equally important, events are likely to occur in a much shorter time period than that portrayed by the scenario. This argues for detailed consideration, *a priori*, of the various individuals and groups and their policies and agendas so that the United States will have a range of previously developed options and responses. To this end, the United States should identify and initiate, or be prepared to initiate, dialogs with key leaders in the PUK, KDP, and Shia tribes as early possible. Such discussions will help to determine with whom the United States could "deal" with, what their positions relative to a change in leadership might be, and what concessions might be required.

IV. Coalition dialogue should begin immediately ~~(S)~~ U

- U ~~(S)~~ **Active support from coalition partners is critical to mission success.**

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U ~~(S)~~ There are many unknowns as to how Arab regimes will think about coalition participation under the circumstances described in the scenario. To facilitate rapid reaction when the time comes, the United States must begin the process of planning for coalition operations and developing the basis for a coalition now. The risks to U.S. regional interests are too high and events are likely to unfold too rapidly to wait until the crisis begins. The benefits of achieving early coalition agreements are likely to outweigh any disadvantages that may occur through leaks back to Saddam. In fact, it may be worth considering a public announcement that the planning for such a scenario has begun in order to encourage regional and other governments to discuss this issue with the United States.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Differing visions of a unified Iraq complicate end-state articulation.**

U ~~(S)~~ The Desert Crossing Seminar demonstrated that there are differing visions of what a post-Saddam Iraq should look like to various coalition partners. These differences will complicate developing a common coalition end state, much less reaching consensus on it. This will delay coalition formation during the critical early stages of the crisis. As part of initial conversations with potential coalition partners, the United States should consult them on their views of an acceptable end state and identify red lines and potential compromises.

- U ~~(S)~~ **Arab coalition may undermine accomplishment of U.S. policy objectives.**

U ~~(S)~~ A critical paradox exposed during the Seminar was that while an Arab coalition will be required for legitimacy in the region, such a coalition may make it more difficult for the United States to attain its objectives. The solutions envisioned by our coalition partners and especially our Arab partners may be significantly different than those envisioned by U.S. goals and interests. For example, the Iraq Liberation Act specifies a democratic outcome that contrasts starkly with traditional Arab governments in the region. A number of participants were concerned, as noted in the following paragraph, that no Arab government would welcome the lengthy U.S. presence that would be required to install and sustain a democratic government and might openly object to the idea of democratic government itself.

- U ~~(S)~~ **A long-term, large-scale military intervention may be at odds with many coalition partners.**

U ~~(S)~~ The nature of the region's relationships with the United States and other western nations in the post-intervention era are likely to be vastly different than they are now. During the operation, coalition dynamics are likely to be different depending on ultimate intervention goals. What participants referred to as the "Japanese Option" (long-term presence and directed change), while at the extreme end of the spectrum, is not likely to be well received by coalition partners. Even less drastic approaches for dealing with anticipated refugee flows and humanitarian concerns, while likely to be better received than long term occupation, would significantly impact Iraq's neighbors with potentially destabilizing results for U.S. relationships with regional and other Middle Eastern states. The roles of coalition forces during the intervention may also be sticking points. Changes that could result from

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intervention at various levels will involve political and military relationships; religious and ethnic conflicts; economic relations; and differing views of social justice. While differences with Arab allies concerning the U.S. presence in the region were managed reasonably well in the past (owing in part to common threats), intervention in Iraq may alter the way these relationships are handled dramatically enough to produce new frictions and conflicts.

V. Iraq's economic viabilty is key to long term regional stability ~~(S)~~ U

- U ~~(S)~~ **Iraqi stabilization requires debt/claims forgiveness.**

U ~~(S)~~ Mounting a large intervention will be costly. Regional partners such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait may not be willing to reimburse the United States for its expenses to the extent that they have in the past. One view is that the costs of the intervention should be covered through Iraqi oil sales, and bringing Iraq's oil and gas online may not be especially difficult. However, using Iraqi oil revenues to pay for the intervention will come at the expense of long-term reconstitution and may affect regional stability if oil prices fluctuate too rapidly. Significantly, Iraq still faces claims estimated at $300 billion as a result of its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. If these claims are relentlessly pursued, economic recovery, and thus stability, may be delayed. A stable Iraq can evolve only if it is economically viable. Policymakers in the United States and abroad should investigate debt and claims forgiveness to improve chances for long term regional stability.

- U ~~(S)~~ **The relaxation of economic sanctions early in the crisis may be a key determinant in the ability of the United States to influence events in Iraq.**

U ~~(S)~~ Some seminar participants believed that one of the most important things the United States could do to improve its image in the eyes of the Iraqi people would be the announcement of immediate lifting of economic sanctions early in the transition crisis. The United States should consider now what its position on sanctions will be when the current regime collapses. Key considerations include whether or not the sanctions hinge on Saddam and the nature of popular expectations for the lifting of sanctions. As part of their charge to represent the post-Saddam power structure, the Iraq Red Team argued that the longer economic sanctions were kept in place following Saddam's departure, the more the Iraqi people will resent the United States. This perception will make U.S. efforts to exert a positive influence in Iraq—and perhaps the region—more difficult. The United States should expect immediate pressure from others, including coalition members, to lift sanctions, even while the outcome of the internal Iraqi situation is still unclear. Seizing the "high ground" and immediately lifting the sanctions upon a change in the Iraqi regime—even if its policies and orientation are unknown—might be advantageous for U.S. interests.

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Section II. Issue-Specific Insights (U)

U ~~(S)~~ The seminar provided 10 specific questions for participants to consider in light of the scenario (Section III). These issues are:

1. What are the key U.S. decision points and conditions for intervention? ~~(S)~~ U
2. **How do we manage Iraq's neighbors and other influential states?** ~~(S)~~ U
3. How do we build and maintain the coalition? ~~(S)~~ U
4. **What are the major refugee assistance challenges external to Iraq?** ~~(S)~~ U
5. **What is the appropriate role for co-opted elements of Iraqi military power?** ~~(S)~~ U
6. **How do we contain Shia and Kurdish threats to the stability of Iraq and prevent fragmentation?** ~~(S)~~ U
7. What is the U.S. role in establishing a transitional government in Iraq? ~~(S)~~ U
8. **How do we synchronize humanitarian assistance, civilian, and military activities during combat and/or peace enforcement operations?** ~~(S)~~ U
9. **How do we re-establish civil order in the wake of combat operations?** ~~(S)~~ U
10. ~~What is the U.S. exit strategy and long-term presence in Iraq?~~ ~~(S)~~ U

(U) This section summarizes the issue-specific insights that emerged from discussions by the Principals Team following the presentation of each Deputies' Team briefing. (Briefing slides from the Blue, Green, and Red Teams can be found in Appendices E-H, Volume II.) Following each summary of the principals' discussion is a synopsis of additional insights from the Deputies' examination of the particular issue.

U ~~(S)~~ **Question 1. What are the key U.S. decision points and conditions for intervention?**

U ~~(S)~~ A central aspect of managing the post-Saddam crisis described in the scenario hinges on making appropriate and timely decisions about intervention. Identifying key decision and trigger points is especially important if the United States is to proactively protect its interests in the region as well as take a leadership role. The participants expressed their understanding of the importance of identifying the conditions under which the United States might intervene and the relevant decisions that must be made prior to intervention.

U ~~(S)~~ The principals began their discussion of Issue 1 by defining their desired end-state:

- U ~~(S)~~ Iraq should remain unified.
- U ~~(S)~~ The Government of Iraq should observe its international obligations (e.g., WMD) and subscribe to international norms (e.g., decent treatment of its own people, recognition of borders).
- U ~~(S)~~ Iraq must not be threatening to its neighbors.
- U ~~(S)~~ Iraq should be a stable country.

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U (S) The principals also agreed that U.S. end state objectives and "Red Lines" in Iraq would remain unchanged from current policy given an end to Saddam's regime. Some participants suggested that to reduce Iraqi repression of Shia in the south, the United States should consider drawing Red Lines for Iraqi ground forces as was done in the north, even though it may draw U.S. forces into Iraq to enforce them.

U (S) Concern was expressed that one or more of Iraq's neighbors (e.g., Turkey, Iran) might intervene in (and even fragment) Iraq if an absence of power in Baghdad is perceived. When Iraq was a powerful force in the region, it served as a balance to many competing interests. The principals viewed the environment surrounding the implosion of the regime in Baghdad as highly tempting to Iraq's neighbors. In the north, for example, Turkey might make an aggressive push to crush the PKK and preempt any Kurdish attempt to break away from Iraq and establish a Kurdish state. In the east, Iran might consider a move against opposition groups based in Iraq, such as the *Mujahidin el-Khaq* (MEK). One of the first actions that the United States should consider taking in such a situation is to engage Iraq's neighbors at all levels to persuade or deter them from taking any unilateral action in Iraq.

U (S) The isolation of Iraq presents a contradiction for Arab countries in the region who are torn between fears of Baghdad's military adventurism and concern for welfare of the people of a fellow Arab and Muslim country. Some even desire Iraq's swift rehabilitation so that it may serve as a counterbalance to Iran. The death of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent assumption of power by his son (or any another member of the "regime") could lead to a desire by Iraq's neighbors, including coalition members, to see how events play out or allow time for an Arab solution. The United States may see a desire emerge in the region and in Europe that the sanctions and policies of containment be lifted as a gesture of goodwill to the new leadership regardless of its makeup.

U (S) Participants observed that the United States needs to be prepared for a variety of succession scenarios by defining what constitutes an acceptable level of "regime change" (e.g., not just Saddam, but his family and associates). For example, are subsequent Iraqi leaders given the benefit of doubt to redefine Iraq's political and military posture in the region? What should the United States communicate to the Iraq Liberation Act-supported groups? The principals felt that the United States should embark immediately on a dialogue with relevant world and regional actors to raise this issue and determine the range of possible responses to the situation in Iraq for the short term.

U (S) Even in the absence of a clear collapse of all authority in Iraq, the United States should be prepared to allay regional allies' concerns by positioning a Desert Thunder-like force in the area. However, arriving at a consensus on what events would trigger specific types of U.S.-led military intervention was difficult. Mission goals might range from providing limited humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians (e.g., Kurds or Shia) from a government-offensive, striking at WMD capabilities, to removal of the post-Saddam regime.

U (S) Waiting for an Arab coalition to take an effective lead in Iraq was considered by the principals not to be a suitable option (might be "stuck" with Saddam's sons or his associates).

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However, Arab involvement was considered necessary for the legitimacy of any intervention. Some participants felt that a U.S. commitment to use ground forces would be a pre-condition to gaining any Arab coalition partners. Iraq's neighbors have been hesitant about an incremental and prolonged military escalation that would lead to discontent in their streets. If there is to be Arab buy-in for a military intervention beyond limited humanitarian goals, the United States must be able to commit to a large-scale, decisive mission that would include substantial ground forces. However, Arab partners will likely push for limited objectives and duration.

U/~~S~~) The principals did express concern at being drawn into a ground mission in Iraq. At present, the United States already has a military presence in the region and flies daily into Iraqi airspace. The situation described in Move 1 of the scenario contains a high degree of fluidity and uncertainty. A military buildup will likely be necessary to protect Iraq's neighbors from possible cross-border military actions taken during the final throes of the regime in Baghdad, address possible refugee flows and displaced persons, prevent the fragmentation of Iraq, or deter other countries (e.g., neighbors, Russia, China, et al) from intervening. Any of these possibilities could lead to a decision to cross into Iraq on the ground. In addition to being prepared to move militarily, the United States should be prepared early on to embark on a strong sustained diplomatic offensive to accomplish U.S. goals and gain the widest possible consensus on responding to various scenarios in Iraq.

U/~~S~~) The principals drafted the following criteria for success if the United States were to embark on a large-scale and decisive intervention:

- U/~~S~~) The destruction of Iraq's WMD capabilities
- U/~~S~~) An Iraqi military restructured around regular Iraqi army, incorporating or eliminating the *mukhabarat* (domestic intelligence services) and the Republican Guard
- U/~~S~~) A stabilized and growing oil economy
- U/~~S~~) An Iraqi government that observes its international obligations and subscribes to international norms.

(U) Additional Comments:

U/~~S~~) Deputies Committee Blue Teams looked at this issue in much the same way. All three teams began with an examination of U.S. interests and potential end states. There was general agreement among the Blue Teams that Iraq's territorial integrity should be maintained; that Iraq's WMD capabilities should be dismantled and that any attempt to use WMD should be met with an appropriate military response; and that humanitarian disasters brought on by sudden regime change should be prevented or alleviated. There was consensus that the United States would not intervene without coalition support except under the most dire circumstances such as WMD use or catastrophic humanitarian disaster. One team believed that U.S. interests were important enough to intervene if one of Iraq's neighbors attacked Iraq during the post-Saddam crisis.

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u ~~(S)~~ Blue Team recommendations for immediate actions based on the scenario were to begin the process to move troops to the region; begin to build a coalition; conduct diplomatic initiatives to restrain mischievous neighbors; begin a public diplomacy campaign; and make preparations to deal with humanitarian crises both unilaterally and as part of and in cooperation with international organizations.

u ~~(S)~~ **Question 2. How do we manage Iraq's neighbors and other influential states?**

u ~~(S)~~ The principals were most concerned with managing the potential for Turkish and Iranian strikes into Iraq. Both of these countries may perceive both threats and opportunities following the passing of Saddam and instability in Baghdad. Move 2 of the scenario suggested that the Kurds in the north might initiate an offensive against Iraqi forces and that in the south tensions were at an all-time high as the Iraqi military commander brutally crushed Shia opposition. Concurrently, Iran moved forces close to the border with Iraq and mobilized several divisions elsewhere in the country. These developments were perceived as highly threatening to regional stability, a top U.S. objective.

u ~~(S)~~ ***Turkey.*** In the north, some principals suggested that Kurdish forces would be able to hold their own against Iraqi forces, especially if the no-fly zone remained in force. However, Turkey has long been highly concerned with any possibility of Kurdish independence, even in northern Iraq. Over the past decade, Turkey has repeatedly struck at PKK positions in Iraq. The mobilization of Kurdish forces against Iraq might be seen as both a threat and an opportunity for Turkey to militarily act in Iraq in order to protect its own interests. The principals agreed that an early U.S. objective should be the management of Turk-Kurd relations to keep the situation from escalating, and to address potential Kurdish refugees fleeing toward Turkey.

u ~~(S)~~ ***Iran.*** The question of how best to manage U.S. interests with Iran preoccupied the principals for most of the discussion. There was consensus that Iran did have "valid" interests at stake because of events in Iraq; Baghdad has been the largest regional threat to Iran and hosts opposition groups such as the MEK. Perhaps the greatest fear in Tehran concerning this scenario is that the United States would install a western-oriented (therefore anti-Iran) regime in Baghdad, continue to tolerate and even support Iranian opposition groups, and place Shia holy sites in western hands. Although it was suggested that Iran might determine it could reap greater gains by sitting on the sidelines, the possibility that Tehran would consider at least some level of intervention was believed by the principals to be real.

u ~~(S)~~ Debate persisted over how best to ensure that Iran not come into conflict with U.S. interests or forces. On one side were those who felt that Iran should be informed in the strongest language that intervention in Iraq would not be tolerated—the buildup of U.S. forces in the region would underscore Washington's determination to oppose any intervention. The size and power of such a force would be sobering for any advocate of military adventurism in Tehran (and may also be threatening). On the other side, many participants felt it would be advantageous to at least explore the convergence of U.S.-Iranian interests, especially when U.S. end state objectives outlined earlier might coincide with Iran's regional interests. At best, the

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success of such a dialogue might lead to new opportunities in bilateral understanding. Nonetheless, enticing Iran's cooperation—to remain on the sidelines at a minimum—was more likely to result from diplomatic engagement, rather than from demarches. Even if Iran did not directly intervene in Iraq, confronting opposition groups or U.S. forces, it possesses the capability to easily distract U.S. forces and policymakers in more indirect ways.

U ~~(S)~~ One possibility raised during the principals' discussion was treating Iran as a non-coalition partner similar to how Russia is being handled in Kosovo. Tehran does have one of the more positive records in the region of assisting refugees that have crossed over from Iraq. Whether the lifting of US sanctions on Iran would be required to gain Tehran's cooperation is unclear. Concern was strongly expressed as to how to deal with Iran once sanctions are lifted, especially if it maintains its support for terrorism, continues to build its WMD program, and exports the principles of its revolution to other countries in the region. Just as strong, however, was the argument expressed by a number of participants that the opportunity to engage Tehran in a cooperative manner should not be missed. Whether such actions would result in a long-term change for the better in the Iran-U.S. paradigm is unclear. However, not expending the effort to elicit Iranian cooperation would likely raise the possibility of Tehran using asymmetric methods to impede and disrupt the deployment and employment of U.S. forces and to oppose U.S. efforts to encourage the creation of a western-oriented government in Baghdad. More so than any other country in the region, mismanagement of Iran, with all its capabilities and possible intentions, could be disastrous for the United States and the coalition.

U ~~(S)~~ The principals also recognized the rivalries and animosities that have erupted over the years between Iraq and Syria and Jordan. The United States should undertake appropriate diplomatic efforts to ensure that Damascus and Amman not undertake any unilateral interventions into Iraq.

(U) Additional Comments:

U ~~(S)~~ The Deputies Team that considered this question began with the underlying assumption that maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity was the most important objective. Their deliberations centered around ways to co-opt neighbors to ensure that Iraq was not subjected to pressures that would ultimately result in fragmentation. In doing so, they tended to examine neighboring states in terms of the threats they posed. In the case of Turkey, the team acknowledged that Turkish support for U.S. policy objectives was critical, both from military (basing) and political (international support) perspectives. Turkish intervention against the Kurds while the United States was attempting to restore order in the south was considered a serious threat. To preclude this event, the team advocated giving Turkey a guarantee that the United States would not support an independent Kurdistan, that it would insist on a regime in Baghdad friendly to Ankara, that it would not interfere in Turkish handling of their internal Kurdish problem; and that the United States would provide support for a Trans-Caspian oil pipeline.

U ~~(S)~~ In terms of Iran, the Blue Team concluded that Iranian support for U.S. intervention—or at least non-interference with it—was critical to long term success.

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They recommended that the United States use diplomatic means to convince the Iranians that the U.S. action (involving up to 300,000 ground troops in the region) was not threatening to Iranian sovereignty. The team believed that the Saudis might be instrumental in doing this. The United States should also build a broad-based coalition to demonstrate to the Iranians that support for the intervention was widespread. The team believed that U.S. assurances to Iran that the Shias in southern Iraq would be protected and provided for would help to keep Iran out. Finally, the team suggested that lifting sanctions on Iran might help also.

u(S) The team believed that Jordan would support U.S. actions, especially if Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did. Offers of economic assistance would help cement their support. The U.S. would have to convince the Saudis that the intervention was in their best interests to gain their support. One way of doing that was to point out the dangers of an Iran-dominated "independent" Shia state on the Saudi border.

u(S) Question 3. How do we build and maintain the coalition?

u(S) Events in post-Saddam Iraq may not generate as much concern among potential coalition partners as did the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. On the other hand, many countries may become quite concerned by the turn of events and desire to play a role in the outcome. Whether the many competing interests can be forged together to establish an effective coalition was the next discussion issue the principals addressed.

u(S) The principals discussed two types of coalitions. One is a broad-based coalition to provide humanitarian assistance. This type of coalition is likely to be the easiest to form politically. The second type of coalition would be one aimed at forcing a regime change in Baghdad or using military force to support one of the internal Iraq groups or elements in seizing or solidifying power. Support for such actions would likely involve much narrower coalition participation. The goals of such a coalition could be very contentious, even for neighboring countries that would welcome the end of Saddam's reign.

u(S) Establishing a coalition for humanitarian assistance would be relatively easy for many countries to accept. The desire of many throughout the region and the world is to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people today regardless of attitude toward Saddam. Should situations such as those posited in the Desert Crossing Seminar scenario occur, some of Iraq's neighbors may wish to see a more aggressive program of humanitarian assistance launched within Iraq to prevent external refugee flows.

u(S) Building and maintaining a coalition for regime change will be challenging and dependent upon the threat perception of Iraq's neighbors to unfolding events. Some states, such as Jordan, have indicated their interest in full participation with U.S. forces in a future coalition. Most will be extremely hesitant about joining forces to intervene in Iraq. Many principals, however, felt that if the United States presented the "Desert Crossing" concept during consultations with Arab

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allies, the latter would come on board once they realized that the United States was serious about the size and decisiveness of its force.

u (S) The principals acknowledged that most challenging would be the difficulty of recruiting coalition partners for a mission advertised as humanitarian and then trying to upgrade it to an intervention or regime changing force at a later date.

(U) Additional Comments:

u (S) The Deputies Committee that considered this question believed that a coalition could be built around humanitarian concerns initially. They noted that even for humanitarian operations, the United States would be expected to safeguard both refugee camps and the nations providing assistance, which would involve commitment of military forces. They also noted that coalition humanitarian efforts would be difficult to organize in areas where fighting was ongoing between Iraqi factions. Most potential coalition partners would be reluctant to take the risks associated with providing relief in the midst of combat zones.

u (S) The team postulated that beginning with a humanitarian assistance effort might be a viable way to build a coalition for later military operations inside Iraq. This concept would involve using aid as a way to gain initial support and entry and then expanding the coalition and the mission if required. In discussing this point, the team concluded that, if combat operations were required, it was likely that some Arab states, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand would participate. Other nations would continue to provide humanitarian assistance and political legitimacy. A number of participants concluded that the United Nations should have no role in combat operations and no command and control role in humanitarian operations.

u (S) As the coalition forms, the Deputies believe it will be difficult to keep France, Russia, and China out if they want to participate. Blocking their entry could create problems in the UN Security Council. Yet allowing them to participate may create another set of problems within the coalition. The team felt that France would be most interested in lifting sanctions on Iraq almost immediately. China is most likely to support humanitarian efforts, but will attempt to block combat operations. Russia is likely to be the most troublesome and will most likely follow a course that ensures it has good relations with a follow-on regime and guarantees payment of Iraqi debts. The United States must be prepared to manage these nations to allow them to achieve at least some of their goals without becoming disruptive. The team noted that the United States should develop a management plan for these and other nations in the coalition well in advance.

u (S) **Question 4. What are the major refugee assistance challenges external to Iraq?**

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U (S) Humanitarian problems of serious proportions may occur in the immediate post-Saddam period. The violence and instability detailed in the scenario may become the trigger for thousands of Iraqis, weakened by years of debilitating sanctions, to flee their homes. Other catalysts may be the failure of essential public services (including food distribution) due to either the collapse of the regime, internal fighting, or as a result of coalition military action.

U (S) The humanitarian lessons from Desert Storm were at the forefront of the principals' discussion. Participants recalled that the Saudis were highly resistant to allowing refugees to enter their country and that they pushed to have the camps established on the Iraqi side of the border. In the north, Turkey was equally resistant to opening its doors to Kurdish refugees fleeing the conflict. Jordan, which allowed tens of thousands of refugees to seek shelter, expended scarce resources to take care of them. Iran also assisted refugees, but like Jordan, did not receive any substantial international financial or material support. Kuwait is anxious about the possibility of destabilizing refugee flows, as they are already a "minority" within their own country. The willingness of countries that would be the destination of refugee flows to provide assistance corresponds directly to the amount of support the United States, the coalition, and the world commit in advance.

U (S) To plan effectively, the U.S. military would want to have as much advanced notice as possible concerning its role in humanitarian relief because of the direct impact on military operations. A high level of urgency for the humanitarian mission would compete with air and sea lift resources assigned to supporting United States and coalition forces, and would complicate the mission those personnel could perform.

U (S) The principals expressed their desire to see as much involvement from regional and international organizations as possible in assisting the Iraqi people through any internal crisis. However, the ability of these organizations to deal with the potential magnitude of the Iraqi humanitarian problem was questioned by some and needs to be assessed. The principals also concurred with the suggestion that, for political reasons, regional organizations should be encouraged to take a leading role, as opposed to subsuming them in a U.S.-led humanitarian assistance mission.

(U) Additional Comments:

U (S) The Deputies Team that considered this question noted that it was necessary to craft an end state early on that did not invoke more commitments and requirements than could be managed effectively. They noted that planners should consider that a commitment to a quick return of refugees would require enough resources to ensure a rapid solution to Iraq's internal problems. On the other hand, a willingness to delay refugee return would require long term commitments from host nations.

U (S) The team felt that any U.S. involvement in humanitarian operations should be preceded by using the PDD 56 process to determine who will be in charge of the effort (U.S. political representative, CINC, the UN, etc.) and how to transfer U.S.

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responsibilities as the military portion of the operation winds down. Participants noted that some U.S. government entities might object to implementing PDD 56 because they view it as infringement on their prerogatives. They also noted that while the military is staffed to continuously plan, other departments and agencies are not. Thus, implementing PDD 56 might be viewed as a detractor from the requirements to manage ongoing crises.

U ~~(S)~~ **The team also noted that some form of military intervention would be necessary to support humanitarian assistance efforts.** This will be true even if the United Nations or another international organization leads the effort. The team believed that Iran would have to be carefully managed during humanitarian assistance operations. They reasoned that the more Shia refugees Iran accepted and cared for, the greater the justification Iran would have for a seat at the table and a vote in the final settlement.

U ~~(S)~~ Another dilemma the United States could face is if a replacement dictator emerges who was linked to the previous regime responsible for creating the humanitarian disaster that necessitated U.S. involvement. They indicated that this might prove to be an "unspinnable contradiction." This concern should be considered during planning before committing assets to a humanitarian operation.

U ~~(S)~~ **Question 5. What is the appropriate role for co-opted elements of Iraqi military power?**

U ~~(S)~~ Perhaps the most direct threats to U.S. and coalition forces are Iraqi forces—the army and the Republican Guard. The scenario provided for the possibilities that some Iraqi elements might engage coalition forces, others would canton themselves, and some might even offer to cooperate. As the intervention evolved from peacemaking to developing and sustaining a transitional government, the principals briefly discussed the existence of the large and still capable Iraqi force and how it may impact on rebuilding efforts and reconstitution.

U ~~(S)~~ The principals spoke of the need for a post-crisis Iraq to be able to defend its long borders. Although many desire to see Iraq's military under civilian control within a participatory governmental system, the principals indicated that such a structure would not be possible in the near term. In fact, the principals accepted an analysis concluding that restructuring and re-equipping Iraq's military might not even be necessary for the protection of legitimate national security concerns.

U ~~(S)~~ The principals discussed a recommendation that exiled Iraqi military leaders play an integral role in the execution of the intervention. They could serve as critical players and partners for the coalition during confrontations with Iraqi units. Some participants argued that the so-called "inside-out" strategy (allowing an Iraqi leader to emerge rather than being installed by the coalition) was the only viable option. The principals concluded that co-opting Iraqi forces would be useful, but the details required further discussion.

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(U) Additional Comments:

U ~~(S)~~ The Blue Team noted that the inside-out approach was probably the most viable and that the United States should recruit or establish contact with possible post-Saddam leaders early. They also noted that the chief problem with this approach is that the United States does not have enough information about potential leaders to make effective overtures.

U ~~(S)~~ The team also discussed the fact that the value of co-opting Iraqi units depended on the overall goals and how far into Iraq the United States and the coalition were prepared to go to achieve them. The level of co-opting and cooperating with Iraqi forces may mean that we will not be able to achieve all of our objectives and might lead to creation of a less-than-desirable post-Saddam state.

U ~~(S)~~ **Another concern discussed by the team was the need to ensure that co-opting did not unnecessarily antagonize Kurd and Shia leaders. Many of these leaders and their constituencies will have legitimate grievances against Saddam's military commanders. The coalition must be careful in agreeing to deals with Iraqi officers that it does not provoke additional instability.**

U ~~(S)~~ **Question 6. How do we contain Shia and Kurdish threats to the stability of Iraq and prevent fragmentation?**

U ~~(S)~~ As occurred in many previous crises in Iraq, this scenario offered the possibility that Kurdish and Shia actions would threaten to "Balkanize" or fragment the country. Participants grappled with the complex challenges posed by trying to balance the legitimate needs of the Kurds and the Shia against the desire to have a stable unified Iraq that would serve as a pillar of regional stability.

U ~~(S)~~ Iran was the country considered by the principals to be most interested in seeing Iraq become weak and fragmented, contrary to U.S. interests. Tehran has long considered Iraq a major competitor and threat in the region. Iran has provided financial and material backing to a number of opposition groups operating against Baghdad. In addition, the prospect of a western oriented government in Iraq could prompt Iran to aggressively support elements that would fragment the country.

U ~~(S)~~ Of all the various groups in Iraq, the Kurds were deemed most likely to act to further cement their separation from Baghdad. Some participants felt that a federalist model could provide sufficient protection of Kurdish concerns to keep the country unified. However, the more protracted and violent the internal Iraqi crisis becomes, the more likely the Kurds would be to seek a separate Kurdish state.

U ~~(S)~~ To date, the United States has acquiesced to Turkey's "security zone" in northern Iraq. The principals expressed concern that under this type of scenario, Ankara may decide to become

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more aggressive in its presence in Iraq if it perceives an increase in Kurdish separatist sentiment. The fear is that a Turkish move to occupy northern Iraq to prevent its fragmentation into an independent state would be viewed by Arab allies as the fragmentation of Iraq. Principals expressed the view that the United States should avoid becoming linked to any perception that it is aligned with moves to fragment Iraq as Arab coalition support would likely dissolve.

(U) Additional Comments:

u (S) The Blue Team that discussed this issue concluded that preventing Shias and Kurds from breaking away depended on ensuring that their needs were satisfied by a post-Saddam regime. The team felt that the Shia consider themselves to be Iraqis and would only reluctantly secede if they felt a new government would not be responsive to their needs. In the case of both the Kurds and the Shias, the team felt their was value in establishing local governments in these areas as soon as possible and then tying them into the central government when practical. Taking this path will require strengthening Shia and Kurd bargaining positions so that a natural balance of power occurs between all factions.

u (S) Achieving this balance depends on a broad-based representative government. It could also be stimulated by reconstruction packages that have reintegration and ethnic/religious protection requirements. Also, the United States would almost certainly have to engage Iran to ensure that it did not interfere with attempts to establish a balance. The team felt this was important because only Iran would benefit from a fragmented Iraq and Tehran might try to achieve that end by fomenting and supporting rebellion among either Shias or Kurds.

u (S) **Question 7. What is the U.S. role in establishing a transitional government in Iraq?**

u (S) At some point in the scenario, it may be necessary for a transitional government to assume authority in Iraq in order to move the country closer to stability and normalcy. The form and nature of such a government could have significant implications for U.S. objectives and commitments in Iraq as well as in the region. Coalition partners and neighboring states are also likely to have differing interests in a transitional government, and the conflicts over the form and orientation of such a government might threaten coalition cohesion.

u (S) The principals debated the virtues of letting an Iraqi leader emerge to take control of a transitional government ("inside-out") versus imposing an interim civil-military authority over the country ("outside-in"). Participants observed that there is a fundamental and potentially disruptive difference between Iraqi leadership that would be internally acceptable to the likely power brokers as opposed to a leadership that would be acceptable to the United States or the coalition. Some participants argued that the "Bosnia model," or inside-out, may provide the best opportunity to exit Iraq in a reasonable amount of time despite risk of a successor no better than Saddam. Others felt that a total U.S./coalition occupation, under the so-called "outside-in" or

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"Japanese model," would be needed for the United States to achieve its goals. The principals agreed that vetting the next Iraqi leadership might be an impossible task. Similarly, there was discussion that there may be a period of widespread bloodshed in which various factions seek to eliminate their enemies.

U (S) Participants also discussed the possible impacts of the Iraqi Liberation Act on planning for a transitional government, specifically the obligation to identify and use certain opposition groups to promote regime change as well as the requirement that efforts focus on building a new democratic state. Although some indicated willingness to provide strong support for the exiled opposition, there was consensus among the principals that the strength and popularity of these groups inside Iraq is unknown, but probably quite low. Others disputed the efficacy of depending on the exile groups entirely. Although some participants argued that exiled opposition leaders could be useful during the regime transition period, there is no dispute that much must be done to ensure their political legitimacy and popularity within Iraq if they are to be a credible force.

U (S) Early establishment of a national authority to begin taking over civil functions (otherwise assumed by the intervention force) was deemed essential—whether or not representative political discourse had been established in Iraq. In the short to medium term, the framework of the transitional government may not be as important as what it actually does. The development of democratic institutions in Iraq will likely be a long and tortuous process because of the many ethnic, religious, and political factions that must be accommodated.

U (S) There will be a high degree of interest, both in and out of the region, regarding the structure and composition of any Iraqi government. Some countries may choose to destabilize a government that is perceived as inimical to their own interests. The principals identified Iran as one possible source of subversion if Tehran felt that the new government in Baghdad was too western in orientation.

U (S) One concern expressed by the principals was that uneven progress might result in one particular area being dominated by a particular group leading to factionalism, a potential contributor to regional instability.

(U) Additional Comments:

U (S) The Deputies Committee that considered this issue concluded that a transitional government that met U.S. standards (e.g., a true regime change, not one of Saddam's cohorts) would have to be pluralistic, though not necessarily democratic. They thought it highly unlikely that a democratic government could be formed, but that an inclusive government involving nationalist leaders was possible. The Blue Team saw the nationalist leaders as a force for stabilization if the latter believe that one of the ultimate goals of the coalition is a unified Iraq.

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u (S) The team believed that overt U.S. participation in selection and installation of a transitional government was likely to be counterproductive. Diplomatic efforts to create a transitional government should be led by Middle Eastern governments. The U.S. role would be to shape their efforts by ensuring that they made provisions for human rights, cooperation with the West on WMD issues, and a non-aggressive stance vis-à-vis neighboring states. Other avenues that the United States should explore in this role include involving the Jordanian government and encouraging a national reconciliation conference under UN or other auspices.

u (S) Overtly, U.S. involvement should be limited to those actions required to stabilize the country militarily; to support humanitarian assistance activities; and rewarding acceptable Iraqi behavior, perhaps through economic incentives. A minority view that was expressed was in order for true change to successfully occur, the United States would have to "own the country," even if it went against the wishes of our partners in the region.

u (S) Overall, the team believed that key aspects of U.S. policy toward a transitional government included: representative in accordance with international norms; that it agree to recognize Kuwait's independence; that it comply with international norms on WMD issues; that it respect human rights. Military policy should be formulated to stabilize Iraq without fostering dependency on the coalition; support humanitarian assistance operations; and WMD verification.

u (S) **Question 8. How do we synchronize humanitarian assistance, civilian, and military activities during combat and/or peace enforcement operations?**

u (S) Experience seems to indicate that any effort to restore and maintain stability in a post-Saddam Iraq will involve several simultaneous activities on the part of military forces and civil entities, including governmental, international organization, and non-government actors. The principals disagreed with a suggestion that a "High Commissioner" could be an interim solution, but felt that the issue of who or what would provide unity of command to the political-military-humanitarian operation must be resolved in advance. The involvement of UN and Arab partners in the planning process would facilitate collective ownership of the tasks ahead.

u (S) Some participants argued that the United States would have such high stakes in the outcome that it must retain tight control over the progression of events. Others objected, asserting that the intervention may be unduly prolonged by not encouraging the growth of indigenous leadership. A participant argued that a successful coalition effort would require Iraqi political coverage and legitimization for major actions.

u (S) The spectrum of tasks from occupation to rebuilding requires the participation of many U.S. government agencies and international organizations. How the political issues surrounding occupation and reconstruction are handled could be the crux of the military operation or the determinant of United Nations Security Council support. The United States cannot afford to wait until after the intervention begins to initiate a PDD-56 process. Past experience has too often

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demonstrated that ignoring interagency coordinating mechanisms and planning tools can lead to aborted, prolonged, or failed missions. U.S. end state objectives in Iraq will not be achieved through an exclusively military intervention.

(U) Additional Comments:

U ~~(S)~~ The Deputies Committee believed that the best way to address the issue was to begin by describing what Iraq should look like at the end and then work backwards to determine requirements. Throughout this process the consideration of political realities would be necessary.

U ~~(S)~~ One of the earliest tasks would be to assess the state of Iraq's infrastructure in order to determine support and resource requirements. Another early task would be to determine the UN's role and the positions of major players with respect to that role. Although team members believed that Russia, China, and France would most likely support a UN role, GCC responses to a UN presence were less clear. Whether or not the United Nations or some other international organization is involved will determine the best ways of synchronizing activities.

U ~~(S)~~ **Question 9. How do we re-establish civil order in the wake of combat operations?**

U ~~(S)~~ Sustaining peace often requires more complex planning and sophisticated intervention techniques than do combat operations. If there are severe disruptions of the infrastructure that impede normal government services, if food and drinking water cannot be distributed, if reconstruction progress does not provide incentives to refrain from renewing hostilities, or if minorities perceive that the social system will not protect them, then peace may be lost.

U ~~(S)~~ Under today's conditions, observers believe that many of the services that still exist are sustained at the local level, as Baghdad can no longer provide services to many areas. A participant observed that there are many technocrats (not bureaucrats) and other industrious people in Iraq who have been able to maintain a modicum of services to their compatriots. Such persons should be identified and considered for serving in transitional governments as their areas are secured. Principals expressed concern that if the crisis were to become protracted and destructive to the infrastructure, or particularly violent, these core persons may be lost—another reason for the intervention to be swift, large-scale, and decisive.

U ~~(S)~~ A participant noted that as long as the destruction of infrastructure and lives is minimized, the Iraqi problem should be approached as a one of failed leadership, not a failed state.

(U) Additional Comments:

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U (S) The Deputies Committee concluded that to create civil order and preserve the peace, there must be some sort of organization that can satisfy the basic needs of the population. Although the coalition may establish services and restore the infrastructure initially, it should turn them over to indigenous organizations as soon as possible.

U (S) In essence, two parallel processes are required. The first is the creation of a government of national reconstruction. The second is the process of transferring governmental powers to this government. Success may depend on suspending the sanctions in order to allow the new government to generate revenues and acquire materials necessary to restore and sustain an infrastructure that would accommodate the needs of the population.

U (S) **Question 10. What is the U.S. exit strategy and long-term presence in Iraq?**

U (S) Under the Desert Crossing Seminar scenario, the United States is likely to play a crucial role in stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq to ensure that the legitimate needs of its population are met by indigenous agencies and that it can defend itself without posing a threat to its neighbors. The principals explored how the United States might assist in bringing Iraq back into the family of nations, without becoming mired in a lengthy occupation, while at the same time protecting U.S. regional interests.

U (S) Arab coalition partners will want to see Iraq rehabilitated to balance against Iran. At present, with Saddam in power, Iraq cannot play such a role. Demilitarization of Iraq is not an option for the United States, as it will invite intrigue on the part of its neighbors. A post-Saddam Iraq will have legitimate security concerns on all of its borders for which a military is necessary.

U (S) A participant offered that the strategy must consider how to balance the need for a new Iraqi government that has legitimacy not just internally, but externally as well.

U (S) Ending the intervention does not mean ending U.S. engagement. Humanitarian assistance, for example, will be required over the long term. The post-Saddam environment will likely take on a different conflictual nature as many countries will vie with the United States and compete with each other for reconstruction and oil contracts in Iraq.

(U) Additional Comments:

U (S) The Deputies concluded that achieving the end state would be the signal to begin withdrawal. They noted that there are at least three end states that must be considered as part of exit strategy deliberations. These are: creation of self-reliant political and economic systems; a stable security environment free from internal and external threats; and respect for human rights.

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u (S) How long it will take to achieve these end states depends on the depth of the U.S. involvement. A MacArthur-like approach would be quickest, but a Bosnia scenario is more likely—which means U.S. involvement could last for at least 10 years. A strategy of minimizing U.S. involvement and relying on Arab states and the international community to achieve these end states will prolong the process indefinitely.

u (S) Throughout the intervention, it is important to stress to the Iraqi people that primary responsibility for political and economic revival rests on them. This should be a major coalition theme.

(U) Concluding Remarks

u (S) This section summarized the concluding remarks of principals in a roundtable discussion of their insights from the Desert Crossing Seminar. Their comments focused on the five dimensions of the potential crisis in Iraq, including the full range of military, humanitarian, reconstruction, coalition, and political/diplomatic elements.

- u (S) Many principals agreed that the worst response to this problem is for the military to become committed incrementally or in a limited way. Military intervention to achieve the desired end-state must be rooted in ground forces and be full scale (i.e., multi-dimensional participation by other governmental agencies and international and non-governmental organizations). The Unified Command Plan issues raised during the seminar are valid, but are not so complicated that they cannot be sorted out. Most importantly, an interagency process (i.e., PDD-56) should begin as soon as possible to discuss issues beyond the military realm. Essentially, they will determine the context and objectives for any use of the military. A strategy must be designed in line with U.S. national interests, as the risks are very high. Non-military options should therefore be considered as well.

- u (S) The serious void in U.S. understanding of the humanitarian problems in Iraq must be filled. Conflicting reports abound, obscuring a sound assessment of the present conditions in Iraq. This information must be obtained so that planners can extrapolate the likely extent of deterioration and required actions to be taken in response.

- u (S) As U.S. and coalition forces stabilize Iraq, a plan for reconstruction of the country must be ready to execute. This plan must answer numerous questions: How do we get Iraq back and functioning? How can mechanisms be developed to help Iraqis help themselves? How do we energize them to do so?

- u (S) Organizing a credible coalition will be a challenging task. Because the exact chain of events to occur in Iraq is unknown, should the United States consult with our allies and regional partners for different types of coalitions? A coalition with humanitarian objectives would function quite differently than a coalition with military objectives. Even if intervention should begin as a humanitarian one, the United States must be prepared for the challenging task of changing the coalition's objectives if conditions warrant. Gaining the

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participation of Iraq's neighbors in a regime changing intervention may require an *a priori* commitment by the United States to put troops on the ground in Iraq.

- U ~~(S)~~ The United States, in consultations with our allies and partners, needs to define an end-state for Iraq. The result may be anywhere on the spectrum from minimalist to grand. Another challenging task will be finding an Iraqi "dance partner" inside Iraq or in exile who can lead the country. Such a person must be credible to the Iraqi people (and to the United States and its Arab allies).

U ~~(S)~~ The involvement of Iraq's neighbors in any operation is critical to success. The future of Iraq—but especially the region—is too critical for the United States not to be involved. Therefore, planning for a quick entrance and exit should not be considered as a possible option. What comes out of all of this is also important in terms of how it impacts what we need to do in the region in the future. An intervention that would completely reshape the Iraqi state will likely have a deep impact on how the region operates in the future.

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Section III. Scenario Summary (U)

U ~~(S)~~ The scenario portrayed a sequence of events that might follow the demise of Saddam Hussein: factional fighting, popular uprisings, machinations by Iraq's neighbors, refugee flows, and a number of other serious political and humanitarian challenges. The scenario was chronologically divided into four "moves" for which the teams were asked to address particular issues. The following paragraphs provide a summary of the scenario situations that initiated each move. Also listed are the issues addressed during each move. (For the complete scenario, see Appendix C.)

Move 1, Issue 1 (U)
Scenario Date: Monday, June 28, 1999 (U)

U ~~(S)~~ U.S. intelligence identified unusual movements of Iraqi forces on June 23rd. While it did not appear that they were assembling for an attack, they had with them the wherewithal in terms of fuel and ammunition to do so on short notice. The Iraqi military commander in the southern region issued new rules of engagement that encouraged the use of deadly force for dealing with the rise in Shia insurgent activity. There was also an increase in the alert status of Iranian forces and the movement of some of those forces toward the Iraqi border region.

U ~~(S)~~ According to a recent defector, Saddam was assassinated by his son Uday on June 21st. The assassination occurred without the complicity of other members of Saddam's inner circle who were caught off guard. Security forces loyal to Uday immediately began to arrest those who could potentially threaten his assumption of power. The next day Saddam's other son, Qusay, convened a meeting with key military leaders and received their support for a counter coup.

U ~~(S)~~ In light of these events, the President was concerned that—given increasing instability, the apparent massacre of a large number of Shia, the withholding of food from large portions of the population, the beginning of possibly large refugee flows, and the movement of armed forces—Iraq might rapidly devolve into chaos. If this occurred, instability might spread to a substantial part of the region, affecting U.S. interests. The President called for a meeting of the Principals to discuss options, including key decision points and the conditions under which the United States might intervene.

Move 2, Issues 2, 3, & 4 (U)
Scenario Date: Monday, July 12, 1999 (U)

U ~~(S)~~ Qusay announced the death of Uday and Saddam on July 3rd. He also declared that Iraqi forces were on high alert, and that he was assuming leadership of the state. In defiance, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, military commander in southern Iraq, warned that he would consolidate his hold on that region and may declare it a separate state. Local Shia vowed to resist and called for assistance from Shias throughout the world. Majid responded by taking a number of Shia leaders

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hostage and summarily executing several hundred others. On July 8th additional Iranian forces were sighted in the border area, and several divisions prepared to leave garrisons in eastern Iran.

u (S) An estimated 50,000 Iraqis were on the roads fleeing fighting, food shortages, and declarations of martial law. The vast majority were converging on the Kuwait and Saudi borders. Regional experts believed that the total number of refugees could more than triple within the next 10 days. Kuwaiti and Saudi officials asserted that they were unprepared for the number of Iraqis they believed would ultimately seek refuge in their countries.

u (S) In the northern portion of the country there were indications that the Kurds were preparing to launch an attack, although the timing and objectives were unclear. As a result, Turkey warned the United States that it would not allow the Kurds to solidify their hold over northern Iraq.

u (S) When the President announced his decision to authorize a U.S. military intervention in the crisis on humanitarian grounds, a number of nations expressed interest in participating. However, details of their roles and contributions were still under consideration and the extent of the latitude they were willing to give the United States to lead coalition operations remained unclear. (To date, no international organization has formally sanctioned the operation.)

u (S) The President asked that the Principals provide assessments on three issues: 1) How do we manage Iraq's neighbors during the crisis? 2) How should we build and maintain a coalition during what may be rough going ahead, and what are the "Red Lines" that may cause some coalition members to withdraw support? 3) What are the major refugee assistance challenges external to Iraq?

Move 3, Issues 5, 6, & 7 (U)
Scenario Date: Tuesday, October 26, 1999 (U)

u (S) The leading elements of coalition armed forces and civil assistance task forces were in the region and initial military operations had begun in southern Iraq. In the months since the President decided to move forward, a number of significant events had occurred that were likely to complicate coalition operations. In August, a group of officers assassinated Qusay. They had been able to control the area immediately around Baghdad and pockets elsewhere, but were unable to consolidate their hold. Rebellious military units and continued Shia and Kurd uprisings complicated the situation, with substantial loss of life and great damage to the country's infrastructure. Substantial Iranian forces remained near the border, and reports suggest that Iran may be supporting both insurgencies. Turkey had also moved additional troops to its border, but had not yet intervened.

u (S) Debates among coalition members and interested third parties over the form and function of transitional governments had become frequent. Many recommended installing transition governments as soon as possible. Expatriate opposition groups had also taken a similar line. Some leaders of these groups had returned to Iraq and were attempting to rally their supporters. While there were some alliances between the Iraqi factions, significant differences remain.

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U (S) Mindful of the need for military forces to collaborate closely with civilian entities and to preserve coalition unity, the President was concerned about three fundamental questions. These are: 1) What is the appropriate role for elements of Iraqi military power that are no longer interested in continued fighting? 2) How do we contain, if not reduce, Shia and Kurdish threats to the stability of Iraq to prevent fragmentation of the country? 3) What is the U.S. role in establishing transition governments in Iraq?

Move 4, Issues 8, 9, & 10 (U)
Scenario Date: Wednesday, March 29, 2000 (U)

U (S) During the past six months, the coalition had made considerable progress in coping with the instability brought on by the end of Saddam's regime. However, the pace had been uneven, and humanitarian and reconstruction efforts by governmental, international, and non-governmental organizations were uncoordinated. Refugees have been cared for at camps in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and the Turkish border areas, as well as at camps scattered throughout Iraq. Some Iraqis had begun to return to their homes, but most preferred to remain in the camps, fearing a lack of services in Iraq and the possibility of renewed fighting.

U (S) Many local transitional governments had gained control over their constituencies. However, none were able to deal with the situation without external assistance. There is no effective national government or central authority. Most of the former regime's bureaucratic offices had been destroyed, but many members of the central government civil service corps remained in Baghdad or its environs. Iraq's infrastructure—communication, transportation, health care, food distribution, water treatment, ports, banking, and petroleum distribution systems—was in varying degrees of disrepair. In some regions and municipalities, the infrastructure was intact, and the officials who operated it during Saddam's regime were still at their stations.

U (S) The southern portion of the country was more-or-less pacified, as were major portions of the central region and some areas of the northern region. However, isolated outbreaks of violence continued in these areas and included acts of terrorism, extortion, and revenge. Inhabitants remained restive, and sustained peace was not yet assured. Renewed outbreaks of large-scale violence are possible, and there is a danger that infrastructure inadequacies and continued food shortages could lead to mass flows of refugees once again.

U (S) Dealing with these issues was essentially "first aid" compared to identifying and completing actions that must be taken to stabilize Iraq for the long term. Conditions under which coalition operations might be terminated were not clear, nor were the responsibilities for achieving them or the time required to do so. Requirements for long term presence in Iraq were vague, but many believed some residual peace enforcement forces and reconstruction oversight would be necessary.

U (S) Against this backdrop, leaders of the coalition will soon meet to determine the next steps. The President asked for options on three issues he planned to raise at the meeting: 1) How do we synchronize humanitarian assistance, civilian, and military activities during combat and/or peace

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enforcement operations? 2) How do we re-establish civil order in the wake of combat operations? 3) What is the U.S. exit strategy and the long term presence requirements in Iraq?

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Section IV. Seminar Design (U)

(U) Seminar Objectives and Approach

u ~~(S)~~ The Desert Crossing Seminar was designed to elicit insights on how to manage change, minimizing undesirable effects and shaping new environments, in a post-Saddam Iraq. The Seminar structure focused the participants on crucial interagency issues that would bear on the situation, as well as interagency interests and responsibilities. The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) briefed a draft Peace Operations Branch Concept, known as "Desert Crossing," to participants for discussion of the proposed phases and concepts, as well as the risks, threats, opportunities, and challenges that are likely to be present under those conditions.

(U) Senior representatives from across the U.S. government, including the Departments of State and Defense and the intelligence community were provided the opportunity to explore a set of issues likely to arise as a result of the scenario presented. (Participants are listed in Appendix A). All participants received an initial scenario at the start of the seminar and were provided updates ~~at the start of each move. (The full scenario can be found at Appendix C.)~~

(U) The scenario was intended to be *plausible*, not predictive, and to present a range of possible events that would allow participants to explore and develop issues and requirements in a not-for-attribution, risk free, environment. Within the context of the scenario, seminar discussions focused on identification of the most crucial interagency issues, interests, and responsibilities. Participants were organized into various teams to facilitate the development of insights, but were not asked to "solve" the problems.

(U) To focus the Desert Crossing Seminar discussions, a listing of ten critical issues based on the scenario situation were developed prior to the seminar and provided to the participants. However, these issues were structured in such a way as not to constrain the participants, allowing them to identify other issues for future consideration. In achieving the seminar objectives, participants exchanged information and engaged in discussions that were largely unconstrained. The issue discussions were conducted within an atmosphere of "creative tension" between participants and Blue, Red, and Green perspectives in order to elicit innovative solutions and successful change management. The challenges put forth in the issues were intended to present a full range of complexities that would require actions by a number of U.S. agencies, international organizations, allies, and non-governmental organizations.

u ~~(S)~~ To accomplish the seminar's objectives, address the identified issues, and surface new issues, the seminar was organized around two levels of discussions which were conducted in four basic seminar sessions or moves. The first level focused on the deliberations and interactions between three interagency Deputies (Blue) Teams, an Iraq (Red) Team, and a Coalition and other Countries (Green) Team. The second level focused on the deliberations of a Principals Committee or Team which considered the recommendations of the Deputies Teams and discussed policy actions and options in light of these recommendations and the evolving scenario situations presented at the beginning of each seminar session or move. During the first session or

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move, all Teams considered the same introductory question or issue. However, to fully consider all ten issues in the limited time available, in subsequent moves, each of the three Deputies (Blue) Teams considered, in parallel, a different issue or question prompted by the move's scenario situation. The Red and Green Teams were asked to consider all issues and to respond mid-move and during end of move plenary sessions to the Blue Deputies Teams' recommended actions. During their deliberations, the Principals Team considered the assessments and recommendations of the Deputies Teams, discussed their relevancy, priority, and, when appropriate, the agency or organization that would have responsibility for pursuing the issues or recommendations. Additionally, the Principals Team identified new issues for future consideration. (For a detailed description of the seminar process, see Appendix B.)

(U) Issue Questions

u ~~(S)~~ As mentioned earlier, a set of ten issue papers was prepared to initiate discussions during the Desert Crossing Seminar. Each of these papers focused on a key question or issue that the interagency community would have to address in a post-Saddam Iraq. These issue papers were not intended to be definitive discourses on problems and challenges. Rather, they were structured to stimulate discussions—and ensure all dimensions of the issue were considered—that would lead to the identification of other issues and sub-issues, options, enabling factors, constraints, and recommendations.[1] (The full text of the issue papers can be found at Appendix D.)

(U) Each issue paper consisted of an issue statement in the form of a question, a brief discussion of key points and implications, and discussion questions. Issues were discussed against the backdrop of an intelligence scene setter that was provided at the beginning of each move. The seminar issue questions addressed during the seminar were:

1. What are the key U.S. decision points and conditions for intervention? ~~(S)~~ u
2. How do we manage Iraq's neighbors and other influential states? ~~(S)~~ u
3. How do we build and maintain the coalition? ~~(S)~~ u
4. What are the major refugee assistance challenges external to Iraq? ~~(S)~~ u
5. What is the appropriate role for co-opted elements of Iraqi military power? ~~(S)~~ u
6. How do we contain Shia and Kurdish threats to the stability of Iraq and prevent fragmentation? ~~(S)~~ u
7. What is the U.S. role in establishing a transitional government in Iraq? ~~(S)~~ u
8. How do we synchronize humanitarian assistance, civilian, and military activities during combat and/or peace enforcement operations? ~~(S)~~ u
9. How do we re-establish civil order in the wake of combat operations? ~~(S)~~ u
10. What is the U.S. exit strategy and long-term presence in Iraq? ~~(S)~~ u

(U) Following the issue discussion, each Blue Team prepared a concise briefing that identified and refined the issue, and identified key related issues, next steps and assumptions, and likely

[1] The issues were developed for seminar purposes only and do not reflect the views of any U.S. Government entity.

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Red and Green Team reactions. To allow for maximum dialogue and interaction, briefings were first presented/discussed in a Deputies plenary session, then separately to the Principals Team.

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~~SECRET~~

DESERT CROSSING SEMINAR

AFTER ACTION REPORT BRIEFING

July 22, 1999

Classified By: CINC CENTCOM/Multiple Sources

Reason 1.5A

Declas: X4

~~SECRET~~

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Background

- On June 28-30, 1999, U.S. Central Command hosted the Desert Crossing Seminar, a senior level interagency effort in which participants were asked to identify insights on how to manage change in a post-Saddam Iraq
- Seminar participation included:
  - Department of State
  - Department of Defense
  - National Security Council
  - Central Intelligence Agency

Purpose

Enhance interagency planning for Iraq crisis by:

- **Identifying most crucial interagency issues**
- **Identifying interagency interests**
- **Identifying interagency responsibilities**
- **Examining proposed phases and concepts for "Desert Crossing" draft plan**

Goal was problem identification, not solutions

Scheduled Moves

- Four moves used to structure issue discussion:
  - Move 1 = June 99.....Pre-Concept
  - Move 2 = July 99.....Concept Phase I
  - Move 3 = October 99.....Concept Phase II
  - Move 4 = March 00.....Concept Phases III & IV

- Scenario ranged from uncertainty surrounding Saddam's departure, through chaos in the aftermath, to improving conditions.

- Challenging and "worst case" elements in scenario

Two Levels of Discussion & Interaction

- First level focused on Deputies:
  - 3 Deputies (Blue) Teams
  - Iraq (Red) Team
  - Coalition (Green) Team

- Second level focused on Principals:
  - Deputies debated and developed recommendations for principals
  - Principals deliberated--determined relevancy, priority, responsibilities, and identified new issues

PrincipalsTeam

- Gen Anthony Zinni (USCENTCOM)
- (DoS/NEA)
- (DoS/PM)
- (DoS/IO)
- (DoD/S&TR)
- (JS/J-5)
- (DoS)
- (USAID/OFDA)
- Amb (Ret.)
- (CIA)
- (DoD/SOLIC)
- (DoD/ISA)
- (DoS/NEA)
- (DoS/PRM)

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Issues Considered

1. What are the key U.S. decision points and conditions for intervention?
2. How do we manage Iraq's neighbors and other influential states?
3. How do we build and maintain the coalition?
4. What are the major refugee assistance challenges external to Iraq?
5. What is the appropriate role for co-opted elements of Iraqi military power?
6. How do we contain Shia and Kurdish threats to the stability of Iraq and prevent fragmentation?
7. What is the U.S. role in establishing a transitional government in Iraq?
8. How do we synchronize humanitarian assistance, civilian, and military activities during combat and/or peace enforcement operations?
9. How do we reestablish civil order in the wake of combat operations?
10. What is the U.S. exit strategy and long-term presence in Iraq?

Draft
Issue Highlights from Principals Team

Issue 1

What are the key U.S. decision points and conditions for intervention?

- Wide ranging debate
- Suggested end state
  - Iraq should remain unified
  - The Government of Iraq should observe its international obligations (e.g., WMD) and subscribe to international norms (e.g., decent treatment of its own people, recognition of borders)
  - Iraq must not be threatening to its neighbors
  - Iraq should be a stable country
- Suggested criteria for success
  - Destruction of Iraq's WMD capabilities
  - Incorporation/elimination of Republican Guard into Iraqi Army
  - Stabilized and growing oil economy
  - Government with respect for international obligations and norms

Issue 2

How do we manage Iraq's neighbors and other influential states?

- Chaos in Iraq may boost secessionist activity by Iraqi Kurds leading to unilateral Turkish intervention
  - U.S. must balance Turk-Kurd relations early
- U.S. involvement in Iraq may lead Iran to prevent the establishment of a "hostile" government
  - United States must quickly engage Iran to prevent destabilizing reactions

Issue 3

How do we build and maintain the coalition?

- Humanitarian assistance objectives
  - Politically easier to build
  - Most countries sympathize with Iraqi people
- Regime change objectives
  - Contentious issue in region and among U.S. allies
  - U.S. commitment to put troops on ground for large invasion may be required to gain support

Issue 4

What are the major refugee assistance challenges external to Iraq?

- Many countries will be resistant to opening borders to refugees
  - Turkey will not permit refugees to enter
  - Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were highly resistant in Desert Storm
  - Willingness to assist corresponds directly to level of international financial and material assistance
- Early dialog with coalition and international and non-government organizations needed

Issue 5

What is the appropriate role for co-opted elements of Iraqi military power?

- For the long term, Iraq may require a strong military
  - Long borders
  - Many neighbors
  - Deter against foreign intrigue
- Exiled Iraqi military leaders might be useful in engaging Iraqi units as coalition forces move forward

Issue 6

How do we contain Shia and Kurdish threats to the stability of Iraq and prevent fragmentation?

- Iran might consider a strategy to weaken and fragment Iraq through support of Kurdish and Shia secessionists
- Kurdish moves to cement autonomous nature of northern Iraq would likely result in a Turkish military response

Issue 7

What is the U.S. role in establishing a transitional government in Iraq?

- "Inside-out" (Bosnia model)
  - Vetting of potential leaders is impossible task
  - Long term stability requires legitimate/credible indigenous leaders
  - May be resistant to US/Coalition influence
- "Outside-in" (Japanese model)
  - Failed government requires complete rebuilding
  - Authorities pursue policies in line with US goals

Issue 8

How do we synchronize humanitarian assistance, civilian, and military activities during combat and/or peace enforcement operations?

- No "High Commissioner"
- Must be determined prior to intervention
  - Enact PDD-56 process ASAP
  - Consult with allies
  - Consult with IOs, NGOs

Issue 9

How do we reestablish civil order in the wake of combat operations?

- Identify and co-opt industrious persons who have been able to maintain services in the absence of material and financial support from Baghdad
- Concern that protracted crisis would destroy infrastructure argues for swift, large-scale and decisive action

Issue 10

What is the U.S. exit strategy and long-term presence in Iraq?

- Iraq on path to serve as a pillar of regional stability (e.g., vis-à-vis Iran)
- Indigenous leadership that has internal and external legitimacy and credibility
- Ending of military intervention does not mean end of engagement
  - Humanitarian assistance will continue
  - Reconstruction/business activities

Draft
Key Observations from Discussions of Deputies and Principals

Key Observations

- Deliberate planning needs to become interagency
  - The development of a Pol-Mil plan should begin immediately
  - Regime crisis may require rapid U.S. action on short notice
  - Regime change may not enhance regional stability
  - WMD issues warrant additional attention

Key Observations (Continued)

- Management of Iran is critical to mission success
  - Iran's anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq
  - Iran possess the ability to raise the cost and the consequences of intervention
  - Lifting sanctions on Iran may be a part of a full Iraqi policy

Key Observations (Continued)

- Ambiguous opposition role clouds U.S. policy development
  - Lack of information on internal Iraqi opposition conditions severely hampers contingency planning
  - Iraqi exile opposition weaknesses are significant
  - The United States should be prepared to initiate, on short notice, a dialog with leaders of key ethnic groups in Iraq

Key Observations (Continued)

- Coalition dialogue should begin immediately
  - Active support from coalition partners is critical to mission success
  - Differing visions of a unified Iraq complicate end-state articulation
  - Arab coalition may undermine accomplishment of U.S. policy objectives
  - A long-term, large scale military intervention may be at odds with many coalition partners

Key Observations (Continued)

- Iraq's economic viability is key to long term regional stability
  - Iraqi stabilization necessitates debt/claims forgiveness
  - The relaxation of economic sanctions early in the crisis may be a key determinant in the ability of the United States to influence events in Iraq

Suggested Next Steps for CENTCOM

- Conduct a detailed review & analysis of "Key Observations" from seminar
- Identify CENTCOM priorities and action plan
  - What issues should be acted upon (and by whom)
  - Update draft Desert Crossing plan as appropriate
- Conduct follow-on engagements with Principals
  - Encourage initiation of PDD-56 process
  - Agreement on issues to be acted upon & ownership
- Establish intelligence taskings to fill gaps