



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) **, former** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) **, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)**

1. The investigation team conducted a recorded interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) **for Operations, I MEF (FWD) on 19 June 2013 at Camp Pendleton, CA as part of the AR 15-6 investigation into the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) executed a permanent change of station (PCS) subsequent to the interview, and he is currently unavailable to sign and return a sworn statement. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that the dialogue transcribed below is an accurate account of the interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The recorded interview is on file with the investigative team.**

Q: Where are you currently assigned?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?

A: Sir, I was the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) **.**

Q: When did you arrive at RC(SW) as the C-3, and when did you depart?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: How was your relationship with MajGen Gurganus? How often did you interact?

A: Sir, pretty much daily, multiple times during the day probably.

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being the UK contingent, then all our other bases. So he would work with the individual ATFPOs for each one of those locations and help them out.

Q: Then within the Camp Leatherneck/Bastion complex it was primarily (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and his ATFPO?

A: Yes, sir and his work with the UK and their piece in that. Now after this happened, I did say hey (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) need to get involved in this because you have the most experience and you need to help them out. So get more involved and ensure they know exactly what they're doing and you have some of those contacts that you can help them with. Probably after September is when he started getting a little more involved in the weekly force protection meetings that we developed when we saw that there was a gap between what the UK was doing and what we were doing.

Q: Did you have an adequate RIP/TOA with your predecessors, LtGen Toolan and his staff?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you feel that they adequately addressed any AT/FP vulnerabilities which may have existed on the BLS Complex?

A: I don't know the answer to that sir. I didn't get involved in that type of detail. That was probably between the MHG Commanders the guy that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) replaced, so I don't know the answer to that. But from my perspective I got a great turn-over from my counter-part and my C3 section obviously got some good turn-overs from their counterparts; that's the only thing I can comment on.

Q: Where were you on 14 September 2012 when the attack commenced?

A: Sir, I was at Camp Leatherneck. I was in my office when it kicked off and then the COC.

Q: Based on your experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts as the attack unfolded?

A: I think we're a big base and it is not uncommon for us constantly to get probes throughout the camp. Every once in a while we would get people acting funny, acting like scrappers but we always assumed that the scrappers were just guys just looking, just probing; we got rocket attacks, so it was not a surprise to me for the camp, a big target, to be attacked or to be at least probed.

Q: Did your duties require you to take any specific actions in response to the attack?

A: No sir, what we established was MHG established a combined COC with the Brits so that was where the response was for the camp. Then I just like any other camp that was getting attacked, I provided that overwatch and provided

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resources if they needed, the helicopters, the surveillance. We turn all that inward when we saw this happening; we started managing the big picture.

Q: Were you aware of the 2011 MOU between CENTCOM and the UK PJHQ, which established a bifurcated C2 architecture for Force Protection of Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion?

A: I wasn't aware of that specific document but I heard about it after the fact when we realized there were a few more gaps than we would want in the way that we did business. We got a little bit of a smattering of that when we first got there when we had what we call the "burning man incident" where the guy lit himself on fire and tried to drive onto the runway. So we cleaned up some of that command and control architecture when that happened. But I wasn't specifically aware of that specific document.

Q: If you were aware of it, did you have concerns about the C2 arrangement established by the MOU? Do you recall any discussions involving MajGen Gurganus and/or the RC(SW) staff about the C2 for Force Protection?

A: I don't think we had any discussions on that portion of it, no sir.

Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ever discuss it with you?

A: No sir. That would probably be (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) baby but he never talked specifically with me about that and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) didn't either. At that point in time, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was still focusing big picture and wasn't focusing inward at that point.

Q: What was your overall assessment of the insider threat at the BLS Complex and did you have concerns?

A: We had a concern on all the camps when it comes to insider threats. We were constantly doing sweeps; the CG was very specific on that. He wanted us to be as vigilant as possible from day one. He was, "I want to change up the look, I want to change them daily, weekly, don't get into a routine." We had a daily meeting with the C3, Intel, and MHG would come to those, and it was a constant beating of the drum, "hey are we changing up our look on the gates, our patrols, everything else?" The answer was always yes. I think the CG's focus was in the right location and the responses he was getting. He would get up in a helicopter and fly around; he would do a ride along with MHG and make adjustments on the spot. He was very clear where his focus was, where our focus was when it came to the internal base.

Q: Do you recall the vetting process for the numerous Local National (LN) and Third Country National (TCN) contractors aboard the BLS Complex? Was TFBW responsible for vetting and security of all contractors, or was it split among the various Camps? If the latter, how did you coordinate vetting and security with your UK and Afghan counterparts?

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A: That was more a Belleau Wood thing. I was responsible for the (b)(1)1.4a and whatever they brought in there, their Afghan counterparts to the Rangers. Every 90 days maybe they always had trouble getting vetted via Task Force Belleau Wood, because Task Force Belleau Wood put them through the wringer. I do not know the process behind that. I just know that every 90 days the Rangers would come up bitching about getting their guys through because it's taking too long. So I know the process was happening and that was with internal guys, ANA type of guys; again out of my lane, but I'm assuming the same type of painful process was happening for the LNs. I do not know the answer for that, but it was happening for the military so I'm assuming by the same person, Task Force Belleau Wood, it's happening for the non-military.

Q: Did you have any concerns about that; particularly the contractors and their ability once they were vetted and approved and had access to the base, one of our interviewees described it as free-range, they could move freely between Bastion, Leatherneck, Shorabak, and the only places you couldn't get into were some of the tighter compounds.

A: It's always a concern. It could be ANA. It could be the guy you're escorting, thinking he's the provincial peace counselor guy. There was always a concern of insider threat and people collectively.

Q: Was that discussed at your command staff and other type meetings you had?

A: Routinely. Again, the CG was constantly putting pressure on Task Force Belleau Wood to do sweeps through all those locations, "civvie-city," doing checks on those, sweeps for cell phones, all that stuff on a routine basis. I would say that it was no doubt there was a threat there, but we were taking steps to mitigate. The CG was giving direct guidance on how to do it. "Civvie City" is where all the civilians or LNs, contractors lived. They all had their own little pods. We were constantly hitting up the American contractors sweeping theirs, making sure there was no alcohol, contraband, and phones; same thing with LNs. You had concrete contractors, you had gravel guys. At the front gate it was constantly put them in the wringer, wear them out, search dogs people and then doing the same thing on base.

Q: Who was responsible for counter-intelligence efforts on the BLS Complex? Were these efforts sufficient? Did they identify any specific insider threats?

A: I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was responsible for overall counter-intelligence and I think there's some type of legalities when it comes to counter-ntel and I'm not smart on that, but he was responsible for all counter-intel. He had folks, I think with Task Force Belleau Wood, that would coordinate with him on a consistent basis. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was our guy that was trying to work that counter-intel piece for the RC but he was responsible for the RC.

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Then there was the UK side, the Bastion side, and they had their piece that was constantly active. I think they have different rules and I don't know the answer to this, and this is counter-intel stuff, but we could be a little more aggressive, a little more active and I don't think that they could, either because they didn't have the number of people or their ROE or their legalities wouldn't allow them to do certain things. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) brought that up early and you would have to ask him, he was our Intel Officer. It was originally (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) took over from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). But he brought it up and we wanted to work a relationship where we could go back and forth between Bastion and Leatherneck to make sure people weren't hiding out at Bastion or hiding out at Leatherneck. And then when they come on from Shorabak to make sure that we were being able to intercept them. So (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would probably be the best person to talk to about counter-intelligence.

Q: Do you recall any specific measures adopted to address the insider threat on the BLS Complex posed by LN and TCN contractors?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I know was doing their counter-intel stuff whatever their operations are. (b)(1)1.4c

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So they were constantly working that on the BLS but also throughout the rest of the RC. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was a counter-intel officer who worked for (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); he worked in the Intel shop.

Q: Did you receive any intelligence indications and warnings (I&W) prior to the 14 September attack?

A: No, sir not that I remember. I know that we got constant kind of chatter and it wasn't consistent but it was like "hey we're going to attack something." There was nothing saying that "we're going to attack Bastion and Leatherneck; we're not going to attack the base in this area." It was just vague, constant "hey we're going to have this big attack" like we heard from the Taliban for so long, and from the insurgents. Nothing saying "hey we're going to attack the base with the big air field" or "we're going to attack Shorabak." There was routine bravado, we're going to attack a Camp and nothing would happen. Nothing would happen. So nothing specific but there was always the chatter and the talk.

Q: What was your assessment of the C-2 section at RC(SW)?

A: Solid, sir; they got in front of a lot of stuff, used all of our assets very well, the SIGINT, HUMINT. They were good networks, and they had good communication. They pushed the word out as quick as threats came in. The first thing the CG would ask was, "does Shorabak know that there's a threat against Shorabak." Yes they do. "Does Dwyer know that there's some communication down by Dwyer indicating that there may be an IED attack somewhere." Yes they do. The answer was always that they had already been informed. That network used in

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their communication mode was very good. That was coming from the top too; coming from higher headquarters to us and then us pushing us down was very smooth flowing.

Q: Although there was no unity of command over AT/FP for the entire BLS Complex, do you know what mechanisms were in place to ensure unity of effort with your UK and Afghan counterparts?

A: Again getting out of my lane a little bit here, I don't know if the unity of command was that jacked up. I know that the unity of effort was there. I would say that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), who took over when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was gone, they have a better idea on how that unity of command/unity of effort was. There was a joint COC and that was used very effectively during the attack. That was where everything stemmed from and that's why we got response out there very quick, and then got the Rangers to go out there so I would say the response was as smooth as it could be on a base that big with essentially boundaries between the UK and the US side because of a one joint COC. Before I would say that the unity of command was all jacked up I would probably ask (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) about that. I think that there were just typical boundaries as well as different ROE that we had to deal with throughout the coalition whether it be with the Jordanians, whether it be with the Bahrainis, we're dealing with that everywhere; the Bahrainis on the front gate, the Jordanians out in the north, so I wouldn't necessarily say that the command and control was jacked up. I would just say that we had to work within a bunch of national caveats.

Q: Tied to that, who was in charge with AT/FP or Camp BLS?

A: From the US perspective it was Task Force Belleau Wood. I do not know the guy for Bastion, I think it was the AEW for the UK guys. They had a relationship and I don't know that relationship because I didn't dig into that detail. But there was a US guy and there was a UK guy that shared that responsibility and did the coordination when it came to the cross boundary. They were doing that since day one so again, I don't know how good it was but I know it was in place because we constantly had UK guys outside the wire going through and doing passage of lines with US guys as well as all the other coalition guys out there helping us; the Bahrainis on the front gate, the Jordanians and everybody else. I do not know; I would say (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from the US perspective when it came to Task Force Belleau Wood and then their counterpart I think was an O-6 on the UK side, the Bastion side. They had a relationship.

Q: What was your assessment of the UK forces' ability to protect Camp Bastion? Please explain.

A: I did not walk the grounds so I cannot give you an eyes-on perspective. The only thing I can say is after the attack when we did our investigation with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) we found out that every other sanger tower was being manned. That was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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A: Yes, sir. We were constantly looking for more bodies, there was no doubt, and everybody was. I think we took the biggest cut of all; about 10,000 Marines. The boss was very clear about Force Protection of BLS was top of the list so we made sure that we didn't cut from there. We did cut from MHG; Intel guys, COMM guys but we tried to avoid and I don't know the exact numbers, but we tried to avoid cutting anything when it came to Force Protection and that was a constant beating on the drum from the boss, but also from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and everybody else so we kept as many as possible. I think that we felt like as we drew down, wow, it would be nice to have more bodies to continue, not necessarily for force protection, but do what we thought was our mission. So you'll probably constantly hear people say, we could have done more if we had more bodies but that was the state we were in; we had to draw down. We drew down the majority of the ground guys, the GCE, some of the aviation and a lot of the logistics guys; we cut the logistics guys pretty close. But we kind of kept the force protection guys in place because we knew that was going to be the last thing that goes. Our constant comment kind of was that at some point in time you're going to cut us so deep that all we're doing is Force Protection; we're just in retrograde, but we weren't at that point yet but we had good Force Protection. We constantly re-evaluated that. The boss wouldn't let us cut; someone would day "hey, we could put the Jordanian's over here bring the Jordanians down," and his response was "nope, I want Americans." "I want westerners covering this base." That was one of his red lines.

Q: The Joint Review Board's Supplemental Review, appointed by MajGen Gurganus and led by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that the 14 March 2012 airfield incursion (often referred to as "the burning man incident"), "...raised concerns regarding the security of the flight line and its assets and access to critical areas within the Bastion airfield. This incident also demonstrated the need to improve airfield and perimeter security and to institute some level of increased access control to the airfield operating areas." Although this incident occurred just two days after MajGen Gurganus took command of RC(SW), how did the RC(SW) staff respond to it? How serious of an incident did it seem to be at the time?

A: Yes Sir, we saw it as a serious incident. We figured that if they could get in and do that then there's obviously insider threat access to weapons, in this case fuel. We saw that as a positive thing, the only thing that he could get his hand on was fuel and a vehicle; still considered a threat but still a positive thing in the fact that he couldn't get weapons, couldn't get additional bodies. But it was definitely in the first 48 hours of us arriving, it was a wake-up call of "hey, let's review our vulnerability assessments and make sure we're doing everything we can to prevent anything like this;" whether it be check points, gates, gate guards, fencing, trenches, whatever it may be to make sure they got limited access; not only to BLS but also to the flight line.

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Q: Did you discuss the “burning man incident” with MajGen Gurganus after it occurred? Please describe the conversation. What guidance did he give the staff?

A: Yes, sir we talked about that; but again, that was more of an internal camp discussion and I tried to stay out of getting into (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) business because I was focused kind of outside the camp and on the whole RC not focused on any individual camps. You know sir, if I got focused on individual camps then I would be doing that for a living and we pay other guys to do that. But my AT/FP Officer did go down there and have some type of support, whether it was to make sure the vulnerability assessment was current or we were reviewing it and things like that.

Q: Are you aware of the Force Protection measures approved to address the threat identified by the “burning man incident”? If so, do you feel that they were adequate? Do you feel that the RC(SW) chain of command took reasonable steps in response to this incident?

A: Pre or post, sir; before the burning man or after?

Q: As a result of the “burning man incident”. Do you think the Chain of Command took reasonable steps in response to the “burning man incident”?

A: I don’t know specifics sir, but I would say yes because it was discussed and the CG would constantly ask, what are we doing to prevent another “burning man incident?” So I don’t know their discussions but I would say that the answer is yes and that’s where probably some of the discussions began between the UK, because this was Bastion and it was their responsibility, and the US on how do we do better coordination. But I don’t know the answer to that specifically.

Q: You said General Gurganus frequently mentioned the “burning man incident” and asked how do we preclude that from happening next time?

A: Yes, either the General or the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), “what do we do to prevent that?” So it would constantly come up; probably in a staff meeting or in the individual morning meetings we had, “hey what are we doing, are we changing the look, are we doing this, doing that?” “What’s happening, give me an update on what we’re doing to prevent access to the airfield.” That was a routine discussion, whether it be individually with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), during our morning meetings, or during the staff meetings that we had weekly. We had a Brit Deputy Commander; his name was Skeates. He was involved in the dialogue about the “burning man incident” and the post response to that incident. The CG and General Skeates were arm-in-arm on all these issues. They recognized that there was a little bit of difference in the way that the UK and US were doing business. General Skeates, from everything I can tell, was aggressively going to try to get rid of any whitespace between the two and make sure that we were communicating. From what I can tell, he was being very aggressive in saying

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“hey, I got it, national caveats, but this is the way we got to do it; we have to communicate, we have to do better.”

Q: Do you recall the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) conducted on parts of the BLS Complex 10-14 June 2012?

A: I don't remember the people, but I remember organizing it. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was involved in that. Yes, I remember it going on.

Q: Do you recall whether the RC(SW) AT/FP Officer provided assistance to TFBW prior to, during, or after the JSIVA?

A: I don't know the answer to that. I would say the answer is yes because they were tied in pretty good but I can't specifically say that I sent him down there to do this.

Q: Were you outbriefed by TFBW or your AT/FP Officer on the results of the JSIVA?

A: I think I got a copy of it but I don't think I actually sat through the out-brief. The out-brief was done possibly to the Chief of Staff. I don't know the answer to that; I got a copy of it.

Q: The report states that a “vulnerability” is “a situation or circumstance that if left unchanged may result in the loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources.” The JSIVA identified six vulnerabilities, the most relevant of which was that flight line access was exploitable and that personnel and equipment were exposed. Do you recall whether TFBW, CO Bastion, or RC(SW) made new requests for AT/FP improvements to the flight line after the JSIVA?

A: I know that access to the airfield, we were concerned with I think vehicle-born IEDs, so I think we started digging a trench, essentially a tank ditch, and a berm; so I think the answer is probably yes that some requests were made. I know that we took actions to prevent vehicle-born access with that tank-ditch-berm. But when it comes to Bastion, I don't know exactly what was requested and what was approved so I don't know the answer to that. But I think the discussion was there, that things were requested. We saw the JSIVA and we were trying to respond to it and make it better.

Q: Do you recall any conversations with MajGen Gurganus or the RC(SW) staff regarding the JSIVA? Do you recall MajGen Gurganus giving any guidance or direction after the JSIVA?

A: I think that's where some of that guidance came from with the tank-ditch and other things. I do not remember specific conversations but again I go back to the CG, it was one of those things that we heard pretty frequently and he would poke people in the chest about, “hey what are we doing to change up our force protection.” I don't know how often he got up in the air and just flew around the

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camp but I know he did that a couple of times. Again, he would take (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or somebody with him or they would

drive the camp and he'd say, "okay, where do we stand on these projects?" Again, I don't know the specifics that's probably going to be Task Force Belleau Wood. The reason I know that is because we want him to be accessible to us and he'd be up flying around the camp in a Huey, and he wouldn't take me with him. I knew he was doing it but I don't know when or the exact conversations they were having in there.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review identified concerns from the JSIVA (TFBW's Risk Management Program, AT/FP Plan, and lack of formalized AT/FP-related working groups) that were not addressed between the time of the JSIVA and the time of the attack. What do you attribute this to?

A: There was a working group, and I forget the name of it, I would have to look it up. One of the working groups where Bastion and Leatherneck came together, the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) attended one of those along with Task Force Belleau Wood and I forget the acronym. But there's potential that we thought that type of topic and conversation was happening in that working group. So there's potential that it got overlooked because we thought it was already happening between the two in this relationship, in this one working group. I'm not saying that's the answer; I'm saying there is potential. There was a US/UK come together on how we're going to run the base so that may have been where they thought this was happening.

Q: Although prior to the attack it was deemed adequate to man approximately 50% of the guard towers on the BLS Complex, two of the immediate changes to Force Protection identified in the JRB Supplemental Review after the attack were 100% manning of all Camp Bastion guard towers and additional Marines assigned to TFBW SECFOR. What do you attribute this to?

A: I guess obviously, the camp was attacked, we saw our vulnerability, and we're asking a certain number of people to be on their game 100 percent of the time; the more eyes you got out there the better chance you've got at preventing something like this in the future.

Q: It's a hard question, but do you think we underestimated the threat?

A: I don't think we underestimated the threat; I think we thought we had it covered. Otherwise if we knew then what we know now then we obviously would have changed the way we were looking. But we thought what we had in place was covering the threat. It had been and we were staying proactive, patrolling. Looking back on it, hindsight is 20/20.

Q: One interviewee expressed a concern that prior to the attack, only half of the guard towers were manned, yet there seemed to be an excess of Marines in MWR

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facilities and coffee shops that could have otherwise been performing guard duty. Did you share this concern?

A: No sir, you have Marines that work 12 hour shifts that are going to go to the MWR, you have people that come in from the outer camps, you have people that are going through RSO&I either on their way in or on their way out, and they don't have a hooch like all the officers and staff NCOs do. They have a tent with a cot or they can go to the MWR. We had a certain number of people assigned to that guard mission and they were doing that 24/7, that was their job. If we didn't have enough people, then somebody would say that we didn't have enough people, and then we would add more people. So that excuse is kind of stupid.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by US personnel prior to the attack? If so, what do you attribute this to?

A: Absolutely not.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by UK personnel prior to the attack?

A: Absolutely not, and I think you know this sir, if we would have seen something like this we would have fixed it on the spot. I did not see that at all. Whenever I would go on the camp I always got stopped by the Tongans, had my ID checked before we went on the camp, before we went on Bastion proper. They always were professional and did a good job; I had no reason to suspect otherwise, that they were asleep at the wheel.

Q: One interviewee informed us that the attitude of personnel on the BLS Complex might have been that it was "too big to fail." Do you agree? Do you believe that TFBW or other US personnel displayed this attitude?

A: No sir. I think that we were constantly checking, patrols outside of the wire, the inbound routes, the outbound routes, we were constantly on it assuming that people were going to try to attack this big base. It's a big target; they can shoot rockets. All they have to do is hit a fairly big number of grid squares and they got a chance of hitting something.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?


A: No sir, I feel bad that I didn't have more detail when it came to the AT/FP of the camp but again I feel like that was the camp commander, he's responsible for that. Same thing with Camp Dwyer and everywhere else. I feel like the CG and Brigadier Skeates pushed hard when it came to Force Protection, and that includes all of us. We didn't want to fail and the CG was on it from day one. It was one of those guys constantly looking: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) saying "hey, are we changing up our look or we doing this are we doing that," and that was prior to the attack and after the attack. I feel like we were

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being pretty aggressive. There's never an excuse, I think the CG, there's no doubt, you know the deal, nobody wakes up and says "hey I'm going to allow us to fail." But I think that our guys were aggressive outside of the wire and inside of the wire trying to make things happen.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



WILLIAM B. GARRETT III
LTG, USA
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release