



Regimental Combat Team Six Daily Intelligence Summary



Period Covered: 1800D 14 SEP to 1759D 15 SEP 2012

The overall classification of this INTSUM: **SECRET//FGI GBR, GEO//REL TO USA, FVEY**


Classified by: Regimental Combat Team Six S-2
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 50x1-HUM

(U) AO Tripoli Significant Events

(U) Events During Reporting Period – 14 1800D* September 2012 to 15 1759D* September 2012

IED Attack	1	Direct Fire	9	Indirect Fire	0	SAHRE	0	VBIED Find	0	Misc Event	0
IED Find	0	Coordinated Attack	0	Cache/UXO/ERW	0	Suicide Attack	0	VBIED Attack	0	Mine Find	0
IED Interdiction	0	NBI/MEDEVAC	2	Detainmentment	0	EOF Report	0	SVBIED Attack	0	Mine Attack	0

(b)(1)1.4a



Measures of Certainty:

The chart below represents the approximate level of certainty associated with each word.



(U) AO Tripoli Assessment (15SEP2012)

(b)(1)1.4c

[Redacted content]

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At approximately 2230D* on 14SEP12, INS conducted a complex attack on Camp Bastion Airfield (41R PR 1556 2510). INS initiated the attack with IDF and then breached the Camp perimeter, sending in an unknown number of fighters. Initial reports claim (3) CF KIA, (12) CF WIA, (6) CF aircraft destroyed, (2) severely damaged, as well as (6) hangers severely damaged. Camp Bastion security elements reported (1) EWIA and (18) EKIA, two of whom were reported to have been wearing undetonated suicide vests. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ I&W for the attack first came in JUN12 when INS reportedly transported three VBIED to NES for use in an attack on Shorabak Airfield, assessed to be Camp Bastion.³ In mid-JUL12, another report suggested INS transported a large quantity of explosives to an area IVO Shorabak Airfield for OP against CF.⁴ In late-AUG12, reporting claimed INS in NZD planned to deploy a VBIED on an unspecified airport in NZD; with no known airports in NZD,⁵ and its relative proximity to WSH, the INS were likely targeting Camp Bastion.

(b)(1)1.4c

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Additionally, reporting has further highlighted the possibility of follow-on attacks. Indications of this began to appear early on 15SEP12 through (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(1)1.4c

The I&W reports were confirmed at 1919D*, when Camp Bastion received IDF in the form of three rockets with POO locations IVO (41R PR 2161 2370).¹¹ However, this does not discount the possibility of additional attacks on other CF airfields or further attacks on Camp Bastion. If INS attack other CF airfields,¹² it would most likely be FOB Dwyer (b)(1)1.4a due to its significant reduction of CF personnel and recent SIGACTS demonstrating an increase of INS probing OP in and around the area.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The complexity and sophistication of the 15SEP12 attack on Camp Bastion, comparable only to the 10APR12 spectacular suicide attack in MSQ on DCoP Abdul Wali Koka, demonstrates

(b)(1)1.4c

that the INS have been planning the 15SEP12 attack for a significant period of time. The relative success of this attack on the largest base in the province will likely embolden INS' actions and increase morale across the province.


(U) 1/7 Assessment

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ As the winter season approaches, many locals have begun their preparations for the upcoming 2013 poppy harvest; while others have decided to heed GIRoA warnings and refrain from planting poppy until the CF draw down is complete. Although many farmers in HMD have little preference between GIRoA and the TB's governance, GIRoA's strong stance against poppy cultivating creates many hostilities from locals who make their living growing poppy. Locals rely on the TB every spring to protect their fields and as of yet make agreements with them to attack any ANSF attempting to carry out GLE on their fields.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ GIRoA officials have used local radio stations in Chakaw Bowery (41S PR 770 476) to broadcast radio messages discouraging villagers from growing poppy. The broadcasted message warns farmers that poppy farming is against the law and that any violators will be punished. Although farmers are aware that it is illegal to grow poppy, many have continued to plant it because it is more profitable than wheat; farmers receive (~80,000) PKR (843.51 USD) for each Mann (4.5 kg) of opium.¹³ The GIRoA warnings have not gone unheard, since locals have been discussing the risks involved in planting poppy. For many people it is safer to work for poppy field land owners during the harvest than attempt to work for GIRoA and face constant TB threats against their lives, and their families. While poppy cultivation has been around in AFG for hundreds of years, it only became the predominate cash crop in the mid to late 1980's and now accounts for (~35%) of the country's GDP.¹⁴ Local farmers from NES noted that it requires no special education to grow poppy and believe after CF depart their country there will be no more emphasis on poppy eradication due to economic necessity. It is likely locals do not understand the laws against the poppy harvest and will continue to resist the laws against planting poppy by utilizing their INS connections to protect their land and intimidate GIRoA during the 2013 GLE.

(U) 23rd Georgian Battalion Assessment

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c



(b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c

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(U) AO Guadalcanal Significant Events

(U) Events During Reporting Period – 14 1800D* September 2012 to 15 1759D* September 2012

IED Attack	1	Direct Fire	0	Indirect Fire	0	SAFIRE	0	VBIED Find	0	Misc Event	0
IED Find	1	Coordinated Attack	0	Cache/UJO/ERW	0	Suicide Attack	0	VBIED Attack	0	Mine Find	0
IED Interdiction	1	NBI/MEDEVAC	0	Detainment	0	EOF Report	0	SVBIED Attack	0	Mine Attack	0

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g



Measures of Certainty:

The chart below represents the approximate level of certainty associated with each word.



(U) AO Guadalcanal Assessment (15SEP2012)

(b)(1)1.4c



(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c

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(U) 3/8 Assessment

(b)(1)1.4c


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(b)(1)1.4c

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SEPTEMBER 2012							
	Friday	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday
GREGORIAN 2012	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
HIJRI 1433	27	28	29	1	2	3	4
EVENT				Dhu I-Qa'da (The Month of Rest 17SEP12-16OCT12)			

(b)(1)1.4a



(U) Common Acronyms

ABP – Afghan Border Police	GCTF - Global Counter-Terrorism Forces	NIPR - Network Internet Protocol Routing
ACM – Anti-Coalition Militia	GIROA - Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report
ACME – Afghanistan Captured Material Exploitation	GLE - Government Led Eradication	NWA – Nawah-ye Barakzi
AFG – Afghanistan	GMRL - Guided Missile Rocket Launcher	NZD – Now Zad
AHP – Afghan Highway Patrol	GPS - Global Positioning System	OBJ – Objective
AKA – Also Known As	GSK - Gereschk	ODA - Operation Detachment Alpha
ALP - Aghan Local Police	GSR - Garmsar	OGA - Other Government Agency
ANA – Afghan National Army	GSW - Gun Shot Wound	OoA - Out of Area
ANAP – Afghan National Auxiliary Police	HAF - Helo Assault Force	OP – Operation
ANASF - Afghan National Army Special Forces	HET - HUMINT Exploitation Team	PAK - Pakistan
ANCOP – Afghan National Civil Order Police	HIG - Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin	PAT - Police Advisory Team
ANP – Afghan National Police	HII - Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami	PAX - Personnel
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces	HMD- Helmand Province	PB - Patrol Base
AO - Area of Operations	HME - Home Made Explosives	PBA - Post Blast Analysis
AO – Al Qaeda	HMG - Heavy Machine Gun	PID - Positive Identification
ARSC – Afghan Regional Security Command	HQN - Haqqani Network	PMT - Police Military Training
ASR – Aviation Support Request	HTT - Human Terrain Team	POI - Point Of Impact
ATT - At This Time	HVI - High Value Individual	POO - Point Of Origin
AUP - Afghan Uniformed Police	HVT - High Value Target	PP - Pressure Plate
BAF - Bagram Airfield	I&W - Indications and Warnings	PPHQ - Provincial Police Headquarters
BAS - Camp Bastion	IDC - Independent Duty Corpsman	PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team
BDA - Battle Damage Assessment	IDF - Indirect Fire	PSD - Personal Security Detachment
BDQ – Badula Qulp	IED - Improvised Explosive Devices	PUC - Person Under Control
BSA – Battalion Security Area	IIR - Intelligence Information Report	QRF - Quick Reaction Force
BTIF - Bagram Theater Interrogation Facility	INS – Insurgents	QYG - Qaleh-ye Gaz
C/S - Call sign	IO – Information Operation	RC - Radio Controlled
CAAT - Combined Anti Armor Team	IOT - In Order To	RC - Regional Command
CAG - Civil Affairs Group	IRGC - Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps	RCP - Route Clearance Package
CDE - Civilian Damage Estimate	IRGC-QF - Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps	RFT2 - Remote Frequency Transmitter (2 nd version)
CEXC – Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell	IROA - Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan	RIF - Regional Interrogation Facility
CF - Coalition Forces	IRT - In Regards To	RIP – Relieve in place
CI – Counter-Intelligence	ISAF - International Security Assistance Force	RKN – Reg-E Khan Neshin
CISE – Counter-Intelligence Support Element	ISCI - Interim Security Critical Infrastructure	RO - Reports Officer
CJSOTF - Combined Joint Special Ops Task Force	ISI - Inter-Service Intelligence (Pakistani "CIA")	ROE - Rules Of Engagement
CJTF - Combined Joint Task Force	ISID - Inter-Security Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani "CIA")	RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade
CMI - Classified Military Information	ISR - Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	RSA - Regimental Security Area
CMOC - Civil Military Operations Center	IVO - In Vicinity Of	RSA - Regimental Security Area
CNA - Coordinates Not Available	JIOC-A - Joint Intelligence Operations Center – Afghanistan	SAF - Small Arms Fire
COA - Course of Action	JISE - Joint Intelligence Support Element	SAFIRE - Surface-to-Air Fire
CoC – Chain of Command	KAF - Kandahar Airfield	SDG – Shadow District Governor
COC – Combat Operations Center	KB - Kite Borne	SGN – Sangin
COP – Combat Out Post	KES – Karez-e-Saydi	SGZ – Southern Green Zone (Sangin)
COY - Company (British Acronym)	KFC - Kandahar Fusion Center	SIPR - Secret Internet Protocol Router
CP - Check Point	KIA - Killed In Action	SMAW - Shoulder Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon
CP - Command Pull	KIFC - Kandahar Intel Fusion Center	SMQW - Southern MSQ Wadi
CP/IED - Command Pull IED	KJI – Kajaki	SOF - Special Operations Force
CSTC-A - Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan	KJS – Kajaki Sofia	SOTF – Special Operations Task Force
CW - Command Wire	KLE - Key Leader Engagement	SSE - Sensitive Site Exploitation
DB - Donkey Borne	KSH - Khash Rud	STABAD - Stability Advisor
DC - District Center	LBW - Long Barrel Weapon	STP - Shock Trauma Platoon
DCC - District Community Council	LCMR - Light Counter Mortar Radar	SVB - Suicide Vehicle Borne
DFC - Directional Fragmentation Charge	LKG - Lashkar Gah	SVB - Suicide Vest Borne
DFFC – Directionally Focused Fragmentation Charge	LMS - Low Metallic Signature	TB - Taliban
DFL - Depart Friendly Lines	LN - Local National	TCN - Third Country National(s)
DIIR - Draft Intelligence Information Report	LNK - Leatherneck	TF - Task Force
DLM - Delaram	LNO - Liaison Officer	TIC - Troops in Contact
DOA - Dead On Arrival	LNU - Last Name Unknown	TKN - Trek Nawa
DOW - Died Of Wounds	LOB - Line of Bearing	TOA - Transfer of Authority
DPHQ - District Police Headquarters	LOC - Line(s) of Communication	TQ - Tactical Questioning
DSA - Division Security Area	M&I - Murder and Intimidation	TTP - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
DST - District Stabilization Team	MANPADS - Man Portable Air Defense System	U/I - Unidentified
DTMF - Dual Tone Multi-Function	MARSOC - Marine Special Operations Command	UGL – Under-barrel Grenade Launcher
ECP - Entry Control Point	MEB - Marine Expeditionary Brigade	UGV - Upper Gereschk Valley
EF - Enemy Forces	MEDVAC - Medical Evacuation	UN - United Nations
EKIA - Enemy Killed In Action	MEF - Marine Expeditionary Force	UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
Enemy FloT - Enemy Forward Line of Troops	MJH - Marjah	UNK - Unknown
EOD - Explosive Ordnance Disposal	MLCOA - Most Likely Course of Action	USD – United States Dollars
EOF - Escalation of Force	MMG - Medium Machine Gun	USPI - United States Protection and Investigations
ETT - Embedded Training Team	MO - Medical Officer	USSF - United States Special Forces
FAC - Forward Air Controller	MOD - Ministry of Defense (or Minister)	USV - Upper Sangin Valley
FB - Firebase	MOI - Ministry of Interior	VB - Vehicle Borne
FDS - Field Detention Site	MOIS - Ministry of Information Services (Iranian "CIA")	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
FF - Friendly Forces	MRAP - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (Vehicle)	VCP – Vehicle Check-Point
FHT - Foreign HUMINT Team	MSO - Musa Qal'ah	VEVAK - Vizarat-E-Ettelal Va Amanat-E-Kishwar
FLoT - Forward Line of Troops	MTV - Medium Tactical Vehicle	VI - Victim Initiated
FMC - Full Mission Capable	NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization	VO - Victim Operated
FMV – Full Motion Video	NDS - National Directorate of Security (Afghan "CIA")	VOGE - Visual Observed Ground Event
FNU - First Name Unknown	NES – Nahr-e Saraj	VOIP – Voice over Internet Protocol
FOB - Forward Operating Base	NFDK - No Further Data Known	VSP – Village Stability Platform
FoM - Freedom of Movement	NFI - No Further Information	W/D - Wheels Down
FP - Foot Patrol	NFTR - Nothing Further To Report	W/U - Wheels Up
FPB - Foot Patrol Base	NGO – Non-Government Organization	WIA - Wounded in Action
GAF - Ground Assault Force	NGZ – Nothern Green Zone	WSH - Washir

(U) Points of Contact

Regimental Combat Team Six
Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
United States Marine Corps

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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(U) MarineLink Servers

(b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

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