SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10USC Section301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number *(SSN)*.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Pendleton, CA	20130620	0900	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)		(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
I MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Where are you currently assigned?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: So did you perform those duties for the entire RC(SW) AO?
A: Yes Sir, but that's a little bit of a misnomer, because there's so much from the CI/HUMINT side that stays in national channels.

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: So RC(SW) was a combined HQs with a Brit Deputy Commander and you had Brit staff integration that occurred in your section too?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was that awkward having this stand-alone UK reporting chain that bypassed RC(SW)?
A: It was, sir. That was kind of the biggest issue we talked about even before we deployed. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	PAGE 1 of 11 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF *TAKEN AT* *DATED*

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(1)1.4c

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Q: When did you arrive at RC(SW) as the C-2, and when did you depart?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: Who did you answer to on a routine basis?

A: For the first half of that deployment through late July was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) He was the C2/G2. Then after that it was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), C2.

Q: How was your relationship with MajGen Gurganus? How often did you interact?

A: I interacted with MajGen Gurganus fairly regularly, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c But I would say that probably at least once a week, maybe once every two weeks I was briefing him on some issue either on the counter intelligence or the HUMINT intelligence side.

Q: Where were you at the time of the attack on the night of 14 September?

A: I was in the SCIF, sir, at Leatherneck in the main C2/G2 offices.

Q: What were your initial thoughts?

A: I think it was around maybe 2200; we were in a meeting and we got word that they were taking fire out on the flight line. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

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Q: Can you explain the counterintelligence efforts on the BLS Complex not in the AO but just in the BLS Complex and around it; specifically, Leatherneck and Bastion.

(b)(1)1.4c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: You mentioned earlier that the CI product coming out of the Bastion side went direct to PJHQ, not shared with the RC. Can you explain that?
A: Yes sir, it did. We basically had weekly meetings over there with both the CIFT and the CISU and it was kind of a CI; well, we had meetings with all the actors to include some law enforcement guys that were present on base, because sometimes there's criminal activity in the counterintelligence nexus. We had that every two weeks. Then every Friday we had a meeting strictly with the Bastion side both with the CIFT and CISU and that was chaired essentially by my deputy (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Again, I had no tasking authority over her. But she was that liaison; she was assigned to the RC but by virtue of being British and by being a badge-carrying counterintelligence officer she was able to liaise with them. A lot of the reporting they would get—we would both try to write for at least the REL FVEY REL to UK EYES, so that was for the most part the reporting piece. The CENTRIX system was for ISAF reporting, but if it was something that was going to be just FVEY, we didn't have a distinct system because obviously they couldn't see the SIPR unless they had the commonwealth access. If it couldn't be put on Centrix a lot of the reporting had to be hand-carried over and ingested that way. It made it much harder. For us it wasn't as big a deal but for the analyst it was tough because trying to find that archive of information on the back end was hard sometimes because they existed on these separate systems.

Q: To recap, what was the sharing of counterintelligence information that occurred on a weekly basis?
A: Yes, sir. As issues came up we obviously would talk. We actually had it set up where the CIS was located in their building, and the CISU was in the other half of that building so a lot of the times at kind of the action officer level as issues were developing throughout the day they could just talk directly. And then they would call back and back-brief me and probably the same with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as well. I think the information exchange worked out. It wasn't formalized really but it worked as such. The problem was that there was just a huge disparity in the overarching counterintelligence effort between the two sides of the base; mainly because of their legal authorities and their restrictions on what they can and can't do.

Q: Could you task for information over there?

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: How would you do that if you couldn't task them to collect?

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: So if they could not honor that request because of legal issues on their side or restrictions or capability shortfalls, how did you cover that?

(b)(1)1.4c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: So given that intelligence gap on Camp Bastion, did you identify that to your boss the C2?
A: Yes sir and we had actually brought it up in the MRX here before we even deployed that it was going to be an issue. That was kind of a constant battle. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: The team knew before they left here, BrigGen Gurganus, the C2, you, and many others probably, of that intelligence gap?
A: Yes sir we knew it was going to be an issue but we thought; well personally, I can't speak for the others, I didn't fully appreciate the scope of the disparity between the two efforts before we got over there. A couple of weeks in, after a couple of those meetings and we were identifying stuff and basically there was not a lot of reciprocal information. It wasn't because they didn't want to share it; it was because they just didn't have it and that was kind of the issue.

Q: Was General Skeates aware of this?
A: Yes sir he was. Again, he didn't understand it. Not being an intelligence officer, I don't think he quite got the nuances of it. He thought, "well we had CI guys there, why can't they do it?" Eventually I ended up briefing him and what we had asked for that didn't happen unfortunately until after the Bastion attack. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Let me ask the question again just to be sure, General Skeates, did he join the team here?
A: He did, yes sir.

Q: So General Skeates knew that gap existed before the team left Camp Pendleton?
A: It had been briefed, he had been briefed on it, but again, I can't say whether he actually understood kind of the nuances of the differences. Again, even I didn't even understand fully until we got on the ground the scope of what we were dealing with. It had been mentioned.

Q: Once you were there were you aware of any efforts by General Skeates to work with his bosses on the UK sovereign side to get after that gap?
A: Sir, it wasn't until after—we did the first briefing I want to say maybe April of 2012 that kind of identified some of those disparities. We were coming in on this old MOU, one that nobody could find that had been written by the previous command. We finally did find the written version.

Q: This is the C2 MOU between CENTCOM and PJHQ?
A: The MOU did not include PJHQ; it was basically just between the old regional command C2 and the different UK CI elements, Joint Force Support kind of signed off on it, and so did the CIFT.

Q: So it was a CI MOU? Intel sharing MOU?
A: Not really Intel sharing; it was more of a CI jurisdictions and de-confliction MOU I guess if you will. That was kind of what we were operating on. Obviously there were a lot of gaps there with that one.

Q: Did General Skeates seem concerned about this gap?

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(1)1.4c

Q: Once you were in country and you're up and running, are you aware of any dialogue with General Gurganus and General Skeates to kind of encourage and push the British side?
A: As far as discrete dialogue between those two, no; but there were times they were both briefed and General Gurganus had raised those concerns with General Skeates in the room. But as far as what they discussed beyond that I'm not privy to it sir.

Q: Based on what you said, General Gurganus had raised some concerns in staff meetings?
A: Yes sir. I can distinctly remember one of the first ones in country being as early as April of 2012. That was after the "burning man incident" out on the flight line, the SECDEF's visit. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: How did you guys get that information?
A: That came afterwards.

Q: After the "burning man incident" the Brits provided that?

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: My bet is that General Gurganus was not very happy when those anomalies and the fact that this had occurred, and was finally revealed to RC(SW)?
A: Yes sir that's correct. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: What changed after the "burning man incident"?
A: Nothing sir, not on the UK side.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Then we had the JSIVA in June; did anything change on the CI side after the JSIVA?
A: Not really on the CI side sir, the JSIVA identified a lot more of the security infrastructure. That may have altered some of the actual kind of traditional Force Protection posture stuff on the Bastion side. I'm not aware of what changes that catalyzed or did not. But from a counterintelligence collection standpoint there was no appreciable change on the UK side. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Any CI successes with the insider threat that you're familiar with?
A: Yes sir, we had quite a few. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: So from the C2, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the DCOM General Skeates, and the CG, General Gurganus do you think you had sufficient support and the appropriate guidance you needed to get your job done?
A: On the US side yes sir, everything within my G2 role on the MAGTF, completely. He'd ask a lot of tough questions but at the end of the day if the op was tight and if it was within the legal parameters that we could work with he gave us a lot of rope to operate. I think we had a lot of successes because of that; that was good. I'm not trying to paint that our relationship with the British was adversarial because it wasn't; it just was frustrating more than anything else and they were getting frustrated too. I had a lot of dialogue with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) where she was I think a little professionally embarrassed honestly that they weren't able to offer the same amount of counterintelligence protection to the force.

Q:Primarily a lack of capacity, they just couldn't do it?
A: Yes sir; it was either legal or regulatory constraints, or missing authorities, or it was they simply that they didn't have enough guys.
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: It's almost a misnomer to call them CI?
A: Yes sir I thought it was. It's not what in the US duty we would consider counterintelligence. They all actually were credentialed Military Policemen.

Q: Did you interact much with TFBW?
A: We did sir; they were right across the passageway there from where the SCIF was. They were literally in the next building over. We worked with them quite a bit. We had a lot of successes down PB Boldak, which was one of their areas. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Was TFBW responsive when you identified potential threats?
A: Yes sir they were. Again there were a lot of times when it was kind of a capacity issue for them; they didn't have a lot of maneuver unit capacity, so that was tough. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: So your assessment of the relationship with Belleau Wood was a good relationship and productive in terms of the sharing?
A: It was sir. Basically I had the CIS OIC able to brief the Belleau Wood commander directly. I know they had one standing brief that they did every Tuesday and as things came up we were able to push them straight over. I talked to their 3 all the time on the phone to try and maneuver some support to them. If we had identified some issue, and we needed some vehicles to actually get our guys outside the wire they were very accommodating at always trying to do that.

Q: How about 3d MAW, the same relationship?
A: It's a little different sir. Within the MAGTF all the collection authorities for both CI and HUMINT reside at the command element level so the MAW and the Marine Division, they don't have their own collection authorities. They can't release reports. We did push it out. The MAW G2 personnel were good about identifying anomalous activity and stuff like that; that was good. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c But as far as like the communication flow and coordination, I think that was good; at least from our end it was. (b)(1)1.4c Obviously they had access to all of our reporting on the back end. If we saw anything that we specifically thought was within the MAWs hierarchy of intelligence requirements we made sure we highlighted that and they saw it beforehand.

Q: Who did you interact with on the 3d MAW staff?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on the G2 side and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) those two were the primaries in the MAW G2. They were kind of the action officers. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c We did a lot of CI awareness and reporting stuff with the MAW and they would push that our way.

Q: Did your team interact with ATFPOs?
A: We did sir; we did on a daily basis especially down at the ECPs. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Do you remember the ATFPO for 3d MAW?
A: For the MAW, no sir, we worked primarily with the Belleau Wood because they had the section that we were responsible for. We did have some of the MAW personnel attend those meetings early on, it was a gunny, I can't remember his name. All that was also then pushed back through the CJOC.

Q: Did you interact with the RC(SW) ATFPO (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
A: We did, yes sir on a pretty regular basis.

Q: What was that relationship? You fed them information or the other way around?
A: It would go both ways. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(1)1.4c

Q: Did you observe (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provide any kind of oversight of the efforts at the lower level?
A: I did not personally, no sir. Usually when I met with him it was in his office or he would have reps that would come to our meeting as well; but as far as his interaction with the other AT/FPOs, no sir I did not see that.

Q: How does CI play a role in I&W?
A: We tried to provide I&W through every counterintelligence system. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: The post attack analysis after September 14/15 indicated that this was a deliberate attack that had been planned and rehearsed for a series of months. As you look back on it now, how did you miss that from a HUMINT point of view?

(b)(1)1.4c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: In the post attack analysis and the after action reviews and things like that that occurred with the Brits, did they acknowledge that they had a gap there?

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: As you look back on what occurred there on 14/15 September 2012, what would you do differently to have mitigated that attack?

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Given that mitigation you talked about, did Gen Gurganus or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ever debate that idea that they should unilaterally do that?

A: Yes sir, there was basically a 3 COA presentation that we had been working on for a while, and the one that we were really pushing for was that we just take responsibility for all of it. Which I honestly think Brigadier Skeates would have been okay with, but there was another Brigadier at Joint Forces Support who didn't answer through the regional command and then the 903d Expeditionary Air Wing; those guys had that TESERAL mission. Because they were responsible for that mission, they did not want to see that level of control from us. To my understanding, that's where it stalled out. It wasn't necessarily within the RC that any of the British people were against it. It was that it was just going to be a bridge too far to try to reconcile that with the other Brigadier of Joint Forces Support and then back up to PJHQ. I can't remember the Brigadier's name; (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was his liaison guy there in the CJOC. I have it written down I can get it for you.

(b)(1)1.4c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Is there anything that you know of that would have caused IJC to declare an "Op-Minimize" on the 14th or shortly there before?
A: Not within those couple of days, sir. We did have another incident. There were some wire breaches throughout the late summer. Some of which I think we still even have on video where literally guys were coming up through the wire, looking in to some of the unoccupied guard posts, etc. Again, the British were pretty reluctant with some of their ROE stuff, what they considered essentially just scrappers, people who were out there to collect C-wire and stuff like that. They would then sell, there was not a lot of appetite to actually go out and run any kind of bait op to detain any of these guys and then shake them down; also because their interrogation policy. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: We actually have video of people breaching the wire and going into a tower and looking inside it?
A: There is video of that, sir. I think we saw it off of the GBOSS feed.

Q: How frequently did that kind of thing occur?
A: I can only remember one where the guy actually came all the way up to and looked into one of the empty towers but there were breaches all the time, and we found evidence of it a lot of times as well specifically on the eastern airfield perimeter. During the weekly meetings we had at the CJOC with the CIFT and CISU, they would report the breaches, but again they would kind of couch it under criminal activity. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: So there was an assumption that the breaches were due to scrappers; not due to somebody testing, probing, rehearsing, or anything like that?
A: That seemed to be the British overall take on it. Have you interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) by any chance; he was the Belleau Wood 3. He had to deal a lot with that; (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) specifically. I know they had a lot of heated debates between what level of effort was actually going to get put towards that.

Q: Do you know if there were any efforts up the chain to fix the CI discrepancy over at Bastion? Any conversations between RC(SW) and IJC or anything like that?
A: Yes sir, I briefed both the CJ2X at both IJC and USFOR-A, just so they understood where some of those discrepancies were, although they obviously didn't have any effect over the British side. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had actually flown up to IJC and briefed General Nakesone personally on it a couple of times through that summer before he left. So it had been brought up.

Q: Any feedback that you remember from them to acknowledge the problem?
A: Yes sir, that was kind of the feeling that I got from my level; I didn't see any discernible change. For the most part I think the British personnel, especially on the Intel side within the regional command wanted to see that change but they were kind of fighting their own bureaucracy with those kind of separate chains there with the Joint Forces Support guys. That was kind of their biggest obstacle to getting any kind of traction on that side.

(b)(1)1.4c

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STATEMENT (continued)

Q: Do you know any type of mitigation they may have done?

(b)(1)1.4c

END OF STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STAEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFUT OR REWARD, WITHO ISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this day of

at (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ART 136 UCMJ

(Authority TO Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

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