DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c former Anti Terrorism/Force Protection Officer, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW(FWD)]

1. The investigation team conducted a recorded interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c former Anti Terrorism/Force Protection Officer, 3d MAW(FWD) on 19 June 2013 at Camp Pendleton, CA as part of the AR 15-6 investigation into the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c is currently unavailable to sign and return a sworn statement. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that the dialogue transcribed below is an accurate account of the interview with CWO3 Orosco. The recorded interview is on file with the investigative team.

Q: Where are you currently assigned?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your current duty position?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: When did you arrive in Afghanistan as the 3d MAW (FWD) AT/FP Officer, and when did you depart?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What were your specific responsibilities as the 3d MAW (FWD) AT/FP Officer? Was it a full time position, or an additional duty for you?
A: That billet includes Force Protection assessments of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing Forward assets, personnel; conduct vulnerability assessments, brief the

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commanding general as well as the staff on any issues pertaining to Force Protection measure increases or decreases on the camp, meaning Camp Bastion or Camp Leatherneck, where ever our 3d MAW assets were at the time. That was my full-time position while I was there.

Q: What training had you received in AT/FP?
A: I have received AT/FP Officer Level I and Level II Certifications.

Q: Were you appointed in writing? Who appointed you? What was the scope of your appointment?
A: Yes, I was by MajGen Gregory Sturdevant. The appointment was focused on 3d MAW assets and personnel aboard the camp and any adjacent or outlying FOBs.

Q: Who did you answer to in the 3d MAW (FWD) chain of command for AT/FP issues?
A: My immediate supervisor was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c; he was the G3, the Operations Officer for 3d MAW FWD.

Q: Who did you report to in your AT/FP technical chain? RC(SW) AT/FPO ((b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c)?
A: That would have been (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c MEF.

Q: How often did you interact with the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c from RC(SW)? What was his guidance to you as AT/FP Officer?
A: Initially and through the end of the year I would say initially once a week, sir. To the best of my knowledge once a week and then going into the fourth or fifth month of the deployment it dwindled down to about maybe once a month, maybe twice a month. His guidance was just to continue vulnerability assessments, keep him abreast on any issues that may have occurred that are counter-productive to keeping Force Protection measures up and running. For the most part as far as the increase and decrease in Force Protection measures and letting my unit know in our subordinate squadrons. I dealt mostly with Task Force Belleau Wood and that was a subordinate of the MEF and they handled camp security there on Camp Leatherneck.

Q: Do you feel that you had the support and authority from both 3d MAW (FWD) and RC(SW) to execute your responsibilities?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you feel that RC(SW) as a whole fostered an environment that stressed AT/FP?

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A: As far as 3d MAW FWD sir, I was able to go out and conduct assessments, provide feedback to my Commanding General on my assessments and my recommendations. As far as the camp itself and the partnership that we had with our NATO Allies, I didn't necessarily see or work with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c directly in an AT/FP capacity.

Q: Did you have an adequate RIP/TOA with your predecessors at the airfield?
A: Yes I did sir. We toured Camp Leatherneck and all of our units aboard that camp as well as the entire flight line, Camp Bastion, and all of our supporting squadrons there and personnel as well.

Q: Do you feel that your predecessors adequately addressed any AT/FP vulnerabilities which may have existed?
A: We addressed them sir but as far as, in my opinion, getting the support necessary to see those recommendations turn into action, I was not witness to that immediately sir, until after the attack.

Q: Do you recall what, if any, vulnerabilities they specifically discussed with you? Did they provide anything in writing?
A: The main document that was used was the JSIVA out brief, and that's the Joint Service Integrated Vulnerability Assessment; that is conducted by a team from Quantico. That document was the main document that we used. That document addressed significant short falls in security, perimeter security in and around the flight line, in and around the aircraft, the terrain associated with the perimeter, and the partnerships that are involved aboard Camp Bastion and Leatherneck. That document itself was used initially and I believe that assessment occurred in June of 2012. So that document was the main document used for my turnover and then we went out physically and toured the entire area of Bastion and Leatherneck, came up with my recommendations following the vulnerabilities assessment and then put that in writing and talked that through with my supervisors, then obviously up the chain due to the fact that we needed support on the camp to get those recommendations accomplished. Not to mention the fact that we needed assistance from our British counterparts because they, in not so many words, owned Camp Bastion.

Q: How did (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c react to those assessments or requests up the chain?
A: Sir, I really was not involved with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c in discussing those items. I was more involved with Task Force Belleau Wood, RC(SW) subordinate solely tasked with maintaining the security of the camp. So my voice was heard by them as well as by our British counterparts because my concerns were mainly for the aircraft squadrons on the flight line. The MEF ATFPO did not necessarily have significant interaction with myself, sir.

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Q: Did you utilize a primary source of Marine or Joint Doctrine to conduct your AT/FP responsibilities? If not, what did you use to establish your standards?
A: Joint Doctrine that stems from the JFOB Protection Handbook as well as both Level I and Level II training; particularly Level II Certification. The basics were defense in-depth, perimeter security, communications, terrain association, that's what I started off with.

Q: Were you required to have your own AT/FP Plan for 3d MAW (FWD)?
A: Yes, I used the one that was currently already in place for 3d MAW FWD that was signed by MajGen Sturdevant early in the deployment. Then following the attack the Commanding General as well as myself following my recommendations and the staff's recommendations, we determined that was not adequate enough so we formed a new AT/FP Order that was put in place about roughly 45-days after the attack. We began Force Protection improvements immediately but that order itself was not put in place until approximately 45-days after, to my recollection.

Q: If so, did you have the assistance and support that you needed to develop and implement the plan?
A: Full support from the 3d MAW FWD staff as well as Task Force Belleau Wood, which was the SECFOR for the base.

Q: Considering that the flight line was on the Camp Bastion side of the BLS Complex, how did you integrate with the UK personnel who were overall responsible for AT/FP on Camp Bastion? Describe that relationship.
A: I was involved with the UK Force Protection wing in a series of Force Protection assessments following the attack, but prior to the attack it was narrowed down to maybe a weekly meeting conducted on Camp Bastion. The attendees of that meeting would be various NATO units but included myself and Task Force Belleau Wood for the most part as far as for the Marine side or the US side.

Q: Where were you during the attack on 14-15 September 2012?
A: I had just returned from the 3d MAW FWD CG's compound and I was located in my LSA aboard Camp Leatherneck.

Q: Based on your experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts as the attack unfolded?
A: My initial thought was that the assessments and the gut feeling that was shared by many in the AT/FP community at the time of my arrival and the concerns that we had, had all come to fruition. It was utter chaos in the sense that I didn't necessarily feel as though the units, the Marine Corps, the US units aboard Camp Leatherneck had the ability to understand what was happening.

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And that, in my opinion, stems from a base plan that did not necessarily have clear communication guidance. There was a COMM system, a loudspeaker that was used but the procedures for using that base intercom system changed after the attack because we found out during the attack that it didn't work properly, bottom line. So the units aboard Camp Leatherneck were just basically looking at the flight line on fire and watching our aircraft hover over the flight line but not a lot was really understood on what was going on until later that evening or going into the morning. That was my initial feeling; the main thing was anger that I initially felt because from the get-go I did not feel like the base was secured properly at least as far as US standards are concerned, and my experience with those US standards. Whether it's Iraq or Afghanistan or even CONUS, anytime we have critical assets or personnel behind a fence line; I didn't feel we were guarding those assets properly. We were depending too much on our NATO partners and the defense-in-depth concept was not really utilized. We depended on the British and Tongan forces on that fence line as a "single point of failure," and in my opinion that's a complete mistake and an utter failure. It shouldn't have been that way. As a single point of failure if someone in that guard tower falls asleep you have 15 dismounted individuals running amok up and down the flight line. Without that defense-in-depth you don't have anyone guarding the flight line just before they get to the aircraft or just before they get to the personnel. I think that we should consider ourselves at the time very, very lucky that the LSA that was located adjacent to the flight line was not attacked. If the insurgents would have gotten that far to the south from their insertion point it would have been an even worse day because that also was wide open.

Q: Did your duties require you to take any actions during the attack?
A: No sir.

Q: Were you familiar with OP CONGO, the combined US-UK crisis management plan?
A: That plan had been discussed briefly upon my arrival and actually I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c mentioned that in a Force Protection meeting; but to my knowledge and to my understanding, OP CONGO was not necessarily a known operation throughout the camp, the BLS complex.

Q: What did the crisis management plan entail for 3d MAW (FWD) in the event of an attack on Camp Bastion?
A: OP CONGO was basically for 3d MAW units to hunker down, to basically barricade themselves in a defensive position and provide communication to their higher for accountability of personnel within the 3d MAW FWD. It took into consideration the TCNs that were adjacent to us or worked amongst us but it didn't necessarily have a plan on how to consolidate those individuals or what to

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do with them in the event of an attack or how to tell who from who and I think that was a glaring thing that was missing.

Q: The Joint Review Board Inquiry Report appointed by MajGen Gurganus and led by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c after the attack mentions that OP CONGO did not clearly address seams between the CO TFBW area of responsibility and the CO Bastion area of responsibility. How were the Camps delineated? Was it clear? Were they walled off from one another?
A: On the BLS Complex there were walls throughout the interior camp and to the untrained eye there was no way you could tell the difference between Camp Bastion and Camp Leatherneck other than if you were passing by a sign that said, "welcome to Camp Leatherneck," or "you are now in Camp Bastion," or you notice the fact that it was British service members or British vehicles, British aircraft. That's the only way you really knew that you were not on Camp Leatherneck and vice versa. But part of that OP CONGO in addition to my previous answer to that question; that was one of the other main problems was who accepts or who takes on the responsibility for quick reaction force. I do know that at least on Leatherneck we had Triple Canopy that offered private civilian security for Camp Leatherneck but they didn't necessarily operate on Bastion. Then the Marine Corps units, or at least the 3d MAW FWD units, didn't necessarily understand the difference between Triple Canopy and maybe British Security Forces that were supposed to maintain the security, or maybe even the Tongan Marines that were put in charge of the guard towers.

Q: Are you aware of the 2011 MOU between CENTCOM and the UK regarding the command and control arrangement?
A: Yes, sir, however I'm very fuzzy on the specifics of it sir.

Q: What that did was kind of split the C2 between the Marines and the UK, were you aware of that split?
A: Yes, sir. The COC was maintained on Camp Leatherneck but that joint COC was British and US Forces. That was another issue that we noticed; communication between the Tongan/British towers and actually getting that information relayed back to that joint operation center. I am familiar now with that MOU sir.

Q: Did you have concerns about the insider threat posed by LNs and TCN contractors on the BLS Complex? If so, please describe any conversations you had with RC(SW) regarding your concerns.
A: Yes sir. I identified those concerns at first to my supervisor, the Operations Officer for 3d MAW FWD, and then I also took action with regard to the squadron ATFPOs in discussing measures to mitigate that risk.

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Q: Who was responsible for counter-intelligence efforts on the BLS Complex? Were these efforts sufficient? Did they identify any specific insider threats?
A: The individuals that I worked with in the counter-intelligence community were involved with the Marine SECFOR, the Task Force Belleau Wood, as well as the MEF. They reported back to the MEF. But as far as what their capabilities were prior to the attack, within that month and a half that I arrived, I wasn't that privy to what they were discussing or their operations in general. Following the attack I was much more involved in what they were doing and what the MAW was doing.

Q: Although there was no unity of command over AT/FP for the entire BLS Complex, what mechanisms were in place to ensure unity of effort between US and UK counterparts, particularly in mixed areas like the Camp Bastion flight line?
A: In addition to the MOU there was a base Force Protection plan but as far as a communications between the two entities, no I was not. There were working groups however I did not at the time prior to the attack see any products from those working groups that were taken into action.

Q: What was your assessment of the UK forces' ability to protect Camp Bastion? Did you ever raise any concerns with anyone? Please describe.
A: My initial assessment upon arrival was a negative one in the sense that not all of the guard towers were manned; and that includes the manning capabilities of both countries, but the towers were not all manned. There were numerous amounts of dead space around the perimeter of Camp Bastion to include numerous amounts of dead space even within the perimeter. On the south and north sides of the flight line alone there was debris, rubble, hills that anyone or anything could have penetrated that fence line and maybe hid there for a day before anyone knew they were there. That was just my assessment to include the west side of the LSA and the west side of the flight line only because there was a significant amount of debris and rubble that was there that would have provided a lot of cover or concealment for any enemy breaches in the perimeter. Bottom line, it was a negative one.

Q: Did you have any specific concerns about the Tongan soldiers manning guard towers on Camp Bastion? If so, what were your concerns and who did you address them to?
A: I was able to get into the towers on the Brit side; my impression was that they were not necessarily taking their job quite that serious. Myself and another chief warrant officer, he's an (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c he was the ATFPO for that squadron and he and I would meet out there maybe every other night out on the flight line. One particular night we walked out to one of the guard towers and it felt like the five individuals that were in there were not coherent, in the sense that they were all asleep. That was at least my impression. The other

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negative impression that I received; the fact is that they had one night vision optic in the tower and if that individual standing on top of the tower is not constantly scanning while he's in the tower he's going to miss something; only because what he's viewing in front of the tower is just a massive amount of ground with so much dead space that if you're not continuously panning left and right with that night vision it's very easy to miss something. Much less the fact that I believe that when we did visit that tower they were asleep. On the top of the towers, to my knowledge, there were "LRTIs" and "MRTIs," long range night vision cameras and those feeds went back to the Combined Joint Operations Center on Camp Leatherneck so who was viewing that at the time of the attack or prior to the attack, I don't have that information. I did witness seeing the screens in the CJOC that were the feeds from those cameras on top of the towers. So essentially you have the Tongan guards or the British guards in every other tower plus in every other tower roughly you have a long range or medium range thermal imager and that feed goes back to the CJOC.

Q: Did you have any specific concerns about the Tongan Marines manning guard towers, did you have any interaction with them?
A: The only interaction was when I would actually drive out behind those towers to kind of look at the perimeter around the flight line which I would do daily. The only night that I did have physical interaction with them was when we actually climbed into their tower and that was the night that I felt that all five of them were asleep.

Q: There have been reports in the media that the Tongan soldiers slept in their guard towers. However, we have learned from some interviews that there were lower levels in the towers where the Tongans slept when they were off-duty, and that they had never been caught sleeping in the towers while on-duty. Can you confirm or deny either version of events?
A: I walked in the lower level and there were two Tongans in that particular tower; they were sleeping on cots. Then there was one, I believe he was sitting on the stairwell going up to the top of the tower leaning up against the wall and he looked like he had been sleeping. Then the two individuals on the top of the tower, I'm not sure what their ranks or what their names were only because it was pitch black in there. I identified who I was as well as the chief warrant officer that was with me. We identified who we were and that we were just visiting; just kind of wanted to take a look outside of their tower and while we were interacting with them that's where I got the feeling they weren't necessarily guarding anything. They were in fact sleeping. Again, that's just my assessment, I did not physically see them sleeping. I thought they were sleeping because they were groggy. Their English was broken which was another thing that I attempted to identify with the 5th Protection Wing. The communication problem in the sense that if you have British and Tongan manned towers that are talking amongst one

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another through whatever VHF channels they have at the time and then relaying that to an American back at the CJOC. Essentially you have Tongans and Brits with a hard time communicating amongst one another over the radio and in essence you're getting on the radio and relaying whatever that message is back to a CJOC and you have an American listening on the other end that at least from my perspective could have been a huge problem. Prior to the attack the towers were at 50% manning, every other tower was manned. I asked the Force Protection Wing the reason for that and that was basically due to manning; the lack of manpower to man every tower.

Q: Would manning every tower have helped on the night of the attack or could the two adjacent towers see and cover?
A: The location where it has been assessed that the perimeter was breached, there's so much dead space in between those towers that I believe that there's every possibility that something could have been missed. I believe that we would have helped ourselves greatly if every tower was manned only because that would have limited the significant amount of dead space in between the towers.

Q: The JRB Report mentions that OP MOLEHILL is a "daily security patrol that surveys the inside of the perimeter fence every day in order to find and repair any breaches." UK forces conducted these patrols. Were you aware of them? We were informed that this patrol had identified 3-4 breaches in the wire in the 3-4 months prior to the attack. Were these breaches reported to you? If so, were they investigated?
A: I am not familiar with that operation, sir.

Q: Are you aware of any changes to the FP posture on Camp Bastion prior to the attack? Had the UK reduced its manpower or patrolling along the perimeter of Camp Bastion? Please explain.
A: I was told that they had elevated and then decreased following what was called the "burning man incident," I believe that the Secretary of Defense was there, but other than that nothing at all that was that drastic.

Q: From what you could see, had the UK reduced its manpower patrolling along the perimeter of Camp Bastion?
A: Prior to the attack, sir, I did not physically witness any mounted or dismounted patrols outside of the perimeter. I did witness maybe one to two patrols on the interior of the perimeter by mounted British patrols. Then after the attack, it was daily if not every two hours that a patrol was conducted. There was a significant increase after the attack in patrols in and around the perimeter.

Q: Did 3d MAW (FWD) or any subordinate Marine units present on the airfield have AT/FP responsibilities on the flight line? Was it internal security? What

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measures did you employ for internal security? Did you conduct patrolling? Man ECPs? Please explain.
A: For their individual units; the 3d MAW FWD Force Protection Plan directed the individual squadron commanders to maintain Force Protection for their squadrons; internal security. Prior to the attack, to my knowledge, only two squadrons maintained an entry control point; that was HMLA 169 and the VMM 161 that was out there. Other than that, every other squadron on the flight line depended on the external perimeter security; meaning they depended on the Force Protection of the Tongans for security as well as the Triple Canopy civilian contractors on the north and south sides of the flight line road that controlled access.

Q: In your opinion did 3d MAW (FWD) have enough personnel to conduct its assigned mission and execute Force Protection responsibilities? Did you ever raise concerns about insufficient security forces to RC(SW)? If so, what was their response?
A: No sir; from my perspective no. I say that only because of interaction between myself and my counterparts at the squadron level and then discussing Force Protection measures with various operations officers or senior enlisted within those squadrons and talking with them and discussing the possibility of changing our Force Protection Plan to include an ECP for every squadron and a guard post at least at a minimum during hours of darkness. We had discussed that but that didn't actually come to fruition until after the attack. I voiced my concerns to Task Force Belleau Wood ATFPO as well as their commanding officer who attended several working groups. Then it was discussed with the Force Protection Wing. It was discussed with the MEF ATFPO, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c Then I brought that up to my supervisors, my chain of command which were already aware of the requirements or the vulnerability due to the fact of the JSIVA outbrief.

Q: When you raised that concern to RC SW, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c what was his response?
A: Sir, I do not recall a response that was anything other than an understanding of the problem but I do not recall a response that included, we are going to take action on any of these issues of vulnerabilities.

Q: So (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c response was passive; he didn't roll out and help you with--
A: No sir.

Q: The JRB Report mentioned that there was no guard force assigned to monitor the dead space between the perimeter guard towers and the flight line. Although this was CO Bastion's area of responsibility, were you aware of this vulnerability?

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Did you coordinate with CO Bastion to address it or mitigate it? What did you do to mitigate it?
A: As part of my turnover in August, I was aware that a proposal had been made by the Force Protection Wing to build an additional fence line within the perimeter around the flight line and that plan had been cancelled due to funding. I did mention to all the Force Protection entities involved in the Force Protection Working Groups that were conducted that I did not feel like we had adequate protection on the flight line on the north, south, or west sides; meaning the lack of patrolling, lack of visibility of the flight line, much less the dead space that surrounded the flight line.

Q: All reports indicate that Camp Bastion manned approximately 50% of their towers. Do you know why manning roughly 50% of the towers was deemed sufficient? Did you ever inspect or assess the UK-run perimeter? Do you know how often they adjusted their pattern for manning the towers?
A: I can only go off of what was discussed in the Force Protection Working Groups and that was a shortage of manpower due to the drawdown and that there was not a significant threat being posed external to the perimeter. I think there was a bigger concern with insider threat then the actual perimeter itself.

Q: The JRB's Supplemental Review stated that the 14 March 2012 airfield incursion (often referred to as "the burning man incident"), "...raised concerns regarding the security of the flight line and its assets and access to critical areas within the Bastion airfield. This incident also demonstrated the need to improve airfield and perimeter security and to institute some level of increased access control to the airfield operating areas." Do you agree? How seriously did you take this incident? What did you do in response?
A: Yes, sir, I agree with that. I know that the 3d MAW FWD chain of command was concerned with the lack of security in and around the flight line. However, from the view that I had in dealing with our adjacent units or our supporting units on the camp, I did not necessarily see any action particularly being done in that area of Force Protection.

Q: In your opinion, did the entire US chain of command share concerns about the flight line and feel the need for improved security? Do you feel that 3d MAW (FWD) reasonably attempted to address these concerns after the "burning man incident"? What about RC(SW)?
A: From my level no sir, I did not feel as though prior to the attack security was a main concern of the tenants aboard Camp Bastion or Leatherneck. At my level and from my view, my perspective, it was more of "we have someone to do that, we have someone to handle security let's stay in our lane let them handle that." That is what I perceived from my perspective. My predecessor I believe took action to improve security, to improve Force Protection, to improve visibility of

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the flight line; but again sir, it goes back to what supporting elements we had and the support that we were receiving at the time. Plans were made. Recommendations were made in addition to the JSIVA but again it was one of those things where if you don't have the equipment and the manpower to conduct these Force Protection improvements it's just words, it becomes a moot point.

Q: Did you discuss the "burning man incident" with your UK counterparts on Camp Bastion after it occurred? Please describe the conversation.
A: No Sir, I did not discuss the "burning man incident" I don't believe at one time with the Force Protection Wing.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review identifies that a UK request for a "Full UK Specification Airside Segregation," which provided for full vehicle and pedestrian access control, was denied by both the UK chain of command and by the BLS Executive Steering Group (ESG). Were you involved in the UK survey and option study for different mitigation techniques? Did you feel that this access control was necessary?
A: I'm not familiar with that sir.

Q: Were the improvements adopted, e.g. a ditch and berm system, responsive to the threat identified by the "burning man incident?"
A: The ditch and berm on the south end of the flight line to be specific, is the only ditch and berm that I'm familiar with; on the south and east side of the flight line and then up through the west side of the flight line road, that was put in place as mitigation for incidents such as individuals running onto the flight line. However, the "burning man incident" was never discussed in my presence as to why that ditch and berm was added. It was more mitigation for a breach.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review addressed a 3d MAW request to emplace concertina wire to secure vulnerable areas around the flight line and to channelize pedestrian traffic to ECPs, which was approved and completed prior to the attack. There is also an exhibit in the Supplemental Review of a 3d MAW flight line barrier plan request submitted at the same time (11 May 2012) to emplace (b)(1)1.4a to protect the flight line. The request stated, "Without these improvements, the flight line equipment and personnel will remain vulnerable to enemy attack at multiple access points, including numerous high speed avenues of approach." This project was eventually approved after the attack. Were you responsible for this request? Was it submitted in May 2012 as the date of the exhibit suggests?
A: After the attack, yes sir. That was part of the updated MAW FWD Force Protection Plan after the attack. Prior to the attack I'm not aware of anything other than a plan to add the chain link fence within the perimeter around the flight line. The only plan that I'm familiar with is the one that I proposed to 3d MAW and

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it was approved and we did receive numerous amounts of support on. The plan included a barrier plan on the west side of the LSA to offer blast mitigation and field of view protection from the perimeter for the personnel within the LSA. The barrier plan also included T-Walls and HESCO to be placed along the east side of the flight line road and also offered a series of entry control points that were then following the attack as part of the plan were manned by each squadron to control both vehicle and pedestrian access to the squadrons and to the flight line. The other parts of that plan included observation utilizing G-BOSS towers on the north and south ends of the flight line. Then a communications plan, which I believe would have assisted during the night of the attack; communication utilizing green gear just basically talking VHF over the flight line was not a capability at that time, so we put in a communication plan to where at least at a minimum we had communication between our squadron ECPs as well as the Triple Canopy civilian BCPs.

Q: Please describe the process in place in RC(SW) to seek AT/FP improvements. Did you have a role in this process? What was the ESG's role? Was this process responsive? Did you have adequate funding? Do you feel that the RC(SW) chain of command provided you the support you needed to improve your AT/FP posture? Please describe.
A: All of my requests for materials went through the G-4 and then as far as manpower and actually getting those Force Protection Plans executed were supported by our MWSS; they were organic to the ACE. I think the process was very responsive, in fact immediate. Funding was never an issue, manpower and vehicle support, heavy equipment support, cranes, dump trucks, whatever was needed following the attack we received full support from all entities to include the Force Protection realm.

Q: What about before the attack?
A: Before the attack, during the time that I was there I didn't necessarily see any of my predecessors' plans or ideas go into action. From what was perceived by us was due to a lack of support from our counterparts at the RC SW.

Q: Did you brief the 3d MAW (FWD) Commander on the results of the JSIVA? What guidance did he give you?
A: Prior to the attack, I did not. After the attack, we did discuss it. Our first discussion of that was when we did a site survey. I had joined MajGen Sturdevant and MajGen Gurganus on a site survey following the attack and we did discuss that JSIVA at that time.

Q: Did it ever come up in dialogue about why they didn't use the JSIVA as justification to mitigate the vulnerability out there on the flight line?
A: Not from the MAW level.

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Q: Did you conduct any coordination with your UK counterparts after the JSIVA, considering that some of the vulnerabilities involved their areas of responsibility?
A: I believe my predecessor did, that's where the project was pitched as far as the chain link fence around the perimeter, around the flight line; that was stemming from that JSIVA. That was one of the recommendations from the JSIVA. Again, that was not approved due to funding.

Q: Do you know when the flight line expansion was complete? Were there deliberations about pushing the perimeter further east to account for the new runway? If so, describe those deliberations and the decision not to expand the perimeter. Was the flight line within small arms range of the eastern perimeter fence?
A: I am not aware of the specific date when the flight line expansion was complete. I was part of working groups that discussed pushing a berm out but not the actual fence line and the towers; just only a berm to allow for better visibility and limit dead space. The flight line was in small arms range but with the terrain it would be very hard to get a shot from most areas; however, the location where VMA was located on the north end of the flight line you could, in my opinion, very easily stand just outside of that perimeter fence and take a shot at that flight line. If the tower is not watching you, you can even hide behind a facility that was out there, it was a Turkish construction company, METAG I believe.

A: (in viewing a map, he describes the location) Here's VMA and then this is the METAG facility, this is the Turkish construction company, this is the perimeter fence. The berm plan was to push dirt out and make all this basically flat, but at any time it was assessed by myself and some of the squadron AFTPOs that you could stand in this location on the outside of the fence and take a shot at VMA and all the aircraft. An even bigger concern was the LSA located right here was someone could easily stand on the outside of the perimeter or even breach the perimeter and maybe take about 5-10 paces and take an RPG or a rocket shot maybe utilizing direct fire in some way on the LSA only because there was so much rubble, so much dead space and every other tower was manned. So this was one of my biggest areas of concern, getting this fixed or at least mitigated the LSA and I can't really view it that well here but somewhere right in there. Gentlemen, I apologize, this is the LSA here, my apologies. This is the LSA and these are the fuel pits. This is where our liquid oxygen farm was and the liquid oxygen farm was a primary concern as well only because if that was hit that would obviously cause a relatively big explosion.

Q: So the LSA was within small arms range of the fence?

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A: Yes sir, because the perimeter is right here, the slope of the terrain goes up towards the LSA and on this east side of the LSA there was so much rubble in here that you could easily just hunker down behind a huge piece of concrete, huge piece of rubble and just take shots all night long at that LSA. By the time someone was able to figure out what was going on it would have been too late before we would have, in my opinion, received catastrophic casualties because of all those buildings are just so close together and that was a big concern. In order to mitigate that we added a wall of HESCO on the west side of that LSA and then we also included some observation towers of our own which were manned particularly at night by Marines with night vision capability with crew-served weapons and so on and so forth; in addition to the ECPs that we did have stood up at the squadrons and the flight line; all after the attack.

Q: There seems something odd to me about having liquid oxygen right next to the fuel farm, right next to the living spaces.
A: In retrospect sir looking at that, I wasn't part of the planning, I am by no means an engineering expert, but just looking at the layout and the Force Protection concerns that I had on my initial arrival, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g I don't know whose idea it was to build an LSA there, maybe that was the only option that we had but it was a huge concern only because it was just so open on this eastern side that if you were living there, which I wasn't, but in talking with my counterparts at the squadrons, they were concerned every day. They were in fear for their lives only because it's not a kinetic thing; every day you're on an airfield, you're on Camp Bastion/Camp Leatherneck, but at the same time you don't know who's walking around this area. There's Bedouins walking around on a daily basis that the squadron members would see, a tribe or a group of folks running or walking up and down the perimeter observing us, observing our movements. In particular, the Turkish Company METAG that was located right here which the MEF CG later had removed from that area after the attack. But it was viewed by numerous people in the squadron that they were being observed by even members within that compound. So there were concerns up and down the line. How those concerns were received at the Task Force Belleau Wood and the MEF level, I wasn't included in those meetings but the concerns were significant. It's not just every other tower being manned, and it's not just Tongans and Brits and depending on them as a single point of failure, it's us, the US Forces in general that I saw a lack of an ideal presence of mind when it comes to Force Protection. Just basic defense-in-depth, basic security procedures that especially officers know they're taught and there just didn't seem to be presence of that; presence of mind when it came to that. The concern wasn't there and not to go too much on a tangent here, but after the attack, a couple of nights later, we

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had a Texas Hold 'Em poker night on Camp Leatherneck. I mean, it's just one of those things where quality of life and happiness has superseded basic fundamentals in security, at least from my perspective.

Q: Was there any oversight from the RC SW ATFPO of any of this? Oversight in the sense of him coming out and walking around, did you ever see him there?
A: A couple of months, I want to say approximately two months after the attack after the MAW Force Protection Plan was approximately 75 percent complete I received an email from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c asking me to join him and the Force Protection Wing Commander out on the flight line so that I could go over the Force Protection Plan by MAW with them, which I did. We discussed terrain, we did a quick terrain observation I discussed the MAW's COMM plan, and our Force Protection measures and our ECPS where we had towers, where we had security at, so on and so forth.

Q: That was your only interaction with him?
A: That was my only physical interaction, that one time outside of an indoor working group.

Q: In how many months?
A: From the time of me arriving? I want to say that was approximately 90 days after the attack we had physically went out there. That's where I physically addressed numerous concerns, at least from my perspective, to the Force Protection Wing Commander and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c who I just assume that would go back to the MEF and be briefed accordingly. I don't want my comments to specifically point out any one individual sir, it was complacency across the board and that's the reason why 15 guys, that are probably not held in high regard, breached our perimeter. It's because of complacency across the board; it doesn't just reside in just one officer or one individual, it was a huge problem at least at the company grade level and below that I could see. And there were significant concerns on MAW personnel, particularly the maintainers working on aircraft. Then the plan I believe after the attack, I think that solved a lot of our issues.

Q: To line things up in my mind on who you interacted with, there seems to be four agencies that could or should have interacted with you as a higher headquarters; one is the MEF AT/FP so how would you describe your relationship with them?
A: From my initial arrival up until the point that I left the country I had more interaction with the Force Protection Wing as well as Task Force Belleau Wood, the SECFOR commander and ATFPO I had more interaction with them throughout the deployment then I did with MEF.

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Q: Did MEF ever contact you ahead of time before the deployment or as soon as you got there and said okay ATFP folks, this is our chain of command, these are our responsibilities down from MEF through MSCs or anything like that?
A: My predecessor and myself initiated contact with them upon my arrival. Basically we went to the MEF Compound, introduced ourselves, I introduced myself as the oncoming ATFPO and then following that it was basically a series of working groups that were already on the schedule; already on the docket which quite frankly just seemed to be a check in the box; a horrible check in the box.

Q: Who was your predecessor?
A: That would be (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c I'm not sure of the unit.

Q: With the UK, you say that you had a fairly substantial relationship with them being a tenant on their part of the base?
A: Yes sir. I'm at a loss for names at this point but I did deal with the Force Protection Officer on numerous occasions particularly with the concerns that I had for Bastion only because we were the main partner with the Force Protection Wing only because we shared ground on the flight line. So my counterpart at the Task Force Belleau Wood didn't necessarily have the same amount of interaction, at least that I saw, with the British only because they didn't necessarily share the ground. They did share however, the combined joint operations center which they manned together.

Q: Would you describe your relationship with the UK as a tenant/landlord type relationship or as a MSC higher headquarter that you could go to them in a way that you felt you could get needs filled, requirements met?
A: I viewed it as if they were our partners on that space of land but at the same time they were our landlords; they were the keeper of the ground that we were on so any issues or concerns that I did have with the perimeter, with the flight line, with security, with Triple Canopy, was either brought to the Force Protection Wing or Task Force Belleau Wood since they were the hirer for the Triple Canopy civilians that maintained the ECPs on the north and south ends of our flight line. So those are my main concerns. The majority of my interaction with the Force Protection Wing included concerns about the terrain around the flight line, particularly the north and south ends and the west of that LSA. That is where I went to the Force Protection Wing constantly trying to figure out ways to better that area, improve the ground.

Q: When you were talking earlier on, I sensed that you felt there was a difference between security and AT/FP; that you saw them as two different stove pipes perhaps. Is that correct or was I misinterpreting things?

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A: My view from the get-go was that Force Protection should be an inherent responsibility of each commander but the security of the base; the security of the assets within that perimeter of the base seemed to have been the consensus that "Task Force Belleau Wood had security for the whole base so let's not worry about it." Triple Canopy, the civilian security contractor, was responsible for the west side of the perimeter because they manned the towers on the west side. They manned all the towers on Camp Leatherneck. So if they have the security on the towers there, the eastern side is manned by the British and Tongans and then internal perimeter security is maintained by Task Force Belleau Wood in the form of mounted patrols, dismounted patrols every now and then. "Hey, let's not worry about security." I don't necessarily mean that from the MAW perspective, I just mean that from any tenant that was aboard Camp Leatherneck and Bastion. That seemed to be the consensus at least as far as what I was receiving from everybody. "We can't do our job and security at the same time so let's rely on these particular entities for our security and leave it at that."

Q: What's the difference between security and Force Protection?
A: Physical security in the sense that I mean in monitoring the perimeter and preventing any outsiders from gaining entry and then security in and around the spaces within the camp as far as just physical security.

Q: Why is that not Force Protection?
A: It is, but maybe I'm misunderstanding.

Q: I'm just trying to understand because one of the problems that I see is that you have these different agencies and one is the AT/FP that doesn't seem to have a whole lot of interaction with you for guidance and support, so what the hell are they there for? It's almost like you see AT/FP as this one stove pipe that is up here in the ether somewhere, and then the Task Force Belleau Wood was the real thing that you could have contact with and use as a part of what you felt you needed to do to protect yourself and the Marines there. Then on a somewhat even level is the UK Force Protection Wing. So I'm trying to figure out the relationship between you as an ATFPO with the MEF ATFPO.
A: My view on that was that the MEF ATFPO was more of a procedural relationship in the sense that we shared whatever existing Force Protection plans there were. Thoughts and ideas were vetted; were discussed. As far as action items, I didn't particularly have a role with MEF AT/FP for action items sir, other than the procedure of, "here's my Force Protection plan, this is what I'm doing as a tenant within RC SW that you own." But me as a tenant and 3d MAW FWD we are working with Task Force Belleau Wood and the Force Protection Wing because we live here, as does the MEF, but again, it was more of a relationship that was procedural in nature.

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Q: You said that some of the squadrons had their own AT/FP procedures at their site and others didn't; why was that not something that was standardized within the Wing?
A: The initial Force Protection Plan that was developed in 12.1 which I believe was possibly a carry forward from the 2d MAW Force Protection Plan. The plan itself directed squadron commanders to produce their own Force Protection Plans. The Force Protection Plan that was changed after the attack was more directive in nature in that, "you will maintain an ECP, you will maintain some type of guard force, you will maintain communication procedures to your adjacent units, and you will maintain a barrier plan and this is the barrier plan that we're building for you; you're going to help guard this." That was after the attack.

Q: What about before the attack; if you had these gut feelings, all this angst about not being protected, why wasn't there something coherent between everyone on the flight line?
A: I don't know the answer.

Q: Did you ever go to any chain of command, particularly in the Wing FWD?
A: I do recall a conversation that I had with VMA and I did discuss with their ATFPO at VMA, the squadron that was pretty much wiped out, that their barrier plan which is included in a Force Protection Plan needed to be a little more than it was and in my opinion, in my view it didn't necessarily exist except for a chain link fence around their maintenance bay. There was no barrier plan around the entire perimeter of the VMA but there was a T-Wall barrier around the HMLA. You have HMLA essentially manning ECP day and night, monitoring traffic going in and out of that compound and then you have that barrier plan and screening from the road.

Q: Why wasn't that consistent within the Wing? In your opinion, if it was necessary, why didn't the Wing demand it?
A: Again, it goes back to the plan that was already in place; it was a commander's decision, a commander's plan that needed to be implemented.

Q: And the Wing Headquarters thought that was sufficient?
A: I couldn't answer that.

Q: You advised them that it was or was not sufficient?
A: I advised them -- and I just hope that my interview here does not imply that I am looking at everything in retrospect and I'm the one that went forward and said we should do this, this, and this. I simply stated, particularly to the VMA, that you are vulnerable significantly from that perimeter, and that perimeter and the guard towers are a single point of failure. You may want to--

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Q: Did you tell anyone up the chain?
A: Yeah, that was discussed with my Operations Officer and that was discussed with the commander of that squadron; that I can say, sir.

Q: But you're the Wing ATFPO.
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who in the Wing – up, not down, up, did you talk to?
A: My Operations Officer, G-3.

Q: You expressed concern about that when the General asked what your feeling was when the attack took place; it was that your worst fears had come true basically right? Your gut feeling, your intuition was that something like this could happen.
A: That was shared specifically with myself and my predecessor where my predecessor and his chief, the enlisted member that he had with him as the Force Protection Chief, in doing those tours around the perimeter. It was discussed thoroughly that this base is vulnerable, this perimeter is vulnerable, here's the JSIVA that says it's vulnerable; what are we doing about it from the MEF on down? Again sir, that's where I believe the problem is. Regardless of who specifically was at each command, we have this JSIVA, this document, this team from Headquarters stating specifically that this is bad we need to fix this. Then projects like that fence line project around the flight line get denied because of funding for whatever reason. Again, I wasn't there and all I know is second hand what the long term plan was. But as far as why wasn't the Wing plan standardized, I couldn't answer that question. I could only state that after the attack we reviewed where the plan failed, where the plan was not adequate, and we tried to improve it from there. And that made each squadron accountable for Force Protection with the Wing with the MAW supervising them.

Q: Before, and I'm not trying to put you on the spot here because you had only been there for a short period of time; but you said there weren't enough people, things weren't being funded, there's complacency across the board, you had issues with the ECPs and the protection of some of the squadrons, who were you telling about this; above, not below, above?
A: At the working groups with the MEF, the ATFP Working Groups and as far as manning and as far as roles and responsibilities the answer that I provided here is again things that I heard in discussions with other people aboard the base. In the sense that if I were to talk to an AT/FP representative from Task Force Belleau Wood who was responsible for the entire perimeter married up with Force Protection Wing and we discussed why every tower was not manned, the reply back would be "hey we just don't have enough people." Okay, let's go to Camp Leatherneck, "hey Task Force Belleau Wood why don't we have mounted patrols

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going through," questions like that and they weren't just posed by me. They were brought up in these meetings and it always went back to "hey, the drawdown's occurring we don't have enough people, we can't be everywhere at one time." That was the thought process; that was the mentality at least from my perspective. The manpower issue, that is not something that I control. I offer that as testimony here today only because it's something that I heard as the reasons why we don't have a robust security plan; because of manning, because of a lack of assets.

Q: Did your commander, 3d MAW, go directly to Gen Gurganus with any of the concerns? Do you know?
A: As far as following the JSIVA and Force Protection, that I do not know, I wasn't involved in that. I was mostly involved in improving Force Protection and physical security within the Force Protection Wing and our subordinate squadrons, then going back to the G3 and reporting what we had accomplished or what we were proposing, and then what was going to be accomplished that day or that week.

Q: Did you get the sense that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and General Sturdevant understood what you were saying and felt the same way?
A: Very receptive; I only say before the attack it was receptive but I did not feel like our supporting agencies were buying off on the need for improving our physical security and Force Protection Plan, our adjacent units. Then following the attack, to answer your question sir, yes they were receptive. They were receptive to my recommendations it was just a matter of what unit are we going to use within the ACE. We have a MWSS that's there to support. The MWSS is undermanned from what they normally doctrinally go out with and they have aviation ground support tasks for the ACE that they need to support on FOBs or along the flight line. So now do we pull them away from that to build a wall and if we are going to do that what are we taking away operationally? Then if we can't use that MWSS that's organic to us then who do we go to? We go to another agency, well who owns engineers, the SeaBees, where are they at, who owns them, are they able to support us? That was a continuous thing up until that attack at least from my perspective and in talking with my predecessor. It was always "the funding is not there or this unit's doing something else, the ground supporting unit is doing something else." Then after the attack it was stop everything, let's get Force Protection as the key focus right now and then that's when the money and the support started piling.

Q: I'm trying to figure out the UK side, is the Force Protection Wing one in the same as the 903d AEW do you know or are they subordinate to the 903d AEW?
A: I believe they were subordinate.

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AFDC
SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: Does the name (b)(6), (b)(7)c **ring a bell for you?**
A: That does not sir.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
A: Just following the attack I believe that once everyone saw that we were vulnerable, we did something about it. I just hope that we learn from this experience across the board particularly with our partners. And just because we're partners with somebody doesn't necessarily mean that we stop concerning ourselves with security. Again, that's just from my perspective.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c **at** (b)(6) **or** (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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