

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Fort Bragg, NC	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20130606	3. TIME 1220	4. FILE NUMBER N/A
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5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	7. GRADE/STATUS AD
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8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
4th Marine Logistics Group, Marine Forces Reserve, New Orleans, LA

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

Q: Where are you currently assigned?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Q: What is your current duty position?
A: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: How long did you serve on a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) team prior to your current assignment?
A: I served with the JSIVA branch from March 2011 to June 2012. I started out as an Infrastructure Engineer, and then I became a Team Chief when I was promoted to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: Where were you assigned while serving on the JSIVA?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Q: What is the primary task and purpose of a JSIVA?
A: A JSIVA provides a base commander a vulnerability-based analysis of the installation's Antiterrorism (AT) program, DoD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) and Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) programs. The assessment report identifies vulnerabilities that may be exploited by terrorists, assesses IEM and CBRNE capabilities, and suggests options that may eliminate or mitigate those vulnerabilities and improve IEM and CBRNE capabilities in the areas of preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. The assessment focuses on the installation's overarching program and its compliance with DoD Instruction 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards; DoD Instruction 3020.52, DoD CBRNE Preparedness Standards; DoD Instruction 6055.17, DoD Installation Emergency Management Program; and Geographic Combatant Command and Service Supplements to these instructions. We provide the base Commander an outbrief and a follow-on report, so that he/she can make risk management decisions.

Q: What is the composition of a JSIVA team?
A: A typical JSIVA Team consists of nine members with a mix of military or Federal Civil Service members:

(b)(1)1.4a

The team that went to Afghanistan consisted of eight members. We did not take a CBRN specialist because the threat at the time did not indicate the need for this particular subject matter expert.

Q: Did you serve as a Team Chief the entire time?
A: No. I was initially trained and certified as an Infrastructure Engineer upon arrival at DTRA in April 2011. I was certified as a JSIVA Team Chief in Dec 2011 upon pinning on O-6.

10. EXHIBIT	(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 of 9 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES CONTAIN THE HEADING (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)		TAKEN AT	DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: What were your responsibilities as the Team Chief?

- A:
- Represent Joint Staff and DIR, DTRA to the installation commander
 - Prepare for and conduct comprehensive and technically complete assessment
 - Provide oversight of the team while conducting the assessment
 - Coordinate specific issues identified during the assessment with the commander
 - Responsible for content and presentation of the assessment outbrief to commander and staff
 - Responsible for completion and accuracy of JSIVA report
 - Prepare Joint Staff Backbrief slides of the assessment results

Q: Did you have particular experience or training which led to your selection as a JSIVA Team Chief?

A: While waiting to pin (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I trained and certified as an Infrastructure Engineer and conducted nine assessments in that billet. I was also mentored and began training as a team chief. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I completed certification as a Team Chief and served as the Team Chief for JSIVA Team 4 until my departure in June of 2012.

Q: What additional training did you receive once selected?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: How would you characterize the JSIVA? Is it the "gold standard" for the Department of Defense?

A: Yes, Sir. We are the capstone for Anti Terrorism/Force Protection.

Q: Please explain the command or agency structure of the JSIVA.

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Is a JSIVA required, or is it conducted at the request of the installation commander?

A: A JSIVA is not the specific requirement. An installation or base is required to conduct its own assessment each year, and then a higher headquarters assessment is required every three years and a JSIVA can fulfill that requirement. There is a "call for assessments," for lack of a better term, and we are rolled into a larger scheme for the upcoming assessments. The geographic commands are supposed to tell JCS what their requirements are. The bases are then slated for the type of assessment they will receive based on their requirements and the amount of resources available to meet their requirement. An installation commander may request a certain type of assessment, however the geographic combatant command (GCC) or owning service generally determines the need for an assessment. As Team Chiefs are not involved in the above process, a better answer to this question can likely be sourced from the Joint Staff.

Q: How often is an installation required to have a JSIVA, if at all?

A: IAW DoDI 2000.16, an external higher headquarters AT assessment is required of each DoD installation of 300 personnel or more, or as mission dictates, at least triennially (installations in high threat areas or with a high turnover of personnel can be assessed more often). This higher headquarters assessment may be conducted by the owning service, the applicable GCC, or a JSIVA team. In CENTCOM's case, they have their Joint Security Office (JSO), which conducts assessments.

Q: How many assessments did you complete as a Team Chief?

A: I completed six (6) assessments as a Team Chief.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Q: How many assessments did you conduct on bases in Afghanistan or any other combat zones?

A: I conducted two in Afghanistan as a Team Chief, and four in Iraq as an Infrastructure Engineer. During the assessments in Iraq, I was being mentored to be a Team Chief as well.

Q: Have you had the opportunity to review the report for the JSIVA that you conducted 10-14 June 2012 of the Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak (BLS) Complex in Afghanistan?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: How well do you remember this particular assessment?

A: I remember the basic details of the assessment but conversations on the ground, which help paint the "snap-shot in time" of any assessment, are typically captured in notes. It's not like an investigation; it is not an investigative body. You move around and talk to those people who are available, and there are a lot of conversations that take place. I PCS'd shortly (end of June) after returning from this trip and destroyed all my notes. The various subject matter experts of the team are likely to have their individual notes.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6),
(b)(7)(C)

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: The report mentions DODI 2000.16, DOD O-2000.12-H, JFOB 6 Handbook, and USCENTCOM OPORD 05-02. Are these the primary sources of standards and doctrine that you used to conduct the JSIVA? Please explain what each of these is. What other documents, if any, provide important standards?

A: The primary source for conducting JSIVAs are the DoD AT VA Benchmarks which contains the requirements outlined in DoDI 2000.16, DoD AT Standards, DoD O-2000.12-H is the ATO Handbook that provides "how to" tools for the ATO and commander. JSIVA teams use this document and others to formulate mitigating actions for identified vulnerabilities and concerns. The JFOB Handbook Version 6 provides recommendations for commanders to mitigate a myriad of threats identified as the CENTCOM design basis threats. The USCENTCOM AT OPORD 05-02 also defines specific requirements for AT programs within the command. JSIVA teams use the DoD and the GCC requirements to conduct their assessments.

Q: Who in a unit or base is responsible for knowing and understanding these standards?

A: The assigned (or appointed) Installation Antiterrorism Officer and staff, if applicable. The installation commander will usually have a general knowledge of the standards and requirements, and he is ultimately responsible. At the end of the day, the base commander identifies, assesses and controls risk by balancing risk cost with mission benefit. This generally occurs after an informed decision making process which subject matter experts take great part in. The commander essentially determines where risk can and cannot be accepted, and then applies strategies to address both situations.

Q: The report states that "vulnerability" is "a situation or circumstance that if left unchanged may result in the loss of life or damage to mission essential resources." How do you make the determination that a situation or circumstance has risen to that level?

A: The JSIVA team evaluates the situation and uses the existing threat(s) we try to determine if it is possible/probable to exploit the weakness. We consider the effects on the mission of the installation and even organizations within the installation. If it fits within the definition, we label it as such. That is not always a clear and concise task to address. Targeting is largely based on previous attacks, but if it seems logical that an adversary is capable of identifying the weakness through open source, research, or surveillance they can plan against the weakness and exploit it.

Q: I realize that it is contained in the report, but generally describe the six vulnerabilities your team identified at the BLS Complex?

- A:
- **Flight line access exploitable:** There were numerous overland avenues of approach into mission areas with little to no hindrance built in. The installation was concerned about insider threats (non-coalition), but they were unable to adequately control access around the largest asset they had.
 - **ECPs lack AT/FP design features:** The East Gate (British) was vulnerable because the installed active vehicle barriers were not used. Troops on the ECP indicated that the crash rated drop inn barriers were not designed to be used frequently to index vehicles, and often incurred maintenance problems. The barriers were closed only at night. The gate was vulnerable to a gate runner tactic.
 - **Inadequate protective shelters:** Protective shelter entrances were not configured properly so that fragmentation was prevented from entering. Concrete box culvert shelters did not include sandbag reinforcements for additional fragmentation protection, as illustrated in JFOB 6 Handbook. There were an inadequate number of shelters for the number of personnel needing them.
 - **No overhead cover for areas with large concentrations of personnel:** Reportedly, command personnel had decided not to construct overhead cover facilities to protect against Indirect Fire (IDF). Overhead cover, as illustrated in the JFOB 6 Handbook, would have been advisable for facilities such as DFACs, LSAs, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Regional Command (RC) Southwest (SW) Headquarters.
 - **Inadequate or missing sidewall protection for assessed billeting and mission assets:** Sidewall fragmentation protection is required for all living quarters IAW USCENTCOM AT OPORD 05-02, as illustrated in JFOB 6 Handbook. Some sidewall protection was provided. However, sidewall protection was not provided in all locations. In some cases, sidewall protection was located a large distance from the protected structure. In other cases, a single concrete wall was used to protect structures on both sides of the wall. For two story billeting, sidewall protection was too short and situated too far away from the structures.
 - **Inadequate Mass Warning and Notification System (MWNS) capability:** Due to the fact that gaps existed within the external/internal speaker coverage across the base, the system/process is not capable of notifying all personnel of an emergency. TF Belleau Wood (responsible for AT/FP and security of Camp Leatherneck and AO Belleau Wood) conducted a survey to identify dead spots/gaps in coverage and procured the hardware to mitigate those gaps. However, the funding for the operator and for maintenance was not approved so the system remained unusable. The command was in the process of pursuing a funding request, which should cover the loss or gaps in coverage. The "snap-shot in time" depicted that a vulnerability was warranted, even though the pending contract will hopefully fix the vulnerability.

Q: Is it typical to identify the types of vulnerabilities present at the BLS Complex?

A: Yes, ACP design issues, in particular, are prevalent at many installations as identified in our common observation analysis. You also run into issues on Coalition bases. The installation commander can tell coalition forces what he wants for AT/FP, but they don't always execute.

Q: Your team also identified 36 "Concerns," defined in the report as "a situation that is exploitable and that can indirectly lead to the death of DOD-affiliated personnel or lead to the destruction of mission essential resources." Please explain the "indirectly" part of that definition. Is 36 Concerns a typical number to identify during a JSIVA?

A: These issues, if left unchanged, could contribute to loss/degradation in the mission or loss of life. Concerns are usually associated with conditions that cannot easily be exploited, and it would take failures in other areas for the adversary to succeed. Thirty six concerns at an installation is not uncommon, especially since they are also associated with the absence of a process, e.g., risk management, and planning documents.

Q: At the time of the JSIVA, were you aware of an incident in March in which a local national interpreter accessed the flight line while Secretary Panetta was present on the BLS Complex? Did you discuss this incident with BLS personnel during the JSIVA? If so, what did they tell you?

A: Initially the team learned of it through the media coverage but yes, the installation walked the team through the event. Some of the mitigating actions or strategies as a result of the event were explained (increase in post personnel at some ECP's) but in reality, from our standpoint, that does not stop a determined individual from driving around them and entering the flight line. Deterrents and obstacles should be multiple and mutually supporting of one another.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: The JSIVA report describes the flight line access at BLS Complex as an "exploitable" vulnerability and "thus, personnel and equipment are largely exposed." Further, the report highlights that "TFRW cannot meet all applicable FPCON measures, to include Bravo 19." What created this vulnerability?

A: Basically, the possibility of mission failure by not being able to control access (vehicle and pedestrian) to the flight line. Not being able to meet FPCON BRAVO 19 was a contributing factor, but not the primary issue. The fact that the installation imposed BRAVO 19 on itself, knowing that it could not meet it, indicates a lack of understanding of FPCONS.

Q: What could have mitigated or eliminated this vulnerability?

A: Afghanistan is obviously a war zone with a determined adversary, so eliminating the threat is not likely. However, the airfield was a Mission-Essential Vulnerable Area (MEVA), so the ATO is responsible for submitting requirements to mitigate threats to it. In AT/FP, we look for a layered defense, a layered posture, and the airfield did not have any real obstacles to mutually support the perimeter fence. You have to protect your MEVAs with security in addition to your perimeter. To mitigate the threat, the installation could have considered:

- Install fencing or barriers; mitigation actions outlined in the report could have increased the chances of detecting/defeating the enemy sooner and possibly defeating them. It was not uncommon to see personnel walking around the base so had someone seen the adversary crossing the terrain it may not have raised the alarm. Climbing a fence indicates a more hostile intent.
- Increasing owner/user awareness: security sometimes isn't intuitive so personnel need to be briefed and exercised to make sure indicators are scrutinized. Also, increasing owner/user participation in actively providing security through additional taskings around their areas.
- Conduct exercises to validate processes and identify shortfalls; internal actions to check response times for posted personnel.
- Increase the number of dedicated/routine patrols to the flight line; self-explanatory.
- Consider utilizing additional security surveillance systems to monitor flight line activities; self-explanatory.

Q: Was the exploitability of the flight line at BLS Complex typical of other flight lines you assessed in Afghanistan?

A: In discussing this particular question with my JSIVA team, the airfield at Bagram was better and the airfield at Shindand was about the same. The airfield at Shindand had less aircraft activity, but it was still a critical area.

Q: Why were the two routine patrols assigned to the flight line "largely ineffective from a preventative/detection perspective"? Based on the size of the flight line, how many patrols likely would have been required for prevention/detection?

A: The size of the airfield and ramps, the dispersion of aircraft, lighting, the detection and warning systems in place, and ease of access to the area all play a factor. We determined that both patrols would largely be reactive. Threat awareness, exercise of the AT Plan, analysis of insider threat, etc. are all factors as well. As for determining how many patrols would be effective, we were not able to conduct that level of analysis. The number of patrols is not the entire issue. The real deterrent of an attack is what augments the patrols: awareness, early warning detection devices, cameras, etc. are mutually supportive of the patrols. With a MEVA, you need persistent forms of security.

Q: Did the BLS Complex personnel express a shortage of manpower to conduct patrols?

A: They absolutely did, but neither I nor the team could recount the exact conversation(s).

Q: Did you assess all parts of the BLS complex with the same rigor?

A: We look at as much detail of any given installation as we can in the time we have available. We pay particular attention to those areas of the installation that the commander deems critical or a Mission Essential Vulnerable Area (MEVA). I would say we gave BLS the same attention. However, in this particular case, our charter was to assess the Leatherneck side or LNK. There were jurisdictional conflicts with the British side (Bastion) in that they were responsible for AT/FP there, and because they look at AT/FP in a different light. We officially looked at the AT/FP program of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and his staff at TF Belleau Wood, because they were responsible for the program at Camp Leatherneck. However, we also looked at some things on (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Bastion, because the entire complex was a combined base and because there were US personnel on Camp Bastion. There was no clear dividing line between Camps Leatherneck and Bastion.

Q: Did you assess the manning and coverage of the guard towers on the BLS Complex?

A: Due to the reasons mentioned in the previous question, we did not visit the towers on the Bastion side. We were only able to observe them as we drove by. We did visit and assess one ACP controlled by the Brits. We visited all manned towers on the US controlled sections with the exception of two that were not manned due to environmental concerns caused by the burn pit.

Q: How did the fact that the UK and the Afghans were responsible for AT/FP on parts of the BLS Complex affect the JSIVA?

A: Circulation control, different perspectives of AT/FP planning, training, and execution are examples of how it affects the posture of an installation. In a coalition type environment, unless we assess all plans, policies and procedures of each element or command of the base, we can only report on what we do assess. What you essentially end up with is a decentralized AT/FP Plan where you have two to three commands with their own plans. If you don't have control over the policies and procedures of everyone on the base, then it depends on the relationships between the coalition partners. However, that does not stop us from identifying issue that are easily identifiable. ACP's, searches, access from one side of the base to the other, etc. That said, we were not allowed to visit the British controlled areas or the Camp Shorabak outer ACP. We requested access towards the tail end of the assessment, but we did not receive approval.

Q: Although JSIVAs do not compare bases to other bases, in your experience, how did the BLS Complex compare to other bases of similar size and composition which you assessed in Afghanistan or other combat zones?

A: I will say that each base in the AOR is too unique to make a thorough comparison. There are similarities though in various areas covered within the report.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

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Q: Are these items in the AT Plan the ATO's responsibility? Yes, but he has to have support from various subject matter experts from the base.

Q: Who else has responsibility?

A: The Base or Installation Commander has the ultimate responsibility, but requires the support from all relevant subject matter experts to be read in and taking part of the AT program.

Q: Do you recall who the ATO was for the BLS complex?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6), was the outgoing, and I believe the incoming (who was training to take over) was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Q: What different levels of command typically have their own ATOs?

A: "ATO's shall be assigned at the battalion, ship, squadron, and separate facility and higher levels (stationary or deployed). A deploying unit having 300 or more personnel assigned or under the operational control of a designated commander will have a Level II certified ATO"

Q: Is it an additional duty or a full time responsibility?

A: This is typically Service dependant. The duties and complexity of the job, especially in a combat environment, warrant a fulltime individual. Although not clearly identified in the references we use, we advocate for a full-time position. Standard 9 of the DoDI 2000.16 (AT Standards) states that a full-time position should be a consideration.

Q: Would it typically be the ATO's responsibility to ensure that the command is complying with USCENTCOM AT OPORD 05-02 for a base in the CENTCOM AOR?

A: The ATO is the action officer that runs the program for the Installation or Base Commander. It is that individual's responsibility to advise the commander so that he or she can make informed risk management decisions. Each commander is supposed to go to a Level III AT Course. So the commander should be aware and pulling guidance from the ATO.

Q: The report states that the Engineer personnel were not trained on security engineering, and were unaware of USCENTCOM AT OPORD 05-02. Is this typical? Who is responsible for ensuring the Engineer personnel are trained prior to deployment?

A: No this is not typical, but was true on both sites visited in AFG during this trip. GCCs have specifically identified the requirement to have at least one security-trained engineer on an installation. This could have been a matter of the requirement not being identified in the deployment requirements. The facility engineering responsibility for LNK (BLS Complex) was provided by US Army IMCOM. The engineering commander was an Army O-6. His deputy (designated as the DPW) was a civilian on a one-year assignment from Schofield Barracks, HI. IMCOM was not fully stood up at Camp LNK, and the Engineers were unaware of the requirement within the USCENTCOM AT OPORD 05-02.

Q: Did you feel that the BLS Complex AT/FP personnel knew the proper AT/FP standards?

A: I think it was compartmentalized. The closer you got to the plan, the better people knew the standards. The ATO, for example, had a pretty good idea of the standards despite some gaps. The further down the chain you got, like the Emergency Management personnel and Base Facilities personnel, no Sir. In my personal opinion, the AT/FP personnel at the BLS Complex, as an entire team, were not well-versed in the standards.

Q: The report mentions that your team provided the BLS Complex AT/FP personnel with copies of standards, training aids, and tools. For example, your team gave the TFBW ATO a copy of the DoD Vulnerability Assessment benchmarks? Is this typical?

A: Yes Sir, every assessment. Sometimes guidance comes out but is not adequately propagated. We try to make sure the base personnel have the latest information from a DoD perspective. We provide DVDs and CDs on every assessment that has all relevant data. We use this as an opportunity to reset them to a foundational level so they have everything that they need to be successful, including example AT Plans.

Q: Did you feel that the BLS Complex AT/FP personnel had the necessary support from the command? On what do you base that assessment? Interviews? Observations?

A: I think they had the support from the command, but as with any installation, the support is limited in fiscal capability, and it's limited in personnel capability (the number of people you have). I base this on other assessments that I've done, and the interviews we conducted. Nobody told us there were issues with support from the command.

Q: What impact did the combined nature (US-UK-AFG) of AT/FP at the BLS Complex have on the overall readiness and posture?

A: We were provided a tour of the CJOC and some interviews were conducted with sections (sensors, security, air ops, etc.) to see if there was integration, and all indicators were that they were working very closely. The observation was made in a stress-free environment. But the base had two chains of command, a British chain and a US chain, and responsibility for directing responses would depend on which side the event occurred. And the fact is that Afghan and UK forces don't adhere to the same FP standards as US forces. As a specific example of AT/FP on a coalition base, we were told some information that we tried to follow up on but were not able to. We were told that the main gate was difficult to get into. It was so difficult to get in there that the contractors would circumvent the main gate, go through the Shorabak gate, and then come through the Friendly Gate between Shorabak and Leatherneck. We were never able to follow up on it, because it may have caused a relationship issue.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: The JSIVA Executive Summary's conclusion describes that the goal of the AT/FP program is for the BLS Complex to become a "hard target" for any insurgent group, inside or outside its perimeter. Based on this conclusion, would you describe the BLS Complex in June 2012 as a "soft target" that was vulnerable to insider threats, external threats, or both? Why or why not?

A: Our greatest concern was insider threat or the exploitation of Shorabak to attack the base. Insider threat exists everywhere not to the degree that we saw there. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also told us that the insider threat was what kept him up at night. If you combine the insider threat, and what that insider might know, with the perimeter of the base and some other issues, I would say you are leaning towards being a soft target. If you are on the outside looking in, it would have appeared to be a hard target. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) You want to present yourself as a hard target as much as you can: guns, drop arms, guards, barriers, fence lines, barriers beyond your perimeter fence line. They did a pretty good job of making themselves appear to be a hard target from the outside, even in areas that weren't necessarily hard.

Q: Similarly, the same conclusion stated that, "Continued emphasis from the leadership of TFBW can serve to eliminate or mitigate all or most of the AT challenges identified." Were there indications during the JSIVA that the TFBW leadership had not placed enough emphasis on AT challenges?

A: No Sir, I would say exactly the opposite. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) This ATO knew exactly what their shortfalls, and even though they didn't have every bit and piece of the plan together, they knew enough about it to know what they needed to do. It comes down to fiscal and personnel resources, and those are in short supply. You do what you can do. The mechanism to raise your vulnerabilities formally is the CVAMP, the Core Vulnerabilities Assessment Management Program. It's the program where the ATO inputs the vulnerabilities, and then the Commander goes in and identifies mitigation strategies that can be routed up the chain. I believe the CENTCOM JSO all the way up to the Joint Staff has visibility of that.

Q: What is the required output of a JSIVA?

A: The JSIVA products include an outbrief to the installation commander and a report NLT 45-days following the outbrief. The final report is uploaded into CVAMP and a survey is emailed to the installation commander. Our desired output is that they have everything they need to be successful, and they know where to go for help if they need it.

Q: Who did you outbrief on the JSIVA prior to departing the BLS Complex?

A: The TF Belleau Wood/MHG Commander (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the focus along with applicable members of his staff. It was well attended. We had some IMCOM folks there. There was also a senior British Officer in attendance and I believe representatives from RCMW.

Q: Did you have any General Officers in attendance?

A: No, Sir. That is not uncommon. The focus is on the base commander's plan, and how well he executes the plan. Bases all over the world have an O6 base commander with tenant commanders who are one-star, two-star, three-star, even four-star Generals. The tenant command typically serves as a resource provider.

Q: How did they respond to it?

A: Favorably, without any issue. There were no negative discussions that I'm aware of.

Q: Do you recall anything during the outbrief that would be relevant to this investigation?

A: Not that sticks out to me. There was minor sidebar discussion about money and what projects would be applied or recommended for mitigation strategies, but I do not recall the detail. They knew about the flight line, and there were discussions about how and when they would get the money, but I don't remember the details.

Q: Did you outbrief anyone else in Afghanistan? IJC? ISAF/USFOR-A?

A: No, Sir. I know that the option was presented, but ended up being discarded.

Q: When did you complete the full, written report?

A: The full, written report was completed and sent via SIPR on 12 July 2012. The vulnerabilities and concerns from the report were also uploaded to the Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) on 12 July 2012. On 7 August 2012 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) relayed that USFOR-A requested that the original report be reclassified to SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO. It was reclassified and resent.

Q: Who got a copy of the report? Who are you required to provide it to?

A: The report was sent to the installation and our distribution list, which includes the Joint Staff and applicable GCC and Service representatives. We have delivery or read confirmation receipts for the following recipients:

- CENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- DIA (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- Installation (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- Joint Staff (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- USFOR-A: Sent to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) be forwarded to USFOR-A

Q: Is a recipient required to acknowledge receipt or provide any type of response to the report?

A: When the final report is emailed, the option for delivery and read receipts is selected. Email receipts are tracked and saved.

Q: The Introduction to the report mentions that, "The final phase in the assessment process is for the installation commander to prioritize these suggestions and then implement those necessary, in light of the threat and available resources." Are commanders required to respond to or implement the suggested corrective actions in response to a JSIVA? Is there a suspense for corrective actions?

A: No, JSIVAs are assessments and the recommendations are just that. It is not directive in nature. CENTCOM however, has reporting and tracking requirements for all completed assessments. But we present them with recommendations to mitigate risk at the outbrief. What they do with it is up to them.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: What funding or materiel resources are typically available to a commander to pursue corrective actions after a JSIVA? Do you typically see these pursued?
A: We advocate that one of the first things a command should do is ensure their identified vulnerabilities are entered into the Core Vulnerabilities Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) to identify a shortfall/requirement. This provides visibility up the chain of command, all the way to the Joint Staff. After that, it is up to the Service and GCC. We used to advocate for Commanders to request funding through the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund (CCIF), but that is a highly competitive and limited source of funding so we started to lean away from that. The CENTCOM AOR has several other funding avenues.

Q: The report discusses responsibilities or proposed actions of the Base Commander in various places. Who was the base commander at BLS Complex for the purpose of AT/FP?

A: The Base Commander for Leatherneck was (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For the purposes of this JSIVA, he was the individual commander in which we considered the overall manager of the AT Plan, Force Protection program and had the ultimate authority to exercise it and make risk management decisions. There were other higher headquarters elements on the base. As on CONUS bases, those commands or commanders are considered tenants and are integrated into the base plan. The higher headquarters (RC/SW) would have served as a source of funding. There were other dynamics involved aboard BLS. As I stated, there were two sides of the "complex" or base; Bastion (British) and Leatherneck (US). Both sides were run with a completely different methodology in terms of AT/FP. With both sides serving in one complex or base with two different methods of AT/FP, it was not hard to figure out that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had some pretty significant challenges. Again, we were not allowed to assess the Bastion plan, program or policies.

Q: What is your understanding of a Base Commander's responsibility for AT/FP?

A: As defined in DoDI 2000.12 and DoDI 2000.16, the assigned Base Commanders have AT/FP responsibility for the personnel under their command, assigned or attached unless designated under the protection of the Chief of Mission. There are often dynamics in which a Base Commander will have to negotiate with a tenant command with a senior ranking officer. Ultimately, the Base Commander has the responsibility.

Q: In actual practice, is it your experience that a Base Commander is very involved in AT/FP, or is it an issue often delegated to subordinates?

A: This varies from base to base/installation. The tendency is to delegate. In my experience, the commands that have a formidable AT/FP program are the ones that have a commander who is involved and provides the appropriate amount of guidance and oversight. I have also seen bases where the ATO was a "rock star," and that individual made the command look good with little guidance. The overall intent is to have a synchronized team, fully aware of the program.

Q: Do units or installations typically take immediate corrective action to address vulnerabilities identified in a JSIVA?

A: We don't track this, but experience has shown us that it varies from base to base or installation. Identifying the vulnerabilities in CVAMP is critical, and going up to higher headquarters for help if necessary. It requires Command emphasis and a complete understanding of the risk management program so that a commander can apply what are typically a limited amount of fiscal resources. If a commander and ATO staff understand the impact of their AT/FP shortfalls and identified vulnerabilities, I would think the commander would create an appropriate sense of urgency for his ATO and staff to apply the necessary mitigation strategy(s). Depending on the issue, we often see on-the-spot corrections. We have seen this take place in combat zones on many occasions. The complexity of the corrections and available resources usually dictate the length of time to make corrections.

Q: Are you aware of any immediate corrective actions taken or attempted by RC(SW) after the BLS Complex JSIVA?

A: No, I am not. I vaguely remember the ATO taking action on the plan but do not recall what those were.

Q: Do you typically continue to communicate with a unit or installation after an assessment?

A: We certainly offer that up and provide the means to do so by providing the contact information for the entire team. DTRA also has a reach back capability that is identified in the reports and out briefs. If an installation, base or station contacts the JSIVA help desk or individual team member, we did an outstanding job of working issues and providing appropriate resources. I have never heard of a complaint.

Q: Who would you typically communicate with after a JSIVA? Higher commands such as JIC, ISAF/USFOR-A, and CENTCOM? Joint Staff?

A: The Joint Staff receives an AAR-type brief via email. However, unless specific contact is made by the command, we typically do not contact the command. The team usually takes a week or so to write their report and then begin preparing for the next assessment.

Q: Did your team communicate with RC(SW) after you left Afghanistan?

A: I am sure one or two members likely communicated with their base counterparts. Maybe we exchanged one or two calls to provide any additional support or clarification needed.

Q: Did you communicate with any of the other commands mentioned above?

A: I did not.

Q: When did you learn of the 14 September attack at the BLS Complex?

A: I don't recall the exact date. It was likely on 18 September and during the MARFORRES Operations and Intel update to the Commander, MARFORRES.

Q: What were your immediate thoughts?

A: My thoughts went to insider threat. I thought maybe one of the areas such as the Friendship or Shorabak gate may had been exploited. It didn't surprise me that the airfield was attacked.

Q: Did you take any actions after learning of the attack?

A: No, other than offer my assistance to the JSIVA staff and chain of command.

Q: Did anyone contact you about the JSIVA after the attack?

A: It was some time after but yes, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DTRA Chief of the Assessment Branch, did. I thought I might have to testify, but that never happened.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Have you seen either of the inquiries conducted by RC(SW) after the attack?
A: No, Sir.

Follow-Up Questions

Q: Did anyone at Camp Leatherneck ask you to come out, or was it a part of your normal rotation directed by the Joint Staff?
A: I have to assume that CENTCOM, during the "call for assessments," asked for a JSIVA at this location.

Q: Was Triple Canopy, the contracted security, there when you were there?
A: There was a security service there. I don't recall what it was; it might have been Triple Canopy. But it does not stick out in my mind. They did not have a negative fact on security. I also remember Tongans on the Bastion side of the base.

Q: What was your assessment of the Tongans and their ability to provide force protection on Camp Bastion?
A: I wasn't able to assess them, Sir. What I did see during drive-by observation, I didn't notice anything out of the ordinary. But if you can't actually go up and test what they know in the tower, like we normally do, you can't assess them.

Q: Did TF Belleau Wood also have responsibility for an entire AOR around BLS?
A: Yes. They had an AO outside the base. One part of our assessment and feedback is counter-surveillance.

Q: Were there boundaries outside the base between the US and UK?
A: I don't recall, but I think the entire area around BLS was TFBW's AO.

Q: What did you assess was RC(SW)'s involvement in the various AT/FP working groups required by a good AT Plan?
A: That was one of the areas where they didn't really have stood up and identified working groups. It wasn't really happening.

Q: RC(SW) was a tenant unit, but they also had subordinate units in the Camp Bastion part of the BLS Complex. TFBW was focused on Camp Leatherneck, but was there someone at RC(SW) focused on AT/FP of their units on Camp Bastion?
A: If I were the base commander with the dynamics of the relationships there, my AT Working Group would be synchronized with all of the commands across the Complex like any other base, like you are supposed to. I would definitely bring in an O6 or two from RC(SW), so you could synchronize the overall AT/FP posture and the synchronizing of the plan, and the protection of the compound. Without that, you can't effectively give guidance. To my recollection, these working groups were not established at TFBW, and therefore not synchronized with the all of the tenant units.

Q: So do you know what interaction the Marine Air Wing located on the flight line had with TFBW?
A: I do not. I think they had their own ATO. I recall conversations between their ATO and (b)(3), (b)(6), regarding division of labor, maybe some boundaries, but I don't recall specifically. But that Wing ATO would definitely be a part of the ATWG. (b)(7)(C)

Q: And then did the MEF (FWD), the staff that made up most of RC(SW), have their own ATO?
A: I don't know.

Q: During the attack on 14-15 September, two separate commanders though they were in charge of the response. Based on what you saw there during the JSIVA, does that surprise you?
A: No, Sir. If you can't synchronize the overall AT Plan for the base then you can't synchronize a response. They should have identified this during the "burning man incident." That issue would have come out pretty clearly, I think.

Q: Do you have anything to add that would be relevant to this investigation?
A: No, Sir. I would just reiterate the difficult scenario at the BLS Complex with the separate bases commanded by separate national commanders. It is very difficult to manage something like that. Circulation control and free access are things that stuck out to me there, which created the insider threat.

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Q: Do you know anyone else who has knowledge or information relevant to this investigation?

A: Actually yes. As I stated, a VA is a functional based assessment conducted by a group of subject matter experts. Each one of those individuals has a key lane that they assess during a JSIVA. I would have thought that this investigative body would want to have talked to several of my SME's, SO, TO, EM, SE, EM, etc. Each one of them conduct in depth interviews with their counterparts aboard the base or installation, conduct their analysis of what they saw and apply it to the AT standards. The detailed information lies with them.

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