DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c, former (b)(3), (b)(6) Task Force Belleau Wood, Regional Command Southwest

1. The investigation team conducted a recorded interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c Task Force Belleau Wood, Regional Command Southwest [RC(SW)], on 19 June 2013 at Camp Pendleton, CA as part of the AR 15-6 investigation into the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c is currently unavailable to sign and return a sworn statement. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that the dialogue transcribed below is an accurate account of the interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c The recorded interview is on file with the investigative team.

Q: Where are you currently assigned?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: When did you arrive and depart Afghanistan as (b)(3), (b)(6) of TF Belleau Wood (TFBW)?

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was TFBW's mission?
A: TFBW was responsible for the security of the Leatherneck complex and also responsible for the patrols taking place in AO Belleau Wood (AOBW).

Q: What did you feel were your primary responsibilities as (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c of TFBW?
A: My primary responsibilities were the morale and care of the Marines first and foremost, and also to advise the Commander and bring everything I heard to his attention. In that, as a (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c in the Marine Corps, which I'm sure is a little bit different than the Army, we aren't as involved in the operational side of the house as what a (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c in the Army is. I think we fill more of what would be a (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: Were you headquartered at Camp Leatherneck the entire time?
A: I was headquartered at Camp Leatherneck the entire time.

Q: How was your relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c? How often did you interact? On what matters did you typically interact?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was my boss; to be honest we didn't have a good relationship. That was a problem on both ends. We made it work. Our interaction was minimal.

Q: How often did you interact with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c at RC(SW)? On what matters did you generally interact?
A: I interacted with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c on almost a daily basis.

Q: Where were you during the attack on 14-15 September 2012?
A: When the attacks started on 14-15 September, I was actually in my can. From there I went across to the building, gave some directions about accountability and met up with the interim commander at the time, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c at what we called the CJOC. I had a very good relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: Based on your experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts?
A: Based on my experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, when I first came out and saw all the confusion it was pretty obvious what it was. My first thought was getting personnel off the streets; which proved to be a problem because people still wanted to go about their business. They didn't want to get off the streets. To be honest, things were kind of a blur. When I came out and

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started giving instructions that was the first thing. People were not moving in a manner in which they should.

Q: What actions did you take during the attack?
A: During the attack, when I came outside my can, the Marines of the MHG were kind of standing around asking what was going on. I saw some of them in sweats with PPE on; kind of like, do we go across the street to our building? Do we get the accountability here? I ran across the street, found where the rest of the Marines were, came back and directed everyone back across the street to the building. I forget who it was that I directed to get the accountability but I told him to start getting counts. I asked him where (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was. They told me that he and the XO at the time (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c were at the CJOC. I made plans to get transportation to the CJOC because I didn't feel the CO and the XO should be there at the same time when we really weren't sure what was going on. Then when things started to- - - when we pulled our heads out of our butts, for lack of better words, we started getting accountability and we started getting our MPs as well as some of the Jordanian Forces out to clear the streets that's when I left to go to the CJOC.

Q: Prior to the attack, what was your assessment of Force Protection on the BLS Complex? Did you ever express any concerns to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c regarding AT/FP on the BLS Complex? If so, what were those concerns? What was the response?
A: Prior to the attack, force protection on the complex was talked about pretty much on a constant basis. Especially after when we first got there and we had what was known as the "burning man incident."
One of the reasons it was talked about was because as we were reducing numbers, we still had the same number of camp taxes as far as the DFAC guards, as far as the ECP guards, and things of that nature; which I believe is one of the reasons that Triple Canopy was brought in. I did talk to all three commanders I had forward about force protection. It was a back and forth dialogue pretty much the entire time. One particular concern I expressed was with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c from the Wing. He called me one day and said that there were some local nationals near, I believe what he said was near the (b)(1)1.4g Basically what happened was, when we got the Triple Canopy contract there were so many workers. Every MSC, for lack of better words, wanted a whole bunch of the Triple Canopy contractors --- but there's only so much to go around. He expressed that there were some local nationals near what I believe he said was the (b)(1)1.4g and we briefly discussed that; about some of their procedures I can't recall in detail. I forget what type of clothing he said they were wearing. I brought that to, I think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was in the seat at that time, either he or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c I can't remember which. Then I went and talked to our ATFP officer; I think his name is (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c or something like that. They went and made liaison with

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the MAW and they came back with the report and briefed the commander basically as they had Triple Canopy at their ECPs but they also had Triple Canopy over on, for lack of better words, on Leatherneck at the ECP to their compound which was pretty much all of the Triple Canopy contract workers that they rated. Some of the things that they could have done was to escort LNs out to the (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4g and escort them back because the (b)(1)1.4g was actually on the airfield. So those kind of things were brought up and discussed.

Q: Were you a participant in any AT/FP related Working Groups or other Boards? If so, please explain.
A: I was not a participant in any of the AT/FP related Working Groups or Boards. I was informed about a lot of what was going on but I was not an actual participant.

Q: Who in the TFBW chain of command was primarily responsible for reporting to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c on Force Protection matters? Who was the AT/FP Officer?
A: I believe that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was primarily responsible for reporting to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c on Force Protection matters. It started out, we had a gunnery sergeant who was AT/FP. He was from a law enforcement battalion, and I cannot remember his name. Then he redeployed, and he left a Staff Sergeant and I can't remember her name now and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Those two were doing the AT/FP.

Q: What was your relationship with the other (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c in RC(SW)? Did they come to you regarding AT/FP concerns? If so, please describe in detail any concerns raised. What was the mechanism to fix these concerns if they existed?
A: AT/FP amongst senior enlisted was talked about all the time. To be quite honest, that's one of the things that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c drove, not only the conduct of the guards at the DFACS but also the conduct and the posture of the Marines as they walked around Leatherneck and the things we needed to enforce.

Q: Did you have concerns about the insider threat posed by LN and TCN contractors? If so, please describe any actions you took regarding your concerns.
A: To be quite honest I don't think there was concern so much as a sense of we need to control the LN or TCN contractors. Some of the things that were brought up were kind of like how after a certain time some of the local nationals at Bastion would come across to Leatherneck and vice-versa. I think there was one time when the MPs said that where the local nationals slept, at a lot of them were coming out of the compound at night. Those were kind of the things that weren't a concern because you knew what they were doing. It was more of a matter of how do you prevent them from breaking the rules and regulations.

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Q: Was TFBW responsible for vetting and security of all contractors, or was it split among the various Camps? If the latter, how did you coordinate vetting and security with your UK and Afghan counterparts?
A: That's one I cannot say for sure. I know we had our share. I know the UK did their side as well. There was an issue with the badges; the badges didn't mean the same on both camps. A lot of times somebody with a UK badge could not come over to Leatherneck and vice versa. I know there was an issue with that but that's pretty much all I can tell you about that.

Q: If you are aware of it, please describe the vetting process for contractors.
A: I am not aware of the vetting process for contractors.

Q: Describe the security measures in place for contractors to get onto the BLS Complex once they were vetted and hired. What control measures, if any, were in place for contractors once they were inside the compound?
A: The color of their badge said pretty much what they had access to. All of us were constantly kind of told that if we see them walking around to stop and check the color of their badge and make sure they were escorted. Aside from that I'm not aware of the security measures in place for contractors that get into the BLS Complex once they were vetted and hired.

Q: Did you have concerns about the AT/FP posture on the Camp Bastion side of the BLS Complex, including the flight line? If so, what were they and what were they based upon? Did you ever express those to anyone? Did you ever discuss them with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c? If so, please describe the conversation(s) and the parties involved.
A: I wasn't over there a lot. The way the guard was stood over on the Bastion side was different then the Leatherneck side. I don't think that was so much a concern as much as I just didn't think that it was professional. There were things going on such as they would kind of be--because they would be left out there for like a week at a time I guess. I'm guessing that they would be driven out and they'd be dropped off and that was kind of where they lived at. They would drive around and they would drop off chow to them. That tower would kind of become their home. I know that when I would see Soldiers at the bottom of the tower whether they were hanging out their socks or whatever; I just didn't think it was professional. Was I concerned that they were not looking out? That didn't cross my mind; I just didn't think that they should be kind of bivouaced at the bottom of the tower. This was primarily UK and Tongan. This discussion came up a number of times but more kind of like when we're discussing, these guys are nasty, unprofessional, let's make sure we're not doing those types of things.

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Q: Did you have any specific concerns about the Tongan soldiers manning guard towers on Camp Bastion? If so, what were your concerns and who did you address them to?
A: No, sir.

Q: All reports indicate that Camp Bastion manned approximately 50% of their towers. Was this also common in Camps Leatherneck and Shorabak? Why was manning roughly 50% of the towers deemed sufficient? We have been told that it was partially because there were primary, secondary, and alternate towers. Is this your understanding as well?
A: I think we were manning over 50% the entire time. If I'm not mistaken, we started manning every tower once we got our, for lack of better word, probe. That's when we stepped up our posture. We could not sustain that so we started rotating which towers would be unmanned. This was done because of a manning shortfall.

Q: One interviewee expressed a concern that prior to the attack, only half of the guard towers were manned, yet there seemed to be an excess of Marines in MWR facilities and coffee shops that could have otherwise been performing guard duty. Did you share this concern?
A: Everybody commented about this. Thing is, people work different hours of the day. It never shuts down, so that Lance Corporal who may have been at the MWR at 12 o'clock in the afternoon was probably up at 12 o'clock in the morning standing a post or doing something that night. I think that comment is just from people who aren't used to a swing shift or just don't know.

Q: Did you have concerns about the split C2 structure for force protection between Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion? If so, how did you mitigate this?
A: I wouldn't say concerns so much as I didn't like it. It's easy to be concerned after the fact. I was not concerned, but I did not like it though because I did not understand it at first. Once I was there for a while I began to understand it and it didn't appear to be a problem.

Q: Please describe your relationship with your UK counterparts on Camp Bastion. Did you discuss AT/FP concerns? Please describe the nature of those conversations and any outcomes or solutions, if applicable.
A: There were three UK counterparts while I was there. All of them were really good guys, no issues there. There was a sharing of information trying to get the two camps online. They would tell me some of the issues they had with US Forces over on the Bastion side and I would do the same and we would each reach out to different units aboard the camp to let them know what was going on.

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Q: Considering that there were Marine personnel and aircraft on the flight line away from Camp Leatherneck, did you pay special attention to Force Protection of the 3d MAW? Please describe the arrangement between 3d MAW and the UK forces considering that UK forces were responsible for AT/FP of the flight line. Was the 3d MAW Sergeant Major satisfied with his arrangement?
A: To be quite honest sir, no I did not. Went out there a number of times, did not attempt to assess their vulnerability, I didn't think about it. I'm not sure if the 3d MAW Sergeant Major was satisfied with the arrangement they were in. Our conversation pretty much consisted of the incident around the (b)(1)1.4g with the local nationals. He never expressed anything else to me. It was more of a thing where almost every unit in every MSC wanted Triple Canopy to guard their ECP or to guard something and that was pretty much across the board.

Q: How much do you know about the local national interpreter's incursion onto the flight line in March 2012 while Secretary Panetta was present on BLS (aka the "burning man incident)? Were you involved at all with any mitigation of risk to the flight line after that incident? If so, please describe. Based on the known and expected threat of attack prior to the 14 September attack, do you feel that the attempted mitigation measures were adequate?
A: Minimal, Sir. As a result of the burning man incident, the UK ran the ECP which was a bar that they lowered and raised. What they did, instead of one Soldier they started putting two out there; they also put some speed bumps in the road. The force posture as far as to get to the Charlie Ramp kind of grew the entire time we were there. Was there just one big definitive big step? No; it was kind of as we learned it got better. It's hard to say if the attempted mitigation measures were adequate; the attack came from a different side.

Q: Did you have any conversations with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c after that incident? If so, please describe.
A: I did not have a conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c after the burning man incident.

Q: Were you aware of the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA), which reviewed the BLS AT/FP Program 10-14 June? Are you aware of the results of that JSIVA? Were the results shared throughout the leadership of RC(SW)? If so, how were they shared and in what manner?
A: I was aware of the JSIVA. I am aware of the results; they were shared throughout the leadership of RC(SW). The results were shared in the meetings where we would all get in and they were shared in the actual report that was sent up as well.

Q: Did you take any actions after the JSIVA? Did you have any conversations with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c regarding the results of the JSIVA? If so, please describe.

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A: The biggest vulnerability that they assessed was the Friendship Gate between Leatherneck and Shorabak. Immediately they went to kind of redo that whole thing, planning and everything. Another thing that they assessed was that a lot of bunkers did not have sandbags on the top of them. We started to work on that as well. The other one was that the billeting was too close together. Which to be quite honest, the mitigation was the T-barriers that were put up because the distance that they were talking about spreading from camp to camp was undoable. Another one that they mentioned was the flight line and that a gate should be placed around the flight line. That had been discussed as soon as we got on deck and it was basically, my understanding and I wasn't in on the conversation I was just hearing sidebar, is that it was a money issue. The US had pretty much built the flight line now, the UK kind of owned the flight line and they wanted the US to put a fence around it so they were kind of holding out and they were talking about millions of dollars. That's just sidebar conversation I heard. The other one was, I believe they recommended that entry control points be placed between Bastion and Leatherneck.

Q: Did you or anyone in TFBW seek assistance from RC(SW) as a result of the JSIVA? If so, what assistance did you seek and what was the result?
A: I am not aware; I know there was some planning going on with the ECP that was going to require engineer assets that we did not have; I mean at the Friendship Gate.

Q: What was your assessment of the threat of attack to the BLS Complex prior to 14 September 2012?
A: I did not think that a threat of attack to the BLS Complex prior to 14 September 2012 was likely. The reason why I say that is because when we first got there we definitely had the number of personnel that we needed. The longer we stayed and the reduction in personnel, I know the security forces took a big hit on that, still trying to maintain the security aboard the facility itself with all the other requirements to run the FOBs as well, I would say the longer we stayed the more likely it became. I did not think it was going to happen though to be totally honest. I thought we had a pretty good security posture. If I'm not mistaken, I think on that particular day of the incident, I could be wrong, but I believe ISAF called down and called "Op Minimize," so the number of patrols that we had out in AO Belleau Wood had been reduced as well. I could be mistaken but I believe that was the same day. I don't know why they made that call.

Q: Did you ever observe complacency on the part of US personnel providing Force Protection for the BLS Complex? If so, what do you attribute this to?
A: No, I did not observe complacency on the part of US personnel providing Force Protection for the BLS Complex. Complacency as far as there were members aboard the installation traversing to and from the exchange and things

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like that where you would have to tighten them up, but in the towers and as security forces patrolling outside the wire, no, sir. With regard to UK personnel, what I perceived to be, I'm not sure would be complacency as much as I would perceive it to be a lack of professionalism. Even when they were down there washing their socks and hanging them up there was always someone that they had up in the tower as well, so I can't say that I observed complacency on their part either.

Q: One interviewee informed us that the attitude of personnel on the BLS Complex might have been that it was "too big to fail." Do you agree? Do you believe that TFBW or other US personnel displayed this attitude?
A: I don't agree with the "too big to fail" comment and I don't believe that any TFBW or any other US personnel displayed this attitude.

Q: Did you have adequate manpower to conduct your mission in RC(SW), including force protection? Did you ever express concerns regarding a manpower shortage to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c If so, describe those conversations and the parties involved? What was the resolution, if any?
A: I think we initially had adequate manpower to conduct our mission. The longer we stayed, all the way up until this, we were getting by I think. Prior to the attack, at one time we were sending out patrols for six days and six nights and that's pretty much the lowest we went down to. After the attack I think we stepped it up to twelve and twelve, sometimes twelve and thirteen, so on and so forth. Most of my concerns regarding manpower shortages, to be quite honest with you, we all knew about the SECFOR, the biggest concern I had was with the Military Working Dog Handlers because of what they were going out to do and who they were supporting and how drastically we were cutting back on them.

Q: Did you have any conversations with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c after the attack regarding the vulnerabilities previously identified during the "burning man incident" and the JSIVA, and whether TFBW had addressed the vulnerabilities appropriately prior to the attack? If so, please describe those conversations.
A: To be quite honest at Camp Bastion after the attack, we talked pretty much every day, lunchtime, breakfast, dinner; all we did was talk about the security of the FOB. There were a lot of plans to build a whole bunch of new stuff. We kind of simplified things; a FOB is just a big fighting hole which requires constant improvement; getting engineer assets out to redig our ditches, putting back up our berms, getting people out for that concertina wire that had fallen down, getting that stuff back up those types of things, kind of "just don't reinvent the wheel."

Q: With the MHG and TFBW being responsible for the security around the base on the US part and then the perimeter around, how did you see your relationship

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with the MEF AT/FP? I'm kind of having a hard time trying to figure out the difference between security and AT/FP and why there seems to be kind of a void between the two.
A: I talked to the MHG AT/FP about that as well. To be honest, I can't tell you what the MEF AT/FP did. When I asked, it was kind of like and I assume that it's like most MEF things, he went around assessing the entire MEF and not just the Leatherneck complex. Camp Leatherneck, as far as I was told, was the responsibility of the MHG in coordination with IMCOM, the installation management command team. So that's why the MHG AT/FP was responsible for Leatherneck whereas the MEF AT/FP had Leatherneck, Dwyer, Delaram and anywhere else we had forces at.

Q: We heard that as far as the numbers go -- and we want to see if this is consistent with your understanding -- numbers went down from 211 to just over 100 in the SECFOR prior to the attack. Do you remember if that's correct and around what time did that big 100-man personnel drop happen?
A: I don't remember if that is correct but I remember the big drop happened about four or five months into the deployment. I think it was about two months when we first started sending personnel back and it was in the twosies and threesies. Then right around the 12.1 and 12.2 cut to be quite honest is when we dropped off a substantial amount, which kind of hurt us even more. I know what they were trying to do but when you're dropping two or three off here a month and then all of a sudden you drop off this great big amount, you may as well have dropped them off at the same time. What the exact numbers were, I think I have most of the count cards saved, I could get that info, but I don't know it off hand.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
A: No, sir. I've been racking in my brain trying to remember everything, and one thing that just stuck out in my mind was I seem to remember that we were in Op Minimize and I think it was because of the attacks and also some IED threats in other regions. I can't be sure of that, but I believe that was part of our conversations afterward. Another one which I'm sure you probably already know was the number of -- they don't call them breaches – they called them scrapper incidents on the UK side. Everybody is talking about "well they were testing, they were testing." But if you look at the previous cuts they were never large enough for anybody to fit through those things.

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2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c **at** (b)(6) **or** (b)(6), (b)(7)c

WILLIAM B. GARRETT III
LTG, USA
Investigating Officer

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