



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND  
4700 KNOX STREET  
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Interview with Major General (MG) Jeffrey L Bannister, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, International Security Assistance Force

1. (U) The investigation team conducted an interview with MG Jeffrey L. Bannister, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS OPS), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), at the ISAF headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan on 24 June 2013 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex on 14-15 September 2012 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The following is a summary of the main points from the interview.

a. (~~U//FOUO~~) At the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the BLS Complex, MG Bannister was serving as the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Deputy J3 for Force Protection. He served in that role from December 2011 to February 2013.

b. (~~S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) MG Bannister was aware of the June 2012 Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) of the BLS Complex, and although it identified the need to "harden" the base, the JSIVA did not strike him as out of the ordinary. MG Bannister stated that CENTCOM did not typically take immediate action after a JSIVA on one of its bases in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), including Afghanistan, unless a particularly acute vulnerability was identified. He stated that CENTCOM had the ability to rapidly move anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) resources into the AOR for urgent needs, and MG Bannister stated that lack of resources was not the issue for the BLS Complex. However, he acknowledged that he did not know whether RC(SW) lacked engineer or other construction support at the time.

c. (~~U//FOUO~~) MG Bannister stated that after the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the BLS Complex, his personnel at CENTCOM went back to pull the vulnerability assessments on the BLS Complex. After reviewing the JSIVA, he recognized that RC(SW) had not completed the follow-on work with the Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) after the JSIVA. Although MG Bannister stated that CVAMP is difficult to use and not a user-

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friendly program, it is intended to identify vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies up the chain of command, so that higher commands can coordinate and assist the bases with their vulnerabilities. MG Bannister stated that inputting vulnerabilities into CVAMP puts the onus on the CENTCOM Joint Security Office (JSO) liaison at US Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to assist the subordinate commands. MG Bannister stated that it is the expectation that the AT/FP officer and the base commander ensure that the proper data is input into CVAMP after a vulnerability assessment.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) MG Bannister stated that he was not aware of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between CENTCOM and the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) regarding command relationships at the BLS Complex. The MOU preceded MG Bannister assuming responsibilities as the Deputy J3 for Force Protection and CENTCOM, and it had never been identified to him.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at (b)(6) or (b)(6), (b)(7)c

  
WILLIAM B. GARRETT III  
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Investigating Officer

Approved for Release