SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10USC Section301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number *(SSN)*.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Pendleton, CA	20130620	0900	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)		(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Camp Pendleton, CA

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Where are you currently assigned?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your current duty position?
A: I'm (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of the First Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: When did you arrive at RC(SW) as the C-3 FECC, and when did you depart?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What were your primary duties and responsibilities as the C-3 FECC?
A: I was responsible obviously for fires, artillery fires. I coordinated the work with our aviation combat element (ACE). I did a lot of (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c We also managed key leader engagements, we had a small Army space support team that we worked with and then targeting, both lethal and non lethal.

Q: Did you answer directly to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the C-3? How was your working relationship with him?
A: On paper I worked for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), but in reality, most of my taskings would come from the DCOM or the CG, but I always went through (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). My relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DCOM, and the CG was good.

Q: Did you have any responsibilities associated with Anti Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) of Camp Leatherneck or the greater BLS Complex? If so, please describe them.
A: Not initially. I actually got to Leatherneck I think on the 1st or 2nd of September so I had only been there a couple of weeks and I was just getting my feet underneath me before the attack. After the attack, at that time (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c plate was full (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) his plate was full, so the DCOM assigned me to take charge of a Force Protection kind of a consequence management team. While (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was trying to get the COC back in action, the DCOM put me in charge of kind of a consequence management team, an effort assigned to get the base, specifically Bastion airfield, back in action. "Okay, let's get the airfield back open;" he just needed a Colonel to kind of run those efforts. Then over the next couple of months I did take on a bigger role with Force Protection, kind of implementing, accelerating review and trying to get other projects implemented. Then by about Christmas time we got things back on track, and it kind of transitioned back into the C3 shop. We put out a lot of paperwork during that time.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INI (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	STATEMENT	PAGE 1 of 8 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF		*TAKEN AT*	*DATED*

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

QUES: Did you have a summary report related to that?
A: I put out a document; I think it was called the Summary, or Force Protection Review. My memory's a little fuzzy but we did an internal review for General Gurganus. Then we got a task from DCOM ISAF, General Carter. ISAF tasked us to do a review so we did another report for them. Then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did a, I don't remember what we called it but the documents were kind of interrelated and referred to each other. I put out the Force Protection Review Report and that fed into the ongoing Force Protection Working Group.

Q: How frequent was your interaction with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW), if any?
A: Before the attack, not at all, other than just as one of our subordinate Task Forces but nothing direct; afterwards quite a bit. I worked with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Again, with the consequence management team, I did some clean up and immediate action with those guys, and then more work as part of the ongoing Force Protection review.

Q: How frequent was your interaction with the RC(SW) AT/FP Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)? Were you his direct supervisor? What guidance did you give him upon I MEF (FWD)'s TOA into RC(SW)?
A: Not before, but after quite a bit. I worked with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) quite a bit after that.

Q: Were there any issues, problems?
A: I was kind of coaching him along; he was a reserve guy that had come in and didn't have a lot of the background. He did okay. Sometimes it just helps having a Colonel help him with the rest of the staff and all the diverse people that were involved in Force Protection aboard BLS.

Q: Was there any resistance to your assistance?
A: Initially he may have been a little resistant to my assistance, but I was able to say "I'm not trying to take your job, just trying to help you. This is a bigger responsibility than just AT/FP," so he wasn't really resistant.

Q: His response to the attack on 14/15 September, did he express a sense of responsibility for what had occurred.
A: Not really, I don't think so. It was kind of a shock. As we were going back through it, that was one thing that we were--I was the new guy, so I had gotten to Leatherneck and it's a big base but I was kind of like any new Marine or Soldier or anybody, just kind of look around and say, am I safe here; it's a big base. I was told and subsequently we reviewed the threats, the biggest concern was a big bomb at the front gate, a vehicle born IED. Second was insider threat; there's so many cats and dogs running around you never know who is who. Third was indirect fire. As the fires guy I was concerned about that; our C-RAM system and counter fire. Our base being attacked was like our fourth concern. Leatherneck's kind of out in the middle of nowhere so it's kind of more of a concern at the front gate, or taking fire, or someone inside. So that was kind of everyone's mindset; that was not something anyone expected. We thought that the measures in place were adequate.

Q: Where were you on 14 September 2012 when the attack commenced?
A: I was in the Fires and Effects Shop, in our office spaces aboard Leatherneck.

Q: Based on your experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts as the attack unfolded?
A: At first we didn't know what was going on and then we were able to call down to our targeting cell, we had comms with the CJOC and we were able to find out that the base had been attacked. I was surprised; frankly again because kind of the same thing, that was not a concern like it had been in my experience in Iraq. We were surprised. We didn't know what was going on but knew enough to stay out of the way until things got settled down.

Q: Did your duties require you to take any specific actions in response to the attack?
A: No other than being a good troop, and stand and recover and staying out of the way, so no. Again, the CJOC had the fight and they had direct access, they called in close air support. They didn't need my help; they had the fight. We were tracking it but we didn't have to get involved at all.

Q: Were you aware of the 2011 MOU between CENTCOM and the UK PJHQ, which established a bifurcated C2 architecture for Force Protection of Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion?
A: I was later as part of the Force Protection Review. I guess I knew it was a joint base but I hadn't seen the document or really been briefed on it in the two weeks that I had been there.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Then when you got it and saw the impact of the attack, any thoughts after the attack; you're saying, okay, there is an MOU saying we have to split the C2 requirements for FP. And then you saw the attack, did you have any post attack thoughts on that?
A: I guess personally, Unity of Command, we're taught that as lieutenants for a reason; that's important. But, the way Leatherneck had kind of grown up, Bastion was there first, then Leatherneck grew on and then Shorabak kind of tagged in. I know there were a lot of national caveats and a little bit of turf war, who's in charge of what part of the base. I wasn't surprised that's how the base was set up. Frankly it worked well that night only because (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were bright, sharp guys that worked together and were buddies. That saved it; that saved it. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c Those two guys were in charge of BLS security in the CJOC. (b)(6), (b)(7)c is an RAF regiment officer so they have the patrolling and the ground; the external wire stuff. On top of it, one of the other British Units, Joint Forces Support, JFSpA, another outfit was in charge of the base itself. It was complicated but that night those two guys were able to identify where the attackers were, call out the QRF, bring in close air support. If those two hadn't gotten along and been as comfortable as they were working together, it could have been a lot worse.

Q: If you were aware of it, did you have concerns about the C2 arrangement established by the MOU? Do you recall any discussions involving MajGen Gurganus and/or the RC(SW) staff about the C2 for Force Protection?
A: Not beforehand, again I had been there two weeks before the attack. I was trying to figure out who's who and what my responsibilities were. Later on there was a concern, but there were other, from my perspective anyway, there were other things more pressing. The C2 arrangement seemed to work okay. The other things more pressing at the time were the actions in the Northern part of the RC's AO; force protection efforts were just ongoing--- I think maybe more efforts on the tactical actions outside of Camp BLS; the larger mission.

Q: What was your overall assessment of the insider threat at the BLS Complex and did you have concerns?
A: I guess some; again because there were just so many people around the base and it was hard to tell who was who. An insider threat had started to kind of ramp up and then it actually kind of spiked later, in my opinion anyway, over the next three or four months. That was always a concern because you didn't know who was who. There were always Afghan Soldiers or contractors or people running around. It was always kind of a low lying. I mean, I didn't lose any sleep over it. You just try to keep your wits about you when you're out and about, in the chow hall or kind of in the open area. I don't think anybody was stressed out about it; we wore our flacks and helmets to go to the chow hall that kind of thing. It was always kind of a present threat.

Q: Do you recall the vetting process for the numerous Local National (LN) and Third Country National (TCN) contractors aboard the BLS Complex? Was TFBW responsible for vetting and security of all contractors, or was it split among the various Camps? If the latter, how did you coordinate vetting and security with your UK and Afghan counterparts?
A: I guess there were some disconnects in the overall process; the Brits did it one way, the contractors did it one way, the Americans did it one way, the Marines did it one way, the Soldiers that were in charge of running the base, the installation command guys did it differently. That was one of the things that came out in the Force Protection Review, that we were trying to tighten that up and unify it. So that as soon as somebody got off the plane they immediately got vetted so that it was consistent. Again, some of it was contractual or national caveats. It was inconsistent on how people were vetted but it was something that we were trying to improve.

Q: Please describe any conversations you had with among the RC(SW) command and staff regarding these concerns.
A: I guess as part of ongoing as we were doing the Force Protection Review, we briefed DCOM weekly and got in to see the CG probably every two weeks to tell him, "okay boss, this is kind of what we've come up with; what we've boiled it down to; what we think the key issues are and the way ahead." That was one of them, was vetting and the C2 was very helpful in that; working with again, kind of across the CI guys and across with all the stake holders at the BLS.

Q: Who was responsible for counter-intelligence efforts on the BLS Complex? Were these efforts sufficient? Did they identify any specific insider threats?
A: I think at least for overall it would have been the C2, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), our C2, and his guys. He worked with the installation management guys, he worked with the Brits, he worked with the contracting officer because that was part of the contract for the guys that worked in the chow hall. I think (b)(6), (b)(7)c would kind of be the; that's who I would have gone to with questions about vetting.

Q: Do you recall any specific measures adopted to address the insider threat on the BLS Complex posed by LN and TCN contractors?
A: Afterwards, yes. Again, improving the vetting process I think they rebadged everybody, brought everybody in to rescreen them. The MHG commander, our headquarters commandant, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) started taking an active role in going through the contractor camp and inspecting them. (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Did the RC(SW) staff or TFBW receive any intelligence indications and warnings (I&W) prior to the 14 September attack?
A: No, nothing.

Q: Did it seem odd to you that you had 15 guys in US uniforms, they were able to breach at the weakest point at the perfect time of the night on the best night of the month?
A: I'm sure it wasn't random. Again, I think our biggest concern was VBEID and indirect fire. In fact I'm not surprised that there wasn't any I&W on that because I think that the 2 shop was focused on providing Intel for the larger mission and Force Protection was kind of a supporting effort; but I'm sure like you said it was not random. Those guys were pretty good.

Q: They came through the British AO on Camp Bastion; why do you think they were able to move without detection through that AO and then onto the base?
A: That side of the base, I'm sure you've seen the maps, there are a couple of little hills out there so there were some people that kind of tucked into the fence and took advantage of US presence. Then of course, the runoff water, they grew poppy and stuff out there, that was probably part of it. That side of the base has a lot of micro-terrain.

Q: From your assessment, were the Brits paying attention to that kind of vulnerability over there?
A: I think they were. They had done a big Force Protection Review and Brigadier Skeates who was a Targeting Acquisition guy put a lot of emphasis on ISR; a lot of the cameras, a lot of the video, the balloons. That was part of it. Then manning of the towers; due to manpower shortages they went to every other tower. I think it was probably (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) one of the Brits had told us that manning shortages was why they had gone to every other tower.

Q: Do you feel that you underestimated the enemy?
A: On the US side it was Triple Canopy contractors and those towers were manned 24/7 all along. They probably had some unmanned towers on the west side too but the west side, pancake flat wide open, nobody out there so probably easier to keep an eye on. Whereas the east side, the Brit side was tougher; I think we underestimated the enemy on that side. It's easy to look back in retrospect. There were people moving around out there and for the most part, just local civilians doing business but you never know and that was one more vulnerable part of the base; so yes I think we did.

Q: Was that vulnerability understood by RC SW chain of command?

A: I'm sure it was understood but again, you have to set priorities you can't be strong everywhere, all the time. Again, I think based on the priorities of work, what we thought was the greatest vulnerability, that's what we focused on.

Q: Was there an issue with the British "sovereignty" on that side of the base? Was there a requirement placed on the Brits by the RC(SW) chain of command to step up the FP efforts out there?
A: There was always sovereignty concerns, that was Brit turf and they kind of had been there first and they were protective of their area and their way of doing business and their chain of command was very complex; I still don't quite understand how it worked. So that was always a part of it, in any coalition warfare and trying to work with your allies. But we were able to work around most of it based on personal relationships, once you get to know them; this is a team sport, we're trying to protect everybody. That was kind of a constant issue. Sometimes the Brits, their hands were tied too with what they could and couldn't do and what their chain of command would allow. Some of it would go all the way back to the Ministry of Defence via other aspects of their military; it was sometimes hard to understand and work with them. In general they were good teammates and carried a pretty heavy part of the load. But looking back, could they have done it better? Sure. I'm sure we could have done it better on our side too.

Q: Although there was no unity of command over AT/FP for the entire BLS Complex, do you know what mechanisms were in place to ensure unity of effort with your UK and Afghan counterparts?
A: That was Task Force Belleau Wood through the CJOC again with 2/10 and 5th Force Protection Wing, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) those guys working together. That was how it worked, all at the CJOC under Task Force Belleau Wood's kind of umbrella. That was how we ran Force Protection for the base. It continued that way too. Then eventually, I'm sure you know we transferred lead responsibility. MajGen Gurganus assigned General Sturdevant kind of as the base commander so that he had another general officer in there that would be focused on Force Protection. This occurred after the attack; it didn't happen formally until January or so. That was a local thing, we didn't know if that was going to fly at CENTCOM or with the Brits but that was something at least internal to have one guy doing it. Before that, it was mainly cooperative, we had a lot of paperwork but it boiled down to professionalism between some key field grade officers.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: What was your assessment of the UK forces' ability to protect Camp Bastion? Did you have direct observation of their force protection? Please explain.
A: The Force Protection Wing was pretty good. The guys that were outside the wire, they were trained. They were pretty good; they'd get out and patrol, they had pretty good reaction forces. They were well armed. The internal guys, were not as good in my opinion. They were just regular Soldiers and they would have them stand guard along the fence line. I think that during the daytime it was fine; you can sit up in the tower and you can see quite a bit. But at night, they didn't have NVGs in the towers, Comms weren't that great.

QUES: Was the lack of NVGs or the Comms problems ever addressed to the Brits?
A: It certainly was, as part of the Force Protection Review recommendations after the attack. Again, that was kind of sensitive; we were telling them how to do business.

Q: Don't you have an obligation to secure your force?
A: Yes absolutely, but again, that's where it became kind of sensitive. That was British turf, Brit rules, which is not the same as the way we do business. But, again that was their responsibility that was their base, they lived there, they were protecting themselves as well as the Americans that were on that side of the base.

Q: Did you actually get to go to the breach site later, and take a look at it, walk the terrain out there, that kind of thing?
A: I didn't go outside, but I certainly, with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he walked me through the whole process from where the fence was cut all the way up into the fuel farm and into the hangars. Then we walked up to the towers to kind of get an idea of how things looked from up there. I didn't go out, but you could see it Sir. It was a couple hundred meters you could see it right from the fence.

Q: The point the breach occurred in the near vicinity of the tower, do you know why that tower was not manned.
A: I think it was every other one. I don't know exactly, but the one to the right and to the left of it were manned.

Q: Did you get a chance to go up in those towers as well?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did they have night vision devices in those towers?
A: Not that I saw, no.

Q: What about on top of the tower, was there an infrared night camera?
A: Not on the tower sir, but I know we put in more. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Q: So the breach occurred there, and the 15 insurgents were able to move pretty deep into the interior of the base; it appears that was a single point of failure and there was no layered defense either in front of it or behind it. So once the insurgents breached, they were in and it's "bar the door and call the QRF," is that correct?
A: Pretty much, sir, I guess so. As I recall it, the insurgents were able to get in and then they split into two groups. I think they were trying to get past the airfield into the main-side. Part of them got to the fuel farm and lit it up and the other part got to the aircraft and destroyed the aircraft. At that point, the Marines realized what was going on and grabbed rifles and started firing back. The bad guys, once the Marines identified them, the bad guys melted. They were not competent they just tried to hide and the Marines hunted them down and killed all but one.

Q: Back to the previous question, about the ability of UK forces to secure Camp Bastion. Their manning you said was down to the point that they could only man every other tower. They did not have the proper equipment potentially and there was no layered defense. In other words, you make the breach you're in, there's nothing out there to stop you?
A: I think they did have internal patrols. There may have been fences around or defensive measures around the individual areas. I would not say that it was a defense in depth. Subsequently, yes.

Q: Is that a violation of how you do Force Protection?
A: It is a violation of the way Marines do it, the way US Soldiers do it.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: The significant drawdown in forces for RC(SW) in 2012 are well documented. Did you have enough personnel in RC(SW) to conduct your assigned mission, including force protection?
A: I think so. General Gurganus brought in an RFF, he brought in an Infantry Battalion. He sent--his concern was for Force Protection down in Camp Dwyer so he sent two Infantry Companies down there to reinforce the Force Protection there and he had a couple of Infantry Companies attached to Task Force Belleau Wood which gave him more of an opportunity to get out and kind of go on the offensive, do more patrolling and more engagement out there in kind of that whole eastern-southern portion of Task Force Belleau Wood AO.

Q: By August 2012, I think they were down to what one interviewee said was two patrols per day.
A: That sounds about right, sir. Again, that was just as I was getting there so I wasn't really tracking that. I do know that Task Force Belleau Wood had a battery out at a patrol base kind of at the southwest corner and they did some of the patrolling out there kind of along the seam between Task Belleau Wood's AO and Task Force Helmand's AO. Then I think that there were some patrolling near the Brits in and near the flight line, the tesseral is what that they called that.

Q: Back to the point of penetration on Camp Bastion, the enemy came across and now they're on the airfield; you have the LSA there undefended, you have the fuel pit undefended, you have the other facilities pretty much undefended. Was there ever a question or a concern from 3d MAW about security? Did they ever express any issues with that, that you're aware of?
A: Not that I knew of beforehand but afterwards, yes. They went to enhanced procedures. Again, I had been there two weeks, and the Force Protection was another part of 3-shop so I hadn't really tracked that. I don't know if I had been to that side of the base at that point.

Q: Were you aware of the JSIVA that was conducted back in June, probably later I'm sure you were.
A: Again, later I was, Sir. That was part of our Force Protection review, going over what the JSIVA had identified, identifying how we were going to implement that, and what else needed to be implemented.

Q: Do you recall any conversations with General Gurganus and the RC(SW) staff, for example (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding mitigation of the JSIVA? It occurred in June and then 90 days later you're attacked. There's a 90-day gap where potentially some mitigation could have occurred.
A: Some of it had happened. One of the things the JSIVA identified was that there should be a fence around the airfield itself to keep people or animals from walking around there. I know that was a concern that had apparently gotten held up in contracting. Afterwards, as part of the kind of consequence management working group and the Force Protection review we did go back and look at that. I know that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) crew had briefed General Gurganus. I know that they talked about the JSIVA but I don't remember anything specific about it, Sir.

Q: Any interaction with General Sturdevant or the 3d MAW FWD team before the attack?
A: Not other than just getting to know them or know that I'd be working with them.

Q: So just introductory stuff?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Then after the attack, General Sturdevant, was obviously very focused on preventing it from happening again, that kind of thing, did you detect any complacency on the part of his staff or his team regarding Force Protection?
A: No, I don't think so Sir. They were focused on their primary mission, flying planes, dropping bombs and moving troops and equipment. So, I don't think, so but I wasn't focused on that until afterwards.

Q: Although prior to the attack it was deemed adequate to man approximately 50% of the guard towers on the BLS Complex, two of the immediate changes to Force Protection identified in the JRB Supplemental Review after the attack were 100% manning of all Camp Bastion guard towers and additional Marines assigned to TFBW SECFOR. What do you attribute this to?
A: I think we were reassessing our vulnerability and realizing that maybe that should have been a higher priority and certainly we're not going to let it happen again. And we didn't want the bad guys saying, if we could do it once maybe we could do it again. So I think that was the command's way of making sure that did not happen.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: One interviewee expressed a concern that prior to the attack, only half of the guard towers were manned, yet there seemed to be an excess of Marines in MWR facilities and coffee shops that could have otherwise been performing guard duty. Did you share this concern?
A: I'm sure we could have put people over there but it wouldn't have been Americans. That was British turf and that was their responsibility and they were going to do it their way with their people. I don't think that would have been accepted.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by US personnel prior to the attack? If so, what do you attribute this to?
A: I don't think so Sir, no.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by UK personnel prior to the attack?
A: Again, probably not by their standards, but by our standards, we do things differently. That side of the base, the Force Protection standards, Force Protection was executed differently than on the west side of the base.

Q: In recognizing that FP was conducted differently on that side of the base, did General Gurganus or any members of the RC SW staff do anything to mitigate that shortfall did we work with 3d MAW to re-enforce FP measures over there.
A: I don't know. After the attack, yes absolutely, but before, I don't know sir.

Q: Do you think based on your relationship with him, was General Sturdevant concerned that he's sitting over there in a place where FP was conducted to a different standard.
A: I think he probably was. Again I don't know but I think as a follow-on, I worked pretty closely with his G-3, I think he probably had been. But again, the focus was on the larger mission. It was probably always a concern but the focus was on flying planes and moving people and supplies. I think AT/FP was just kind of a supporting effort. But again, I don't know before the attack.

Q: What's the distance from the perimeter fence to the runway roughly? Small arms range?
A: It is small arms range; although it is kind of micro-terrain. You couldn't shoot anybody on the airfield from the fence. It's within probably a thousand meters easy.

Q: General Sturdevant never expressed any concerns about that that you're aware of?
A: Not that I'm aware of sir.

Q: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) his 3, did he ever express any concerns about that?
A: Not before the attack; after the attack yes. After the attack on 15 September, that was an overriding concern; but before that no.

Q: The fact that they were sitting in a location protected to a lower standard of FP then US Forces receive typically? The fact that it's not a layered defense, this is literally a single point of failure and once you breach you're in, the fact that there's no layered defense inside of the wire, that didn't concern anyone?
A: Again, I don't know sir. In the two weeks that I got there, I don't know. I don't think that I had been on that side of the base. Afterwards, yes. People look back and say we need to fix this but I can't tell you what the concern or the opinions were before the attack, just based on not having been there long enough. But afterwards, yes, that was 100 percent effort and that's all we did for the next six weeks was a shift in effort. Engineers got out and all impediments before went away. We were able to get GBOSS towers in, we were able to--

QUES: --Did General Gurganus direct that?
A: Yes he did, sir.

Q: Why did he direct it after the attack and not before the attack?
A: I don't know, sir.

Q: Did General Sturdevant ask for that before the attack and it was not provided?
A: I don't know. I doubt it. I'm sure that had he asked for it the CG would have done whatever he needed to get it into action.

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	PAGE 7 OF 8 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

STATEMENT OF	TAKEN AT	DATED
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	Camp Pendleton	20130620

STATEMENT (continued)

Q: In your interaction with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did he indicate the either he or General Sturdevant had ever asked for it at any time and was denied that?
A: I do remember talking (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as part of the Force Protection review and follow on. They were frustrated about not being able to get a fence and there's always some ongoing friction with the Brits over a lot of things; the way the airfield was run, and Force Protection, and just life in general on the east side of the base.

Q: Was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) oversight being conducted at the appropriate level, was he on top of that? Did he not recognize as the ATFPO of RC (SW) the vulnerability of 3d MAW (FWD)?
A: I don't know sir, in retrospect, probably not.

Q: One interviewee informed us that the attitude of personnel on the BLS Complex might have been that it was "too big to fail." Do you agree? Do you believe that US personnel displayed this attitude?
A: I don't know. Again, I think we probably did assume that since we were kind of out in the middle of nowhere, we were a long way from Sangan, Musa Kala, Kajaki, we probably did feel relatively safe. If you're going to be in Helmand Province, that corner of Washer District is safer than other parts. So that probably was a general feeling. I think most people would realize that you're never safe in Afghanistan, anywhere. So relative is still not safe; safer than maybe the grunts that are out at the patrol base or closer to the Taliban area but we're never really safe.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
A: No, I guess not sir. It was unfortunate and I do think that maybe that horse was out of the barn but afterwards we absolutely ramped it up. A lot of people have asked what happened and why, in retrospect it was force priority. We had a lot of effort to improve the front gate where trucks came and went every day, right by the Afghan military base, indirect fire, insider threat. The threat of being breached was low but I don't think that I have anything to add. I hope I provided something useful.

END OF STATEMENT

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AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 8. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STAEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFUT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

WITNESSESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of April 2017

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Deputy SJA I MLG Camp Pendleton, CA

(Authority TO Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)