

COL(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sir, I have read your notes and I concur, with one addition. I just would like to clarify that the comments I made about escalating fires were regarding ECAS (CAS without a qualified JTAC), and is in accordance with our standards.

If the JTAC had asked for a bomb on the village near Keating--at a time when I already knew the friendlies were not able to withdraw and were taking effective fire--I would have confirmed he knew the grid was in the village and whether CDE was a factor. If he came back with "CDE isn't a factor, we need the bomb now" he would have gotten it.

V/R,
Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Legal Advisor

(b)(3), (b)(6)

To: (b)(3), (b)(6) LtCol USAF AFCENT 335 EFS/CC; Olde, Gordon F Jr Capt USA
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) LTC MIL USA TF MTN Warrior
Sub view notes for statement (~~SECRET~~)

Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) / Capt (b)(3), (b)(6)

Appreciate if you can review notes below and correct or add to any, and then reply e-mail confirming they are your collective statement. Appreciate your time and assistance. And thanks for the great work you do.

COL (b)(3), (b)(6)
15-6

On 29 Oct 09, Lt (b)(3), (b)(6) and Capt (b)(3), (b)(6) were interviewed as part of an AR 15-6 in the battle ng, Afghanistan on 3 Oct 09, and provided the following information:

- On 3 Oct 09, (b)(2)High was on duty flying to the south, when it was re-t a troops in contact situation vic COP Keating; the aircraft moved as directed and checked in at FOB Bostick, got an AO update and moved on-station over Keating

- They initially circled the area to confirm friendly locations and get general CDE understanding; communications were difficult; final clearance was needed from a JTAC located at Bostick since they could not do their own PID of target

- The aircraft quickly got on-station; learned the JTAC was not on site, i.e., not at Keating; a JTAC away from the target area slows the process; this case relied on ommunications relay, from JFO at target area to JTAC, who then relayed to (b)(2)High who remained over Bostick and would pass to

(b)(2)High at target area; JFO cannot give final clearance, and aircraft not on
cy CAS if talking with JTAC

- Timeline: 014Z - tasked to TIC; 0155Z - check in with
stick; 0209Z - on-station at Keating; 0218 - first bomb on target; 0225Z - (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High second set of bombs on target

- USAF does not normally use local naming conventions for
targets, e.g., switchbacks, diving board, putting green, waterfalls; did not have
communications with guy on ground; JFO was on CAG radio net which air crew not
normally monitor; must get with guy on ground, and crew working 9-lines were
given right away; normal to proceed to AO and get update

- Type 2 CAS - JTAC has to see aircraft or target to clear;
Type 3 - JTAC just say clear to engage and aircrew work targets

- What ground force commander is comfortable with; type 3
usually with friendlies in set location; might have worked here, though type 3 is
not preferred method

- When got pushed to TIC, JTAC was pushing 9-lines; JTAC
normally in comms with JFO, but does not push aircrew to talk with JFO since he
does not have clearance for fires

- USAF lesson learned that need to get AO update quickly; here
did not know village deserted; might have pushed type 3 CAS more knowing
situation now

- Tactical Directive - want situational awareness on situation;
first want know where are friendlies; use caution re: CIVCAS and CD; TIC primary
goal to protect US soldiers; under tactical directive guidance, try and work
where JTAC asks if taking effective fire, and can you withdraw; if so, recommend
show of force and graduated response; if JTAC call for bombs due to situation
then good to go and drop; effort to have longer conversation take place between
JTAC and ground force prior to aircraft on-station, so when aircraft arrives is
short discussion

- Almost always type 2 CAS in Afghanistan; not generally
urgency in actions to date

- Generally not want type 3 CAS; too much burden on crews to
protect friendlies and CD; take extra minute or two and get whole team to
participate; balance speed with accuracy; there is reason for steps in process

Aircrew experience - (b)(2)High prior deployment; (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High - 2 of 4 crew prior deployment; (b)(2)High - 2 of 4 prior deployment

- (b)(2)High saw Apaches on-station at 0248Z, but th have
arrived ea s (b)(2)High saw near end of strafing run; (b)(2)High did not drop
any bombs on villag