DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c Combat Logistics Regiment-15 (CLR-15), Regional Command Southwest [RC(SW)]

1. The investigation team conducted a recorded interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c CLR-15, RC(SW), on 11 June 2013 at Quantico, VA as part of the AR 15-6 investigation into the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c is currently unavailable to sign and return a sworn statement. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that the dialogue transcribed below is an accurate account of the interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. The recorded interview is on file with the investigative team.

Q: Where are you currently assigned?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?
A: At the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camp Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak, I was the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c for Combat Logistics Regiment 15 in the LCE portion of the MAGTF over there.

Q: When did you arrive and depart Afghanistan as Sergeant Major of CLR-15?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was CLR-15's mission?
A: It was the logistics combat element of the MAGTF for I MEF(FWD).

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Q: Were you headquartered at Camp Leatherneck the entire time?
A: I was headquartered at Camp Leatherneck the entire time.

Q: How was your relationship with your CO, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c?
A: My Commanding Officer (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I had a great working relationship both personal and professional.

Q: Who did you answer to in the RC(SW) chain of command?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c answered to MajGen Gurganus; that was his direct OIC.

Q: How was your relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c at RC(SW)? How often did you interact?
A: It was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c there the whole time when I was there. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was already gone. If I didn't interact with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c at least daily, I'd say it was at least every other day whether it was by phone or in person.

Q: Where were you during the attack on 14-15 September 2012?
A: During the attack, I was right there in the CLR-15 Compound. It was a good distance away, I can't provide an exact distance, but it was at least several kilometers.

Q: Based on your experience of living on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts?
A: Initially following the attacks, I didn't know what it was because it was a pretty good distance away. When it came over the net to let us know what it was, then we're aware and the reporting comes in. Then our AGDAG which was assigned to us was right there. It was hit with an RPG so of course we definitely started to recognize it.

Q: Did your duty position require you to take any actions during the attack? If so, what?
A: No, sir; not other than monitoring in the COC.

Q: Did your command have any Force Protection responsibilities at Camp Leatherneck or anywhere else on the BLS Complex? If so, please describe those responsibilities.
A: No, sir. We didn't have any responsibility as far as the security of the base other than the security of our own compound.

Q: Were you responsible for providing any personnel to support TF Belleau Wood's performance of FP responsibilities? If so, please describe.
A: We had "camp taxes" that went to them. What those individuals did for Belleau Wood, I couldn't honestly give a good assessment because I'm not sure.

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But I know that we had taxes that went to them for those types of things. I would say there were ten to fifteen, they were everything from working at the gym or the DFAC, things like that.

Q: Were CLR-15 Marines responsible for any security patrols inside or outside of the BLS Complex for AT/FP purposes?
A: No, sir.

Q: Did you have an AT/FP Officer or section in CLR-15? If so, who filled this role? What were his responsibilities for AT/FP? Did they extend beyond CLR-15 to the greater Camp Leatherneck or BLS Complex? Was he tied in with any relevant AT/FP Working Groups or other Boards, Bureaus, Cells, Centers and Working Groups (B2C2WG)? If so, who did he report to you regarding AT/FP?
A: We had an AT/FP Officer in the CLR-15; I don't know exactly what his responsibilities were. As I said the only security we had was inside our own internal compound and it was only really a three-man guard that was at the gate of our little compound. I am not aware of any responsibilities CLR-15 might have had beyond that in Camp Leatherneck, the larger BLS complex or even further out. The AT/FP cell that we had was tied into the larger cell run by RC(SW) or over at Bastion just by communication.

Q: Did you identify any AT/FP concerns for Camp Leatherneck when you were assigned to RC(SW)? If so, what were they and upon what did you base those concerns? Did you ever express those to anyone?
A: Our trips around the ASP, the new ASP that was set up, there were potentially a couple of things that, I wouldn't say were highlighted but definitely had some things that we may have had concerns about. When the ASP was first built, it was right before I got there, the ASP was brand new. It was on the outer edge of the Camp Bastion Compound. When it was first built it was very close to the road. There were towers out there I couldn't tell you how often or who manned them. I know the civilians were the ones to man those. There were a couple of dead space issues initially. When it was first built, the concern was RPG rounds could potentially come and hit some of the ASP stuff, but force protection measures were taken. Barriers were put up, the Hesco barriers were put up. I don't know how quickly, but it was fairly quickly. You would go away and then come back a week later and the stuff was already out. They were identified and measures were definitely taken to avoid an attack on that side for sure. When Gen Broadmeadow was still there (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c may have discussed these issues with him, I'm not sure. I discussed it with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c he was the ASP OIC that was out there with us.

Q: Did you have concerns about the AT/FP posture on the Camp Bastion side of the BLS Complex, including the flight line? If so, what were they and what were

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they based upon? Did you ever express those to anyone? Did you ever discuss them with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c or anyone else at HQ RC(SW)? If so, please describe the conversation(s) and the parties involved.
A: I didn't recognize any concerns about the AT/FP posture on the Camp Bastion side of the BLS Complex. My interaction on that side was very limited to the AGDAG and the ASP. From what I saw, there were no concerns about the Brit side; I don't know what type of security measures they had on that side. When I learned that the breach occurred on that side initially I was upset because this is supposed to be a fairly secure base. In the same aspect, there's nothing secure, we're in Afghanistan so of course it's not safe. With three or four or eight or ten hardened/determined individuals you can just about get in anywhere if you just really put your mind to it. I don't know what their breach plan was. Unfortunately we lost some aircraft, but I believe that it could have been worse that night if they would have went towards the (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4g were at. I think it could have been a lot worse with a loss of lives, honestly.

Q: Did your command ever seek assistance from the RC(SW) chain of command for AT/FP needs? If so, what assistance did you seek and what was the result?
A: Not that I'm aware of, no sir.

Q: What was your assessment of the threat of attack to the BLS Complex prior to 14 September 2012?
A: It's fairly open desert, aircraft are flying around that spot all the time so the fact that they were able to get there shows definitely that maybe we weren't as vigilant as we thought we were. When I say we, I don't know who was watching the gate on that side. Honestly, I don't know if it was the Brits or the US but it was definitely not expected honestly.

Q: Did you ever observe complacency on the part of US personnel providing Force Protection for the BLS Complex? If so, what do you attribute this to?
A: I never observed complacency on the part of the US personnel providing Force Protection for the BLS Complex. If I would have, I would have addressed it right there. I know (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c out at the ASP took it upon himself to make supplementary positions and stuff like that in case in the night they were hit and they manned those positions just to make sure they were safe.

Q: Did you have adequate manpower to conduct your mission in CLR-15? Did you ever express concerns regarding a manpower shortage to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c or anyone else in the RC(SW) chain of command? If so, describe those conversations and the parties involved? What was the resolution, if any?
A: I believe our command had adequate manpower to accomplish our mission.

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Q: Did you ever observe or identify a lack of manpower on the BLS Complex necessary to conduct AT/FP tasks? If so, please describe. Also describe any mitigation measures employed to address the shortage, if applicable.
A: I did not observe or identify a lack of manpower on the BLS Complex that might have effected AT/FP tasks; I am not aware of the force size whatsoever.

Q: Did CLR-15 assume any AT/FP responsibilities after the 14-15 September attack? If so, what were they? Increased patrols? Increased personnel TACON or OPCON to TFBW for AT/FP purposes? What do you attribute this to?
A: CLR-15 increased awareness at the ASP and the AGDAG following the attack. There were more force protection measures, so to speak, internally around the building itself. It was not directed on our part, the Marines took it upon themselves to build up the positions and stuff like that. I'm assuming RC(SW) directed increased FP measures following the attack because around the Air Wing units, they definitely built up. They put the concrete barriers and things like that up around their flight line.

Q: Did you do any convoy security off the base?
A: We didn't do convoy security for other units; our convoys went off all the time, but they were their own security when they went out.

Q: Did you have any ownership of the (b)(1)1.4g
A: No, sir that was held by the base. Unfortunately our AGDAG was hit when one of (b)(1)1.4g right there next to the AGDAG was hit. The RPG went over the (b)(1)1.4g and hit the side of our AGDAG. We had no responsibilities over the (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4g themselves.

Q: You mentioned that you heard before the attack, not every guard tower was always manned.
A: That was my understanding, that not every guard tower was manned. I couldn't even begin to tell you how many guard towers are out there, I know there's quite a few. I don't know if they shifted it randomly, I'm not sure about that.

Q: Did you have any concerns about the insider threat while you were there?
A: Our CLR-15 Compound was right next to Shorabak. I actually went over to Shorabak to eat with our, I don't want to say counterparts, but individuals that helped us out. That was my third trip to Afghanistan and as far as security, that was the most secure place I've been in my time in Afghanistan. Of course there were threats, but I didn't take the victim mentality and I was always aware of my surroundings. Personally I would say "no," I was not, but I was very aware all the time.

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Q: Did you have any concerns about the vetting of the LN or TCN work force while you were there?
A: I can't speak to that, I can only speak to me personally and I never had any issues with any of those individuals, but that's just my personal take on it.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
Eight or ten individuals with the right mentality can cause havoc. The loss of aircraft and two lives is horrible but honestly, when pulling back and looking at it afterwards, it could have been a lot more loss of lives. I'm glad that the individuals in the QRF reacted the way they were supposed to.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c **at** (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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