

I, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) affirm the below statements are true and correct.

v/r
MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)
TF P

h Cavalry

(b)(2)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) COL MIL USA TF MTN Warrior Legal Advisor
Sen 8, 2009 6:20 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ USA TF Pale Horse 7-17 CAV S-3
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) TF MTN Warrior SJA
Sub tigation re: COP Keating (~~SECRET~~)

MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)

Thanks for your time the other evening. Below are my notes reflecting our conversation. In order to have a record for the investigation, I appreciate if you can review and confirm this is info provided by you. That will suffice in lieu of a sworn statement. You may add any additional information, or please correct anything I may have misstated. I'll ask that you then send back to me with affirmation that it is your statement. Best if you're able to do NLT COB on Fri, 30 Oct. Thanks.

Any questions, let me or the Bde JAG know.

CO (b)(3), (b)(6)

On 26 Oct 09, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) met with LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) and CO (b)(3), (b)(6) and provided the following information as par R 15-6 investigation re: COP Kea

- The aviation task force provides direct support to 4/4
- Aviation support is a challenge due to terrain in eastern Afghanistan; the Kunar and Kamdesh valleys canalize both ground and air transportation assets; mountains and weather often inhibit aviation operations.
- COP Keating, OP Fritsche, and COP Lowell were cut off from road traffic; there were approximately 160 pax at five locations in the Kamdesh Valley; resupply was entirely air-centric since forces could not drive beyond Bari Kowt (north of FO Bostick); and ingress and egress routes were predictable since there really were only two options; one is based on weather supporting a 10k foot ceiling, the other route passes through a very high threat portion of the Kamdesh Valley.
- The aviation unit fell in on the SOP of no flights during (b)(2)High so flew resupply into Keating during (b)(2)High once 90 days of deployme ilots were more comfortable w routes and changed to flights during (b)(2)High it was a calculation of balancing accidental risk vs. tactical risk; there wa of having lost a Chinook during a day flight in Korengal; there were caveats to the guidance which allowed for emergency resupply; it was all conditions based and subject to approval by the AVN BDE CDR.
- predictable flight schedules and routes made it so for the enemy as well; guidance was to require CAS and SIGINT to fly missions; these were AVN BDE standards; intent was to protect the mission not hinder support

- the AVN BDE commander makes decision whether to land MEDEVAC in support of a high risk 9-line; while extremely uncommon, if dispute with brigade commander of unit on ground, then goes to division commander; no dispute at Keating on 3 Oct 09, as all concurred LZ was too hot for earlier MEDEVAC landing
- at the onset of the attack on COP Keating on 3 Oct, there were no MEDEVAC or other aircraft staged at or en route to Bostick; AWT and MEDEVAC aircraft were based at Jalalabad Airfield (FOB Fenty) and moved on order in support of Keating
- documents provided included storyboards from 03 OCT engagements, TOC Log, and draft narrative of events (award citation)