

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45, the proponent agency is PMG

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20130703	3. TIME 1100	4. FILE NUMBER
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5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
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8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CJ2, USCENTCOM, MacDILL AFB FL 33621

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

(U) What is your current duty position at CENTCOM?
Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) for CENTCOM Non-State Threats Division (Analytic lead for CT)

(U) How long have you held that position?
I've worked on AFG/PAK since 2003 but joined CENTCOM in 2011 and started working with the Non-State Threats team upon returning from my fourth deployment to Afghanistan in November 2011.

(U) What are your responsibilities in that position?
I provide analytic oversight and direction to JICCEN CT, threats, and illicit activity issues.

(U) Are you a DOD Civilian employee? If so, how long have you served in this capacity?
I joined DIA HQ in 2003, working AFG/PAK insurgency issues and threats.

(U) Describe your past experience and deployments working in the intelligence community for the U.S. government.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(U) What was your duty position at the time of the attack on the Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex on 14-15 September 2012?
During the attack, I served as the senior intelligence advisor to COMISAF and ISAF J2 MG Bob Ashley.

(U) What were your responsibilities in that position?
As the senior intelligence advisor, I provided assessments, responses, and assistance to the ISAF J2 on a myriad of analytic Afghan issues to include threats, Afghan security forces, Afghan politics, Pakistan, and more. Through my duties, I coordinated and collaborated across the community on products.

(U) Were you familiar with the intelligence personnel at RC(SW) at the time?
Yes. We participated in weekly sync video teleconferences with all the RC J2s to include RC SW. IJC's senior intelligence advisor served as the primary contact to the RCs; however, the collective cross-coordinated routinely.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	PAGE 1 of 6 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT OF		TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(U) Who were the primary intelligence personnel at RC(SW) who you interacted with?

We dealt primarily with the Marine J2--his name escapes me, and our analysts directly coordinated on analytic issues with the analysts at RC SW. At ISAF HQ, we operated predominately on JWICs computer systems, while our colleagues in RC SW operated off of Sivr. ISAF CJIOC-A has both systems which ensured RC SW's visibility and analytic concurrence on daily production, raw traffic, and information flow.

(U) In what capacity did you interact with them? How often?

ISAF HQs hosts CJIOC-A which produces a daily intelligence summary. Articles written require analysts to continuously coordinate with the appropriate RCs. As a result, RC SW routinely communicated with the CJIOC team in addition to the senior video teleconferences.

(U) In your opinion, were they effective? On what do you base your opinion?

RC SW J2 elements consistently provided outstanding insight on local analytic threat/insurgent issues. They fully understood their area of operations, tracked threats and personalities in advancement of mission. Information sharing between the US and British elements appeared seamless. Their comments, intelligence summaries, and communication to our team in Kabul demonstrated this, often to the advantage of our publications as well.

(U) In your experience, what percentage of overall intelligence effort in Afghanistan is spent focused on identifying threats to coalition military bases?

Force protection is a top priority composing different levels of efforts as determined by commanders on the ground. Each unit handles their own threat streams, in coordination with the RC elements, threat reporting gets passed immediately, and it is constantly reviewed. RC SW and S shared information regularly as neighbouring RCs to overcome any intelligence seams.

(U) In your opinion, did the RC(SW) intelligence staff place the proper amount of focus on threats to their bases? On what do you base your opinion?

~~(S//NF)~~ Yes. Given the nature of the insurgency, RC SW intelligence staff focused an appropriate amount of attention on threats to local bases and ISAF personnel from what we saw in Kabul. Each base faces a variety of threat streams and the quality of the reporting varies. At the time, threat streams against Camp Bastion ranged from alleged insurgent intent to kidnap Prince Harry to third party nation targeting. At the time, no threat streams indicated an imminent or spectacular attack against Bastion.

(U) Did RC(SW) have adequate manning in their intelligence sections? Were they properly trained? Did they have access to the proper systems, databases, and intelligence information?

I cannot speak to the manning or training of RC SW's specific intelligence sections but they had access to the proper systems, databases, and intelligence at Bastion. They composed an important element of the overarching ISAF J2 team.

(U) Describe what the term "Indications and Warnings (I&W)" means to an intelligence professional?

In the context of threat streams specifically, indications and warning forewarn of terror attacks which can range from aspirational intent to final stages of execution. Intelligence tips I&W, which prompts the review of force protection, interdiction efforts, and more to neutralize potential attacks. In Kabul for example, a biweekly discussion reviews all threat reporting. This review of I&W for the capital includes all stakeholders to ensure widest dissemination of information and actionable intelligence reaches the right units.

(U) Where does intelligence on I&W come from?

I&W is an all-source analytic effort drawing on collection from HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT.

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(U) Please generally explain how the intelligence community (IC) works together to develop and share I&W.
~~(S)~~ IC efforts on I&W differ in Afghanistan because it is a combat zone. The CJCS J22 runs and coordinates I&W threat levels across the CENTCOM AOR but Afghanistan falls outside that effort. As mentioned previously, VTCs in Afghanistan provide a forum to discuss emerging threats and to discuss I&W. However, threats posed to RCs S and SW prove different than RCs N or W resulting in different levels of effort. Threat reporting is pushed to the RCs, discussions ensue, and sometimes those threats are shared with our Afghan counterparts. Additional resources will be tasked to collect intelligence on nascent plans to disrupt networks and neutralize threats.

(U) How is the intelligence shared or accessed? Has an intelligence analyst made an assessment prior to it being available, or is it raw intelligence?
 Raw intelligence provides the evidence that supports an analyst's assessments. As new, raw intelligence emerges, analysts discuss amongst each other. Analysts socialize new assessments and discuss prior to publication or issuing warnings. As part of the production protocol at ISAF and IJC, RC SW comment was required on all products. This ensures the RCs are aware of the latest developments and their visibility is shared with analysts elsewhere in the country. Intelligence is shared across Siplr and/or JWICs computer systems, the threats are discussed via conference calls, VTCs, and through other mechanisms.

(U) Who is responsible for fusing various sources of intelligence for a commander at the RC level? How is this done in practice?
 RCs have their own J2s who have organic all-source analytic units reviewing and fusing intelligence. The units traditionally write daily summaries, provide briefs, and work on questions tasked while concurrently monitoring new developments.

(U) What responsibility does CENTCOM J2 have for disseminating I&W intelligence products to USFOR-A/ISAF? What about USFOR-A/ISAF to IJC? IJC to the RCs? The RCs to their subordinate commands?
 Afghanistan has a four-star in theatre and it's a combat zone, so CENTCOM J2 does not have responsibility for disseminating I&W. With that said, CENTCOM's analytic units working on Afghanistan and Pakistan pass threat information daily to the forward deployed analysts at CJIOC and IJC. CJIOC and IJC analysts work with the RCs to flow that information out. However most of the time, visibility on and threat reporting to RCs originate from the field or the units in danger—vice from national-level entities telling theatre. The exception might be single source tippers (NSA, CIA) that might go direct to a unit based on the seriousness of a particular threat.

(U) How does the dissemination of I&W work in practice?
 Please see above responses.

(U) On the other side of the coin, what responsibility do the intelligence staffs at the various command levels have for pulling I&W that is available in the IC?
 This question is unclear to me. The IC receives the threat reporting, culls daily intelligence summaries and the like to understand the threats. The forward deployed units are supported by elements of the IC.

(U) What I&W existed prior to the attack on BLS Complex?
~~(S)~~ In the weeks and months leading up to the 14 September 2012 Camp Bastion attack, no I&W forewarned of the attack.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

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(U) If there was a lack of I&W for this attack, what do you attribute that to?

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(U) Did any level of command miss I&W that existed in the IC?

No level of command missed indicators of an attack and nothing suggested missed I&W through the after action reviews conducted by ISAF or the UK elements at Bastion.

(U) In your opinion, did the RC(SW) command and staff have any intelligence lapses or failures regarding the attack on the BLS Complex?

Given the absence of raw intelligence reporting, no one on the RC SW command and staff failed to detect the attack. The information was not available to anyone.

(U) Was RC(SW) coordinating with the right people and accessing the right information to pick up on I&W if it existed? Please explain. On what do you base your opinion?

Not applicable given that the I&W did not exist.

(U) Did any other level of command have an intelligence lapse or failure regarding the attack on BLS Complex?

In my opinion, no. Again, the information did not exist in intelligence channels.

(U) What role did you play regarding intelligence collection and analysis on the attack after it occurred?

~~(S//NF)~~ Following the attack, I participated in the scrubbing of intelligence to see if ISAF/IJC missed anything, to surmise culpability of the attack, and particularly to determine third party nation involvement. At the CJIOC, several papers addressed the different aspects of the attack.

~~(S)~~ As details emerged, to include the posting of the attackers training online, I provided updates to the ISAF J2 and worked with intelligence partners/allies to gain the best understanding of the events possible. I collated and sent questions to the debriefers working with the surviving attacker to glean additional details on the attack. I worked with the ISAF J2X CI elements, who travelled to Bastion to review the attack and the insider threat. While there, the team engaged in extensive force protection discussions with the British.

(U) What were you able to learn about the attack after it occurred?

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(U) How were you able to make these assessments and determinations?

~~(S)~~ Site exploitation at Bastion, the video clip, and debriefs of the surviving attacker provided the best evidence for the assessments on the attack.

(U) Was/is it still your opinion, based on what you were able to learn afterwards, that there were no intelligence lapse or failure by RC(SW) or any other level of command?

~~(S)~~ Yes. Following the attack, it became clear that no intelligence lapses occurred by RC SW or other levels of command.

(U) Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?

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(U) Do you know anyone else who has knowledge or information relevant to this investigation?

Yes, but in my opinion, they would almost certainly provide validation of the information provided above. Upon request, I'm happy to pass along any number of contacts who worked at CJIOC, IJC, or at CENTCOM covering this issue during the event.

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

TAKEN AT McDILL AFB

DATED 3 Jul 13

9. STATEMENT (continued)

Nothing follows

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AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE ____ I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

Witness: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CENTCOM, CCJA McDILL AFB FL
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ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
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(Typed name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 36, UCMJ
(Authority TO Administer Oaths)

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