



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND  
4700 KNOX STREET  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Interview with Lieutenant General (LtGen) Thomas D. Waldhauser, former Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command

1. (U) The investigation team conducted an interview with LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, former Commander, Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT), via Secret Video Teleconference (SVTC) on 14 June 2013 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex on 14-15 September 2012 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The following is a summary of the main points from the interview.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) LtGen Waldhauser served as the Commander of MARCENT from October 2010 to September 2012. He relinquished command of MARCENT one week prior to the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the BLS Complex. MARCENT is the Marine Corps service/component command responsible for US Marines deployed in the US Central Command Area of Operations, including Afghanistan. MARCENT had no tactical responsibilities or control over RC(SW).

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) LtGen Waldhauser felt that his responsibility to Regional Command South West [RC(SW)], commanded by MajGen Mark Gurganus from March 2012 until the end of LtGen Waldhauser's tenure at MARCENT, was to ensure that RC(SW) had the people, equipment, and resources to accomplish their mission. This included force protection equipment and resources. LtGen Waldhauser also tried to protect the interests of the Marine Corps at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) levels.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) LtGen Waldhauser recalled that he and his staff tried to go out of their way to support force protection requests from RC(SW). He specifically recalled helping RC(SW) acquire a Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS or "aerostat") for the BLS Complex, and he also negotiated with coalition partners to ensure continued personnel support for RC(SW). The coordination for coalition personnel support addressed MajGen Gurganus' concerns about manpower shortages. Due to the surge recovery drawdown of personnel, the only other thing LtGen Waldhauser could do was to coordinate for contract

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security personnel, which were provided by Triple Canopy. LtGen Waldhauser explained that acquiring contract security personnel for RC(SW) was unprecedented up to that point; Marines always provided their own security. It was a contentious issue for many Marines, and he dealt directly with Headquarters Marine Corps to help pave the way for the Triple Canopy contract.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) LtGen Waldhauser recalled that he engaged with MajGen Gurganus on a near-daily basis. LtGen Waldhauser read the RC(SW) situation reports every day, he had a weekly SVTC with MajGen Gurganus, and they spoke on the phone as required. LtGen Waldhauser recalled specific conversations regarding the surge recovery drawdown of personnel. He recalled that MajGen Gurganus was very vocal to LTG Terry about his manpower concerns and his ability to accomplish the mission at the reduced numbers. LtGen Waldhauser's advice to MajGen Gurganus was that there may be things that RC(SW) could do before the drawdown that they would not be able to do during or after. LtGen Waldhauser advised MajGen Gurganus to inform LTG Terry if there were things he could no longer do at the reduced manpower. MajGen Gurganus would have to assume risk, and then mitigate it to the best of his ability. Finally, LtGen Waldhauser told MajGen Gurganus that he had a difficult job to do, that he would have to make tough calls during the drawdown, and that he just had to keep the best interests of the Marines in mind. LtGen Waldhauser felt that MajGen Gurganus had enough personnel to accomplish his mission and provide adequate protection for his forces, but not without risk.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) LtGen Waldhauser conducted quarterly site visits to RC(SW) at the BLS Complex, and his overall impression was that force protection of the base was improving each time he went. The leadership placed the proper amount of emphasis on anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP), and RC(SW) was changing and adjusting to the threats. MajGen Gurganus was aware of the insider threat, and he was personally interested in mitigating it. Finally, LtGen Waldhauser was aware of the June 2012 Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) of the BLS Complex, but he did not recall MajGen Gurganus requesting assistance from MARCENT to address the identified vulnerabilities.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at (b)(6) or (b)(6), (b)(7)c



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