

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB FENTY, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2009/10/27	3. TIME 1020	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS O4/MAJ	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 41BCT-4ID, APO AE 09354			

9. I, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am the brigade S2, OIC.
 The BCT did not allocate additional ISR efforts or assets to COP Keating because we didn't have specific intel from multiple sources for the attack. We base our daily reports against multiple sources and we didn't see that for this event. We focused on the intel that had a more direct focus on a specific FOB. On Election day, we knew that FOB Bostic and FOB Joyce would get rocket attacks so the units had elevated Force Protection postures. Keating was nothing of that sort. We didn't request for more information because the intel wasn't specific or reliable. The most concise intel we had came on the 2nd of October and said that 100 insurgents would attack Keating, Fritche or Lowell. The report did not come from a previously known to be reliable source and was not corroborated by other reporting. Everyday by about 0600 we produce a slide with the up to date intel information for that day. On 2 October 2009 between 11-1400, HCT 29 at FOB Bostic, sent up a report that there were 100 individuals that were going to attack a COP that contained 60 Soldiers. The threat wasn't so high. We knew that the enemy refit cycle was every 10 -12 days and we were close to that so we assessed that there would be some sort of harassment attack in the next 24-48 hours as of 030500Oct09.
 A month before the attack we got reports of the commanders and leaders conducting a lot of meetings. Our main indicator is generally additional funding, we are not too concerned with change in command or authority as the activity is very difficult to confirm and does not have a significant impact on other indicators we see.

(b)(2)High

I trained and deployed with the brigade and my shop. The S2 shop consists of both geographic analysts, those focused on a geographic region and INT specific analysts with (b)(2)High The CPTs generally work on lethal or non-Lethal all source analysis. We are not overwhelmed and we have the amount of individuals needed to accomplish the mission.
 The first 2 months of being in theater, we generally got 1 line of FMV per day. The FMV was often a (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

been focused elsewhere. My shop talks to ANSF, ANP, NDS, and ANA biweekly during meetings.
 The overall outcome of the attacks form a Kamdeshi local source was 400 individuals in attack with 140 killed. (CONTINUED)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT FOB Fenty _____ DATED 2009/10/27 _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(CONTINUATION)

1. (c) Who attacked COP Keating? How many Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) were involved in the attack? How many AAF were killed or injured during the attack?

A wide selection of Taliban Sub-commanders under the central leadership of Haji Usman and Abdul Raman attacked COP Keating on 3 October, 2009. With the amount of money and coordination involved it is almost impossible that Dowst Mohamed was not the overall facilitator/planner. It is estimated from contacts with village elders that nearly 400 AAF were involved in the attacks at Fritsche and Keating and that about 140 were killed in the attacks. Recent reporting and atmospherics indicates that the attack has in fact been a substantial setback and defeat for the various AAF groups in the area.

2. (g) What was the AT/FP plan for the COP? Was it current? Was it available at the FOB or was it at a higher HQ? Was the plan appropriate based on the terrain and AAF activity in the area?

The AT/FP plan was maintained below the BCT level. I am not familiar with the content or location of the plan.

3. (h) What are procedures for hiring Afghan Security Guards? Were there contract security guards in place at COP Keating?

There are some contractual requirements for the hiring of ASG but I am not familiar with the procedures. They are worked through contracting and I do know that there were ASG at COP Keating on 3 October.

4. (j) Was there a current vulnerability assessment? If so, what was the result of the vulnerability assessment? How were identified vulnerabilities mitigated?

I do not know if there was a recent vulnerability assessment, though reviews of force protection measures were directed by the BCT since TOA.

5. (l) Was there a current threat assessment? Had any intelligence reports been received indicating a possible attack in the 30 days prior to this attack? If so, what was that intelligence? What office was responsible for those reports? What actions were taken as a result of that intelligence? Were those actions appropriate? Were higher HQ made aware of any current intelligence?

(b)(2)High

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

5. (1) Was there a current threat assessment? Had any intelligence reports been received indicating a possible attack in the 30 days prior to this attack? If so, what was that intelligence? What office was responsible for those reports? What actions were taken as a result of that intelligence? Were those actions appropriate? Were higher HQ made aware of any current intelligence?

None of the intel reports were assessed to be clear and imminent threats to coalition forces and did not necessitate changes to current operations. There have been more comprehensive and detailed reporting against other COPs every week since the TOA in 23 June 2009.

6. (m1) What Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms were covering COP Keating at the time of the attack? Was the ISR support appropriate? What organic ISR support was available at the COP? Was that organic support adequate? Were any deficiencies made aware to higher HQ? Was anything done to correct deficiencies?

(b)(2)High

7. (m2) What was the relationship with the local community prior to the attack? Was there any indication from the local community that there would be an upcoming attack?

To the best of my knowledge the relationship was neighborly, not friendly, not unfriendly. I have only second hand knowledge.

8. Was there any (b)(2)High conducted in the vicinity of COP Keating? If so, what intelligence was generated regarding AAF activity?

(b)(2)High

NOTHING FOLLOWS*****

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27th day of October, 2009 at FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN, APO AE 09354

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) CPT, JA (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ARTICLE 136 UCMJ (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)