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CCSS

9 July 2007

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101


MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Legal Counsel to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(ATTN: COL (b)(3), (b)(6), Pentagon Room 2E841, Washington, DC 20318-9999

SUBJECT: Classification Determination of Blackwater "Post-Incident Investigation:
Ambush of BSC Team 31 Mar 04 in Fallujah"

1. (U) Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and IAW Central Command Regulation 380-1, I have been designated an original classification authority for documents classified by HQ, USCENTCOM and subordinate units.

2. (U) I have reviewed the document listed above and find the criteria provided in EO 12958 for information being classified CONFIDENTIAL was not met. This document includes sensitive information that does not rise to the level of causing damage to national security. The document should be marked UNCLASSIFIED in its entirety. None of the national security criteria contained in EO 12958 prevent the disclosure this document to members of Congress or to attorneys who are representing Blackwater.

3. (U) POC is CW4 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6)


TIMOTHY F. GHORMLEY
Major General, USMC
Chief of Staff

Attachments:

(1) Blackwater "Post-Incident Investigation: Ambush of BSC Team 31 Mar 04 in Fallujah"

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~~Classification Determination Pending: Protect as though Classified CONFIDENTIAL~~
(DoD 5220.22-M, ¶ 4-105(b))

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From: (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

Ref: Post-Incident Investigation: Ambush of BSC Team 31 Mar 04 in Fallujah

On 2 Apr 04, I received a phone call from (b)(6) of BSC requesting my element which works and lives in vic of Fallujah, to conduct an investigation to flesh out some details involving the ambush of the ESS detail on 31 Mar 04. On 3 Apr 04, 2 KE 1 teams and myself proceeded out to conduct the investigation (encountering two IED detonations along the way) with the results articulated in the following paragraphs.

At approx. 1200 hrs, we arrived at Camp Fallujah (formerly known as FOB MEK) and were signed in by name and number of vehicles at the gate. Upon obtaining directions to the DFAC we proceeded there. I spoke to a Mr (b)(6) and Mr (b)(6) both being Jordanian, if they had encountered anyone transporting food on the day in question and found that they were in the wrong location. They stated that they had spoke to no one from BSC, ESS or any food truck drivers. They related to me that all food deliveries must stop at the KBR office first. I awaited a KBR rep to arrive but he never showed. They called him Mr (3), (b)(6)

In the interim, my other team had gone to the billeting office where they spoke to a GySgt. (3), (b)(6) They stated that they wanted to know what the procedures were for contractors coming in off of the road and needing billeting accompanied by HCN's. They were asked if they were BW personnel but they avoided the question and continued the inquiry. They were told that all personnel accompanying HCN's had to stay with those personnel in a special tented area. The HCN's had to be escorted by the contractors at all times and sleep in the same area.

Outside of the DFAC, I engaged a LCpl (3), (b)(6) in conversation about USMC checkpoints in the vic of the ambush on 31 Mar 04. He stated that 2/1 had been in the area the day prior. This would correspond with my convoy on 30 Mar 04 heading to Baghdad, seeing Tanks, LAVS and earth moving equipment all in the vic of the clover leaf of MSR Mobile and MSR Michigan. Apparently these forces had been removed on 31 Mar 04 or the night before. My convoy noted that they were not in the area on 31 Mar 04 as they returned from Baghdad around 1100. LCpl (3), (b)(6) it turns out is one of the security guys for the Commander of the RCT and he escorted us to the RCT COC.

At the RCT COC, we were directed to the SJA first and then the RCT S2 (Maj. (3), (b)(6)). Maj. (3), (b)(6) advised us that an operation was in the planning stages and he could not give out information until it was kicked off. Once the operation was underway, we would be free to gain access to whatever he had on the incident with the proper clearances. I stated that we could not for anymore than that and we would return. Telephone # (b)(6)

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At the same time of the above exchange, (b)(6) my S2 was having a conversation with an intel junior officer who relayed the following information with map references:

The team had arranged a link up with an ICDC battalion rep vic grid (b)(2)High. This was an arranged meeting. The ICDC advises that they will act as guides and show them a shorter route through town. As the ICDC guides proceed, they lead the TM into the first of three ambushes which was located at (b)(2)High. The ICDC also facilitate blocking positions to prevent the teams escape. ICDC members involved disappeared after the incident. A dark colored Mercedes 300 set the roadblock at the 12 position along their route of travel which was east to west. A 1990 model white pickup with a double cab and an early model tan Opel sedan assisted in setting the roadblock. An Oldsmobile of unknown color was observed transporting the people that fired the AKs. A grey Opel sedan pulled the victims from the vehicles, tied rope to their legs, dragged them to the old bridge vic of (b)(2)High and hung them there. 2 Dark Opel Sedans with 4-5 pax, poured gasoline on the victims and lit them on fire.

While one vehicle did appear to attempt to evade, this is believed to be "dead man on the wheel" activity. There is no evidence that any attempt at return fire was made from the vehicles. Upon observing the vehicles, which are located at Camp Fallujah, the only bullet holes in the cars are on the rear driver door of one and the rear passenger door of the other. There are also some rounds through the rear hatch door of the vehicles. All evidence indicates that the attack was initiated from the rear blind spots of the vehicles orienting fire on the shooters first, then the drivers. Followed up with point blank shots through the windows.

It is believed that this attack was conducted by mujahedeen and former Iraqi military intel officers.

Distance from link up to ambush is approx 2.59 km and ambush to bridge 2.69 km.

This concludes my report, pictures of the vehicles are also available.

Please use restraint in publication so that the officer that shot straight with us does not get in trouble.

Respectfully submitted,

(b)(6)
C1 Knotted Engineer 1

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