



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**  
MARINE ATTACK SQUADRON 211  
3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING (FORWARD)  
UNIT 43010  
FPO AP 96427-3010

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
3300  
ATFP  
07 Jul 12

From: Antiterrorism Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211)  
To: Antiterrorism Officer, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward)

Subj: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT IN CASE OF MARINE ATTACK  
SQUADRON 211 FLIGHT LINE

Ref: (a) DoD Directive 2000.12H DOD Antiterrorism Handbook  
(b) DoD Instruction 2000.14 Combating Terrorism Programs  
(c) DoD Instruction 2000.16 Combating Terrorism Standards  
(d) Marine Corps Order 3302.1E MC AT/FP Program  
(e) Appendix 15 to Annex C to 2D MAW (FWD) OPOD OEF 11-1

Encl: (1) MSHARPP Vulnerability Assessment Matrix  
(2) Pictures Documenting Vulnerability Assessment

1. From 7 July 2012 to 9 July 2012, a vulnerability assessment (VA) was conducted aboard Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 211's squadron spaces, Camp Bastion, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The VA specifically focused on Marine Attack Squadron 211 facilities on the flight line. Facilities such as the squadron working spaces, the maintenance hangar, and the flight line were considered in this assessment.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

a. Mission. Mission assesses threats to the situation, activities, capabilities, and resources within the area that are vulnerable to a terrorist attack yet necessary to accomplish the unit's mission. The degradation of Importance, Effect, and Recoverability of each target area was considered during the Mission analysis of MSHARP. Ratings of Mission were assessed using the following criteria:

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3. MSHARPP Vulnerability Assessment Results. The MSHARPP methodology was applied to 6 identified targets for VMA-211's VA. Complete results can be reviewed in enclosure (1). The following top three targets are listed as MEVAs for HMH-362:

a. Flight Line. The first and most vulnerable target according to the MSHARPP assessment is the Flight Line with a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. In the event of a successful attack on the flight line, operations would not only be reduced but depending on the scale of the attack the squadron could potentially cease flight operations for an unforeseen amount of time. The only advantages the flight line holds are the blast shields between the aircraft and its distance from the main road. The aircraft are also easily seen from multiple points in Camp Bastion. Again, depending on the scale of the attack the damage could vary between minimum maintenance damage and full scale destruction of the aircraft.

b. Hangar. With a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g on the MSHARPP assessment, the Hangar was identified as the second-most vulnerable target. The Hangar is located just west of the main road and with no barriers protecting the hangar, it is in an extremely vulnerable area for an attack. The Entry Control Point (ECP) is the only obstacle for a threat that has made it on Camp Bastion proper. There is also a small road that goes between the hanger and the work spaces, offering direct access to the flight line. The Hangar itself has minimal protection

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and could not prevent any direct or indirect-fire weapon systems from penetrating the outer layer. It is also easily seen due to its size and proximity to the flight line.

c. Work Spaces. The work space has a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and is the third MEVA for VMA-211. The Work Spaces contain multiple essential maintenance shops as well as the majority of the leadership of the squadron including all High Value Individuals. The Work Spaces importance as the leadership and central command behind all of the squadron's operations and activities make it essential to the functioning of the squadron. The Work Spaces' major weaknesses are its proximity to the road and its importance as the center of operations for the squadron. The strength is that the thin metal exterior offers some protection and concealment.

4. General Security of the Flight Line. The Flight Line is an open area with low-medium security. The British forces have responsibility for the security around the flight line and conduct random mounted and dismounted patrols on the eastern side of the Flight Line road just outside the wire. A few guard towers remain along the flight line and guards are posted at random in the towers to watch for potential intrusion into the Flight Line. There is a 6 foot concertina wire fence that runs the length of the flight line except for an entry control point at the flight line entrance. However, sections of the perimeter due to its size will be easy to exploit. Overall, the presence of patrols and concertina wire minimize the enemy threat.

5. Potential Targets. VMA-211 identified 7 potential targets at the Flight Line working spaces as illustrated in enclosure (2). The following details and analyses are provided to augment the photographs and captions in enclosure (2). (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

a. Flight Line. Enclosure (3), page 1 and 2 shows the flight line and its proximity to the hangar. The flight line is not elevated above any of the other terrain but due to the multiple hangars located along it, it is easy to assess where it is located. In addition, an access road provides a high speed avenue of approach directly to the Flight Line between the hanger and office spaces. VMA-211 will investigate who has access to the maintenance yard, and keep that gate closed and locked whenever possible. The space and blast shield between each aircraft is an advantage for minimizing any damage that indirect fire may cause. Overall, it is further back from the road but presents the most likely target for indirect fire.

b. Maintenance Hangar. Enclosure (3), page 2, shows the Hangar and its proximity to the flight line. The hangar is easily visible from multiple points around Camp Bastion and from the perimeter of the

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base itself. Its use is easily known by any individual familiar with the basics of air operations. Its large area that it occupies as well as its proximity to the road makes it a very valuable target for both indirect fire and small arms and its lack of any hard shell surrounding the hangar.

c. Work Spaces. Enclosure (3), page 3, shows the Work Spaces and its proximity to the flight line and the hangar. The Work Spaces have two distinct advantages. First off it has a moderately protective exterior composed of thin sheet metal, this gives minimal cover but excellent concealment in case of an attack by small arms. The second advantage is its lack of distinguishing characteristics; (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Our squadron is currently looking for separate location in the case of a successful attack on the work spaces building.

d. Ordnance. Enclosure (3), page 5 shows the locations bomb storage trailers as well as its locked conex box containing ammunition and flares. The actual security of these two areas that comprise ordnance are moderately secure, if the flight line roads were closed off. The weaknesses are a lack of a solid perimeter and the fact that the ammunition is in a conex box located away from the building itself. A hardened ordnance storage area is currently under construction, and should be a good solution to many of the ATFP concerns once it's completed.

e. Generators. Enclosure (3), page 7, shows the squadron generators and their location between the Work Spaces and the hangar. These are mission critical items and must be protected. They have no other value to a threat, besides slowing down our operations and reducing our tempo. Personnel are not consistently in this area. They are within view of the road but are smaller targets and not something that would be aimed for during an indirect fire attack. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Putting blast shields around them is not realistic due to the necessity to access them for maintenance and fueling purposes.

e. Generators. Enclosure (3), page 4, shows the squadron bus stop. This is the most accessible structure from the MSR that would typically have gathering of Marines in its vicinity. This gathering of people only gets to be more than ~5 personnel around shift change times. At times of heightened use, the bus stop would be vulnerable target for attack by vehicle borne IED, direct fire, or indirect fire.

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6. VMA-211 will continue to work on improving the security posture and physical security conditions along the Flight Line. The priorities remain improving our security posture and making sure our Marines know to question personnel who aren't recognized in squadron areas.

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


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Figure 1: VMA-211 Flight Line/Sun Shades. Picture taken facing southwest from flight line entrance near the storage yard. Ordinance is typically in vicinity of the jets throughout the day.

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Figure 2: VMA-211 Maintenance Hangar. Picture taken facing east. The Flight Line is to the west of the hangar and the area from where the picture was taken.



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Figure 4: VMA-211 Bus Stop. Picture is taken facing the southwest, located just to the north of the office spaces. This is the most accessible structure from the MSR that would typically have gathering of Marines in its vicinity (especially during shift change).



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Figure 7: VMA-211 Generators and fuel storage. Located right between the Office Spaces and the Hangar and easily accessible due to their location close to the only MSR that drives past the Office Spaces and hangar.

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