DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
4700 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFDC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

1. The investigation team conducted a recorded interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I MEF (FWD) on 19 June 2013 at Camp Pendleton, CA as part of the AR 15-6 investigation into the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak Complex in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) retired from the US Marine Corps subsequent to the interview, and he is unavailable to sign a sworn statement. The purpose of this memorandum is to certify that the dialogue transcribed below is an accurate account of the interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The recorded interview is on file with the investigative team.

Q: Where are you currently assigned?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) of I MEF (FWD) and RC(SW).

Q: When did you arrive at RC(SW) as the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and when did you depart?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: How was your relationship with MajGen Gurganus? How often did you interact?
A: Every minute, Sir.

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: As (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for RC(SW), did you have any responsibilities associated with Anti Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) of Camp Leatherneck or the greater BLS Complex? If so, please describe them.
A: No direct responsibilities there, Sir, but as the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) my job was to coordinate and integrate staff efforts. I was also responsible for coordinating Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW), which was our MEF Headquarters Group, who actually did the security mission.

Q: Did you actually sit on any boards or working groups for the base regarding AT/FP?
A: Not directly for AT/FP, but I did sit on the Executive Steering Group (ESG), which was a board of UK officers, Danish officers, civilian employees, and the RC(SW) staff. The intent of that board was to try to establish a working relationship, a rapport, between Bastion and Leatherneck. Because they were two separate camps with two separate commands, and the idea was to start working with the UK on things like weapons conditions, transportation authorities, driving between the two bases. Security was one of the issues we discussed, but the major one was construction or de-milling, the breaking down of buildings.

Q: How frequent was your interaction with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW), if any?
A: Probably every week, actually every other day with the CO. We talked about a multitude of issues.

Q: How frequent was your interaction with the AT/FP Officer for RC(SW), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
A: We probably talked maybe once a week. He worked for the C-3, and I made an effort not to reach too far down into another (b)(3), (b)(6) personnel. I wanted to maintain a good continuity of information flow.

Q: Did you have an adequate RIP/TOA with your predecessors, LtGen Toolan and his staff? Do you feel that they adequately addressed any AT/FP vulnerabilities which may have existed?
A: It was an exceptional turnover. They set us up for success, and turned over all of the issues that they were dealing with at the time of transition. For AT/FP, I would have to defer that to the C-3.

Q: Where were you on 14 September 2012 when the attack commenced?
A: I was on the command deck, in my office.

Q: Based on your experience of living and working on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts as the attack unfolded?

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A: Initially, we were trying to figure out what they were talking about on the radios. We were focused on making sure the CG was informed, and I focused on getting people out of the way, off the phones clogging up communication. Let the base CJOC work the issues. We thought at first that it was an attack along the perimeter, outside of the base. That was our first impression.

Q: Did your duties require you to take any specific actions in response to the attack?
A: Again, my duties were to coordinate staff efforts. I talked directly to the CJOC a few times. They were running the show, so the first person to be making decisions on the response was the Watch Officer. The second officer that would take charge, based on our agreement with the UK, was that whichever base the attack was commencing on, that commander would take charge. So it would have been the 903d commander for the UK. I just wanted to make sure the CJOC was coordinating with the 903d and the Camp Bastion leadership.

Q: Were you aware of the 2011 MOU between CENTCOM and the UK PJHQ, which established a bifurcated C2 architecture for Force Protection of Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion?
A: Yes, Sir. I was aware of it. Bifurcation is a great word to describe it, and that was my focus on it. We had an incident, an internal incident, which became kind of our focus. It coincided with a visit from the SECDEF, although it was in no way related to that visit. We had a gentleman, a contractor, I believe he was an interpreter, who was upset with his UK leadership and supervisors. He commandeered a vehicle, and ran down one UK individual, and then he ended up coming down the flight line where our folks were standing, waiting for the Secretary of Defense. He ended up entering the ramp and setting himself on fire, and he passed away that night. So I started working on a cohesive Memorandum of Understanding, trying to establish a single person in command of the base and a single person in command of the security forces. But at that time, we didn't get a lot of traction.

Q: So, you led that effort? Did MajGen Gurganus ask you to lead that effort?
A: Yes Sir, I talked to him about it, and then I tried to lead it through the ESG. But we ran into some friction, so we worked on that supported/supporting command relationship.

Q: Where did the friction come from? US side? UK side?
A: Higher headquarters, to be exact Sir. IJC and ISAF. They were not ready for us to go ahead and separate some of the national requirements. They did not want us to combine the bases and camps at that particular point in time, so they preferred us to work on the supported/supporting relationship.

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Q: Any idea what was driving that?
A: I don't know, to be honest with you, Sir.

Q: Do you recall any discussions involving MajGen Gurganus and/or the RC(SW) staff about the C2 for Force Protection?
A: Not early on, Sir, no. The bigger discussions were how we would interrelate and coordinate with Camp Shorabak, which was the Afghan camp. That was our bigger concern early on.

Q: Was that concern based on the insider threat?
A: Yes Sir, the insider threat and also infiltration through their lines.

Q: As I understand it, there was not a physical boundary between you and Camp Shorabak. There was a gate, but not much else. Is that correct?
A: There was a wall there, Sir. There was a gate and a wall, but it was not an obstacle covered by fires. It was just an obstacle.

Q: What was your overall assessment of the insider threat at the BLS Complex?
A: We were very concerned about it, especially after what we called the "burning man incident." We had a fair amount of contractors, a lot of third country nationals (TCN). There was a lot of work being done by TFBW, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and his team, to figure out what contractors were there, what access they had, whose contracts had run out. There was also a significant challenge trying to work out the relationship between us and Installation Management Command (IMCOM), which was a garrison command. That was an Army-led command, but it was a new construct in Afghanistan. There were only two places that had IMCOM, and we were one of them.

Q: Do you recall the vetting process for the numerous Local National (LN) and Third Country National (TCN) contractors aboard the BLS Complex?
A: I didn't know about it in detail as far as vetting, but I was concerned about it. That was why I was talking to TFBW about it, and they took it for action. They started working internal procedures assigning security personnel to start checking badges. TFBW began increasing internal patrols, and we had a very active C2X program.

Q: Was TFBW responsible for vetting and security of all contractors, or was it split among the various Camps?
A: It was split between the camps.

Q: If it was split, how did you coordinate vetting and security with your UK and Afghan counterparts?
A: That one I can't answer, Sir. I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would know.

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Q: Describe the security measures in place for contractors to get onto the BLS Complex once they were vetted and hired. What control measures, if any, were in place for contractors once they were inside the compound?
A: They all carried badges, and they had different colors which indicated where they could and could not go. We started posting security personnel at the PX, at the chapel, and things like that. Inside Leatherneck, we had security procedures in place and everyone was badged. Contractors were prohibited from having electronics.

Q: It was described to us that once inside the BLS Complex, there was "free range." Do you agree?
A: That would be fair to say in the open areas like the roads. But once you started getting into the Headquarters areas and things like that, you couldn't. You had to have badges and codes. They could move around the base though.

Q: Did this include access to the flight line?
A: Yes Sir, and that is a fair question. The flight line had security around certain areas, and fencing around certain areas of it. On the US side, we were focused on putting the drop arm barriers in and digging the ditch. The greatest fear was a vehicle borne threat getting onto the flight line, so that is the threat that we were focused on. Some of the squadrons had security, some didn't. Some had entry control points by the road, some didn't.

Q: So that wasn't a Wing directed requirement to have security?
A: Sir, to the best of my memory, it was not Wing directed. Some squadrons did it, some did not.

Q: Who was responsible for counter-intelligence efforts on the BLS Complex? Were these efforts sufficient? Did they identify any specific insider threats?
A: Overall, it was the C2 at the MEF. He also worked closely with NCIS and CID on Leatherneck, and he also worked with the UK side of the house and their security team. They did identify several threats that were actually taken out through various methods, and we were actually able to take action on those threats before they happened.

Q: Did you receive any intelligence indications and warnings (I&W) prior to the 14 September attack?
A: (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c A standard breach and assault. We concentrated heavily on the ECP. It was a coalition ECP. We had

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Bahrainis, Jordanians, UK, and US personnel working the ECPs. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g We were also focused on the internal threat. The third threat was indirect fire (IDF).

Q: What was your assessment of your C-2 personnel at RC(SW)?
A: I thought they were very effective. Very detail oriented. And they were focused on the entire AOR, Helmand and Nimruz Provinces. The BLS Complex was a very small part of what they were doing. They had a huge AO to worry about. They were focused out vice down.

Q: Although there was no unity of command over AT/FP for the entire BLS Complex, do you know what mechanisms were in place to ensure unity of effort with your UK and Afghan counterparts?
A: The ESG is the group that I led, but that was a BLS-level coordination meeting, where we were trying to integrate construction, aircraft coming in and out, who was manning the fuel pits, and things like that. There was an AT/FP meeting, but I don't know much about it. That would have been in (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) purview as the C3. There was also a meeting between TFBW and the RAF FP Wing. I don't know what the frequency was. There were integration meetings going on, but I can't tell you how often they were going on at the lower headquarters.

Q: What was your assessment of the UK forces' ability to protect Camp Bastion? Please explain.
A: At the time, we thought they were good. In retrospect, there were some things they were missing, manpower being one of them. There had been no issues. There were scrapper threats that both security forces were engaging with. They were also doing OP TESSERAL, where they would go and defend the air corridors as the big aircraft came in. There was a great concern with the surface-to-air threat.

Q: Did they have contractors?
A: They did not have contractors to my knowledge. They had an RAF unit who went out and patrolled, and then they had a Tongan force that stayed on the base and guarded the perimeter.

Q: What was your impression of the Tongan forces?
A: I rarely saw them, Sir.

Q: You mentioned some "in retrospect" concerns about the Brits' ability to secure Camp Bastion. Can you expand on that?

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fenced areas, but you could just drive through the fence. We started working with all of the units to put in drop-arms. The terrain is not easily accessible with the rental vehicles; we had the standard rental vehicles that everyone used over there, and they were not really designed to get through the terrain that you would have to cover on open ground to access the flight line. But a military vehicle could, and an all-terrain vehicle could. So we started putting up defensive measures to guard against the VBIED threat. Guards, spike strips, drop-arms, and we were working on digging a ditch that would go around the perimeter of the flight line. Because you already had security outside of the flight line, the concern was from the inside.

Q: Did you discuss the "burning man incident" with MajGen Gurganus after it occurred? Please describe the conversation. What guidance did he give the staff?
A: That's when he told me that we needed to work on the unity of command issue. They responded well in the CJOC to that incident, but they were still working out the various issues of who was in charge. They responded, but timeliness was the issue. You don't have a single watch officer in charge; you had two separate commands sitting there together, but still separate. That gets at the supported/supporting relationship that we eventually worked on. But at the time, he told me to work on the unity of command and a better response time. We also discussed redistributing the internal portion of the QRF. That proved valuable on September 14th, because those QRFs were positioned perfectly and responded within 10 minutes.

Q: Please describe the purpose of the BLS Complex Executive Steering Group (ESG). What different entities comprised the ESG? What was your role with the ESG?
A: The ESG was designed to integrate Bastion and Leatherneck actions. I was co-chairman, and the Deputy Commander of the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d Adjacent to them was the 903d Expeditionary Air Wing, and the 903d Commander was a British RAF Colonel-equivalent. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the first one. The plan for the ESG was to integrate actions better between the bases. I'll give you some examples. We had some concerns with vehicle movements, so we coordinated rules for convoy movements between the two bases. Weapons condition was another one. There were differences of opinions between us and the UK on having magazines in the weapons on base. What we didn't want people doing was changing weapons condition when they moved between bases, because that is a surefire way to have a negligent discharge. So we worked on agreements like that. We talked

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about money a lot, and whether we wanted to spend money on security in various places, like Tombstone on Camp Shorabak. So, that's what we did in the ESG. I had myself, a C3 rep, a logistics rep, a comms rep, a combat engineer rep, and a comptroller rep. The UK had the AT/FP Officer, and airfield operations officer, a logistics rep, and the 903d Commander showed up, and TFBW was there too with a few reps.

Q: What role did the ESG play in adjudicating requests for AT/FP improvements? Please describe the different factors which typically entered the discussion when adjudicating AT/FP requests?
A: If one nation wanted to do something on their base, and it didn't affect the other base, we would stay out of it. If it dealt with both bases, then we would discuss it. Who was going to do it, who was going to finance it, what was the endstate of that particular construction. The ditches around the airfield was one of these discussions. We dealt with the cost of the ECPs. The Brits would say that the airfield is on their side, but everyone is using it, so let's share the cost. The MOU was 75/25, the US would pay 75% of costs and the UK would pay 25%. We would look at whether projects were a good use of taxpayer money, and I'm honest about that. We discussed it a lot. Big discussions about whether it was prudent to build a multi-million dollar fence line or something, only to tear it back down a year from now. Then we would get the intell folks to determine what the threat was, and we would vote on the projects. What we really did was validate requirements. On some occasions, we just couldn't agree. One was the cost of runway repairs. It was millions and millions of dollars, so we had to determine if it was okay as it was, if we were only going to use it for another 18 months. We had to see if it was a safety issue. Those were the discussions we would have. When I say "vote," really we would discuss it until we had a resolution. We would talk it out. On a few occasions where we could not reach a decision, it would go back to the commanders. I would go to MajGen Gurganus, and they would go to the Brigadier at (b)(1)1.4d Then MajGen Gurganus would normally talk to Brigadier Skeates, our Deputy Commander, and he would go to the UK side, and they would all hash it out at the GO level.

Q: Do you recall how often those types of things would get elevated?
A: Twice, maybe twice. We tried to keep it at the Colonel level. One of the issues that I took to MajGen Gurganus was the attempt to come up with a new memo to unify command. The other was airfield manning, because the UK was scaling back too.

Q: Can you describe those discussions with MajGen Gurganus when the issue got elevated?
A: With the airfield manning, he just told me to help the UK where we could help the UK. That was for airfield operations. I don't ever recall the issue of force

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protection on the airfield coming to the ESG. I remember working the ditch, the drop arms, and repositioning of the QRF to make them more reactive to the airfield, particularly to the eastern side.

Q: Do you feel that the ESG was responsive to the AT/FP needs of tenant units on the BLS Complex?
A: I thought it was, yes Sir. I thought it was effective during the year while we were there. We felt that we had a good relationship with the UK on a multitude of issues. ECPs was another issue that we came to agreement on.

Q: As a result of a UK Survey of the Bastion Airfield conducted by the Counter Intelligence Security Unit (CISU) after the "burning man incident", the UK Works Group Royal Engineers then conducted a Perimeter Fenceline Operational Option Study. They identified 4 options, ranging from Option 1 "Do Nothing" to Option 4 "Full UK Specification Airside Segregation," which provided for full vehicle and pedestrian access control. The Royal Engineers recommended Option 4. Although you were not present at the ESG that denied that request, are you aware of the deliberations either before or afterward that led to the decision?
A: I was given a background brief on that one, but I was not there as you mentioned. Some of the discussion was whether it was an internal fence or an external fence. Some of the discussion was whether we were trying to build a fence all the way around the airfield like you would have back in the States at Miramar. We thought we already had a fence around the airfield, which was the perimeter fence. And there was security there. So, from my understanding, the discussion came down to three things. First, how long was it going to take to build? We were supposed to be breaking things down at that point. Second was the cost of the fence, and third was the intelligence. What was the effectiveness of the fence going to be? They had already put the drop arms in, so we were already taking care of vehicle control. The pedestrian threat, people thought that an individual would have to walk through people's work area to access the airfield. So there was no real threat of people just wandering onto the airfield at that time.

Q: The ESG ultimately recommended Option 2 "Vehicular Restriction," which constituted construction of an anti-vehicle ditch and berm. Although risk compared to cost and time certainly weighed heavily on the decision, do you feel that this Option was responsive to the threat of both vehicle <u>and</u> pedestrian incursions identified by the UK Survey?
A: The way we understood it, the biggest threat was a VBIED onto the flight line. We were not seeing threats by individuals to attack the airfield. The concern was for a VBIED to access the flight line and cause catastrophic loss of life and property damage. Those were the concerns at the time.

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Q: Do you feel that the ESG and RC(SW) properly addressed the threat identified by the "burning man incident?"
A: I thought we did very well at that, Sir. I say that because we worked really hard to work the C2 between the two camps in the CJOC. I think the response on 14 September gets lost in some of the discussion, but I think their rapid response and professional actions are a reflection of the work we did to re-wicker the C2. The QRF did exactly what it was supposed to do, and the CJOC did exactly what they were supposed to do in accordance with the plan put in place after the "burning man incident." They actually called in close air support within their own lines to neutralize the enemy very quickly.

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review addressed an 11 May 2012 request from 3d MAW to emplace concertina wire to secure vulnerable areas around the flight line and to channelize pedestrian traffic to ECPs, which was approved and completed prior to the attack. There is also an exhibit in the Supplemental Review of a 3d MAW flight line barrier plan request submitted at the same time (11 May 2012) to emplace (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to protect the flight line. The request stated, "Without these improvements, the flight line equipment and personnel will remain vulnerable to enemy attack at multiple access points, including numerous high speed avenues of approach." This project was eventually approved after the attack. Do you recall whether the date on the exhibit (11 May 2012) indicates when the 3d MAW actually submitted the request? If so, do you know if it reached the ESG or a different decision making body? If submitted in May 2012, do you recall why this project was not approved?
A: I do not, Sir. The concertina wire was certainly part of the discussion. The thought was that concertina wire could be just as effective as a fence, which it was. They cut through the c-wire on 14 September, but they cut right through the fence too. The thought was to channelize pedestrian traffic to the ECPs. The T-walls as you mentioned were to control high speed avenues of approach, which we did by putting in ECPs with guards and spike strips to control high speed avenues of approach. The ditch and berm was supposed to be the next layer to control vehicles. Unfortunately, only the first obstacle was covered by fire. The ditch was not covered by fire, but it was meant to slow a vehicle, not an individual person. So with all of that, the intent of the request was being met with the ditch and the concertina wire and the ECPs to control the high speed avenues of approach.

Q: So that is why the project wasn't approved, because the intent of the request was being met through other means?
A: It was probably not approved for a couple of reasons. One was time. The t-walls and Hesco barriers would have taken months to do. And one issue weighing heavily on us was that we were scaling back, we were closing bases

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and retrograding, so new construction was looked at very carefully. T-walls are expensive and so is moving them around. As far as the intell threat, the intent of the request was being met.

Q: Are you aware of any other AT/FP improvements completed or requested in response to the "burning man incident"?
A: We added more security at the ECPs; we improved communications on people entering the flight line area; we added some additional GBOSS cameras to survey some areas where we didn't have coverage. We put T-walls between aircraft to protect against the IDF threat, which was third on our list at the time. And we increased RAMs. It was definitely harder to access the flight line after the "burning man incident."

Q: Do you recall the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) conducted on parts of the BLS Complex 10-14 June 2012?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Do you recall whether the RC(SW) AT/FP Officer provided assistance to TFBW prior, during, or after the JSIVA?
A: He did, Sir.

Q: Were you outbriefed by TFBW or anyone else on the results of the JSIVA?
A: I was not, Sir. The 903d and TFBW commanders got de-briefed by the JSIVA team.

Q: The JSIVA report states that a "vulnerability" is "a situation or circumstance that if left unchanged may result in the loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources." The JSIVA identified six vulnerabilities, the most relevant of which was that flight line access was exploitable and that personnel and equipment were exposed. Do you recall whether TFBW, CO Bastion, or RC(SW) made new requests for AT/FP improvements to the flight line after the JSIVA?
A: I think the next discussion after that one was digging the ditch outside the perimeter fence. Again, the VBIED threat was the number one threat. By the time of the JSIVA, we had the four or five things I already discussed in the works. We felt that the projects already in the works mitigated the threat to the airfield.

Q: Do you recall any conversations with MajGen Gurganus or the RC(SW) staff regarding the JSIVA? Do you recall MajGen Gurganus giving any guidance or direction after the JSIVA?
A: No, Sir. He did not give any direction to me, Sir. It probably would have gone to the C3 or TFBW.

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Q: The JRB Supplemental Review identified concerns from the JSIVA (TFBW's Risk Management Program, AT/FP Plan, and lack of formalized AT/FP-related working groups) that were not addressed between the time of the JSIVA and the time of the attack. What do you attribute this to?
A: I don't know, Sir. I know they had working groups already set up. After the attack, we set up a higher level working group. I know they were conducting an AT/FP meeting though. Regarding the AT/FP plan, we had the CJOC plan and battle drills to respond to an incident, and that came after the "burning man incident."

Q: Two of the immediate changes to Force Protection identified in the JRB Supplemental Review were 100% manning of all Camp Bastion guard towers and additional Marines assigned to TFBW SECFOR. What do you attribute this to?
A: I think the guard tower issue was what came out of the AARs. On the Camp Bastion side, they had some towers unmanned based on their assessment of the threat. We went to 100% after the attack. I think the additional SECFOR request was to increase the number of patrols outside the perimeter. At the time, we were running two patrols per day outside the perimeter. There was actually a patrol outside the wire at the time of the attack, and that patrol was the one that cut off the attacker's egress route. They were unable to egress because that patrol boxed them in.

Q: You said you had two patrols per day. Were they day/night, alternating, that sort of thing?
A: I believe they overlapped a bit, day and night. They would stop by the local village every third day or so, just to let them know that we were in the area. And then OP TESSERAL was always going on from the RAF to secure the air corridors. Then there were inside patrols by the UK along the fence line every day to check the fence. That's where they would discover where scrappers tried to get in, and things like that.

Q: Can you describe the manning of the guard towers a little bit more?
A: Based on the threat, and the obstacles covered by fire, and the fields of view that they had, there were towers that they felt they could leave unmanned. That's where the discussion of their manpower shortages came in. Certain towers were left unmanned, because other towers could observe the area. That is one thing at our command deck level that we were unaware of. That goes back to the discussion of the split C2. They were responsible for protecting Camp Bastion, and they structured their security on the VBIED threat and also on the internal threat.

Q: So, was their decision to man towers a unilateral decision on their part?

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A: I don't know who they talked to about that. I was unaware of it, but I do not know if anyone on our side knew.

Q: What do you attribute the decision of going to 100% manning of the Camp Bastion towers after the attack to?
A: Obviously, it was a lesson learned. Their fields of view maybe weren't as good as we thought. And the perimeter could be breached without manning every tower.

Q: Do you believe that we underestimated the threat?
A: That is a tough one to be honest. Give the enemy his due. It was a well-planned and well-coordinated attack. It really was. Like any attack, the enemy has a vote of what goes on. You have to be aware at all times in your defensive positions. The enemy only has to get lucky – not lucky – I mean the enemy only has to be successful one time. Multiple times they tried and were unsuccessful. This one was successful. They had to have somebody scoping out where the best place to come in was. And not only did they get through the fence, but they got through the concertina wire on that side of the base. If they had been spotted there, they never would have got in.

Q: How did you differentiate between a scrapper breach of the wire, and something else?
A: Scrappers only went so far. They were pretty consistent, and their actions were indicative of scrapping activity. They would try to distract you and then somewhere else they would be pulling up metal. They went straight for the metal. While I was there, I do not remember a direct attack on the perimeter other than on September 14th. The scrapping activity was daily, so their actions were pretty consistent.

Q: Do you think the enemy could have hired the scrappers to cut a breach for them?
A: On that side, there wasn't a whole lot of scrapping actions like our side. The ranges were on our side, so there was a lot more scrapping activity on the western side than the eastern side.

Q: One interviewee expressed a concern that prior to the attack, only half of the guard towers were manned, yet there seemed to be an excess of Marines in MWR facilities and coffee shops that could have otherwise been performing guard duty. He mentioned that he discussed this with you informally on at least one occasion. Do you recall this conversation, and did you share this concern?
A: I don't recall the conversation, but I do know that there were always people on duty who complained about the people who were off duty. We were not aware that the UK had unmanned towers; if we would have known, we might have been

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able to give them assistance. If they had asked. But they made their decisions based on the threat. The person making that comment was talking about Marines on the Leatherneck side, but that was not an issue on our side.

Q: Were the towers on the Leatherneck side always fully manned?
A: Yes, Sir. They were always manned. I will defer to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) There may have been a few spots where there was overlapping observation, so a tower or two might have been unmanned. But my understanding is that towers on Camp Leatherneck were manned all the way around.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by US personnel prior to the attack?
A: Not for the personnel on duty. We were a large camp, so there were some folks who were inattentive on the camp. So we constantly beat the drum about the insider threat and being aware of your surroundings. So there was definitely some people in their off duty routine who were not alert and combat ready. The people on duty though were always alert and ready to do their jobs. There was not complacency in the guard towers I walked up and visited. They were not sleeping; they were not reading; they were not listening to music; they did not have headphones on. They were attentive and doing their jobs.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by UK or Afghan personnel prior to the attack?
A: By the UK, no. But again, I did not go into their towers. I went to the CJOC a few times, and I had been to the (b)(1)1.4d COC as well. But not the towers. On the Afghan side of the house, it was a little different. So we had our second echelon of security on that side, and we constantly talked to Tombstone about their security and alertness.

Q: One interviewee informed us that the attitude of personnel on the BLS Complex might have been that it was "too big to fail." Do you agree? Do you believe that TFBW or other US personnel displayed this attitude?
A: No, Sir. I don't agree with that. Security was in place, and it was discussed all the time. I didn't see that at the higher level. I don't think anyone thought we were incredibly safe on BLS.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
A: I do think it is important to note that we tried to change that C2 relationship after the "burning man incident," but the supported/supporting relationship that we worked very hard on; it worked very well on the night of the attack. There was no lapse in decision making. They responded very well. I do believe the enemy had a vote in this, and that it was a well-coordinated attack. It was a low-light night, so that made it more difficult to see that night. I think we responded

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appropriately to the threats as we saw them at the time. I think we did a good job not to overreact to them. I got it…some people say that it's an airfield, so it should be built like Miramar. That's a different discussion in hindsight. I think the actions taken were appropriate to the threat we were seeing.

Q: Can you explain to us how the different command relationships worked between you and the MHG, and what forces they had available to them? Did that change at all from the MEF that was there prior to you?
A: We made more improvements to the command relationships than our predecessors.

Q: I mean internal to the US forces. Who was tactically controlling the security forces on the ground?
A: Task Force Belleau Wood was, Sir. The MHG commander was one in the same as the TFBW commander. And he had a security force that fell underneath him. At the time it was an artillery battalion. He had internal security, and then he did external security in coordination with the UK. The first MHG Commander was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and he left midway through to go to school, and his XO, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ook over. We figured that we didn't need an O-6 in that position anymore and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was already the XO. Then the SECFOR also had an O-5 commander, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) He was the commander of the artillery battalion. So TFBW had the SECFOR battalion, a Military Police detachment, a 500-man Jordanian battalion (one company at Leatherneck, one company at Dwyer, one company at PB Boldak), a 100-man Bahraini company, and a 215-man private security contractor, Triple Canopy. They were all under the TFBW CO, and he used them to do internal security and external patrolling in AO Belleau Wood.

Q: Who was in command of TFBW at the time of the attack?
A: It was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and he had been in command for about 45 days, I think, at the time of the attack. At first, he was the acting commander, but we decided that we didn't need to bring in an O-6, so he was given command. The CG drafted up a letter giving him command authorities.

Q: Were the 3d MAW(FWD) living quarters in Leatherneck or Bastion?
A: They were originally on Leatherneck, but we built them an LSA over on the eastern perimeter of Bastion. That's where they lived at the time of the attack.

Q: What kind of security did they have at the LSA?
A: That's a good question, Sir. I know they had security, but I'm not aware exactly how they had it set up. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for 3d MAW(FWD), and (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was their OPSO. They would probably know.

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AFDC
SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: You mentioned that the obstacles between the perimeter fence and the flight line were not covered by fire. Do you attribute that to manpower shortages?
A: I think primarily because the threat didn't dictate that it was necessary. It's not doctrinally correct to have an obstacle not covered by fire, but in this case here, we had a perimeter fence with guard towers right on it with security personnel there. Then you had some open terrain, and the MAW's concern was that someone could move right into their hangar spaces. That's why we put the concertina wire around there. So the thought was that any vehicle coming through the perimeter would cause quite a commotion. If they got through, then they had to cover some pretty rough terrain, and then get through the concertina wire. A vehicle can obviously drive through concertina wire, but it will slow it down a bit. By then, the thought was that we could be ready to respond to anything coming through. Again, some squadrons had security, albeit small, and others had none. In hindsight when I heard about that, I figured it was something that we probably should have standardized. One last important issue for the RC. The RC command element was looking up and out. We used TFBW and the 903d to take care of security on the BLS Complex, and the CG would just weigh in where he needed to. If there was a big disagreement, the CG would weigh in. Because the CG is ultimately responsible, and he's always been clear on that.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is my legal advisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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