

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION MCB Quantico, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20120612	3. TIME 1000	4. FILE NUMBER N/A
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS JIEDDO, Crystal City, VA			

9. I, _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.
Q: Where are you currently assigned?
 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What is your background in the Marine Corps?
 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: What was your duty position at the time of the 14-15 September 2012 attack on the Camps Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex?
A: I was the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for I MEF (FWD), so I processed all of the JUONS and Urgent UNS created by the Marines forward. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c My job was to educate the Marines forward to the technology currently in theater, like mine detectors, mine rollers, things like that. Also, when the Marines were looking for a new product to attack the IED network, I produced the JUONS and Urgent UNS to MARCENT and higher headquarters.

Q: Who did you answer to in the RC(SW) chain of command?
A: Sir, often to the Chief of Staff but ultimately directly the CG, MajGen Gurganus.

Q: What was your relationship with MajGen Gurganus? How often did you interact?
A: Very positive, and I talked to him on a daily basis.

Q: Where were you during the attack on 14-15 September 2012?
A: I was in my office, when the first gunshots were heard around 2209 or 2210. From where my office was, you could actually see the smoke and the flames from the flight line. I was about a mile from the runway. My office was in the I MEF compound.

Q: Based on your experience of living on the BLS Complex, what were your initial thoughts?
A: Bastion Leatherneck Shorabak (BLS) is three separate bases. You had the UK Bastion side, which included the runways. The Marines share some responsibility for the runway, like maintenance and upkeep but not all responsibility. The UK has force protection responsibility for the runway and Bastion internal. Then you have Shorabak controlled by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Leatherneck under the responsibility of the Marines. As for all three, they seemed very secure. There had been no severe incidents at BLS since the Marines initially developed Camp Leatherneck in 2008. We had very little indirect fire because it was not in a populated area. So my impressions of the base were very secure. You could see people coming from a long way off. So I thought it was a plane mishap on the runway. It was probably 20 minutes afterwards that we realized that it was an attack.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	PAGE 1 of 12 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____		DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Did your duty position require you to take any actions during the attack? If so, what?

A: No Sir. We were locked down in the MEF compound. I just made sure my men were locked down and accounted for.

Q: Who appointed you to serve as the Chairperson of the JRB?

A: It actually came through Brigadier Skeates the DCG first. I sat with him first, and he let me know what he was looking for, and then MajGen Gurganus signed off on it later.

Q: Did you receive an appointment in writing? What was the directed scope of your inquiry? What did you understand to be the JRB's task and purpose?

A: Yes, Sir I did. It had an original thirteen questions based on the JSIVA that was conducted after the "burning man" incident. He wanted me to take a look at what had been brought up in the JSIVA and compare that with the current force protection. It was basically to see what happened, try to find out how it happened, and then put in procedures to ensure that it didn't happen again. Much like a Joint Initial Assessment Team (JIAT) which gathers the facts and then puts together the lessons learned to ensure that we put the right procedures in place to avoid it in the future. It basically lays the groundwork for a more thorough investigation. The task is to gather enough information for the CG, so that he can determine what level of investigation is required. It is a quick assessment within a 24-48 hour period. The initial review board I was given two weeks to make my initial assessment.

Q: Did you discuss the appointment or the inquiry with MajGen Gurganus prior to beginning the inquiry? If so, what did he tell you? If not, who did you discuss it with in the RC(SW) chain of command, and what did they tell you?

A: Yes, Sir, he sat me down and told me to find out what was going on and to keep the (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) informed and that he would sit down with me as things progressed in my assessment. He did, but I don't remember right now exactly what it was. It was basically, "find the facts, find out what happened," something like that.

Q: Were you involved in any discussions to determine the proper scope and level of the inquiry? If so, please describe those discussions and who you discussed it with.

A: There was some discussion back and forth, especially with General Skeates. I would report back to him once or twice a day on what I was finding, and he would provide me general guidance as I went forward.

Q: Who served on the JRB? Who did you consult with?

A: Legal services, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). We had intelligence guys, British forces, we tried to tap into coalition forces so that we had a fair representation.

Q: Were any members of IJC or ISAF/USFOR-A on the JRB?

A: None on the initial. IJC/USFOR-A probably came down about a week later to work with us, because IJC had some questions they wanted answered. So there was cross-talk.

Q: The JRB Report mentions that OP CONGO, the combined US/UK crisis management plan, did not clearly address seams between the Bastion and Leatherneck Commanders' areas of responsibility on the BLS Complex. How were the Camps delineated? Was it clear? Were they walled off from one another?

A: Some areas were walled off and others were not. There were main avenues of approach. There were entry points into the airfield. Bastion 1, 2, and 3 which was next to the runway was a little different. It was more wide open, but they had roving guards. Just like the runway had roving guards.

Q: During your inquiry, did anyone indicate that they had raised this concern prior to the attack? It appears that there was an ability for contractors to move about somewhat freely. If so, who raised the concern, and to whom?

A: Yes, Sir. It was raised, and it relates back to what we call the "burning man incident," where the guy set himself on fire on the runway. They did a review on that, which I was not a part of. I think (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did a review on that. Prior to that, the Brits did a survey. They came up with areas that they thought should be improved. Based on cost, some of those ideas were shot down. And any of the reviews that we did with the British, things went to the Executive Steering Group. Anytime you have a new AT/FP Officer or a rotation of forces, you have somebody saying we need to do this, or we need to do that. So even though things were brought up, the base was constantly being improved. Anytime they could put in a new ditch or a berming system, they would do it with the engineering assets that they had right there.

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(b)(6),

(b)(7)(C) STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Do you know whether OP CONGO had been rehearsed prior to the attack? Including communications interoperability?

A: Yes Sir, I think three times. One thing that is important to note is that since there were three bases there, there had never been a single point on top of that which managed all three. Everything was separate. You couldn't point at one person and say that person was in charge of total force protection with respect to BLS. When you look at the attack in this case, they had rehearsed on three different occasions, and it helped in the reaction. Communication worked pretty well. The fact that there was no blue-on-blue was pretty impressive.

Q: The JRB Report states that the confusion over C2 between CO BSN and CO TFBW during the attack indicated "that the organization of Op Congo C2 architecture is not fully supportive of command and control of a crisis or USMC reporting requirements." Please describe further, particularly with regard to USMC reporting requirements.

A: The Brits do things a little differently than we do. We have a direct line of reporting from the company to the battalion to the regiment. The Brits have something that they call collars. A grey collar, a blue collar, or whatever. How they go up through their chain and we go up through our chain is not the same route. Another source of confusion was the difference between crisis management and consequence management. The British felt that OP CONGO thought should be more of a consequence management, where the Marines thought it should be more of a crisis management. It was more coordination of different interpretations of terms, because when the attack happened, things melded pretty well. When you look at the base, a good example is that Brits controlled inside Bastion. They were responsible for internal patrolling. The Marines, we had internal patrolling of Leatherneck but we were also responsible for patrolling outside of the base. We also had that responsibility.

Q: So, only the Marines did the external patrolling?

A: Yes, Sir, along with a partnership with the ANA.

Q: During your inquiry, did anyone indicate that they had raised concerns regarding the OP CONGO C2 structure for crisis management on Camp BLS (i.e. there was no unity of command over the entire BLS Complex)? If so, who raised the concern, and to whom?

A: I had not heard that anyone brought it up prior to my review, Sir. It came up during my review, but nobody ever said, "I told this person 8 months ago..." or anything like that. You actually have to go back in time to the MOU in play ever since the Marines first came to the base. And changing it would require going all the way up the UK chain to the Prime Minister. After the attack procedures were put in place to get the MOU changed and pushed up through the UK chain of command.

Q: Do you recall the year of the MOU between USCENTCOM and the UK PJHQ regarding C2 arrangements for BLS Complex? Do you remember any areas of concern when you read it?

A: I believe it was 2008, Sir. Just the point that there was no single person in charge, that it wasn't MajGeneral Gurganus or General Skeates who was the "belly button" for the whole base.

Q: Was it your impression that the OP CONGO C2 arrangement for the BLS Complex (no unity of command) was required by the MOU?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Why was there a separate CONGO Cell during a crisis instead of centralizing C2 in the CJOC, which was already a combined US-UK effort?

A: Two things: limited space. It is tight in the CJOC. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who was in charge of the Bastion side made the call that they would set up in a smaller trailer about 50 feet away from the CJOC, so it was basically the same. As Marines, we tend to get right in the middle of the battle so we can command and control, but when (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) came back it was his job to be in charge of OP CONGO for the Marines. They were dual hatted, but (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) decided to move into the trailer to have more room. They were basically co-located but 50 feet apart. You would have to have some form of communications between the two to get things going quickly.

Q: Did you also produce the 18-page RC(SW) document titled "14 September 2012 Attack on the Bastion, Leatherneck, Shorabak Complex"? It is a thorough post-attack intelligence summary, and it appears that you used it to help draft your JRB Report. If you did not create it, do you know who did?

A: Yes, Sir, I did.

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STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Do you know whether OP CONGO had been rehearsed prior to the attack? Including communications interoperability?

A: Yes Sir, I think three times. One thing that is important to note is that since there were three bases there, there had never been a single point of Command established for the entire BLS complex. Everything was separate, each with its own Command. You couldn't point at one person and

Q: During your JRB inquiry, what did you determine regarding the performance of intelligence personnel in the chain of command? Any flaws?

A: During the attack, they were feeding intelligence as they had it. The question that has risen is whether there was any information out there before the attack. There was some chatter out there, but nothing finite that said there would be an attack on Leatherneck on this date. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c One of the ANA commanders mentioned that he thought he saw something in a newspaper that they were going to attack but it didn't say whether it was Leatherneck or somewhere else. So there was a lot of chatter out there but nothing finite. So the intell group was doing their job, I felt that they were feeding the best information they had. You can always improve your intelligence, but it takes analysts out there and sources walking the ground.

Q: What, if anything, did you find regarding counter-intelligence efforts for identifying internal threats on the BLS Complex were insufficient?

A: They were appropriate at the time, from what I saw. There was a threat identified after the "burning man incident." They had BOLO lists for people trying to come on the base that we were concerned about. So the threat was insider, as opposed to coming through the wall or the perimeter. So most people thought it was sufficient at the time.

Q: Do you recall what the Enemy Most Likely Course of Action and Most Dangerous Course of Action were regarding threats to the BLS Complex? Do you feel that RC(SW) paid adequate attention to mitigating both?

A: MLCOA: Insider threat. MDCOA: Threat at the ECPs by blowing up a VBIED at the ECP. Yes, Sir. We were constantly improving the ECPs. From a Science and Technology standpoint, we were taking new technology out there, from the sniffing devices, to the dogs we used, to the camera systems.

Q: What about mitigation measures for the insider threat?

A: We put a new aerostat in within the last 8 months. But of course, the aerostat is only as good as where you direct it to look. We were constantly looking at the contractors. It's a major problem for any large base, because you need the contractors, and we had a lot of them. It's kind of like "attack the network." Starting from the contracts itself, how they do the hiring, to the badging, building BOLO books and sending out messages that this particular individual has not checked in. So we were constantly doing that. So the ATFP internal to Leatherneck and Shorabak was working and constantly improving.

Q: During the JRB Inquiry, did you get any evidence to suggest how or why the personnel in Tower 17 did not observe the insurgents breach the perimeter wire?

A: When you look at most of the terrain around the BLS Complex, it's actually pretty flat except for the area to the east of the runway. Where towers 15, 16, and 17 are, it's pretty much the worst undulating terrain around the whole base. The British had procedures established where you had to have interlocking fields of fire. Where 15, 16, and 17 are, with the gap in the middle with 16 being unmanned, yes, you could see out a distance. There was overwatch out at a distance. It gets a little harder on a night with no illumination, no moon. It was (b)(6), (b)(7)c call on what towers were manned on Bastion. It was not Leatherneck's call. It goes back to the unity of command. It was their base, and we were a guest on their base. I hope I'm not out of line by saying this Sir, but when we put the additional runway in on the eastern side, we didn't push the fence line out. Before we put in this other runway, there was a huge distance between the runway and the perimeter. We constrained ourselves, but also the area to the east of the base began getting populated with Afghans. And that is a GIROA issue. We had mentioned this issue. It was their responsibility to push the local nationals away from the perimeter, because it was Afghan land. We were leasing it. MajGen Gurganus asked the ANA to push the locals out, because they actually started to come in and put poppy fields right outside the perimeter. Our role over there is not to make enemies, so if we go out there and displace a bunch of locals we end up cutting our own necks. So we realized that it had to be the Afghans to do it.

Q: So if we couldn't push the wire out because of the local nation population, were there other mitigating measures put in place?

A: Yes, Sir there was. There were additional berms put out on the eastern side. If we couldn't knock down an existing compound, we would put up a berm. In the area where they actually breached, there were some berms out there. There was concertina wire put out there. There was not concertina all the way around, but it was put there in an effort to channelize. The Brits had been working on this for years. It was their role as manning the towers to cover the berms and the obstacles.

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STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: So if the Marines had put obstacles out there, the Marines would have ensured that they were covered by observation and fires per Marine doctrine?

A: Yes, Sir. And the Brits will tell you that they were covered. And to a certain extent, they were. You have to realize that during this timeframe, we had a considerable drawdown in forces. We went from 17,000 to 7,000 just on the Marine side. The Brits didn't have quite as drastic a drawdown, but they were affected too. And that's where (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had to make the tough decisions of what towers to man, and which ones could be rotated through. He didn't just unman a tower for a long period of time. He would mix it up to keep it off balance. He had the Tongans, and he also had what we called his "camp tax" to man those towers. He had his cooks and others go out there and man the towers.

Q: Did you interview the personnel in Tower 17 the night of the attack? If not, why?

A: Yes, I interviewed one of the Tongans who was there that night in Tower 17. I interviewed him 2-3 days after the attack. After talking to him, he said that it was really dark and they didn't see anyone. The equipment they had in those towers was British equipment. Being a science and technology guy, I can tell you that our equipment was far superior to theirs. I actually tested our equipment against theirs, and the guys in the towers all said they would rather have ours. I tried to get them some of our excess equipment, but I was told by higher headquarters that I couldn't give it to them because they had to buy it from us.

Q: Was their equipment good enough to perform the security task required?

A: Yes, Sir. It was good enough at the time. Had every tower been manned, absolutely Sir. But when you have a gap, based off of the terrain in there, they could have used better equipment.

Q: The JRB Report mentions that OP MOLEHILL is a "daily security patrol that surveys the inside of the perimeter fence every day in order to find and repair any breaches." What unit conducted patrols for OP MOLEHILL? Was this a once daily patrol? Did they vary their time and route? Were interior perimeter patrols ever conducted at night?

A: It was the British unit that did it, basically made up from the "camp tax." Different people rotated through there. They rode along the perimeter fence in their Land Rover two feet from the fence line to check for holes in the wire, and they varied their times so that they didn't form a pattern. It was one vehicle, I believe with four people with communications back to the CJOC so that they could identify their position. One of the main reasons for OP MOLEHILL was because of the threat from "scrappers." They were locals who would try to come up to the base to steal metals and sell it out on the economy. The scrapping was much more prevalent on the west side of the base, because our ranges were over there. Not so much on the eastern side.

Q: So, based on what you know, your opinion is that they chose the breach point not for the manning of the towers, but for the terrain?

A: Yes, Sir. It was very, very well planned. Everywhere else was flat. You could see for kilometers. They knew that the area had ditches, mounds, undulating terrain, wadis, scrub vegetation, and other micro-terrain that offered concealment. We went out there after the attack, and there was a mound that they apparently hid behind before moving forward. We found clothing there, water, batteries, and things like that. We had a LEP, law enforcement personnel, go out there and take a look. He was a tracker, and he actually followed the footprints and showed their route through the ditch, into the wadi. And they found things like batteries along that route. We found grenades and wire cutters too. We were also able to figure out their route once they got through the wire and how they split up into their five-man teams.

Q: Back to Tower 16, when was that last manned? Do you know?

A: I believe that it had been unmanned for 2-3 days. The rotation might be 2 days, 3 days, or 5 days.

Q: But more than one day?

A: Yes, more than one day. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tried to shift it around.

Q: Did the patrols cover the entire interior perimeter of BLS Complex? Did MOLEHILL cover entire interior perimeter of the BLS Complex?

A: Yes, Sir. Day and night, and on a daily basis.

Q: Did the patrol discover breaches prior to the 14-15 September attack? If so, what actions were taken in response?

A: Yes, Sir. I believe they discovered three breaches and patched up those breaches in a 3-4 month period before the attack.

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9) STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: So were those breaches treated as anything out of the ordinary requiring additional patrols or intelligence collection, or did they just patch them up and move on?

A: I did not fully flesh out that question. They did say that when they found one, they would patch it, and bring it up to the chain of command. They said that they would do some additional patrolling, but I can't really say whether it was the next day or next several days. I didn't get the information on how long they focused on that area after a breach.

Q: Were there any changes to OP MOLEHILL prior to the attack that you are aware of?

A: The only changes may have been the times, because they altered times. After the attack, they changed to more than two times per day going through there in the vehicle. But there were no increases or decreases in OP MOLEHILL. They did increase interior patrolling prior to the attack because of a VVIP who was stationed on base with the UK at the time. But no changes to OP MOLEHILL.

Q: The report also mentions that TFBW with support from the 215th ANA Corps patrolled daily outside the perimeter fence. What was the task and purpose of these external patrols? How often did they patrol? Did they vary their time and route? Did they conduct these patrols at night? Did the patrols cover the entire exterior of the BLS perimeter? Had there been any changes to these patrols prior to the attack? If so, please describe.

A: Yes, Sir. They did it day and night, and they varied the times. The purpose was to ensure that nothing had changed outside the perimeter. There was always the IED threat, so they were out there on vehicle patrols. They often went out with mine rollers. They would also go into the villages encroaching on the base just to make sure their presence was felt out there. They typically went out 2-3 times per day, but they varied the times and the number of patrols per day. They covered the entire exterior of the perimeter. They had pulled back their presence before the attack though, because of the video that came out back in CONUS that was anti-Islam. It was talked about a lot at the time. We didn't want a full up presence at the time, because of the tensions. We didn't want a major presence in the populated areas.

Q: No changes to TFBW patrols prior to the attack?

A: Only as I mentioned before, we were trying to minimize our presence in populated areas during the day because of the video.

Q: Did tenant units on Camp Leatherneck provide personnel to TFBW, or did TFBW have organic personnel to conduct all of their Force Protection tasks? If tenant units provided personnel, how often did they rotate for this duty? Did you get the impression during your JRB inquiry that there were personnel shortages for TFBW's FP mission? If so, was this by choice or because of true manpower shortages?

A: At the time, they had a battalion, and they also had some Jordanians and other coalition forces manning the CJOC. We liked to have that Jordanian presence out on the patrols, and it helped that they could speak the local language. But it was the British who patrolled Camp Bastion, and we handled Leatherneck internally. The tenant units would provide Marines at times based on the threat.

Q: If tenant units provided personnel, how often did they rotate for this duty?

A: I'm not sure of the actual time, but it wasn't a random tasking. Maybe they were there for a month, maybe longer. The only exception was if we got intelligence about an insider threat or something like that. We might pull extra guys from the tenant units to increase TFBW's manning to be prepared for whatever threat we were looking at. On the Brit side, they had more of a "camp tax" on their units, (b)(1)1.4d I'm not exactly sure on that.

Q: Did you get the impression that TFBW had personnel shortage that hurt their ability to do their job?

A: No, Sir. That was looked at very stringently, but you have to remember that we were going through a drawdown from 17,000 to 7,000. We were trying to pull in the perimeter where we could on Leatherneck. But based on what we had and on what the FML allowed us to have, we did the best that we could.

Q: The JRB Report mentioned that there was no guard force assigned to monitor the dead space between the flight line and the security towers. Was this vulnerability properly mitigated by other means? Did the insurgents have a clear avenue of approach to the flight line once they got past the perimeter security towers?

A: No, Sir. They weren't able to directly access the flight line. There was concertina at points internally, and you saw the points where they had to cut through that to get to the flight line. Tower 15 could not have seen the breach point because

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(b)(7)(C) STATEMENT (Continued)

of a hill between them and the breach point. Tower 16 absolutely could have seen them but it was unmanned. Tower 17 could have possibly seen them if they were looking right in that direction, but we have a natural tendency when we are in a tower to look directly out. Tower 15 and Tower 17 had interlocking fields of fire and observation out at a distance, but there was dead space once they got past the point where the fields interlocked. Once inside the fence line, you had some sporadic concertina in the area between there and the airfield, and then you had concertina and small Hesco barriers around the airfield. So there were some concertina areas that they had to go around or cut through. They weren't totally channelized, but there were only so many ways that they could have gone without highlighting themselves.

Q: Were these internal obstacles covered by fire or observation?

A: No, Sir. Not at the time.

Q: And there was also no local security patrol in that area?

A: Yes, Sir. There was a random patrol. It was an internal, vehicle-mounted patrol driving around the roadways in that area. They did not dismount and actually go through that area, but they would drive all through there were the roads were. There were larger Hesco barriers right on the flight line, but there were gaps in it based on the threat at the time. There wasn't a threat of somebody coming through the fence line in that area.

Q: So, based on what you are telling me, did the insurgents have a direct avenue of approach to the flight line once they got through the fence?

A: No, Sir, they didn't. They had to cut through the concertina and they had to cross the road. It was single-strand at the time. (b)(1)1.4a

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Not exactly what we would call a guardian angel, but somebody who would keep an eye on things. There were guard control points that were manned based off the force protection conditions established by the Marine Aircraft Wing at the time. The Marines had roving patrols in the area. One other thing is that the airfield itself was lit up like a baseball field. The guard towers would not have been able to see into the area behind the towers, because they would have been whited out from the airfield lights.

Q: So the first time the insurgents would actually encounter Marines would be at an ECP on the runway, assuming it was manned?

A: Yes, Sir. The areas around the refueling farm and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b were not what we would really call ECPs. They were just roving guards in there. That's because there were ECPs at the north and south end of the road that ran along the east side of the flight line. That's the road that the insurgents had to cross to get to the flight line, and they had to cut through the concertina wires and climb over the small Hesco barriers there. The one group went up and around to get to the actual flight line where the Harriers were. One group went south and hid behind some barriers at the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b. The other group cut through the wire and actually started to cross the road. There was a rotator bus coming through, and that group fired on that bus. That's when the first shots started to be heard around 2209. (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

The detainee, once he started talking, said that his group was going to where they thought the living space was so they could kill Marines. But the LSA where the Marines lived was further south, and they had a crisis plan of where to go and what to do if something happened. This was a kamikaze mission. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

Q: Did anyone during your JRB inquiry express that they had identified this vulnerability prior to the attack? If so, who identified it and to whom?

A: Prior to the attack, the only vulnerability that was brought up was the fence line. The area between the fence line and the flight line was not formally brought up as an issue.

Q: What was the distance between the fence line and the flight line?

A: Roughly, I would say about 500m from the fence line to the road next to the airfield.

Q: Were the towers right on the fence line?

A: No, Sir. The towers were actually set back a little. Probably about 50-100m for Towers 15, 16, and 17.

Q: Was the airfield within range of the fence line with an RPG?

A: Sir, I'm not sure what the max effective range of an RPG is, but because of the mound in between it would have been an

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indirect fire type shot. You couldn't take a direct, straight shot.

Q: The JRB Report mentions that an additional tower on the Bastion perimeter was manned during August 2012, which bolstered the area where the breach occurred 14 September. Why was this additional tower unmanned at the time of the attack?

A: I don't know, Sir. I think it was just (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) changing them up to be sporadic.

Q: Did you find any other changes to the FP posture which occurred prior to the attack? If so, please describe. Was there any reason leading up to the attack for the BLS Complex FP posture to be relaxed or changed?

A: No, Sir. In a way it was heightened because of the video. We didn't have a big population outside the base. We had the few villages encroaching there, but in speaking to the guys who did the patrols out there, they said that the people there were generally friendly to US presence.

Q: Was it common in Camps Leatherneck and Bastion to only man half of the perimeter towers?

A: I wouldn't say it was common, Sir, but it was dictated by the drawdown. Prior to the drawdown, things were manned differently. The Brits had used the Tongans there for a long time, but I think their numbers were reduced too. The Brits also had to start using the "camp tax." After the attack, the UK brought in an additional 200 people to help.

Q: Were they manned at the same general ratio as Camp Bastion at the time of the attack?

A: We Marines man our towers a little bit differently. The Tongans were allowed to sleep in the towers. The towers are like almost three story towers where the lower section was a sleeping area. For the Marines, we don't do that. For us, there is a shift, there is a standard, you are awake for the whole time that you are there. Once you come off that post, you come out, replenish, and go back.

Q: Did the JRB Inquiry reveal any individuals who had expressed concern about the Camp Bastion perimeter FP posture prior to the attack? If so, who identified the concerns and to whom?

A: There were some internal issues brought up about generally increasing the security in the area after the "burning man incident." Some of those were brought up and funded, others were not. At one time, they wanted to put T-walls around everything. That just wasn't feasible based on the threat at the time. That's why we went to the ditches and to the berms. It was focused on vehicles.

Q: Were lights utilized to illuminate the perimeter or any dead space between or behind the towers?

A: The towers each had a light system on it, but not a spot light on the tower.

Q: The JRB Report mentions that the Giant Voice/WAVES systems did not perform as designed during the attack. This deficiency had previously been identified as a FP vulnerability by the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA). Did the lack of performance of the WAVES system impact reaction time of the QRF or the vulnerability of personnel or equipment on BLS Complex?

A: It did not impact the response of the QRF, because they had internal comms. What we meant by that was that not all personnel on the complex could hear when we called OP CONGO or LOCKDOWN. Part of the problem was that the Brits and the US used different terms for the same thing. We fixed that afterwards. We also fixed problems with the speaker system, because there were gaps where you couldn't hear the speakers on the camp.

Q: Two of the immediate changes to Force Protection identified in the JRB Report were 100% manning of all Bastion sangers and additional Marines assigned to TFBW SECFOR. What do you attribute this to?

A: Just in the sheer fact that we didn't want to see a repeat of the attack. We went to a camp tax the day after the attack to fill some gaps. It was necessary to address an immediate concern, not necessarily showing that things were inadequate before when you consider the threat at the time. The attack changed or viewpoint. We had Marines over on a NATO base not protected by Marines. I don't think it was knee-jerk reaction. We knew we needed to tighten up after we were attacked, and we wanted to fix them. This was an attack. At some point the enemy is going to find a vulnerability. Just like we look for gaps in the enemy to exploit, they do the same thing. Could we have done things better over the period of time we were there? Probably. Could we have pushed the wire out? Probably. But we couldn't just displace those people.

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Q: Why was that level of protection not up and running prior to the attack?

A: Because of the threat. The threat before the attack was more internal and the external threat was an attack on an ECP. The "burning man incident" turned us internally quite a bit. We can sit back here and say that we should have done other things. But we had limited Marines and limited Brits, and you have to balance what you have with the things you have to get accomplished, and you are going to have to assume risk in some areas. I truly believe MajGen Gurganus did a good job of this, especially considering all of the things he was tasked to do. He was tasked with starting to tear down bases, building roads, humanitarian assistance, security force assistance, and going after the enemy all while drawing down forces. He was also constantly talking to the commanders about internal security, and how guys had to do more to provide internal security.

Q: Do you think we underestimated the threat, being more focused on internal rather than external?

A: No, Sir, I don't think we underestimated it. It was an attack. It was an enemy attack. We try to prepare for everything the best that we can, but it was an enemy attack on a side of the base that was assigned to the Brits. And the MOU that was signed before MajGen Gurganus got there set up that the Brits had that side of the base, and that's what MajGen Gurganus was working off of, Sir.

Q: In your opinion, did US forces take FP seriously prior to the attack?

A: Yes, Sir. Undoubtedly.

Q: Were the respective AT/FP Officers effective?

A: Yes, Sir

Q: Did the commands listen to the advice of the respective AT/FP officers?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Did you identify any deficiencies?

A: Being a science and technology guy, we always wanted more acrostats and GBOSS systems and things like that. But we were working hard on that throughout. The JUONS and Urgent UNS were out there, and we were improving.

Q: RC(SW) established a BLS FP OPT and a BLS Counter-Threat Working Group led by the RC(SW) DCOM, and also an AT/FP Working group in the aftermath of the attack. Did you sense a lack of senior leader emphasis on AT/FP prior to that point?

A: No, Sir. Those were actually running prior to the attack. They may not have met as often beforehand. The meetings were there, but it was less formal.

Q: Did you identify any complacency or lack of discipline regarding Force Protection by US personnel prior to the attack? If so, what do you attribute this to?

A: No, Sir, not by US personnel.

Q: MajGen Gurganus signed the initial JRB Report. Did you outbrief him on the JRB Inquiry? If so, how did he respond to it? Did you have conversations with him regarding the inquiry? If so, please describe those conversations?

A: I did outbrief him, Sir. He was very positive that the information was brought to him. He was the type of guy who wanted to know what his deficiencies were so that he could take care of them right away. As you know, Sir, you can't have eyes everywhere. He hoped that he brought the right guys along to give him those eyes, and if he had a deficiency to fix he would. I also like MajGen Gurganus because he wasn't out there looking to chop somebody's head off. If somebody made a mistake, he ensured that they learned their lesson. If it happened twice, then he would chop somebody's head off.

Q: MajGen Gurganus also directed and approved the Supplemental Review that you conducted, which focused on RC(SW) response to the 10-14 June 2012 JSIVA. Did MajGen Gurganus give you any guidance or direction not contained in the appointment memorandum? If so, what was that guidance or direction?

A: His guidance was basically to understand what the JSIVA was all about, what it identified, and to let him know if we had guys out there not doing what they were supposed to be doing. That was the main point. If the JSIVA identified something, was something done. Did they at least consider those deficiencies, even if things didn't get done due to funding or resources. Or did they just ignore it. He wanted to make sure systems were in place, and they were.

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Q: How did he gain knowledge of the JSIVA?

A: The JSIVA team outbriefed (b)(3), (b)(6), and I believe that (b)(3), (b)(6), then briefed MajGen Gurganus. Once the attack occurred, he remembered the JSIVA and he wanted to make sure we had done what was prudent after the JSIVA.

Q: Was anyone else appointed with you to conduct the Supplemental Review? Who did you consult with?

A: I got my team back together that was part of the initial review. I worked a lot with our (b)(3), (b)(6), I had what I needed to get it done. (b)(7)(C)

Q: Your Supplemental Review stated that the 14 March 2012 airfield incursion (often referred to as "the burning man incident"), "...raised concerns regarding the security of the flight line and its assets and access to critical areas within the Bastion airfield. This incident also demonstrated the need to improve airfield and perimeter security and to institute some level of increased access control to the airfield operating areas." In your opinion, did the entire US chain of command share these concerns about the flight line and feel the need for improved security? Do you feel that RC(SW) reasonably attempted to address these concerns after the "burning man incident"?

A: Yes, Sir. We were talking about the internal of Camp Bastion. Perimeters were put up, ECPs were established, and things that were already emplaced were improved. It was brought up to put T-walls all the way around there, but it was financially impossible unless we were going to stay there for the next 50 years. But there was a serious effort to constantly improve.

Q: The Supplemental Review identifies that a request for a perimeter fence around the airfield was denied by both the UK chain of command and by the BLS Executive Steering Group (ESG). Please describe any specific deliberations you are aware of that are not included in the minutes regarding the ESG's decision to deny funding for the fence. Did your Supplemental Review identify anyone who discussed this decision with you? If so, who did you identify and what did they tell you?

A: They were looking to put T-walls up around the whole flight line. Both said that they couldn't pay for it. What was done was putting new ditches and berms in there. I talked to the Chief of Staff about why they didn't think it was feasible to do, and it was because we would have had to practically put a concrete plant on the base to get it done and it would have taken 18 months. Even if it would have been just a fence line, it wouldn't have been done until October.

Q: What commands are on the ESG?

A: Sir, it is made up of the US and the Brits. For the US, you have the MEF and all of the subordinate commands. It is led by the MEF Chief of Staff.

Q: Your Supplemental Report addressed a 3d MAW request to emplace concertina wire to secure vulnerable areas around the flight line and to channelize pedestrian traffic to ECPs, which was approved and completed prior to the attack. There was a 3d MAW flight line barrier plan request (enclosure 7 of the supplemental review) submitted at the same time (11 May 2012) to emplace over 10,000 linear feet of HESCO barriers and 650 linear feet of T-Walls to protect the flight line. The request stated, "Without these improvements, the flight line equipment and personnel will remain vulnerable to enemy attack at multiple access points, including numerous high speed avenues of approach." This project was approved after the attack. Do you recall why this request was not approved after the "burning man incident"? Do you know if it reached a decision making body?

A: From what I remember, Sir, it was still in draft format and didn't get submitted until after the attack. They were still working to get it forwarded.

Q: This and other improvements like the flight line perimeter fence were requested after the "burning man incident" but prior to the JSIVA. Do you know why 3d MAW, TFBW, and/or RC(SW) did not use the JSIVA as additional support to request AT/FP improvements for identified vulnerabilities?

A: No, Sir, I can't answer that.

Q: Did you speak to TFBW AT/FP personnel as part of your Supplemental Review? Do you recall who?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6), was the AT/FPO for RC(SW). (b)(7)(C)

Q: Do you know who the other AT/FP Officers were?

A: All subordinate units had one.

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Q: Considering that TFBW had responsibility for US FP on the BLS Complex, did you get the sense that TFBW AT/FP personnel were trained and proficient?

A: Yes, Sir, and the reason I say that is because of the fact that we didn't have a blue-on-blue incident during the attack even though it was a very complex situation. We had two QRFs running around and Marines on the flight line too, so they knew what they were doing, Sir.

Q: Did the Supplemental Review reveal why the AT/FP Working Group was not stood up after the JSIVA until October (after the September attack)?

A: No, Sir. What was revealed was that the meetings were happening. They just weren't formally organized under that name.

Q: The Supplemental Report identifies other concerns from the JSIVA (TFBW's Risk Management Program and AT/FP Plan) which TFBW apparently did not address between the time of the JSIVA and the time of the attack. What do you attribute this to?

A: Turnover, drawdown of personnel. Basically, when the JSIVA came down and between the attack, I think there was a turnover of the SECFOR.

Q: Do you know whether RC(SW) requested assistance from IJC or higher for AT/FP improvements in response to the "burning man incident" or the JSIVA? If so, please describe.

A: I believe so, Sir, but I don't have specifics.

Q: Do you know when the new runway was completed?

A: I think it started in 2010 but didn't get finished up until late 2011 or early 2012.

Q: Going back to the scrapper issues. Were there also smuggling or stealing issues, and were there ever instances of ECPs being bought off and things like that?

A: I am not aware of any issues at ECPs. Most of the scrapping activity came near the ranges. They were also trying to grab stuff and re-sell it. They were trying to breach the perimeter to do that.

Q: Knowing what the threat was at the time, if we hadn't had the drawdown in Marines, would we still have reduced the security patrols?

A: No, Sir, we would not have reduced the security if we wouldn't have had the drawdown. We still had the mission to protect that area, but we had to make cuts across the board because of the drawdown. We had to get the contract with Triple Canopy to help man some of the posts. I think there were 280 of them.

Q: Some people have mentioned that there were too many Marines on liberty that could have been pulling security. Do you share that opinion?

A: No, Sir. When you are there for 365 days, if you don't break away to play that football game, or do some PT, or whatever it is that you do, you will literally drive yourself crazy. And it would raise the possibility of suicides. So I totally disagree with that. Our Marines and Brits did their jobs, and I do not agree that giving people liberty was the problem.

Q: Can you talk more about the Tongans sleeping in the towers?

A: Sir, when I say they were sleeping in the towers, it means that the off duty personnel were sleeping down below, because they lived there for a certain period of time. Their food was brought out there and everything. They typically live at that tower during their whole time there with a few days off here and there to go back to the camp. They were never caught sleeping on the job or anything like that. The off-duty personnel slept in the lower level of the towers while the on duty personnel were upstairs pulling guard.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?

A: Yes, Sir. We can always go back and look at something, and say that we could do better. But I firmly believe based off of the two reports that I did, that we took a look at things based on the threat at the time. We were basing that off of what had happened in the past, but we were also looking to the future. We also take a strong look at what we think will happen. As a science and technology guy, I was always looking for the next piece of gear that could help Marines. We were looking to get more aerostats, and we did put one in during our time there. We were always looking for more GBOSS towers, and that was a big thing for MajGen Gurganus. He wanted to have the capability to have eyes on every area where we had Marines.

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Based on what had happened, and what we thought was going to happen, I firmly believe that we were doing the best that we could with the amount of personnel that we had. We went from a lot of Marines to a few Marines. Having ISR assets is going to help our Marines as we continue to have fewer Marines there. The same thing is going to happen there as happened in Iraq – we are going to have people trying to hit us as we leave so they can say that we are running out of there. I don't think there is any one person to blame for this. Could I say that the original MOU could have been worked out a little bit different? Absolutely. I think that MajGen Gurganus did all he could do based on the Marines that he had, and based on the information and intelligence that he had at the time. My review was not an informal investigation, because this was an attack. And from what I've been told over the years is that we don't normally investigate attacks. If we had done something wrong, then absolutely you investigate that. But this was a force that came directly at us.

END OF STATEMENT

Approved for Release

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I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

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Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 29th day of July, 2013 at 1431 hr (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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