

MEMORANDUM THRU

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Commander, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Jalalabad, Afghanistan, APO AE 09310

FOR Commanding General, CJTF-101, Bagram Airfield, APO AE 09310

SUBJECT: Vulnerability Assessment of COP Keating, Afghanistan

1. On 17-19 July 2008, I conducted a vulnerability assessment of COP Keating in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. The assessment included the outer perimeter fence line and force protection Hessco wall surrounding the COP, the gates and gate procedures, the force protection measures already in place, and the infrastructure within the COP. I accomplished this assessment by walking the perimeter and recording every weak point in the fence line, doing an assessment of the entire camp to include the DFAC, TOC, Mortar Pit, and living areas.

2. Operating a COP in a hostile area has numerous vulnerabilities—each with its own risks. The most likely risk comes from Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) trying to undermine the US led effort to rebuild the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In our area, the most dangerous risks to the camp are any type indirect fire attacks (rockets and mortars) and small arms fire to include precision small arms fire. Based on the location of the camp, secondary risks include Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).

a. AAF in the area are known to use all of these types of attacks to disrupt US efforts across the theater. Historically for COP Keating, the most common attack has been indirect fire and SAF from numerous attack by fire positions. There have only been twenty-one rocket and small arms attacks in the last ten months; of these attacks two RPG and fifteen small arm attacks actually impacted inside the confines of the camp.

b. The local Afghan Security Guards as well as US personnel will continue to control our one entry control point that regulates vehicle and pedestrian traffic onto camp. The current BATS employee badge system will continue to be used.

c. VBIED/IED/Suicide Bomber. A VBIED or IED attack against the COP is unlikely because of lack of VBIED technology and resources, techniques, tactics and procedures in the area. Mitigation measures are in place, so only the gate would take the brunt of the blast. The road located directly outside the gate is the only route into the area is around a bend in the road and can be effectively closed off. Afghan Security Guards (ASG) are already in place to control and limit access to the camp, with US and ANA Soldiers at the interior access points.

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Limited access to the camp and thorough search and gate procedures significantly reduce any possible suicide bombers from infiltrating the camp.

d. SAF/SNIPER/RPG. The COP is located at the junction of two rivers and is surrounded on all sides by high ground. The river acts as a natural obstacle against any AAF infiltrating from the North. A common TTP for the enemy has been to establish an Attack by Fire position from the North due to the fact that they cannot get near the COP from that location. The high ground to the West is also a common ABF position as well as an indirect fire point of origin (POO) area. The standoff capabilities of our vehicular mounted crew-served weapon systems and indirect fires have historically been very effective in eliminating the threat posed by these locations. When the enemy has used reverse slope methods of engaging us with either indirect or lobbed RPG attacks it has been slightly more difficult to combat. ISR assets such as UAV's are critical in these cases to detect the threat. **The high ground to the South is dominated by OP Fritsche, however there still is a great deal of dead space that exists for AAF to infiltrate within 100m of the COP.** We are currently shoring up our Southern perimeter with multiple layers of Concertina wire, tanglefoot, trip flares, and claymore mines in order to mitigate this very vulnerable area. I recommend as much Concertina wire as possible be sent out to our location as soon as possible. The southern perimeter is really the only area that could be used to infiltrate the COP without any early warning. Once our (b)(2)High are sent here to COP Keating, they will provide another layer of defensive patrolling of the area South of Keating is ongoing and has proven to be a very effective deterrent. We have also hired locals to clear the brush and trees from the area. Bottom line, the southern perimeter is our most vulnerable area and most likely point of penetration. The delivery of more Class IV and our ongoing development of an engagement area in this location will greatly mitigate any chance of infiltration by AAF. Eventually the entire Southern slope will be covered in tanglefoot, razor wire, and concertina wire. The wire is being laid in such a fashion as to turn the enemy into established engagement areas with TRP's and claymore mines. Trip flares and BIDS systems will be layered into the perimeter as well. Once these measures have taken place, it will be very difficult for the enemy to mount an assault or infiltration of our line from the South.

e. Indirect Fire. The COP is located in a small valley surrounded by high ground all around providing numerous vantage and firing points nearby. The indirect fire POO sites have historically been to the North and West. The 107mm Rocket has been the rocket of choice for rocket attacks. It only has an effective range of nine kilometers and the mountain peaks do not provide AAF an easy shot onto the COP. Mortar fire has been used more often and has been very effective at times. The barracks and TOC have rock and cement walls over a foot thick. The roofs of these structures are reinforced with approx. 5 inches of concrete and a layer of sandbags on top. On the top of this structure another roof has recently been built that is slanted for rainfall and snowfall. This adds yet

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another layer of protection. These buildings have withstood direct hits from rockets and mortars. The dining facility is much more vulnerable, with only plywood walls and roof. Efforts are underway to reinforce the facility. The latrine area and showers are also vulnerable, with little to no protection at all from direct and indirect fires. The COP Mayor has a plan in place to have rock and mud walls surround the areas as soon as other more critical force protection measures have taken place. Eventually we'll reach a point where we have hardstand, reinforced structures for these facilities.

3. If the above mentioned vulnerabilities have been mitigated as recommended, the risk will be mitigated to an acceptable level. In accordance with the Joint Forward Operations Base (JFOB) Risk Management Matrix, the risk assessment evaluation summary is acceptable. Recommend approval for the participation of U.S. Military personnel to occupy this camp. Appropriate reinforcements to the current base defense will be applied with currently available materials and Class IV. Statements of work will be established for contracts that need to be submitted.

4. (b)(3), (b)(6) is the undersigned at DSN (b)(2)High or email at (b)(3), (b)(6) @swa.army.smil.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Commander