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From: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c U.S. Marine Corps
To: Commanding General, Regional Command - Southwest

Subj: SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEW OF 14-15 SEPTEMBER 2012 INSURGENT ATTACK AT CAMP BASTION FOCUSING ON THE RESPONSE TO THE JOINT STAFF INTEGRATED VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (JSIVA)

Ref: (a) Joint Review Board Initial Report of 24 September 12
(b) Task Force Belleau Wood Area Of Operations
(c) Chronology of Events on 14 September 12
(d) INS Movements on 14 September 12
(e) INS Equipment on 14 September 12
(f) Loss of Personnel and Equipment

Encl: (1) "Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) Camp Leatherneck/Bastion, Afghanistan 14-14 June 2012" Report dated 7 August 12
(2) MOB Bastion Requirement for Airfield Survey dated 24 March 12
(3) U.K. Joint Force Support - Afghanistan Statement of Requirements (SOR) 45748 for Bastion Airfield Fence
(4) U.K. Joint Force Support Airfield Security Business Case SOR 45748 dated 28 May 12
(5) RC(SW) Executive Steering Group (ESG) minutes of 28 April 12
(6) Enhanced Flight line Security at Bastion Airfield Request submitted 11 May 12
(7) 3d MAW Flight line Barrier Plan request submitted 11 May 12
(8) TFBW Plan to Construct Force Protection improvements for Leatherneck (PEPL ref: 1988)
(9) RC(SW) and BLS Force Protection Working Group DCOM brief dated 5 November 12
(10) Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW) Camp Leatherneck AT/FP Plan dated 15 March 12
(11) Statement of Requirements 45748
(12) Triple Canopy Camp Leatherneck Base Defense Plan dated 22 June 12
(13) Email traffic dated 10 November 12
(14) List of TFBW AT/FP projects
(15) JARB package JARB-FY13-WK35-0017
(16) IMCOM Material Delivery Contract #W5K9FH-12-P-0228
(17) Force Protection Review Report dated 19 October 12 (less annexes C)
(18) Construction of Perimeter Improvements at BLS PEPL #2094
(19) Executive Summary of JSIVA to USFOR-A/COMISAF dated 13 November 12
(20) Construction of Friendship Gate Improvements PEPL #1993
(21) Appointing Letter dated 23 October 12
(22) Extension request dated 11 November 12

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. A Joint Review Board (JRB) was convened on 17 September 12 to inquire into the facts and circumstances of the 14 September attack and was completed on 24 September. The Joint Review Board initial report conducted a comprehensive review and incorporated a report dated 12 August 2012 from the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA). The JSIVA report was the result of a 10-14 June 12 JSIVA team visit. The JSIVA performed a vulnerability assessment of Camp Leatherneck/Bastion and made recommendations regarding identified vulnerabilities to six separate areas, one of which was access to the flight line proper. Although the JRB made reference to the JSIVA report and included it as an annex to the JRB initial report, it did not fully analyze the identified area vulnerabilities and recommended measures, leaving that analysis to the more comprehensive Force Protection Review. In order to ensure a complete review of the JSIVA recommendations, the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Fwd), directed a supplemental review specifically focused on the JSIVA recommendations.

2. In response to the JSIVA findings, the leadership responsible for security and force protection at the Bastion/Leatherneck/Shoraback (BLS) complex made several improvements to alleviate security vulnerabilities throughout the entire complex, including planning and securing funding to secure airfield access, and diverting resources to critical areas and vulnerabilities.

BACKGROUND

3. Camps Bastion, Leatherneck and Shorabak (BLS) are situated in a relatively isolated area of Helmand province. The area surrounding BLS is designated as Area of Operations (AO) Belleau Wood. (Reference (b)). Very few insurgent (INS) initiated attacks have been directed towards BLS. Indirect fire (IDF) is rare. Metal scrapping activity occurs regularly outside the perimeter fence line as a result of the large scrapping economy operating out of BOLDAK and NAWABAD villages. The populations of local NAWABAD and SHEIKABAD villages are largely supportive of CF presence. Most INS initiated attacks have occurred to the south of the Belleau Wood AO around SHOWAL and HABIBABAD. No specific intelligence indicating an imminent threat against BLS was received before the 14 Sep 12 attacks.

4. The eastern edge of the Bastion airfield contains a significant amount of undulating terrain both within and outside its the perimeter fence. The villages of SHEIKABAD and NAWABAD are located several hundred meters to the East of the perimeter fence. The main north-to-south road runs through a wadi which is approximately 1km from the perimeter and presents the full range of pattern of life activity. The perimeter line is composed of a single row of concertina wire, a ditch and berm obstacle, and a boundary chain link fence. The fence line is approximately 400 meters from the Juliet and Lima Ramps of the Bastion airfield. Guard towers are set at intervals around BLS, to include concrete sangers (observation towers) along the eastern perimeter of the Bastion airfield. (Reference (b)).

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5. On 14 Sep 12, at an unknown time, fifteen (15) INS infiltrated the BLS eastern perimeter by cutting the chain link fence and suppressing the concertina wire obstacle. The breach occurred on the eastern boundary of the BLS complex, due east of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing workspaces and section of the Bastion flight line. The breach occurred between Observation Towers 16 and 17; approximately 140m from Tower 16, and 200m from Tower 17. Analysis of the breach location reveals that it is within the actual fields of view, and observable from, both Tower 16 and 17. On the evening of the attacks, Tower 16 was unmanned; Tower 17 was manned. However, the breach was undetected by tower personnel. (References (a)- (c)). The INS commenced a three pronged attack on the Juliet and Lima Ramps of the flight line at 142209D*SEP12. The beginning of the INS attack was reported to the BLS Combined Joint Operations Center (CJOC) by the Automated Sense and Warn (AS&W) detachment and Marines from Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211, USMC AV-8B Harrier). The INS used SAF, RPGs, and hand grenades to target CFs, USMC AV-8Bs, and flight line infrastructure. (Reference (e)). The attack resulted in CF casualties, fires and significant damage to CF aircraft. (Reference (f)).

6. Based on early reports of SAF and a fire on the flight line, the CJOC tasked Bastion (internal) Quick Reaction Force (QRF), call-sign (C/S) GRANITE 30A, with escorting the fire section and the AO BELLEAU WOOD QRF, C/S 30B, with responding to the SAF. Upon arrival, both QRFs received SAF from INS positions inside the perimeter, preventing the fire section from fully containing the fires. The fire section then withdrew west of the runway to await further orders. At this time, the CJOC began to implement Force protection (FP) procedures across BLS in order to restrict all non- essential movement.

7. US and UK attack helicopter Close Air Support (CAS), under the control of the CJOC's Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), arrived on station to support the ground CAS Marines and Airmen from the UK Resident Field Squadron (RFS), who engaged the INS with small arms fire for a protracted period. The first reports of UK and US casualties were received shortly into this engagement.

8. Within approximately four hours of the initial INS attack, the RFS, Marines, and CAS assets had completely neutralized the enemy positions. The INS at Juliet Ramp were neutralized by 142338D*SEP12 and the INS at Lima Ramp were neutralized by 150208D*SEP12. At first light on 15 September 12, Coalition Forces (CF) call-signs swept the area, ensuring that the airfield was clear of all INS. The airfield was never closed: helicopter movements were conducted during and after the attack. A shortened runway opened to fixed wing aircraft at 151530D*SEP12. Full operating capability was restored at 161725D*SEP12.

9. The attack resulted in 14 x INS KIA and 1 x WIA (detained). CF suffered 2 x USMC KIA, 8 RFS WIA, 8 x USMC WIA, and 1 x CIV WIA. (Reference (f))

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INTELLIGENCE

10. This was a significant, well planned and well executed attack, conducted at night with no moon/illumination with several months of surveillance and training. (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

11. An intelligence review found no specific reporting to indicate the possibility of an attack on Bastion or Leatherneck prior to this incident.

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

12. It was also assessed by BLS force protection personnel that the primary threat to the Bastion airfield was vehicle-borne threats, and pedestrian threats a lower priority.(Enclosure (2)). As a result, primary efforts to secure the Bastion flight line were directed at minimizing airfield vulnerability to unauthorized vehicles and mitigating pedestrian threats.

13. Intel reporting following the attack suggests multiple local insurgent leaders were responsible for the 14 Sep BLS attack. (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

RESPONSE TO 14 MAR 12 AIRFIELD INCURSION

14. The Bastion flight line was previously identified as vulnerable based on the 14 March 2012 airfield incursion. The incursion occurred within Bastion (BSN) Joint Operating Base (JOB) when a Local National (LN) interpreter made an unauthorized entry onto the BSN flight line. This incident and its timing, coinciding with a Very, Very Important Person (VVIP) visit, raised concerns regarding the security of the flight line and its assets and access to critical areas within the Bastion airfield. This incident also demonstrated the need to improve airfield and perimeter security and to institute some level of increased access control to the airfield operating areas.

15. As documented in a 21 March 2012 report, United Kingdom representatives responsible for Bastion Airfield security undertook an independent investigation of airfield security and force protection measures and developed several courses of action to alleviate security concerns. A Statement of Requirements (SOR) was generated to request the preferred course of action: the installation of an airfield perimeter fence to prevent

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unauthorized airfield access and secure critical areas of the airfield (Enclosures (3,4)). UK estimates for financing and installation of the airfield fence put the estimated time of completion (if funded by 22 June 2012) as 15 October 2012, a month after the 14 September 12 attack. (assuming best case scenario of no delays in construction).

16. This SOR was initially sent through UK chain of command for approval; however, it was denied on the basis of cost/verse security gains. Concurrently, the airfield fence project was submitted as a Joint Force Utilization Board (JFUB) package to the RC(SW) Executive Steering Group (ESG). The JFUB evaluates and reconciles component requirements for real estate, the use of existing facilities, inter-service support, and construction/repair projects when conflicting or competing requirements materialize. The ESG denied the request based on cost but approved an alternate berm barrier/ditch complex to secure the airfield. The project was submitted to the RC(SW) C-8 to determine cost-sharing for the project between the US and UK according to the "70/30" cost share agreement (Enclosure 5).

17. In the interim, on 11 May 2012, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW) requested, and was approved, funding to emplace concertina wire (c-wire) to secure vulnerable areas around the flight line and to channelize pedestrian traffic to ECPs (Enclosure (6)). The project was reviewed by the Prioritized Engineer Project List (PEPL) Working Group on 26 June 12, and work began on the project on 1 July 12. This project was completed on 26 July 12. Design work and funding for the berm/ditch complex continued until work on the project began on 1 September 12. Work on the berm/ditch project was completed on 22 October 12.

18. A separate internal perimeter fence would likely have not presented any serious challenge, barrier, or impediment to the enemy on the day of the attack. Indeed, the enemy easily exploited and overcame similar obstacles. As discussed in the JRB initial report (Reference (a)), the enemy was successful in their attack by negotiating and cutting through the perimeter fence in four (4) different locations and remained undetected by the adjacent manned towers. On the night of the attack every other tower was manned along the BSN perimeter. Bastion security towers (referred to as sangers by the UK) were manned based on the current UK assessment of the security threat.

19. On 30 June 12, Task Force Belleau Wood (TFBW) submitted a plan to construct force protection improvements for Leatherneck. TFBW submitted a request (PEPL #1988) to upgrade and construct a series of berms, ditches, guard posts, and obstacles to improve standoff and to mitigate other vulnerabilities (Enclosure (8)). On 10 July 12, the project went to the PEPL Working Group to determine the scope of the project; the project was approved on 7 August 12 began work on 3 September 12. The following is a list of improvements the project is scheduled to complete by 30 December 2012 (Enclosure (17) Annexe (G)).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

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JSIVA REPORT AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

20. From 10-14 June 2012, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency conducted a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) of the BLS Complex. This assessment report provides the commander "a vulnerability-based analysis of the Antiterrorism Program" and, "identifies vulnerabilities that may be exploited by terrorists and suggests options that may eliminate or mitigate those vulnerabilities" (Enclosure (1)). The JSIVA team's primary focus was the Camp Leatherneck (LNK) and TFBW as it recognized that there is no real delineation between Camp Leatherneck and JOB Bastion.

21. The JSIVA of 10-14 Jun 12 was verbally briefed to the Commanding Officer, I MEF Headquarters Group, the Commanding Officer, 903 Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW), and representatives from other entities playing a role in AT/FP on 15 June 12. The JSIVA, both as verbally debriefed on that day and

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as issued in the written report on 7 August 12, made five anti-terrorist/force protection recommendations with regard to the vulnerabilities at the Bastion Airfield. The discussion that follows identifies these recommendations and assesses the corrective measures taken in response.

Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Plan

22. The JSIVA report noted that the TFBW AT/FP program then in place needed some improvements, but that it still provided an effective defensive posture. The JSIVA report noted that TFBW should improve its AT/FP documentation in order to facilitate turnover with successive leaders and units acquiring the AT/FP mission.

23. Two key areas identified in the JSIVA report are the establishment of a Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM) program and chartering an Antiterrorism/Force Protection Working Group.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

24. Task Force Belleau Wood's current AT/FP plan, dated 15 March 12, is currently being updated to reflect the concerns of the JSIVA report and the 14 September 12 attack. The updates, required after recommendations by the JSIVA team and the RC(SW) Force Protection Working Group, is currently in the staffing phase of the update process. However, the current Camp Leatherneck AT/FP plan is itself a recent update and enhancement of the previous Camp Leatherneck AT/FP plan of 2011.

25. I MHG AT/FP, in response to the JSIVA recommendation for enhanced awareness of the latest in AT/FP measures hosted an Anti-terrorism Level II course from 23-27 July 12. Representatives from units aboard Camp Leatherneck, Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) throughout RC(SW), and USFOR-A, attended the course.

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26. Triple Canopy, the private security contractor aboard Camp Leatherneck, published their Camp Leatherneck Base Defense Plan on 22 June 12 (Enclosure (12)).

27. I MHG has published its standard operating procedures for Insider Threats on 8 September 12, with reports due to the RC(SW) AT/FP officer on the fifth day (5th) of each month.

28. TFBW has embarked on numerous AT/FP measures as a result of the JSIVA report's recommendations. Notably, TFBW has completed or begun the following vulnerability assessments (VA):

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

29. TFBW has also completed 13 physical security surveys, as recommended by the JSIVA report:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Assessment

30. The JSIVA team highlighted six (6) AT/FP vulnerabilities of the BLS complex. Although the assessment judged the BLS complex's overall security posture to be effective, there were some vulnerabilities identified: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

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Pages 9 through 15 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

CONCLUSIONS

41. The JSIVA of BLS was a valuable tool in identifying those areas that require attention to reduce the risk of loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources due to enemy activity. The JSIVA report provided the Commander and leadership with key information identifying six (6) vulnerable areas and provided suggestions to eliminate or mitigate the threat. Notably, there are five (5) recommendations the JSIVA team provided to enhance security and control access to the Bastion flight line, which was attacked by enemy forces on 14 September 12.

42. The most relevant recommendation to enhance flight line security was the JSIVA suggestion of installing an airfield fence or barriers to control vehicle/pedestrian access to the flight line. On 21 March 2012, after an investigation into 14 March 12 unauthorized airfield incursion by a local national interpreter during a VVIP visit, JOB Bastion officials responsible for Bastion Airfield security submitted a request for an airfield fence. This was denied by both the UK chain of command and the RC(SW) Executive Steering Group on 28 April 2012, on the basis that the cost outweighed the force protection gains. However, an alternate plan, a berm/ditch obstacle/barrier, was approved and forwarded for design and requirements definition phase in May 2012, to the Flight Line Working Group. The design and requirements definition phase was still in process by the time the JSIVA debrief was presented to the Camp Leatherneck Commanders on 15 June 2012. Third Marine Aircraft Wing began emplacing concertina wire between the flight line and the perimeter fence on 1 July 2012, and the project was completed on 26 July 2012. Work on the berm/ditch project began on 1 September 2012 with a projected completion date of late October 2012. As discussed, a separate internal perimeter fence would likely have not presented any serious challenge, barrier, or impediment to the enemy on the day of the attack. The enemy easily exploited and overcame similar obstacles undetected during the attack. As discussed in the Joint Review Board initial report, the enemy was successful in their attack by negotiating and cutting through the perimeter fence in four different areas undetected by sanger/observation tower personnel. An additional fence surrounding the flight line would not have been an effective deterrent to prevent this particular attack.

43. As a result of the JSIVA report, the command has made significant progress in mitigating vulnerabilities and concerns identified by the JSIVA team. As stated in the JSIVA report: "A JSIVA is not a fix for AT/FP deficiencies, but rather a tool for Commanders to enhance their overall AT/FP posture." With renewed efforts toward the risk management processes and overall Antiterrorism and Force Protection planning, vigorous oversight and management, the BLS complex in particular, and RC(SW) in general have

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established a firm foundation for enhanced security and force protection and further development of measures to reduce threats to RC(SW) personnel and assets.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

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