SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10USC Section301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number *(SSN)*.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Pendleton, CA	20130619	1100	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)		(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, CA

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Where are you currently assigned?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camp Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?

A: Sir, I was the RC(SW) C-2 for MajGen Gurganus.

Q: When did you arrive at RC(SW) as the C-2, and when did you depart?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: How was your relationship with MajGen Gurganus? How often did you interact?

A: For the first half of the deployment, I saw him several times per week. It was daily after I became the C-2. I had an excellent relationship with MajGen Gurganus.

Q: As C-2 for RC(SW), did you have any responsibilities associated with Anti Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) of Camp Leatherneck or the greater BLS Complex? If so, please describe them.

A: Intelligence updates on the threats on the Leatherneck side of BLS.

Q: How frequent was your interaction with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW)?

A: I spoke with him a few times a week, and my section would interact with TFBW almost daily.

Q: How did TFBW pull intelligence on current AT/FP threats?

A: TFBW had their own intelligence section, but our buildings were literally 10 meters apart, so they could come over any time they needed information. They were also on the distro for any products that we pushed to the RC major subordinate commands. They were getting everything that we were pushing out.

Q: Going up the chain of command, how often did you interact with the intelligence personnel at IJC and ISAF/USFOR-A? In what capacity did you interact with them? How often?

A: Depending on the functional area that we were talking about, I would interact with them 2-5 times per week depending on what week it was. I had a good relationship with the CJ2 at IJC, BGEN Paul Nakasone. I had worked with him before, and he gave me everything I needed.

Q: How much of your overall intelligence effort in Afghanistan did you spend on identifying AT/FP threats?

A: My counter intelligence folks, including my staff CI officer, were focused exclusively on threats on the base or in close proximity to the base.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	NG STATEMENT	PAGE 1 of 6 PAGES

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Did you feel that you had adequate manning in your intelligence section? Were your personnel properly trained? Did you have access to the proper systems, databases, and intelligence information?
A: Absolutely, Sir. I had access to everything. JWICS, NSA Net, CENTRIX, and obviously NIPR and SIPR. I had it all in one location. We moved into what we called the 30K building after I took over as the C2.

Q: Where were you during the attack on 14-15 September 2012?
A: I was in the 30K building that I just referred to. I was still at work.

Q: Based on your experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts as the attack unfolded?
A: It was quickly apparent that this was not an exercise. My concern as we went into lockdown was that there was information that I felt I needed to get to the command deck. I left the compound and went to the command deck to get into contact with the CG and the C-3 to let them know what we knew, which quite frankly, was very little at the time.

Q: Did your duties as C-2 require you to take action during the attack?
A: Not other than trying to find out what was going on, or determining intelligence indicators of what might follow.

Q: Did you have any ISR shortfalls or gaps at the time of the attack?
A: No, Sir. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Did you believe this was adequate? Had you previously requested more assets? If so, when and to whom did you make the request? What was the result?
A: I think it was adequate, Sir. I had not requested anything specifically for the BLS Complex that we didn't get.

Q: What was the enemy Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) and the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) at the time of the attack?
A: As we went back and looked at the attack, I think they accomplished what they set out to do by destroying the aircraft. If they would have turned 90 degrees to their port side towards the living facilities, it would have been significantly worse. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Did you have concerns about the insider threat posed by LN and TCN contractors? If so, please describe any conversations you had with the RC(SW) staff regarding your concerns.
A: Absolutely. The LN and TCN population on BLS Complex was significant. On the Leatherneck side alone, we had 2500-3000 contractors. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Did you ever express any concerns to MajGen Gurganus or anyone else regarding the vetting of contractors or anything similar?
A: Yes Sir, I did. From a CI perspective, we needed to identify who these people were and what the badging procedures were. My CI guys brought that up to me on a regular basis, and I shared that with MajGen Gurganus that the threat was there. He fully understood that the threat was there, and he gave me direction and guidance to mitigate that threat as best we could. I think we did.

Q: Was TFBW responsible for vetting and security of all contractors, or was it split among the various Camps? If the latter, how did you coordinate vetting and security with your UK and Afghan counterparts?
A: For Leatherneck, TFBW had a part of the badging process, and I think the IMCOM people did too, since they were more or less in charge of the contractor population. It was different among the camps, and at first, there were even different badging procedures on Leatherneck. My CI guys worked with TFBW, IMCOM, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) get one solid procedure on Leatherneck, and I felt pretty good about it.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I believe that was fixed prior to the attack. My CI and HUMINT staff officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), did a phenomenal job. He's one of the best I've ever seen on the CI and HUMINT side.

Q: Describe the security measures in place for contractors to get onto the BLS Complex once they were vetted and hired. What control measures, if any, were in place for contractors once they were inside the compound?
A: The badging was the most visible control measure. The different colors indicated where you could be, whether you had to be escorted on the base, whether you had to be escorted to and from your domicile to your place of work, and things like that.

Q: Who was responsible for counter-intelligence efforts on the BLS Complex? Were these efforts sufficient? Did they identify any specific insider threats?
A: I was responsible for CI as the senior intelligence officer. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c Those teams were led by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), my CI and HUMINT staff officer.

Q: Describe what the term "Indications and Warnings (I&W)" means to an intelligence professional?
A: Yes Sir, those are intelligence tips that we get that would give us an indication of enemy activities that are in the works or imminent.

Q: Where does intelligence on I&W come from?
A: A variety of means and sources, including Signals Intelligence, Human Intelligence, open source intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, across the breadth and spectrum of the intelligence capability. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Please generally explain how the intelligence community (IC) works together to develop and share I&W.
A: Within the RC(SW) intelligence community and the Marine Corps intelligence community writ large, we take the various intelligence reporting, and the all-source intelligence, analysts take a look at it and try to identify any trends or anything imminent that is about to occur. If it is imminent, we would put that out immediately to the relevant unit, first with a phone call and then by pushing it electronically.

Q: Who is responsible for fusing various sources of intelligence for a commander at the RC level? How is this done in practice?
A: That is my responsibility as the RC(SW) C-2. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: What responsibility does the J-2 at USFOR-A/ISAF have for disseminating intelligence product to IJC? What about IJC to the RCs? The RCs to their subordinate commands?
A: It would be unusual for higher headquarters to push intelligence down unless they had access to something that a lower headquarters didn't have. As the guy on the ground, I had better SA on what was going on in our RC. So the information flow usually went the other way, from the bottom up. We would push finished intelligence reports up the chain, in the form of INTSUMs and the like. The only thing that might come down to us was intelligence from our neighboring RCs that was relevant to us.

Q: How does the dissemination of I&W work in practice?
A: If it was coming from IJC, I would expect a phone call and then a push of the electronic data.

Q: On the other side of the coin, what responsibility do the intelligence staffs at the various command levels have for pulling I&W that is available in the IC?
A: Most of I&W is pushed. Products that get hung on various intelligence portals can be mined during data research, but it is not typically I&W-type information.

Q: What I&W existed prior to the attack on BLS Complex?
A: Specifically regarding the attack, not very much. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: If there was a lack of I&W for this attack, what do you attribute that to?
A: Quite frankly Sir, the intelligence community missed it. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Did any level of command miss I&W that existed in the IC?
A: I don't think so, Sir. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: What do you attribute the collection gap to?
A: We may have just been in the wrong place at the wrong time with assets. But I don't think so. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: What role did you play regarding intelligence collection and analysis on the attack after it occurred?
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Do you think we had a local collection gap at BLS on 14-15 September 2012?
(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Did the UK identify it to you that they had a HUMINT gap on Camp Bastion, or did you identify it to them?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(1)1.4c

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(1)1.4c

Q: Was there any indications of "scrappers" helping the attack team?
A: No Sir, there were no indications of that. Based on the fact that wire cutters were found at multiple locations after the attack, our assessment was that the attackers conducted the breach themselves.

Q: Did you actually make it out to the breach site? What was your impression?
A: I did go out there, Sir, and my impression was that their approach and breach was tactically sound. They probably knew through surveillance where they wanted to go in. The two pop-up villages on the eastern side of the base, Nawabad and Sheikabad, were out there. (b)(1)1.4c They used the wire cutters to breach the perimeter fence, they moved in and breached the concertina wire, and then they had access to the flight line and the aircraft. I think surveillance led them to a breach point next to an unmanned tower. It is speculation on my part, but that's how I would have done it. Use surveillance to determine vulnerabilities based on tower rotations, terrain, and the like. I think that this was well-planned and coordinated.

Q: What was the UK intelligence assessment of the attack?
A: There was only one C2 section for the RC and that was mine. There were force protection personnel on the Camp Bastion side, and they may have had some intelligence officers. But I had 22 Brits integrated into my C2 staff, including my OPSO. It was virtually one team, and by the end of the surge recovery, I had as many Brits on my staff as I had Americans.

Q: When you spoke to the UK intelligence personnel on your staff, what did they think of the attack?
A: We discussed it, and tried to piece together the intelligence. That was a single team effort. I don't recall any speculation on their part about what the cause of the successful breach was.

Q: Where was the PGSS aimed, and why do you think that was unable to detect the attackers?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Q: For the GBOSS or PGSS that may have been able to observe the attackers, who would actually monitor that feed?
A: It would have been the CJOC.

Q: Do you recall the assessed threat to BLS at the time of the attack?
A: The VBIED threat was the most prominent (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c The threat to all the major installations was constant and consistent. The insider threat was a constant theme based on what was going on in Afghanistan at the time. (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c

Q: Would your C-2 section have been in the decision making process regarding mitigation of vulnerabilities identified during the "burning man incident" or the JSIVA?
A: If it was a vulnerability inside the wire, which these were, it was our CI people who would go back and take a look at how it might have been connected to insider threats. That would be fed to the C3.

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Q: Based on the vulnerability of the flight line identified during the "burning man incident" and the JSIVA, do you think the mitigation measures, which primarily included anti-vehicular measures, were reasonable?
A: Yes, based on the resources we had at the time. We were primarily looking at the vehicular threat. If it was going to be an insider attack, it would have been small arms. It would have been TCN contractors that were trying to conduct an attack, and they would have had to smuggle small arms or an explosive on board the base to conduct an attack. So focusing on the vehicles as opposed to individuals – because individuals really came back to a CI function – was reasonable at the time.

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: When you visited the breach point, what were your impressions as far as observation from the towers that were manned at the time of the breach?
A: We visited both of the towers that were manned, and also the one that was unmanned. At night, with low illumination, it would have been difficult to see anything out there from either of the manned towers. They probably could have seen it with NODs, but I would be speculating to make a judgment on whether they should have seen the infiltration and breach.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
A: Sir, from my perspective as the C2, the immediate thought was "how did we miss this?" "Was there something that we should have picked up on?" As we went back and looked at all the reporting and the raw intelligence as well, there wasn't a whole lot of I&W for this attack. It's hard not to feel bad for not developing more intelligence before the attack, but I don't think we missed anything. The threat at the time was high for all of the major installations, and I think we had appropriately used our resources to mitigate the threats that we were looking at, both inside and outside the wire. I think we were postured appropriately with our collection assets based on where we were focused operationally. As you can imagine, I have second-guessed myself several times regarding whether I should have had guys here versus there. But at the end of the day, I'm proud of my team and the work that we did. We looked very hard at this attack and what we might have done better, and more importantly, what we could do in the future to preclude it from happening again. I think the command team was doing what it was supposed to be doing, and taking the appropriate measures for the threat we faced and the mission were trying to accomplish as well. I understand the nature of this investigation, and that it is about accountability. It's not an excuse, but this was combat, and we couldn't prevent everything. I don't think anyone feels any worse about this than the folks who were there on site at the time.

END OF STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STAEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFUT OR REWARD, WITHOUT TH (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) D WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(ing Statement)

Subscribed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) rson authorized by law to administer August, 2013

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
g Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Deputy SJA, 1st MLG
(Authority TO Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMEN (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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