DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **former Anti Terrorism/Force Protection Officer, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW(FWD)]**

1. The investigation team conducted a recorded interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **former Anti Terrorism/Force Protection Officer, 3d MAW(FWD) on 11 July 2013 via Secret Video Tele Conference (SVTC) as part of the AR 15-6 investigation into the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **is currently unavailable to sign and return a sworn statement. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that the dialogue transcribed below is an accurate account of the interview with** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **. The recorded interview is on file with the investigative team.**

Q: Where are you currently assigned?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your current duty position?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at 3d MAW (FWD) at the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex in 2012?
A: I was the Anti Terrorism Officer with 3d MAW (FWD), Sir.

Q: When did you arrive in Afghanistan as the 3d MAW (FWD) AT/FP Officer, and when did you depart?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What were your specific responsibilities as the 3d MAW (FWD) AT/FP Officer? Was it a full time position or an additional duty for you?

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AFDC
SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

A: It was full time position, Sir. My responsibilities were to brief MajGen Sturdevant on what I knew through personal assessments or my coordination with Task Force Belleau Wood, and our personnel at the other bases and airfields. I talked to a lot of people about their concerns, and I would pass that on to the CG.

Q: What training had you received in AT/FP?
A: I received the Army ATO Basic Course and Advanced Course, and the USMC Expeditionary Officer Course.

Q: Were you appointed in writing? Who appointed you? What was the scope of your appointment?
A: I believe I was appointed in writing, or it said it on my orders. It would have been my G3 or my Assistant G3, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c I was an active part of the G3.

Q: Who did you answer to in the 3d MAW (FWD) chain of command for AT/FP issues?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c He worked for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: How often did you interact with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c ? MajGen Sturdevant? Were they responsive to your AT/FP recommendations?
A: I would say 2-10 times per day, Sir. We talked often. I interacted with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(6), (b)(7)c just as often, but I interacted mainly with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c I didn't interact with the CG as much, but at least once per day. I briefed him once per day. The subject of the brief was some sort of update on AT/FP.

Q: How often did you interact with the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c from RC(SW)? What was his guidance to you as AT/FP Officer?
A: Not really, Sir. Maybe twice. We asked for a lot of information, but he was mostly unavailable. The communication wasn't really there; he would tell us to talk to the TFBW ATOs instead.

Q: How often did you interact with the CO of Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW), regarding security operations on the BLS Complex and on Camp Bastion specifically?
A: Not very often, Sir. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was not present at the AT briefs. We talked to his S3 a lot, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c. We primarily talked to his ATOs, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: Do you feel that you had the support and authority from both 3d MAW (FWD) and RC(SW) to execute your responsibilities? Do you feel that 3d MAW (FWD) as a whole fostered an environment that stressed AT/FP?

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A: I certainly did from 3d MAW (FWD). It was a great command to work for. They always had time for me, and gave my opinion merit. My interaction was very limited with the MEF. I felt that the Wing was supportive. They took me seriously despite the fact that I was only a First Lieutenant.

Q: Did you have an adequate RIP/TOA with your predecessors at the airfield? Do you feel that your predecessors adequately addressed any AT/FP vulnerabilities which may have existed? Do you recall what, if any, vulnerabilities they specifically discussed with you? Did they provide anything in writing?
A: Not really, Sir. It was a GySgt, and I don't think he was school-trained. He didn't have much in the way of paperwork or electrons. It was pretty weak. I felt that I had to pretty much build everything from the ground up. The one thing that he did have that helped was his Wing AT/FP Order, which I used to serve as a baseline for mine.

Q: Did you utilize a primary source of Marine or Joint Doctrine to conduct your AT/FP responsibilities? Did you use the JFOB Protection Handbook? If not, what did you use to establish your standards?
A: Sir, I had all of my materials from my schools. The JFOB Handbook was definitely a good reference. We had it on the desk. A lot of it, I learned by talking to different people from the different services. Communicating and networking to get things done was a big part of the job.

Q: Were you required to have your own AT/FP Plan for 3d MAW (FWD)? If so, did you have the assistance and support that you needed to develop and implement the plan?
A: I had a plan, Sir. I got assistance. It was staffed and I got good input from the various G shops.

Q: Considering that the flight line was on the Camp Bastion side of the BLS Complex, how did you integrate with the UK personnel who were overall responsible for AT/FP on Camp Bastion? Describe that relationship.
A: It was a very good relationship. I went over and met the British RAF. (b)(6), (b)(7)c, who was on a four-month deployment. He came there with a similar level of motivation as I did. I had been trying to deploy for a long time, so I took a great interest in it. So did (b)(6), (b)(7)c He came up with the idea for the fence line around the perimeter, which had been denied because of money. I tried to help him reinvigorate that project. I got with all of the Squadrons to get their individual plans to see how they would defend their portion. Most airfields stateside had fences to control access with turnstiles and key cards. Our idea was bolstered after the "burning man incident." I got with all of the Squadrons to work on our 3d MAW portion of the plan, and

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submitted it to (b)(6), (b)(7)c plan. Unfortunately, the plan got denied because of cost.

Q: Did it concern you that your Squadrons were on a Camp not secured by Marines? Did you understand the doctrine, standards, ROE and procedures that the UK utilized to conduct AT/FP on Camp Bastion?
A: I was not concerned when I first got there. I made it my mission to become an expert of how it worked from the outside in. I talked to TFBW about the roving patrols outside. I kept in contact with one of their LTs who would keep me informed of what they were seeing, things that I wouldn't necessarily get from the intelligence briefings. The northern portion of the fence line on the eastern perimeter was Tongan, and the southern part was British. They tried to randomize as much as they could. I went up in the towers to see for myself both the British and the Tongan personnel. I was more impressed than I thought I would be. They had rifles, scopes, NVGs, binoculars, pictures taken in each direction to serve as a baseline to see if things changed. The only thing that gave away where they were is that the occupied towers had a port-o-john and a generator behind it and you could hear it if you got up close to the fence. I also understood that there were (b)(1)1.4c outside the perimeter. I was told by my contact in TFBW that the area not to be concerned about was the eastern perimeter. The (b)(1)1.4c would know if someone new came into those villages. There were UK patrols inside the perimeter to look for breaches from scrappers, but most of that problem was on the western or southern side where the ranges were. One of the major concerns for me was an area between two roads where they had gravel pits, garbage dumps, where TCNs wanted daily or hourly access to. I wanted to control the interior access to the flight line, so we came up with our own fence working with the MWSS. We built a Hesco and concertina wire wall that was low cost. It looked a little shabby at first, because it was made with whatever we could find around post. But we showed it to the leadership to show them that we were trying to do something on our own, and we got some more money to replace the ragtag system with a better one to keep TCNs out from the garbage dumps and areas like that. We also had two guard posts on either end of the flight line road that we improved over time to keep people out of the flight line area that we didn't want in.

Q: What was the local security posture of your Squadrons on the flight line? We have been informed that two of the Squadrons had local security, but the rest did not. Is this accurate? Did VMA-211 have local security?
A: I believe that one of the Squadrons that did. Only one had real local security. They had a two-man post under some makeshift shade with sandbags. Even though we had the road closed off, they would sit there at the sentry post and watch the traffic coming and going. There was maybe one other unit near the time that I left that did the same thing. It was something I brought up to other

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units when we would talk. I think all of the units liked the idea, and they all wanted Triple Canopy, because not all of the Squadrons had enough manpower to man security. So actually the other Squadrons kind of looked down on the one Squadron, because they wondered how they had enough people to man security.

Q: How often did you get out to the flight line to visit the Squadrons? Did you provide guidance on AT/FP based on that circulation?
A: I was out there often to talk to people or try to get a ride to the other FOBs, usually Delaram or Dwyer. I knew all of the XOs and most of the COs pretty well.

Q: What was your understanding of the primary threats to the BLS Complex at the time you were the ATFPO of 3d MAW (FWD)?
A: We had intelligence briefs from the CG's meeting, and intelligence from TFBW, and I got things sent to me from the (b)(1)1.4c I didn't think that we had much of a threat to us in 3d MAW. The first thing we heard about a real threat to us was that (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c But it was just early indicators that weren't a developed problem. There was not a lot of talk about threats to BLS. They mainly talked about the more kinetic areas. I think overall that they thought our area was really safe. My contact in the SECFOR, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c told me that our side was really safe. He said that they had so many things in place over there that we wouldn't get attacked. TFBW walked me around to the aerostat and GBOSS operators and I got the impression from them that an attack couldn't occur without us knowing about it. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the S2 or S2A at TFBW.

Q: Many interviewees have expressed that the BLS Complex's location "out in the middle of the desert" made them believe that a ground attack was unlikely. Was that your impression as well?
A: Not at all, Sir. I did not want to be complacent. It was part of my job, but it was my job to be the skeptic. I tried to turn the map around to see how I would attack this base.

Q: Did you inspect the perimeter of the Camp Bastion? If so, please describe your impressions.
A: I did go out to those towers. I never did get outside of the perimeter on the eastern side, but I did walk pretty much every step of the perimeter on the eastern side. The perimeter fence never looked impressive to me, and that was often the impression of people that came out there, that "this was all that was keeping us from the wild west?" But I was told that it was more than meets the eye, with the exterior patrolling and the other observation devices I was told about. I knew something could go wrong when there were locals to the north who were lasing the pilots with green lasers. We were told it was the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g It was actually northeast of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g where trucks congregated. I talked to my friend in the

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SECFOR, and he actually caught the guys with the lasers. It indicated to me that the locals weren't as friendly as TFBW maybe indicated. There was at least some harassment and intelligence collection.

Q: Why did the towers go down to 50%?
A: They were always like that as far as I know. I was told that it was a manpower problem.

Q: Did you ever observe the amount of space each tower would be required to cover based on 50% manning? Day and night?
A: I would say that they lost quite a bit by taking out the tower in between. They did have NVGs, they did have range cards. We went up there to make sure they were awake. But there's no doubt that they lost something by not having every tower manned.

Q: You likely recall the 14 March 2012 local national interpreter's incursion onto the flight line that happened to coincide with a visit from the Secretary of Defense (often referred to as the "burning man incident"). Some members of the RC(SW) staff told us that this incident exposed the bifurcated Command and Control (C2) structure between the US on Camp Leatherneck and the UK on Camp Bastion. Did you know about the C2 structure prior to the "burning man incident?"
A: Very limited, Sir. I knew about the CJOC where there were US and British there. I know they could see the ISR feeds and would manage any crisis response out of there.

Q: The compromise of not unifying C2 was OP CONGO and the establishment of the CJOC. OP CONGO set up a supported-supporting commander relationship for crisis response on the BLS Complex depending on where an incident took place. If an incident occurred on Camp Leatherneck, CO TFBW would be the supported commander and CO Bastion would be the supporting commander, and vice versa. Were you aware of OP CONGO? Was 3d MAW (FWD) tied into the plan at all? Did 3d MAW (FWD) have any responsibilities in the crisis response plan for an incident occurring on Camp Bastion?
A: I did not know about OP CONGO. I was never briefed if we were tied in with the British. I felt like we were operating in the dark over there, and we were just setting up relationships with the British. It was worse because they had a high rate of turnover. I was told that the British did have a response plan, but I felt like the plan had fallen to the wayside, or at least that there was no central person in charge of it. I never saw a written order or anything. But the Squadrons did not really have a sector or a definitive response plan that was integrated with the British. I would say that the MWSS had more of that role than the Squadrons.

Q: Were you comfortable with this arrangement?

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A: I certainly would have liked to have more power. I would have accepted it if 3d MAW could have had overall security of the airfield. I felt like we were third in line behind the British and TFBW even though we had the most square footage, equipment, and personnel over there.

Q: So you were the Big Kahuna over there on the flight line, but you couldn't inspect the towers, you weren't tied in to the response plan, you couldn't look at the perimeter, and you had no authorities over there. As an AT/FP officer, that had to make you uncomfortable. Did you ever raise this with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c or MajGen Sturdevant?
A: I discussed it with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c I discussed at length with them my frustrations in dealing with the British. I definitely discussed my frustrations with TFBW and how I didn't think they cared about the other side of the base. I often stated how it seemed that there was an apathy about Camp Bastion. I certainly voiced all of that. Maybe about a tenth of that was discussed in front of the CG. I certainly was not as candid and frank in my discussions with the CG.

Q: So TFBW was concerned about Camp Leatherneck and exterior patrolling. The British were concerned about securing the perimeter. Who secured 3d MAW (FWD)?
A: That was supposed to be the British, and also the MWSS, and the MPs who worked for PMO and 1st MHG. The MPs in the MWSS were an asset to me, because I would work with them to do roving patrols in their gun trucks on the flight line.

Q: The JFOB Manual that we spoke of earlier talks about the requirement for a layered, defense-in-depth for a base. You described a chain link fence that was the only thing between you and the wild west. Why do you think that we didn't have a defense-in-depth on September 14th when you previously had the "burning man incident" and the JSIVA which identified vulnerabilities on that flight line?
A: I think for a few reasons, Sir. But I want to clarify that I didn't say that we only had a fence out there. I just said that was my first impression. I was informed that we did have a defense-in-depth.

Q: Who informed you of that?
A: The main people that told me about that were the ATOs from TFBW. They told me about the active, roving security outside the perimeter. Then there were the guards in the tower. Then there was the British roving patrol along the fence line looking for holes and breaches. There were also Tongans in a QRF in a building near the fence. Then there was the MWSS that provided patrols near the flight line. There (b)(1)1.4g GBOSS systems in the north and south. There was the

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balloon that gave visibility. There was also the wire and Hesco system that we came up with. There were also the check points that limited access. There were also some T-wall barriers set up by the squadrons to block them off. So I thought we did have a sufficient defense-in-depth, but I guess it wasn't sufficient based on the end result. But it did think it displayed the principals of defense-in-depth.

Q: You mentioned that you got briefed on this, but surely you got out and confirmed or denied some of this?
A: Certainly I did Sir. I went into the towers, and I walked the fence line. I talked to the QRF, and I talked to the MWSS. The only thing I wasn't able to confirm was the (b)(1)1.4c engaging the locals out in the villages, but I did receive reports that suggested they were out there. I think I had visibility on all of those things.

Q: The JRB's Supplemental Review of the attack, which MajGen Gurganus approved in late November 2012, stated that the "burning man incident," "...raised concerns regarding the security of the flight line and its assets and access to critical areas within the Bastion airfield. This incident also demonstrated the need to improve airfield and perimeter security and to institute some level of increased access control to the airfield operating areas." How seriously did you take this concern? Did MajGen Sturdevant, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), direct you to do anything in response? Did you direct anything to the Squadron ATFPOs?
A: I took it very seriously, and I believe they did too. It gave a lot more justification of my interest in putting a fence around the flight line. But if anything resulted from it, it was the more expeditionary Hesco and concertina wire fence as an alternative to the flight line fence line.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review addressed a 3d MAW request to emplace concertina wire to secure vulnerable areas around the flight line and to channelize pedestrian traffic to ECPs, which was approved and completed prior to the attack. There is also an exhibit in the Supplemental Review of a 3d MAW flight line barrier plan request (enclosure 7 of the supplemental review) submitted at the same time (11 May 2012) to emplace (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a to protect the flight line. The request stated, "Without these improvements, the flight line equipment and personnel will remain vulnerable to enemy attack at multiple access points, including numerous high speed avenues of approach." This project was eventually approved <u>after</u> the attack. Do you recall why this request was not approved after the "burning man incident"?
A: I was told that there wasn't money for it, Sir. I didn't think there was any way that it could be denied after the "burning man incident." I was told by the UK that it was denied by a board of engineers, and we briefed it back to the G3 and CG

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that it had been denied. I offered my alternative plan for the expeditionary barrier at that time.

Q: So, MajGen Sturdevant was aware that the board denied that request? Did you discuss the vulnerability with him?
A: Yes, Sir. Both MajGen Sturdevant and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c were not happy that it wasn't approved.

Q: Were you ever denied other AT/FP resources that you requested from a higher command?
A: Mostly personnel, Sir. We always wanted more. We couldn't pull from the flight line for sentries, and the MWSS was short. The answer was to try and work a contract with Triple Canopy.

Q: The "burning man incident" also highlighted the insider threat on Camp Bastion. What did 3d MAW (FWD) do to address the insider threat?
A: Primarily, we didn't allow them in. Anyone in there needed a reason to be in there, and they were watched by the MWSS. But there was always a battle with trucks trying to get access to our flight line road for construction or garbage, and we would have to block off a new access route with Hesco barriers or wire. It was a constant work in progress while I was there.

Q: How do you think the insurgents were able to gain the information needed to conduct the attack in such a precise manner?
A: I don't know, Sir. I was never given any intelligence to indicate that there was any type of surveillance or attack threat on that side of the base. Again, I was told over and over again that the east side was the safest side of the base. The concern was the scrappers on the southern and western side. I was told that they were just poor locals trying to make money, not part of a larger probing effort. I was told this by the TFBW ATO, S3, and S2. I was a skeptic, but I had no direct information to counter their assessment.

Q: Where you aware in advance that a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) team (led by Marine (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c would be conducting an assessment of parts of the BLS Complex?
A: Yes, Sir. We prepared for it. I worked with TFBW, and I used it as a vehicle to make improvements.

Q: Did you get briefed on the JSIVA's results?
A: There was a power point outbrief that I received. I was also at the outbrief over at TFBW's conference room.

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: The report states that a "vulnerability" is "a situation or circumstance that if left unchanged may result in the loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources." Did you get briefed on the vulnerability of the flight line?
A: I did, and I thought it was good. It confirmed what I was saying and I thought it would help me get materials to make improvements.

Q: Did MajGen Sturdevant provide input on where he was and was not willing to assume risk? Did you get involved, or did your leadership get involved in the mitigation of the vulnerability?
A: I don't recall any specific direction given after the JSIVA.

Q: Did you discuss the JSIVA with the UK personnel on Camp Bastion considering that two vulnerabilities (East Gate ECP and flight line) were on Camp Bastion?
A: They were present at the outbrief and I did discuss it with them. The UK had done a turnover in personnel by the time the JSIVA came out, and they were not as enthusiastic as the people before. I didn't know what they were going to do to address the problems. Our relationship was not as good as with the previous rotation.

Q: The JSIVA report describes the flight line access at BLS Complex as an "exploitable" vulnerability and "thus, personnel and equipment are largely exposed." The primary AT/FP improvement recommended after the "burning man incident," namely the airfield perimeter fence, was denied. Did you feel that the Squadrons were exposed?
A: I believe that they were exposed, but there were some security measures in place. I think every Marine there was doing the best that they could based on the materials and personnel that they had. It didn't tell me anything new. It confirmed what I was saying.

Q: Do you think that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and MajGen Sturdevant shared your opinion that the Squadrons were exposed?
A: I think they agreed that there could be a better fence or barrier. I don't know that they thought the threat was as severe as it was in the more kinetic areas of the AO.

Q: Did you discuss increasing the local security posture of 3d MAW Squadrons (additional ECPs, guards, patrols, lighting)?
A: Yes, I definitely discussed increasing the manpower and security there. I was told that we were retrograding, so the answer was to work a contract with Triple Canopy.

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c your successor as ATFPO, informed us that when he tried to get all of the Squadrons to man ECPs and guards, they pushed back that they didn't have enough personnel. Did you have a similar experience?
A: Yes, Sir. All of them except for the HMLA Squadron that always had two personnel serving as sentries. The other Squadrons didn't have the personnel, and they wanted security to come from the MWSS or Marines that they felt were just sitting around at the 3d MAW HQs.

Q: How much interaction did you have with the RC(SW) ATFPO, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c? Was he helpful to you?
A: I never was able to get much help from him, Sir. I e-mailed him or tried to call him, and he usually just referred us to TFBW. We hoped to see him at the AT/FP meetings where we discussed security on the BLS Complex, but we didn't see him. He never came to the flight line or to the Wing HQs.

Q: What was your assessment of the UK forces responsible for security?
A: I mostly dealt with the leadership, and there was a lot of disparity. Some were very enthused about improving security, while others were not. Some even seemed amused by the notion that we needed to improve security. I mainly noticed a lot of disparity in attitude among the leadership.

Q: Did the UK personnel on Camp Bastion ever express to you that the UK did not have enough forces to adequately protect Camp Bastion? Were you aware of any such shortage of manpower?
A: I don't believe they ever did, Sir. I don't remember them voicing the manpower concerns like we did.

Q: Did you have any concerns about the Tongan Soldiers or Marines guarding parts of Camp Bastion?
A: I heard rumors that they were bad, but I went up and spoke to them and I had no concerns or issues with them. I'm not sure why those rumors persisted, maybe just because they were a different military. But no, I did not have any issues with them. I did not notice any complacency or indiscipline.

Q: The RC(SW) J2X told us that they had a video of an individual who breached the fence at night and looked around inside an empty guard tower. Were you aware of that incident?
A: I was not aware of that, Sir.

Q: When did you learn of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on Camp Bastion?
A: I heard about it on the news back in the States. I was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c with my new unit. I was saddened by what I heard. I was surprised due to all of

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the reporting I had heard about how safe it was. I had a very emotional reaction to it, because I realized that many more Marines could have been hurt or killed.

Q: A week after the attack, 3d MAW (FWD) published a Force Protection/Incident Response Plan that included a barrier plan and an integrated defense of the flight line. Should this plan have been in place prior to the attack? Why or why not?
A: I think anything that could have been done to improve security should have been in place.

Q: Why did it take the attack to force 3d MAW to publish a response plan?
A: I'm not sure, Sir. We did a lot while I was there.

Q: One interview informed us that the attitude of personnel on the BLS Complex might have been that it was "too big to fail." Do you agree? Do you think that contributed?
A: I think it must have. I do think there was a certain hubris that we couldn't get attacked. That's why I had to keep reminding people that it could happen even though it hadn't in the past.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at (b)(6) or (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

WILLIAM B. GARRETT III
LTG, USA
Investigating Officer

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