# SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

## PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10USC Section301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

| 1. LOCATION | 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) | 3. TIME | 4. FILE NUMBER |
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| Camp Pendleton, CA | 20130619 | 1000 | N/A |

| 5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME | 6. SSN | 7. GRADE/STATUS |
|---|---|---|
| (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | | (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC |

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
I MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Where are you currently assigned?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?
**A: I was not there at the time of the attack. I went to AFG on the 18th of JAN, 2012. I left 15 June 2012. The plan all along was to do half of the deployment. I then went back to Joint PME II in Norfolk, VA. I was replaced by my Executive Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) He was given a letter from MajGen Gurganus essentially assigning him with command responsibilities.**

Q: When did you take command of TF Belleau Wood (TFBW), and when did you relinquish it?
**A: I took command in Afghanistan on 18 January 2012, and I relinquished it on 15 June 2012.**

Q: What was TFBW's mission?
**A: We had a variety of missions. It was actually a very complex organization. When I got there in January, we had about 3000 people. We had all of the subordinate battalions of the Headquarters Group who were deployed out in the AO, so we had command and control over those units.** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

**The Bahrainis were very well-trained and they were multi-lingual with Arabic, Pashtu, Dari, and English. Prior to Triple Canopy taking responsibility for the perimeter, we had "camp tax" Marines to do that mission. So that was Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW), Sir. The C2 was quite complex, because of the different relationships. I had OPCON of the subordinate battalions. I had US TACON of the SECFOR. I had NATO TACOM of the Bahrainis. The Brit side of Bastion, I had no control over those personnel there. The Brit Force Protection Wing controlled two Squadrons. One was the RFS, which was the outside-the-perimeter light infantry force, and the second was the Royal Military Police unit that had the inside the wire mission. I had no control over the Brits on Camp Bastion, including the Tongans that manned the perimeter over there.**

Q: Did 2/11 Marines transition with 2/10 Marines?
**A: Yes, Sir, in mid-May 2012.**

| 10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT | PAGE 1 of 10 PAGES |
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*ADDITIONAL PAGES CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF* *TAKEN AT* *DATED*

*THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED*



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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Who did you answer to in the RC(SW) chain of command for AT/FP issues?
**A: Directly to MajGen Gurganus, Sir.**

Who else in the RC(SW) chain of command did you report to or coordinate with regarding AT/FP?
**A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the G3. If it was G3, it was resource related. It was a real taffy-pull to get people to fill internal requirements for camp tax. I also partnered with the CO of Bastion (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) while I was there. He had command and control of the personnel over there on Bastion, like the Royal Military Police and their Counter Intelligence folks. That really came to a head, the command and control piece, when we had the now infamous "burning man incident" over on the flight line in March 1. That was where the SECDEF was supposed to visit. That really showed us where we had holes in our command and control; that we did not have unified command and control. In a briefing to MajGen Gurganus after the incident, we informed him that with the US-UK MOU, the best we could do was unity of effort, because it did not allow for unity of command. We tried to do some rectification on that, but because of the political aspects of it had to go up to the CENTCOM level to fix. We couldn't fix that at our level. MajGen Gurganus as the RC commander could not dictate that we chop those UK forces under my command. That was something that we really struggled with during my time out there; that we had a bifurcated system with different stakeholders and FOB security.**

Q: How was your relationship with MajGen Gurganus? How often did you interact?
**A: He had a very busy schedule, Sir. It was tough to get in to see him. Probably a couple times a month I got in to see him.**

Q: Did MajGen Gurganus specifically delegate authority to you for AT/FP? What was the scope of the delegation? Was the delegation verbal, written, or in an official order? What was his guidance to you?
**A: He never explicitly said that, but it was implicit that those were parts of my duties. It was verbal. He shared with me his ideas about battle space geometry around the BLS Complex. We would give him briefings on the threat that we were seeing. I would send him a weekly SITREP on my perspectives of what was going on around AO Belleau Wood (AOBW). We were having a pretty good amount of enemy activity down in the southeast part of the AO. We had a platoon operate out of PB Boldak directly south of the BLS Complex. We had a fair amount of Level 0 operations where I could approve at my level. We would go down and do some clearing down there in the southeast. If I could get support from the ACE, I would do some insertions down there to keep the enemy off balance. We would send forces down into those wadis down in the southeast part of the base. There was a bit of a seam between TF Helmand and TFBW. The enemy started to exploit that I thought. We would therefore start to cross those boundaries so the enemy couldn't exploit it. One of the things that MajGen Gurganus directed me to do right after he took over was in relation to the area right outside the base on the east and southeast side. For a little background, Sir, I was the G2 there at Leatherneck in 2010 and that whole eastern side of the FOB was completely cleared. When I came back for my PDSS in the fall of 2011, there were villages that had just proliferated over there and farms that had been created. So I asked my predecessor what we were doing about this, and he told me that they were trying to get the ANA to clear some of those areas. When I came back in January it had proliferated even more with the locals building their mud huts out there. So MajGen Gurganus recognized it as a Force Protection (FP) threat. I was more concerned with the northern side of the base. You had (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g on the northern side of the base and a lot of shops that had sprung up there to support all of the truck traffic that was coming in and out of Leatherneck. I saw that as the bigger threat. In my view, we were getting probed at our Main Entry Post, with people trying to test out our security. People were ignoring the escalation of force measures to see how close they could get. A few times it ended up shooting out windshields and things like that. Thank God we didn't kill anybody. I told MajGen Gurganus that I wanted to set up what I called the "Al Assad" model from Iraq where you set up a no man's land around the FOB where people had to cross open area and get over a berm before even getting to the base's internal defenses. So he told me to run with that. I started to work with General Malouk over on the ANA side, but there were several agendas going on over there. It was difficult to unravel who was getting what pay-offs to be able to operate there. We came up with a barrier plan that we could put into place. We needed to move the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g shops north of Highway 1 first. Then we could build some berms, so before you even came to the Main Entry Point, you had to get through that system first. But by the time I left, I was getting no traction. But on the eastern side, based on MajGen Gurganus' thought that this was the bigger threat – and there were a lot of poppy fields too, and MajGen Gurganus was concerned with the optics of that as well – we came up with a plan that we called OP LANDLORD. We gave a detailed mission analysis brief to MajGen Gurganus, and we laid out how the eastern side of the camp had populated over the years since 2010. We went from zero civilian population in AOBW to probably 5000 by May 2012. I think we briefed him the first week in June. I told him that this was a military problem, a force protection problem. He agreed and said that he was worried about a burning hulk of a helicopter at the end of the runway because we have allowed people to encroach**

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

**around the camp. He was pushing me hard to do something about it. We got the run-around from the ANA on who owned that land. I told him that this was a military problem but it required a political solution. He said that we couldn't just clear the area, so I told him that I needed him to weigh on it. We think there were some illegal leases out there, probably let by some senior officers over there in the ANA. I told him we needed him to engage higher levels of government to make this happen, because the ANA was being elusive. About a week after that brief, the JSIVA team turned up and I'm sure you've seen the report. I left the FOB the day after the JSIVA outbrief.**

Q: How did MajGen Gurganus ensure that you properly exercised that delegated authority? How often did you report to him?
**A: It was mainly weekly SITREPs by e-mail, Sir. I'd tell him what we were doing on the FP side, and he'd usually get back to me with some guidance. At the three-times-a-week brief that he had, I had a speaking piece there with all of the staff principals. I would just hit the high points, usually on the Level 0 ops. The RFS had some sniper teams, so I'd let him know when we were setting those up.**

Q: So the buck stopped with you on a day-to-day basis for AT/FP?
**A: Yes, Sir. Absolutely. With the caveat about the C2 issues we had over on Bastion, and the fact that I didn't have control of them.**

Q: Did you have an adequate RIP/TOA with your predecessors in TFBW? Do you feel that he helped prepare you to assume command of TFBW?
**A: Actually, that was a weak TOA, Sir. The TFBW commander that preceded me actually left in December (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and they had a fill-in commander, but he was also the comptroller over there. So his attention was diverted elsewhere. It was a bit of a challenge, but I don't think it inhibited us too bad. We did what we had to do to get our SA up. I relied upon (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the SECFOR CO at the time, to get my SA up on AT/FP issues, and he was fantastic. My biggest concern at the time was what I talked about earlier, the encroachment in the north. I think my predecessors binned that in the "too hard to do" category. I realize that nothing is easy when dealing with the Afghans, but I think they lost interest in trying to solve that problem.**

Q: Did you utilize a primary source of Marine or Joint Doctrine to conduct your AT/FP responsibilities? If not, what did you use to establish your standards?
**A: It was Marine doctrine, Sir. I don't recall specifically, Sir. We had a FOB Defense manual, and my AT/FP staff helped me out with that. We also used the JSIVA checklist, which is pretty darn good. If you did everything on that list, you would be well on your way to having a secure base. Some of it was unrealistic because of existing construction, but it was good. The JSIVA checklist was probably our primary guidance, and I got briefed on a weekly basis where we were on our progress.**

Q: Did you order your own assessment of the AT/FP plan after assuming command of TFBW?
**A: I did, Sir. I had my AT/FP staff, led by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), do a whole soup-to-nuts review. We made some changes to the main entry point up in the north, and we put some remote cameras in on parts of the perimeter that we didn't have before. We got an aerostat, which was a challenge because of the geometry with the airfield. But we made that a priority.**

Q: Did you uncover any vulnerabilities that you weren't aware of at the time you took command? What did you do in response?
**A: There were some over on the Shorabak side, and I was not happy about the physical perimeter of their side. That was bad enough, but then there was also infiltration from the Shorabak side onto our side, which exposed us some. So we did some things to improve that, but a crafty enemy could have bypassed some of the security measures over there. So we kept working on that, and we kept a really close eye on that. I used to really go out myself and go up in the towers on Leatherneck and ask the Marines if they knew their ROE, their left and right lateral limits, and most importantly their escalation of force measures. I tried to do it once a week, but it probably ended up being three times a month. It was leadership through presence.**

Q: Were those towers manned 100%?
**A: No, Sir. We had enough manning to put people up in every other one, and we would rotate those on an aperiodic basis so that we didn't set a pattern. The idea was to make it look like all towers were manned at all times, but that couldn't happen with the manpower we had. When Triple Canopy took over, it heightened my trips out there, because you had everything from people with a ton of combat experience to people with hardly any trigger time that they pulled off the street. That transition occurred in May 2012. They took all of the towers on Leatherneck.**

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: What was your initial reaction when you heard about the attack on 14-15 September 2012?
**A: My first reaction was that the SECFOR reductions that were planned may have been a contributing factor in that. When I did my PDSS in September, the SECFOR was 311 personnel. That got cut by a hundred right before I got there to 211. The plan was to push the SECFOR down to 110 personnel. I thought to myself that the SECFOR got so small that they couldn't produce enough patrols. Of course, no base can rely on just guarding the perimeter to secure it. You have to have a layered defense, and part of that is active security patrols. Before I left the Camp, I voiced to MajGen Gurganus that 110 was not going to be enough to do our mission.**

Q: When did you identify that to MajGen Gurganus?
**A: That was in May 2012, Sir. I had identified it to him on a few occasions. Once one-on-one in his office. Also another time when he had all the MSC commanders in his conference room, and he went around the room on the staff output on the proposed manning for the 12-2 manning document. He asked me what I thought, and I told him that I though 110 personnel was not going to be sufficient to produce the patrolling. But he decided to go with the plan that the staff came up with. We had some follow-up, and he told me that he was trying to talk with Gen Allen to get another Rifle Company down there for the SECFOR. He told me that he was worried about it too. In fairness to MajGen Gurganus, we went from 17,000 Marines down to 7,000 in the MAGTF, so there were a lot of competing requirements that we just could not fill. The biggest thing I objected to was that the Ground Combat Element was in charge of planning the manpower for the security of BLS. I had my planners in there, but they weren't getting the traction that they needed. When my S3 was in there telling them that 110 personnel wasn't going to get it, which included not just a patrolling mission but also logistics, planning, manning ECPs, and manning the CJOC. We were only going to be able to do 2-3 patrols out there at that number which I didn't think was sufficient. You have to be able to produce enough combat power to get out there and know what was going in your AO. To know who had moved in. Going back, I think not being able to move the farmers out may have been the biggest factor in the attack. We just didn't have a buffer zone out there around the camp.**

Q: Were you aware of the 2011 MOU between CENTCOM and the UK that bifurcated the C2 of the BLS Complex?
**A: I was aware of the MOU, and MajGen Gurganus was intimately aware of it after the "burning man incident." It generated a lot of discussion.**

Q: Joint Publication 3-10 (Joint Security Operations in Theater, 3 February 2010) states that, "Unity of Command is fundamental to effective security within the [Joint Security Area]." Is Marine Corps doctrine consistent with the Joint Publication? If so, did you raise the concern about the lack of unity of command for AT/FP on the BLS Complex?
**A: It is consistent with Marine Corps doctrine. Every Marine above Lance Corporal is aware of General Mattis' 5-3-5 rules, which contain the requirement for unity of command. I did raise the concern up to LtGen Toolan at first, because he was my commander for the first six weeks. I told him that the bifurcated system really inhibited our security operations. He was surprised by it. MajGen Gurganus became very aware of the MOU after the "burning man incident." (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ran a weekly coordination meeting with the UK, and the C2 issue probably ate up about 75% of that meeting after the "burning man incident." We were trying to figure out how to correct it. I was told by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that it would have to go up to CENTCOM or higher to fix. We were open to talking about this subject with our UK counterparts, but we were told that it was going to take an inordinate amount of time to fix. So the message was to work with the structure that you have now, don't try to get unity of command, but try to get unity of effort. So we worked on that pretty hard. I met with my counterpart quite a bit, and the SECFORs had a good working relationship in the CJOC. Where we didn't have unity of command or unity of effort was on the perimeter security, or with the PMO on my side and the Royal Military Police on Bastion. Those police forces only had superficial coordination. The QRFs did a good job coordinating.**

Q: How did TFBW receive intelligence about threats to the BLS Complex?
**A: I had my own intelligence section, and they were pretty good. They kept me well apprised of the threat. When I first got there, I was not happy about the CI threat briefs I was getting. So I talked to the G2, and I started getting a better CI threat brief both inside and outside the camp. Because there was an active CI threat inside the base.**

Q: Did your intelligence section receive the proper support from RC(SW) and higher echelon intelligence sections? Please explain.
**A: I was satisfied, yes Sir.**

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: What was the enemy Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) and the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) against the camp?

**A: MLCOA was indirect fire (IDF). The MDCOA was a spectacular attack which we thought would be directed at the Main Entry Control Point.**

Q: Describe how you formulated TTPs for TFBW based on the assessed threat. How did you mitigate the threats?

**A: For the IDF, we did some IPB and we had concentrated our patrols to mitigate there. In the five months over there, we only had one IDF incident, so we were pretty successful. But I kept telling MajGen Gurganus, to the point that he was probably sick of hearing it from me, that we were really vulnerable there to IDF. My biggest concern was really a complacent attitude on the base about IDF. I would run drills in coordination with RC(SW). We did those on a fairly routine basis. The first few were abysmal, with people just ignoring warnings and going about their business. But we worked hard to get people to react appropriately by getting into shelters, getting their PPE on, and those sorts of things. We also identified a problem with the mass warning system, that the acoustics just weren't really good. So we identified some shortfalls that we spent months to correct, including the attitude on the base. We also did drills and rehearsals with QRFs to respond to an attack against the main ECP or the south ECP. We would stage an attack, even a spectacular attack where people got inside the base, and we would make sure the internal security occurred like it was supposed to. I felt by the time that I left in June, we had pretty good response mechanisms in place to respond to different kinds of attacks.**

Q: Was TFBW responsible for vetting and security of all contractors, or was it split among the various Camps? If the latter, how did you coordinate vetting and security with your UK and Afghan counterparts?

**A: It was a shared responsibility with the UK that we ran out of the same facility, which was in the middle of the two camps right next to the CJOC. It was a big mess though when we first got there. There were people with expired badges and we had no idea where those people were. I put a SSgt in charge of that, and he did a great job. He went through tons of documents and put them in a database. And he went to the contractor management to run that down. We had a much better handle on that by May.**

Q: Who was responsible for counter-intelligence efforts on the BLS Complex? Were these efforts sufficient? Did they identify any specific insider threats?

**A: The MEF CI officer, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was in charge of both HUMINT and CI. I thought they did a good job on the CI responsibilities. I got regular updates from him.**

Q: Did you receive any indications and warnings (I&W) prior to the attack? In your post-attack analysis, were there any indications of missed I&W or other intelligence failures?

**A: We'd gotten some specific reports on a few threats (b)(1)1.4c that would indicate that we had some plots that might be brewing from the Shorabak side of the camp. We didn't have specific targets, but what I did was put armed guards on all of the dining facilities. This was a very unpopular move. The guys that were the biggest problem were guys of my rank or near my rank. That was my biggest fear, a mass casualty event in the DFAC. That's what kept me up at night.**

Q: What was your assessment of the UK forces' ability to protect Camp Bastion? Please explain.

**A: I didn't have the level of situational awareness that I would have liked to have with what they were doing on the perimeter. Their Regimental Field Squadron was good. They were solid. I went out on patrols with those guys, and they were good. On the perimeter, I didn't have enough information to make an assessment. It was never going to be my place to go up and check their posts. I was happy with what was going on in Leatherneck even with the contractors after a little bit.**

Q: Did you have any specific concerns about the Tongan soldiers manning guard towers on Camp Bastion? If so, what were your concerns and who did you address them to?

**A: Nobody ever expressed anything to me. It was actually Tongan Marines. They had their RIP/TOA at the end of May so they had a new crew. I never heard anyone express any concerns with them.**

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Did TFBW ever inspect the towers or perimeter defense on Camp Bastion? Would this have been tenable under the relationships established on Camp BLS?
**A: I did not get out there, Sir. I was not in their chain of command, so it wouldn't have been my place to do that. I had been around the road before. I was very familiar with the area outside of the perimeter. We would go look on that side of the camp. One concern I had was their gate procedures on that East Gate. They were leaving that gate open quite often. The JSIVA noticed that, and I had actually talked to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) before the JSIVA. Afterwards, I was more hyper sensitive about it and we would swing by there to check on their procedures. But I did not have the level of SA over there that you are asking about.**

Q: One of our previous interviewees told us that he noticed inattentiveness and patterns in the guard towers during his PT runs along the Camp Bastion perimeter, and that he had discussed it informally with you on occasion. Do you remember any conversations like that?
**A: No, Sir. That doesn't ring any bells with me. I think the way those towers were constructed over there, it would be really difficult to tell what was going on up there without actually going in them. They were tall, concrete encasements. I just don't think that you'd be able to tell without going in there.**

Q: Considering that there were Marine personnel and aircraft on the flight line, did you have any responsibilities for AT/FP on the flight line?
**A: I did not, Sir. That was run by the ACE, 3d MAW (FWD).**

Q: Please describe this arrangement, and explain the coordinating mechanisms in place, both between you and the tenant Marine units and between you and your UK counterparts.
**A: My AT/FP folks would coordinate with their AT/FP folks. They identified some issues with their ECPs, that you could bypass them easily. So there were some barrier fixes in the works when I left. Of course, the biggest vulnerability that was identified in the "burning man incident" was just the easy access to the flight line. That was constant discussion during the weekly coordination meetings with the US and UK. The UK didn't want to pay the million dollars to put a fence around the airfield. That did not get resolved before I left; it still would have been pretty easy to get a vehicle out on the flight line.**

Q: Do you recall OP MOLEHILL is a "daily security patrol that surveys the inside of the perimeter fence every day in order to find and repair any breaches." UK forces conducted these patrols. Were you aware of them?
**A: No Sir, I'm not familiar with that.**

Q: Were you aware of breaches of the wire while you were there?
**A: We had several reports of breaches while I was there. These would typically come up during O&I meetings in the CJOC with our UK counterparts. I remember a few occasions. The context I was briefed in was that it was likely scrappers.**

Q: Did you get support from the 215th ANA Corps for your exterior patrols?
**A: Yes, Sir but it was really minimal. That would be 2/11 and 2/10 Marines later on that would coordinate with the ANA garrison company. Especially when we went through the villages, we wanted to get support from the ANA. It was like pulling teeth, but we did run those patrols with the ANA.**

Q: Did you change these patrols up, or did you have a standard route?
**A: The perimeter was broken up into two sectors, Sir. The RFS would do patrols known as OP TESSERAL, which I learned was a doctrinal patrol designed to protect aircraft when large bodied planes would come in. Their TESSERAL patrol would run out on the approaches.**

Q: Did you have enough personnel to conduct your assigned mission in AO Belleau Wood? As part of your risk analysis, did you ever raise concerns about insufficient security forces to MajGen Gurganus, Brigadier Skeates, or anyone else in the RC(SW) chain of command? If so, what was their response?
**A: Yes, Sir. I did raise those concerns with MajGen Gurganus like I spoke of before. I thought I had enough people to conduct adequate patrolling, but I didn't think they would after the cut to 110. There really was no type of response; just that I was going to have to live with that.**

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: RC(SW) had a significant drawdown in personnel during 2012. Did the drawdown affect your numbers in TFBW? If so, did your mission change? How did you mitigate this loss of personnel?
**A: Yes, Sir. The numbers were going to drop to 110. Those support battalions that I had were going to get cut about 50%. The mission did not change, but there was discussion when I left whether the SECFOR would have the QRF mission with the TRAP mission. There was a lot of concern with the number of missions we were running out in Zaranj. We had to run security, and we had to support those missions which we ran with great frequency after I MEF came in, so much so that I think we started to establish a pattern. I think it was March when a Master Sergeant got killed out there, because they had gone out there several successive days and I think it set up a pattern in the city there. We had some of our personnel on that mission when that happened; in fact, we had a corpsman who recently won the Silver Star recently for his actions there. But yes, I did discuss with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that the Zaranj missions were hurting my ability to conduct patrols around the BLS Complex. The drop to 110 people for the SECFOR happened after I left.**

Q: The JRB Report mentioned that there was no guard force assigned to monitor the dead space between the perimeter guard towers and the flight line. Although this was CO Bastion's area of responsibility, were you aware of this vulnerability? Did you coordinate with CO Bastion to address it or mitigate it? Did you coordinate with the 3d MAW to address it or mitigate it?
**A: No, Sir. I was only aware of it based on what the JSIVA report said. I met with the UK counterpart every week, and we discussed all security vulnerabilities. There was no confusion that that this was an unmitigated vulnerability. I did not personally coordinate with 3d MAW. My AT/FP personnel coordinated with them, but I'm not aware of the outcomes.**

Q: All reports indicate that Camp Bastion manned approximately 50% of their towers. Was this also common in Camp Leatherneck? Did your personnel from TFBW man the towers on Camp Leatherneck? Why was manning roughly 50% of the towers deemed sufficient?
**A: Yes, Sir, 50% was the norm on Camp Leatherneck too. When we got the contractors, it off-ramped the camp tax. Before that, we had cooks, bakers, and candle stick makers serving as guards for 60 days a pop. We ran a two-day guard camp, and then the SECFOR supervised them. The geometry determined the tower manning. Sometimes you had two right together that were manned, and sometimes not. We still had unobstructed observation and intersecting fields of fire, even in periods of limited visibility with NODs.**

Q: Did you conduct a TFBW inquiry or review of the "burning man incident"?
**A: There was a DCOM inquiry, which was primarily a UK inquiry.**

Q: In your opinion, did the entire US chain of command share concerns about the flight line and feel the need for improved security? Do you feel that RC(SW) reasonably attempted to address these concerns after the "burning man incident"?
**A: Absolutely, Sir. It was a weekly discussion with the UK and it came down to haggling over money.**

Q: Were the improvements adopted, e.g. a ditch and berm system, responsive to the threat identified by the "burning man incident?"
**A: I don't think they were adequate, Sir. I think a fence was in order. With the 100 million plus that we spent on that airfield, springing for an additional million dollars on a fence didn't seem unreasonable, but the UK really got wrapped around the axle on not wanting to pay for that fence. I think the ditches and berms were mitigation, but I don't think they were adequate mitigation. I think you needed to have a really foolproof way to prevent people from getting out on that flight line. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was carrying the water on that, Sir.**

Q: The incident occurred two days after MajGen Gurganus took command of RC(SW). Had you already in-briefed MajGen Gurganus or another member of the RC(SW) chain of command on AT/FP? If so, did you identify any vulnerabilities during that in-brief? What was the response?
**A: I didn't actually brief him until after the incident. I was supposed to brief him prior to the TOA, but I spoke to him about a week after the burning man incident because of a scheduling issue.**

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review identifies that a request for a perimeter fence around the airfield was denied by both the UK chain of command and by the BLS Executive Steering Group (ESG). Please describe any specific deliberations you are aware of.
**A: I was not a member of the ESG, but I think it was just a money thing.**

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: The JRB Supplemental Review addressed a 3d MAW request to emplace concertina wire to secure vulnerable areas around the flight line and to channelize pedestrian traffic to ECPs, which was approved and completed prior to the attack. There is also an exhibit in the Supplemental Review of a 3d MAW flight line barrier plan request submitted at the same time (11 May 2012). Were you aware of that?
**A: No, Sir. I had heard of the request but I was not aware of the details.**

Q: Please describe the process for seeking AT/FP improvements while you were the CO of TFBW. What was the ESG's role? Was this process responsive? Did you have adequate funding? Do you feel that the RC(SW) chain of command provided you the support you needed to accomplish your mission? Did MajGen Gurganus? Please describe.
**A: We had a weekly meeting that my guys would chair, and we raised improvements that we'd want to make. This was our AT/FP group. If they came to a conclusion on something they wanted to ask for, I would get briefed on it. Then it went over to the JFUB, which I'm not sure what that acronym stands for. It was essentially another board that the RC would run to determine if they wanted to spend money on it. They would vet the money and whether it would affect some other function on the base. So in my view, the bureaucracy was a bit cumbersome, because you had to get buy-in from so many stakeholders before a project went forward. I don't think it was responsive to an emerging requirement. We had the aerostat for three months before we got approval to float that thing, because of different concerns. I spoke to MajGen Gurganus about the aerostat, and he directed (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to get it solved. That solved it. I think we did have adequate funding; it was not an inhibitor except for the fence that I spoke about.**

Q: When did you learn that a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) team (led by Marine (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c) would be conducting an assessment of the BLS Complex?
**A: I think it was February or early March when I got an e-mail from out of the blue from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) It was really a good thing, because it gave us a level of focus to get things going. I thought it was really positive.**

Q: How comfortable were you with your AT/FP Program and its mechanisms – such as working groups – at that point in time?
**A: I think our processes were a little weak, but I think preparing for it sharpened them a bit.**

Q: Who was your AT/FP Officer?
**A:** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: Was he responsible for the AT/FP Plan? Was he already at the BLS Complex when you took command?
**A: He came over about a month after I got there. We had (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at first, who was an old pro at this. I was concerned at first with having a Gunny in that position, but my fears were put to rest when I saw him in action. He was very professional and a good communicator. Then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) came in, and he was effective too.**

Q: What was your reaction to the JSIVA outbrief from (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the rest of the JSIVA team? Did you agree with it?
**A: I thought they really did a great job, Sir. I was the senior man in the room. I had an Army Colonel from IMCOM there, because he had the infrastructure responsibilities. I had all of my people in there, and I had the SECFOR in there. We had some UK reps in there. I thought the JSIVA team was very thorough. You're not always happy with what an inspection team has to say, but they did a professional job. I turned to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after that and told him that this was our homework now, and he had to start whittling away at the things they identified.**

Q: The report states that a "vulnerability" is "a situation or circumstance that if left unchanged may result in the loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources." Did you agree with the six vulnerabilities assessed by the JSIVA team [flight line access exploitable; ECPs lack AT/FP design features; inadequate protective shelters; no overhead cover for areas of large concentrations of personnel; inadequate or missing sidewall protection for assessed billeting and mission assets; inadequate Mass Warning and Notification System (MNWS) capability]?
**A: Yes, Sir. I agree with all of them, but I disagreed with the ability to mitigate them in any timely manner. The billeting camps were built in 2009, and to put sidewall and overhead protection for those would have been a major infrastructure project. I thought we were pretty solid on the main ECP and the south ECP, but I respected their professional opinion and judgment on what they saw there. I embraced their recommendations. It should have provided us some more ammo to go to boards like the JFUB to say that we needed some more money to get some things changed.**

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Did you brief MajGen Gurganus on the results of the JSIVA?
**A: I did not brief him, because I left the FOB literally the next day. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was supposed to brief him, but I don't know whether he did. I sent a note to MajGen Gurganus with a thumbnail sketch, and I put that note in a very positive light.**

Q: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c indicated that inputting vulnerabilities into the Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) is the best way to get visibility of those vulnerabilities all the way up to the Joint Staff. The JSIVA Report indicated that CVAMP had not been updated for the BLS Complex since a CENTCOM Joint Security Office (JSO) Vulnerability Assessment conducted in January 2011, and that neither you nor your ATO had access to CVAMP. The Report recommended that you both get access to CVAMP and input the results of the JSIVA. The Report also recommended that you prioritize the identified vulnerabilities and identify mitigation strategies in the Risk Assessment field, and then approve the mitigation strategies in CVAMP. Were you able to do this after the JSIVA? If not, why?
**A: I first learned of the CVAMP requirement at the outbrief, Sir. I don't know if anyone got it done after I left. It was not a contentious issue at the outbrief. I was not aware of it before, and we realized that we just needed to do it.**

Q: Two of the immediate changes to Force Protection identified in the JRB Supplemental Review were 100% manning of all Camp Bastion guard towers and additional Marines assigned to TFBW SECFOR. What do you attribute this to?
**A: I can only speculate that this was directly attributable to the attack.**

Q: One interviewee expressed a concern that prior to the attack, only half of the guard towers were manned, yet there seemed to be an excess of Marines in MWR facilities and coffee shops that could have otherwise been performing guard duty. Did you share this concern? Did you ever express it to anyone on the RC(SW) staff?
**A: It's kind of a philosophical question, Sir. I think the biggest frustration that I had was that when we were taking these cuts in manning, it was an uneven cut. Some sections had excess personnel that allowed you to do those sorts of things. We were working at a breakneck pace, 18 hours a day. Our break was the six hours to go back to our hooch and get some sleep at night. I kind of agree with the General McChrystal philosophy that your organization will work best if all of your personnel are working at close to full capacity, and I think that was uneven on the camp.**

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by US personnel prior to the attack? If so, what do you attribute this to?
**A: I think early on, definitely, when we started doing those IDF drills. There was more responsiveness when I left. We had no sector defense responsibilities on Leatherneck when we first got there. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) fixed that, and everyone had a sector guard force after that.**

Follow-On Questions

Q: Is it correct that you had no security force responsibilities on the airfield?
**A: That's correct, Sir.**

Q: So we would have to speak to the Air Wing to see what procedures they had in place?
**A: Yes, Sir.**

Q: Could you point the aerostat wherever you wanted it from the CJOC?
**A: The CJOC did not control that, Sir. There was a control center on the south end of Leatherneck. (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4g The CJOC watch officer did control where the control center pointed it. Then they could monitor in the CJOC, and the CJOC could direct where to look at.**

Q: Do you know whether they routinely observed the eastern perimeter because of the undulating terrain? It is assessed that the enemy chose that breach point, because it was the most vulnerable area. Had we made that same assessment, and did we keep an eye on it with tools we had available?
**A: The aerostat had not been up very long by the time I left. But I made several visits down there, as did the SECFOR commander. I had those types of conversations with them, and we were concerned with the eastern perimeter. The contractors in that control center were already witting of it. They were not novices off the street; they were very experienced folks. They knew where to look.**

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STATEMENT (continued)

Q: Just to clarify, because we've received different answers. Can you confirm that the towers on Camp Leatherneck were manned at roughly 50%?

**A: I can tell you unequivocally that it was about every other tower, even when Triple Canopy got there, because I donned my PPE and climbed up in those towers. It was roughly every other tower.**

Q: If you had all the manpower you needed, was every other tower the right number or would you have manned more of them?

**A: You can never have too much security, Sir. I would have manned 100% if I had enough people. Guard duty in my mind, having done this a few times in combat, is all about fighting complacency. So we constantly monitored it.**

Q: What was the manning like in the towers when we had 20,000 Marines in RC(SW)?

**A: It was the same as when Triple Canopy was there, Sir. Because I was still only given low numbers to man the towers. I know for a fact that in 2010 we did not have them manned at 100% either. A key issue that has to be answered is what was the number of patrols we were running with the lower numbers. We thought we would be down to as low as two patrols with that number. You are just going to lose your SA with that number. Even at 211, we were stretched thin, but we were doing about 6 patrols per day. I think those guys had pretty good SA in our AO. They knew who was who, and they knew if someone new moved in. I was very sensitive to the number of patrols. I didn't want to chase a number, but I was worried with quality.**

Q: Did MajGen Gurganus or other members of the RC staff go out there and troop the line with you?

**A: He went out there with me once to the** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g **when I was trying to move that. He got a sense of the human filth concentrated out there when he was there. Dead goat carcasses lying around and things like that.**

Q: Did you think it would be a seamless transition to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) since he was your XO?

**A: Yeah, I think so. He is actually back at Leatherneck now. He'd definitely be a guy you want to talk to.**

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AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 10. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STAEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFUT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5th day of April, 2013

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Deputy SJA 1 MLG Camp Pendleton CA

(Authority TO Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



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