

**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN)

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Quantico, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20130612	3. TIME 0900	4. FILE NUMBER
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5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c USMC
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8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Where are you currently assigned?  
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?  
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?  
A: I was the (b)(3), (b)(6), Regimental Combat Team 6.

Q: When did you arrive and depart Afghanistan as CO, RCT-6?  
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was RCT-6's mission?  
A: Our mission was to conduct counter-insurgency and partnering operations with the Afghan National Security Forces and our partnering countries in order to set conditions for continual transfer of authority to Afghan Forces.

Q: Were you headquartered at Camp Leatherneck the entire time?  
A: No, sir, I was not. I did not move to Camp Leatherneck until approximately July of 2012.

Q: Who did you answer to in the RC(SW) chain of command?  
A: My immediate superior was the Commanding General of Task Force Leatherneck. At the time of the attack it was MajGen Dave Berger.

Q: What was your relationship with MajGen Gurganus? How often did you interact?  
A: He was in my fitness report chain of command. He was my reviewing officer so he was my next higher headquarters. I rarely interacted with him. Usually it would be during battle field circulation if we happened to be collocated at the same position for whatever purposes; probably monthly.

Q: Where were you during the attack on 14-15 September 2012?  
A: If memory serves me, the attack occurred at about 2215 or 2230 local time. I had just gone to quarters from my office and was in the process of changing into PT gear when a ruckus occurred outside. I popped outside of my living space and noticed flashes on the horizon so I ran to our COC and they were getting filtered information that the base was under attack. Didn't have real good information so at that point in time I returned, got back into uniform, and I went over to the COC at the RC SW Headquarters. At that point in time I learned that there had been some kind of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c as I recall, the eastern side of the perimeter along the

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THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS		ING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED	

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(b)(7)c

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Bastion airfield. At that point in time I just tried to gather SA, see what we needed to do. I think that everyone was in the same situation; there wasn't a whole lot of information, so we had very little to act on. I was aware that QRFs had been dispatched at that point in time and they were in the process of launching aircraft (b)(1)1.4g I returned back to my COC, interfaced with General Berger by phone and effectively was on strip alert, if you will, as I did not have any major role in base defense. I probably assumed that posture for about an hour at which point in time, internally, we decided that the best thing to do is that at least our living spaces needed to have some kind of hardened security there. Through my Headquarters Company Commander, I just ensured that we had a physical hard presence outside of the billeting areas and put Marines in condition 1 with our weapons and hardened up in PPE; just keeping their eyes open. We issued what we could as far as commo gear just so that there was a continual communication loop so that we that we had an understanding of what was going on and then again just kind of stood by. I also gave subordinate commanders a heads up that we were under attack at Leatherneck and didn't have any idea; this was kind of a late offensive that could be a coordinated attack across the entire battle-space. I wanted the Battalion Commanders to understand that we were having an issue there as well and have them adjust their FPCONS appropriately. When I mentioned that I checked in with General Berger, I meant that I called him in his office. My office and his office were probably 100 - 150 meters apart but I just picked up the phone.

Q: Did your duty position require you to take any actions during the attack? If so, what?

A: I did not, I was simply a tenant. Through the course of the evening, I think the biggest unknown to everybody was, what is this, is it an initial attack, is it a feint, what are we dealing with here. As we kind of got our act together and gained SA we hardened the interior compound which is where the RC Task Force Leatherneck and the RCT Headquarters are encased. I don't know if you've been there but it's inside the center portion of Camp Leatherneck. Any access point, we ensured we had physical security on; two armed Marines. That stripped my headquarters down pretty good because my job was outward focused. I was controlling the battle spaces to the north and south and so I just needed to make sure that I was ensuring continuity of operations there so I pared off, portioned off as may personnel as I could for COC security and then the billeting space security. I had one Battalion that had just come out of the battle space that was preparing to redeploy, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Gave him a call because at that time there was discussions about, you know we understood that it's isolated we think at Camp Bastion. Don't think there's been any penetration into Leatherneck; don't have a clear picture whatsoever on Shorabak but we think that Leatherneck has not been penetrated or compromised. At that point in time we internally, with General Berger's consent, decided to go ahead and effectively just secure Leatherneck a little bit more. I was able to utilize Marines from 1-1 to shore up hardened positions at the approach and intersections leading into Camp Leatherneck. The initial call was, hey we need people over here to Bastion. I was hesitant to send Marines with weapons and no control measures into the middle of a fire fight with contractors and Tongans and Jordanians and US and British and insurgents because I think that would have been just a mess. I felt it was better as long as we knew exactly where we were to kind of set up a hardened defense.

Q: Were you responsible for providing any personnel to support TF Belleau Wood's performance of FP responsibilities? If so, please describe.

A: No, sir.

Q: Were RCT-6 Marines responsible for any security patrols inside or outside of the BLS Complex for AT/FP purposes? If so, please describe the frequency, duration, times, routes, etc. Did these patrols see any increase or decrease in frequency leading up to the 14-15 September attack? If so, why?

A: That was all separate chain of command as I recall, through Task Force Belleau Wood and the commander there, the primary commander that I used to liaise with was a guy named (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c who was the (b)(3), (b)(6) of 2nd Battalion 10th Marines. I think he had the immediate security just on the exterior of the BLS Complex.

Q: Did you have an AT/FP Officer in RCT-6? If so, who? What were his responsibilities for AT/FP? Did they extend beyond RCT-6 to the greater Camp Leatherneck or BLS Complex? Was he tied in with any relevant AT/FP Working Groups or other Boards, Bureaus, Cells, Centers and Working Groups (B2C2WG)? If so, did he report directly to you regarding AT/FP?

A: Yes, sir. He was my (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c I used him as a second set of eyes across the battle space when I would go across battle field circulation to kind of augment the battalions, FOBs and COPs; just to give a different perspective; to take a look and augment them with base defense plans, AAFP plans and of course material requirements that they had.

Q: Was he tied in with any relevant AT/FP working groups or other boards, bureaus, cells, centers and working groups?

A: He would attend the meetings just to stay abreast of the thoughts, discussions and things of that nature and input. He was a valid but not a contributing member, was not a voting member

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: He obviously reported directly to you, or did he go through your 3 or how did that work?

A: He worked in the S3 Shop but as an ATFPO he would come to me with specific concerns about anything that needed my attention.

Q: Did you identify any AT/FP concerns for Camp Leatherneck when you were assigned to RC(SW)? If so, what were they and upon what did you base those concerns? Did you ever express those to anyone? Did you ever discuss them with MajGen Gurganus or anyone else at HQ RC(SW)? If so, please describe the conversation(s) and the parties involved.

A: Probably not on the front side of the attack but in the aftermath it became suddenly clear that I was very unclear on the base defense integration mechanism; the overall base defense. I was pretty clear that Task Force Belleau Wood had the adjacent battle space around the BLS Complex for security and the interior security, the interior guard, for Camp Leatherneck. I knew that the British had interior guard responsibility for Bastion and I was aware that 215th Corps had responsibility for the interior guard of Shorabak. We're all in the same room in different chairs and that's when the question was unclear to me was "how is this integrated?" I think that was a subject for discussion after the fact that was identified as an area for improvement. Prior to the attack, the only concerns that I had, and this is just (b)(3), (b)(6), talking, was the vetting process. With the overwhelming number of Third Country Nationals and contractors that just seemed (b)(7)c to be milling about by the thousands; how do we know who's here and who's valid and who's not. That was my biggest concern.

Q: Did you have concerns about the AT/FP posture on the Camp Bastion side of the BLS Complex, including the flight line? If so, what were they and what were they based upon? Did you ever express those to anyone? Did you ever discuss them with MajGen Gurganus or anyone else at HQ RC(SW)? If so, please describe the conversation(s) and the parties involved.

A: The only concerns that I had was that the, let me back up here if I may, it doesn't get any better than a hardened tower with an RPG fence set up around it; that's the gold-plated standard I think. The fences seemed to be adequate of course the biggest threat that I think we were concerned with at the time was the S-VBEID threat. So there were anti-vehicle ditches positioned appropriately in front of all the fences. That, with the towers, and as long as the individuals in the towers are dialed in and they're paying attention and they're properly equipped to be able to see at night in the reduced visibility, I felt pretty comfortable across the board. I'm a big runner so I used to run the perimeter a lot and I would notice quite often that towers seemed to be unmanned and you would have the silhouettes up there. At times you would see a hatch would be open and it seemed to be nothing but mattresses and cots on the bottom. With the one way glass I wasn't always sure that all the towers were manned. That was a little bit of a concern. I used to look for patterns to see if they changed up; one day this one is manned, this one is not manned the next day, so on and so forth. In my opinion, there was a little bit of a pattern where some of the towers just didn't seem to be manned and others were consistently. My concerns were primarily focused on manning of towers. I understand that there are shortfalls with personnel and it was a huge gap, but just avoiding the patternization was my concern. They would have the silhouettes in the towers and they would be in the same towers for what seemed to me to be weeks on end. I can understand a day or two and you change it up. I did not express my concern to General Berger or General Gurganus; however, I did bring it up to a guy named, I think it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c kind of the Task Force Belleau Wood Commander who was the guy who had the rose pinned on him for BLS security, at least Leatherneck security. I do not remember the specifics of the conversation I had with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c but the general consensus was you know as the camp continues to expand they build more and more towers we certainly don't have the personnel to stand all of them. What we do to mitigate that threat is continue to increase the local security patrols on the outside of the perimeter and vary our patterns and routines.

Q: How frequently did you interact with (b)(3), (b)(6), was it off the cuff informal or was this done in a formal way?

A: No, sir. It was informal at the dining (b)(7)c facility.

Q: How much do you know about the local national interpreter's incursion onto the flight line in March 2012 while Secretary Panetta was present on BLS (aka the "burning man incident)? Were you involved at all with any mitigation of risk to the flight line after that incident? If so, please describe.

A: No, sir. At that point in time I was out at Delaram 2; I was involved with the General Panetta visit and met the secretary at one of our COPs with the Georgian Battalion, and we had heard of the incident after we arrived on deck at the COP. That feeds directly back into the question, a couple of questions prior, about here we got all these guys wandering about; they get a little badge because they go to the badge office and that automatically means that they're good to go. Just a compounding issue for me and maybe that's why I really felt as strongly about the number of TCNs and LNs on the base as I did. As I recall, there was no border or boundary that is demarcated between the bases, there's no T-WALL. They have their own separate billeting areas that are T-WALLED off but it's open-access. As I recall, it's not gated; nor are any of the coalition areas, US areas, with the exception of RC SW Compound when I was there. So it was basically just free-play. Once you had access to the base you could pretty much just go about anywhere except for the RC SW Compound (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Did you have any conversations or attend any meetings where MajGen Gurganus or the RC(SW) chain of command issued any guidance relating to that incident? If so, what was it?

A: No sir, nothing that stands out in my memory in particular with that incident. Of course again, I still wasn't the attendant at that point of time. We took that opportunity to hold school if you will, get everybody together and just say, hey, you never know. We have to be right 100 percent of the time. They have to be right 1 percent of the time. We reviewed our procedures and took a look at some of the things that we needed to do. I didn't have nearly the insider threat concerns at Delaram 2 that they did at Leatherneck. We knew who our contractors were; we knew them all pretty well. If an individual popped up on scene they'd get ratted out pretty quick; get them to the right resources and find out who they were.

Q: Was your command a part of the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA), which reviewed the BLS AT/FP Program 10-14 June?

A: I was not involved in that. I would have to go back and check to see if (b)(3), (b)(6), had a seat at the table there, maybe a back row seat. He very well may have; (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c To tell you that he did or did not (b)(3), (b)(6), now I can't do that. We were in the throes of our move as well and I think at that particular date I was on circulation in the southern battle space getting ready to assume that AOR. I may be aware of the results of the JSIVA in the form of an order that likely came down expressing changes in FP status or conditions but otherwise, no, sir.

Q: Did you have any conversations or attend any meetings where MajGen Gurganus or the RC(SW) chain of command issued any guidance relating to the JSIVA? If so, what was the guidance?

A: Nothing stands out in particular sir. I'm sure it was discussed but to be honest with you sir, my focus was completely on other things at that point of time.

Q: Did your command ever seek assistance from the RC(SW) chain of command for AT/FP needs? If so, what assistance did you seek and what was the result?

A: We did, sir. In particular at Delaram 2 was my greater concern and I would do quarterly ATRP assessments and just being a Ranger School grad and an infantry guy, I didn't use that term; I call it defense. There were defensive requirements that I thought that we needed to have in place there so most of the requested items were physical in nature; T-barriers, we wanted to improve our ECP, things of that nature. I beat that drum pretty hard and it took time but yes, the materials were eventually delivered. I built up Delaram 2 just in time to tear it down unfortunately. But everyone understood, things only move so fast with the logistics and the contracts; but people were definitely more than willing to try to meet our need. I would characterize that response to my request as reasonable given the constraints that were present in theater. It didn't meet my personal designs as far as timelines but yes, sir they did the absolute best that they could; they were very accommodating.

Q: What was your assessment of the threat of attack to the BLS Complex prior to 14 September 2012?

A: In that kind of an environment, sir, I'm never comfortable at all. My greatest concern to be honest with you is, even though it was a rare occurrence, the vulnerability to mass indirect fires. If they had been able to get themselves some 120 mortar systems or something, that's what I kept thinking was going to be our greatest concern. None of the billeting spaces had overhead protection or anything else and if they would have been monitoring that. That's certainly what I would have done if I was Johnny Taliban. Then of course the insider threat was always on my mind as well. Those were the two major things that I was always worried about. The perception I think sir, was that it was "too big to fail;" they'll never attack us because they're going to get crushed if they do, and obviously they did. But they still attacked us. I think that kind of dominated just about every person's thought while walking up and down Camp Leatherneck or anywhere else, "hey, they're not going to attack us because there are too many of us here."

Q: Did you ever observe complacency on the part of US personnel providing Force Protection for the BLS Complex? If so, what do you attribute this to?

A: How do we define US personnel, uniformed personnel, sir?

Q: Yes.

A: The hardest thing that we do in the military is the defense. It requires vigilance, and leaders get lazy too. But that's what it takes, you've got to go out there continuously and consistently and check on your positions. In the framework of directing operational security as a commander that had base commander responsibilities to delve onto; I delegated that of course to my Headquarters Company Commander and I gave him a base defense integrator assistant and they were the ones that I held to the daily task. I would routinely go out and check posts; if Marines were asleep, I'd sit down and figure out what do we need to do, ask "why are we like this." I understand that for the Lance Corporal, it's like watching paint dry. Especially when you're looking at the desert it can get

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STATEMENT (Continued)

pretty tough. So I think that you just have to be constantly aware of that. I think you have to be very attuned to the amount of time that individuals are on post and I think you have to be very attuned to setting your patterns. The best way in my opinion to avert that is through recurrent security patrolling. I think that local security patrolling in an un-patterned approach is probably your greatest mitigator to any kind of threats that would be ground based or vehicle based. Again, when I got to Leatherneck I had another person who was doing that, focused on the battle space, I talked to them and figured out that they had the mission.

Q: So back to the question, did you observe any complacency on the complex? You mentioned while you were out running some issues with the towers perhaps the manning of towers but any complacency on the part of folks providing security there?

A: At Leatherneck, sir, I don't think I ever saw a US service member on post, only at Delaram 2; I saw Triple Canopy guys out there, I saw Jordanians, I may have seen a Tongan or two; but sir, I don't honestly think I ever saw a US personnel on post. I did see them actively patrolling, doing security patrols, but on post at Leatherneck, no sir. There were a lot of Afghans on post as well, ECPs and things of that nature.

Q: Did you have adequate manpower to conduct your mission in RCT-6?

A: Yes sir, and I did go through an FML reduction while I was there. I started off with a 249 man regimental headquarters and I ended up redeploying with about 170. It was the "nice to haves" not the "need to haves" that ended up going back. As a regimental headquarters and RCT headquarters I had to execute command and control and provide logistics support and communications augmentation support to the subordinate units. Those were the personnel that I left untouched so I could execute my mission. The things that I lost were my PSD, some additional "nice to have" folks in the Motor P section, some "nice to have" folks in the data section, COMM section, things of that nature. I think with the morphing of the mission going from US-led to shoulder-to-shoulder, and then to behind the shoulder of the ANA, I think we did. Now across battle space that did pose some concerns especially for the distant positions that were led by a major with about a six-man team for the insider threat. But for what they were needing to do as the mission evolved, I think we had sufficient manpower. Conversely I think it contributed to mission success and it really forced the Afghans to sever their dependence on Americans being out in the battle space. So I think that it was the right approach but it wasn't without risk.

Q: Did you ever express concerns regarding a manpower shortage to the RC(SW) chain of command? If so, describe those conversations and the parties involved? What was the resolution, if any?

A: We constantly discussed that balance between the number of personnel, insider threat, threat from Taliban and being able to provide those essential enabling capacities to the Afghans that they desperately needed to maintain their confidence. Yes sir, that was continually assessed and discussed.

Q: Did you ever observe or identify a lack of manpower on the BLS Complex necessary to conduct AT/FP tasks? If so, please describe. Also describe any mitigation measures employed to address the shortage, if applicable.

A: I found it odd, sir, that we had unmanned towers but at times we always seemed to have uniformed service members in all the USOs and the coffee shops and wandering about aimlessly and in the gyms and everything else. I never was able to quite put that together. I had discussions with the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c who was a friend of mine, "what are these guys doing and don't we have enough to continue to augment." Those were just maybe some points that I would shoot at him; outside of that, no sir.

Q: Did RCT-6 assume any AT/FP responsibilities after the 14-15 September attack? If so, what were they? Increased patrols? Increased personnel TACON or OPCON to TFBW for AT/FP purposes? What do you attribute this to?

A: No sir. Again, my mission was primarily to provide the support to the battle space owners. My headquarters was independently located there at Leatherneck so I just had the folks that I needed to be able to do that job; maintain 24 hour continuous operational capability. There was a camp tax, but it was minimal and I don't think there were any increases that I recall. We did not participate in any increased patrols. For a short period, if you think of it in the AT/FP and threatcons, kind of when we were at DELTA if you will, of course I did have some Marines that were augmenting some of the entry points to the RC SW compound. But as that time period kind of digressed and the I&W subsided of any kind of pending further attacks, we went back to FPCON BRAVO or whatever and I was able to pull those Marines back into their routine chores, their jobs.

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT (continued)

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?

A: I don't believe I do sir.

END OF STATEMENT

Approved for Release

**AFFIDAVIT**  
I, \_\_\_\_\_, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME  
ENDS ON PAGE \_\_\_\_\_ I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT  
I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH LINE OF  
THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT  
UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

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Subscribed and sworn to before me and administer oaths, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August, 2013  
at \_\_\_\_\_

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*Peterson AFB CO, SC 29114*  
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