



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND  
4700 KNOX STREET  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**AFDC**

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD**

**SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Interview with Lieutenant General (LTG) James Terry, former Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC), Kabul, Afghanistan**

1. (U) The investigation team conducted an interview with LTG James Terry, former Commander, IJC, via Secret Video Teleconference (SVTC) on 12 July 2013 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex on 14-15 September 2012 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The following is a summary of the main points from the interview.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) LTG Terry served as the Commander of IJC from June 2012 to May 2013, so he had been in command of IJC for approximately three months at the time of the attack. Regional Command Southwest [RC(SW)], commanded by MajGen Mark Gurganus, was a subordinate command of IJC on the ISAF side of the chain of command. LTG Terry was MajGen Gurganus' immediate supervisor, and they spoke at least five times per week, on average. LTG Terry visited RC(SW) at the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex every 1-3 months.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) LTG Terry felt that providing information flow on intelligence indications and warnings (I&W), and following up on the resourcing of force protection measures were two of his important responsibilities to the Regional Commands (RC). LTG Terry routinely provided guidance on force protection priorities to all RC Commanders, particularly due to the surge recovery drawdown of personnel throughout Afghanistan in 2012, and the evolving mission from partnered operations with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to Security Force Assistance with the ANSF. This caused commanders to constantly balance mission accomplishment with force protection, and all of the RCs were required to spend significant organizational energy on force management in 2012.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although it was prior to his tenure as commander of IJC, LTG Terry was aware of the "burning man incident" which occurred on the BLS Complex airfield in March 2012. LTG Terry viewed it as part of the "insider

AFDC

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with Lieutenant General James Terry

threat,” and he recalled discussing counter intelligence and the screening of contractors with MajGen Gurganus. LTG Terry was not aware of a request from RC(SW) to change the Command and Control (C2) structure at the BLS Complex in the aftermath of the “burning man incident.” LTG Terry was also not aware of the Memorandum of Understanding between US Central Command and the United Kingdom Permanent Joint Headquarters regarding command relationships at the BLS Complex until after the 14-15 September 2012 attack.

d. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) LTG Terry was aware of Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVAs) being utilized to address vulnerabilities at bases, although JSIVAs conducted in Afghanistan normally stayed within the US chain of command as opposed to the ISAF chain of command. He was not aware of the vulnerability identified at the Camp Bastion airfield, and he could not recall any specific requests from RC(SW) for force protection improvements after the 10-14 June 2012 JSIVA at the BLS Complex. LTG Terry did not view the BLS Complex as a “soft target” prior to the attack; he recalled that they had some challenges, and that he was concerned about counter intelligence efforts to mitigate the insider threat. He also recalled discussing improving the BLS Complex’s standoff on the perimeter to guard against the VBIED threat. Finally, LTG Terry recalled a request from MajGen Gurganus for an additional Rifle Company for his security forces (SECFOR) at the BLS Complex, but he could not recall the timing of that request in relation to the attack. [Note: LTG Terry subsequently provided a sworn statement on this matter after reviewing IJC records on the RC(SW) request.]

e. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) Prior to the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the BLS Complex, LTG Terry expected insider attacks and attacks on Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), but he was more concerned with overpressure explosion attacks such as the ones the enemy had attempted at Kandahar Airfield and FOB Salerno in 2012. LTG Terry was more generally concerned with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), 120mm rocket attacks, and man-portable air defense (MANPAD) weapons.

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) After the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the BLS Complex, LTG Terry wanted to know how they had missed intelligence I&W warning of the attack, but his staff determined that there had been no explicit I&W. LTG Terry’s post-attack guidance to RC(SW) was to reinforce the security posture and harvest the lessons learned from the attack. LTG Terry recalled discussing with his Staff Judge Advocate what the appropriate type and scope of the investigation should be regarding the attack, and LTG Terry was leaning towards a national investigation such as an AR 15-6 investigation. However, LTG Terry stated that ISAF made the decision to conduct the Joint Review Board, which ultimately conducted the inquiry into the attack.

AFDC

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with Lieutenant General James Terry

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) Regarding his overall impressions after the attack, LTG Terry thought that somebody must have “dropped the ball.” He further stated that we must ask whether the US C2 structure was right, because if the C2 is wrong it will bite you. Yet, LTG Terry felt that MajGen Gurganus was doing everything he could to protect the BLS Complex based on what MajGen Gurganus knew at the time.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at (b)(6) or (b)(6), (b)(7)c



WILLIAM B. GARRETT III  
LTG, USA  
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

### SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is PMG

#### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number(SSN).

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2013-08-02	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME TERRY, JAMES L.	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS O9	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USARCENT			

9.

I, LTG JAMES L. TERRY, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I, LTG James L. Terry, currently commander of Third U.S. Army (ARCENT), Shaw AFB, South Carolina, previously commander of Vth U.S. Army Corps and Commander of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) from 12 June 2012 until 2 May 2013, provide the following answer(s) in response to the following:

Background:


a. In May of 2012, the RC(SW) Staff conducted analysis related to upcoming force cuts to the ISAF MAGTF as part of the larger U.S. Force reduction to 68K. The RC(SW) planners were attempting to balance the tasks assigned within the IJC Campaign plan (OP NAWEED) within their apportioned FML. The planners determined that per the apportioned FML, the SECFOR of Bastion-Leatherneck (BSN-LNK) would be cut too far to provide appropriate force protection. The Phase 2 Surge Recovery FML for the ISAF MAGTF at that time was programmed to drop from 19,401 to 6,798 by 1 Oct 13. In response, MajGen Gurganus directed the Staff to pursue an FML increase of 205 Marines for more security forces at BSN-LNK.

b. On 12 May 12, IJC released FRAGO 164-2012 - 68K SUBORDINATE COMMAND FORCE MANAGEMENT LEVELS - which directs IJC subordinate commands to achieve a United States Force Management Level (FML) of 68,000 US service members in the Combined Joint Operating Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A). The FRAGO directs RC(SW) to reduce to a FML of 6,913 by NLT 15 Sep 13.

Questions:

1. Did MajGen Gurganus ever alert you that RC(SW) was at risk of "mission failure" or could not accomplish its mission due to inadequate manning?
2. Did MajGen Gurganus ever alert you that RC(SW) was at risk of "mission failure" or could not accomplish its mission due to inadequate force protection resources?
3. Did you support the request by MajGen Gurganus for the FML increase of 205 for the SECFOR?
4. Who was the final approval authority on FML decisions in CJOA-A?
5. On 15 Aug 12, the final Sep 2012 FML was approved which retained the VMA Squadron and increased RC (SW) FML by 151 but did not provide the FML increase of 205 for the SECFOR. In response to this decision, did MajGen Gurganus take any actions to reallocate forces or resources to protect the BLS Complex and mitigate existing vulnerabilities?

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT 	PAGE <u>1</u> OF <u>3</u> PAGES
-------------	--	---------------------------------

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT    TAKEN AT    DATED   ."

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF LTG James L. Terry TAKEN AT Camp Arifjan, Kuwait DATED 2 August 2013

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Based on the above, I provide the following to the best of my recall:

Questions/Answers:

1. Q: Did MajGen Gurganus ever alert you that RC(SW) was at risk of "mission failure" or could not accomplish its mission due to inadequate manning?

A: I do not recall a specific mission failure discussion. What I do recall are numerous discussions with the five affected Regional Command Commanders regarding risk to mission given U.S. FML decisions. I also recall supporting MajGen Gurganus's request for additional FML.

2. Q: Did MajGen Gurganus ever alert you that RC(SW) was at risk of "mission failure" or could not accomplish its mission due to inadequate force protection resources?

A: I do not recall a specific mission failure discussion. What I do recall are numerous discussions with the five affected Regional Command Commanders regarding risk to mission given U.S. FML decisions. I also recall supporting a number of requests across the Regional Commands for force protection resources. One specific instance was supporting MajGen Gurganus' request for a MARCENT contracted, USAFOR-A funded contract security force. This was different as the majority of contracted security came from within Afghanistan and per Afghan Presidential decree eventually to be converted to the Afghan Public Protection Force under the Minister of Interior.

3. Q: Did you support the request by MajGen Gurganus for the FML increase of 205 for the SECFOR?

A: Yes. In fact we looked into our own IJC FML and the ISAF FML to determine if there was a buffer that could absorb an additional 205. As I recall there were two USMC Rifle Companies that were extended to cover a period of time. The eventually retained VMA Squadron was recommended for off-ramp to produce FML space in RC SW. I specifically recall a discussion with MajGen Gurganus regarding the VMF Squadron or a boots on the ground preference. Mark stated if it came to a choice between the two, that he would rather have boots on the ground.

4. Q: Who was the final approval authority on FML decisions in CJOA-A?

A: COMUSAFOR-A/COMISAF.

5. Q: On 15 Aug 12, the final Sep 2012 FML was approved which retained the VMA Squadron and increased RC (SW) FML by 151 but did not provide the FML increase of 205 for the SECFOR. In response to this decision, did MajGen Gurganus take any actions to reallocate forces or resources to protect the BLS Complex and mitigate existing vulnerabilities?

A: I am not certain but I presume that he would have given our many risks to mission discussions.

6. Q: Additional comments?

A: The V U.S. Corps assumed authority from the I Corps of the IJC on 12 June 2012. The Phase 2 Surge Recovery plan to reduce FML by 23,000 down to 68,000 had been designed by the previous command in conjunction with COMUSAFOR/COMISAF and was in place upon TOA. We were in execution of that plan upon transfer of authority. Phase 2 Surge Recovery affected five of the six Regional Commands and placed reduced U.S. troop numbers on those regional commands. Additionally this plan called for a reduction of tactical and operational infrastructure commensurate with reduced FML. The not later than date was 30 September 2012 to reach the objective number of 68,000. This operation was conducted during Ramadan, during the middle of what is known as the fighting season, and during a period of ANSF growth which produced numerous adjustments in force posture across the affected five (RC Capital was not impacted) regional commands. In that regard, there was constant dialogue with subordinate commanders regarding the execution of the plan and adjustment of force posture to include protecting the force. There were specific discussions about operational reach—the ability of a formation to extend its operations in space as defined by the limits of MEDEVAC, CCA, CAS, and Maneuver. This was also the period when insider attacks increased and which heightened force protection discussions.

In addition to battle field circulation to each regional command to receive combined and coalition only backbriefs, there were numerous one on one discussions with subordinate commanders and twice weekly VTC's to discuss operations and concerns from commanders. Sunday night VTC's were designed specifically to hear from subordinate commanders. There was a constant balance between projecting forces and protecting the force during this period with priority to protecting the force that each RC commander determined. Within that overarching context, the above answers are provided.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT



PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF LTG James L. Terry TAKEN AT Camp Arifjan, Kuwait DATED 2 August 2013

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT USED

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

AFFADAVIT

I, LTG James L. Terry, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

*James L. Terry*  
(Signature of Person Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2<sup>nd</sup> day of August at Arifjan Kuwait

(b) ( ), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

WITNESSES

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

*Adede 136*  
(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

*JWT*

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES