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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Fenty DATED 2009/10/27

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

We were always improving force protection and improving our fighting positions. We went on patrols daily. We would not go in the villages because we didn't have the man power to do so. We would pass through the village of Urmul. We would patrol to all the target area's; the switchbacks, putting green, diving board, ect. Our primary mission was force protection of COP Keating. OP Fritsche had eyes on the Kamdesh and it held a more dominate position. It was a much stronger position. There were about 24 US Soldiers, some ANA, ASG, and ANP. All of them were of the same quality as the ANSF at COP Keating. The Soldiers at Fristche did not conduct patrols outside the wire.

COP keating and OP Fritsche were solely depended on air assets for resupply. So it was pretty easy to decide what you needed to prioritize based off consumption of CL I, III, IV and CLV.

Most intelligence that I received came from the locals. We got more attacks in 5 months than the troop before us got the entire year they were there. We would constantly hear that a group of bad guys are coming our way. We knew that they were always out there, watching us. They wouldn't attack us head on. They would wait until we were back in the wire from a patrol to start shooting at us. They knew when we left and would try to attack us on our returning back to the COP. We once received an SD card with clips of AAF conducting recons of COP. The recon footage was prior to our arrival in country but did confirm our reports of AAF observation. We always knew there was a possibility of a large scale attack of AAF coming to the COP. We had seen smaller complexed attacks since we've been there. There was no direction that we haven't been shot at from. Both Fristche and Keating were hit simotaniuously at times. We counted 65 separate contacts with the enemy of various sizes in 4 months. When we got there, the unit we replaced were wearing soft caps and no body armor. We stayed in full battle rattle at all times.

We had the LRAS systems on the trucks and cameras that we could move. We had one raven, but because of the winds through the valleys we had issues with flying it. We had about 12 RDISS cameras. 3 of them were moveable (PTZ). FSR came twice to replace cameras that were inoperable. The cameras were inside the wire and most of them worked. The cameras however were wired into the main power so if the TOC lost power then they wouldn't work.

Due to our location and proximity to villages we could not get artillery support. We had called for 155mm ARTY support from FOB Bostic twice in support of contact with OP Fritsche but the rounds were only to cut off enemy exfill routes. There were lots of caves in the area around COP Keating and OP Fritsche. We were told that when an CCA and CAS would come on station the AAF would climb trees or hide in the caves.

We have 120's and 60's both at Keating and Fristche. Our mortar guys were great.

The medevac was a concern. They came from JAF and flew to Bostic to refuel before coming to COP Keating or OP Fritsche. This process would take about an hour from when the medevac was requested until the patient was picked up. Due to the size of our HLZ we also ensured we were ready for a hoist mission if needed.

The 1SG got to the troop just before the deployment. He was not with us through the train up. My junior leaders could always come and talk to me if they had issues or if they had an idea or suggestions to improve the COP.

When we initially arrived at the COP and OP some of the claymores on the OP were turned around by AAF to face inward or the wires were cut. Claymores can be very effective. We were in the process of replacing them with the SPIDER system. There was a shipment of them at Bostic. We were still waiting on the munitions and training.

We didn't have any formal discussions on Wanot.

I wasn't there at the fight on Keating, so I can't say that I would have done anything different. I did talk to my replacement (CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)) about my concern with the mulitple aircraft turns it would take to close COP Keating. //NOTHING FOLLOWS//

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Fenty DATED 2009/10/27

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27th day of October, 2009 at FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN APO AF 09354

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) CPT, JA (Type Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136 UCMJ (Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES