



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Interview with Lieutenant General (LtGen) John A. Toolan, Jr., Commander, First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), Camp Pendleton, CA

1. (U) The investigation team conducted an interview with LtGen John A. Toolan, Jr., Commander, I MEF, via Secret Video Teleconference (SVTC) on 18 June 2013 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex on 14-15 September 2012 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The following is a summary of the main points from the interview.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) LtGen Toolan preceded MajGen Gurganus as the Regional Command South West [RC(SW)] Commander, and he served in that role from 26 March 2011 to 12 March 2012. The RC(SW) Headquarters is located on Camp Leatherneck on the BLS Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Despite the three different camps on the BLS Complex, LtGen Toolan expressed that he had complete responsibility for the security of the BLS Complex. Although RC(SW) did not have tactical control over the UK forces performing security functions on Camp Bastion, LtGen Toolan influenced them through his relationships with his UK Deputy Commander, the UK Commander of Task Force Helmand, and the UK Commander of the Joint Air Group. LtGen Toolan did not consider that the UK had responsibility for the protection of the Marines located on Camp Bastion, which included the airfield. LtGen Toolan also coordinated through the Air Component Element (ACE) Commander, Brigadier General (BGen) Walters on security matters for Camp Bastion and the airfield, similar to how he coordinated with the Task Force Belleau Wood Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c on security matters for Camp Leatherneck. LtGen Toolan relied on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c both BGen Walters and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c to make sure that the UK security posture on Camp Bastion supported his Marines located there, because they obviously had a vested interest. However, LtGen Toolan acknowledged that it was much more difficult to coordinate for security measures on Camp Bastion, because the UK security forces were not under his tactical control.

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c. (U//~~FOUO~~) LtGen Toolan's primary concern for the BLS Complex was the insider threat posed by the thousands of contractors who worked there. Therefore, he focused on counter-intelligence (CI) efforts on the BLS Complex, and he personally sat down with the UK to discuss and coordinate CI efforts.

d. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) LtGen Toolan was aware of the January 2011 CENTCOM Joint Security Office (JSO) Vulnerability Assessment conducted on Camp Leatherneck, but he felt that the majority of it was "ridiculous." He simply did not have the resources to correct the deficiencies, and it was unrealistic in a combat zone. However, his predecessor, MajGen Mills, and he certainly worked to correct the deficiencies that they could address, such as entry control points (ECPs). Instead, the split in US and UK command and control on the BLS Complex was his main challenge, and therefore his primary focus area along with CI. LtGen Toolan established the Combined Joint Operations Center (CJOC) to enhance unity of effort between US and UK forces providing force protection and security of the BLS Complex.

e. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) LtGen Toolan stated that he was very concerned by the fact that RC(SW) was going to lose 10,000 Marines in the surge recovery drawdown of forces in 2012. LtGen Toolan recalled that he could not keep up security both inside and outside the wire with that number, and his risk assessment in the area of operations was therefore "red."

f. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) LtGen Toolan expressed that he spent a significant amount of time discussing anti-terrorism/force protection issues with MajGen Gurganus during their turnover of command. The three focus areas were the insider threat on the BLS Complex; the fence line and the encroachment of the villages and poppy fields; and the indirect fire (IDF) threat to the airfield. He specifically focused on the insider threat, because he felt that it was the biggest threat to the morale of the force and also to the support at home for the war effort.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at (b)(6) or (b)(6), (b)(7)c



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