

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN
2. DATE: 2009/10/2
3. TIME: 1752
4. FILE NUMBER: (b)(3), (b)(6)
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3), (b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: O3/AD
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: HHT, 3RD SQN-61ST CAV REGT, 4IBCT-4ID, APO AE 09354

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
3-61 CAV (TF Destroyer) has one of the larger intelligence shops in the 4IBCT, before deployment TF Destroyer was allocated an additional junior intelligence analyst and we were able to empower our subordinate troops by providing them with an intelligence Analyst, which improves the ground-up reporting. SGT (was SP6) (b)(3), (b)(6) rough 30SEP09) was assigned to B Troop. SG (b)(3), (b)(6) turned out to be the strongest intel analyst assigned at the troop level and his daily reports were the model for reporting). Also, as part of the RIP process to ensure the task force assumed the same footprint, we assigned a (b)(2)High (SQ6) (b)(3), (b)(6) B Troop. Initially there was an (b)(2)High with an operator on OP Fritsche. It was at OP Fritche because COP Keating only facilitates two directions for intercept that provide any early warning. From OP Fritsche the system can provide accurate lines of bearing (LOBs) to the transmitter, but it doesn't provide the same reporting. To offset this, at COP Keating they were using (b)(2)High (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6)

When Taliban (TB) Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) attacked Barge Matal village the situation started to change. TF Chosin (1-32 IN) was assigned to retake and hold Barge Matal, and they provided the (b)(2)High to support that mission. After two weeks, TF Chosin asked to be relieved of the tasking and our BCT HQ tasked this SQDN to support the (b)(2)High mission until Chosin could reassume it. Unfortunately, Chosin was on a different deployment cycle from us and their (b)(2)High Team had to finish out their environmental morale leave and we continued to support their mission in Barge Matal. We rotated our male (b)(2)High collectors into the cycle of every 2-3 weeks in Barge Matal, but when SQ (b)(3), (b)(6) rotated back he filled the gap here at FOB Bostick. He was needed at here at Bostick because this FOB's (b)(2)High workload is one of the highest in the BCT. Our (b)(2)High produces more (b)(2)High reports than any other BN TF (b)(2)High team in the BCT, and the majority of that is produced here at FOB Bostick. Additionally, the reports that SQ (b)(3), (b)(6) produces at COP Keating were extremely informative, but because of the manpower there and the terrain I saw little utility in his presence while the Barge Matal mission was a priority. In retrospect, he probably should have stayed there to reduce risk, but at the time I saw the usable product out of Bostick as a higher priority than unusable product at Keating. SG (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware of the (b)(2)High sources that came to COP Keating and helped SQ (b)(3), (b)(6) maintaining rapport with them; while they continued to come in SG (b)(3), (b)(6) would facilitate (b)(2)High with them and any information they provided he would include in his daily summary. Eventually, the (b)(2)High cell at the BCT HQ learned what he was doing. (b)(2)High (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Additionally, at this time I was assessing the validity of the (b)(2)High a rare resource, at OP Fritsche. TF Destroyer received a (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS: (b)(3), (b)(6)
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT 1750 _____ DATED 2009/10/23

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Since TF Destroyer arrived in country, there had been a spike in enemy activity across the battle space. As Coalition Forces were recognizing that the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan had reached critical mass, the Taliban had as well. By early August we had noticed that the number of engagements with the enemy had tripled over last year's count. I also evaluated the attacks for intensity and assigned a quantifiable scale and determined that the attacks this year had shifted to much more intense and concerted efforts by the Taliban across the AO. Beginning in late June we received a report that Taliban in Kamdesh had announced they were going to drive coalition forces out of Nuristan by the end of October. I had also noticed a large involvement by Taliban commanders in the AO. The read on the enemy leadership at the time was that Dost Mohammed, the senior Taliban commander for Nuristan spent almost 9 months of 2008 in Pakistan recruiting and resourcing his subordinates, and left the day to day decisions to his commanders on ground. The reporting now indicates that Dost Mohammed has been in AO Destroyer or one of our neighboring Nuristani provinces since June and has not left the area yet. Additionally, all summer long while the fighting was its most intense in Kamdesh we received reporting on a routine basis that a large enemy assault was imminent of over 200 fighters, but routinely petered out with 60 or less fighters. As Barge Matal began there was a huge lull in enemy activity in Kamdesh. Because of the tribal system among Nuristanis, there is a feudal methodology to insurgency in our AO. Rather than assign a subordinate commander to a mission, Dost Mohammad will plan a large assault and task each of his subordinates to provide fighters commensurate to their proximity to the engagement area. Many of the fighters from Kamdesh went to the assault on Barge Matal and were continually decimated while engaging TF Chosin. As Barge Matal continued to be an area contended by the TB, in combination with elections, we saw an almost complete drop-off of enemy activity around COP Keating compared to the intensity of the summer. We expected that it would return for an autumn spike in October after Barge Matal was closed, Ramadan ended, and elections were over. In years past October was the final fighting season for the enemy before winter and we expected conditions to return to relatively the same as summer: COP Keating sustained routine attacks of relatively non-complex nature, but on a daily basis and drastically inflated reporting of enemy numbers before the attacks. *DM*

Additionally, at this time TF Destroyer leadership had begun engaging the Shuras of Kamdesh and testing them for their perspective on an ISAF withdrawal from Kamdesh while replacing the forces with ANSF as part of the COIN methodology. This occurred right before TF Chosin closed the ISAF presence in Barge Matal. We were relying on a rift between the Hezbe-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and Taliban of Kamdesh to facilitate future security in Nuristan. The HIG were not appreciative of the TB methods, that they were without consideration for collateral damage among the population and unilaterally against the GIRoA; whereas the HIG were also a legitimate political party that was very much population oriented and was open to using GIRoA (and reportedly ISAF, given enough plausible deniability). To that end, we had been using the acting commander of the Afghan Border Police, an ethnic Nuristani from the Bazgal/Pitigal area to communicate with the leader of HIG in Kamdesh about security contracts and the employment of Afghan Border Patrol forces to maintain security in Kamdesh while we moved ISAF and ANA into the denser population centers in the southern part of AO Destroyer. *DM*

Then, on 26 September we received a report that the Taliban had assembled another composite force to retake Barge Matal of approximately 200 people. The report stated that after they had overrun Barge Matal they would then turn south and attack COPs Keating and Lowell. At this point there were several other reports indicating a gathering of AAF. These, however were confounded by reports of HIG involvement in Shuras to defuse their plans as well as the expectation of attacks to be significantly smaller than reported. *DM*

On the evening of 28 September CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) commander of B Troop called me to discuss the increase in threat reporting for his AO. He told me about the volume of local nation discomfort with the expectation of attacks, as well as the source reporting that SC (b)(3), (b)(6)s about to write into a (b)(2)High of an imminent attack. I told him that I understood the situation as he was describing it and based on the situation at any moment he should request an Air TIC for imminent threat (b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

In Darin, the Taliban leaders planned the an attack on Barge Matal which would then be sent to Kamdesh to attack and destroy COPs Keating and Lowell with coordinated diversionary attacks against the rest of the Squadron AO. Because of the timing, these forces were in movement when TF Chosin secured exited Barge Matal. Because of this, there was a large force of fighters already dedicated to the clearing of coalition forces from Nuristan. These fighters were then given a few days to plan and prepare for an attack on COP Keating, which was indicated by the probing attacks on COP Keating and OP Fritsche for the week before as well as the uneasiness of the locals in the village of Urmol, immediately outside COP Keating. After the attack on Keating attacks began from OP Bari Alai all the way to OP Mace, spanning 30 kilometers and several ethnic regions. It was reported that these attacks were planned as diversionary attacks to be simultaneous with the attacks on Barge Matal and Kamdesh, but the change in coalition positioning cause them to execute the attacks early and the attacks in the south were strung out over several days instead of on 3 October (b)(3), (b)(6)

Throughout this time, our situational awareness was greatly improved by the availability of an OGA task force stationed in our battle space. Although they are constrained to report purely inside their agency channels, we have immediate access to the reports once they are published by their higher headquarters and receive copies of them through the M3 profiling service provided by (b)(2)High SIPRNet. They generally track the sam(b)(2)Highs our unit and have participated in operations to disrupt the enemy in our AO as mutually beneficial. Even though their chartered target set is more geared toward higher level Taliban and Al Qaeda operative, they recognize the necessity of keeping the AO clear of enemy influences and coordinate with us to provide as much relevant intelligence as possible. Even while S(b)(3), (b)(6)s in Barge Matal, both the OGA and TF Destroyer continued to receive (b)(2)High because there were sources that traveled to Kamdesh for both of our agencies and provided some reporting on enemy activities. We have also been developing a relationship with the ODA team, which has begun passing us (b)(2)High on our targets in late August. Unfortunately, their situational awareness in Kamdesh was not very good, as they did not have many sources that moved that far north, which created a seam in our relationship that limited our information sharing to items that involved Naray and Ghaziaba (b)(3), (b)(6)

END OF STATEMENT-----NOTHING FOLLOWS-----

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23 day of October, 2009 at FOB BOSTICK AFGHANISTAN APO AF 09354

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) JA
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136, UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)