DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), former Anti Terrorism/Force Protection Officer (AT/FPO), I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) and Regional Command Southwest [RC(SW)]

1. The investigation team conducted a recorded interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) former AT/FPO, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) and RC(SW) on 19 June 2013 at Camp Pendleton, CA as part of the AR 15-6 investigation into the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is currently unavailable to sign and return a sworn statement. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that the dialogue transcribed below is an accurate account of the interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The recorded interview is on file with the investigative team.

Q: Where are you currently assigned?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: When did you arrive to RC(SW) as the AT/FP Officer and when did you depart?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What were your specific responsibilities as the RC(SW) AT/FP Officer?
A: I was responsible for all of the facilities from an AT/FP perspective in RC(SW), which ranged from the smallest COP to the largest base, the BLS Complex.

Q: What training had you received in AT/FP?
A: Level I, Level II, and I served as the AT/FP Officer for I MEF on active duty prior to going forward with I MEF (FWD).

Q: Were you appointed in writing? By MajGen Gurganus? What was the scope of your appointment?

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A: I was, Sir, by MajGen Gurganus. The scope was to serve as the AT/FP Officer for RC(SW)

Q: Who did you answer to in the RC(SW) chain of command for AT/FP issues? Directly to MajGen Gurganus? To the C-3, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)? Who else in the RC(SW) chain of command did you report to or coordinate with regarding AT/FP?
A: I went directly to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I was rarely given access to go direct with MajGen Gurganus. Those occasions were the insider threat, and some of the mitigation measures after the attack.

Q: How was your relationship with MajGen Gurganus? How often did you interact? What was his guidance to you as AT/FP Officer?
A: MajGen Gurganus is a very straight-forward man. He gave very direct guidance. I dealt with him often on the rash of green-on-blue incidents that we had. I built the SOP and the conference. I was involved in the corrective action after the attack after being appointed in writing by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and signed by MajGen Gurganus.

Q: Do you feel that MajGen Gurganus supported you and provided you with enough authority to execute your responsibilities? Do you feel that he took AT/FP seriously?
A: I do, for both questions.

Q: Did you have an adequate RIP/TOA with your predecessors, LtGen Toolan and his staff? Do you feel that your predecessors adequately addressed any AT/FP vulnerabilities which may have existed? Do you recall what, if any, vulnerabilities they specifically discussed with you?
A: There was a challenge with this particular facility. It was just one of the bases I had responsibility for in RC(SW), and I did not have responsibility or authority for it. I MHG and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had responsibility there. I was there to assist them. LtGen Toolan's staff gave us a prior vulnerability assessment, the CENTCOM JSO, which still had some outstanding vulnerabilities identified. We used that as our guideposts for making improvements.

Q: Did you utilize a primary source of Marine or Joint Doctrine to conduct your AT/FP responsibilities? If not, what did you use to establish your standards?
A: It was a combination of both, but I can't remember them off the top of my head. We had the manuals out there.

Q: Was there a RC(SW)-wide AT/FP plan? At what level is there typically an AT/FP Plan? Is it only for an installation or base commander?
A: Yes, Sir. We provide an overarching Commanding General guidance, and then the base commanders come up with their own plans. Our main duties were to

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provide hardware and equipment resources, and also to go out and conduct assessments for the bases under the CENTCOM threshold.

Q: What supervisory responsibility did you have to your subordinate command AT/FP Officers?
A: Just to provide an overarching MEF AT/FP plan, and then they specify that guidance to their particular situation, and they also come back to me for resource needs.

Q: How many subordinate AT/FP Officers were there? Spread out over how many bases, camps, outposts, etc.? Where did you focus most of your effort?
A: They went down to basically the battalion level. I would go through the MSCs to get to the FOBs, COPs, and bases. We had about 50-60 FOBs, COPs, and bases. I focused most of my efforts on the MSCs, so that they could then reach down to their subordinates out on the various bases.

Q: What assistance and expertise did you provide to the AT/FP Officer at Task Force Belleau Wood, considering that CO TFBW was the base commander responsible for security on Camp Leatherneck and AO Belleau Wood?
A: What I and my staff did was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g We also provided a great number of GBOSS. We went from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g before the attack to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g . We mainly provided them hardware and resources. They had their own staff for technical expertise.

Q: Where were you during the attack on 14-15 September 2012?
A: I was in my office at the MEF Headquarters.

Q: Do you recall what FPCON status you were in at the time of the attack? Did Camp Bastion have a similar status?
A: I don't recall what our status was at the time. There were three different standards for Marines, Army, and British, which created some risk. It was a bit confusing.

Q: Based on your experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts as the attack unfolded?
A: I thought the base was way too large. There was a lot of exposed country out there. It became difficult to guard. The layered defense was strained at best. Deep down I felt something like this could happen.

Q: Were you involved with planning or supervision related to OP CONGO, the combined US/UK crisis management plan? The Joint Review Board Inquiry Report appointed by MajGen Gurganus and led by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after the attack mentions that OP CONGO did not clearly address seams between the CO TFBW

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area of responsibility and the CO Bastion area of responsibility. How were the Camps delineated? Was it clear? Were they walled off from one another?
A: I was only aware of it after the attack. There were physical delineations and there were jurisdictional delineations. That really came out during counter intelligence (CI) efforts later. We couldn't do things over on Bastion that we could do on Leatherneck. (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c

Q: Did you identify this deficiency in OP CONGO prior to the attack? If so, how did you address it?
A: I didn't know about OP CONGO prior to the attack.

Q: What did you attribute it to that you didn't know about OP CONGO?
A: The British had Bastion, and this seemed Bastion exclusive.

Q: The JRB Report identified that the C2 arrangement between CO TFBW and CO Bastion was the source of confusion, and stated that "the organization of the Op Congo C2 architecture is not fully supportive of command and control of a crisis or USMC reporting requirements." Why was the arrangement not fully supportive of USMC reporting requirements?
A: I can't really speak to what he's saying there.

Q: The JRB report indicates that the split C2 arrangement was required by the 2011 MOU between CENTCOM and the UK. Was this your understanding as well? When did you first learn of the MOU?
A: Yes, Sir. The MOU was quite exhaustive, and we didn't have it at the time. We weren't operating to the MOU. We were operating to the best TTPs. I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was tasked for a re-write of that. But people were aware of the C2 deficiency.

Q: Joint Publication 3-10 (Joint Security Operations in Theater, 3 February 2010) states that, "Unity of Command is fundamental to effective security within the [Joint Security Area]." Is Marine Corps doctrine consistent with the Joint Publication? If so, did you raise the concern about the lack of unity of command for AT/FP on the BLS Complex? Do you know whether MajGen Gurganus was aware of this arrangement?
A: Absolutely. When I had issues on Bastion, I went to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). It was very infrequent. By going there, then we would get into Bastion.

Q: Did you have concerns about the insider threat posed by LN and TCN contractors on the BLS Complex? If so, please describe any conversations you had with RC(SW) regarding your concerns.
A: Nothing more than I had at any other facility.

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Q: Was TFBW responsible for vetting and security of all contractors aboard the BLS Complex, or was it split among the various Camps? If the latter, how did you coordinate vetting and security with your UK and Afghan counterparts?
A: It was split. Right there you see an example of one base, but different procedures. I don't know the degree of the difference.

Q: Describe the security measures in place for contractors to get onto the BLS Complex once they were vetted and hired. What control measures, if any, were in place for contractors once they were inside the compound?
A: I did not have too much visibility on that. I only had experience with the TFBW vetting process.

Q: Who was responsible for counter-intelligence efforts on the BLS Complex? Were these efforts sufficient? Did they identify any specific insider threats?
A: There were Brit CI personnel who reported to Brigadier Skeates. We had (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c as our J2X.

Q: Although there was no unity of command over AT/FP for the entire BLS Complex, what mechanisms were in place to ensure unity of effort between your subordinate AT/FP Officers and their UK and Afghan counterparts?
A: We would work with TFBW to help them get hardware primarily. We met with the British on a regular basis. They were very focused on the aerostat asset and other technical means. They were more technically focused than procedurally focused, in my opinion. We started to build processes and procedures with the Afghans during our time there.

Q: What was your assessment of the UK forces' ability to protect Camp Bastion? Did any of your subordinate AT/FPOs ever raise concerns to you? Please explain.
A: The people who actually raised concerns to me weren't actually military personnel, they were contractors. The GBOSS program manager, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) talked to me. They would get called out to fix these towers. They would tour the perimeter to fix the GBOSS, and he raised concerns to me a few times. And Bastion was the prize. I don't think the UK had the manpower to do it. They struck me as very professional and serious, but a significant number of towers were unmanned.

Q: Despite the C2 split between US and UK forces on the BLS Complex, did you as the RC(SW) AT/FPO have any oversight over AT/FP on Camp Bastion? Did you ever conduct inspections or assessments of UK AT/FP?
A: Not on Camp Bastion. I did not conduct inspections on UK personnel.

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: Considering that there were Marine personnel and aircraft on the flight line, did you have any responsibilities for coordination of AT/FP on the flight line with UK forces? Did the 3d MAW or any subordinate Marine units present on the airfield have AT/FP responsibilities on the flight line? Please describe this arrangement, and explain the coordinating mechanisms in place, both between you and the tenant Marine units and between you and your UK counterparts.
A: I had no responsibilities over there, but I did coordinate with the 3d MAW AT/FP Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I think they had some responsibilities around their own hangars, but I think that's it for their responsibilities on the flight line. I had coordinating mechanisms with my MSCs, but informal with UK personnel. They were responsible for their own AT/FP.

Q: Violence in parts of the Middle East spiked in the days preceding the 14-15 September 2012 attack, allegedly due to an anti-Islam YouTube video produced in the US. Was RC(SW) aware of this increased tension? Had RC(SW) noticed any increase in tension in the Helmand Province? Was there any change in the AT/FP posture on the BLS Complex prior to the attack, either an increase or a decrease, because of the video or any other reason?
A: We were aware of the tension, but we didn't see it rise in our AO. We were moving more aggressively to get non-lethal munitions, but we never had the means to employ them. But we did not change our AT/FP posture as far as FPCON.

Q: In your opinion did RC(SW) have enough personnel to conduct its assigned mission and execute force protection responsibilities?
A: I believe so. I do know that TFBW was thinned a bit, but I don't think it hindered. There is a lot of paperwork required for AT/FP but I don't think it hindered us due to lack of resources.

Q: As part of your risk analysis, did you ever raise concerns about insufficient security forces to MajGen Gurganus, Brigadier Skeates, or anyone else in the RC(SW) chain of command? If so, what was their response?
A: No, I did not.

Q: The JRB Report mentioned that there was no guard force assigned to monitor the dead space between the perimeter guard towers and the flight line. Although this was CO Bastion's area of responsibility, were you aware of this vulnerability? Did you coordinate with CO Bastion to address it or mitigate it? Did you coordinate with the 3d MAW to address it or mitigate it?
A: I was not aware of that until after (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) report.

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A: I had not briefed him at that point.

Q: Did you discuss the "burning man incident" with MajGen Gurganus after it occurred? Please describe the conversation. What guidance did he give you?
A: No. My direct conversations with the General were with the insider threat when he directed me to come to Kabul with him, and a few conversations in his office with his aide where we discussed technology like the GBOSS systems. Those were it. Everything else went through (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review identifies that a request for a perimeter fence around the airfield was denied by both the UK chain of command and by the BLS Executive Steering Group (ESG). Please describe any specific deliberations you are aware of that are not included in the minutes regarding the ESG's decision to deny funding for the fence.
A: I do not know the particulars or the specifics of the discussion.

Q: Do you think you should have been on the board for the ESG?
A: It couldn't hurt.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review addressed a 3d MAW request to emplace concertina wire to secure vulnerable areas around the flight line and to channelize pedestrian traffic to ECPs, which was approved and completed prior to the attack. There is also an exhibit in the Supplemental Review of a 3d MAW flight line barrier plan request submitted at the same time (11 May 2012) to emplace (b)(1)1.4a to protect the flight line. The request stated, "Without these improvements, the flight line equipment and personnel will remain vulnerable to enemy attack at multiple access points, including numerous high speed avenues of approach." This project was eventually approved after the attack. Do you recall why this request was not approved after the "burning man incident"? Do you know if it reached a decision making body? Did you discuss this request with 3d MAW personnel?
A: I do not know about that request, Sir.

Q: Are you aware of any other AT/FP improvements completed or requested in response to the "burning man incident"?
A: I am not.

Q: Please describe the process for CO TFBW or CO Bastion to seek AT/FP improvements. Did you have a role in this process? What was the ESG's role? Was this process responsive? Did you have adequate funding? Do you feel that the RC(SW) chain of command provided you the support you needed to improve your AT/FP posture? Did MajGen Gurganus? Please describe.

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A: The MSC would identify their need, and we would help them justify it according to the manuals and procedural guidance available. Depending on the amount, we would send that request up through the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) or the other appropriate board. We would speak on their behalf at the board, which met once a week. That was a funding process. If they wanted hardware, we would go through Marine Corps property or Army IMCOM. The ESG, I'm not sure exactly what their role was, but I think it went to them if it met some dollar threshold. I don't know if it was responsive, because I did not participate in it. I do think we had adequate funding, and as far as support, we got the support that we needed for what we asked for from the RC(SW) command and staff.

Q: When did you learn that a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) team (led by Marine (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) would be conducting an assessment of the BLS Complex?
A: We had sufficient foreknowledge, but I can't remember specifically.

Q: Did you provide assistance to TFBW prior to, during, or after the JSIVA?
A: We provided assistance before and during, but not so much afterwards. They had their remediation.

Q: How comfortable were you with the TFBW AT/FP Program and its mechanisms – such as working groups – at that point in time?
A: I was comfortable with it.

Q: Who was the TFBW AT/FP Officer at the time? Was he/she responsible for the AT/FP Plan? Were you responsible for reviewing these plans?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the ATO at the time. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was brand new, and he leaned heavily on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is probably one of the best physical security NCOs in the Marine Corps. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would have reviewed his AT/FP Plan.

Q: Were you present for the JSIVA outbrief from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the rest of the JSIVA team? Did you agree with it?
A: I was at the outbrief, yes Sir. I agreed with it, Sir.

Q: The report states that a "vulnerability" is "a situation or circumstance that if left unchanged may result in the loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources." Did you agree with the six vulnerabilities assessed by the JSIVA team [flight line access exploitable; ECPs lack AT/FP design features; inadequate protective shelters; no overhead cover for areas of large concentrations of personnel; inadequate or missing sidewall protection for assessed billeting and mission assets; inadequate Mass Warning and Notification System (MNWS) capability]?

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A: There were two in there – overhead protection and sidewall protection – that I did not think were fair. There was no real indirect fire (IDF) threat.

Q: Did you brief MajGen Gurganus on the results of the JSIVA? If not, did you brief someone on the RC(SW) staff? What guidance did they give you regarding the results of the JSIVA?
A: Not MajGen Gurganus directly. It would not be my place to brief the CG on a MSC's base. That would have been (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) responsibility. During the stand-up meetings, I would constantly refer to FP issues just like that to keep the C-3 informed.

Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ask for any follow-up?
A: No, Sir. I told him what things were being done, so he may have been satisfied with that and didn't require follow-up. We spent a lot of money and a lot of time fixing the ECPs after the JSIVA. Some of the vulnerabilities, like the two I mentioned before, you just assume the risk and move on. Those would have been huge, high level projects.

Q: So my question is how did the information get to the Commanding General? He has six vulnerabilities assessed by an external, "gold standard" assessment team.
A: I'm not sure about right after the JSIVA outbrief, but I gave dozens of briefings on AT/FP that the General saw, and they had those vulnerabilities on there. We used the stop light charts to show our progress. We also had a weekly meeting on Saturdays where we would brief Leatherneck and Dwyer specifically. The DCOM typically took these meetings, so I can't vouch for the CG's cognizance.

Q: The JSIVA identified a number of concerns regarding the AT/FP Plan, working groups and other processes, Risk Management, Emergency Management, and more. What do you attribute this to? Had you provided assistance to TFBW in these areas prior to the JSIVA? Had they requested assistance?
A: I think just the voluminous nature of the paperwork on the techniques, procedures, and policies. It's just a very paperwork-driven process. I had assisted TFBW prior to the JSIVA, but mainly with technology. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the Lt had the paperwork part of it. I think it is interesting though that the JSIVA did not assess what we now think is the root cause of this incident, and that is command and control. You had one base, but three separate commands responsible for their own AT/FP. We could have collectively done better, so that one person would have been in charge to identify things before the fact instead of after.

Q: What did you do after the JSIVA to assist TFBW?

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A: The main thing we helped with was the money and equipment to enhance the ECPs. We had to JARB that, and it took a while.

Q: Did you request support from IJC? Did you receive the support that you needed from IJC to accomplish your plan?
A: The main thing they had was tasking authority for engineering assets for things like the ditch and berm. If we requested something from the, and they had it on hand, they would get it to us. Otherwise it took a long time.

Q: Did you conduct any coordination with your UK counterparts after the JSIVA, considering that some of the vulnerabilities involved their areas of responsibility?
A: No, Sir, that would have been TFBW.

Q: Did they request assistance or resources from RC(SW)? If so, were you able to meet the request?
A: Limited to surveillance and observation technology.

Q: The JSIVA report describes the flight line access at BLS Complex as an "exploitable" vulnerability and "thus, personnel and equipment are largely exposed." Although some AT/FP measures (e.g. the airfield perimeter fence) were denied after the "burning man incident," did TFBW or RC(SW) use the JSIVA as new justification to mitigate the vulnerability to the flight line? If so, what did you pursue and with whom?
A: No. If my memory serves me, the threat posture was assessed as a VBIED not a coordinated ground attack. I think that was instrumental in denying some measures. But your enemy should be doing what you don't expect him to do.

Q: Do you know when the flight line expansion was complete? Were there deliberations about pushing the perimeter further east to account for the new runway? If so, describe those deliberations and the decision not to expand the perimeter. Was the flight line within small arms range of the eastern perimeter fence?
A: I heard talk of expanding east, and I was thankful for that, because I thought the base was already too large. It's about 500m, which is maybe suppressive range but not effective range.

Q: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that inputting vulnerabilities into the Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) is the best way to get visibility of those vulnerabilities all the way up to the Joint Staff. The JSIVA Report indicated that CVAMP had not been updated for the BLS Complex since a CENTCOM Joint Security Office (JSO) Vulnerability Assessment conducted in January 2011, and that neither CO TFBW nor his AT/FPO had access to CVAMP. Did you have access to CVAMP?

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A: We did, and we helped our MSCs get access too.

Q: Did you assist TFBW in getting access to CVAMP and inputting the vulnerabilities?
A: I tasked one of my contractors with getting the MSCs access to CVAMP.

Q: Do you know whether CO TFBW prioritized the identified vulnerabilities and identify mitigation strategies in the Risk Assessment field, and then approved the mitigation strategies in CVAMP?
A: I can't say whether they actually input the vulnerabilities. It is the MSCs' responsibility to input their own data.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review identified concerns from the JSIVA (TFBW's Risk Management Program, AT/FP Plan, and lack of formalized AT/FP-related working groups) that were not addressed between the time of the JSIVA and the time of the attack. What do you attribute this to? What was your oversight role?
A: I don't know. We would provide oversight and assistance if they asked, but it's ultimately the MSCs' responsibility directly to the General.

Q: RC(SW) established a BLS Complex Force Protection OPT and a Counter-Threat Working Group led by the RC(SW) DCOM in the aftermath of the attack. Did you sense a lack of senior leader emphasis on AT/FP prior to the attack?
A: I don't think I sensed that, but I do find it interesting that we unified the command afterwards the attack. We should have done it beforehand.

Q: One interviewee expressed a concern that prior to the attack, only half of the guard towers were manned, yet there seemed to be an excess of Marines in MWR facilities and coffee shops that could have otherwise been performing guard duty. Did you share this concern? Did you ever express it to anyone on the RC(SW) staff?
A: I think people in a combat zone could be optimized better. I did not express this concern, and I had not heard that particular comment about excess personnel in the MWR.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by US personnel prior to the attack? If so, what do you attribute this to?
A: No.

Q: One interviewee informed us that the attitude of personnel on the BLS Complex might have been that it was "too big to fail." Do you agree? Do you believe that TFBW personnel displayed this attitude? Did your UK or Afghan counterparts?

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A: No. That sounds a little silly, if I may. Nobody ignored FP. That particular term applies to financial and economic situations, not a combat zone.

Q: Did we provide the UK technology in the towers on Camp Bastion?
A: We did not. They only requested the PTDS, PGSS balloons. We had one balloon that could observe the airfield.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
A: Just that I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) report was very precise.

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2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) **at** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

WILLIAM B. GARRETT III
LTG, USA
Investigating Officer

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