DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **former Operations Officer, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW(FWD)]**

1. The investigation team conducted a recorded interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **former Operations Officer, 3d MAW(FWD) on 11 July 2013 via Secret Video Tele Conference (SVTC) as part of the AR 15-6 investigation into the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **is currently unavailable to sign and return a sworn statement. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that the dialogue transcribed below is an accurate account of the interview with** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c **. The recorded interview is on file with the investigative team.**

Q: Please provide a synopsis of your background in the Marine Corps.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: When did you arrive as the G3 of 3d MAW (FWD)? When did you depart?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: Were you aware of any specific vulnerabilities on the Camp Bastion flight line?
A: No.

Q: Upon assuming your position as G3, what were your primary concerns regarding AT/FP of your Wing?
A: I'll be honest with you General, I did not have any concerns at that time.

Q: Did you or MajGen Sturdevant specifically delegate authority for AT/FP to your AT/FP Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c followed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c ? If so, was this delegation in writing or was it verbal? What was the scope of this delegation?
A: As far as delegation of responsibilities, General Sturdevant and the AT/FP, the ATFP Officer was a special staff member to General Sturdevant but I would say without a doubt that individual fell within my purview, within my chain of command. Sir, everything belonged to me; everything in the AT/FP realm fell to me and then I subsequently delegated it to the officers you listed. For the first half I also had a Staff NCO. As far as anything written, there were no written instructions, there was an AT/FP order that we updated and we continued to update it under, it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c as you mentioned Sir, he got promoted later, and then we continued to update that post attack and then handed that over to the 2d MAW as we rotated out of there.

Q: Did you or MajGen Sturdevant direct any AT/FP assessments upon taking over at 3d MAW (FWD)? Please describe.
A: Sir, we didn't direct them but just based on his attention to detail, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was looking to have those done himself; so he looked to do an assessment of his area in the very beginning.

Q: What was your guidance to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c for AT/FP? Did you require them to give you updates? What information was included in these updates and how often did they occur?
A: I would say they were more than daily. They were at least daily with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c a little bit less than daily with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c The updates were the activities that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and the staff were doing on a daily basis to ensure the squadrons had what they needed as far as material resources and then as far as what was going on with the fence line or a berm, or cameras, or hardware, what was going on with the patrols, and then just active measures that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was taking like I said, in his initiative in attention to detail, that he was taking upon himself to make sure that any concerns that the flight line had, that the squadrons had, he took them onboard and we got the resources to put to task.

Q: How often did you interact with Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW), regarding security operations on the BLS Complex and on Camp Bastion specifically? I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c was the commander at the time.

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A: Yes, sir. I would say, not directly, he worked directly for General Gurganus; however, in my meetings, in my daily interactions with the C3, if those items came up I was a direct liaison from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c through the C3 of the RC. Case in point, if they wanted a section of skids to go look at some area of interest, then I was a direct liaison and we would put that to task.

Q: How often did you interact with RC(SW), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c or others? How was your relationship with him? How often did you discuss AT/FP matters?
A: Sir, it was almost like we lived together, it was that often, sir.

Q: Did you have an orientation of Camp Bastion and the flight line prior to taking over at 3d MAW (FWD)?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did it raise any concerns?
A: No, Sir, in fact I do recall that on our pre-deployment site survey that we did in October of '11, again we got the full windshield tour of the area that we were going to, we went to all the spaces and like I said, I was solely in an offensive mindset. I did not have the defense of my forces at the forefront of my thinking. When we went over to Kandahar literally within five minutes of us getting on deck and receiving a brief from the 88B Squadron Commander that was on deck we received IDF and we were under the desk so that for me, not the first time that I thought that was a potential but the first time that I thought we need to look after where our Marines are living what's over their heads, what are their procedures, and what do they need to do in case of an IDF. I would honestly say that it was solely, in terms of IDF attacks, something that an enemy would launch from a distance at us, not necessarily something that would involve an attack against us, them breaching the perimeter.

Q: Did it concern you that your Squadrons were on a Camp not secured by Marines? Did you understand the doctrine, standards, and procedures that the UK utilized to conduct AT/FP on Camp Bastion?
A: I had no concerns and to be honest with you with the relationship that we had with UK Forces and how they did things, obviously it was brought under greater scrutiny after the attacks so I would say there's probably more criticisms of how they did things afterwards. At the time, like I said previously, I had no concerns over how they did things. The ROE from my perspective was in keeping with every other ROE that we had for our forces in-theater. I had full trust and confidence that they were doing their part.

Q: Do you know how the UK doctrine, standards, and procedures compared to Marine Corps standards?

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A: I think we spent more time on the details of that post-attack. Prior to, I can honestly say that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c would brief me on who was responsible. Thinking back I can't recall a specific discussion that he and I had on his concerns. But I would have to say knowing the type of individual he was, there's probably a time or two where he would raise issues that it wasn't a Marine. But I think that you know as well as I do, General, that he was a younger officer; probably not as accustomed to joint operations, not as comfortable with another colored uniform standing the perimeter as opposed to a Marine. I was more comfortable with that and I probably told him at the time that it's okay they're not Marines, they can do it just as you or I can. They're going to do it a little bit differently. Those are probably the extent of those types of conversation. But as far as specific escalation of force details in their ROE, we did not get into that level of detail on those discussions.

Q: Did you direct your ATFPO to coordinate with TFBW or the RC(SW) ATFPO to get assistance? What was the response? Were they responsive to your request?
A: Yes, sir. I think that we had a good working relationship up and down between us, the RC and then Task Force Belleau Wood. You've been there, it's all one team one fight so I think if it was a concern at the RC level regardless of the uniform then we saw that it was taken care of. I would say that it was a very good working relationship. The AT/FP Working Group that met post-attack, was obviously a lot more formalized than it was prior to but they still had their meetings on a weekly basis but that's not to say that their forces as well as my AT/FP Officers weren't out there on a daily basis making sure that the squadrons were taken care of.

Q: What was the local security posture of your Squadrons on the flight line? We have been informed that two of the Squadrons had local security, but the rest did not. Is this accurate? Did VMA-211 have local security?
A: I would say that's accurate sir, I think the posture of the squadrons on the flight line, if anything you can blame me for having them have a false sense of security that they needed to focus on their operations getting the aircraft out to the Marines and the Soldiers in the field to chase down the Taliban; they didn't have to worry about those folks coming at us. However there were squadrons that took that a little bit differently just based on the fact that they weren't operating out of home station and they had their own Force Protection which was probably a little bit stepped up from what we at the Wing had thought was the standard. VMA-211 probably just had a check point at the flight line before you entered the flight line.

Q: How often did you get out to the flight line to visit the Squadrons? Did you provide guidance on AT/FP based on that circulation?

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A: I personally was not on the flight line all that often. We had weekly OPSO meetings where they would come and we would discuss the challenges that those units were having. So I personally was not the point-man to look at their posture. I would say that my ATFPO was the guy that would be out there on a daily basis looking at those.

Q: What was your understanding of the primary threats to the BLS Complex at the time you arrived at Camp Bastion with 3d MAW (FWD)?
A: The primary threat, like I stated before was indirect fire.

Q: Many interviewees have expressed that the BLS Complex's location "out in the middle of the desert" made them believe that a ground attack was unlikely. Was that your impression as well?
A: Yes sir. I think that we probably got a little bit of false sense of security about our location and the proximity. If you were in Lashkar Gah you would have a different opinion as to a ground attack. But where we were, yes sir, I think that we got into that position where there's enough desert and there's enough time to see something coming our ways. So yes, I would say that's a pretty accurate statement.

Q: Did you inspect the perimeter of the Camp Bastion? If so, please describe your impressions.
A: As far as walking the fence line, sir?

Q: Or just getting out there to visit, drive it, or get up in a tower or anything like that?
A: I would say, our perimeter inspection, if you will, was more along the lines of where do we have our assets on the base more than it was a, I need to check what my perimeter looks like. To say I actually went out there to examine my perimeter would be a false statement. Sir, I never went out to actually inspect the perimeter at Camp Bastion.

Q: Were you aware that approximately every other tower was manned on Camp Bastion? Did you have any concerns regarding the tower manning? If so, who did you discuss your concerns with?
A: That was brought to my attention sir based on their manning levels with Task Force Belleau Wood and the forces that they had and I would say again looking back prior to the attack, that was probably not optimum and that was something (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c brought to my attention and you know as well as I do that it's a risk versus benefit, "what do I have, what can I put at the threat," and with the primary threat being IDF I think we were more concerned with how can we see what's out there before it gets launched towards our position. So if forces or any individuals would get within probably a 10 to 20 kilometer-position of the base

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that would start to bring our attention to that direction. I would say that I knew about the every other tower manning situation but at the time that was not a large concern of mine.

Q: Did you get a chance to dialogue with General Sturdevant about that? Did you guys ever get to talk about it, any concerns or anything to do with the tower?
A: Sir, I would say that General Sturdevant and I talked about everything that was out there on Bastion and that undoubtedly came up. In my role as his G3, I was probably the guy that looked right at him and said, "Sir, this is the situation of Task Force Belleau Wood's protection of the perimeter; they're doing the best with what they have." And based on where our operations were and how we were taking it to the insurgency all over the battle space I thought we had the right troops tasked at that time.

Q: I'm sure you recall the 14 March 2012 local national interpreter's incursion onto the flight line that happened to coincide with a visit from the Secretary of Defense (often referred to as the "burning man incident"). Some members of the RC(SW) staff told us that this incident exposed the bifurcated Command and Control (C2) structure between the US on Camp Leatherneck and the UK on Camp Bastion. Did you know about the C2 structure prior to the "burning man incident?"
A: Anything that I would tell you sir is obviously probably post incident discussions that I was made aware of. Prior to that, I was not aware of any type of C2 problems.

Q:Were you aware of the 2011 CENTCOM-UK PJHQ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which apparently led to this C2 arrangement?
A: No, sir.

Q: Were you aware of Gen Mattis' 5-3-5 Card that was (and still is) prevalent combat leadership guidance in the Marine Corps? Is Unity of Command from the 5-3-5 card consistent with other Marine Corps doctrine? Did 3d MAW (FWD) raise concerns about the C2 arrangement to RC(SW)?
A: Yes, Sir. Prior to the attack, there were no concerns about Unity of Command at the BLS complex.

Q: Did you sense friction and/or pressure from the UK regarding the C2 arrangement on the BLS Complex. Please describe.
A: No, Sir.

Q: The compromise of not unifying C2 was OP CONGO and the establishment of the CJOC. OP CONGO set up a supported-supporting commander relationship for crisis response on the BLS Complex depending on where an incident took

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place. If an incident occurred on Camp Leatherneck, CO TFBW would be the supported commander and CO Bastion would be the supporting commander, and vice versa. Were you aware of OP CONGO?
A: Prior to the attack I was not aware of nor had I heard of OP CONGO; however, post attack I was aware of OP CONGO.

Q: Was 3d MAW (FWD) tied into the plan at all? Did 3d MAW (FWD) have any responsibilities in the crisis response plan for an incident occurring on Camp Bastion? Did 3d MAW (FWD) have its own crisis response plan prior to the 14 September 2012 attack?
A: Prior to the attack I can't say. If we were tied into an operation or attack of that sort our standard protocol would be to run some type of drill to practice those procedures and we had never done that; so I would say that prior to the attack we were not doing any of those procedures. The 3d MAW worked on a couple of different methods to move our forces. It was in large part due to the threat from the west, as you can imagine, that we had to have a dispersal plan if Bastion was to come under attack. We're talking something larger than IDF, something that would come from Iran that would cause us to have to move. So as far as dispersal and what we would do under that attack, we did have a plan in place for that.

Q: Although there was no unity of command over AT/FP for the entire BLS Complex, what mechanisms were in place to ensure unity of effort with your UK counterparts?
A: I would say for us to interact with my UK counterparts-- my ACE was also comprised of UK aircraft and although we answered directly to General Sturdevant I had a close working relationship with the commander of the Joint Air Group which was the UK Air Group that was in-theater. Our operations were seamless in that every daily task that we had to employ rotary or fixed-wing air it was a combined US and UK effort. We prided ourselves on a pretty seamless integration between US and UK on the air side.

Q: To be a little more specific, if you identified ATFP issues on the Camp Bastion side, did you have a way with your UK counterparts to fix that or address it?
A: Yes, sir. I would definitely say that if I was concerned with anything that went on with a UK member of that the command or the JAG, then at General Sturdevant's level it would be between General Gurganus and Brigadier Skeates and then in and amongst those staffs for me and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c He had UK members on his staff that I could interact with. So I would say that there were definitely methods for us to get at the UK issues if we had a problem with their procedures.

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: The JRB's Supplemental Review of the attack, which MajGen Gurganus approved in late November 2012, stated that the "burning man incident," "...raised concerns regarding the security of the flight line and its assets and access to critical areas within the Bastion airfield. This incident also demonstrated the need to improve airfield and perimeter security and to institute some level of increased access control to the airfield operating areas." How seriously did you take this concern? Did you direct anything to the Squadrons in response?
A: Not in direct response to the "burning man incident", no sir. I would say there was an ongoing, you can call it a struggle, you can call it a debate, difference of opinions between us and the UK forces that control the airfield in that we wanted access points, check points, at one location and they wanted at another. Case in point, is where as you would enter the Bastion Complex, where they would place their guard towers in relationship to the road; where General Sturdevant and I thought they should be and I think in large part their focus was on, as we began reconstruction and movement of people in and around the Bastion Complex, they were in my opinion, more concerned with smooth traffic flow then they were proper security procedures allowing people to get access to the flight line.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review identifies that a request for a perimeter fence around the airfield was denied by both the UK chain of command and by the BLS Executive Steering Group (ESG). Are you aware of the deliberations behind the ESG's decision to deny funding for the fence?
A: No, I am not sir.

Q: Were the improvements adopted, e.g. a ditch and berm system, responsive to the threat identified by the "burning man incident?"
A: Yes, sir. I think as you look around the BLS Complex, that berm that was going up would definitely inhibit anyone's ability to get close to the flight line on that side of the airfield.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review addressed a 3d MAW request to emplace concertina wire to secure vulnerable areas around the flight line and to channelize pedestrian traffic to ECPs, which was approved and completed prior to the attack. There is also an exhibit in the Supplemental Review of a 3d MAW flight line barrier plan request (enclosure 7 of the supplemental review) submitted at the same time (11 May 2012) to emplace (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a to protect the flight line. The request stated, "Without these improvements, the flight line equipment and personnel will remain vulnerable to enemy attack at multiple access points, including numerous high speed avenues of approach." This project was eventually approved after the attack. Do you recall why this request was not approved after the "burning man incident"?

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A: No, sir.

Q: Did you discuss this request with RC(SW) or identify it to General Sturdevant as a concern?
A: I personally did not sir. But that was May of 12; I'm pretty sure that would have still been (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c That was his project that he was trying to ensure that every member of 3d MAW that was anywhere on BLS or anywhere else in the AO were protected. Again, like I talked about before, we had dialogues about this based on the threat that we had perceived. We wanted those to get pushed through but when we did not receive the funding or did not receive those assets I would say that I personally did not raise that as a concern.

Q: We've been informed by IJC, ISAF, and MARCENT that they could have supplied RC(SW) with AT/FP resources if RC(SW) had expressed the need. From your perspective, was the process for requesting AT/FP resources responsive to your needs at 3d MAW (FWD)?
A: I would say yes, sir. Again, like anything else we did there, we had to look at what assets we had available, what was the threat, what did we need to do. I would offer that we weren't focused on building a fort, a defensive perimeter to keep people away from Bastion. I think we probably viewed that "burning man incident" as a procedural error and a "one off" and we were not necessarily focused on the potential for a coordinated attack.

Q: The "burning man incident" also highlighted the insider threat on Camp Bastion. What threats were you primarily concerned with? Threats from the ANA? Threats from local national (LN) and third country national (TCN) contractors?
A: The "burning man incident" raised concerns to me about the insider threat. I think that was always the case with our in-briefs. We talked about individual Marines taking their own personal responsibility to look at IDs, look at people that were around the complex. As you are well aware it's a dynamic place that has all sorts of individuals from all sorts of backgrounds and countries. I personally stopped numerous people on the base while I was out PT'ing or driving that did not look like they were doing what they were supposed to or did not have the right uniform or ID card out. I had a staff NCO and I relied on him to get the word out to the people as far as what the badging policy was, who can be where at what time. So, I think from the very beginning we were utilizing those procedures to ensure that the likelihood of an insider attack or somebody being on base that wasn't authorized would be minimized. That was always something that we attempted to do.

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: Did 3d MAW (FWD) have any responsibility for vetting and security of contractors? Did you do anything to coordinate with the UK on vetting and security of contractors on Camp Bastion?
A: That was all done by either the RC or Belleau Wood, sir.

Q: Were you comfortable with the counter-intelligence efforts aboard Camp Bastion?
A: I can't say I had concerns; only in the fact that my level of dialogue with anyone that was involved with that kind of Intel was minimal. That includes the UK side as well.

Q: Were you aware of the intelligence collection gap that existed outside the perimeter in the UK part of AOBW, particularly Nawabad and Sheikabad, the pop-up villages encroaching on the base? Did you do anything to mitigate this intelligence gap?
A: No, sir.

Q: Do you feel that the 14 September 2012 attack on Camp Bastion displayed the characteristics of insider intelligence collection?
A: That's a good question, sir. I would say post attack obviously we were privy to some video tape; whether that was manufactured post or prior to, the chances are the evidence is that it was actually prior to, of them rehearsing, looking at the lay down where we were postured. I think it brought to light that they were always collecting they were always looking at our procedures, looking at our posture. And I think it made all of us aware of any avenue that they could collect, whether it was a classified frequency card or a lack of attention to detail on checking badges going into the gym. From soup to nuts I think it became abundantly clear that we needed to have a focus on every aspect of that.

Q: How concerned were you with the threat posed by Nawabad, Sheikabad, and other LNs encroaching on Camp BLS?
I will say that post attack I went out with one of the patrols that Task Force Belleau Wood was running into those and through those areas and they were running them quite frequently. Prior to the attack, I viewed them as the local populace that just happened to be living close to Bastion and did not realize the impact that they potentially could have feeding the insurgency any type of potential insider attack information. I was not concerned at that time of those living areas.

Q: Where you aware in advance that a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) team (led by Marine (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c) would be conducting an assessment of parts of the BLS Complex?

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A: Yes, sir. I'm not aware of what they looked at or what they found but my ATFPO was aware that they were doing that.

Q: Did you get briefed on the JSIVA's results?
A: I'm pretty sure that my ATFPO did that too.

Q: The report states that a "vulnerability" is "a situation or circumstance that if left unchanged may result in the loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources." Did you get briefed on the vulnerability of the flight line and of Camp Bastion's East Gate?
A: I can't recall.

Q: Did you have any specific thoughts? Did you provide input on where you were and were not willing to assume risk? Did you get involved, or did you direct anyone to get involved in the mitigation of the vulnerability?
A: No, sir.

Q: Did you receive guidance from RC(SW) regarding the vulnerabilities of the flight line and the East Gate?
A: No, sir.

Q: Did you discuss the JSIVA with the UK personnel on Camp Bastion considering that two vulnerabilities (East Gate ECP and flight line) were on Camp Bastion?
A: No, sir.

Q: The JSIVA report describes the flight line access at BLS Complex as an "exploitable" vulnerability and "thus, personnel and equipment are largely exposed." The primary AT/FP improvement recommended after the "burning man incident," namely the airfield perimeter fence, was denied. Did you feel that your Squadrons were exposed?
A: There's no question sir, when you look at how we were postured. Given the facts of the attack itself they are definitely exposed. You probably couldn't draw another analogy but if it was a small FOB with HESCOs and C-wire, they would have good procedures for their defense because obviously they're small enough where they feel like they could be overrun, but going back to our discussion earlier, where we were located in our relatively remote spot in RC SW, the squadrons were exposed but at the time we did not view that as a threat.

Q: RC(SW) stated that they did not use the JSIVA as new justification to seek flight line improvements, because they felt that the ditch and berm project, which didn't get started until 7 September, mitigated the threat. Were you aware of this?

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A: I was aware of that and I concurred. Again, if I felt that the threat was high or there was something more to look at there then I probably would have taken some further action.

Q: You mentioned that you agreed with that JSIVA that the squadrons were exposed. Did you and General Sturdevant have a chance to address that before the attack? The JSIVA came out in June the attack occurred in September. They're about 90 days in there.
A: Sir, I would have to say that we were focused on other things. So I would have to say that dialogue probably never happened between he and I.

Q: Based on the vulnerabilities identified by the "burning man incident" and the JSIVA, did you consciously choose to assume risk based on the assessed threat, or did you think you were mitigating the identified risks? Please explain.
A: I think, like I mentioned previously, based on what I perceived the threat to be and the assets that we had protecting our forces on the flight line, I would have to say that we assumed risk.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review seemed to focus on the fact that an airfield perimeter fence, even if completed in response to the "burning man incident" or the JSIVA, would not have presented a barrier to the 14 September 2012 attackers. Even if true, couldn't other measures have been undertaken in response to these assessments? Did you discuss increasing the local security posture of 3d MAW Squadrons (additional ECPs, guards, patrols, lighting)?
A: I think all the procedures that we put into place post attack were sufficient, and those include all those that you just described with the ECPs, with the lights, with G-Boss towers. Everything that we did post attack mitigated the likelihood of another occurring.

Q: There was a reliance on the ditch and berm as a means to protect access to the airfield prior to the attack. The ECPs, guards, patrols, lights, all that came after the attack. Any idea why we were not able to get that done prior to the attack?
A: I would have to say that was not our focus, sir. The efforts were for bringing it offensively not defensively; plain and simple.

Q: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c your ATFPO at the time of the attack, informed us that when he tried to get all of the Squadrons to man ECPs and guards, they pushed back that they didn't have enough personnel. Were you aware of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c efforts? Did you feel that the Squadrons had enough personnel to both complete their mission and provide their own local security?
A: I would say that I am aware of the struggle he was having with the units. I'm also aware that those squadrons are not manned to do the local security as well

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as maintaining 24/7 flight operations; that's just not how we're structured. I think if we would have brought squadrons into theater knowing that was a requirement then we would try to get more manpower. But again, you know how difficult that is to get manpower in that AO, especially at that time as we were coming down on personnel.

Q: Were you aware of any conversations (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c had with the leadership of VMA-211 warning them that they were exposed and that they should emplace barriers and local security?
A: He informed me of those, yes sir.

Q: Was there any reaction there by leadership in VMA-211? Did they actually move out to implement the recommendations prior to the attack?
A: I think, much like any other aviation organization, they're looking at this individual coming into their space and saying, hey you're exposed over here and in their mindset their job is on the other side of the hangar getting those jets ready to launch on the combat sortie. So given the troop-to-task they went with their priority mission and they would get to those types of procedures if there was a lull or if there was a break; and quite frankly there never really was until it became apparent that something needed to be done post attack.

Q: The RC(SW) ATFPO, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c assessed the UK forces as professional, but under-resourced and under-manned. Did you share this assessment? What was your own assessment prior to the attack?
A: The UK forces were postured similar to us in terms of resources and manpower, troop-to-task.

Q: Based on what you could see, was it your assessment that Camp Bastion had an integrated layered defense in-depth or was it primarily a perimeter fence?
A: To be honest with you sir, I was not aware of all their roving patrols that they had internal to the base and external. Although I know they were going on and obviously they got stepped up. We implemented OP TASSERAL post and the roving patrols that Belleau Wood did both internal and external to include the snap TCPs inside the base just looking for potential insider attacks. I would say that there was a defense in-depth from the very beginning but it probably was not as deliberate or focused as it was post September 14th.

Q: Did you have any specific concerns about the Tongan soldiers or Marines manning guard towers on Camp Bastion? If so, what were your concerns and who did you address them to?
A: No, sir.

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: The RC(SW) J2X told us that they had a video of an individual who breached the fence at night and looked around inside an empty guard tower. Are you aware of that breaching incident?
A: No, sir.

Q: Did you ever receive reports of scrappers and breaches in the wire and that kind of thing?
A: Yes, sir. That was a daily occurrence to include when we would have aircraft go off. Before they would go on a sortie they would test fire their weapons and they always had to be looking for scrappers on the ranges. As crazy as it sounds, you could have people running underneath an aircraft as it was test-firing it's 20 and grabbing brass off that aircraft. That was a daily battle that we had to make sure our aircrew were aware of.

Q: TFBW with support from the 215th ANA Corps patrolled daily outside the perimeter fence. What was your knowledge of these patrols? Did you feel that the SECFOR was trained and proficient?
A: No, sir. I assume you're still talking before September 14th. I really did not think that we had any gaps in our security. But I think in large part it was again due to our focus being offensive rather than defensive. Just based on what (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c recommendations were for the defensive improvements that would (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c indicate that there were gaps there. But I, much like probably the rest of the leadership said, yes, we got it, the task at hand is these kinds of operations and not necessarily reinforcing the complex that we're on because who in their right mind would come and attack the base where these forces are located. I think that was probably the overwhelming mindset.

Q: Did you have any reason to believe that TFBW did not have enough personnel to conduct its assigned mission both inside the perimeter and outside in AO Belleau Wood?
A: I was not aware of their lack of manpower to do that.

Q: Where were you during the attack on 14-15 September 2012?
A: I had just gone back to my quarters; that was about 2200. At about 2205 is when I heard (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c say something happened on the flight line. Then I was in the TAC in about 10 seconds; I was right there.

Q: Based on your experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts as the attack unfolded?
A: Surprise is probably a good word for it but at the time you don't think about the surprise, you look at what is going on and what do we have to bring to bear. We were more concentrating on what can we do to help the flight line and who is out there. What do I have that's airborne and what can I bring to the fight.

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Q: Please describe what actions you took throughout the engagement.
A: I went to the Ops Center. At that time it was about the time of the senior watch officer change over and I believe I had the outgoing SLO and I had the oncoming SLO, so I had both of those gentlemen able to assist. I immediately went in and obviously asked for a status report and found out that some aircraft were shot at and a couple of Harriers were on fire. In the subsequent, you've read through the dialogue of what occurred, we immediately looked for what type of fire fighting equipment can we bring, do we know where the shots are coming from, who do we have airborne. I immediately looked for an ISR platform, and then I was just looking for reports from the flight line. But at the same time, I didn't want call any of those individuals; the flight line would call us to inform the TAC of what was going on. I was trying to get as much information as I could. I was in the TAC, obviously I'm a representative of the General; so just trying to command what we had to bring to the fight and then the General was in there in a few minutes as well.

Q: Do you know what Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets or early warning devices specifically focused on the BLS Complex were operational at the time of the attack?
A: We relied on GBOSS Towers; we relied on our own ISR and we relied on the Mark-1 eyeballs of the aircrew as they were going on and off the installation.

Q: Did you get any specific information regarding how the guards in Towers 15 and 17 missed the infiltration and breach? Did you learn afterwards that only Tower 17 had direct line of sight to the breach point?
A: I definitely wasn't concerned about that on the night of the attack. I did find out about it post attack.

Q: Did you receive any indications and warnings (I&W) prior to the attack?
A: No, sir.

Q: In your post-attack analysis, did you discover a failure in dissemination of I&W? Did you identify a collection gap that led to a lack of I&W?
A: No, sir. I think based on our dialogue that we had with the RC C2, if there was a concern of theirs, they wouldn't hold that back from us; they would let us know. I would say they would be the parent organization in a collecting and receiving that I&W over and above even Task Force Belleau Wood. But Task Force Belleau Wood's ISR fed right into the RC structure in through the Intel and then obviously through the C3. So as I said, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c and I talked multiple times a day. So I would have known if there was a concern and prior to the attack we were not made aware of any I&W that would indicate that we should be concerned.

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good subordinate he said, aye aye, Sir and he went on and took care of it. So as far as whether the UK did or did not appreciate or if there were any type of reservations behind that new command structure, we're all professionals over there. That's what needed to be done. General Gurganus said this is how we're going to do it then we marched on.

Q: Could that have been done prior to the attack?
A: Sir, I think that again, looking all the way back to day one of hey, this is what we need to go do out in RC SW, if that was a concern we would have done it. But it didn't reach the threshold where we needed to place resources at the problem.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by US personnel prior to the attack?
A: No, sir.

Q: By UK personnel? If so, what do you attribute this to?
A: No, sir.

Q: One interviewee informed us that the attitude of personnel on the BLS Complex might have been that it was "too big to fail." Do you agree? Do you believe that TFBW personnel displayed this attitude? Did your UK or Afghan counterparts?
A: No, sir.

Q: Within 3d MAW, the mindset was that you were a tenant on Bastion and the responsibility for security for that base really belonged to other forces who are designated with that tasking and it wasn't really a responsibility that fell to the Wing, is that a fair statement do you think, the way that you all perceived that?
A: Yes, sir. Much like I alluded to on what manpower we brought into theater at the ACE. We went to the airfields with the understanding that the perimeter was not our responsibility.

Q: Would that be considered a failed assumption?
A: I don't think that's a failed assumption, I think that's--again, looking at what was the threat, where are we going to operate out of; the Marines' being expeditionary in nature. As you skip up whether it's into Baghdad or whether it's into RC SW, you know every place you have a lily pad or where you operate out of, you immediately assess the potential for an attack on your position. I assume that just by our nature of being Soldiers and Marines that we're always looking for somebody trying to come at us but based on where we are going and what we are doing. The history behind the lack of these types of attacks against Bastion; I think that was just "this is how the Force Protection works at Bastion." Was it a

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faulty assumption? Hindsight obviously being 20/20 you can say we could have spent more time on it, but I think that if you remove that attack from history we would still be doing what we did prior to September 14th with the next rotation of OEF forces that went.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
A: No, sir.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)c at (b)(6) or (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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